



Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, 1770–1831

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HEGEL: THE LETTERS

Translated by Clark Butler
and Christiane Seiler
with commentary by Clark Butler

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For Barbara and Elizabeth

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In the March 16, 1981, issue of *Newsweek* magazine, the lead-off question in an article on the Endowment asked: "if synthetic fuels and child-nutrition programs were on the block, after all, who would go to bat for. . . the first book-length edition of Hegel's letters in English" [p. 28]. Hegel himself, the reader will see, went to bat philosophically for the sort of European type of "rational state" which is prepared to support such undertakings. Of course, without the Endowment grant the project might still have been completed, though in less timely fashion, with the support given by the *state* of Indiana to its universities.

But, without attempting to address here the serious philosophical issue raised by the above quotation, it is surely permitted to thank those who in fact have gone to bat for this particular undertaking. They include Professors Moltke Gram and H. S. Harris. Harris, who consented to serve as an NEH consultant for the project, painstakingly reviewed much of the manuscript. Appreciation is also expressed to Mr. Richard Meiner of Felix Meiner Verlag—publisher of the German edition of the letters which has primarily been used for translation—for his encouragement over several years, and for his willingness to make page proofs of supplementary letters to the German edition available prior to publication. The commentary is particularly indebted to the annotational and biographical work of Johannes Hoffmeister and Friedhelm Nicolai contained in the Felix Meiner edition. Hoffmeister has been frequently cited with regard to specific interpretations, but throughout he has been the most frequent source of dates, titles, names, and immediate historical data.

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With the array of benefactors which this volume has enjoyed, it is perhaps not perfunctory to end by noting our sole responsibility for any remaining failings in the final product.

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HEGEL: THE LETTERS

...with respect to the nature of critiques, it is to be added that they are in general instructive in their *treatment* when their *content* is less about the subjectivity of the book and its author than about the matter which he has elaborated. . .

G. W. F. Hegel

Werke XX, 35 (1819–20)

...Jacobi's letters are clear in themselves; they aim in the direction of thoughts entering into a development, elaboration and progression, so that the letters come to form a connected series, and make up a kind of book. The French have a saying: *Le style c'est l'homme même*. Hamann's writings do not so much *have* a characteristic style as they *are* through and through style. In everything which has come from Hamann's pen, personality is so obtrusive that the reader is inescapably directed to it more than to the apprehension of content.

G. W. F. Hegel

Werke XX, 202 (1828)

Why Hegel's Letters?

WE HAVE BEEN LIVING in a post-Hegelian and thus, in a sense, post-philosophical age since the middle of the last century. Comte then proclaimed the coming age of positive science to eclipse the previous metaphysical age, Kierkegaard publicly recorded the bankruptcy of reason, and Marx called for a revolutionary praxis to change the world in place of philosophies resigned merely to interpreting it. Then, on the European continent, it would seem Western culture lost its philosophical nerve—an event that has proved largely fateful for our century. American pragmatism and British analytic philosophy were twentieth-century reverberations of what had already occurred in the Continental nineteenth century. It is not accidental, however, that the decline of philosophy in the West coincided with that of the Hegelian school. For if Hegel persuaded his critics of anything, it was that he was a philosopher, i.e., that his philosophy was paradigmatic for philosophy generally. Yet the various post-Hegelianisms have failed to achieve consensus on just how to go beyond Hegel. The whole process by which in the last century Hegel was “transcended” is today being reenacted slowly, examining each step along the way. This is surely one of the most important reasons for being interested in Hegel today. It is also an important reason for making his letters available in English.

Unlike Descartes or Leibniz, Hegel never used letters as an important vehicle of philosophical exposition. What Goethe once surmised about Hegel (*Berichten* 159)—namely that he was a scholarly organizer of existing knowledge more than an original investigator or creator of new knowledge—Hegel had long since, in a letter to von Sinclair, admitted himself [167]. Hegel wrote that his life work was to make philosophy teachable, to strive to give it scientific form much as Euclid had done for geometry. It is thus only natural that he should have looked upon tomes, more than letters, as his principal vehicle. As early as 1818 one of his students, Richard Roth, surmised that he was the Aristotle of modern philosophy (*Berichten* 237).

Interestingly, the reaction which arose against Hegel's systematic philosophy on the grounds of its abstractness, aridity, and remoteness from life eventually led—in large part through the work of Wilhelm Dilthey near the turn of the century—to a rediscovery of Hegel as an individual in his existential situation and development. Among the documents which have provided the basis for reconstructing Hegel's development, his letters as a whole have so far played a relatively minor role. Yet as attention extends back from an initial preoccupation with the

young Hegel to the mature Hegel who made history, interest in his letters should grow. Despite gaps in the record, the letters are distributed throughout the years from Hegel's youth to old age and collectively give an account of a figure in the history of ideas as controversial as he is pivotal. They introduce us to the historical and biographical paradigms from which he elicited central concepts in the philosophy of spirit. His concept of the corporation, for example, becomes more concrete if we keep in mind the university faculty corporations or senates which he knew. Knowing more of his historical world, we implicitly introduce new qualifications as we return to his published works.

This introductory chapter has three aims: prefatory, biographical, and critical. The first is to describe the plan and rationale for the present edition. The second is to summarize Hegel's development from youth to old age as it appears through the letters. And the third—concerning the interpretation of Hegel in the history of philosophy—is to examine the frequently encountered thesis of an affinity between Hegel's philosophy and old age. Our more ultimate aim is thus to interrogate Hegel's biographical development in the letters with a view to the light it sheds on the systematic formulations of the so-called mature Hegel. The kind of biographical-historical Hegel scholarship pioneered by Dilthey and pursued in this edition of Hegel's letters has sometimes been thought to imply a depreciation of Hegel's systematic works, even an inability to understand them. I shall argue, on the contrary, that the letters significantly enhance understanding of Hegel's systematic position. While his systematic works are developed from a standpoint within the system, the letters provide a metasytematic perspective on the system within a larger context. The letters, however, reveal considerable tension among Hegel's correspondents, and even in Hegel's own mind, between a "panlogist" reduction of the Absolute to the system and a metasytematic distinction between the system and a more comprehensive Absolute in which even the system is embraced. The panlogist Hegel is of course the one who went down into history and called forth existentialist and other reactions—including Dilthey's own "philosophy of life." It is a thesis of this commentary, however, that panlogism functioned for Hegel as a polemical strategem which can be explained only by reference to the historical context of romanticism in which he lived, and that Hegel's more fundamental, a-polemical position affirmed that the system was the self-comprehension of the Absolute, but not that it was indiscernibly identical with the Absolute. Yet if the system is indeed an open one, emerging within the womb of historical and cosmic life even as the self-comprehension of such life, it opens most immediately onto the life and times of Hegel himself. Dilthey's turn away from the aridity of a closed panlogist system to the pathos of Hegel's life and development finally leads, as we pass on from Hegel's presystematic "theological" writings to the letters spanning his mature years, to a revised and indeed revitalized concept of the system itself.

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much as possible to let Hegel reveal himself. Prima facie, an account well-grounded in Hegel's letters would seem to be privileged. There would seem no better way to test and lay to rest various Hegel myths that have circulated over the generations. An account based on the full range of available letters comes from Hegel himself without his having had any intention thereby to write an autobiography. The letters were written for private or sometimes official consumption. That they are available to us is generally due less to the author's own self-editing than to various decisions by the numerous correspondents who received them. Assuming the letters are available in a certain critical mass, the story they tell is one intended by no correspondent in particular but resulting from the collaboration of all.

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We have sought, however, to provide as complete a collection of the letters as is available, including material collected in Friedhelm Nicolin's 1981 completion of the Hoffmeister edition (*Briefe* IV, Part 2), plus a few items which have appeared more recently in *Hegel Studien*. The German of Hegel's letters is, on occasion, astonishingly eloquent; yet Hegel scholars will appreciate that this translation often represents a difficult compromise between good English style and a certain cumbersomeness in the original of which even German readers are acutely aware. In most cases the English translations have been made from the Hoffmeister edition. Italicized terms or phrases in the English are almost always carried over from this German edition and convey emphases in Hegel's original. But the English edition also includes certain lengthy letters to persons in official capacities which were originally published in Hegel's works rather than with the edition of the letters. Even though they are chiefly reports, not personal communications, they have been included here because they meet the criteria for a letter: they are dated, addressed to a particular individual, and signed. Yet a definitive, even if incomplete, edition of Hegel's letters is still far off. Because of new finds in the decades since Karl Hegel's and even Hoffmeister's editions, the record has grown considerably in quantity and hence fidelity; moreover, further finds in the case of an author as recent as Hegel remain not only possible but virtually certain. This is why a new German edition of the correspondence is likely to be the very last assignment the

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We have sought, however, to provide as complete a collection of the letters as is available, including material collected in Friedhelm Nicolai's 1981 completion of the Hoffmeister edition (*Briefe* IV, Part 2), plus a few items which have appeared more recently in *Hegel Studien*. The German of Hegel's letters is, on occasion, astonishingly eloquent; yet Hegel scholars will appreciate that this translation often represents a difficult compromise between good English style and a certain clumsiness in the original of which even German readers are acutely aware. In most cases the English translations have been made from the Hoffmeister edition. Italicized terms or phrases in the English are almost always carried over from this German edition and convey emphases in Hegel's original. But the English edition also includes certain lengthy letters to persons in official capacities which were originally published in Hegel's works rather than with the edition of the letters. Even though they are chiefly reports, not personal communications, they have been included here because they meet the criteria for a letter: they are dated, addressed to a particular individual, and signed. Yet a definitive, even if incomplete, edition of Hegel's letters is still far off. Because of new finds in the decades since Karl Hegel's and even Hoffmeister's editions, the record has grown considerably in quantity and hence fidelity; moreover, further finds in the case of an author as recent as Hegel remain not only possible but virtually certain. This is why a new German edition of the correspondence is likely to be the very last assignment the

West German Hegel-Archiv will undertake in the course of its long-term current project of providing a text-critical edition of Hegel's works.

Unlike the Hoffmeister edition, this is an edition of Hegel's letters, not of his correspondence. No systematic attempt has been made to include letters to Hegel, although substantial excerpts and summaries from letters to Hegel have been added to the strict commentary to illuminate his letters. This edition is further distinguished from Hoffmeister's edition in that the aim has been a volume capable of a continuous reading. The letters are arranged topically into chapters rather than in purely chronological fashion as in Hoffmeister. The German edition is ultimately a source book, and is most valuable for scholars who have some prior idea of what they are looking for. Since letters that can be understood only in relation to one another are sometimes separated by hundreds of pages or even volumes, a continuous reading is in principle excluded. The aim of the present edition is to interweave letters, annotation, summary, excerpts, and interpretive commentary so as to approximate a life in letters. In this way it is hoped that this edition will be of interest even to scholars familiar with the German edition.

The commentary, however, has strict limits. It does not provide anything resembling a complete or even balanced biography of Hegel or a record of his intellectual development. Nor is its principal aim to give an account of the evolution of German idealism, of the origin and early development of the Hegelian school, or of the cultural or political history of the times. The purpose has rather been to draw on all such fields of inquiry insofar as is necessary to help illuminate the letters and provide a thread of continuity.

Admittedly, not all letters are equally susceptible to commentary. At one extreme are letters that need no commentary, and at the other, those that defy commentary. Nothing at all has been found to say in illumination of the following undated letter to an unknown recipient.

Hegel to Unknown [698]

[Undated]

Good Morning! Last evening I wanted to give you the enclosed to read. I send it to you to show you, should you be curious, what kind of people I have to deal with and what trend of affairs prevails here. Please return it this forenoon, or, should you be at home at 11:30 a.m., I will drop by for a moment. Yours, Hegel

READERS WHO WISH further detail than is given in the present commentary will frequently benefit from the extensive annotation in the Hoffmeister edition. The commentary in this present edition does not aim to be primarily annotative. In conjunction with occasional bracketed notations in the texts it contains a necessary minimum of bibliographical and historical annotation, although its aim is also interpretive and evaluative. Since any Hegel interpretation is bound to be controversial despite the most earnest attempts to be convincing, some justification of assigning a role to interpretation in an edition of a classical author seems called for. The justification here is that letters, unlike the sections of a book, form detached fragments, and that interpretation must fill the gaps if the letters are to convey an

overall view. The safest procedure is to alert the reader to the interpretive perspective at the very beginning.

The Hegel interpretation which, in this edition, is both brought to the letters from the published works and supported by the letters may—as already suggested above—be characterized as nonpanlogist, nonessentialist, or non-Schellingian. On the other hand, neither is it the theistic/Neoplatonic interpretation favored by J. N. Findlay (Findlay, *Re-examination*, Ch 3, sect 1), Quentin Lauer (Lauer, *Dialectics*, 69-74), or Michael Rosen (*Hegel's Dialectic*): it does not see reason, philosophical comprehension, as an approximation to the divine mind or eternal mystical vision. The best way to characterize the present view positively is to say that it places Hegel in the hermeneutic tradition dating from Herder. According to the hermeneutic Hegel interpretation, philosophical reason is the interpretive reenactment of the objective progress of reason in world history, which in turn is the actualization of cosmic self-consciousness. Philosophy is not by itself the Infinite, as panlogism—a form of subjective idealism—would have it. Nor is it an approximation to the Infinite as Neoplatonism would suggest. Rather, it perfects the development of the Infinite, giving it conceptual self-understanding. The self sees itself in Nature, whereby Nature sees itself in and through the self. But this objective idealist belief in the objective inwardness or selfhood of nature cannot be pragmatically justified within the subjective idealist limits to which the young Hegel restricted himself. Nor can this inwardness of nature be grounded by reverting to metaphysics in the dogmatic pre-Kantian manner. The self exists in community with a transcendent object or not-self which is at once another self. This other self and this community are grounded neither theoretically nor practically; they are neither an epistemological certainty nor a projection or postulate of the original self. Such community, which rests on neither will nor certain knowledge but on love, is the ultimate from which thought abstracts and to which it returns.

The chronological index of letters at the end of this edition identifies each letter by its number in the Hoffmeister edition and indicates the page in the English edition where it may be found. Hoffmeister's numbering is also used to refer to letters throughout the text; bracketed numbers without an identifying author or title code are such Hoffmeister letter numbers. The name index and the general index of ideas and historical movements—the latter new to the English edition—permit the reader to document the evolution of Hegel's more or less unguarded views on a wide range of topics. It is true that Hegel, perhaps sensing that his correspondents' inclination to save his letters kept pace with his increasing fame, became more guarded in his personal communications as time went on (Cherbuliez, 20). Some readers will delight in finding an inconsistency with his systematic teaching here or personal foible there. However, hardly anyone can remain completely a hero to uninvited readers of his private letters.

Within the overall topical organization of the volume, the chapters follow in a largely chronological pattern. The exceptions are certain chapters devoted to individuals: Christiane Hegel, Ludwig Fischer, Karl Hieronymus Windischmann, Franz von Baader, Goethe. Chapters 2 through 4 trace important phases of Hegel's early development. Chapters 5 through 14 largely record the progress of his career.

Chapters 11, 15, and 16 provide sidelights on his family life. And the last chapters—20 through 25—treat the mature Hegel's interchanges with contemporary philosophers, such as von Baader, Windischmann, Victor Cousin; with men of letters, including Goethe; and with European cultures, notably those of Austria, Italy, Belgium, Holland, Russia, France. The volume thus begins with Hegel's private striving and then proceeds to document the public expression of this inner force, first in a career at the national level and secondly in the enjoyment of national and international recognition. Three chapters on family matters remind us that such a force of spirit remained subject to natural contingencies in its drive for self-expression. The final chapter shows Hegel's affinity with the truly commanding figure of the *Goethezeit*, Goethe himself. As we take leave of these letters, we will not err by including this affinity in our more lasting image of him.

HEGEL'S LIFE IN LETTERS: AN OVERVIEW

The most extensive body of correspondence from the years before the move to Jena in 1801 consists in the exchanges with Schelling. The correspondence was initiated by Hegel, who, in his position as a private tutor in Bern, felt isolated from the fast-breaking philosophical history being made in Germany [6]. A letter from the end of January 1795 shows Hegel's admiration for the scholarly attainments of the precocious Schelling, five years Hegel's junior [8]. Hegel feels a bond with his former Tübingen roommate through their common attachment to the Enlightenment. Despite their alienation from the orthodoxy of the Tübingen seminary, it is a specifically German, Christianized version of the Enlightenment: "Reason and Freedom remain our password and the Invisible Church our rallying point" [8].

Hegel's excuse for his relative ignorance of the latest developments in speculative philosophy, a domain in which he will one day outshine Schelling, is not merely his geographical isolation in Bern. For he professes a greater concern with questions of "applicability." His interests are more practical, and theory is valued for its revolutionary potential. "May the Kingdom of God come, and our hands not be idle!" [8]. Still, his criticism of Robespierre in a letter of Christmas Eve 1794 shows that he is no Jacobin [6].

Hegel notes that Kant has been placed in the service of orthodoxy by Tübingen theologians like Gottlob Christian Storr, who sought to show that Kantian limitations on knowledge opened the door to postulates of the practical life of faith buttressed by the authority of historically documented miracles. Yet Hegel is confident that the theologians who used Kant are unwittingly playing with fire [8]. Nevertheless, the Hegel of 1795 does not exaggerate the power of ideas. There is a sobering dose of historical materialism in his admonition to Schelling that "orthodoxy is not to be shaken as long as the profession of it is bound up with worldly advantage" [8].

The January 1795 letter from Hegel closes with a question about the skepticism Schelling seemed to voice concerning God's status as an "individual, personal being." The query is significant because it reveals that Hegel, despite his reservations about Lutheran orthodoxy, still views God as personal. Schelling's reply [10]

contains a succinct resume of his 1795 essay "On the Self as the Principle of Philosophy or the Unconditioned in Human Knowledge." Schelling professes to follow Lessing's Spinozistic denial of a personal God. God is absolute or "unconditioned." Since to be a person is to be conscious, and since to be conscious is to be relative to and thus conditioned by some object of consciousness, God cannot be a person. God is rather an "absolute," "infinite," and "free" self. But, in the guise of theoretical reason, the unlimited self accepts the contradiction of being limited and determined by an object of contemplation (the not-self) in order, by struggling against this self-contradictory limit, to determine the not-self in the guise of practical reason. Since theoretical reason knows only objects, the Absolute is unknowable to it. Practical reason eternally strives to overcome limitation by an object, and thus to extinguish its consciousness and personhood. Driven by the idea of the Absolute, in which it seeks total release, practical reason has failed: since the total release of the person or finite self in the infinite is barred in the Kantian system that Schelling is explaining, the finite self is condemned to immortality, i.e., to endless progress toward the Absolute.

Schelling explains himself to Hegel in a Fichtean vocabulary and conceptual framework, which Hölderlin had touched upon in a letter to Hegel mailed just a week before [9] and which eventually will prove decisive in Hegel's evolution from a critic of society and theology to a philosopher. This is not to say that he will totally embrace Schelling's vision of 1795. The 1807 *Phenomenology of Spirit* will repeat Schelling's Fichtean progression from theory, i.e., "observation," to practice or "active reason," but it will ultimately transcend practical as well as theoretical reason. The endless striving of practical reason for the Absolute is a prime example of what Hegel generally stigmatizes as the transcendent "bad infinite." The true or good infinite is not so unreachable. Hegel will be led to a new concept of philosophy as a personal consciousness enjoying total oneness with its object. The object of consciousness will be conceived as an other which is none other than the conscious subject, i.e., as an object which truly actualizes rather than limits consciousness. The Spinozism of conceiving the Absolute merely as substance and not as subject (or consciousness) will thus be repudiated.

But in 1795 Hegel is not ready to become a systematic philosopher. That transformation will be signaled five years later when Hegel, about to embark upon an academic career in Jena, writes to Schelling that he had been preoccupied with the "subordinate" interests of mankind but is now led to express the "ideal" of his youth in systematic reflective form [29]. The ideal to which he refers was the Hellenic ideal of the public-spirited ancient polis. For a brief time Hegel, like others, had been captive to the illusion that the French Revolution was the restoration of classical Athens in his midst, but by the December 1800 letter to Schelling he was convinced that the ideal of reconciliation with an apparently alien world could not be achieved by recapturing a lost past, but only by philosophical comprehension, by liberating acceptance of the irreversible dialectic of historical advance.

Hölderlin's letter of January 26, 1795 [9], we noted, also communicates the Fichtean vocabulary and concepts contained in Schelling's letter of February 4.

Hölderlin attended Fichte's lectures in Jena, but his initially enthusiastic response shortly gave way to a more critical perspective. Indeed, it was Hölderlin who, through introduction of the concept of love, pointed out to Hegel the way beyond the Fichtean dilemma of having to choose between theoretical and practical reason, i.e., between domination of the self by the not-self or object and domination of the not-self by the self. Domination, whether theoretical or practical, is incapable of achieving the authentic reconciliation of subject and object possible only through love. Dieter Henrich has persuasively argued that this thought, planted in Hegel by Hölderlin, is the germ of Hegel's own mature standpoint (Henrich, 9-40). Ineffable "love" will in Hegel's vocabulary shortly become "life," and will end up as the conceptually intelligible infinite "Spirit" which is the true definition of the Absolute in the final Hegelian system.

That a decisive step has been taken beyond Schelling's Fichteanism of January 1795 is apparent from the January 1796 poem which Hegel addressed to Hölderlin [18], and which repudiates Fichtean "weary care" which "never rests." The poem is still Hellenizing, but it is also mystically pantheistic in inspiration. And yet, if we recall Hegel's commitment to the Kantian doctrine of postulates of practical reason, voiced more than once in letters to Schelling [11, 14], we will not be too quick to interpret the poem as a reversion to precritical dogmatic metaphysics. The pantheistic infinite, in which the finite self is lovingly embraced, is itself a postulate of practical reason, i.e., a condition of the possibility of the satisfaction of practical reason's striving.

The correspondence shows that Hegel moved from Bern to Frankfurt in 1796 in part to be closer to Hölderlin. Once in Frankfurt, a growing center of German commerce, Hegel wrote a number of letters to Nanette Endel, a friend of his sister's, which show a strong Rousseauian feeling for nature viewed as a refuge from urban bustle [22, 23, 24, 25, 27]. The girl was Catholic, and Hegel's flirtation with her also suggests a flirtation with Catholicism. In *Faith and Knowledge* (1802) Hegel would identify Fichtean moral striving with the Protestant spirit, considering both essentially closed to the post-Old Testament Christian spirit of love and reconciliation with nature. He embraced Schellings's anti-Fichtean philosophy of nature precisely because it overcame the Fichtean-Protestant desacralization of nature. The Protestant spirit desecrated nature by seeking only mastery over it. A letter from a certain Möller [50], dated November 14, 1804, suggests that Hegel went so far as to discuss the possibility of his own conversion to Catholicism, though by 1809 [147], writing as a Protestant working in the school system of Catholic Bavaria, he would mock Austrophile Friedrich Schlegel's conversion. Earlier in the decade he had looked to Catholic Austria in search of a Prince who would recreate the German state, which, after the peace of Rastatt, was no more; but when only Napoleon came forth, Hegel reverted to his earlier enthusiasm for the anti-Catholic French Revolution and sought to make common cause with Napoleonic Germany as a Protestant.

Hegel's admiration for Napoleon appears nowhere more clearly than in his letters, and is repeated on numerous occasions from 1806 through 1816 and even beyond. Napoleon is a world-soul on horseback [74], the great professor of law in

Paris [103, 117], a tragic genius who allows himself to be destroyed at the hands of the multitude [233]. The Germans, slowly learning from the French, have declined to imitate France in the popular elections and political participation which Hegel in 1808, contrary to views expressed in the *Philosophy of Law*, calls the best fruit of the French Revolution. Yet someday, Hegel opines, the Germans may surpass their teachers [85]. After the fall of Napoleon, Hegel claimed to have predicted in the *Phenomenology* the migration of the world spirit from France, the land of "absolute freedom and terror," to Germany, seat of "the moral view of the world" [233]. Still, his enthusiasm for Napoleon and the French Revolution never disappeared. The strength of France, he wrote in a clear repudiation of what is now called totalitarianism, derived from the fact that it trusted the free initiative of its population and refused to smother life in bureaucratic regimentation [85, 108]. And the Restoration, he wrote, would change little; instead of reversing the Revolution it would consolidate it, and for this reason one could consent to join in and give it an assist [271].

The move from Frankfurt to Jena at the start of 1801 brought Hegel to the established center of German cultural life. Goethe (with whom Hegel would later correspond at length in support of the Goethean anti-Newtonian theory of colors), Schiller, Fichte, Schelling, Friedrich Schlegel, Schleiermacher, Wieland, and Herder were all briefly together in Weimar. Hegel made his philosophical debut at the University of Jena as a follower of Schelling. He collaborated with Schelling on the *Critical Journal of Philosophy*, devoted, he said in a letter from 1801, to deflating pseudophilosophical inanities [32]. Within a short time after Hegel's arrival in Jena, however, the locale lost its position as the capital of German letters, and Hegel's correspondence of 1804-05 makes it plain that he felt increasingly isolated, left behind by new migrations of the world spirit. The University of Jena was losing its most illustrious professors. Schelling had gone to Würzburg in 1803. To have arrived finally at the center of things and then feel the center walking away from him was obviously difficult for Hegel to accept. His early correspondence with Schelling shows how intense was his sense of historical movement and how keen was his desire to be up with the times.

When war disrupted the University of Jena in 1806, Hegel was obliged to seek employment elsewhere, as a newspaper editor in Bamberg. In his letters he notes his interest in current events [89] but says he would have preferred the opportunity to create a journal of literary criticism [90, 95]. The idea of a literary review was one which he mentioned periodically throughout his correspondence, and would result in the founding of the *Yearbooks for Scientific Criticism* by his friends and followers in 1826. Yet the newspaper editorship in Bamberg had the advantage of leaving him time for his personal research [98]. He sought to model the *Bamberger Zeitung* on French newspapers [89]. However, he found the work somewhat menial [129] and difficulties with censors trying [127]. He was more than happy to be relieved of the position in 1808 when the rectorship of a gymnasium opened up in Nuremberg.

Friedrich Immanuel Niethammer, who appointed Hegel Rector and Professor of Philosophical Preparatory Sciences, was responsible for the reorganization of

Bavarian schools, but as a Protestant he ran into local Catholic opposition. Hegel meant to develop a classical humanistic curriculum [144] free of ecclesiastical tutelage. He joined in the protest voiced by his faculty against a rule requiring their attendance at religious instruction classes [156] which he saw as symbolic of the old feudal order that Napoleon's victory in Jena—an event which he said came along no more than once a century [104]—was sweeping away. The cause of quality secular education he perceived as essentially Protestant rather than Catholic [109, 272]. Whereas in Catholicism the Church is the hierarchy of the priesthood, in Protestantism the universities and schools are the churches; everything depends on the general level of education in the entire community. Secular education is itself sacred, and must not fall under the authority of Protestant clerics aspiring to emulate their Catholic counterparts. In Bamberg he had declined an opportunity to teach theology, because he insisted that his theology would be enlightened and because he would dread local church supervision [108]. Yet later, in Berlin, he would be concerned to establish, against charges of "pantheism," the consistency of his philosophy with Lutheran orthodoxy [422, 617, 659], and would show particular anxiety that he not be branded an "atheist" [389, 390].

Hegel's years in Nuremberg gave him occasion to reflect on the teaching of philosophy in secondary education. His general conclusion was that philosophy as he understood it was best left to the university [211]. He took his title as Professor of Philosophical Preparatory Sciences quite literally, and "preparation for philosophy" meant chiefly the ancient classics, ethics, syllogistic logic, and Christian theology (whose content he considered essentially speculative). The study of foreign languages gave access to foreign and ancient cultures and was not to be allowed to degenerate into philological word-learning and textual criticism, except—for those who have an interest in that sort of thing—at the university. As for formal logic, the chance must be grabbed in secondary education to teach it while students will still submit to it, since as an elective at the university it is likely to be avoided. Most surprisingly, Hegel urges that experimental science be taught almost exclusively in secondary schools, since at the university level natural science is essentially mathematical [144].

The years spent at Nuremberg were devoted to writing the *Logic*. This, following the *Phenomenology*, was the next task in the exposition of his system. Concurrently, Niethammer asked Hegel to write a logic for secondary schools, but Hegel begged off saying it is easier to be unintelligible in a sublime way than intelligible in a down-to-earth way [101]. He admitted that the ultimate test of clarity was teachability at the elementary level, but feared that his logic would be as difficult for the poor teachers as for their pupils. He seems even to have been incapable of making his logic fully intelligible to a mathematician on his own Nuremberg faculty. Unfortunately the letter he wrote to Professor Pfaff trying to explain his logic is lost, but from Pfaff's responses it can at least be inferred that Hegel earnestly wanted to make himself understandable to a mathematician, and even employed formalizations for the purpose [202-04]. The difficulty was that Hegel promised proofs while Pfaff could find only definitions. Judging from other correspondence and reports of contemporaries, one of the puzzling aspects of Hegel's

scientific method was that he did not follow the Aristotelian rule of beginning only with the absolutely true premises: the development of the system was rather the refutation of the beginning [218; see also comments by Goethe in *Berichten* 159].

In 1811 Nuremberg saw Hegel's marriage to Marie von Tucher, of a local patrician family. The letters Hegel wrote her show the same pedantry of which Nanette Endel had accused him years before and of which he himself was aware. He bids Marie teach him happiness, but cautions that in all deeper souls happiness is tinged with melancholy [186]. He also appears by today's standards insufferably condescending, and remained so to the end. In 1824, in one of the travelogues he wrote home, he cautioned Marie against expressing political opinions in her letters and then suggested that she in any case was not inclined to have any [476]. When he declares that love, to be complete, must be perfected by religion and duty [186], one suspects that he is still suffering from the bad conscience he expressed in 1808 [125] regarding Christiana Burkhardt, the mother of Ludwig Fischer, his illegitimate son born the year before. Hegel had feared the woman would make trouble for him, and was evidently relieved when Marie accepted Ludwig into the family home in Heidelberg [317]. To Niethammer he wrote that with his marriage the second of two overriding conditions for happiness had been attained, the first being a secure job [197]. Everything else was secondary. Hegel also wrote that his marriage had the beneficial effect on his teaching of making him want to be more accessible [196].

But, however content he now was with the mere fact of a stable position, he was still a university professor in exile. All during the years in Nuremberg he sought a university appointment. Finally, after peace returned in the post-Napoleonic era, opportunities opened up in Heidelberg, Berlin, and Erlangen. Supported by admirers such as Karl Daub, Hegel opted for Heidelberg in 1816 before the offer from Berlin arrived. While angling for an offer from Berlin he had written a long letter to a professor there, Friedrich von Raumer, on the teaching of philosophy in the university [278]. Philosophy, as he had said on a number of occasions, must be teachable. What he most opposed was the excessive subjectivism of the age, which made everyone wish, by "thinking for himself," to have his own philosophy.

After Hegel's move to Heidelberg, however, the old ambition to be at the center of things still burned in him. His delight in finally arriving in Berlin in 1818 is thus understandable. "You know," he wrote to his friend Niethammer in 1821, "I have come here to be in a center of things instead of a province" [390]. Hegel, the son of a functionary, had never been fulfilled in private life; ". . . as seductive as independent isolation is," he wrote from Bamberg in 1807, "everybody must maintain a connection with the state and work on its behalf; the satisfaction one thinks one will find in private life is after all deceptive and insufficient" [98]. But if one is going to work in a state, it is best to do so in the capital [122]. Curiously, however, when he arrived in Berlin he wrote a book, the *Philosophy of Law*, in which he announced in the Preface that philosophy always comes too late to change anything. Although he might have wished to exercise a liberalizing influence on Prussian politics, i.e., to bring with him some "live coals" into the heart of the Holy Alliance, he went to Berlin in part to win the security and

tranquility that comes from staying close to the center of power: "... being at the center of things. . . has the advantage of affording more accurate knowledge of what is happening so that one can be more assured of one's interest and situation" [390]. Hegel was only half joking when he wrote Karl Ludwig von Knebel from Bamberg in 1807 that "by experience I have persuaded myself as to the truth of a biblical saying which I have made my guiding light: strive first for food and clothing, and the Kingdom of God will fall to you all by itself" [104].

Examination of a letter from 1805 to Heinrich Voss provides a baseline for measuring Hegel's evolving attitude toward both philosophy and his employment as a teacher of the subject from Jena to Berlin. This letter, the most revealing from the period in Jena before the *Phenomenology*, exists in three drafts retained by Hegel; it implores Voss, the well-known translator of Homer, to intervene on Hegel's behalf in filling a vacancy at the University of Heidelberg [55]. The letter is famous for its expression of the wish to teach philosophy to speak German; but it is also notable for its insistence on the "abstract" character of philosophy, which makes the special sciences as necessary to philosophy for the sake of its concrete development as philosophy is necessary to them if they are to attain conceptual depth. Since this formula defining the relation of philosophy and the special sciences is repeated in the 1816 letter to von Raumer [278], we have reason to take it seriously as Hegel's considered and definitive view. As a consequence we cannot assume that philosophy for Hegel is free to dictate to the special sciences. Philosophy must learn from the empirical sciences as much as they from it. This will be the basis on which Hegel will not only construct but revise his *Encyclopaedia of Philosophical Sciences*.

It is also notable that Hegel by summer 1805 is already concerned to defend himself against the charge of formalism, the habit of applying schemata mechanically and externally to concrete subject matter. This same repudiation of formalism will appear in the Preface of the *Phenomenology*. In a letter to Schelling, Hegel will anticipate and seek, sincerely but unsuccessfully, to ward off Schelling's suspicion that Hegel's condemnation of formalism is a critique of Schelling himself [97]. Schelling's terse reply will be the last letter known to have passed between the two friends [107].

Certainly the most harrowing story related in the letters is that of the publication of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* against the backdrop of the Battle of Jena in October 1806. The printing had begun in February 1806 [67]. Most of the remainder of the manuscript was mailed from Jena to the printer in Bamberg by Friday, October 10, just two days before the famous battle [74]. The material was mailed under such uncertain circumstances, we learn, to meet a deadline imposed by the publisher, Göbhardt, assuring an urgently needed payment of royalties [71]. Hegel confessed to his friend Niethammer that, were the manuscript to be lost, it would be difficult to rewrite [73]. The last sheets, which were written the night before the battle [95], were sent off on October 20 [76]. When the battle subsided, Hegel, who had sought refuge with friends, returned to his apartment to find it broken into and his papers and notes in disarray [76]. It was not until the end of his life that he began the task of revising the *Phenomenology* for a new edition, but his letters

show dissatisfaction with the book even before the first edition came out. In letters to Niethammer and Schelling he laments the over-elaboration of detail as well as the hurried state of the last section [84, 95]. But the cross-references between different sections were so complex that it would be difficult, he wrote, to express the structure of the whole clearly.

Ironically, however, Hegel wanted to give philosophy "public currency." The 1805 letter to Voss attacks willful obscurantism and unabashedly calls upon philosophy to enter the general culture of the times. This call is in the tradition of the Enlightenment and is connected with the demand that philosophy cease to speak foreign tongues. In the *Differenzschrift* (1801) Hegel boldly announced that philosophy was the requirement of the age (*Werke* I, 44-49); the social divisions which prevented immediate political actualization of the ideal of his youth could be rendered philosophically intelligible only through their historical necessity. It is true that shortly after the disruption of life in Jena by war Hegel confessed in a letter that "philosophy indeed has something solitary about it; it does not, to be sure, belong in the alleys and marketplaces, but neither is it held aloof from the activity of men, from that in which they place their interest as also from the [sort of] knowing to which they attach their vanity" [85]. Yet, as we contemplate history, "science [i.e., philosophy] alone is the [true] theodicy and she will just as much keep from marveling speechless at events like brutes—or, with a greater show of cleverness, from attributing them to the accidents of the moment or talents of an individual, thus making the fate of empires hang on the occupation or nonoccupation of a hill—as from complaining of the victory of injustice or defeat of right" (Ibid). When the world, suffering the evil of division, asks how God can allow it, the world is itself on the verge of a conversion to philosophy, however solitary or reflective. And in October 1808, Hegel writes to Niethammer in an unusual state of exuberance: "I am daily ever more convinced that theoretical work accomplishes more in the world than practical work: once the realm of representation [*Vorstellung*] is revolutionized, the actual [world] will not hold out" [135]. So even the "mature" Hegel of the period after the *Phenomenology* did not acquiesce without internal conflict in the view that philosophy, like the Owl of Minerva, which takes its flight only at dusk, always comes too late to decide who will carry the day.

But, as his repeated wish to clear the field of pseudophilosophical inanity—e.g., Jakob Fries [196]—shows, his identification with "philosophy" was personal and total, so much so that "philosophy" sometimes seems to have become for him a euphemism for "I." Charges of presumptuousness, it must be confessed, are not without some *prima facie* plausibility. They were conveyed explicitly to Hegel as early as 1819, when H. F. W. Hinrichs, probably the first Hegelian to teach the Hegelian system, solicited a response from Hegel to concerns of his students [356]. From Hegel's reply, which has been preserved in brief fragment [357], it appears he did not view his philosophy as "his" in some exclusive proprietary sense. His philosophy is rather a mature fruition of the perennial philosophy. And if some persist in accusing Hegel of egotistically arrogating all wisdom to himself, they are only projecting onto him the Romantic, sick subjectivity of our modern age, in

which each individual insists on having his own private philosophy. But it is not clear that Hegel succeeded in completely ridding himself of the standpoint of the individual person. When he had been passed over in the competition for a faculty vacancy by someone he considered less competent he would say that "philosophy" had gone out empty-handed [218]. When he said in the nonscientific Preface of the *Philosophy of Law* that philosophy arrives too late, one suspects he may have meant, perhaps even unconsciously, that he personally had arrived at the center of things only when the spirit of his revolutionary age—and he with it—had grown old. Is it possible that, instead of surrendering his limited personal identity to the universal claims of philosophy, he at that point invoked the name of philosophy to speak autobiographically of his own changed personal situation?

In Nuremberg, under the leadership of his friend Niethammer, there was still a world to build. In Berlin of the 1820s "liberals" such as von Altenstein and von Hardenberg had already accomplished most of what they were going to accomplish. The task for the liberals would rather be to preserve their work from erosion, to hang on to their positions. "You know that, on the one hand, I am an anxious man," Hegel wrote to Niethammer in 1821 after recounting political developments which caused him some anxiety, "and, on the other hand, that I like tranquility. It is not exactly a comfort to see a storm brewing every year, even if I can be persuaded that at most only a few drops will touch me" [390]. Indeed, he had been in Berlin hardly more than a year when he wrote to Creuzer, a colleague from Heidelberg, that "I am about to be fifty years old, and I have spent thirty of these fifty years in these ever-unrestful times of hope and fear. I had hoped that for once we might be done with it. Now I must confess that things with us remain as ever; indeed, in one's darker hours it even seems that they are getting ever worse" [359].

It was perhaps understandable that in 1807, shortly after war had disrupted university life in Jena, he would say that philosophy is "solitary" [85]. Shortly before going to the University of Heidelberg in 1816, Hegel explained his motivation in terms of the solitude of philosophy: "in no other science is one so solitary as in philosophy, and I sincerely long for a more animated sphere of activity" [286]. Writing to his Dutch friend van Ghert after a year in Heidelberg, Hegel could announce with some satisfaction that "given the meager nourishment and encouragement to which the study of philosophy has long been restricted, it was a pleasure to note the interest youth immediately shows in a better philosophy once offered" [323]. His success and acclaim grew in Berlin, though not without controversy. Yet despite the acclaim and his effort to make philosophy universally accessible, the feeling of solitude returned, so much so that in the context of the July Revolution of 1830 Hegel wrote to Göschel, his defender and popularizer, that philosophy, which he had early announced as the requirement of the age, was for the "isolated few" [659]. As he had explained to Duboc a few years before, religion, and not philosophy, is the form in which most people receive the truth [422]. Philosophy was to be pursued, he now wrote in 1830, principally for the individual's private satisfaction [659].

This was his last position. It was in appearance a far cry from 1795, when he wrote to Schelling in the midst of the original French Revolution that "from the

Kantian system and its highest completion I expect a revolution in Germany" [11]. "The philosophers are proving the dignity of man. The peoples will learn to feel it. They will not only demand their rights which have been trampled in the dust but will themselves take them back" [11]. Yet even then he did not expect revolution from the development of "esoteric philosophy" as much as from the "application" of philosophy to every domain. In Jena he himself became a devotee of "esoteric philosophy," but was, as we have seen, bold enough to believe it could be made itself popular or exoteric. And this even though his reputation for obscurity in Jena was so great that, when in 1816 Berlin University considered him for the philosophy chair vacated by the death of Fichte, Hegel was frankly asked to reply to the doubts raised regarding the clarity of his teaching [284]. He replied that, after his "timid" beginnings in Jena, eight years of secondary instruction in Nuremberg had been more advantageous than even university teaching could have been in attaining "fluency" [292].

However, his last-stated position—expressed to Göschel toward the end of his life and repeated in his concluding lectures on the philosophy of religion (*Werke* XVI, 355-56)—was that the "esoteric philosophy" to which Schelling had converted him three decades before could never be anything but esoteric, even if or perhaps precisely because it was the "foundation" of all else [135, 152]. But where the Hegel of 1795 was drawn away from esoteric philosophy because only "applications" had true revolutionary potential, the mature Hegel seems to have taken refuge in esoteric philosophy from the winds of revolution. Von Altenstein, the minister most instrumental in bringing Hegel to Berlin, congratulated the philosopher for teaching restless youth in the *Philosophy of Law* that what is actual is rational and rational actual [251]. Hegel admired Prussia in a later letter because it was free of that "fetish" of liberties which spoiled French politics [677]. It was seemingly reassuring to Hegel that the Prussian populace was ready to descend to the level of animals and replace the very horses which pulled the King's carriage, though he also notes the King would not permit them to stoop so low [677]. Hegel himself sent a copy of the *Philosophy of Law* to von Hardenberg with a letter noting that his work sought "to demonstrate" philosophy's agreement with principles required by the essence of the state, and more directly with "the principle which the Prussian state. . . has the good fortune of having upheld and of still upholding" [376]. "My treatise is thus intended as an attempt to grasp in its principal characteristics what lies before us. . . . I do not think I presume too much in my belief that, by maintaining the posture required by its specific task, philosophy warrants the protection and favor allotted to it by the state" [Ibid].

It is easy to dismiss the *Philosophy of Law* as an ideological deformation of philosophy. One of Hegel's own friends, von Thaden, did not hesitate to do so in a long letter to Hegel [394]. However, the truth is more complex, and indeed in a way which ultimately prevents Hegel from being legitimately claimed by either the Right or the Left. If we examine Hegel's conservative-sounding statement to von Hardenberg we find, beyond a concern for his own security, that the praise heaped on Prussia is implicitly contingent on its upholding rational principles. The Prussian state, in taking philosophy—i.e., Hegel—under its protection, may have

unwittingly ingested some "live coals," just as Hegel in 1795 wrote to Schelling that Tübingen orthodoxy, by appropriating Kant, had unknowingly taken in such coals and contributed to the "general diffusion of philosophical ideas" [8]. In 1830 and 1831 Hegel had only to think of Gans or Michelet, both followers of his, to see that the effect of his own teaching in Berlin was confirming the "live coal" theory of 1795. As his letters show, Hegel in the 1820s was himself active behind the scenes on behalf of liberal "demagogues" prosecuted by the Prussian police [e.g., 495]. By the July Revolution he understood intellectually that the Great Revolution of 1789 had been merely the first wave in a new age of successive revolutionary waves, and that his own philosophical activity had acquired in men such as Gans a life of its own to which his own person was dispensable. He apparently no longer had the heart or strength, however, to join in the adventure.

THE DIALECTIC OF YOUTH, MANHOOD, AND OLD AGE

Hegel's development, as just sketched from his own letters, provides a faithful replication of the stages of individual life—youth, manhood, old age—as he himself defines them in Paragraph 396 of the *Encyclopaedia*. Youth, corresponding to what Erik Erikson calls "adolescence" (Erikson, Ch 7), opposes a subjective ideal to the way of the world. "Manhood," corresponding to Erikson's "adulthood," recognizes that what was true in the ideal of youth is already concretely actualized in the world, and that what was false in that ideal was its emptiness or abstraction. Ethically, youth tends to a self-righteous moralism while adulthood reaches the pragmatic realization that there are no infallible private moral intuitions, that any conflicts of duty rooted in the contradictions of historical ethical life are inevitable, and that guilt is bearable insofar as it is accordingly also inevitable. From the perspective of youth the transition to manhood may appear to be a "painful lapse into philistinism," and youth's resistance to this transition, to the compromises it implies, and to the preoccupation with detail it imposes typically leads to "hypochondria" (*Werke* X, 105). Overcoming this malaise, manhood develops its talents by joining in with the world, becoming part of the "system" or establishment. The man assumes the burden of the world and advances its work, serving as vehicle by which the world works through its contradictions. He succeeds in discovering "honorable, far-reaching, and creative" activity in the world, which renews itself from generation to generation.

Where youth retreats into obscurity, the adult communicates by embracing public institutions. Hegel goes on in the *Encyclopaedia*, however, to distinguish old age from both manhood and youth. The more the man occupies himself with his work, the more he is at home in it, the less frequently does he come up against an essentially new situation for which he is not prepared by established habits and general rules, the less does he find need to struggle and master any challenge in his situation. With the loss of struggle there is a loss of interest in the situation. Thus does manhood pass into old age:

An elderly person lives without determinate interest, for he has given up hope of actualizing ideals formerly cherished, and the future seems to hold no promise at

all of anything new for him. On the contrary, he regards himself as already acquainted with the universal, essential principle of anything he might still encounter. The mind of the elderly person is therefore solely directed toward this universal, and to the past from which he derives his knowledge of it. . . he [thus] loses his remembrance of present singularities. He forgets names, for example. On the other hand, his mind is correspondingly tenacious of the wise precepts of experience, and he takes it to be his duty to preach them to those who are younger. This wisdom is, however, subjective activity's complete and lifeless capitulation to its world. In that it effects a return to oppositionless childhood, it closely resembles the processless habit into which the activity of the elderly person's physical organism subsides. . . . It is precursive of death. (*Encyc* ¶396)

Already, at thirty years of age, Hegel could look back to what he called "the ideal of my youth" [29]. The move to Jena and the systematic development of an ideal already actualized in the modern world in place of Romantic striving for an unrealized ideal appear to mark a transition from youth to manhood, while the move from Heidelberg to Berlin in 1818 seems to mark the onset of a transition from manhood to old age. That Hegel, in the additions to the paragraphs on the stages of life incorporated in the 1827 and 1830 editions of the *Encyclopaedia*, is generalizing from autobiographical reflection is suggested by the special use we have noted there of the term "hypochondria." In a letter [158] from 1810 to Windischmann the term occurs with the same meaning; however, the context is now explicitly autobiographical:

From my own experience I know this mood of the soul, or rather of reason, which arises when it has finally made its way with interest and hunches into a chaos of phenomena but, though inwardly certain of the goal, has not yet worked its way through them to clarity and a detailed account of the whole. For a few years I suffered from this hypochondria to the point of exhaustion. Everybody probably has such a turning point in his life, the nocturnal point of the contraction of his essence in which he is forced through a narrow passage by which his confidence in himself and everyday life grows in strength and assurance—unless he has rendered himself incapable of being fulfilled by everyday life, in which case he is confirmed in an inner, nobler existence. . . . It is science which has led you into this labyrinth of the soul, and science alone is capable of leading you out again and healing you.

There is a philosophical orientation which corresponds to each of the three ages, and which is seemingly expressed in letters from respective periods of Hegel's life. The zeal to change the world apparent in the early letters to Schelling stems from a philosophy of youth. Hegel's desire, in the letters from Bamberg and Nuremberg, to work for the state illustrates a philosophy of manhood, while his concern in Berlin for security illustrates a philosophy of old age. While the philosophy of youth opposes the subjectivity of the individual to the way of the world, the philosophy of manhood opposes the individual's labor on behalf of the world to the resistance of particular objects. And the philosophy of old age detaches itself from opposition to particular objects or persons and withdraws into a harmonious relation to the universal precepts distilled from past experience of opposition. One

senses from the Berlin letters a certain resentment on Hegel's part of the continuing need to confront new challenges.

It would be an oversimplification, however, to say that the Berlin period is exclusively marked by the deformation of old age, the Nuremberg period by true adulthood, and the period from Tübingen through Frankfurt by the Romantic subjectivism of youth. Hegel was already *der Alte* to his classmates in Tübingen, and the manhood of laboring to organize a revolutionary new world during the Napoleonic era might be viewed as an application of the elderly wisdom of resigned acceptance: when the age in which one lives is itself revolutionary, comprehending acceptance of one's world means even the celebration of revolution. On this view, the category of psychological old age would predominate in interpreting Hegel's life as a whole. On the other hand, there were signs of resilient adulthood even in Hegel's Berlin period, as when he admitted in conversation to Weisse that the world spirit would someday take unpredictably new forms [603]. Thus old age never existed in a pure state, out of tension with manhood. Yet the advent of the old age of the whole era, i.e., the Restoration, seemed to coincide with approaching chronological old age on Hegel's part so as to shift the balance during the Berlin years in favor of what Hegel himself defines as a mentality of old age.

It is indeed remarkable that Hegel's youth, manhood, and old age appear to coincide with the youth, manhood, and old age of his epoch, the epoch of the Great Revolution. Revolutionary France in the 1790s can plausibly be viewed as an age of youth, in which subjective ideals were impatiently opposed to the perverse order of the world. In the adulthood of the Napoleonic years the Revolution overcame anarchy and organized itself, while the Restoration is familiar to us as the old age of this revolutionary epoch, in which the world seemed content to rest from its exertions. The stages of Hegel's life from the onset of the French Revolution appear to follow corresponding ages of the epoch so closely that one might interpret his transitions from youth to manhood and manhood to old age as voluntary adjustments to the requirement of the times by an individual who maintained a higher-order adulthood throughout. There are times when an adult, as opposed to elderly, acceptance of one's world—i.e., participation in its struggles rather than celebration of its achievements—means to accept the implications of an objectively revolutionary situation, while there are other times when consolidation and retrenchment are on the world's agenda. Yet in the end we are left with considerable ambiguity: textual evidence from the Berlin period can be adduced to support the hypothesis of both an essentially elderly and an essentially adult mature Hegel. In all likelihood the two tendencies coexisted in him.

If we ask which of the three philosophical orientations is the true one, Hegel is unequivocal in the *Encyclopaedia* of 1827: "the man attains to the true relationship" [¶396]. That this must be so is clear from even rudimentary knowledge of the Hegelian philosophy. The essence of philosophy for Hegel is absolute negativity, negation of negation, the overcoming of opposition in reconciliation. The true standpoint is not that of the youth, because the youth locks himself into an opposition to the world which cannot be overcome. Nor is the true standpoint that of old

age, for old age lapses into an inactive reconciliation, effecting, according to Hegel, a return to "oppositionless childhood." The innocence of childhood, however appealing, cannot be the true standpoint, for truth lies in the identity of opposition and nonopposition, in reconciliation which is immediately known to be a triumph over alienation. The philosophically true standpoint is thus that of the man who joins in with the ongoing work of the world. Reconciled to the world, to his own historical age, he aims to reconcile his institutional world and ever-new situational predicaments, and thus to advance the work of the world.

Methodologically, Hegelianism is best understood as a variation within the hermeneutic tradition in Germany dating from Herder. Hegel's dialectical method is a version of the method of empathetic understanding. He interprets the present as a product of the past; and he understands the past as a dialectical series of ideal types, empathetically reenacting thought as it concretizes itself. The present is reconstructed as a resolution of past alienation, vindicated as a triumph over historical contradictions. It embodies the successful labor of overcoming. Hegel is less attentive to the stubborn contradictions of the present. His procedure clearly threatens philosophy with ideological corruption, but the threat is evaded insofar as history has at least in principle reached an end (*Phil of Law* ¶352-60). Only at the end of history is pure philosophical justification of the present a scientific labor—and an essential need of the age. The autobiographical allusion in Hegel's discussion of the stage of adulthood suggests that he means to include the labor of the philosopher.

When Hegel writes—in the *Philosophy of Law*, under the Restoration—that philosophy paints its gray on gray only when the spirit of an age has grown old, that philosophy always comes too late to change anything, and that philosophy can be only the comprehension of the world rather than its transformation, he himself, yielding to age, seems already to have fallen away from the philosophically true standpoint of transmitting ever-renewed opposition to particular obstacles into reconciliation. At that point philosophy seems no longer a matter of joining in the ongoing labor of the world, but of comprehending its past labor. The philosophy of old age recognizes nothing new produced in the labor of the present. Such philosophy is "complete and lifeless capitulation to its world" (*Encyc* ¶369, Addition). In the Restoration—as history retreated from its Napoleonic end—Hegelian philosophy, instead of systematically critiquing institutionalized contradictions, seems to lapse into Hegelian ideology.

It is tempting to interpret the three ages of life ideologically, contrasting the conservatism of old age with the Romantic radicalism of youth. But what Hegel takes to be the true standpoint, that of manhood, is neither of the Right nor of the Left, though according to the situation it may, as we have noted, by turns be both: if to do the work of the world in the 1790s is very different from doing it in the 1820s, it is arguable that Hegel already attained manhood in his youthful opposition of the 1790s, and that he retained it even in his elderly stance during the Restoration. Yet if we can assume with Hegel that world history was nearing its end despite the Restoration—i.e., that the Restoration was essentially superficial [271]—insistence on the truth of the standpoint of manhood and practical engage-

ment in the world implies that the need, not of one or another period within Hegel's life but of the whole age in which he lived, was for the theoretical comprehension proper to old age. The theoretical contemplation of old age preserves a dimension of practical engagement; as the philosophy of spirit it is in fact an identity of theoretical and practical reason—in Kantian terminology, a philosophy of aesthetic reason. The evidence suggesting that Hegelianism is a philosophy of psychological old age thus does not really count against the thesis that, as Hegel himself claims regarding his own philosophy, it is fundamentally an expression of adulthood. Joining in with the practical work of the world at history's end—i.e., in its old age—meant, for Hegel, to become a philosophical interpreter. That the Owl takes its flight merely at dusk thus cannot be reduced to the claim that Hegel had arrived at the hub only when the wheel of history had ceased to turn; the elderly flight of wisdom was rather itself the wheel's final rotation toward its destination.

When Marx will say, with a side glance at the Owl passage in the Preface to the *Philosophy of Law*, that philosophers only interpret the world but that the point is to change it, the passage to which reference is made is, however famous, philosophically false even in Hegel's own terms, indeed even for the Hegel of the Berlin period. The true Hegelian standpoint was most clearly expressed in the Napoleonic period, when adulthood called for an openly adult response and did not yet have to assume, as sometimes in Berlin, the mask of old age. From that standpoint, philosophical interpretation of the world is an essential part of the world's own self-transformation. Whereas a philosophical interpreter in the days of the world's youth or manhood is simply "elderly" in the psychological sense, such an interpreter in the world's last days has not left manhood behind. For when the world has grown old, doing the work of old age is doing the world's work, too. The opposition between comprehending and changing the world, present both in the Owl passage and in Marx's *Theses on Feuerbach*, is from the Hegelian standpoint false. Of course, Hegel may have been mistaken in believing the world had attained old age, and thus mistaken in affirming philosophy to be the principle need of the age. But his project, mistaken or not, would remain at a deeper level one of adulthood rather than of old age.

Yet, however much the "true position" according to Hegel is the open-ended labor of adulthood, the most widespread interpretation of Hegelianism has associated it with the conceptual finality of old age. The reigning tradition can be traced back from *nouveau philosophe* André Glucksmann (*Maitres penseurs*, 1977) through Jacques Derrida (*L'Écriture et la différence*, 1967), Heidegger (*Holzwege*), Russell (*Philosophy of Bertrand Russell*, Ch 1), Marx, Feuerbach, and Kierkegaard to the late Schelling. But Schelling arguably misunderstood Hegel at least in part because he misunderstood Hegel's relation to both his own earlier philosophy and to Hölderlin. Psychohistorical interpretation, which seems unavoidable in the case of letters never intended to be context-free, is used in the following chapters to highlight the polemical Hegel and to correct the prevailing Hegel legend through reassessment of the relation of thought and feeling, concept and love, in Hegel's mental economy. It becomes apparent that, the late Schelling notwithstanding, Hegelianism is not a closed system; that the system is not the

Absolute; that Hegel was not a panlogist or essentialist; that he neither reduced the rich hues of reality as Russell charged to something "thin and logical" nor dissolved reality into what Bradley called an "unearthly ballet of bloodless categories"; that he was not primarily moved as the Heideggerians suppose by an all-consuming Nietzschean will to power, i.e., to conceptual mastery of the world; and that he was in fact much closer to Hölderlin's neopietistic stance of letting being be than Heidegger imagined. In recognizing that there is always more in feeling or experience than has been thought, in acknowledging ever-new frontiers, it is "manhood" which exhibits true piety, resisting the lapse of old age into the blasé arrogance of conceptual finality.

It would be unfair, however, to attribute the panlogist deformation of Hegel's system merely to the influence of the late Schelling. For the letters show that this deformation functioned in Hegel's own mental economy as well. It functioned there not as an expression of psychological old age but as a compensatory over-reaction to the then-prevailing Romantic celebration of feeling devoid of conceptual grasp—especially the feeling of nostalgic attachment to some irrecoverable personal or collective past. The "neopietistic" cast to Hegel's thought, centering on Hölderlin's concept of love later developed as spirit, failed to hold uncontested sway in Hegel's mind at least in part because the dominant trend of the whole age—e.g., F. H. Jacobi, Jakob Fries, Schleiermacher—was precisely a pietistic repudiation of systematic philosophy. The one-sided absolutization of pure feeling engenders the equal but opposite absolutization of pure thought. Hegel himself admitted to Göschel such a deformation in his work, and pointed to its eventual correction (Ch 19 on Göschel).

One consequence of relegating the panlogist interpretation of Hegel to a distortion—albeit a self-distortion by Hegel himself—is to legitimate contextual as well as textual interpretation. For if the system is open, opening onto the entire natural, institutional, and cultural universe, that universe defines a context which is as capable in its own way of illuminating the system as the system is of illuminating the universe. Three levels of contextual interpretation are distinguishable: cosmic interpretation of the system in the context of reality as a whole—e.g., as the conceptual self-consciousness of reality; psychological interpretation of the system in light of Hegel's biography; and historical interpretation in light of the age in which he lived. As an open system the Hegelian philosophy is subject to self-correction in every version. Only the dialectical process of self-correction—the process of opening itself—is not subject to correction. The failure of Hegelianism as a perfect panlogist totality is at once the failure of purely textual interpretation of the system understood as thoroughly rational, coherent, and true. But to the extent that the panlogist reading is present in Hegel's own formulations and is not merely a misreading by Schelling or others, it is not only the system but its formulation as well that falls short of full coherence. Once again, rational interpretation in abstraction from the psychological position of the author—the sort of interpretation readily conceded to scientific or mathematical texts taken up into the impersonal body of accepted knowledge—must yield in places to psychological interpretation, and to the contextually more embracing mode of historical

interpretation. Once polemically induced "cracks" of incomplete rationality are acknowledged even in some of the greatest systematic work that can be credited to human reason, psychohistorical interpretation of Hegel's letters emerges as an indispensable complement to text-analytic interpretation of the systematic works. Hegel himself freely admitted, at several points in his letters, the presence of such cracks; what he perhaps did not foresee was that so much attention would be devoted to their explanation.

For some a leading question today is whether the Hegel revealed in the letters helps to fuel or extinguish any resurgent Hegelianism. Biographical and historical concretization arguably tends to show that there never was more than one Hegelian, and that he died over a hundred and fifty years ago. Indisputably, there never will be more than one *Hegel*, who died that long ago. Whether Hegelianism died with Hegel depends on whether the sort of tensions, ambiguities, foibles, or even contradictions detectable in the letters so overshadows or contaminates the wealth of thought content in his works that Hegelianism perishes with them, or whether the richness of that content, together with knowledge of those tensions, ambiguities, etc., enables a reformulation free of them. I myself find this second alternative attractive. But, though the question is one which an edition of the letters may help answer, it is also one which such an edition must be content to leave open. It may suffice to note that if, despite Hegel's imperfections, we do credit him with absolute knowledge—with systematic speculative knowledge of the Absolute—the letters serve to indicate how one historical individual managed to live in the possession of such knowledge.

II

Hölderlin and Schelling: Two Encounters with Fichte

HEGEL'S LETTERS to Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling extend from 1794 in Bern through 1807 in Jena. Rarely have the destinies of two philosophers been so intertwined before the public. They were fellow students at the Tübingen seminary from 1790 to Hegel's graduation in 1793. In the remaining years of the century, Hegel, five years Schelling's senior, witnessed the meteoric rise of Schelling's philosophical career with an admiration unmarred by envy. When Hegel in 1801 finally embarked upon such a career himself, it was in Jena, where Schelling had been a professor since 1798. Hegel's academic career began under Schelling's sponsorship, and until publication of Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* in 1807 he was chiefly known as a Schellingian. The *Phenomenology* was widely interpreted—not least by Schelling himself [107]—as a repudiation of Schelling's position. As Hegel's own star rose, Schelling's career began to falter as the public wearied keeping up with new versions of the Schellingian system. Schelling's pique at Hegel's increasingly dominant position was all the greater. Yet he bided his time, outlived Hegel by twenty-four years, and was called to Berlin in 1841 by the Prussian state to write an obituary on Hegelian philosophy from Hegel's own chair. Both Kierkegaard and Engels attended as Schelling began his lectures defending his own *positive* philosophy against Hegel's *negative* philosophy, and both existentialism and Marxism would perpetuate the Schellingian critique of Hegelianism as a form of essentialism or idealism which reduced sensuous reality to a weave of concepts.

Hegel's relation to the Romantic poet Friedrich Hölderlin was less public than the one to Schelling, though hardly less significant in Hegel's intellectual development. Documents in this chapter illuminate Hegel's renewed contact with Hölderlin and Schelling after his graduation; Hegel's assimilation of Fichte in 1795-96 with the help of both friends; and Hegel's move to Frankfurt, to Hölderlin, and to a more critical perspective on Fichte at the start of 1797. The final section concerns the continuing importance of Hölderlin in the thought of the mature Hegel.

HEGEL IN BERN, 1793-1796

Hegel initiated the correspondence with Schelling [6], but Hölderlin, following their graduation from the Tübingen seminary in 1793, initiated the exchanges with

Hegel. On July 10, 1794, Hölderlin addressed a letter [5] to Bern, where Hegel had accepted a private tutorship. Though it is not certain when they became close friends, in this first letter Hölderlin remarks on how Hegel had been his "guiding spirit":

I am certain that in the time that has transpired since we separated with the "Kingdom of God" as our rallying cry, you have thought of me once in a while. It is my faith that after each metamorphosis we still would recognize each other by this same rallying cry. I am certain that no matter what happens to you, time will never erase this trait in you. I think this should also be true in my case as well. It is this trait that we chiefly love in each other. And thus we are certain of the eternity of our friendship. Moreover I would wish you often close to me. You were so often my guiding spirit [*Genius*]. I thank you greatly. I have fully realized this only since our separation. I surely would still like to learn much from you, and once in a while communicate something to you of my own as well. Correspondence is of course never more than a makeshift, but it is still something. Thus we should never entirely neglect it. We should admonish ourselves from time to time that we have great rights upon each other. [5]

Hölderlin contrasted in the same letter his own current tutorial post—in Waltershausen—with Hegel's in Bern:

I believe that in many respects you will find your world rather well adapted to you. Yet I have no cause to envy you. My situation is likewise good for me. You have come to terms with yourself more than I. It is good for you to have no matter what sort of clatter about you; I need quiet. I am not lacking in joy either. For you [in the Swiss Alps] it is everywhere present. . . . It will be difficult for you to find in your Bern someone like Frau von Kalb.¹ It could only do you good to bathe in her sunlight. Were it not for our friendship you would have to be a little angry that you yielded your happy fate to me. [Hegel had had a prior option on the post which Hölderlin took.] Even she must almost think, after all I told her about you, that she was the loser by my blind luck. She has already often reprimanded me to write you, and now does so again. . . . [5]

If Hölderlin judged his own good fortune in Waltershausen to lie in a personal relationship with the Baroness, he found Hegel's to lie in the natural beauty environing Bern. Hegel himself, however, found the city of Bern to be a center of aristocratic civilization at its most corrupt [11]. Hegel had negotiated in autumn 1793 through a certain von Rütte, a teacher in Bern, for the tutorial position in the Bern household of Karl Friedrich von Steiger. Von Steiger was an army captain and member of the Bern aristocracy which Hegel would come to criticize so scathingly [11].

Since Hegel had entered the Tübingen seminary on the presumption that he was training for the ministry, he needed the seminary's permission to accept the tutorship. A letter [267] addressed twenty years later to a certain Grüb, an acquaintance

¹Baroness Charlotte von Kalb. She was a friend of Schiller and the poet Jean-Paul Friedrich Richter. In May 1793 she had asked Schiller to help find a private tutor for her son, and Schiller in turn asked the advice of the radical lawyer-poet Gotthold Friedrich Stäudlin, who recommended Hölderlin. The Baron von Kalb, who resided in Waltershausen, was an officer in the French army.

from his Bern years, shows that even after Hegel took the post in Switzerland it was assumed he would resume a clerical vocation.

Hegel to von Rütte [2]

Stuttgart, August 24, 1793

Through the innkeeper Brodhag I have, my most respectable and noble sir, safely received your kind letter to me concerning the position of tutor in Captain von Steiger's household, and I consider it my duty for now at least to answer you insofar as my present circumstances allow. These circumstances prevent me from giving a definitive reply before two weeks. If, as I hope and pray, I am then able to accept your kind offer, I shall let you know immediately.

I feel too acutely the great confidence placed in me in appointing me to assist with the rearing and education of Captain von Steiger's children not to do my duty as fully as possible, with the conscientiousness called for by the importance of the office. I hope to be able to meet Captain von Steiger's requirements and expectations.

Inasmuch as I am convinced that my activity and position in Mr. von Steiger's house will completely fulfill my favorable expectations, I leave it up to Captain von Steiger's discretion to determine whether—in view of the costly way of life in Bern, the expense of a wardrobe required by the prevailing conditions of social life, and other expenditures—the salary of fifteen *louis d'or* will cover the necessities. To you yourself I meanwhile present my devoted gratitude for your kind endeavor in the matter, and ask that you please convey to Mr. von Steiger my humble respects. I have the honor of being very respectfully your honor's obedient servant Hegel, Master [in theology].

Hegel to von Rütte [3]

September 11, 1793

I hasten to reply briefly to your kind letter, my most respectable and noble sir, by letting you know that circumstances upon which I still had to wait have now led me to expect no further obstacles to assumption of the position offered me in Mr. von Steiger's house. I will do my utmost to satisfy the Captain's wish for me to arrive as soon as possible. Since I must still be examined by the Ducal Consistory at the end of this month before I can leave, it will not be possible for me to arrive in Bern before the beginning, perhaps the first week, of the next month. Due to my relationship with this faculty [*Collegio*], it is necessary that I obtain its permission to accept the position, and that Captain von Steiger to this end address a letter to it. If, then, you will kindly send me this request [of his], I will present it to the Consistory and receive without delay the necessary authorization.

I have safely received the draft for over five *louis d'or*. I have likewise noted from your letter the kind regard the Captain had the goodness to show for the matter raised in my letter [2].

As for Captain von Steiger's daughter, I will take greatest pleasure in contributing all I can to her education.

Hoping to be able to prove my respect for you in person, I have the honor of remaining your devoted servant Hegel, Master.

It has pleased me greatly, my dear friend, to have received news from you after so long, and to have learned that you are well.

Mlle. Graf, who kindly delivered your letter to me in person, will probably have told you that she at least saw me and talked to me, but was able to say nothing of any further courtesy extended to her. I must apologize in this regard to you both for not having better honored your letter of recommendation, and I ask you to do so to her in my name. I did not even once present her to my wife, who was not home when she called. I was incidentally detained a few days from repaying her visit. When I tried to see her Thursday forenoon in the Raspe publishing house, she had already left that morning. Be assured, however, that if you again address someone to me the welcome will be warmer. That your letter was so little honored was due to accidental circumstances rather than any ill will; and my wife, who sends her kindest regards, feels as deeply sorry as I.

You as well, as I have already heard in part from another source and in part learn from your letter, have encountered quite a range of vicissitudes since we were together in Switzerland. You have lost a wife but had no children by her. I am not a clergyman here, but rather am Rector of the Gymnasium and am serving as a School Councillor. Four years ago I married a local woman—*née* von Tucher. We have two healthy boys. And, thank God, on the whole I feel quite well. Human life is in any case never without distress, annoyances, and unfulfilled wishes. Our old friend [Wilhelm Ludwig] Fleischmann has pursued a quieter path in life than we. He held to the high road for holders of the Master's degree, and in due course became a regular minister. I present my compliments and remain with complete respect your most devoted servant, Hegel.

HÖLDERLIN AS WELL AS HEGEL looked upon private tutorships as an escape from a clerical vocation. The source of Hölderlin's inspiration was secular if not pagan: "Kant and the Greeks," he wrote to Hegel in July 1794, "are almost my only reading. I am trying chiefly to become familiar with the aesthetic part of the critical philosophy" (i.e., *Critique of Judgment*, 1790). In a distinctly Rousseauian vein, Hölderlin looked in the same letter with some longing upon the Swiss landscapes which surrounded Hegel:

I surely at times would like to have your lakes and Alps about me. Nature on a grand scale irresistibly ennobles and purifies us. . . . Recently I took a little excursion over the Rhon mountains into the country of Fulda. The colossal heights and fertile, charming valleys—where scattered houses and the foot of the mountains lie in the shade of pine trees among flocks and running brooks—make one believe one is in the Swiss mountains. Fulda itself is also very pleasantly situated. The mountain dwellers are here as everywhere somewhat rustic and simpleminded. For the rest they may have many a good side which our culture has destroyed. [5]

A chief German purveyor of Rousseau's primitivist ethic was Johann Gottfried Herder, whom Hölderlin met shortly thereafter in Jena. Having been introduced to

the literary luminaries of Weimar—where he arrived after abandoning his private tutorship in order to complete his novel *Hyperion*—Hölderlin reported in January 1795 encouragement from Schiller, great humanity from Goethe, and cordiality from Herder: "Herder was cordial, he shook my hand, but showed himself more as the man of the world, often speaking entirely in an allegorical fashion, as you likewise know him to do" [9]. Schiller's encouragement took concrete form: Hölderlin published a revision of his poem "The Genius of Boldness" (*Der Genius der Kühnheit*) in Schiller's *Neue Thalia*.

FICHTE

Apart from literary endeavors, Hölderlin was studying Fichte, who had recently joined the philosophy faculty at Jena. Both Hölderlin and Schelling sent Hegel reports of Fichte. Yet whereas Hölderlin soon became a critic of Fichte, Schelling undertook to complete rather than repudiate Fichteanism. Hegel assimilated influences from both friends. He embraced the aesthetic idealism which Hölderlin opposed to Fichtean practical idealism, but came to express it in the language of Kantian-Fichtean reflective philosophy employed by Schelling [29].

Hegel initiated correspondence with Schelling from Bern on Christmas Eve 1794 upon noticing an announcement of Schelling's first publication, *On Myths, Historical Legends and Philosophical Problems of Antiquity*. The essay—which shows the influence of Herder—appeared in *Memorabilien*, a theological and philosophical journal edited by the rationalist theologian Heinrich Eberhard Gottlob Paulus, then a professor at Jena. By Christmas 1794, Fichte's reputation as the author of the *Kantian Critique Of All Revelation* was secured, while Karl Leonhard Reinhold's reputation as an interpreter of Kant had already been established the previous decade. Gottlob Christian Storr, who had been one of Hegel's theology professors in Tübingen, had just published his *Theological and Philosophical Annotations to Kant's Teaching on Religion* in German. Storr sought to appropriate—in Schelling's [8] and Hegel's view to misappropriate—Kantianism for the cause of traditional religious authoritarianism: the Kantian limits placed on reason made room for positive faith in the literal truth of biblical revelations warmed over as "postulates of practical reason."

Hegel's letter shows keen interest in the French Revolution, though his comment on the "ignominy of Robespierre's party" in the execution of fellow terrorist Jean-Baptiste Carrier shows that Hegel himself was no Jacobin. He was an avid reader of Johann Wilhelm von Archenholz's political and historical review *Minerva*, which carried Konrad Engelbert Oelsner's *Historical Letters from Paris on the Events in France* in its first volume, published in 1792. Oelsner's news of the career of Karl Friedrich Reinhard, a compatriot of Hegel's from Württemberg serving in the French diplomatic service, was of interest to Hegel.

Karl Christian Renz, whom Hegel suspects of burying his talent, had graduated first in Hegel's class at the seminary, but unlike Hegel and Schelling he settled into a conventional life as a Lutheran pastor. The student who graduated first the previous year, Christian Philipp Leutwein, later speculated that Hegel's philosoph-

ical greatness was in no small part overcompensation for the painfully felt inferiority of being placed fourth in the "Renzian Class" (*Berichten* 8).

Hegel to Schelling [6]

Bern, Christmas Eve, 1794

I should have liked long ago, my dear friend, in some measure to renew the amiable relationship we formerly had with each other. Recently this desire again stirred afresh. For only lately I read the announcement of an essay of yours [*von dir*] in Paulus's *Memorabilia* and found you pursuing your old path, clarifying important theological concepts and helping us little by little to be done with the old leaven. I can only assure you of my delight and interest. The time has come, I believe, for us to become generally freer to speak out; moreover, to some extent we are already doing so and have license to do so. My remoteness from the centers of literary activity, however, does not put me in a position to obtain occasional reports on topics which interest me so very much. You would put me greatly in your debt if from time to time you were to give me news both of general literary events and of your own work. I long very much for a situation—not in Tübingen—where I could bring to fruition what I formerly let slip by, and could even on occasion set my hand to work. I am not completely idle, but my occupation, heterogeneous and often interrupted as it is, does not allow me to achieve anything proper.

Quite by accident I spoke a few days ago with the author of the letters signed "O." in Archenholz's *Minerva*. You are no doubt acquainted with them. The author, purportedly an Englishman, is in fact a Silesian named Oelsner. He gave me news of a few persons from Württemberg in Paris, including Reinhard, who has a post of great importance in the *Département des affaires étrangères*. Oelsner is still a young man, but one sees that he has toiled much. He is living by private means here this winter.

What is Renz doing? Has he buried his talent? I hope not. It would certainly be worth the trouble to stimulate or encourage him to pull together his no doubt penetrating investigations of important topics. Perhaps this might compensate him for the annoyance under which he has been living for a long time. I have a few friends in Saxony who would probably help him along to further endeavor. If you do not take him to be completely disinclined, encourage him in this direction, seek to overcome his modesty. In any case, convey my greetings to him.

How are things otherwise in Tübingen? Until someone of the order of Reinhold or Fichte holds a chair there, nothing solid will be forthcoming. In truth, nowhere is the old system so faithfully propagated as there. And even if the system has no influence on isolated good minds, it still to a larger extent prevails among mechanical minds. In view of the latter, it is very important to know what sort of system, what sort of spirit, a professor has; for it is through such minds that a system or spirit is for the most part placed or maintained in circulation.

As to refutations of Kant's teaching on religion, I have heard of none beyond Storr's. Yet the doctrine will surely have already encountered other refutations. Yet its influence, which at present is to be sure still quiet, will only in the course of time come to the light of day.

You [*Ihr*] probably know that Carrier has been guillotined. Do you still read French papers? If I remember correctly, someone mentioned to me that they are banned in Württemberg. This trial is very important, and has revealed the complete ignominy of Robespierre's party. Greetings a thousand times over to Süskind [i.e., Tübingen classmate Johann Gottlob Süskind], and Kapff. Your friend, Hegel

[In the margin of the second page:] [Tübingen classmate Friedrich Heinrich] Mögling told me recently that Süskind believes letters to Switzerland are all opened, but I assure you [*Dich*] that you [*Ihr*] need have no such worry.

[In the margin of the third page:] One more request: could Süskind send me the sheets from the *South German News* [*Oberdeutschen Zeitung*] in which [Immanuel David] Mauchart's [*Allgemeines*] *Repertorium* [*für Empirische Psychologie*] [1792] is reviewed? I would not know how to hunt them down here.

SCHELLING'S REPLY of January 5, 1795, makes clear the new direction his inquiry had taken since his first publication on ancient myths, legends, and philosophy:

Who wants to bury himself in the dust of antiquity when the movement of *his own* time at every turn sweeps him up and carries him onward? I live and move at present in philosophy. Philosophy is not yet at an end. Kant has provided the results. The premises are still missing. And who can understand results without premises? Perhaps a Kant, but what is the great crowd to make of it? *Fichte*, the last time he was here, said that one must have the genius of a Socrates to fathom Kant. I find this truer every day. We must continue still further with philosophy. Kant has swept *everything* away, but how is the crowd to notice? One must smash it to pieces before their very eyes, so they grasp it in their hands. The great Kantians now everywhere to be seen have got stuck on the letter, and bless themselves on seeing still so much before them. I am definitely convinced that the old superstition of so-called natural religion as well as of positive religion has in the minds of most already once more been combined with the Kantian letter. It is fun to see how quickly they can get to the moral proof. Before you can turn around the *deus ex machina* springs forth, the personal individual Being who sits in Heaven above! *Fichte* will raise philosophy to a height at which even most of the hitherto Kantians will become giddy. . . . I am now receiving the beginning of the detailed exposition from Fichte himself, the *Foundation of the Entire Science of Knowledge*. . . . I read it and found my prophecies had not been proven false. Now I am working on an ethic *à la* Spinoza. It is designed to establish the highest principles of all philosophy, in which theoretical and practical reason are united. . . . [7]

Fichte had visited Tübingen a second time, in May 1794, although it is not certain that he and Schelling met. In any case Schelling responded to Fichte's *On the Concept of the Science of Knowledge* (1794) by publishing his *On the Concept of the Form of Philosophy in General* in fall 1794, a copy of which he sent to Fichte. In summer 1794 Fichte wrote the first part of the *Foundation of the Entire Science of Knowledge*, sending Schelling a copy at the end of the year. This second Fichtean text stimulated Schelling's *On the Self as the Principle of Philosophy, or On the Unconditioned in Human Knowledge*, published in spring 1795 and summarized in a letter [10] from Schelling to Hegel dated February 4, 1795.

Hegel clearly states in his reply [8] to Schelling's letter of January 5 [7] that his interest is in practical applications of Kantianism rather than, as in Schelling's case, with theoretical foundations. Though Hegel clearly works within the Kantian orbit, he is not yet a philosopher. He will become one only when he abandons a utilitarian dependence of theory on practice, i.e., only when the impass of "revolutionary practice"—of what Hegel casually calls "intervention in the life of men" [29]—leads him to a more theoretical stance. Hegel's letter is likewise noteworthy for a recognition of the ideological function of philosophical writings as bound up with worldly advantage. Yet even reactionary ideology has a revolutionary function insofar as it contains what Hegel calls "live coals" by paying lip service to ideals which contradict the existing system of worldly advantage.

Even while reporting Hölderlin's enthusiasm for Fichte—communicated to Hegel in letters from Hölderlin, some of which have been lost—Hegel distances himself from Schelling's own enthusiasm expressed in a letter from January 5: Fichte himself in his *Critique of All Revelation* is partly responsible for Storr's distortion of Kant. Schelling grants the point in his reply of February 4 [10]. Yet, however much Hegel criticizes the pseudo-Kantian orthodox natural theology of Storr, his puzzlement at Schelling's rejection of the personal individual God of classical theism shows that he himself still holds to the orthodox concept of God. Moreover, his reference to the Kantian "moral proof" indicates a continuing acceptance of at least a minimal natural theology as well. Despite his celebration—with Hölderlin and Schelling at the Tübingen seminary—of Gottfried Ephraim Lessing's vision of the One and the All (*Hen Kai Pan*), Hegel thus far had not embraced the pantheistic philosophical consequences (Harris, 99-101). Schelling's letters brought him to face those consequences.

Hegel to Schelling [8]

[end of January 1795]

I need not elaborate at greater length, my dear friend, on what pleasure your letter has given me. The only thing which could interest me more than your faithful remembrance of your old friend is the course of development which your mind has long since taken and now still pursues. As friends we have never become strangers to each other, and still less to the great Cause of every rational man, a Cause to whose advancement and extension every such man will seek to contribute to the limit of his ability.

Some time ago I took up again the study of Kantian philosophy to learn how to apply its important results to many an idea still current among us, or to elaborate such ideas according to those results. With more recent efforts to penetrate to more profound depths I am still just as little familiar as with the efforts of Reinhold. For to me these speculations, rather than being of great applicability to universally usable concepts, seem of more direct significance mainly to theoretical reason alone. Thus I am not more directly cognizant of these efforts with respect to aim, and my intimations regarding them are even more obscure. Yet you have not passed on to me the sheets you published. You certainly should not have been deterred by postage. Simply give them to the mail coach, not to the mounted mail. They will be most valuable to me.

What you tell me about the theological-Kantian—if it should please the gods [*si diis placet*—course taken by philosophy in Tübingen is not surprising. Orthodoxy is not to be shaken as long as the profession of it is bound up with worldly advantage and interwoven with the totality of a state. This interest is too strong for orthodoxy to be given up so soon, and it operates without anyone being clearly aware of it as a whole. As long as this condition prevails, orthodoxy will have on its side the entire ever-preponderant herd of blind followers or scribblers devoid of higher interests and thoughts. Should they read something contrary to their own convictions—assuming one wishes to do their verbiage the honor of designating them as such—and yet sense something of its truth, they say "Yes, it is no doubt true," go to sleep, and the next morning make coffee and pass it around to others as if nothing had happened. They moreover make do with whatever is offered them, and with whatever maintains them in the system of humdrum routine. I believe it would be interesting, however, to disturb as much as possible the theologians who in their antlike zeal procure critical building materials for the strengthening of their Gothic temple, to make everything more difficult for them, to block their every escape until they no longer find any way out and have no choice but to fully display their nakedness in the light of day. Yet, amidst the building materials which they carry away from the funeral pyre of Kantianism in order to prevent the conflagration of dogmatics, they are carrying home with them some live coals; they bring with them the general dissemination of philosophical ideas.

However, to the mischief of which you write and whose mode of argumentation I can thus imagine for myself [e.g., Storr], Fichte has indisputably opened the door through his *Critique of All Revelation*. Fichte himself has made moderate use of it, but once its principles are firmly adopted there is no longer any limit to be set to the theological logic. He reasons from the holiness of God, from what by virtue of His purely moral nature He must do, etc., and has thereby reintroduced the old manner of proof in dogmatics. It would perhaps be worth the trouble to elucidate this more closely. If I had the time, I would seek to determine more closely to what extent, after having fixed moral belief, we might now utilize the thus legitimated idea of God backwards, for example in the elucidation of goal-directedness, and so on; that is, to what extent we might take the idea of God derived from our present vantage point in moral theology [*Ethikothologie*] with us back into physical theology [*Physikothologie*], in order to legislate in this second field by means of that idea. This seems to me to be the procedure generally taken in the case of the idea of Providence, as also in the case of miracles generally, in that of revelation as with Fichte, and so on. If I should come to the point of developing my opinion more extensively, I will subject it to your criticism but shall ask in advance your indulgence. My remoteness from various and sundry books and the limitation of my time do not allow me to work out many of the ideas which I carry around with me. I will at least not do much less than I can. I am convinced that only by continually shaking the branches from all sides is a significant result finally to be hoped for; something always remains hanging [on the tree]. Every contribution of this sort, even if it contains nothing new, has its merit. Communication and common labor renew and give strength. May your summons be often repeated to us: "Let us not remain behind!"

What is Renz doing? There seems to be something mistrustful in his character, something that does not gladly lend itself to communication, that works only for itself and does not hold others worth the trouble of doing something for them, or considers the evil to be too far beyond cure. Is not your friendship capable of prevailing over him, of challenging him into action to polemicize against the currently surviving theology? The necessity [of it], the fact that such activity is not superfluous, is surely evident from the very existence of this theology.

Hölderlin writes me now and then from Jena. I shall reproach him on your behalf. He is attending Fichte's lectures and speaks enthusiastically of him as a Titan who is fighting for mankind and whose sphere of influence will surely not remain within the walls of the lecture hall. You must not conclude from the fact that he does not write to you that his friendship has cooled, for it is surely undiminished, and his interest in cosmopolitan ideas, it seems to me, is ever increasing.

May the Kingdom of God come, and our hands not be idle!

There is one expression in your letter concerning the moral proof that I do not entirely understand: "which they know how to manipulate so that out springs the individual, personal Being." Do you really believe we fail to get so far? Farewell.

Reason and Freedom remain our password, and the Invisible Church our rallying point. Hegel

Answer me very soon. Greetings to my friends.

SCHELLING, IN HIS FEBRUARY 4 REPLY, expresses surprise at Hegel's apparent retention of classical theism. He uses the occasion to summarize his own pantheistic perspective as expressed in his new essay *On the Self*. . . :

Now for a reply to your question as to whether I believe we cannot get to a personal Being by means of the moral proof. I confess the question has surprised me. I would not have expected it from an intimate of Lessing's. Yet you no doubt asked it only to learn whether the question has been entirely decided in my own mind. For you the question has surely long since been decided. For us as well [as for Lessing] the orthodox concepts of God are no more. My reply is that we get even further than a personal Being. I have in the interim become a Spinozist! Do not be astonished. You will soon hear how. For Spinoza the world, the object by itself in opposition to the subject, was *everything*. For me it is the *self*. The real difference between critical and dogmatic philosophy seems to me to lie in this, that the former starts out from the absolute self still unconditioned by any object, while the latter proceeds from the absolute object or not-self. The latter in its most consistent form leads to Spinoza's system, the former to the Kantian system. Philosophy must start from the *Unconditioned*. Now the question is merely where this Unconditioned lies, whether in the self or in the not-self. Once this question is decided *everything* is decided. The highest principle of all philosophy is for me the pure, Absolute Self; that is, the self insofar as it is merely a self, insofar as it is unconditioned in any way by objects but is rather posited by *freedom*. The alpha and omega of all philosophy is freedom. The Absolute Self encompasses an infinite sphere of absolute being. In this infinite sphere *finite* spheres are formed, which arise through the *limitation* of the absolute sphere by an object: spheres of *determinate being*, theoretical philosophy. In these finite spheres we find nothing but the state of being conditioned, and the Uncon-

ditioned leads to contradictions. But we *ought* to break through; that is, we ought to emerge from the finite sphere into the infinite sphere: *practical* philosophy. Practical philosophy accordingly *demand*s the destruction of finitude and thus leads into the supersensible world. "What was impossible for theoretical reason because it was enfeebled by the object is achieved by practical reason." Only in practical reason are we able to come upon nothing but our Absolute Self, for only the Absolute Self has circumscribed the infinite sphere. There is no other supersensible world for us than that of the Absolute Self. *God* is nothing but the Absolute Self, the Self insofar as it has annihilated everything theoretical; God in *theoretical* philosophy thus equals zero. Personality arises through the unity of consciousness. Yet consciousness is not possible without an object. But for God—i.e., for the Absolute Self—there is no object *whatsoever*; for if there were, the Absolute Self would cease to be absolute. Consequently there is no personal God, and our highest endeavor is aimed at the destruction of our personality, at passage into the absolute sphere of being; but given even eternity this passage is not *possible*. Hence only a *practical* approach toward the Absolute, hence *immortality*. [10]

A week before, on January 26, Hölderlin communicated to Hegel the same Fichtean vision in much the same language from Jena, where he heard Fichte firsthand:

Fichte's speculative papers—*Foundation of the Entire Science of Knowledge* [1794]—as also his published lectures *On the Vocation of the Scholar* [1794], will interest you greatly. At the beginning I very much suspected him of dogmatism. If I may venture a conjecture, he seems to have actually stood at the crossroads, or even to be still standing there now; he would like to get beyond the fact of consciousness in *theory*. This is shown by many of his declarations, and is just as certain as it was with previous metaphysicians who tried to get beyond the existence of the world—indeed, it is even more strikingly transcendent. His Absolute Self, which equals Spinoza's Substance, contains all reality; it is everything, and outside it, is nothing. There is thus no object for this Absolute Self, since otherwise all reality would not be in it. Yet a consciousness without an object is inconceivable; and if I myself am this object, then I am as such necessarily limited even if only in time, and thus am not absolute. Thus, in the Absolute Self no consciousness is conceivable; as Absolute Self I have no consciousness; and insofar as I have no consciousness, to that extent I am—for myself—nothing, and the Absolute Self is thus—for me—nothing. Thus did I write down my thoughts while still in Waltershausen, as I read Fichte's first sheets immediately upon reading Spinoza. Fichte confirmed me. . . [five lines missing]. . . of the positing of the reciprocal determination of the self and the not-self—to use his own language—is certainly noteworthy, as also the idea of striving, etc. . . . [9]

Hölderlin concludes this letter with another reference to Kant's third critique. Responding to a missing letter in which Hegel disclosed something of his own work on "The Positivity of the Christian Religion," Hölderlin writes:

That you are taking up religious concepts is in many respects good and important. You are of course dealing with the concept of Providence in a fashion entirely parallel to Kant's teleology [in the *Critique of Judgment*]. The way in

which he unites the mechanism of nature—and thus of fate—with teleology really seems to me to contain the entire spirit of his system. [Hegel in the “Tübingen Fragment of 1793” had urged that faith in providence—in divine teleology—be united with Greek resignation to fate. Thus Hölderlin implies that Hegel’s own view, presumably expressed in a lost letter, embodies the spirit of the Kantian system as expressed in the third critique.] It is, to be sure, in this same way that he reconciles all the antinomies. With regard to the antinomies, Fichte has a very noteworthy thought, about which I would rather write you at another time. I have long occupied myself with the ideal of a people’s education [Volkserziehung]. And since you are just now concerning yourself with one part of this education, with religion, perhaps I shall choose for myself your image and friendship to conduct thoughts into the outer world of the senses, and shall write in *timely* letters to you—which you are to judge and correct—what I perhaps would have written later. [9]

T. L. Hearing and H. S. Harris have shown that throughout the 1790s Hegel’s overriding ambition was, like Hölderlin’s, to be a popular educator in the Enlightenment tradition, and that Hegel at last became a philosopher only because of disappointment in this initial vocation (see Harris, xv-xxxii). Hölderlin rightly notes above that Hegel’s more specific vocation as an educator of the people was the criticism and reconstruction of religion. What Dilthey called Hegel’s *early theological writings* were thus more political than theological—which is also one of Lukacs’s theses in *The Young Hegel*.

Hegel’s reply to Schelling’s rather more breathless narration [10] of the Fichtean world-view shows how contagious the narration of philosophical news could be. Hegel now assents to Schelling’s definition of God as the Absolute Self, but still fails to see the revolutionary potential of this idea, which he consigns to the realm of “esoteric philosophy.” He does not yet see how it belongs to the public revolution in German philosophy, from which he expects a revolution *tout simple* in Germany. He does not yet suspect that the age’s most practical “need” is precisely for speculative philosophy.

Hegel attributes his delay in replying to political distractions in Bern. The commentary in the letter’s first paragraph will be repeated in notes attached to his anonymous 1798 publication of a German edition of Jean-Jacques Cart’s letters on the Bern aristocracy and its oppression of the people of the Vaud (*Entwick*, 247-57). While working for Captain von Steiger, who was a member of the governing Greater Council, Hegel was able to observe this aristocracy at close range, with supervisory duties transcending his private tutorship [12].

Hegel’s admiration for Schiller’s *Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man* (1795) is apparent in the letter, although shortly thereafter, in Frankfurt, Hegel will be persuaded by Hölderlin that the metaphysically skeptical Kantian limits of Schiller’s position had to be transcended. Hölderlin projected “new letters” on aesthetic education in which the Beautiful would function, however imperfectly, as a metaphysical revelation of Being. Yet from Hegel’s letter of April 16 it is clear that Hölderlin’s own thinking was at that time still subject to Kantian—and Fichtean—limits.

My delay in replying, dear friend, is in part due to diverse occupations but also in part to distractions caused by political festivities celebrated here. Every ten years about ninety new members replenish the *counsel souverain*, replacing those who have departed in this period. I cannot describe to you how all-too-humanly this is done, or how all the intrigues involving cousins and so on at princely courts are nothing compared to the schemes concocted here. A father nominates his son, or perhaps the son-in-law who adds the largest marriage portion, and so it goes. To get to know an aristocratic constitution one must have lived through a winter such as is encountered here before these vacancies are filled during the Easter holidays.

Yet what prevented me even more from replying sooner was the wish to send you a thorough critique of the writing you sent me—for which I thank you very much—to show you at least that I have fully grasped your ideas. Yet I lacked time for a thorough study of these ideas. However, insofar as I have grasped the main ideas, I see in them a completion of science which will give us the most fruitful results. I see in them the work of a mind of whose friendship I can be proud and who will make a great contribution to the most important revolution in the system of ideas in all Germany. To encourage you to work out your system fully would be an insult, for an endeavor that has laid hold of such an object needs no encouragement.

From the Kantian system and its highest completion I expect a revolution in Germany. It will proceed from principles that are present and that only need to be elaborated generally and applied to all hitherto existing knowledge. An esoteric philosophy will, to be sure, always remain, and the idea of God as the Absolute Self will be part of it. After a more recent study of the postulates of practical reason I had a presentiment of what you clearly laid out for me in your last letter, of what I found in your writing, and of what Fichte’s *Foundation of the Science of Knowledge* will disclose to me completely. The consequences that will result from it will astonish many a gentleman. Heads will be reeling at this summit of all philosophy by which man is being so greatly exalted. Yet why have we been so late in recognizing man’s capacity for freedom, placing him in the same rank with all spirits? I believe there is no better sign of the times than this, that mankind is being presented as so worthy of respect in itself. It is proof that the aura of prestige surrounding the heads of the oppressors and gods of this earth is disappearing. The philosophers are proving the dignity of man. The peoples will learn to feel it. Not only will they demand their rights, which have been trampled in the dust, they will take them back themselves, they will appropriate them. Religion and politics have joined hands in the *same* underhanded game. The former has taught what despotism willed: contempt for the human race, its incapacity for any good whatsoever, its incapacity to be something on its own. With the spread of ideas as to how things *ought* to be, the indolence that marks people set in their ways, who always take everything the way it is, will disappear. This enlivening power of ideas even when they are in themselves still limited—such as the idea of the fatherland, of its constitution, and so forth—will lift hearts, which will learn to sacrifice for

such ideas. For the spirit of constitutions has presently made a pact with self-interest and has founded its realm upon it. I always exhort myself with words of the Autobiographer [*Lebensläufer*]: "Strive towards the sun, my friends, so that the weal of the human race soon may ripen! What are the leaves and branches holding you back trying to do? Break through to the sun. And so what if you tire! All the sounder will be your sleep" [Theodor Gottlieb von Hippel's 1778 quasi-autobiographical novel *Biographies in an Ascending Line—Lebensläufe in Aufsteigender Linie*, von Hippel, *Werke* III, 137].

It occurs to me that this summer is your last [as a student] in Tübingen. If you write a dissertation [for the Master's in theology] of your own, I will ask you to send it to me as soon as possible—just give it to the mail coach, writing on it that it should be forwarded by coach. Also, if you should have something else printed, ask [Johann Friedrich von] Cotta the publisher to have it sent to me. I am eager for products of the Easter fair. I shall undertake the study of Fichte's science of knowledge during the summer, when I generally will have more leisure to develop some ideas that I have long carried around with me; in connection with them, however, I lack the use of a library, which I would really need. The first two parts of Schiller's *Horae* [*Horen*] have given me great pleasure. The essay on the *Aesthetic Education of the Human Race* [*Menschengeschlecht*] is a masterpiece [Schiller, *Über die ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen*]. [Friedrich Immanuel] Niethammer announced a *Philosophical Journal* [*Philosophisches Journal*] at the beginning of the year. Has anything come of it? Hölderlin often writes me from Jena. He is completely entranced with Fichte, whom he credits with great designs. How pleasing it must be for Kant to behold already the fruit of his work in such worthy successors. The harvest will one day be glorious! I thank Süskind for the friendly endeavor undertaken on my behalf. What is Renz doing? In view of your disclosures, his relation to his uncle is incomprehensible to me and discourages me from turning to him. What sort of path is [Tübingen teaching assistant and mathematician Karl Friedrich] Hauber pursuing?

Farewell, my friend! I would like to see us reunited some day so we could tell each other this or that, and hear from each other what might confirm our hopes. Yours, Hegel

[In margin:] Kindly avoid having your letters post-paid in the future; they go more safely this way. I will start with the present one.

Hegel to von Steiger [12]

Tschugg, July [Heumond] 9, 1795

The little news I can give you since your departure from Tschugg, most honored Captain, comes down to this:

The town justice [*Chorrichter*] from Endscherz has brought back the reply from Mr. Racle [a merchant] in Erlach that the latter could not furnish more than 36 liters per week, 1.5 liters being valued at 16 *Batzen* [local currency of Bern].

Anne-Bebe [a household servant] hurried home Saturday from the spa, since it caused her great discomfort in her chest. Last night your wife also returned from the spa, which she could not take advantage of because of the cold weather, and which did not agree with her the first time she took the waters.

The workers have done nothing in the gravel dig, since they were occupied in the vineyards and swamp. Benz [a servant of Captain von Steiger] has transported what little gravel had been processed down in front of the barn. Tomorrow, however, all the common laborers will bring gravel from the dig at Ins. Benz has filled in, and leveled with sand and the like, the stretch up high on the [wine?] cellar road which was still somewhat lower than the road level both before and further on. He also tells me that the livestock are all in good shape.

For the rest, [fellow tutor] Mr. Rauber and I are quite satisfied with the children. They, like everyone else in the house, are in good health and send their regards to their papa, just as I have the honor of assuring you that I remain your most devoted servant, Hegel.

SCHELLING RESPONDED to Hegel's letter of April 1795 [11] on July 21 [13]. He sent Hegel a copy of his dissertation on the Gnostic heretic Marcion, which he had defended at the Tübingen seminary in the previous month (Schelling, *Of Marcion, Corrector of the Pauline Epistles—De Marcione Paullarum epistolarum emendatore*, 1795). The topic was the question of Marcion's alleged falsifications of the Pauline epistles. Schelling wrote that if he had enjoyed a freer atmosphere he would have chosen another topic, namely, "On the Outstanding Defenses of the Early Orthodox Church Fathers Against Heretics" (*Praecipuis orthodoxorum antiquiorum adversus haereticos armis*), which, in view of the subject, would inevitably have been, he notes to Hegel, "the most biting satire." Hegel comments on Schelling's dissertation in his letter of August 30 below [14], complimenting him for its "free spirit of higher criticism" and its refusal to "sacralize words." Hegel's own conscious affiliation with the tradition of Gnostic Christianity becomes apparent here. The mature Hegelian philosophy is in fact the most systematic expression of that tradition. Hegel maintained his recommendation of the spirit over the letter all his life. When he eventually came to define the Absolute itself as spirit, the contrast between spirit and external nature functioned as a systematic expression of a once prephilosophical distinction between the freedom of spirit and "mechanical minds" [6]. The distinction had practical significance for Hegel before it acquired systematic meaning. And even later he continued to uphold as a virtue the looseness with which he infringed upon the letter in copying and quoting texts [e.g. 211]. Still, the Hegelian version of Gnosticism was critical of the Platonic dualism of spirit and nature characteristic of the original, early Christian Gnostics (*Werke* XIV, 31, 134-35). For Hegel the kingdom of the spirit could be actualized only by remaining with external nature, transfiguring it rather than escaping from it.

Schelling's letter of July 21 repeats the connection noted by Hegel in his April 16 letter between the despotism of biblical literalism and political despotism. The absolutist Duke Ludwig-Eugen of Württemberg had just died in May and had been replaced by the more liberal Friedrich-Eugen. Schelling expressed the hope that the philosophical-theological despotism of the Tübingen seminary would thereby suffer a blow. The authoritarian, orthodox misuse of Kant's practical philosophy by Storr and Johann Friedrich Flatt had concealed, behind the mask of "Enlighten-

ment," a "moral despotism" even worse than the "physical despotism" of the Dark Ages: "It was never a question simply of knowledge, judgment, and faith, but of morality. It was never a matter of judging one's knowledge of talents, but only of judging one's character." Orthodox dogmatic faith as a postulate of practical reason became a condition of good character. Hegel replies on August 30 with a denunciation of all political systems that impose moral tests in the distribution of benefits and burdens. However good the intentions, such moralism—Hegel will argue in Chapter Six of the *Phenomenology*—inevitably breeds hypocrisy. The hypocrisy of the Kantian rule-moralist is overcome by his transformation into a Fichtean act-intuitionist. But the hypocrisy of the Fichtean stance eventually forces a retreat from overt deeds into mere self-righteous judgment of the deeds and motives of others (Gram, Robinson). The Tübingen seminary and its censors institutionalized this incoherence of the moral point of view. (See Ch 3 on Hegel's struggle against the moral point of view in himself.)

The Schellingian essays which Hegel discusses in the second paragraph of the August 30 letter are, first, *On the Possibility of a Form of Philosophy in General* (1794) and, second, *On the Self as the Principle of Philosophy*. . . (1795). Schelling had already given Hegel a resumé of his "Spinozist" position on February 4 [10]. Hegel's response shows his acceptance of a metaphysical use for Kant's doctrine of postulates of practical reason. Abandoning pre-Kantian metaphysics, Hegel now temporarily adopts the practical standpoint. Schelling, both on February 4 and in his essay, had upheld the Fichtean view that only endless progress toward the Absolute Self is possible for us, and Hegel on August 30 agrees that the task is one of "approaching" rather than absolutely becoming God. The objective physical world—what Hegel on August 30 calls "the world of appearances"—is postulated as a condition of the possibility of the finite self's endless practical striving towards the Infinite Self. The only reservation Hegel expresses regarding the second essay concerns the propriety of calling the Absolute Self the one and only substance, seeing that for Kant (and Aristotle) a substance possesses accidents elicited by interaction with other substances. Yet Hegel himself will in time adopt Schelling's Spinozistic usage. Even in this letter he encourages Schelling in the face of the public criticism of which Schelling had complained in his previous letter. Fichte and his followers Schiller and Schelling had been denounced in Ludwig Heinrich Jakob's *Philosophical Annals* (*Philosophische Annalen*), no. 4 (1795). Jakob was a Halle colleague of Kant's Leibnizian-Wolfian critic Johann August Eberhard. The public that had found Fichte's 1793 *Contributions to Correcting Public Judgments on the French Revolution* and other writings shocking was, Schelling wrote Hegel, now avenging itself. Fichte himself, after his initial success as a professor at Jena, had provoked the ire of German student associations by trying to reform their ancient customs, and was obliged to leave Jena for a while in the summer of 1795 [686].

Against this background, Hegel, on August 30, tries to cheer Schelling. In the second paragraph he emboldens Schelling against backward Kantians who refuse to part with their "not-self." The "not-self" is of course a Fichtean expression, and to refuse to part with it is at once to refuse to part with one's correlative self.

According to the Fichtean standpoint, which Hegel then shared with Schelling, the not-self can never be completely parted with, but the particular not-self confronted by Schelling's opponents might be overcome if only their self-identity would progress to the new Fichtean position. For Hegel the reactionary Kantians are in the untenable position of wishing to preserve the complete content of orthodox theism while at the same time basically transforming the form of justification from the precritical arguments of supersensible metaphysics to the Kantian practical justification. Schelling's 1795 essay, which Hegel cites below, makes it clear—in light of what Hegel will later call the identity form and content (*Werke* IV, 566-69)—that if the traditional form of argumentation is changed the content of what is being argued for must also change. The old, determinate, relative, or "conditioned" divine attributes, such as lordship and even personality in the usual sense, fall by the wayside. Schelling writes in *On the Self* that his position will displease "those who believe that Kant could hold knowledge that he considered impossible in theoretical philosophy to be possible in practical philosophy and thus could in practical philosophy again exhibit the supersensible world—God, etc.—as something external to the Self, as an object, as if what is an object would not have to be an object for theoretical philosophy as well and thus be knowable" (Schelling I/1, 201-02). Hegel's implied assent on August 30 is at once an implied abandonment of the theistic "moral proof" to which he still clung in his January letter [8] to Schelling. In the philosophical idiom of our own century—after Bloch, Kojève, and Altizer—it is permissible to call Schelling's and Hegel's view "atheistic." Yet as the 1798-99 *Atheismsstreit* surrounding Fichte made clear, "atheism" was hardly an acceptable password then. Nonetheless, the concept of God which Hegel on April 16 called "esoteric" by August 30 was made so obvious to him by Schelling's writings that only incurable mental density seemed capable of explaining its rejection.

Hegel also criticizes, though less severely, the review in the *Tübingen Scholarly Review* (*Tübingen Gelehrten Zeitung*) of Schelling's first essay on the "form of philosophy." Basing himself on Schelling's first two essays, Hegel denied the charge that through Schelling German idealism had restored a precritical dogmatic metaphysics positing the ultimacy of an absolute object rather than subject. Reinhold, in a December 1795 letter to Fichte (Fichte, *Gesamt Ausg* III, 2, no. 330), charged Schelling with a return to pre-Kantian dogmatism on the ground that Schelling deduced the moral law from the metaphysical Absolute rather than, as in Kant, deducing God from the moral law. It was true that for Schelling the categorical imperative commanding the finite self to overcome all limitations implied a concept of God as the absolute unlimited self. Use of the term "self" in reference to both the finite and the infinite self expresses an affinity between the two: limitation is experienced by the finite self as a barrier to its own self-actualization.

Clearly, the phrase "return to pre-Kantian metaphysics" can mean different things. In Reinhold's sense, Hegel himself, who by August 30 shares Schelling's position, is as pre-Kantian as Schelling, and yet Hegel refuses to grant that the Absolute could be an "absolute object." But even as Hegel was writing on the

30th to Schelling he was awaiting Niethammer's new journal to read the first part of Schelling's *Philosophical Letters on Dogmatism and Criticism*. The last part of this work was completed in Stuttgart in the winter of 1795-96, under the influence of Hölderlin, who had just returned from Jena with a new aversion to Fichteanism. Whereas the essay *On the Self* had denied that the Absolute could be an absolute object, Schelling's *Philosophical Letters* will openly seek to develop a "coherent dogmatism," i.e., an objective idealism constructed as a metaphysical superstructure on a Kantian epistemological base. Kant had refuted dogmatism theoretically. But anyone who understands the doctrine of practical reason and its postulates realizes the possibility thus opened up of establishing dogmatism anew on a non-theoretical base. Yet the "absolute object" to which we seek to abandon our finite selves, achieving a sort of pantheistic-mystical "rest in the arms of the universe" (Schelling I/1, 284), is really an infinite subject-object identity for Schelling. Gradually—as Schelling's position develops from the *Philosophical Letters* to the *Introduction to the System of Transcendental Idealism* (1800) and essays in the *Journal for Speculative Physics* (1800)—the metaphysics of the absolute object (more precisely, of an objective subject-object identity) and the associated Romantic philosophy of nature achieve first parity with, and finally independence of, Fichte's system of the absolute subject (Lauth, Ch 1-3).

On a post-Fichtean philosophy of identity Hegel and Schelling will both agree and diverge. They will agree that there is a standpoint higher than Fichte's subjective idealism, namely, a "system of identity." And both will eventually thus renounce Fichte's practical, subjective epistemological foundation for metaphysics. But Schelling will interpret identity as a Neoplatonic "point of indifference" between subject and object, self and not-self; while Hegel will construe identity as an identity-in-difference that preserves as well as transcends the distinction of subject and object. In light of a hermeneutic rather than panlogist (or Neoplatonic) interpretation to Hegelianism, identity-in-difference between subject and object is not the identity of internal relations, but that of sympathetic identification. And a metaphysical thesis of sympathetic identification between an infinite subject and an infinite object cannot be epistemologically founded and constructed, like Fichte's metaphysics of subjectivity, by wilful acts of postulation or subjective fiat. Nor is it founded in pre-Kantian demonstrative metaphysics. Its foundation is rather tentative and problematical, lying in hermeneutic conjectures steeped in the interpreting subject's self-abandonment to the life of a cosmic object (*Werke* II, 51-52). The dialectic in its conceptual development is necessary. But, however well-confirmed by a scholarly understanding of history and an empirically informed penetration of nature, the objectivity of the dialectic as a world process remains conjectural.

On August 30, 1795, however, this development is still in the future. Schelling has in fact not yet had the encounter with Hölderlin which Hegel supposes. Still, Hegel now sees Schelling's system in a more developed form than on April 16. Hegel is indeed so impressed with Schelling that he refers very disparagingly to his own essay on the "Positivity of the Christian Religion" (Nohl, 152ff), which by the end of August 1795 was surely more than a "plan," and which sought to show

how the history of the Christian church exhibited the restoration of authoritarian religion despite the original emancipatory impulse of Jesus. Hegel is even prepared to describe Schelling's system as the dominant system of the era, although he consoles his friend that he is ahead of his times, as if to say one could "jump out of one's century" (*Phil of Law*, Preface).

Hegel to Schelling [14]

Tschugg near Erlach via Bern, August 30, 1795

The gifts you have sent me, my good friend, have, along with your letter, given me the keenest pleasure and greatest delight. For this I am most obliged to you. It is impossible for me to write to you all that I have felt and thought in this connection.

Conjoined with the attempt to study Fichte's *Foundation* and, in part, with my own presentiments, your first work has enabled me to penetrate your spirit and follow its course much more than was possible on the basis of that first work alone—which, however, is now illuminated for me by your second work. I was once on the point of making clear to myself in an essay what it might mean to approach God. I at that point thought I had found how to satisfy both the postulate according to which practical reason governs the world of appearances and the remaining postulates as well. What previously floated before my mind darkly and in undeveloped form has been illuminated by your writing in a most splendid and satisfactory manner. Thanks be to you for this—for my sake. And everyone who holds the welfare of the sciences and the good of the world close to his heart will also thank you—if not now, then in the course of time. What will stand in the way of your being understood and your opinions being accepted is, I imagine, that in general people simply will not want to give up their not-self. Morally speaking, they fear enlightenment. And they fear the embattlement into which their comfortable system of convenience is apt to fall. Theoretically, they have indeed learned from Kant that the hitherto existing proof of immortality, the ontological [argument] and so on are not valid—they look upon this as the unmasking of an artificial illusion; see page 17 of your [first] work [Schelling I/1, 101-02]. But they have not yet understood that the failure of these adventures of reason, of the self in jumping to conclusions, is grounded in the very nature of reason. Accordingly nothing has changed with them even, for example, in their treatment of the attributes of God. Only the foundation is laid otherwise, and these divine attributes—as our Autobiographer [*Lebensläufer*] somewhere puts it—are still the master key with which these gentlemen open everything up. They are plain stupid [*capita insanabilia*] if even page 103 of your work fails to open up an understanding of this for them. They are too indolent to draw these conclusions themselves. Everything must be dictated to them in so many words [*totidem verbis*].

The reviewer of your first work [on the form of philosophy] in the *Tübingen Scholarly Review* may in other regards be worthy of respect, but to have interpreted the writing as affirming the highest principle to be an objective one truly shows no penetration of mind. It is probably Abel! Yet you have treated the dreadful reviewer [of the essay on the Self] in Jakob's *Philosophical Annals* as he deserved. Jakob

seems to want to play the knight to Fichte's philosophy as Eberhard did to Kant's, and their pompously advertised journals will enjoy a similar fate.

The gloomy prospects to which you point for philosophy in your letter have filled me with melancholy. . . [conclusion of sentence illegible].

You are aloof to the consequences that misunderstanding of your principles could have for you. You have tossed your work silently into the infinity of time. That you are occasionally the target if grins is, I know, a matter of disdain for you. Yet, as far as others who recoil before the results are concerned, you work might as well have never been written. Your system will suffer the fate of all systems produced by men whose spirit is ahead of the belief and prejudices of their times. One has decried and refuted these systems on the basis of one's own system [see Ch 11]. Yet meanwhile scientific culture silently pursues its course. And fifty years later the crowd, which merely swims along with the stream of its time, discovers to its surprise that works of which it heard polemically as containing long-refuted errors, if by chance it heard of such a work at all, now contain the dominant system of their times. I recall in this connection an opinion which a teaching assistant [*Repetent*] expressed about you last summer. He told me that you were all too enlightened for this century, but that your principles will perhaps come into their own in the next century. Such a judgment seems to me to be trite when applied to your case, though it is characteristic of the person who uttered it, and of the entire large class of those who do not think it proper to rise above the degree of enlightenment prevailing in their age-group, circle, or state, i.e., above the general level, but who entertain the comfortable hope that everything will work itself out in time and that there will then still be time enough for them to take a step forward. Or they rather hope they will be carried along, too, with the current of the time. Off the seat of your pants, gentlemen!

I recognized in your description the spirit that the previous government threatened to introduce. It is grounded in hypocrisy and cowardice—a consequence of despotism—and itself again fathers hypocrisy. It is the spirit which necessarily becomes dominant in every public constitution that pounces on the illusory idea of wishing to probe minds and hearts [Psalms 7:9], and to take virtue and piety as the norm in evaluating merit and distributing posts. I feel most deeply what is deplorable in such a situation—where the state descends into inner santom of morality and tries to pass judgment on it. It is deplorable even when the state means well, but infinitely more lamentable when hypocrites get control of this judgmental function, which *inevitably* happens, even if in the beginning the intentions were good. This spirit also seems to have influenced the filling of vacancies in your staff of teaching assistants, which—were it made up of good minds—could be of many a use.

You cannot expect observations from me on your writing. In this matter I am but an apprentice. I am attempting to study Fichte's *Foundation [of the Entire Science of Knowledge]*, 1794]. Allow me one observation that has occurred to me, so that you at least see evidence of my goodwill in satisfying your request for me to communicate observations to you. In paragraph twelve of your writing [*On the Self*] you ascribe to the "self" the attribute of being the only substance. It seems to me that if substance and accident are reciprocal concepts, the concept of substance

could not be applied to the Absolute Self, although no doubt it could be applied to the empirical self as it arises in self-consciousness. Yet the previous paragraph, where you ascribed indivisibility to the self, made me believe that you are not talking about this [empirical] self uniting the highest thesis and antithesis. Indivisibility is a predicate that would only be attributable to the Absolute Self, not to the [empirical] self arising in self-consciousness. The empirical self arises by self-positing as merely a part of the Absolute Self's reality.

What I might write concerning your dissertation [*De Marcione*] would serve to bear witness to my joy over the free spirit of higher criticism which holds sway in it, a spirit uncorrupted—as I could only expect from you—by the venerability of names. It is a spirit which keeps the whole in view, and which does not sacralize words. And I would also compliment your perspicacity and learnedness. I have at once found confirmation in it of a suspicion I have harbored for a long time, namely, that it would perhaps have done more credit to us and mankind if no matter what heresy, damned by councils and creeds, had risen to become the public system of belief, instead of the orthodox system maintaining the upper hand.

Fichte grieves me. Beer glasses and the swordplay of ancient student custom [*Landsväter*] have withstood the power of his spirit. Perhaps he would have accomplished more had he left them to their coarseness and aimed merely at drawing to himself a small, quiet, select group. Yet his and Schiller's treatment at the hands of would-be philosophers is still shameful. My God, what letter-bound men [*Buchstabenmenschen*], what slaves, still number among them!

I hope to obtain Niethammer's [*Philosophical*] *Journal* any day, and will take special delight in your contributions [*The Philosophical Letters*]. Your example and endeavors encourage me anew to follow as closely as possible the developing culture of our times.

Hölderlin, I hear, has been in Tübingen. You two have surely passed pleasant hours together. How I would have wished to have been the third man there.

My works [e.g., *Positivity of the Christian Religion*] are not worth speaking of. Perhaps I will shortly send you the plan of something I am thinking to work out. In connection with it, in time I shall especially make claims on your amicable assistance as well—and shall do likewise in the field of church history, where I am very weak and can best catch up by your counsel.

Since you will shortly be leaving Tübingen, please be so good as to inform me soon of what you plan to undertake and of your next place of residence, as of all that befalls you. Above all, take care of your health—for your sake and that of your friends. Do not be too stingy with the time you must devote to your recovery. Greet my friends warmly. I will enclose a letter for Renz with my next one. This time it would delay the departure of the present letter. In the meantime send him my warm greetings when you write! Farewell. Answer me soon. You cannot believe how much good it does me in my solitude to hear something from you and my other friends from time to time. Yours, Hegel

SCHELLING REPLIED in January 1796 [16], inquiring if Hegel had yet read his *Philosophical Letters on Dogmatism and Criticism*, the last part of which was soon to be published. Schelling surmised that the letters "could be of some interest" to

Hegel. Hegel's reply has been lost, but a few things are evident from Schelling's reply of June 20 [17]. First, it appears that Hegel's evaluation of the first part of the *Letters* was positive. Schelling simply writes: "A thousand thanks for your judgment on my *Letters*. It interested me to know whether they would bear the test of your criticism." Secondly, it appears from Schelling's June 20 letter that Hegel had been dejected:

Allow me to tell you still something else. You seem currently to be in a state of indecision and, according to your last letter to me, even depression—which is entirely unworthy of you. Fie! A man of your powers must never permit such indecision to come upon him. Tear yourself away from it as soon as possible. Should Frankfurt or Weimar not work out, allow me to schedule a plan with you to get you out of your present situation. . . . I repeat that your present situation is unworthy of your capabilities and ambitions. [17]

Alexandre Kojève attributes deep meaning to this depression (Kojève, 168), surmising that Hegel, in assimilating Schelling's system of the Absolute Self, was either experiencing the death throes of finite individual selfhood or already mourning its loss. On the other hand, it may simply have been a final expression of Hegel's frustration over his isolation in Bern, and of his desire to move to Frankfurt, where, as Schelling mentioned in his letter of January [16], Hölderlin was now residing. Schelling himself notes on June 20 Hegel's preference, expressed in the missing letter, for Frankfurt over Jena—a geographical preference which at once suggests an elective spiritual affinity with Hölderlin rather than Fichte in Hegel's mind.

TO FRANKFURT AND HÖLDERLIN

Hegel had already received a letter from Hölderlin [15] mentioning Frankfurt. The letter, dated November 25, 1795, was clearly preceded by correspondence from Hegel that has been lost. Hölderlin, having left Jena, was now in Stuttgart looking for a post as a private tutor. He had a particular post in Frankfurt in mind, and was looking for a similar post for Hegel in the same city; however, negotiations for the positions had been delayed due to uncertain military and political conditions. But Hegel had also expressed interest in a teaching assistantship back in Tübingen—a prospect that aroused sharp comment from Hölderlin:

You ask me about the teaching assistantship. So you want to be influenced by my decision? Dear friend! You do yourself an injustice. For now I have not even the slightest pretension to such a position, and I am simply as little up to it as to any position in which one *faces* diverse personalities and situations. Yet I unfortunately have still other quite particular reasons, which I must lay to my prior follies in Tübingen. For you, however, it would surely be a matter of duty, inasmuch as you might awaken the dead of Tübingen, though the city's gravediggers would no doubt do all they could to defeat you. If I thought your work might be in vain, I would consider it self-betrayal on your part for you to want to occupy yourself with this miserable tribe [*Volk*]. Yet whether your Swiss or our Swabians offer a preferable sphere of activity for you is admittedly a difficult question. . . . [15]

Two months later Hölderlin would assume tutorial duties with the Jakob Gontard household in Frankfurt. Hegel, instead of going to Tübingen, would follow Hölderlin to Frankfurt in a similar post a year later.

The only reference in Hölderlin's letter of November 25 to Hegel's current scholarly work concerns the Epistles of St. Paul: "Above all do not put aside your literary occupations. I already thought a paraphrase of the Pauline letters according to your idea would surely be worth the trouble." This statement should be seen in light of Hegel's own statement to Schelling of August 30, 1795, supporting "heresy," responding to Schelling's dissertation on the interpretation of St. Paul's letters by the Gnostic heretic Marcion.

The first "letter" from Hegel to Hölderlin is in fact a draft of a poem dated August 1796 and entitled *Eleusis*. The title, of course, refers to the Eleusinian mysteries connected with the worship of Demeter, the Olympian goddess of the harvest and fertility. The poem is a hymn written in a form inspired by Hölderlin's work in Tübingen and, via Hölderlin, by Schiller. Hegel's reference to the "genius of innocence," for example, is parallel to Hölderlin's "Genius of Audacity," the title of the poem to which Hölderlin refers on January 26, 1795. *Eleusis* begins by announcing Hegel's anticipation of reunion with Hölderlin in Frankfurt. Hegel casts himself and Hölderlin in the role of sons of the goddess, initiated into her mysteries. Reference is made early in the poem to the special bond which united Hegel and Hölderlin along with Schelling and Isaak von Sinclair in Tübingen. The poem then quickly moves into an outpouring of mystical pantheism attained by a return to nature from what Hegel will later call "civil society," but which in *Eleusis* he calls "the never-weary care of busy people" and "the alley and marketplace." That communion with the Infinite in nature is attained by abstraction from the finite world of contemporary society marks it, in terms of Hegel's own mature position, as an essentially Romantic communion with a limited and hence false infinite. Equally Romantic is the poem's nostalgic insistence that the gods have grown silent, that their mysteries cannot be revealed to thought and discourse. Their vehicle is rather myth, fantasy, silent deed.

In light of Hegel's position that the reconstruction of metaphysics must take place on a critical and hence pragmatic basis [14], *Eleusis* should not be interpreted as a return to pre-Kantian Spinozistic metaphysics. Yet the price of using Kantian practical postulates in order to avoid a reversion to pre-Kantian metaphysics in the context justification (*Werke* I, 69-70) seems to be a certain incoherence: the incoherence of a subjective idealist justification of objective idealism. An egoistic justification of altruism is really a reduction of altruism to egoism; similarly, the practical justification of self-loss in the arms of the universe in fact rules out such self-loss. If objective idealism, the genuine inwardness of nature, is necessary for a oneness of subject with object that is authentic rather than make-believe, the inwardness of nature cannot be purely postulated or dictated. But eventually Hegel himself would see that a non-cognitive justification by Kantian practical postulates is insufficient to ground his objective idealist world-view (*Encyc* ¶552).

Around me, in me, dwells rest—the never-weary care of busy people sleeps;
 liberty and leisure to me they accord.
 Thanks be to you, my Liberator, Oh Night!
 The moon's white misty veil envelops the hazy boundaries of distant hills;
 the bright beam upon the lake kindly gleams across to me.
 Faded is the recollection of daytime's tedious noise,
 as if from then to now lay years.
 Your image, My Beloved, passes before me along with the joy of days gone by;
 yet soon it yields to sweeter hopes of our reunion.
 The scene of our long-sought and ardent embrace depicts itself even now before
 my eyes.
 Then the questions, the scene of more secret and mutual searchings,
 what in the attitude, expression, temper of the friend has meanwhile changed—
 the bliss of certainty, of finding the loyalty of the old bond still more solid, more
 ripened
 —of this bond no oath has sealed, to live but for the free truth,
 never, never to make peace with the decree that regulates feeling and opinion.
 Now the wish which, over mountains and rivers, carried me to you lightly
 negotiates with more sluggish reality
 —yet soon a sigh announces their discord,
 and with it flies away the dream of sweet fantasies.
 Toward the vault of the Eternal Heaven my eye does rise
 toward You, Oh Brilliant Star of the Night;
 and the forgetting of all wishes, all hopes,
 streams down upon me from Your Eternity.
 Sense is lost in contemplation, what I called mine does vanish,
 unto the Boundless do I myself abandon.
 I am in it, am everything, am only it.
 The now-returning thought is startled, shuddering before the Infinite.
 Stunned, it grasps not this intuition's depth.
 Fantasy brings the Eternal closer to sense, wedding it to shape—
 Welcome, you noble spirits, you sublime shadows, from whose foreheads perfec-
 tion beams.
 That thought does not take fright. I feel it is also of my own homeland—
 this ether, this earnestness, this brilliance surrounding You.
 Ah! If the portals of Your sanctuary by themselves now sprang open,
 Oh Ceres, You who have been enthroned in Eleusis!
 If, drunk with fervor, I were now to feel the awe of Your proximity,
 to understand Your revelations, to unlock the majestic meaning of the images,
 to hear the hymns sung at the feast of gods, the high verdicts of their counsel.
 Yet Your halls have fallen silent, oh Goddess!
 Flown is the circle of gods back to Olympus from their consecrated altars.
 Flown from the grave of a desecrated mankind is
 the genius of innocence that brought them here in thrall!

The wisdom of its priests is silent.
 No sound of holy ordinations has found refuge with us;
 and in vain the scholar searches, more from curiosity than love of wisdom
 —which such seekers [claim to] have, despising You!
 To master wisdom they dig for words in which Your sublime spirit might be
 imprinted!
 In vain! Nothing but dust and ashes have they snatched,
 in which Your life will no longer be restored to them.
 Yet even in rot and lifelessness
 have those forever dead enjoyed themselves, self-content!
 In vain—of Your feasts no sign remained, nor of Your Image a single trace!
 To the son once initiated, the wealth of elevated teachings,
 the depth of unspeakable feeling, was too holy
 for him to value their dry signs.
 The thought already fails to apprehend the soul, which,
 time and space transcending, lost in presentiment of the Infinite,
 forgets itself, and now again to consciousness awakens.
 Whoever would to others speak thereof,
 speak he even with angels' tongues, must feel the poverty of words.
 The Holy viewed thus lightly, made through words so small,
 so makes him shudder that to him speech seems a sin
 and so, alive, he seals his mouth.
 The initiated having forbidden himself,
 a wise law forbid poorer spirits from making known
 what he in holy night has seen, heard, and felt,
 so that his higher self be not disturbed in contemplation by their noisy nonsense,
 so that their twaddle not provoke his anger toward Holiness Itself,
 so that the Holy not be so trodden in dirt as to be set to memory,
 that it may not become the sophist's plaything and commodity to sell for a few
 pence,
 a cloak for the smooth-tongued dissembler,
 even, yes, the paddle taken to the joyous lad, and in the end become so empty
 as to have its life-root merely in the echo of some foreign tongue.
 Your sons, oh Goddess, bore sparingly Your honor out into the alley and market-
 place,
 preserving it in the inner sanctuary of their heart.
 So on their lips You did not live.
 Their life has honored You, and in their deeds You still live on.
 This night as well have I heard Thee, Holy Goddess.
 Your children's life as well reveals often Thee to me.
 Often I sense Thee as the soul of their own deeds!
 Thou art the sublime sense, the true belief,
 who, being a Goddess, remains unshaken even if all else goes under.

THIS IS THE MOST substantial poetic effort by Hegel which remains. Later poems
 from his letters are shorter, largely occasional, festive, humorous, or honorific.

The following lines, for example, make no pretense at serious artistic purpose, even if they do share some thematic content—e.g., love, friendship—and are, like *Eleusis*, cast in a Greek idiom. They are a feeble echo of a time of intense association with Hölderlin, before Hegel's conversion to philosophy, when poetry was more vital than logical discourse.

Hegel to Unknown [469] [rhymes in German]

March 31, 1824.

Three sisters—kindness, cheer, and understanding—
You have chosen as your Fates;
'Tis they who weave your life's bond,
No one, even born at Sans-Souci,
Is free of misery; yet the strong hand
To conquer it, those Horae extend;
And allow those devoted to their grace
Everywhere to be led by love and friendship.

In kind remembrance, Professor Hegel

ON OCTOBER 24, 1796, Hölderlin described the post that Johann Gogel in Frankfurt had now firmly offered Hegel:

You would first have to educate two good boys of nine to ten years of age. You could live in his [Gogel's] house without ever being disturbed. And—this is not unimportant—you would have your own room, next to your two lads. . . . For every fair you will receive a very considerable gift. And you will have everything free except the hair stylist [*Friseur*], barber, and other such minor items. You will drink very good Rhine wine or French wine at the table. You will live in one of the most beautiful houses in Frankfurt, on one of the most beautiful squares in the city, Rossmarktplatz. You will find in Mr. and Mrs. Gogel reasonable people, free of pretension and prejudice, who for the most part live to themselves despite their aptitude—due to joviality and wealth—for social life. The reason is that they—particularly Mrs. Gogel—prefer not to associate with *Frankfurt society folk*, with their stiff ways and poverty of heart and spirit, so as not to defile themselves or spoil their domestic happiness. [19]

Hölderlin asked Hegel to address a letter to him expressing his response to the offer; Hölderlin would then read the letter to Mr. Gogel.

Having found a position for Hegel, Hölderlin is now more definite than before [15] in recommending against a teaching assistantship in Tübingen:

Let me finally, dear friend, impress this on your heart as well: a man who has remained faithful to you in heart, memory, and spirit despite rather variegated transformations in his situation and character, who will be your friend more deeply and warmly than ever, who will freely and willingly share every moment of life with you, whose situation lacks nothing but you to complete its happiness—this man will be living not at all far from you if you come here. I truly need you, dear friend, and I believe you will be capable of needing me as well. Once we have come to the point of cutting wood or trafficking in boot

polish or pomade there will be time enough to ask ourselves if it would not perhaps be better to become a teaching assistant in Tübingen. To me the stipend [for an assistantship] reeks throughout all Württemberg—and down here in the Palatinate as well—like a stretcher already alive with all sorts of worms. Seriously, dear friend, you have no right to subject your mind with such headlong abandon to such an unbearable test. . . . I would still have many a thing to tell you, but your arrival here must be the preface to a long, long, interesting, *unscholarly* book written by the two of us. [19]

Hegel responded in November 1796:

Hegel to Hölderlin [20]

[Tschugg near Erlach via Bern, November 1796]

Dearest [*Liebster*] Hölderlin,

So I once again have the pleasure of hearing something from you. Every line of your letter bespeaks your inalterable friendship for me. I cannot say how much pleasure your letter has given me, and, even more, how much hope [it gives] of shortly seeing you in person and embracing you.

Without lingering any longer over this pleasant prospect, let me speak right away of the main issue. Your wish to see me in the situation of which you write is by itself a sufficient guarantee to me that this situation can only be advantageous to me. I thus respond without hesitation to your call and forsake other prospects which have been offered to me. It is with pleasure that I join this excellent family, in which I can hope that my participation in the education of my future striplings will be happily crowned with success. One is, to be sure, ordinarily successful in filling their heads with words and concepts, but a house tutor will have but little influence on the more essential matters of character formation if the spirit of the parents does not harmonize with his efforts. With respect to economic and other conditions, it is, of course, often prudent to obtain exact clarification beforehand. Yet in this case I think I can dispense with this precaution. I leave it to you to care for my interests, since you will know best what is customary in Frankfurt in this respect and what the relation is between money and the necessities of life.

I will also be able to count on service in the house, and free laundry.

I refrain from asking you for clarifications regarding Mr. Gogel's wishes as to the instruction and special supervision of his children. Instruction for children of this age will still consist in such knowledge as belongs to all educated men. As for external behavior, I will best learn on the spot the greater or lesser degree of free play Mr. Gogel wishes to leave to the liveliness of youth. I will be able to reach a more complete understanding with him in person than is possible in letters.

Concerning the trip, I foresee its cost will not exceed ten carolins. I would wish you to speak beforehand with Mr. Gogel about it, and then, depending on what you find opportune, ask him either to send me a money order through you or reimburse me for the expense when I arrive in Frankfurt.

As much as I regret not being able to set out on the road immediately, it is nonetheless impossible for me to leave the house to which I am presently attached sooner than toward the end of the year, or to arrive in Frankfurt before the middle

of January. Since you have already begun to act as my intermediary in this, I must still ask you to communicate the essential content of my letter to Mr. Gogel, and at once to assure him of my high esteem. He will surely see for himself that part of what you may have told him about me, to instill the confidence in him with which he honors me, must rather be attributed to your friendship for me—in other words, that one friend cannot always be accurately judged by another.

Meanwhile, assure him that I shall make every effort to merit your recommendation.

I will say nothing of the extent to which my longing for you has contributed to my sudden decision. Nor of how the image of our reunion, of the joyous future which I shall share with you, will meanwhile hover before my eyes. Farewell!
Yours, Hegel

HÖLDERLIN REPLIED to Hegel on November 20, 1796 [21], reporting Mr. Gogel's satisfaction with the above letter. He added that Mr. Gogel considered Hegel's competence in French an advantage, but consoled his friend for having to provide elementary education by claiming he would derive more pleasure from it than from occupying himself with "the state and church in their present condition." He assured Hegel that he would have leisure time, since he would be relieved by special instructors for calligraphy, arithmetic, drawing, dancing, fencing, and so on. Hölderlin's expectations, raised by his imminent reunion with Hegel, were as high as ever in this letter, which is the last remaining document in their correspondence. Hölderlin reported having recently dreamt in anger of Hegel "still making all sorts of long trips around Switzerland," though he later took pleasure in the dream. Isaak von Sinclair (Ch 11), in nearby Homburg, was said to be delighted that Hegel was soon to arrive. Only Hölderlin, Schelling, and von Sinclair, apart from Hegel's family and an early classmate [1], were addressed in his letters by the familiar "du." The only dissonant note struck in Hölderlin's letter is a paragraph that, like Schelling's letter in June [17], speaks of a state of dejection Hegel apparently mentioned to Hölderlin in correspondence now lost:

Fraternally we want to share pain as well as joy, old friend of my heart. It is really good that the infernal spirits that I took with me from Franconia and the aerial spirits with metaphysical wings that have accompanied me since Jena [and Fichte] have abandoned me since I have been in Frankfurt. Thus I can still be somewhat useful to you. I see that your situation has somewhat deprived you likewise of your well-known ever-merry disposition. Just watch out! By next spring you will be your old self [*der Alte*] again. What you write about "guiding" and "directing," my dear faithful friend, has hurt me. So many a time you have been my mentor when my own disposition made a foolish lad of me, and you will still have to assume this role many a time again. [21]

HÖLDERLIN OR SCHELLING?

It is not difficult to conclude from the above correspondence that Hölderlin's and Hegel's expectations of each other were too high for disappointment not to have been inevitable. Hölderlin's failure to achieve reconciliation with the modern

world through art and poetry was inevitable. After arriving in Frankfurt, Hegel never again mentions the poet's name in his letters—except in response to Schelling or von Sinclair. Hölderlin's name never appears in Hegel's published works, though one may see a critique of Hölderlin in Hegel's treatment of the "beautiful soul" in the *Phenomenology*. Yet Hölderlin's 1797 contribution to Hegel's development can be judged greater than even Schelling's (Henrich, Ch 1). If Schelling won Hegel over to Fichteanism in 1795, in 1797 Hölderlin weaned Hegel away from Fichte. Hegel, Hölderlin, and Schelling all embraced a Romantic form of Spinozistic pantheism at Tübingen. But, until his reunion with Hölderlin in Frankfurt, Hegel followed Schelling in justifying the pantheistic view of nature in the nondogmatic Kantian manner as a postulate of practical reason [8]. Hölderlin in January 1795 [9] and Schelling in February 1795 [10] both equated Fichte's Absolute Self, which, as absolute, lacks all consciousness, with Spinoza's cosmic substance. The substance of nature and the Absolute Self were the same. Yet since Spinoza was considered a dogmatic, precritical metaphysician, the equation threatened Fichteanism with, as Hölderlin notes to Hegel [9], a return to dogmatism. The solution that Schelling found was to offer a practical rather than theoretical justification. If the self is to be self-actualized in its relation to nature, nature must be the self in disguise.

Hölderlin, however, discovered a way of justifying the above equation neither from the standpoint of pre-Kantian dogmatic metaphysics nor from that of practical reason. His new way drew neither on one-sidedly theoretical reason nor on Fichtean practical reason, but rather on Kant's third critique of judgment or aesthetic reason, which Hölderlin had already twice invoked in letters to Hegel [5, 9]. Thus Hölderlin—and Hegel in Hölderlin's footsteps—could view themselves as Kantians despite and indeed precisely because of their criticism of Fichte. In January 1795 [9] Hölderlin wrote to Hegel that the third critique embodied the entire spirit of the Kantian system and was the basis of Hegel's own reconciliation of the "mechanism of nature" with teleology. Yet Hegel's contemporary letter to Schelling at the end of January 1795 [8] shows that Hölderlin supposed too much, that Hegel's assertion of purpose in nature was still justified from the standpoint of "moral belief" as a postulate of practical reason. The contrast between Schelling's and Hegel's practical Fichtean standpoint and the aesthetic standpoint which Hölderlin had already won in 1795 is seen in the contrast between the first paragraph of the *Earliest System Program of German Idealism*, which if not authored by Schelling was at least written by Hegel under the influence of Schelling's Fichteanism, and Hölderlin's *On Judgment and Being* from the first half of 1795 (Harris, 510-16). Yet by 1797, Hegel—though not Schelling, who would soon join Fichte in Jena—had followed Hölderlin to an aesthetic rather than a purely theoretical or purely practical standpoint. Schelling also adopted an aesthetic standpoint in his *System of Transcendental Idealism* (1800), but unlike Hölderlin did so without abandoning an underlying practical, Fichtean standpoint. Artistic creation and aesthetic experience for Schelling were a means to realizing the aim of practical striving. From Hölderlin's standpoint they thus harbored the paradox of the selfish cultivation of selflessness. For Hölderlin aesthetic experience and love

do not subserve Fichtean practical striving; they replace it. It was not until the development of the philosophy of identity a little later that Schelling freed himself from the practical standpoint.

There is a Neoplatonic strain in Schelling's later identity philosophy as well as in Hölderlin's philosophy in Frankfurt, and Hegel won his own independent position by repudiating it in the case of both friends. The mystical pantheism Hegel imbibed since Tübingen itself had strong Neoplatonic as well as Spinozistic overtones. If the theoretical standpoint is that of knowing the truth, and if the practical standpoint is that of willing the good, Hölderlin's aesthetic standpoint is that of love for the beautiful. The true, the good, and the beautiful are, of course, different Platonic designations of Being, the One. Yet in Hölderlin's Platonism, which was influenced by Shaftesbury, the beautiful is not purely intellectual, but is a sensory anticipation of the One, which full intellectual intuition, were it possible, would behold. For Hölderlin the Kantian imperative of moral autonomy or self-determination, of total reconciliation between subject and object, could be actualized neither by purely theoretical knowledge nor by purely practical volition. For in pure knowledge the subject or knower is ruled by the truth or object known, while in pure willing the object or world is ruled by the willful subject. In both cases there is domination, which Hegel will thematize as *lordship*, whether of object over subject or subject over object. And as long as lordship defines the relation between subject and object they are unequal, making it impossible for the subject to recognize itself completely in the object and thus achieve autonomy. True identification of subject and object is possible only from the standpoint of love. For love neither dominates like pure volition, nor submits to domination like pure knowledge obliged to conform to the object known (Pöggeler, 164).

One-sidedly theoretical reason, which Hegel will call *observation* in chapter five of the *Phenomenology*, is distinct from what he calls *absolute knowledge* in the final chapter. Knowledge to be absolute must not be merely theoretical. It must identify with its object as *love*. The Hegelian identity of subject and object was not a subjection of object to subject. To view Hegelianism as a panlogism asserting the tyranny of the thinking self over empirical reality is groundless. Subject-object identity for Hegel rather expresses self-surrender to the general will, i.e., to community or love. For the object is another subject like oneself (*Werke* I, 124-28). And if beauty is, as Kant suggested, freedom in sensory form, subject-object identity is at once a recognition of beauty. Love affirms the other in its own free creativity. It wills not to surmount an obstacle but to bring to fruition the other's own willing. Raised to the level of scientific method, love becomes the "abandonment to the life of the object" of which Hegel speaks in the Preface to the *Phenomenology* (*Werke* II, 50). In Hegel's hands, Hölderlin's *love* will become *life* and finally *spirit*, the true definition of the Absolute, which systematic philosophy seeks to grasp concretely by conceptual labor. For the mature Hegel, the truth is an identity of nature and spirit attained by a rest from practical labor and reliving of the world's own conceptual life.

Hegel clearly abandons Neoplatonic features of Hölderlin's view. He does not view beauty as seen by aesthetic love as a faint revelation of the transcendent One,

contemplation of which can only be approached. The finite world is not an inexplicable emanation or falling away from the Absolute viewed as the self-sufficient One. The process of finite experience, relegated by Neoplatonism to the sphere of emanation from the Absolute, is for Hegel the process of the Absolute itself (Henrich, 95). The Absolute is process, and the comprehension of the One attained upon reascending after alienation from the One is enriched by the very experience of alienation, which that comprehension preserves and justifies. Hölderlin's Neoplatonism was a continuing bond with Fichte insofar as it retained the bad infinite, which may explain how Hegel in 1810—in a letter [167] to Hölderlin's close friend and expositor, von Sinclair—could still call Sinclair a "stubborn Fichtean."

The relation of Hegel to Hölderlin is not merely of historical interest. Hölderlin, who won poetic recognition only in our own century, has been upheld by Heidegger against Hegel. Hölderlin for Heidegger is the archetypal poet whose love allows beings to *be*, to manifest freely their Being (Heidegger, *Holzwege*), while Hegel is accused of reducing all presence of Being to a system of objects constituted by the philosophical labor of his subjectivity, of refusing to admit any presence which he has not constituted and presented to himself. For Heidegger, as more recently for *nouveaux philosophes* such as André Glucksmann (*Maitres penseurs*), Hegel evinces a quasi-Fichtean metaphysical will-to-power insistent on containing everything in its conceptual niche.

This Heideggerian critique repeats in different words Schelling's critique of Hegel from 1841: Hegel reduces all reality, the Absolute itself, to his System (*Offenbarung*, 111-39). Yet when Schelling criticized Hegel in 1841, he was really criticizing his own early Fichtean standpoint and subsequent Neoplatonic identity philosophy. Hegel, Schelling said, "made the identity philosophy itself into a positive philosophy, i.e., raised it to the absolute philosophy which leaves nothing outside itself" (Ibid, 122). Though the identity philosophy is essentially free of the Fichtean practical standpoint, Hegel allegedly reabsorbs it into such practical striving by his willful imposition of it on all reality. Perhaps Hegel, in his desire to be launched professionally in Jena, was not clear enough to Schelling as to his prior repudiation of Fichte and adherence to Hölderlin's more pietistic, nonvoluntaristic philosophy of love, nor about his repudiation of the undifferentiated Neoplatonic One. What Hegel was really about was not the inflation of the Neoplatonic One into all reality, but the self-thinking of love, life, or spirit.

The consequences for Hegel criticism of Schelling's misunderstanding of Hegel have been extensive. Heidegger is a case in point. Hegel's pretense at having yielded his personal self-will to the universal will of the Absolute is on Heidegger's showing false: in fact Hegel one-sidedly absolutizes essence apart from existence (Ibid, 122). But Hegel's letters to Voss [55] and von Raumer [278] suggest, contrary to Schelling and Heidegger, that the Absolute is not the system for Hegel, that the system for Hegel remains open, opening onto presences of the Absolute not objectified within it. And Christian Hermann Weisse notes in his 1829 letter to Hegel [603] that Hegel himself had granted orally that the world spirit might take forms never contemplated in the system.

Consideration of Hegel's relation to Hölderlin shows that such admissions are not accommodations to a realism inconsistent with the Hegelian philosophy but rather belong to that philosophy from its very origin in an encounter with Hölderlin. Philosophy sought to raise love to the level of thought, but did so as a labor of love itself. Love or aesthetic feeling remained the undissolved basis of thought's self-abstraction. And yet the rise to thought is indispensable. Love raised to thought is the absolute identity of theory and practice. Love is a form of practice, of willing. It is the willing of what is. But it is also theoretical, for the willing of what is requires a concept of what is. To raise love to the level of thought is thus to actualize the concept of love itself.

III

Frankfurt and the Unmaking of a Moralist

OF THE SIX LETTERS preserved from Hegel's years in Frankfurt, 1797-1800, five were written to Nanette Endel, who was employed in the Hegel household in Stuttgart when Hegel returned home from Bern for a few weeks before taking his post in Frankfurt. Conceivably the liaison represented Hegel's initiation to sexual love. It may even have provided Hegel with a concrete paradigm of the mystical union of souls, which, under Hölderlin's influence, became central to his quest for a way beyond heteronomy. Hegel did draw on the experience of sexual union shortly thereafter in his concept of love (Nohl, 378-82). And in view of his unquestioned later affair with Christiana Burkhardt (Ch 15) there would be no point in trying to spare the philosopher raised eyebrows. But if it is unnecessary to protect his reputation by conventional bourgeois standards, it is also unnecessary to assume an affair upon the slightest textual pretext. A careful reading of the letters makes it probable that both interpretive predispositions are wrong, that the relationship was neither platonic nor consummated. Moreover, even if it was consummated, H. S. Harris is surely right that the purely biographical fact that Hegel's concept of love could be traced to a relationship with Nanette Endel would be of very minor importance (Harris, 266).

The interest of the letters to Nanette must be sought elsewhere: in what they show of Hegel's frame of mind in Frankfurt, in the Rousseauian contrast developed between civilization and nature, in Hegel's reflections on Catholicism with the Catholic Nanette, etc. Most importantly, the letters evidence Hegel's gradual abandonment of the subjective, moralistic opposition to the world characteristic of his own youth. But it was an abandonment that was still halting, hesitating between an amoral mystical escape from the way of the world into the arms of nature and the enterprising embrace of the ethical world Hegel will later identify with adulthood.

We see from Hegel's February 1797 letter [22] to Nanette that she sermonized to Hegel on the blessings of her religion. Yet she displayed a gaiety and conviviality out of keeping with the austere seventeenth century Jansenist Sister Jacqueline Arnaud whom she cited. By mutual agreement, Nanette and Hegel associated Hegel with the figure of St. Alexis, the fourth century Roman saint who renounced his fiancée and all his material possessions on the eve of his marriage—in a classic example of Christian, or, more particularly, Catholic, asceticism. Hegel, for his part, had striven in Tübingen and Bern to reform prevailing social and religious

institutions according to a classical Greek model of public spiritedness. He had been critical of the individualistic fragmentation of German social life since his Stuttgart days (*Entwick*, 48-51). He abstained from the reigning spirit of corruption for the sake of a moralistic pedagogical mission of popular enlightenment. For this he, like a modern St. Alexis, had deferred marriage and a secure job. Yet—like the youthful author he would criticize in 1828 [574]—he had failed to communicate or find an audience.

Frankfurt was to begin his transformation from youthful moralist into philosophical adulthood. Signs of the impending transformation appear in the first letter [22] to Nanette: his earlier Romantic rejection of the world begins to yield to sober realistic acceptance in the second paragraph. On March 22 he will reiterate the idea, remarking on his own renewed likeness to the world [23]. The “world” meant in particular civil society, the arena of the burgeoning industrial and commercial revolution of which Frankfurt was a prime symbol in Germany. Through his study in Frankfurt of the Scottish political economist Sir James Steuart, Hegel would conclude that the dynamism of modern civil society was irreversible and that the resulting fragmentation of social life was not to be dissipated by the ideology or even the poetry of Hellenism (Plant, Ch 3). So Hegel would find his way back from the monkish renunciation of a St. Alexis to a more Protestant embrace of worldly institutions such as the family and civil society.

Yet the next two letters show a renewed attraction to nature. After having become more like the world in Frankfurt, on July 2 [24] Hegel withdraws into the “arms of nature” to escape society. One stimulus to this Rousseauian frame of mind may have been Schelling’s philosophy of nature in the *Philosophical Letters on Dogmatism and Criticism*, which promised a saving “rest in the arms of the universe” (Schelling I/1, 284). Hegel affirms the Rousseauian contrast of civilization and nature again on November 13 [25]. The letter also criticizes a form of Fichte’s morality of conscience. The ultimate retreat of conscience, Hegel will argue in the *Phenomenology*, is self-righteous judgment, which holds itself aloof from action as a standard of moral perfection by which the action of others is inevitably found wanting (*Werke* II, 508-11). Hegel’s criticism of Fichte’s—and Kant’s—moralism developed under the influence of Hölderlin. It went hand in hand with a new appreciation of forgiveness in Christian love (Nohl, 286-90), and with a new sense of community with nature as expressed in the Schellingian philosophy of nature. Nature was no longer merely the not-self posited to challenge moral striving. The criticism was also a renunciation of Hegel’s own prior moralistic stance [22] as a would-be preacher to an unresponsive world.

Hegel’s last letter to Nanette, with its reference to “these sorrowful times,” continues to express the *Weltschmerz* of the previous two—but not the first two—letters to her. The destruction along the Rhine which he mentions was the work of invading French armies in the previous two years. French General Louis-Lazare Hoche reached Frankfurt itself in April 1797. As Republican wars of national defense became expeditions of conquest, Hegel’s identification with the French Revolution became more difficult to defend. Hegel was not yet firmly committed to the middle way of “howling with the wolves” [22] between Fichtean moralism

and Oriental nature mysticism. The triumph of this way would wait upon the seemingly irreversible triumph and institutional taming of the Revolution under Napoleon. The Romantic view of nature was finally only a passing reaction to Fichtean moralism. The “mature” Hegelian position would view the transcendence of social alienation through mystical union with nature as an Oriental escapism leaving that alienation intact. Only when we howl with the wolves, taking on the alienation and contradictions of the world and doing the world’s work, is the world transfigured and redeemed. Salvation is *through*, not *from*, suffering.

Hegel to Nanette Endel [22]

Frankfurt, February 9, 1797

How much I am obliged to you, my gentle dear Nanette, for having insisted on writing to me as soon as possible, and for having rewarded me so richly and lovingly for my letter. How I thank you for being good enough to compensate me occasionally by written conversation for the loss of your company. Indeed an imperious fate grudgingly restricts me to this alone. But it is conquered by my power of imagination, which makes good what fate has withheld: the sound of your voice, the soft glance of your eyes, and all else of which life boasts over written words.

I have written more extensively to my sister [Christiane] of my situation, and to you I can only say that nothing remains for me to desire but the possibility of hearing from time to time in the evening an account of—*soeur Jaqueline*, etc. The tone in our house is equally removed from formality as from idle, dull, and heartless talk. What is done or said stems from friendship and cheer, and I would know of no one who would feel so very much at home here as you. Admittedly I have so far come to know only a few people more closely, but from how they live among themselves I believe I may correctly conclude that, at least among the class of men I have already seen gathered [here], the virtues of Saint Alexis will find no admirers, though perhaps nowhere else more than here would there be an opportunity to practice them in a grand style. And since I find it would be a completely thankless task to give people here an example of such style, and that Saint Anthony of Padua surely accomplished more while preaching to the fish than I would ever accomplish here through such a life, upon mature reflection I have decided not to try to improve anything in these people, but on the contrary to howl with the wolves. I have decided to preserve abstinence *à la* Alexis for the day my star for once leads me to Kamchatka or the Eskimos, and only then to raise my hopes of being able by my example to help these nations resist many sorts of luxury—such as the wearing of taffeta bodices, a host of rings, and such things.

I am surrounded on all sides by objects which remind me of you. Next to my bed hangs the lovely watch chain [*porte-montre*]; over my little table hangs—according to my servant’s arrangement—the most darling small pouch for my toothpicks [*guisidents*]. Each “*ist*” reminds me of your pronunciation. In Swabia I was still saying “*ischt*.” But ever since inhaling Palatine air I hiss only fine “*ists*.”

How anybody, especially the Privy Councillor [Hegel’s sister?—*Briefe* I,

442], could have the idea of calling you roguish I do not understand at all. Against that charge brashly invoke my own testimony. Who will say of water that it is hard, of a lamb that it is impatient, of a brook that it flows upward, or of a tree that it grows downward! There is also a Catholic church here, or several, I believe. I already saw many a dirty Capuchin running about. But they seem to me stricter father confessors than the one to whom you usually confess, and I do not believe that you would get off so cheaply here. They are also probably stricter than you yourself, who have absolved me without inflicting a penance. As soon as I learn that there is a high mass I will go to perform my religious duties and to lift my soul in prayer to any beautiful image of the Virgin Mary.

Farewell, my friend. Very cordially greet and kiss [*grüssen und k. . .*] my dear friend [Wilhelm Friedrich] Seiz in my name. But do so only in my name, add nothing of your own, nothing from your own heart, from personal involvement. Otherwise you might easily be slightly embarrassed if you were again to confess in an open room. Many compliments to your dear sister as well! In the order of my feelings I surely ought to have placed these compliments ahead of those greetings. But in this matter one is often guided out of politeness by the person one is addressing. Tell your sister how much I regret having missed saying goodbye to her. Farewell, dearest friend. Continue to remember kindly your true friend, Hegel.

NO DOUBT Hegel's relation to Nanette had a romantic element. At least he did not carry ascetic renunciation as far as a ban on dancing [27]. The above suggests Nanette felt her flirtations with Hegel were serious enough to be worth confessing. Still, it should not be forgotten that Nanette and Hegel had been under the watchful eyes of Hegel's father and sister in the family home. Moreover, they were of different religious affiliations. Hegel probably had some concern for the dignity of his position as a member of the household and as a recently graduated member of the Protestant clergy. Yet Nanette was unintimidated enough to tease Hegel—e.g., about his academic title as Master [24, 25]—as much as he teased her.

Hegel to Nanette Endel [23]

Frankfurt am Main, March 22, 1797

I appeal first of all, my dear friend, to your kindness, hoping to obtain from it quicker forgiveness for my long silence than I am able to grant to myself. I only hope this letter finds you still in Stuttgart, and serves in my place to give you a second farewell and to wish you all the best. Because of your [impending] departure from our house, you appear to become even more separated from me. I can imagine the sadness your departure will cause my sister and many another as well. How much would I have wished your guardian spirit to bring you to these parts! My own bad example does not permit me to ask you to inform me very promptly of your future situation. But do charge my sister with letting me know right away the news you will give her. You demand nothing more of men than to be good. But even if you should not find this demand completely fulfilled, you will nevertheless oblige them to turn their evil side only against one another, not against you. It will

please me greatly if you continue your friendly correspondence, and I promise to be more deserving of it by greater punctuality in replying.

I remember having traveled through Memmingen and having come upon a nice fertile region which is in particular completely sown with hop gardens. On the banks of the Iller you will surely find nice parts. Your spiritual nourishment is surely also well provided for. I remember having been in a Franciscan monastery. I do not know whether I should say that I fear the good seed which the young Protestant clergy in Stuttgart has sprinkled into your soul may risk being choked off there, or rather that such weeds may come to be rooted out there. At least you must sincerely procure a rosary, prepare longer for confession, pay more respect and reverence to the saints in word and deed, etc.

Here in Frankfurt I am becoming somewhat more like the world again [*wieder etwas mehr der Welt gleich*]. At least once a week I attend the theater. Recently I also saw the *Magic Flute* [by Mozart], which was performed with beautiful stage settings and costumes but bad singing. Tomorrow [Mozart's] *Don Juan* will be performed, which I am very eager [to attend] due to the music. An actor who is said to have been also in Stuttgart and whom you perhaps have seen as well—[Friedrich Ludwig] Schröder—is especially successful with the female portion of the audience.

My brother [Ludwig] asks me to tell you many a nice thing in his name. Do the same in my name with your dear sister. Farewell. I commend myself to your friendship. Your sincere friend, Hegel

Hegel to Nanette Endel [24]

Frankfurt am Main, July 2 [1797]

This being, dearest friend, the first time in a long while that I have again taken pen in hand to write anyone at all a letter, let it be to pay a most oppressive debt by discharging the pleasant duty of sending you, a kindhearted friend, news of myself. In letter writing my credit is generally already so bad that I really feared losing some of the love of my friend by such negligence. I moreover count so heavily on your indulgence that I am constantly sinning. For, as you yourself know, indulgence spoils. And even if you put on a downright angry face and gave a downright sour mien to your written words, by some betraying feature or another I would still always recognize you. I could not possibly see the sour face, but would still only see you yourself.

As far as I recall your previous history, fate has not yet acquainted you with country life from firsthand experience. I am sure, however, that you had no need to get used to it first in order to find pleasure in it, but that right from the start you found yourself [at home] in it without any disharmony, without the mood into which nature, free and beautiful, transposes us finding any resistance in you. I must confess it would take me some time to purge myself a little of the dross injected into us by society, city life, and the quest for distraction which they produce—[and] of the longing for such distraction expressed in boredom. The recollection of those days passed in the country even now ever drives me out of Frankfurt. And so as I reconciled myself there in the arms of nature with myself and with men, I thus

often flee here to this faithful mother, separating myself again with her from the men with whom I live in peace, preserving myself under her auspices from their influence, forestalling an alliance with them.

If in one of the coming summers you can still be found in your beautiful Franconia, it could just be that I may visit you there in a year or two. According to my reckoning we are only separated by approximately twenty-four hours from each other, a distance that can be covered in two or three days. Today is Sunday. Tuesday I could already be with you. And yet I am separated from you by years.

What my sister and the people in Stuttgart generally are doing I have no idea. I do not think I have heard from them for a few months.

I hope, based on my anticipation, that you will not be vindictive, and that you will describe your region for me so I can at least roam through it with you in thought. Soon—in the true sense of the word—you will receive from me a few sequels to [Karoline von Wolzogen's anonymously published] *Agnes von Lilien* [in Schiller's *Horen*], which interested you so much. How much I would like to be able to read it to you!

What if your gracious mistress were for once to get the idea of trying to make the trip from Franconia to Swabia via Frankfurt? The detour would not be that long.

As soon as you stopped holding me to piety, it was all over. I never more than pass by churches. According to your letter, in church attendance at Memmingen you find not only no consolation for itself, but also cause for sorrow and regret in the miserable sustenance being handed out to the two-legged believers.

July 17

I had written this far some time ago, and would have left this sheet lying around for still some time if a higher power, my guardian spirit, had not suddenly awakened me from my lethargy. My patron himself, the blessed Saint Alexis, called out to me in symbols on the day of his celebration: Wake up, you who sleep, arise from the dead; only in friendship is life and light!

Since I feel myself too unworthy to approach this Saint, he could easily regard this lack of reverence and service—which has its source in the very feeling of my baseness—as sinful negligence. He could thus deprive me of his clemency and grace. Fortune has accordingly bestowed upon me a mediator between saints and human beings who represents me before him, and through whom the Saint allows his grace to flow toward me.

I accept with all due respect one of the significant symbols—the ecclesiastical collar—along with what he thereby wished to recall to me. I will guard both as a precious treasure, a relic, and take great care not to profane them by usage and application. The other, more beautiful, human symbol—the wreath that unites parted friends—I wish to make the companion of my life. The flowers are of course dry, and life has vanished from them. But what on earth is a living thing if the spirit of man does not breathe life into it? What is speechless but that to which man does not lend his speech? This little wreath will always lip to me: “There lives somewhere a small black-eyed being—a dove nonetheless—who is your

friend.” And as proof that I gladly allow the small wreath to tell me this, I will occasionally leave a visiting card with my address, as is now the fashion in the world. One drives up, makes someone's mouth water as if he were now to get much to hear, and then simply leaves a card.

Farewell! I am going to bathe in the Main. The waves which will cool me perhaps you yourself saw flowing by Obbach. Your friend, Hegel—still, as ever, “Master” in the address

Hegel to Nanette Endel [25]

Frankfurt, November 13, 1797

For a long time, dearest friend, I have had an almanac on my desk that was meant for you, and that I am finally sending. I only hope it will not have lost the appeal of novelty for you because of my delay. Yet this story [?] can be always reread from time to time. In any case, only the pleasure of repeated viewing is decisive in the beauty of a work of art—the fact that one gladly returns to it. I am anxious to know how this story appeals to your sensibility. Many passages and character traits in it will not be lost on a sensibility such as yours—which distinguishes the natural from the affected and gives its sympathy to the former.

For your kind letter written in Franconia and Upper Swabia I thank you. I envied your good fortune in being able to enjoy freely the country life and to live with people who not only did not disturb you in this enjoyment but to whom you could attach yourself. By its contrast to the stillness of nature, an impure mood of souls offends much more in the country than in the city, where unnaturalness more or less surrounds one and where one is less able to collect oneself and thus does not demand any tranquility from others.

I attend the theater more assiduously here than in Stuttgart. Music and a few actors are excellent. I do not know if you still knew the singer Lang in Stuttgart. He is now at the local theater, but earned little acclaim in his first tryouts here. There are a few pretty girls among the actresses. They play nice roles of their sex, doing so as well and naturally onstage as such roles are said to be foreign to them offstage. I say “are said to be” because I do not know by firsthand knowledge. People's pretended love of justice and the strict upholding of virtue and perfection in judging others I am inclined to regard as the feeling of their own weakness and unworthiness, and as their inability to recognize anything pure and beautiful apart from themselves.

I do not know why I always fall into general reflections. But you will forgive a man who once was a Master, and who drags himself around with this title and its accessories as with a thorn in the flesh from an angel of Satan [2 Cor 12:7]. You will still remember our way and manner from Stuttgart. I have every reason to assume that longer association with you would have liberated me more and granted me a greater capacity for merrymaking.

Farewell, and may you preserve your friendship for me! Your sincere friend, Hegel

Not to thank you, dear Nanette, for such a beautiful dear gift made by the hand of friendship, a gift to which you had to devote so many moments and by which I could have the pleasant thought of you remembering me during some of these moments—not to thank you for this long endeavor for me, for this long remembrance of me over many months, to say nothing at all—is just too awful, and is in fact unpardonable. Do not spare me. Tear me to pieces, tell me yourself how irresponsible my negligence is. You do nothing but exercise justice. Burden me with hearing masses, with telling beads, with as many rosaries as you like, I have deserved it all. Just do not do me the injustice of believing I have not appreciated the value of your gift. You consecrated it in memory. To know good pure souls among human beings, to preserve their image in one's heart, and to live in one's faith in them—this is the best treasure a person can gain. So I will remain equally loyal to my faith in you, to your memory. But why have you, loose child, added a butterfly to a gift offered to memory? Do you not feel the contradiction? A butterfly flutters from one flower to another without recognizing the soul of either. The fleeting theft of a few sweets is the butterfly's pleasure, but it has no sense of what is immortal. With a base soul, memory is only a soulless impression on the brain, the mark on a material that always remains different from the imprint it possesses and never becomes one with it.

I hear that your Babet [Nanette's sister?—see *Briefe* I, 443] is married. My sister no doubt attended the wedding. There must have been much merrymaking. We would have surely also danced a lot—like the evening before my departure. I have turned in circles ever since. Have you not had any balls in Memmingen? I very much like balls. It is the happiest thing there is in our sorrowful times.

The migratory birds have already again searched out their summer abode, and thus you too are probably already back in Franconia. This spring I went to Mainz, where I have seen for the first time in its quiet, still greatness the Rhine, on whose beautiful banks you passed your youth. In Schaffhausen I was struck by its wild raw energy. But how everything is devastated and destroyed around the quiet stream! There is no village on its banks which does not lie half in ruins, its tower and church no longer with even a roof, with nothing left but the barren walls.

I am sending this letter to my sister for handling since I do not know where you are.

Live happily. May people never trouble the serene peace of your mind. I may, however, ask you not to take revenge on me through silence. Continue to remember me kindly. Your true friend, Hegel

IV

Reunion and Break with Schelling:
Jena, 1801-1807

HEGEL'S CONVERSION FROM would-be religious poet following in the footsteps of Hölderlin in Frankfurt to philosopher allied to Schelling in Jena is reflected in his letters beginning in 1800. Yet Hegel no sooner arrived in Jena than the position of the city began to decline as a cultural middle point between the German South and the German North. In Schelling's and Hegel's respective characterizations of the breakdown of this middle point, the philosophical difference between them comes to the fore. This difference—already present in correspondence—merely becomes public by 1807, when a letter by Schelling expresses resentment of Hegel's criticism of the Schellingian "point of indifference" in the *Phenomenology*. In alliance with Schelling, Hegel had secured his identity as a philosopher. In contention with Schelling, he now established the identity of the Hegelian philosophy.

TO JENA AND SCHELLING

While Hölderlin's importance to Hegel is a discovery of twentieth-century scholarship, his relation to Schelling is a matter of long-standing historical record. Schelling contributed much of the technical philosophical language with which to raise spirit to the level of thought. After, beginning in 1796, Hegel's sights turned to Hölderlin and Frankfurt, his correspondence with Schelling broke off for a few years. In 1798 Schelling received a call to a professorial chair in Jena. Finally, in November 1800, Hegel wrote from Frankfurt to his friend again [29], announcing his conversion to systematic philosophy and his intention of moving to Jena, then the undisputed center of German letters and philosophy.

Hegel to Schelling [29]

Frankfurt am Main, November 2, 1800

I do not think, dear Schelling, a separation of several years can be an embarrassment to me in appealing to your kindness with respect to a particular wish. My request concerns a few addresses in Bamberg, where I wish to stay awhile. Since I am finally able to leave the situation in which I have been [presumably because of an inheritance following the death of Hegel's father—letter 28], I am determined to spend a period of time in independent circumstances, devoting it to works and studies already begun. Before daring to entrust myself to the literary revel of Jena, I first want to fortify myself by a sojourn in a third place. Bamberg occurred to me

all the more because I hoped to find you there. [Yet] I hear you are back in Jena, and I do not know anybody in Bamberg; nor do I otherwise know how to get an address there. Permit me therefore to ask you for such an address, and for your good advice. Your advice would be most helpful to me in finding an arrangement for room and board and the like; the more definite the information you can give me, the more obliged I will be to you and the greater will be the time and useless expense I will save; it will be equally agreeable to me if you will procure access to a few literary acquaintances for me. Should your knowledge of localities give preference to another place—Erfurt, Eisenach, or the like—I ask you to advise me. I am looking for inexpensive provisions, a good beer for the sake of my physical condition, [and] a few acquaintances. The rest does not matter—though I would prefer a Catholic city to a Protestant one: I want to see that religion for once up close. Excuse my request as being due to the lack of acquaintances who would be more closely situated [to Bamberg], and pardon my fuss over such details in the name of our old friendship.

I have watched your great public career with admiration and joy; you leave me the choice of either speaking humbly of it or wanting to display myself before you as well. I avail myself of the middle term: I hope we rediscover each other as friends. In my scientific development, which started from [the] more subordinate needs of man, I was inevitably driven toward science, and the ideal of [my] youth had to take the form of reflection and thus at once of a system. I now ask myself, while I am still occupied with it, what return to intervention in the life of men can be found. Of all the men I see around me, only in you do I see someone whom I should like to find as my friend with respect to both [public] expression and impact on the world; for I see that you have grasped man purely, i.e., with all your heart and without vanity. With respect to myself, I thus look to you so full of confidence in your recognition of my unselfish endeavor—even should its sphere be lower—and in your ability to find merit in it. As to my wish and hope of meeting you, no matter how long it takes I must also know how to honor fate and must wait upon its favor to determine how we will meet.

Farewell. I beseech you to answer me soon. Your friend, Wilhelm Hegel
Remember me to our friend [Karl Wilhelm Friedrich] Breyer.

THE PATHOS of the situation, in which Hegel casts pride aside and displays considerable vulnerability to Schelling, comes to sudden expression in Hegel's rare use, in signing off, of the familiar *Wilhelm*.

This letter, apart from the interest in Catholicism to which it attests, provides a valuable summing-up by Hegel of his prior intellectual development at an important turning point in his life. By the "more subordinate needs of man" he ostensibly means the political, aesthetic, and religious needs that concerned him in his private writings, first published in this century by Hermann Nohl under the title of *Early Theological Writings*. By the "ideal of [my] youth" he refers to the essentially pagan, Romantic-Hellenistic ideal of a free people united in a religion described as at once "subjective" and "public" ("Fragments on Folk Religion and Christianity," 1793-94). The transformation of this ideal into a reflective and scientific "system" means suspension, in response to both the initial failure and

the increasing imperialism of the French Revolution, of Hegel's "revolutionary practice" as a historical critic of society and religion. The endeavor, in any case, had only the most meager public impact, since Hegel had merely succeeded in publishing his anonymous edition of Cart's letters on the abuses of the Bern aristocracy.

Yet even in withdrawing from the difficulties of practical engagement into the theoretical realm, Hegel is still concerned to maintain a connection of theory to practice, to find a way to return to practical "intervention" in human affairs. Hegel thus begins his career as a theoretical philosopher with a repudiation of pure theory. Theory arises out of and returns to practice: it is a necessary recourse, though one that for Hegel would last a lifetime. His *German Constitution*, on which he resumed work upon moving to Jena in 1801, was surely not itself the return to intervention in the life of men which he sought. Apart from a somewhat forlorn appeal for a German Theseus (Lasson, 135-36) or Machiavellian Prince (Ibid, 110-16) on a white horse, its effect was to promote resigned understanding of what is (Ibid, 5). The resolution of the seeming contradiction of a simultaneous commitment to both theory and practice is found rather in the 1801 *Differenzschrift* regarding the advance of the Schellingian over the Fichtean philosophy, where theoretical philosophy, speculative self-comprehension, is proclaimed as the practical need of the present world-historical age (*Werke* I, 44-49). Instead of a "return" from philosophy to practical engagement, there is a deepened understanding of philosophy as itself an expression of such engagement. Hence the Hegelian "identity" in the place of the Marxist-like "unity" or "alternation" of theory and practice.

JENA AND THE DIALECTICS OF NORTH AND SOUTH

From January 1801 until the summer of 1803 Hegel and Schelling collaborated on their *Critical Journal of Philosophy* (*Kritisches Journal der Philosophie*) and for some of the time even lived in the same house. The summer 1803 saw both Schelling's marriage to Caroline Schlegel and his departure for a new post at the University of Würzburg, which had just recently been secularized and was now establishing a Protestant faculty. Schelling left in the midst of the scandal caused by his courtship and marriage with Caroline, whose divorce from August Wilhelm Schlegel was completed in April of the same year. The University of Jena, however, had been in decline as a center of German culture since the departure of Fichte in 1799 in the aftermath of the *Atheismsstreit*. Both Paulus and Niethammer left Jena for Würzburg in autumn 1803, leaving Hegel behind in Jena. On July 11 Schelling [38] wrote Hegel from Stuttgart before going to Würzburg, announcing his marriage but also mentioning Jacobi's recent attack on both Schelling and Hegel: Friedrich Köppen's *Schelling's Doctrine, or the Entire Philosophy of Absolute Nothing, With Three Related Letters by Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi*, 1803. Yet it is Hölderlin's mental condition that touches Schelling the most in the letter:

The saddest spectacle I have seen during my stay here [Stuttgart] was that of Hölderlin. Ever since his trip to France—where he had gone on the recommendation of Professor Strölin with wholly false conceptions of what he would

have to do in his post, returning immediately because demands appear to have been made on him which in part he was incapable of fulfilling and which in part he could not reconcile with his sensibility—ever since this fateful trip his mind has been completely disturbed. And though he is still to some extent capable of doing a few kinds of work—for example translations of the Greek—he otherwise finds himself in a state of total mental absence. The sight of him quite shook me: he neglects his exterior to the point of disgust; and though his speech does not greatly indicate a state of insanity, yet he has completely adopted the outer manner of those in such a state. There is no hope of curing him in this land. I have thought of asking you if you wished to take charge of him if he came perhaps to Jena, which he wanted to do. He needs quiet surroundings and probably could be put back in shape by sustained treatment. Anyone who wanted to take charge of him would absolutely have to function as his governor and rebuild him from the ground up. If only one had first triumphed over his exterior he would no longer be a burden, since he is quiet and withdrawn. [38]

Hegel to Schelling [40]

Jena, August 16, 1803

Above all let me wish you happiness in your marriage. In all justice I should at least send a sonnet marking the occasion, but you are in any case already used to making do in general with my prose, which does not permit one to be more expansive in such matters than a handshake and an embrace.

The enclosed package was sent to me by Dr. Assal [a Jena lawyer representing Schelling in litigation against his publisher, Christian Ernst Gabler], while the letter was sent by the post office. I hope that both will still reach you in Swabia. If your positive assurance to me as well as to [Schellingian natural philosopher Franz Josef] Schelver had not preceded, after all that we heard from Franconia we would have thought you to be by fall in Würzburg rather than Italy.

I thank you for the various souvenirs of Swabia which you have given me. I did not expect the various notable art objects you found in Stuttgart. Yet it is surely still little to maintain a counterbalance to the otherwise trite and uninteresting system at home there. Even more unexpected [was] Hölderlin's appearance in Swabia. And in what shape! You are certainly right that he will not be able to recuperate there. Yet, what is more, he is beyond the point where Jena can have a positive effect on a person. And the question now is whether, given his condition, rest will suffice for him to recuperate on his own. I hope that he still places a certain confidence in me as he used to do, and perhaps this will be capable of having some effect on him if he comes here.

For some time it has scarcely been possible to keep up with all the news here. The latest is that the *Literary Review* [*Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung*, edited by Christian Gottfried Schütz]—after staying in Würzburg for a few days and after, upon its return [to Jena], giving assurance quite definitely that it would move there [to Würzburg] under excellent conditions—is now most certainly moving with bag and baggage, [coeditor-librarian Johann Samuel] Ersch, etc., to Halle. A few days ago [coeditor-anatomist Justus Christian] Loder brought back the definitive settlement of the matter from Potsdam, where he traveled to [an audience with] the King, whom, however, he has likely not seen.

[Law Professor Anton Friedrich Justus] Thibaut received four calls, but is remaining here with a 300-thaler increase. [Law Professor Gottlieb] Hufeland has received very advantageous offers from Würzburg; a 200-thaler increase has been forwarded from Weimar; yet it seems that he, like [rationalist theologian Heinrich] Paulus, will accept the call to Würzburg if an official invitation is extended. Finally, [Law Professor Friedrich Ernst] Mereau is becoming head bailiff in the Coburg region, and [Law Professor Georg Friedrich von] Martens from Göttingen has been called to replace him. [Physician Samuel Thomas] Sömmering has not accepted; his first condition was that no students be allowed to approach him. He has suggested in his place [Physician Johann Gottfried] Ebel, who has written about the Swiss mountain people [cf *A Portrait of the Swiss Mountain People*, 1798]—should you still see Hölderlin [who knew both Sömmering and Ebel in Frankfurt], please tell him this. [Karl Ludwig] Fernow will arrive here soon. [Fernow taught aesthetics in Jena from 1803.]

I should now still have to write to you of learned matters or myself, but there is little to be said about either; it should please me to receive something on Jacobi from you. [Publisher Karl Friedrich Ernst] Frommann awaits another manuscript from you. [Jena Philosophy Professor Johann Baptist] Schad is having a physical apparatus made for himself and will lecture on experimental physics in the winter; others think he is in the process of going mad. One more thing: [Catholic theologian Franz] Oberthür wrote from Würzburg to [art historian Karl August] Böttiger that, *regardless* of the notice in the *German Mercury* [*Deutschen Merkur*], you will go there anyway; these people from Würzburg—Böttiger, Schütz—seem to stick together most closely.

Schelver has informed me of [your brother] Karl's forthcoming scholarly walking-tour. Tell him how much I am pleased for him; *perhaps* I will see him in Vienna next summer if he is still there, and then even more see you in Italy. The matter, however, is still far off, and thus nothing more about it.

Please remember me most kindly to your wife. I hope you will write to me from time to time on your way, and even put it to you as a request. I will not fail, if you are interested, to inform you at your address of local matters, and of myself and your acquaintances. Farewell, and remember me kindly. Your Hegel

IN HIS REPLY of August 31 Schelling [41] refers to the breakup of the Jena school as the "explosion" of the "point of indifference" between Northern and Southern Germany. Loder and Schütz returned north to Prussia, while Schelling, Paulus, and Niethammer came back south. "The Prussian Monarchy," Schelling writes, "is gradually transforming itself into an institution for the use of worn-out and ill-starred scholars, and in this climatic distribution there seems revealed a veritable law of nature according to which we shall shortly be able to assign each individual his place." Schelling, already in the South, sees the explosion of his point of indifference with relative equanimity insofar as the better element has fallen to the South; while Hegel in his reply of November 16, still living in Jena, sees first-hand the "damage" done. Both agree that the fate of those who have returned to the Prussian North is unfortunate. Yet Hegel interprets Jena's fall from the pinnacle of German letters rather as a "breakdown of the universal" into particular "ele-

ments" than as an "explosion" of the "point of indifference." Hegel, in the Preface to the *Phenomenology* (1807), with its reference to "the night in which all cows are black" (*Werke* II, 22), will of course be interpreted to have ridiculed Schelling's identity philosophy and its view of the Absolute as the point of indifference. Yet the universal that Hegel upholds here in 1803 against the "point of indifference" is clearly already the concrete universal, an organic whole of distinguishable through inseparable, internally related elements. All elements distinct from any given element are yet one with that element, i.e., are what they are in and through it. The unfortunate breakdown of the universal, however, signifies the falling apart of the organic whole into a mechanical aggregate, an aggregate in which each element enters into a life and death struggle with others for the possession of what in the state of "nature" remains up for grabs by all. Such a breakdown, occurring in the literary world in Jena, was of course being repeated on the political level in all Germany with the disintegration of the Holy Roman Empire. Hegel's favorable response to the emerging Napoleonic middle point [74] betrayed a critique of political nationalism.

Hegel to Schelling [42]

Jena, November 16, 1803

I am writing you since I hear you have arrived at your final destination. Let me mention first that I received your letter to me [41] written shortly before your departure from Stuttgart for Munich.

I need not tell you how much your appointment [to Würzburg], which is at once very respectable in every regard, has delighted me. Jena, bereft of such great energy [*tantis viris orba*], has missed you most dearly, and even among the common folk your departure has been regarded as the most significant, just as the folk that does not designate itself as "common" seemed to wish to get you back again.

You still owe me an account of the many remarkable things you have seen on your trip. I especially hope you will not withhold from me what you think of this whole new Bavarian spirit and activity [due to the alliance with Napoleon], nor in particular how our friends in Salzburg are faring—and my special friends in Munich along with this whole clan. As far as can be observed, the mood of this clan [Jacobi et al.] seems for the time being to prefer to soften itself against you, and thus to prepare itself for a transition to a contrary mood.

Concerning local affairs you will probably have been sufficiently informed by people from Jena migrating to Würzburg. The fate of these emigrants is no doubt as contrary as their directions. Loder has recounted in no uncertain terms that he has suffered a loss in student fees of 1,000 thalers this year; there are only thirty-five medical students in Halle, and their attendance at lectures is poor since they have to take the entire course over in Berlin;—simple facts which surely could be known beforehand. The others do not see a good prognosis in this. The old *Literary Review* [*Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung*, formerly of Jena] has received the 10,000 thalers on condition that it repay 1,000 thalers for any year short of ten years it may have migrated again, away from Halle. Should it now migrate to nothingness it could double its losses.

You will have heard into which brooklets your philosophical current may disperse here. Even I have started lecturing again [on the "system of speculative philosophy," including "logic and metaphysics according to transcendental idealism," the philosophy of nature, and the philosophy of spirit; see *Ges Werke*, V-VI, for Hegel's remaining lecture notes from the year]. I am getting along with it better than before.

The new literary review [Goethe's *Jenaische Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung*, January 1, 1804-] which is to appear soon will become as common an establishment as the previous one [*Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung*], and as every other. Goethe has cared about nothing else. Since [Heinrich Karl] Eichstädt offered himself and money, the entire matter was settled without delay so that Jena might have a literary review.

To be counted among recent events is the fact that [Johann Wilhelm] Ritter has been invited by the students to lecture on galvanism; he has bypassed the philosophical faculty and awaits notice from the Court. Fernow could find no auditorium large enough for the students registering; it is said he is reading off Kantian definitions to them.

I have not caught sight of any literary news other than a pile of shit by [August Friedrich] Kotzebue, *Expectorations*, a diarrhea which he emitted while still in Germany [see Ch 17 on Kotzebue]. It is the old song about Goethe and the Schlegels. It even makes use of the anecdote that, since Friedrich [Schlegel] indecently manhandled [Schiller's] *Horae* in the journal *Germany* [*Deutschland*], Goethe swore at a dinner at Loder's house that these people should never gain a foothold in Jena. Goethe goes very much in for the real [*das Reele*], and for [scientific] apparatuses. He not only got Schelver to set up a botanical cabinet, but is to have a physiological one erected as well. He immediately demanded of Ritter the plan for a galvanic apparatus.

The Weimar Theater has not yet brought out anything new; Schiller is said to be working on *William Tell*.

So here you have a letter chock-full of news items and particulars [*Einzelheiten*]. The entire crisis of the present time seems at the moment to be exhibiting in general a many-sided fuss over details, although to be sure the basic elements are already separated. Just for that reason each element seems occupied to obtain possession, out of the breakdown of the universal, of what by nature belongs to any one of them. When the operation is over, even those who are without eyes and wanted none must perforce behold the damage and be highly astonished. Farewell, preserve your friendship for me. Yours, Hegel

[P.S.] Please remember me most kindly to your wife. Has she remained in good health during this many-sided trip?

[On the margin:] Have you received the copy of [natural scientist Jakob Josef] Winterl's *Accessiones Novae ad Prolusionem Suam Primum et Secundum* [*New Additions to His First and Second Preliminary Exercises*, 1803] which—from what [Jena mineralogist and natural historian Johann Georg] Lenz told me before fall—the author had ordered at the fall fair to be sent off to you?

A FURTHER LETTER to Schelling, dated February 27, 1804, is chiefly devoted to Schelling's litigation with Christian Ernst Gabler, who had published works by Schelling between 1799 and 1801. The February 1804 letter is preceded by two letters from Hegel to Assal, Schelling's attorney. After Schelling left Jena, Hegel represented him in discussions with Assal. Though Schelling sued Gabler (*Briefe* I, 452), it is hard to read letter 37c without presuming that Gabler filed a counter-suit.

Hegel to Assal [37a]

[fragment]

[Jena, after May 21, 1803]

[Regarding the request that the remaining documents and the like be sent], which Professor Schelling also has sought to obtain and read over. . . . Such examination is necessary for me so that I may subsequently speak knowledgeably with you according to Professor Schelling's wishes as points arise in the further proceedings, and so that I am able to send Professor Schelling a proper report.

Hegel to Assal [37c]

[End of June, beginning of July 1803]

I have the honor of sending you, sir, the text in duplicate concerning Professor Schelling's affairs [cf documents requested in 37a], and apologize greatly for having kept it lying around here so long. I here attach the points on which a remark has occurred to me, which I add at least to show you the attentiveness with which I have read your excellent elaboration.

Folio 2, regarding II: Professor Schelling wished here some indication of the reason for inserting this account. For all alone it does not of itself make clear whether Gabler has paid off these amounts as parts of a larger debt, whether each time he owed only that amount, or whether these payments were advances. In the latter two cases no claim would arise against him.

Ibid., line 29 on the following page: 50 Imperial thalers: Professor Schelling himself retracts this higher amount, and thirteen lines later the sum is put at 30 Imperial thalers. The first reference is to be corrected in light of the second, which otherwise would contradict each other.

Folio No. 4, Page 2: "Meanwhile his [Gabler's] confession—will in time no longer be necessary," etc.

This point seems to me especially important. Since the plaintiff [Gabler] openly and at once confesses the above, it can and indeed must be accepted—as Professor Schelling himself remarks. This makes further investigation by the defendant [Schelling] unnecessary, should such negotiation by the defendant be capable of entry in the record. A purely conditional acceptance of the confession is even less necessary; by such conditional acceptance the confession is rather eliminated, and the advantage to be gained from it against the plaintiff lost.

These are the few points on which I thought I had something to note. Since I must write Professor Schelling today, please let me know briefly during the day—at your convenience—the extent to which, especially on this last point, you can accede to Professor Schelling's request for immediate acceptance of the adver-

sary's confession, so I can write him according to his wish the necessary minimum about it, in case a departure from his disposition in the matter should perhaps be called for. For the present, however, I must hold to this disposition without deviation.

I have the honor of respectfully being your most humble servant, Dr. Hegel

Hegel to Schelling [45]

Jena, February 27, 1804

The day before yesterday Dr. Assal asked me to see him, to inform me of the point your legal proceedings with Gabler have reached and, at the same time, to instruct me to write you about it. About ten days ago the other party's conclusion—the reply to the document you have seen—was delivered to him with indication of a two-week deadline, since the matter had already been drawn out to such length. He thereupon read to me not only the adversary's main points but his [own] entire labor as well, which so far as it is complete comprises most of what concerns the *species facti*. What is new from the adversary is that he denies the note to you in which he invited you to borrow money should you need it, and in which he assumed all expenses and interest charges. Then there is the account which, in its final form, he increased by large entries—in fact in such a way that while there remains in the account an entry of 30 Imperial thalers from May 13, he adds a different entry from May 13 for 36 Imperial thalers. Similarly, besides an entry in the account of 18 thalers to Councillor Schlegel [?] in August without further specification of date, he adds another for 78 thalers to Councillor Schlegel from August with a specific date, both as per receipt, which right away sheds light on a falsification of the receipts. In both cases Assal has responded by promising to present the account and note in [Gabler's] own hand. The rate of a 2 *louis d'or* honorarium per sheet mentioned in the suit for the journal [*Zeitschrift für Speculative Physik?*] has now been declared a slip of the pen by the adversary. Finally, he also holds you to your word in the surrender of two notes in which you charge him to lend you money.

Assal's reply seemed to me [to be composed] in the style and particular rhetorical flourishes with which you are familiar, [but] otherwise to be on the whole cogent, since reply to the indicated points is in itself natural, while the prior writing has more or less exhausted the other matters. He had not yet worked up the legal perspective; otherwise the records have become very swollen. The next step will be for the judge to render the verdict upon proof. If you want to correspond more extensively with Assal himself about the matter it will be necessary to write him about it soon, since he claims to have received an early deadline. It will have to be prolonged for him as well as for the adversary.

I hope that you and your wife are well, and ask you to remember me to her very kindly.

William Tell by Schiller is being rehearsed in Weimar. Goethe wanted to come here again this week. He is very busy with the new [*Jena General*] *Literary Review*, in which you will have recognized Reinhold's review of [*On the Different Methods of Philosophizing*, 1802, and *Fundamental Philosophy*, 1803, by

Wilhelm Traugott] Krug [no 5-6, 1804]. But he had no time to come on account of a moon-rainbow and other marvelous things that are to be staged in *William Tell*. Farewell. Your sincere friend, Hegel

SCHELLING REPLIED to the above on March 3, thanking Hegel for his assistance. A second letter from Schelling, dated July 14, 1804, invited Hegel's collaboration in a projected new journal, to be edited by Schelling together with the physician Adalbert Friedrich Marcus: the *Yearbooks of Scientific Medicine*. Hegel, however, left the invitation without reply until January 3, 1807. In the third paragraph of this January letter [82] Hegel refers to Schelling's new post with the Bavarian Academy of Fine Arts following his transfer from Würzburg to Munich in April 1806 after the Treaty of Pressburg. The treaty detached Würzburg from Bavaria, and Schelling chose to remain in the Bavarian service.

In the same paragraph Hegel harks back to the contrast of North to South Germany already discussed in his reply to Schelling on November 16, 1803 [42]. The North and South are complementary elements, each deficient in isolation. The spirit of the North is moralistic, Protestant-Hebrew and Fichtean, formal and reflective, in contrast to the more substantial Catholic spirit of the South. The contrast between North and South, along with the associated philosophical geography, becomes fully explicit in his *Faith and Knowledge* of 1802 (*Werke* I, 281-82; also 47). Even before going to Jena, however, Hegel wrote Schelling that he wished to express the ideal of his youth in reflective form [29]. The ideal of his youth, which bore the strong imprint of Hölderlin, was already implicitly "southern" in spirit—the one in the all, community, "love" [see 82 below]. The desire to express this ideal in a scientific [29] reflective form, a form which Fichte had carried to the ultimate extreme of rigor and moral earnestness ("hardness" in letter 82), itself implied a quest for synthesis between North and South even before Hegel's arrival in Jena. The evolution of political and military history, however, extended the cultural contrast of North and South into a contrast between Prussian and Napoleonic forces. The Battle of Jena was a material realization of that "explosion of the point of indifference" (Schelling) between North and South—that "breakdown of the universal" [42]—which had already transpired on the spiritual level. The philosophical judgment passed on the spirit of the North preceded and anticipated the military judgment passed on Prussia through Napoleon's 1806 victory (Ch 6). Hegel's response was to work for the constitution of a new "center" for German letters, a new North-South meeting point or concrete universal. This meeting point could no more come to rest in the one-sidedly southern Catholic Empire of Austria than in the Prussian North. The most reasonable hope was that Catholic Bavaria, the largest of Napoleon's German allies, might emerge as the new meeting point by receiving scholars from Jena trained in the reflective culture of the North—scholars such as Schelling and Hegel himself.

Hegel to Schelling [82]

Jena, January 3, 1807

Upon my return about two weeks ago from Bamberg, where I spent a few weeks, I found your publication regarding the relationship of natural philosophy to

the newly improved philosophy of Fichte [*Darlegung des wahren Verhältnisses der Naturphilosophie zu der verbesserten Fichte'schen Lehre*, 1806]. I must both thank you for this gift and tell you that the amicable and honorable mention of my essay on Fichte's philosophy [*Glauben und Wissen*, *Werke* I, 277ff] from the *Critical Journal* has pleased me. It is, besides, a pleasant occasion for me to ask you for news of yourself and, at the same time, to give you news of myself. I in any case must apologize to you for having neglected already more than one such opportunity, and especially even now for not having replied to your amicable invitation [47] to take part in the *Annals of Medicine* [i.e., *Jahrbücher der Medizin als Wissenschaft*, 1805-08]. The reason was a wish to prove to you at once by deed my willingness to make contributions insofar as such contributions can be expected from me. But I could not get around to carry out my wish, and thus the reply I at least ought to have made was also neglected.

I need not tell you that I took great delight in your analysis of Fichte's new syncretism, of your confrontation of "the old harsh rigor with this new love," and of his stiff originality with the silent gathering of new ideas [Fichte, *The Way to the Blessed Life*, 1806; *Basic Characteristics of the Present Age*, 1806]. I was equally pleased to see your manner, as powerful as it was measured, put his personal outbursts to shame. We have examples enough of the foolish behavior he previously engaged in whenever he let himself go. But I think this is the first time he has gone so far as base actions which are at once flat and unoriginal. The purpose of the publication, which except for the necessary explanation of this latter side restricts itself to what is properly philosophical, makes your treatment of Fichte's new debut still sparing. For at least the only one of these popular works that I have seen—the *Spirit of the Times* [i.e., . . . *the Present Age*]—contains enough ridiculous matters to permit and almost invite equally popular treatment. To produce this sort of stuff with such self-conceit—without which, however, it would be completely impossible—can be understood only in relation to his audience, which was already made up of people totally lacking in orientation and now [in Berlin] consists of people who are completely disoriented and have lost all substance, as was also demonstrated clearly enough of late in a different field [i.e., on the battlefield at Jena, where, in October 1806, Fichte's Prussian sponsors were defeated by Napoleon—see Ch 6].

I was happy to hear not only that you feel well in your present situation [as Secretary General of the Bavarian Academy of Fine Arts] but also that it is precisely the one you prefer to all others. As to us here, we have not yet been able to overcome the fame that Jena has attained. Yet, in fact, we had even before already come to the point of enduring all pokes as much as water; there was nothing much left to spoil. To be sure, for quite some time I had directed my eyes and hopes here and there. People seem still to be very generally convinced, however, that the post of teaching philosophy might really be more or less filled by anybody—or rather, since they know that no science or faculty can exist without philosophy, and at the same time feel that such sciences contain nothing philosophical and have advanced thus far without philosophy, philosophy seems to them to consist precisely in this nothingness. Schelver is going to Heidelberg, to be sure with a call but no definitive appointment yet. I have few prospects there. Only

Bavaria is left to me and in Bamberg [Ch 7]. I would hope to hear what is new in the works. Thus far I hear that nothing is happening. Since you are close to the source, perhaps you will learn more definitely what intentions are entertained there and at the same time can judge whether prospects may open up there for me. In such a case I may call upon your friendship, news, advice, even help. It would be highly desirable for me to find a position that is to some degree externally secure. Our peace has established the status quo, and thus perhaps pushed the whole [situation] further back than it already was. Yet nothing proper is to be expected anymore from the spirit of North Germany, although some conditions are present there that are still lacking in South Germany. Formal culture seems to have fallen to its lot, and this service seems to have been allotted to it exclusively—though enjoyment of its fruit will have to be reserved to a still higher genius.

I have long hoped, even as early as last Easter, to be able to send you something of my work [i.e., *Phenomenology of Spirit*—and this also was responsible for the prolongation of my silence—but now I am finally looking forward to the end of the printing and will be in a position to send it to you by Easter. Yet it is only the beginning, although for the beginning it is surely voluminous enough. It will be of special interest to me if you do not disapprove of my thoughts and manner.

It will likewise please me if you set aside the debt of my long silence and write me soon. For this I beseech you greatly. I hope that Mme. Schelling is likewise enjoying herself in Munich and feeling well, and I ask you to give her my kindest respects. Farewell. Your Hegel

SCHELLING'S LONG AND SPEEDY REPLY [83] was dated January 11. It expressed once again the hope that Hegel would find his way south, and communicated reports of new experimental findings tending to support Schelling's natural philosophy of cosmic polarities. Hegel responded on February 23 announcing his prospect of a newspaper editorship in Bamberg (Ch 7) and his hopes of founding in collaboration with Schelling a literary review in liaison with the Bavarian Academy of Sciences. Hegel now casts Bavaria in the role of a new center of German letters arising out of the ashes of Jena, integrating the achievements of Prussian "formal culture" in a new organic totality. Hegel makes reference in the second paragraph to the reorganization of the Bavarian Academy in 1807, a reorganization in which Protestants such as Schelling and Niethammer assumed leading roles at the expense of their enemies, the conservative, so-called "Old Bavarian" Catholic group. The remainder of the letter shows Hegel's sympathetic though not unskeptical interest in Schelling's philosophy of nature. Hegel concludes with a description of Goethe's own scientific activity. Goethe's *Theory of Colors*, of which Hegel would become a strong supporter (Ch 25), was published in two volumes in 1810, though certain copies of the first volume bear the date 1808. Goethe's writings on morphology, incorporating his studies of the metamorphosis of plants and animals, did not appear in print until a decade after the present letter. The letter to Schelver, which according to the postscript Hegel mistakenly sent to Schelling, is lost.

I am, my very dear Schelling, very much obliged to you for your amicable reply of the 11th of last month. It has pleased me deeply to have found your old benevolent disposition toward me still intact. I recognized it in the openness with which you describe your situation in Munich, inasmuch as I spoke to you about looking for something else. You would like me to leave the North—which, its own star having long descended, has shone merely through the light of foreign ones—and even to come to Munich itself. For the time being I am thinking of returning at least to Bamberg [see letter 82 on his prior trip to Bamberg]. I have been offered a deal that pays more than staying here, and for me this is, for the time being, the prime consideration. Even should the business itself not seem completely suitable, nor even completely respectable in the eyes of the world, at least it is not dishonest. It is the editorship of the political newspaper of Bamberg. Yet there is more in it than immediately appears, since I can regard it as [a way of] reaching Bavarian ground and soil at least temporarily, and of having my shoes in it even if not yet my feet. Since this engagement does not bind me to a definite time, in Bamberg I can doubtless for the moment pursue private study and discharge my obligations at the same time. Yet I beseech you not to talk about it yet since I am not yet bound and I have not yet given up my present situation at a salary of 100 thalers. A plan closer to my heart is the project of a critical journal of German literature—of what is more important or striking in the field [Ch 5]. It may be that some kind of appointment will take me to Heidelberg, and that I may carry out my project there. I am very enthusiastic about the matter and, given some help, would hope to accomplish something worthwhile. German literature looks like a rich meadow whose luxuriance once moved someone to profess the wish to be a cow so as to be really able to relish it. To strip it of this appearance and thus free the wheat by uprooting the weeds, and to restore to it the appearance of a field fit to nourish a human being, must surely be a timely and valiant task. Should the Academy in Munich want to assume a position roughly like that of the French Academy, both keeping a tight rein on immature gossip and arrogant ignorance, elevating what is better and drawing attention to it, such a journal's connection with the Academy—the journal need not appear under the Academy's name though its members would support it—would be appropriate, especially in Bavaria, whose blight [*Nacht*] and heterogeneous constituents at once create the greatest need for the country to be recalled from the anarchy of its scientific pursuits to some middle point, and to be made attentive to the accumulation of knowledge so gravely lacking [in Bavaria]. Like the state of Bavarian education which we are now to expect, such a journal could constitute the transition from the old to the new. To be sure, the new cannot be acquired except by what has gone before, but possession of the new is conditioned less by all the labor [of the past]—which other times and other countries have already accomplished and thus spared Bavaria—than by its results. I would develop special love for this enterprise if, as I should hope, I could count on the support of which your versatility and—I believe—interest in such enterprises give promise. The journal that you are devoting to a specific field [i.e.,

"scientific medicine"] surely does not exhaust this versatility. At first I will not be able to do much for the project in Bamberg, but I shall work toward reaching a position from which the matter may become more feasible. The Bavarian publishers will certainly not be very suitable for such enterprises. You call [the city of] Landshut *Landeshuts*. Does it perhaps guard [*behüten*] the land from reason, taste, and good customs? That [philologist Georg Anton Friedrich] Ast sprouts branches over into philosophy would surprise me if his name were not Ast [i.e., "branch" in German]. Considering this quality [of his], however, I do comprehend it. If a professor of philosophy there must possess as his main qualification the ability to cut away such rhetorical flourishes, the Ministry would find in me a good pair of shears. As to how to come within closer reach of one or the other of these positions, I will not fail to follow your advice for me. You seem to consider the matter far easier than I had thought. I am happy I can count on your support, which, even if it cannot proceed directly, will indirectly be of great benefit to me. Perhaps you will find in my idea of wishing to found a literary journal a more harmless occasion enabling you more easily to speak of me, or have others speak of me, than could be found in the mere application for just any position. A literary journal would be appropriate for the Academy, for the capital, to possess, so that it might no longer see literary middle points ever located elsewhere, regarding itself perpetually as a province in view of the judgment that is bound to be expressed principally within its borders.

The feeling I have of your friendly sentiments toward me, which I wanted to express right away, has immediately led me so deeply into my own wishes that I am only now doing what I should have done at the start: namely, attest to you my joy over your satisfaction with your situation and sense of well-being given your circumstances. In view of these circumstances, from my information the entire operation showed the tumultuous state—mixed with chance and caprice—of the most weighty affairs. This state has not helped improve the credit of the Bavarian government abroad. More than having become actually able to injure you—that state of affairs has fortunately merely bestirred against you. Yet the first revolutionary procedure now seems to yield to the thought of a more solid organization, which thus merits all the greater confidence inasmuch as, grown wise by blunders constituting the inevitable price of one's instruction, one advances more slowly and cautiously, and gives all the more prospect of maturity.

I have read with the greatest interest your disclosures of a new, higher side of physical science. In the meantime I have so far collected, at least in general, more the thoughts of the matter than the experiments. Concerning the latter, I did not find the required steadiness of hand sufficiently assured; and, if an experiment seemed to be very successful, in part other experiments intervened that, under the same conditions, were contradictory; while in part oscillation ensued even outside the [experimental] conditions, which placed responsibility for any successful experiments with my unsteadiness of hand, thus making them doubtful. I would probably have to go to school under one of the experimenters trained by you [*euch*]¹—assuming, as I hope, I otherwise have the capacity for it—in order to make sure I have excluded both the mechanical factor, which I believe enters into

the experiment with the waterhammer, and the element of accident. Otherwise, I remember having seen the general experiment of oscillation done by a French emigré about twelve years ago, but with a twist which made it more feasible to present in society: a spherical gold ring, suspended from a hair, fell into oscillation in a glass partly filled with water without the slightest assist of the fingers that held it having been visible. These oscillations became so strong that they struck the sides of the glass as often as the hour struck! If this last [phenomenon] were well-founded, what a connection [would be established] between the blind instinct of time division, which seems arbitrary, and nature! What could be more welcome to [Johann Wilhelm] Ritter in his study of time periods? His experiments, however, become at times transcendent in a way that others cannot follow, and he will have trouble getting his magnetic needle consisting of two metals, which you cite in your publication against Fichte, accepted by other physicists. As far as I hear, at least great disagreement still prevails about it. Regarding the experiments on siderism, I have thus heard with pleasure that he writes that he has pointed out a device with which to remove the accidental [factor]²—which can interfere with such experiments. Without this [device] I dare not consider even one of my experiments to have succeeded; to be sure, I have also been able to experiment only with lead cubes, coins, and the like, not cubes of gold and silver.

I have aroused the curiosity of Goethe, who for a while was making his [customary] jokes about it. He continues to work on his account of colors [*Theory of Colors*], of which he is having printed two parts simultaneously: a theoretical—i.e., empirical—part and a historical part. Probably twenty sheets are already printed from each part. I have seen part of it. Out of hatred for the thought by which others have corrupted the question, he adheres completely to the empirical, instead of going beyond that thought to the other side of the empirical, to the concept which will perhaps only get to shimmer through. He is also having a morphology printed; the beginning of it is the unchanged reprint of his *Metamorphosis of Plants* [1790]! He generally seems to want to set his house in order and set right his temporal affairs. You probably are already more closely acquainted with the treatises on the animal organism to which he will proceed from here. That is about all I can offer you in response to your wealth of scientific disclosures.

Farewell—and if you will soon please me with a reply, I will be very much obliged to you! The attached enclosure will probably be aimed more at Mme. Schelling than to you. I was pleased to hear of her well-being and ask you to present my kindest regards to her. Your Hegel

Mme. Frommann as well as Mr. Frommann, from which the enclosure comes, present their kindest compliments. February 27

[In the margin:] P.S. A few circumstances, followed by an inquiry at the post office, have convinced me that I sent a letter to you which I wrote for Schelver the same evening I wrote yours, which remained behind because of the expected enclosure. I apologize to you very much for the confusion and ask you, out of regard for the comical aspect of the situation, to forget the awkward impression that a letter written to a second person has on a third. In this hope, I spare myself the effort to set matters right by giving you explanations of what I recalled from the

letter [to Schelver], and I thus want to ask you to put them right yourself as best you can.

SCHELLING RESPONDED from Munich on March 22 [93], cautioning Hegel, in his grand design for a Bavarian literary review, not to move too quickly before even establishing himself on Bavarian soil. Schelling also notes the unlikelihood that the membership of the Academy would have "the abnegation to entrust the project to a single capable man and let him act as he wishes so it could have a chance of success. . . ;" continuing, he confides to Hegel:

. . . I fear—like all the rest, this is said just between us—that such a review might quickly become an establishment in the service of Jacobi, as likewise the Academy itself. I know that [editor Johann Friedrich von] Cotta is cultivating a similar project and would gladly associate with the Academy to this end. The matter would thus soon be accomplished, and would directly tie back in with your idea; but everything must depend entirely on Cotta, since, as for the others, you cannot imagine their fear of a man such as yourself, and how much it would displease them to put the knife in the hand of such a man. . . . [93]

Hegel's reply of May 1, which follows, takes Schelling's advice to heart, and shows quick recovery from his infatuation with the idea, expressed in his previous letter, of a Bavarian golden age of the sciences.

The second paragraph from May 1 takes up questions of the philosophy of nature again. Schelling, on March 22, had waxed quite lyrical in protesting Hegel's mild skepticism of February 23:

As for the experiments about which I wrote you recently, things are nonetheless continuing to progress and prove indeed correct. Campetti's superior strength permits its employment in a manner excluding all illusion.¹ Thin sheets of tin—as likewise broad and heavy plates of metal—revolve with the greatest regularity when balanced on his index or middle finger. What is most profound in the matter is the undeniably nonmechanical, magical influence of the will, or of even the most fleeting thought, on these experiments. The pendulum—like the [divining] rod—behaves just like a muscle activated by free will, just as muscles on the other hand are veritable divining rods which oscillate now outward—extensors—and now inward—flexors. . . . [93]

Schelling also recommended to Hegel an article by his brother Karl in his medical journal on animal magnetism ("Ideen und Erfahrungen über den tierschen Magnetismus," *Yearbooks of Medicine as Science*, vol 2, 1807, no 1, pp. 1-42; no 2, pp. 158-90).

Hegel concludes on May 1 with a description of his *Phenomenology*—its composition and publication (see also end of [82] above and ch 6). He calls attention to what Schelling, replying on November 2 [107], describes as the "polemical part" of the Preface, where Hegel purports to be criticizing only Schelling's lesser followers.

¹Johann Wilhelm Ritter, who found the young peasant dowser Francesco Campetti in Italy, admitted later that the latter was a charlatan.

I thank you, dearest friend, for communicating to me your view—afforded by your experiences and proximity—of the mentality of this country in literary matters. Neither science itself nor the influence which it enjoys for and through itself seems to have won independent respect and importance. Yet though your advice to me personally—as to not causing any commotion before establishing possession to some extent—will no doubt prove to be good, still matters will no doubt follow the course [I indicated] [90]; and the belief that what has been drawn near, brought under protection, and established is to be maintained with the sort of gratitude which allows nothing to be done beyond the protective intent will probably prove in the end to be deceived and the hoped-for pleasure spoiled. Regarding my wish to take a vital part in a literary-critical institute, I have not taken any step whatsoever. I will not be able to take part in a Jacobian institute if I otherwise understand his concept properly. Moreover, I could not happily take part in any [institute] in which I did not stand more or less at the top and represent the whole—or, what amounts to the same thing, in which the same intention [as my own] failed to govern matters. For the determination of other external circumstances, I can resign myself for now to Niethammer's friendship and hoped-for influence. In any case, no literary scientific activity whatever can appear to owe Bavaria its origin, matter, and structure or stimulus, for there is still little in Bavaria that deserves positive consideration in the arts and sciences; even if it is geographically present, it is not indigenous. Thus far I have tried to conduct my doings independently of all circumstances or of persons; I have sought to pay what is demanded to secure external conditions, but otherwise to keep the field free for myself. For the time being, we still want to be patient.

You have afforded me a few new disclosures on siderism, which is thus swept away again from the position where—from the perspective of the pendulum experiments, which I had taken quite objectively—I first located it. On the basis in particular of your reference to Karl's nice treatise in the *Medical Annals*—which reminded me with pleasure again of him, though where is he now?—I understand siderism to be brought closer to the psychical or entirely drawn into it. What we have in animal magnetism in its most miraculous power—i.e., this fusion [*In-Eins-Werden*] of persons in which, in the natural sphere, the one sinks even into being an accident of the other, for in the spiritual sphere this phenomenon is known well enough—descends in siderism to the so-called inorganic [level] and particularizes itself into a magical fusion and sympathy of higher and lower natures [166]. This is roughly the sort of general representation of the matter which I form for myself for the time being. You will surely believe me when I say I am most intensely curious to become further acquainted with the experiments that have been carried out. And from you or Ritter, or better from both, I hope soon for greater disclosures to the public.

My manuscript is finally completed. Yet the same unfortunate confusion enters into the distribution of copies to my friends as has governed the entire process of publishing and printing and even in part of composition itself. This is why you still have no copy from me in hand. I hope, however, I will still be able to

reach a point where you will receive one soon. I am curious as to what you will say to the idea of this first part, which really is the introduction—for I have not yet got beyond the introducing right into the heart of the matter [*in mediam rem*]. Working [my way] into the detail has, I feel, damaged the overview of the whole. This whole, however, is itself by nature such an interlacing of cross-references back and forth that, even were it set in better relief, it would still cost me much time before it would stand out more clearly and in more finished form. I need not mention—as you will find out for yourself all too easily—that even individual sections in many respects would still need further groundwork [*Unterarbeitung*] for them to be brought into subjugation [*unterkriegen*]. Make allowances for the greater want of form in the last sections by recalling that I actually completed the draft in its entirety in the middle of the night before the Battle of Jena. In the Preface you will not find that I have been too hard on the shallowness that makes so much mischief with your forms in particular and degrades your science into a bare formalism. I need not tell you, by the way, that your approval of a few pages would be worth more to me than the satisfaction or dissatisfaction of others with the whole. Likewise, I would not know anybody else by whom I would rather have this writing introduced to the public, and from whom I could prefer a judgment on it.

In the meantime, farewell. Remember me to the Niethammers, who, I hope, will happily have joined you. Remember me especially, however, to Mme. Schelling. Yours, Hegel

[In margin:] Has the organization of the Academy not yet been made known? Or is it not yet at all known?

BY THE TIME he replied on November 2 [107], Schelling had read only the Preface. This reply was the last recorded correspondence between the two philosophers:

... Insofar as you yourself mention the polemical part of the Preface, given my own justly measured opinion of myself I would have to think too little of myself to apply this polemic to my own person. It must therefore, as you have expressed in your letter, apply only to further bad use of my ideas and to those who parrot them without understanding, although in this writing itself the distinction is not made. You may easily imagine how happy I would be to get these people once and for all off my back. Whatever conviction or opinion in which we may actually differ beyond reconciliation can be quickly and clearly found out and determined between us. For surely everything can be reconciled but one point. Thus I confess I do not yet understand your sense in opposing 'concept' to intuition.² By this first term you can only mean what you [e.g. *Faith and Knowledge*, *Werke* I, 347] and I have called the Idea—which by its very nature is concept in one of its aspects and intuition in another [see *Werke* I, 66-68, from Hegel's essay on the difference between Schelling and Fichte]. ... Have the kindness to convey to the Liebeskinds as well a copy of my speech so they can

²Hegel championed science, system, and concept over intuition in the Preface to the *Phenomenology* (*Werke* II, 14-15).

read it.³ Farewell. Write me again soon, and retain your attachment for your true friend, Schelling.

It was apparently Hegel who never replied, though in a letter of July 8, 1808, he defended Schelling's October 1807 speech, and on August 20, 1808, he greeted him via Niethammer. On October 23, 1812, Hegel noted that Schelling had paid a "friendly visit" during which philosophical discussion was avoided. Hegel's own reputation was at last on the upswing after the *Phenomenology*, while Schelling's reputation, along with that of his natural philosophy, suffered due to his seeming credulity in associating with Ritter and the scientific quackery of Campetti. The once heady correspondence of the two philosophers ended on a sustained note of mutual embarrassment.

The later Schelling would reject Hegelianism as a purely negative philosophy of concepts pretending to be nonnegative, positive, or absolute (*Offenbarung*, 122, 136-37). In fact, Hegel understood that philosophy was nonabsolute as well as negative [e.g. letters 55, 120a]: philosophy does not deny or negate the world of particular existents, but it is *not* that world. Yet Hegel remained content with such philosophy, while Schelling sought a second, positive philosophy. Hegel surely agreed with the late Schelling that the concretely existing world can only be defined, not ontologically or even descriptively exhausted, by negative philosophy. But Schelling grew dissatisfied with a purely systematic approach, and came to seek disclosures of what exists concretely through a philosophical interrogation of historical myth and religious revelation. Schelling's positive philosophy is thus a negation of conceptual philosophy viewed as a sufficient grasp of the Absolute.

³Johann Heinrich Liebeskind was judicial councilor in Bamberg; the speech Schelling sent Hegel with his letter is entitled "On the Relation of the Plastic Arts to Nature," and was delivered on October 12 at a ceremonial meeting of the Academy of Sciences in Munich.

The Elusive Ideal of Nonpolemical Criticism

THOUGH HEGEL is chiefly known for his systematic treatises, throughout his career he pursued philosophical criticism in the form of shorter review articles. He collaborated with philosophical and literary periodicals, and was instrumental in founding two. The letters in this chapter—with the exception of those which concern Hegel's 1801 habilitation—document editorial and critical review activity by Hegel in the pre-Berlin period. The shift discernible in Hegel's concept of philosophical criticism is particularly noteworthy. In the early Jena years he upheld criticism as essentially polemical [32]. By 1806, however, he came to view criticism as requiring appreciation of what is positive in a text [70]. Negative criticism itself had to be grounded in such appreciation. Such nonhostile internal criticism clearly agreed better with the dialectical method to which Hegel was committed. The dialectic's ancestry went back to Zeno and the method of indirect proof, which insisted that the critic empathetically adopt the standpoint under criticism. The abrasive polemics of external criticism are less apt to persuade the opponent, and especially likely to lock the critic himself into a form of one-sidedness. Yet it will be apparent from letters presented in subsequent chapters that Hegel did not remain firm in his 1806 commitment to internal criticism. The clash of personalities was sometimes stronger than philosophical commitment, with the usual consequence of misunderstanding.

HEGEL AND THE ERLANGEN LITERARY REVIEW, 1801-1802

Upon arriving in Jena to launch an academic career, Hegel became, with Schelling's recommendation, a contributor to the *Erlangen Literary Review*, edited by Gottlob Ernst August Mehmel, philosophy professor in Erlangen. Mehmel responded to Hegel's undated acceptance [30b] of an invitation to collaborate on August 16, 1801. In the months since arriving in Jena, Hegel had already written his first philosophical publication: the *Differenzschrift*, which upheld Schelling's objective idealism and philosophy of nature over Fichte's subjective idealism, and which itself contributed to the final rupture between Schelling and Fichte.

Hegel's chief critical targets in his letters to Mehmel—Rückert, Bouterwek, Schulze, Reinhold, Krug—display a common pattern: commonsense philosophy, skeptical repudiation of theoretical speculation, and an ostensibly Kantian standpoint of practical reason. Joseph Rückert, who taught philosophy at Würzburg, defended common sense on a pragmatic basis, repudiating the cognitive claims of

theoretical philosophy. A review of his work appeared in volume one of the *Critical Journal* (*Ges Werke* I, 239-55), which Hegel published with Schelling in 1802, although the question as to which of the two philosophers wrote it is unsettled (*Ibid* I, 546-47). The *Critical Journal* also carried a review (*Ibid* I, 197-238), definitely by Hegel, of Gottlob Ernst Schulze. Hegel sharply criticized the modern, empiricist skepticism of Schulze, contrasting it to the ancient skepticism of Plato's *Parmenides* essential to all true philosophy.

On August 26, 1801, Hegel sent a review of Bouterwek (*Ges Werke* I, 95-104) to Mehmel. Friedrich Bouterwek, who had taught in Göttingen since 1797, drew much from Kant, but fell increasingly under the influence of Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi. In the book Hegel reviewed, Bouterwek addressed the problem—which would occupy Hegel in the *Phenomenology* (1807)—of introducing post-Kantian “speculative philosophy.” Bouterwek used a “skeptical” method of introduction: nothing was to be accepted unless it survived the most rigorous doubt. Hegel's criticism anticipates his rejection, in the Introduction to the *Phenomenology*, of the epistemological tradition in modern—especially British—philosophy: Bouterwek never gets beyond “provisional philosophizing” and thus never reaches speculative philosophy in the sense of actual knowledge of the Absolute. The closest Bouterwek gets is to claim that all thinking, even that of the skeptic, presupposes as its object an unknown Absolute reality or thing-in-itself. For Bouterwek this presupposition is, using Jacobi's language, an incontrovertible “fact of consciousness” whose denial by Fichte in effect turns consciousness upside down.

In his August 26 letter [31] Hegel notes to Mehmel that Bouterwek's position is a variation on the approach seen in two other contemporaries: Krug and Reinhold. One is tempted to describe Wilhelm Traugott Krug as a somewhat pedantic, superficially Kantian G. E. Moore. The successor to Kant in the philosophy chair at Königsberg in 1804, he was, like Rückert, a commonsense philosopher. Like Bouterwek, however, he employed the skeptical method. Despite his flirtation with the transcendental ego, he was more frankly concerned to refute than to “introduce” speculative philosophy. In 1800 Krug published a skeptical critique of Fichte's *Science of Knowledge*, while a critique of Schelling's *System of Transcendental Idealism* followed a year after. Krug accused Schelling of basing his system on the unproven presupposition or hypothesis of the self-identical Absolute. But Krug is most famous for his mockingly modest request that Schelling follow through with the promise to deduce “the entire system of representations” by the deduction of a mere pen. In his own “fundamental philosophy” Krug, following Jacobi and Hume, takes the existence of the external world to be a stubborn “fact of consciousness” which speculation is impotent to dislodge. Hegel replied to Krug briefly in the *Erlangen Literary Review*, and at greater length in the *Critical Journal*, arguing among other things that Krug's preoccupation with his pen when philosophy had taken up again the all-important question of God—the Absolute—disqualified him as a philosopher (*Ges Werke* I, 178-79).

Karl Leonhard Reinhold was known for his work popularizing Kant. He had reconstructed the first Kantian critique on a general theory of human “representation” embracing sensibility, the understanding and reason, but closed off from

knowledge of the transcendent thing-in-itself. By 1801, however, Reinhold no longer agreed with Bouterwek about the thing-in-itself. Fichte's "theory of knowledge" had been indebted to Reinhold's "theory of representation," but Fichte subsequently influenced Reinhold to abandon the unknown thing-in-itself. Hegel's 1801 *Differenzschrift* responded to the just-published first installments of Reinhold's *Contributions toward an Easier Understanding of the State of Philosophy at the Onset of the Nineteenth Century*, in which Reinhold attacked Schelling's *System of Transcendental Idealism* (1800) and proposed that first principles in philosophy be taken as hypothetical pending confirmation through their consequences. Reinhold argued that philosophical inquiry was made possible only by the admission of one's fallibility, i.e., by faith in a possibly still undiscovered objective truth. Hegel replied that any principle which is merely a problematic hypothesis pending future confirmation will forever remain so, since no matter how well confirmed it becomes it may still be disconfirmed (*Werke* I, 182). Categorical principles providing certain knowledge of the Absolute will never be attained. Hegel of course granted fallibility. Indeed, the fear of error, according to the *Phenomenology*, is the very first error (*Werke* II, 68-69). Yet he rejected Reinhold's bifurcation of truth and error, the Absolute and its representation. Even an erroneous hypothetical definition of the Absolute arises within the Absolute, constituting a self-knowledge by the Absolute not entirely devoid of categorical truth. For the categorically true knowledge yielded by speculative philosophy is a dialectical thought process which generates as well as corrects erroneous hypotheses. Hegel would restate his view of Reinhold in a letter to Edouard Duboc twenty-two years later [450].

The only truly speculative philosopher reviewed by Hegel was the mathematician Johann Werneburg. Hegel's brief review of Werneburg's critique of Fichte and Fichte's opponents was published in the *Erlangen Literary Review* (*Ges Werke* I, 105-06). Hegel identified with Werneburg's speculative concept of a primordial union of self and thing, and of man as the "mirror"—*specularis* in Latin—through which the Infinite first attains self-knowledge. Hegel's cultivation of the theory of light and colors with Goethe (Ch 25) and others surely expresses a desire to unpack the metaphor of looking-glass philosophy which Werneburg espoused. But Hegel criticized Werneburg for pretentiousness and a lack of systematic development. Many years later Hegel similarly criticized fellow speculative philosopher Karl Wilhelm Ferdinand Solger for remaining unscientific (Ch 14). Hegel's claim was never that he had originated the speculative standpoint but that he had given it scientific development.

Hegel to Mehmel [30b]

[before mid-August 1801]

I happily accept your kind invitation to collaborate on your scholarly undertaking, and so ask you to send as soon as possible Bouterwek's work [*Principles of Speculative Philosophy: Attempt at a Treatise*, 1800]. I shall endeavor to justify your gracious confidence.

You would like me to suggest a few publications on which I might like to

write notices. Except for Schelling's writings, present philosophical literature offers little of real scientific interest, as you yourself know best. I would have to treat Fichte's clear-as-day demonstration [*Clear as Day Report to the Wider Public on the Real Essence of the Latest Philosophy: An Attempt to Compel the Reader to Understand*, 1801] as an unfortunate subjective attempt to popularize speculation. It will in general be increasingly necessary to separate Schelling's cause from Fichte's, and I have tried to advance this separation in a work currently in press by which you may become better acquainted with me [*Difference between the Fichtean and Schellingian Systems of Philosophy*, 1801—*Werke* I, 33-168]. Other than that, I note in the [book-]fair catalogues: Rückert's *Idealism* [presumably Rückert's *Realism or Basic Features of an Entirely Practical Philosophy*, 1801]; Schulze's *Critique of Theoretical Philosophy*; and perhaps [Johann Christian August] Grohmann's *On Revelation and Mythology as a Supplement to Kant's Religion [within the Limits of Reason]*, 1799], which would perhaps call for a more detailed review. As I recall, [former Tübingen seminarian Jakob Friedrich] Düttenhofer's work [*An Essay on the Ultimate Principal of Christian Ethical Teaching*, 1801] has already received a notice. If you send me something from among these works I shall start work on them with pleasure. I have the honor of being very truly yours, Hegel

Hegel to Mehmel [31]

Jena, August 26, 1801

I must send you herewith, most esteemed Professor, the review of Bouterwek. I hope you find it satisfactory. The main form on which Bouterwek so greatly prides himself is his skeptical method. In itself I have sought to present it as an *excuse* for the dearth of philosophy prevalent in speculative philosophy. Reinhold, Bouterwek, Krug, *et alii* are all from the *same* mold. Each calls his peculiarly accidental and insignificant form "originality," and pretends to be an actual philosopher. The cardinal point around which we by all means must revolve is that these gentlemen have no philosophy at all. I will go on to Krug and Werneburg next. I will first have to get hold of the old edition of Herder's *God*—I do not have my copy with me here—so that I can give account of the new edition.¹ It is at least clear to me that he left out what Jacobi discusses in the *Letters*. Had he truly grasped this, he would have had to leave *everything* out.

Schelling sends you his cordial greetings. He says he is angry about the more than twenty misprints in his review [of August Kotzebue in no. 35 of the *Erlangen Review*].

¹No record of a review of the second edition (1800) of Johann Gottfried Herder's *God* remains, though Hegel discusses Herder's text in connection with Jacobi in *Faith and Knowledge* (1802; *Werke* I, 353). Herder's book was originally published in 1787 in response to Jacobi's *On Spinoza's Teaching in Letters to Moses Mendelssohn*. Hegel alludes to Herder's omission in the second edition of passages in his first edition critical of his friend Jacobi. Yet Herder continued to articulate a romanticized version of Spinoza in the face of Jacobi's historically more accurate account of the Dutch philosopher. Hegel's early development in the 1790s bore the imprint of Herder both in his rejection of pragmatic Enlightenment historiography in favor of empathetic understanding of past experience in its uniqueness, and in his espousal of a romanticized pantheism of the One and the All.

You will forgive me for forgoing the pleasure of conversing with you longer. I am going to have my disputation tomorrow and so still have a few things to do. I have the honor of being your devoted servant, Dr. Hegel

HEGEL'S HABILITATION IN JENA

The "disputation" which Hegel mentioned in closing to Mehmel was a defense by Hegel of assigned theses. It was part of the habilitation process at the University of Jena authorizing him to teach philosophy. Addressing the senior member of the Jena philosophy faculty—Johann Heinrich Voigt—Hegel requested on August 8, 1801, that the faculty officially recognize his 1790 Tübingen Master's degree in philosophy as equivalent to the Doctor's degree in Weimar [30a]. He thus received no doctoral degree beyond his work at Tübingen. Since the rank of *Privatdozent* for which Hegel was applying carried no salary, he sought to establish his ability to support himself [30c]. The "few thousand florins" capital he mentions were inherited in 1799 from his father. In 1793 he had passed theological examinations in Tübingen and thus was eligible for appointment to a curacy or gymnasium post in Württemberg. He refers to this eligibility as his "station in Württemberg," a further guarantee of financial security. In the second paragraph Hegel requests permission to lecture prior to distribution and defense of his dissertation. Since Hegel was unable to complete his dissertation on time, habilitation as a *Privatdozent* was instead made contingent on the defense of theses proposed for the purpose (*Erste Druckschrift*, 403), with the understanding that the dissertation would be submitted later (*Briefe* IV/2, 94). Hegel did meet the two-week deadline mentioned on August 15 [30c]; the theses defense took place on August 27, his thirty-first birthday. Professors Schelling and Friedrich Immanuel Niethammer, along with Thomas Schwarzott, a student, served as Hegel's opponents, while Schelling's physician brother Karl supported Hegel's theses as the "respondent." The successful defense enabled Hegel to announce lectures on "Metaphysics and Logic" for the winter 1801-02 semester.

The dissertation which Hegel subsequently submitted is entitled *On Planetary Orbits*. Hegel is frequently ridiculed for having sought to prove *a priori* that there could be no planet between Mars and Jupiter when such a planet—the asteroid Ceres—had just been discovered. In fact, by hypothesizing that the distances of the planets from the sun followed a different numerical progression from what had been supposed, he sought an explanation for the long-standing empirical failure of astronomers to find such a planet. A more general intent of Hegel's dissertation was to enhance the reputation of Kepler, a fellow Swabian, to the detriment of Newton. Hegel was struck by Kepler's vindication of the Pythagorean music of the spheres, esteeming Newton's contribution to have been little more than a few mathematical formulas. The hostility to Newton evident in the dissertation reappears in his support of the Goethean theory of colors against Newtonian optics (Ch 25).

Hegel to Voigt [30a] [in Latin]

August 8, 1801

To the Esteemed Senior Member of this most Distinguished Philosophy Faculty and other most Distinguished Examiners:

Since I should like to lecture on theoretical and practical philosophy at this illustrious university, I hereby request, distinguished gentlemen, that I be granted university authorization to teach. The granting of such authorization, which is within your benevolent purview, is required if I am to lecture. Because I have already been promoted to the degree of Master of Philosophy, I hereby request that I be granted what is usually called "nostrification."

Farewell, distinguished gentlemen. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Doctor of Philosophy

Hegel to Voigt [30c]

Jena, August 15, 1801

[misdated Aug. 16 by Hegel; see *Briefe* IV, 93]

I have the honor, distinguished Privy Councillor, of sending to you with this letter my [Master's] diploma as requested.

In clarification of the security of my future external subsistence, it can easily be seen that if, on the one hand, the philosophical faculty does not consider talents and the possibility of subsistence deriving from them as a form of capital, neither does it, on the other hand, require security based on a completely sufficient income independent of one's labor. Rather, it merely requires security in case of an emergency. Against this I am protected in part by a few thousand florins in capital, and in part by circumstances implicit in my station in Württemberg.

Regarding the requirement that a disputation [i.e., dissertation] shall precede permission to lecture—a requirement of which you notified me only today—you yourself can see that a disputation cannot possibly be written, printed, distributed, and defended in the twelve days to two weeks within which announcements for the catalogue of public lectures must be submitted. However, I am sure that you and the philosophical faculty will be content if I submit most—if not all—of the dissertation by this date. Inasmuch as I would not seek nostrification [of the Tübingen diploma] apart from permission to lecture and announcement of it, everything would be lost through delay in the dissertation's printing and defense, which might then take place only next month. For the philosophy faculty always has at its discretion the power to suspend the permission to lecture.

Should you, your Honor, find this representation [of the situation] natural, please support it before the philosophy faculty. I have the honor of being your devoted servant, Dr. Hegel

Hegel to Voigt [30d]

August 26 [1801]

I wanted last night, distinguished sir, to take the liberty of calling on you to present my theses, and to inform you that with regard to my respondent and disputants, nothing has changed since I first had the honor of naming them to you.

I likewise send you the announcement of my inaugural lecture, and have at once noted on it the order [in which the different lecturers speak], which, from what I hear, conforms with faculty regulations. I understand that these regulations require the order of public disputation [giving Hegel precedence over two Weimar natives who had completed their dissertations and been promoted in the usual way]. Tomorrow I will have the honor of escorting you to the event, sir, at the time you set.

I have the honor of being your devoted servant, Dr. Hegel

Hegel to Schütz [689]

[undated]

Regarding the philosophy faculty's action against me, be assured that I did not have the least suspicion of steps on your part. I wanted precisely to talk with you as to whether we might take common steps in this regard in the future. But in no event could we achieve anything for this vacation. Just now I visited your father [Christian Gottfried Schutz, editor of the *General Literary Review* in Jena] and found his view to be that we could not do anything, which confirms my own view. But I also heard from him that he wants to bring the matter up himself. Any comments on the whole matter are superfluous, and I could make none other than those occurring to you yourself. Hegel²

THE CRITICAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY, 1802-1803

A close connection and even interchangeability is evident between Hegel's review activities in the *Erlangen Literary Review* and in the *Critical Journal*, published by Hegel and Schelling in 1802-03. Hegel was concerned both in the Erlangen periodical and in the *Critical Journal* to secure his identity vis-à-vis contemporary philosophers. Hegel announced the forthcoming *Critical Journal* in a letter of December 30, 1801, to Caroline and Wilhelm Friedrich Hufnagel. He had come to know the Hufnagel household during his Frankfurt years. Dr. Hufnagel was active in the reform of secondary education in Frankfurt. In May 1803, Hufnagel mentioned to Hegel the availability of a gymnasium professorship in Frankfurt, but without really supposing that Hegel would exchange a university career for such a post [37]. Hegel in his December 30 letter conveys the gratitude of Heinrich Eberhard Paulus for Hufnagel's offer to assist in procuring Spinoza editions. Paulus, then a Jena colleague of Hegel's, belonged to the rationalistic school of theology known for its naturalistic explanation of miracles. Hufnagel himself was a rationalist theologian in this classical Enlightenment tradition. The letter concludes with reference to Hegel's essay on the difference between Schelling and Fichte and to his dissertation on planetary orbits, as well as to the *Critical Journal*. The ideal of polemical, external criticism is clearly expressed here. The letter was written in a period of close collaboration with Schelling. Publication of

²This letter, addressed to *Privatdozent* Friedrich Karl Julius Schütz, was likely in reaction to the faculty's refusal to allow Hegel to give a free course of public lectures in his second term as a *Privatdozent*. Only salaried professors were allowed to give such lectures.

the *Differenzschrift* itself helped precipitate Schelling's decision to replace Fichte with Hegel as coeditor of the new journal, which had been planned for some time.

Hegel to Hufnagels [32]

Jena, December 30, 1801

How am I to thank you enough, dear wife of Dr. Hufnagel and dear friend of mine, for all your kindness in handling the orders which you took upon yourself out of friendship. Shoes, tea, money, sausages—in short, everything [has] turned out so superbly that no praise is high enough. Especially the first [the shoes] did me much credit. . . .

I likewise thank you for the other news from Frankfurt, which is especially strong in marriage announcements. What pleased me most of all, however, is the news of the well-being of you and your entire family, of the beautiful happiness of your family life, and of your friends. On Christmas I imagined your decorated and abundant room embracing the joy of all, and thought that were I in Frankfurt at that hour I would likewise augment the circle of such merry people and share in their joys. For the New Year I wish you continuation of your happiness and joy as well as of your friendship for me. Please present my compliments to your entire house.

As for you, my dear Doctor, allow me to present my respects briefly to you myself and to thank you for your last letter, since I see I am still in good standing with you, and that you continue to preserve the full cordiality of your friendship, which I so very much respect and value.

Dr. Paulus was likewise very pleased by your kind remembrance of him. We have both received your kind offer concerning the rare works of Spinoza with greatest pleasure. In the meantime, however, he has collected all of Spinoza's works and is planning a new edition of them. At least the first volume is scheduled to appear by Easter. I thus absolutely want to hold off until then with my curiosity. But the learned old-theological public, which has already long viewed this Paulus [Paul] as a Saulus [Saul], will no doubt find that he has raised himself through his edition of Spinoza—which, moreover, he is financing himself—into a Saulus of the second degree [*in die zweite Potenz*].

I have long ago set aside a copy of my brochure [on Schelling and Fichte] as well as of my dissertation for you, which I will mail in the near future. Presently something new is being launched, namely the first issue of a *Critical Journal of Philosophy*, which I am editing with Schelling—with whom I am lodging and who sends you his best regards. Its tendency in part will be to increase the number of journals, but in part to put an end and limit to unphilosophical rubbish. The weapons the *Journal* will use are very diverse. One may call them cudgels, whips, and bats. It is all for the good cause and glory of God. There will probably be complaints of it here and there, but the cauterization has indeed been necessary.

Accept my good wishes for the New Year. Be assured that they come from a most sympathetic heart, and that there are few whose friendship I value so much as yours. Your most devoted friend and servant, Hegel

I further ask you to remember me especially to [the Hufnagel's children] Eduard and Mimi.

[in the margin:] P.S. May I ask you to remember me to Mr. and Mrs. [Karl] Volz and Mme. [Maria] Bansa, also to Professor [Christian] Mosche. [Mr. Volz was a Frankfurt merchant, Mr. Bansa a banker.]

HEGEL'S CONTRIBUTION to the *Erlangen Literary Review* for a short time continued concurrently with his editorship of the *Critical Journal*. On March 26, 1802, he dispatched, besides the review of Werneburg and a brief notice on Krug (*Ges Werke* I, 112), a review (Ibid, 107-11) of Karl Friedrich Gerstacker's *Attempt at an Easily Understood Deduction of the Concept of Law out of the Highest Grounds of Knowledge as a Basis for a Future System of Philosophy of Law* (1801).

Hegel to Mehmel [33]

Jena, March 26, 1802

I am taking advantage of the first free moment, my dear Professor, to clear away my debt by sending you—beyond the review of Werneburg and a notice on Krug, which touches on why it has remained a mere notice—the two enclosed critiques: one on Gerstacker's [essay on] the principle of law, which parades much pretension in its title as well as in the announcement published in the newspaper; and one on Fischhaber. The statement at the beginning of the review [on Fischhaber] refers to a very strongly-stated review in the local paper.³ You see that I have not forgotten you and your interesting periodical, and have looked out for what I could find that would be suitable for it. Within a few days I shall also at last receive the first edition of Herder's *God* and will then discharge this [review] obligation as soon as possible. If you wish to send me work for this vacation, I will gladly take care of it promptly. It is a pleasure to contribute to a publication which, thanks to you, grows in interest with every passing day, while other periodicals decline by the day, especially philosophy periodicals such as the ones published here.

I am very curious about the critique you announced to me of the most recent issue of our [*Critical Journal*], the second installment of which you, too, will have received by now [i.e., review of the first installment of the *Critical Journal* in the *Erlangen Literary Review*, no 24, 1802, columns 185-91]. I am happy that my writing *On the Difference [between the Fichtean and Schellingian Systems of Philosophy]* has met with your approval, since you are one of the few whose approval one may [truly] wish to merit.

I enclose herewith the receipt for the payment received, and am most respectfully your most devoted servant, Dr. Hegel

Professor Schelling sends you his greetings and hopes for a letter from you.

POLEMICS RENOUNCED: THE CASE OF JACOBI

When Schelling left Jena for Würzburg in 1803, the *Critical Journal* was discontinued. Yet Hegel's interest in journal editing did not wane, although the type of

³Gottlob Christian Fischhaber's *On the Principle and Main Problems of the Fichtean System with an Outline of a New Dissolution of that System* (1801) was favorably reviewed in Jena's *General Literary Review*; the review by Hegel has been lost.

journal he now envisioned was no longer narrowly philosophical. From 1805 to 1807 he repeatedly brought up the idea of founding a literary review in connection with a hoped-for position at Heidelberg University or in Bavaria. His identity as a philosopher now secure in his own mind, his new editorial ambition was to emulate the French tradition of *culture générale* [55] and promote scientific and "aesthetic" education, a mission affecting all literate men. Karl Wilhelm Gottlob Kastner, a Jena student of Hegel's who became a professor of chemistry in Heidelberg in 1805, wrote Hegel on November 1805 with reference to the projected literary review [57], and on September 17, 1806, Hegel explained his plan to Niethammer:

I have long been planning a literary journal—in the manner of the French ones. . . . It would not be in the same spirit as the review journals which contain only judgments on books and authors and nothing or little of the content. Nor would it have the much ballyhooed aim of completeness, but would rather restrict itself to what has real impact on the sciences and is important for general culture. In particular [it would]—without becoming really polemical, i.e., merely disparaging or unfavorable—[take aim at] the wretchedness of present-day philosophy, as likewise theology, physics, and even aesthetics, etc. [70]

A few months later, in early 1807, Franz Josef Schelver, a Jena colleague of Hegel's who had just joined the Heidelberg medical faculty, asked Hegel for his thoughts on a critical periodical [86]. Hegel responded with the short piece entitled *Maxims for the Journal of German Literature* (*Ges Werke* I, 509-14). The piece expands upon points already made in the September 17 letter to Niethammer. Reviewers should avoid a purely negative attitude, "for it is more difficult to elaborate suitably why something is excellent than to discover its deficiencies" (Ibid, 512). But the renunciation of negativism is made reasonable by the authority with which only works of intrinsic or public importance are reviewed [90].

But there are also differences between the letter to Niethammer and the account to Schelver. The review journal which Schelver contemplated in January 1807 was to be established with the collaboration of Georg Friedrich Creuzer, professor of philology and ancient history at Heidelberg since 1804, and Karl Daub, a Heidelberg theology professor since 1795 and already an admirer of Hegel [58]. Johann Heinrich Voss, the Heidelberg professor and translator of Homer to whom Hegel addressed himself so eloquently in 1805 [55], was an adversary of Creuzer's, and thus now appeared as an opponent to Hegel's plans. Schelver frankly writes that Hegel has to contend with a reputation in Heidelberg for unintelligible speech, though he says Hegel could easily refute the charge [86]. This warning may help explain what, after Hegel's critique of Krug and other commonsense philosophers, are kind words in the "Maxims" for "sound commonsense" so long as it has the educated self-assurance not to let itself be put upon by empty "formalism" and pretenses at scientificity. In fact, Hegel had never been a critic of common sense, only of commonsense *philosophy*. Four perpetrators of such formalism and arrogance are cited by name: Johann Josef von Görres, Karl Josef Hieronymus Windischmann (Ch 20), the Schellingian natural philosopher Heinrich Steffens, and Schelling himself. Hegel's criticism of Schelling in the "Maxims" responds to Schelver's insistence in his January 1807 letter:

I beseech you in particular to express yourself without any indiscretion in your memoir on, for example, the philosophical procedures of Görres and Windischmann, and on Schelling's philosophy as well, indeed all the more so because these gentlemen [e.g., Creuzer, Daub] might, I fear, . . . have the idea of calling upon Schelling [instead of Hegel]. . . . [86]

Kastner's letter of November 15, 1805, to Hegel expresses privately circulating criticism of Schelling:

The introductory study to the *Philosophy of Nature* [Aphorismen zur Einleitung in die Philosophie der Natur, Jahrbücher für Medizin als Wissenschaft, vol 1, no 1, 1805] by Schelling has pleased me greatly. Only—let it be said between us—it seems to me that a certain weakness is apparent in his constant way of withdrawing behind the Absolute. [57]

But Hegel is not wholly critical of Schelling in his "Maxims," since he notes that Schelling, after supporting formalistic arrogance and confusion in the sciences, subsequently backed off. This tends to confirm Hegel's claim on May 1, 1807, to Schelling [95] that criticism in the Preface to the *Phenomenology* was directed to Schelling's lesser followers, not Schelling himself.

There was still equivocation in Hegel's attitude toward Schelling. On February 23, 1807, as he was trying to win Heidelberg for his projected journal, he appealed to Schelling [90], hoping for his support in implementing the project on Bavarian soil. His letter to Schelling, like a contemporary one to Niethammer [89], expresses a preference for the editorship of a literary review to the Bamberg newspaper editorship which he was offered. Schelling cautioned in his March 22 reply [93] that a new Bavarian literary review would more likely fall under the domination of Jacobi than Hegel, to which Hegel replied [95] that if he had understood Jacobi he could then take no part.

Jacobi, who became president of the Bavarian Academy of Sciences in 1807, was a moving force behind the pseudophilosophical inanities of Krug and Bouterwek, which Hegel criticized in the *Erlangen Literary Review* and in the *Critical Journal*, though Jacobi insisted, more than certain Kantian practical philosophers, on the theoretical, not just practical, certainty of realism with respect to the thing-in-itself. In Jacobi's philosophy of feeling and faith, theoretical skepticism was combined in a neo-Humean vein with faith in God and in the thing-in-itself. Both God and the thing-in-itself could be immediately intuited, but no demonstrative knowledge was possible of either. The principal adversaries of the speculative philosophy of Schelling, and hence of the Schellingian Hegel, in Bavaria—Friedrich Köppen, Jakob Salat, and Kajetan von Weiller—were also followers of Jacobi. Jacobi had attacked Schelling's philosophy of identity in three "letters" attached to Köppen's *Schelling's Doctrine of the Whole Philosophy of Absolute Nothingness* (1803). Salat and von Weiller had published *The Spirit of the Very Latest Philosophy by Mr. Schelling, Hegel, and Company* (1803-05). At Niethammer's suggestion Hegel seems to have written a review, which has been lost, of the book by Salat and von Weiller [61, 62, 67].

When in 1807 Niethammer left Bamberg for Munich just as Hegel arrived to edit

the Bamberg newspaper, he reported to Hegel that Hegel's advancement in Bavaria depended on a reconciliation with Jacobi, for which Hegel was evidently not yet ready [98]. But as the distance grew between Hegel and Schelling, Hegel changed sides in the long-standing feud between Schelling and Jacobi. This shift began with an expression of sympathy by Hegel for Jacobi, the Protestant from the North, in the face of "Old Bavarian" criticism of his inaugural address as president of the Bavarian Academy of Sciences in July 1807. Hegel showed interest in the address, requesting copies of it from Niethammer [102]. Upon reading Jacobi's praise of free scientific inquiry, steeped in religious instincts and allusion to the prior degenerateness from which South Germany was now emerging, Hegel voiced mild approval [103]. But when Karl Rottmanner, a Bavarian Catholic, published a scathing attack upon Jacobi and the associated Protestant infiltration of South Germany, Hegel jumped to Jacobi's defense in a long letter to Niethammer [111]. When Niethammer showed Hegel's letter to Jacobi, Hegel was not displeased [112]. In August 1808 Hegel began transmitting compliments to Jacobi through Niethammer [126]. In 1811—in *On Things Divine and Their Revelation*—Jacobi sharply criticized Schelling's alleged pantheism, and in 1812 Caroline Paulus reported the rumor that Schelling's quest for a professorship in Tübingen was frustrated in part due to his reputation as an "atheist" with the Württemberg King [206]. Schelling defended himself in a merciless attack upon Jacobi entitled *A Memorial to the Text on Things Divine, etc., by Mr. Jacobi and to Its Charge of an Intentionally Deceptive, Lying Atheism* (1812). Jacobi responded by privately requesting permission to retire from the presidency of the Academy. Niethammer, in reporting this request confidentially to Hegel, conveys Jacobi's regard for Hegel and notes that Jacobi has begun to study the just-published first volume of Hegel's *Logic* [209]. Hegel, again through Niethammer, wishes Jacobi well in his retirement [211], though Jacobi's offer to retire was declined.

THE HEIDELBERG YEARBOOKS, J. F. FRIES, AND HEGEL'S POLEMICAL RELAPSE

Hegel's reversal of attitude toward Jacobi culminated in his favorable review of the third volume of Jacobi's works, published in the *Heidelberg Yearbooks for Literature* in 1817 (*Werke* VI, 313-48). Hegel had been nominally associated with the *Heidelberg Yearbooks* since 1808. Though his plan of 1807 to found a "journal of German literature" failed, he was invited in 1808 to collaborate on the periodical which was finally founded in Heidelberg. The *Yearbooks* began publication in January 1808. In May the philologist Creuzer extended to Hegel an invitation to participate [123]. Creuzer wrote that the Heidelberg professors founding the review counted on Hegel's support in the area of philosophy, "given that in this field you have acquired such an important position." Hegel replied a month later:

Hegel to Creuzer [124]

Bamberg, June 28, 1808

I have received your much appreciated letter, dear sir, of the 29th of last month but see from the date that I must apologize greatly for my delay in answer-

ing. I am pleased to accept your invitation to collaborate on the *Heidelberg Yearbooks for Literature*. I have high regard for the volumes already published, and they give promise of even more in the future. It will be a pleasure for me to be allowed to join this honorable Society [of scholars] and to merit its approval of my share of the work.

You wish me to define more precisely the sphere of my scientific activity. It will in general interest me to work on philosophical works of a more speculative or metaphysical nature, writings on logic or metaphysics, the so-called philosophy of nature, natural law, maybe even moral theory and aesthetics. There are works of related content, though they are not scientific, of which I would gladly undertake critical notices. To indicate more precisely the type of writings I have in mind, I mention for instance Jacobi's and Schelling's addresses before the Academy of Sciences in Munich, along with the brochures which have appeared against them. They have caused much excitement in Bavaria and could be of wider interest in showing the Bavarian way both in general and in particular, especially its way of assimilating products of a higher foreign culture. You will perhaps give the public the pleasure of calling its attention to August Wilhelm Schlegel's [*Comparison between Racine's and Euripides' Phaedra* 1807]. Fichte's *Address [Rede] to the German Nation* [1808] is similar in nature. However, I hear Friedrich Schlegel has already published notices on Fichte's works of this sort. I have not yet seen the volume containing this critique.⁴ Of the former [more speculative] type [of writings] I would suggest the natural philosophy of [Heinrich] Steffens [Steffens, *Basic Characteristics of Philosophical Natural Science in Aphorisms for Use with Lectures*, 1806] and [Gotthilf Heinrich] Schubert [Schubert, *Views of the Nocturnal Side of Natural Science*, 1808] if I knew how far back the Institute plans to go. But such a distribution of work is in principle the responsibility of the editors.

Thank you for informing me of the monetary arrangements, which I note with satisfaction. We shall presumably be in due course told by the publisher what is to be done with the reviewed works, whether the reviewer keeps them at a discount or completely free [of charge], or has to send them back.

In closing I take the liberty of asking you to assure the Society of the pleasure caused me by its kindness in associating me with its work. With the greatest of respect, your most humble servant Professor Hegel

HEGEL'S COLLABORATION with the *Heidelberg Yearbooks* remained purely nominal until Hegel joined the Heidelberg faculty in 1816. In 1815 Hegel's long-standing rival Jakob Friedrich Fries, himself a professor in Heidelberg, published a negative

⁴Jacobi's inaugural address to the Academy of Sciences on July 27, 1807, was entitled "On Scholarly Societies, Their Spirit and Purpose," while Schelling's address, delivered on October 12, was entitled "On the Relation of the Fine Arts to Nature." The acclaim which Schelling's address won resulted in his being named General Secretary of the Bavarian Academy of Fine Arts (*bildende Künste*) shortly thereafter. Rottmanner's criticism of Jacobi's address was matched by Father Josef Sebastian von Rittershausen's attack on Schelling in his *Examination of Professor Schelling's Address on the Relation of Nature and Art* (1808). Both addresses were attacked by the Romantic poet Achim von Arnim in the *Heidelberg Yearbooks* (vol 1, 362ff). Friedrich Schlegel's review of Fichte's *Addresses to the German Nation* also appeared in the *Yearbooks* (vol 1, 3ff).

review of Hegel's *Logic* in the *Yearbooks* (vol 1, 385-93). Hegel complained to Heinrich Paulus, then his primary contact on the Heidelberg faculty, the same year.

Hegel to Paulus [250]

Nuremberg, August 16, 1815

In spite of everything, I cannot refrain from entrusting a few lines to Mr. [Thomas] Seebeck to renew your remembrance of me. Have you, dear friend, forgotten us so completely that you no longer send us any letters? Nor to the many other people who remember you as well? I can give no report of you nor convey any remembrance from you. Just a week before his death [Josef von] Bayard also asked about you.

Leave the Jesuits and other such vermin [241] alone now and again for a quarter hour, and give us, who come asking as children, a few crumbs.

That alongside the Jesuits and Isidor's Decretals—God forgive the imposter who forged them [the Decretals] for all the mischief they have caused—my poor innocent *Logic* and I are being similarly pilloried in the *Heidelberg Yearbooks*. You will say it is just vengeance [for Hegel's critical note on Fries in the Introduction to his 1812 *Logic*]. I, as the aggrieved party, on the other hand, must find it trite and crude, all the more so inasmuch as the charge of ignorance made against me ought to be completely turned back against him [Fries]. May God enlighten him as to his own lack of enlightenment. Perhaps what it means is: "The feet of those who shall carry you out [for burial] are already at the door" ["*pedes eorum, qui efferent te, jam ante januam*," Acts 5:9]. How can this fellow and his Mr. Bouterwek, Schulze, and Company throw so much weight around? If that is the fortune which dead wood meets with, what is to become of green wood [Luke 23:31]?

But I had hoped to hear the distant voice of the little woman and beautiful Emmi [Paulus's daughter] as well. It is as if I had been long since living on St. Helena! Just as I have seized in the greatest haste the opportunity provided by Dr. Seebeck, I hope you will give me at least a brief reply, which would be greatly valued by your devoted Hegel.

WHEN, FROM 1816 TO 1818, Hegel succeeded Fries in the philosophy chair in Heidelberg, he assumed editorship of the *Heidelberg Yearbooks* for philosophy and philology. In 1819-20, in Berlin, he addressed a proposal (*Berlin Schrift*, 509-30) for a "critical literary review" to the Prussian government, stressing the importance of governmental subsidy for a periodical edited in the capital city. But nothing came of the plan, and it was only in 1826 that Hegel together with his friends and students founded the *Yearbooks for Scientific Criticism* (Ch 19).

In April 1817 [316], Hegel welcomed Jacobi's approval of his review of the third volume of Jacobi's works in the *Yearbooks*. In contrast to earlier reviews from the Jena period, Hegel here practiced his advice of 1806-07 that critics ought to spend more time finding out what is excellent in a work and less discovering its deficiencies, i.e., that they ought to avoid a "polemical", "merely disparaging" and "unfavorable" [70] attitude. Yet he did not substantially alter his objections to Jacobi's philosophy, expressed in *Faith and Knowledge* (1802). Hegel defended

himself against the charge of pantheism by agreeing with Jacobi that the personality of God, freedom, and immortality were not mere practical postulates, but he continued to champion systematic philosophy against Jacobi's philosophy of feeling. Still, his on-the-whole charitable review of Jacobi was welcome relief from the prevailing tone of the German academic world, which Hegel himself had described as "a spiritual realm of animals" (*Werke* II, 303-22). Had he been as charitable to his Jacobian rivals Fries and Schleiermacher and to their philosophy of feeling, exhibiting what is excellent rather than succumbing to the easier path of mere faultfinding, his own reputation in the history of philosophy might not have succumbed so easily to Schelling's later attack on him as a panlogist "essentialist." But, as it was, Hegel's attacks upon Friesian and Schleiermacherian incarnations of the Jacobian philosophy of feeling were so vehement [e.g. 196] that his own formulations would lend credibility to the late Schelling's equation of the Hegelian Absolute with a system of logical categories devoid of sentience. In the history of philosophy Hegel has ironically fallen victim to the very spiritual realm of animals which he ably criticized, but which he nonetheless inhabited.

VI

The Battle of Jena and Birth of the *Phenomenology*

THE GESTATION OF Hegel's first major work was literally caught in the crossfire of Napoleonic Europe's own emergence. A few years before the book's 1807 publication, Hegel's closest colleagues began to migrate from Jena to Napoleonic Germany, while Hegel himself hoped to follow. He finally succeeded, but only in the aftermath of Napoleon's October 1806 victory at Jena. The turmoil surrounding the completion of the *Phenomenology* in 1806-07 led him to contemplate a second edition even before the appearance of the first. Yet reflection on the meaning of the turmoil of the battle at Jena led him to articulate the fundamental theses of his philosophy of history. Letters brought together in the present chapter record the intersection of Hegelian philosophy and world history in the Napoleonic era.

THE MIGRATION FROM JENA TO NAPOLEONIC GERMANY, 1803-1806

Bavaria's new Protestant territories, sanctioned in 1803 by the Diet of Ratisbon, called for a Protestant theology faculty. One was established the same year with the help of a minor migration from Jena to the University of Würzburg, which itself had recently fallen into Bavarian hands. Besides the theologians Niethammer and Paulus, the law professor Hufeland and Schelling both left Jena for Würzburg in 1803. Tübingen-trained historian Karl Wilhelm Breyer abandoned Jena for the Bavarian University of Landshut in 1804. Hegel was to become a close associate of Niethammer's, joining him in Bavaria in 1807. But in 1804 Hegel remained in Jena with the circle around Goethe, including editor Frommann, Johann Diederich Gries, Karl Ludwig von Knebel, Schellingian natural philosopher Franz Josef Schelver, and physicist Thomas Johann Seebeck. Yet as an unsalaried *Privatdozent* Hegel searched for prospects elsewhere. Weimar was then allied with Prussia. Given Hegel's antipathy toward Prussia [59], it is not surprising that the three lands which most attracted him in 1805-1806 as places of future employment were Baden, Württemberg, and Bavaria—all allied with the French.

In a September 1804 letter [48] to Gries—translator of Tasso, Ariosto, and Calderon—Hegel inquires about a possible post in Heidelberg, which had been acquired by Baden the previous year. Gries had gathered literary limelights around his tea table in Jena since 1800, and it is this group to which Hegel apparently refers as "the Society." Friedrich Karl von Savigny, whom Hegel mentions, had won a reputation as a historian of law with his *Law of Possession* (1803). Neither

Gries nor von Savigny, however, established himself in Heidelberg as Hegel supposes likely.

In Bavaria, Schelling was gathering a circle around himself and his natural philosophy. This group included physician Adalbert Friedrich Marcus, mentioned by Hegel to Niethammer in December 1804 [52]. Marcus advocated the so-called Brownian method of therapy, in which he interested Schelling. Between 1805 and 1808 they coedited the *Yearbooks for Medicine as Science*. Scottish physician John Brown theorized that health consisted in moderate excitation, so that illness was due to either over- or under-stimulation. It followed that, regardless of the disease, therapy consisted in measured doses of stimulation. Hegel, in his 1816 letter to von Raumer [278], distances himself from the schematic and soon discredited Brownian system. Konrad Joachim Kilian, cited in the same letter, was also a physician, but opposed Schelling's natural philosophy. Kilian and Marcus had engaged in a public quarrel over an article by Marcus concerning the University of Würzburg.

Niethammer's reply [53] to Hegel's December 1804 letter reported the most recent scandal surrounding Schelling. The Bishop of Würzburg had threatened Catholic students attending Schelling's popular lectures with excommunication. Late in September Schelling had embroiled himself more deeply by sending criticisms of the new Bavarian curriculum for secondary schools to Count Friedrich von Thürheim. The Count replied that Schelling's arrogance showed the lack of proper respect and reasonableness engendered by "speculative philosophy." Christian August Fischer, professor of history and literature at Würzburg, supported the Count through thinly veiled attacks on Schelling from his podium, while Schelling's students sought to save the honor of their "idol" by so disrupting Fischer's lecture hall that he was forced to abandon the premises. University officials penalized the offending students by expelling the foreigners and drafting their leader into the military. Schelling was abandoned in the affair by Paulus, his erstwhile Jena colleague, who made a show of escorting his family to attend Fischer's lectures. Niethammer was hostile to Fischer and agreed with Schelling's call for secularization of the school curriculum, but he moderated his remarks and maintained a guarded neutrality to preserve his future efficacy in Bavaria. In 1808 Niethammer would win approval for his own secondary school plan for all Bavaria in place of the one Schelling had attacked. In 1804, however, Schelling interpreted Niethammer's neutrality as hostility and counted Niethammer among his enemies—which explains Hegel's closing reference to Schelling in December 1804 [52]. Hegel would tie his own future to Niethammer's accommodationist diplomacy rather than to Schelling's bravado.

Kajetan von Weiller, the Bavarian Catholic philosopher and priest mentioned by Hegel in March 1805 [54], taught in the Munich secondary schools and was a leading "Old Bavarian." He had been the moving force behind the 1804 church-dominated curriculum publicly criticized by Schelling. Philosophically he was a follower of Jacobi. In collaboration with Jakob Salat, he had published a tract entitled *The Spirit of the Very Latest Philosophy by Mr. Schelling, Hegel, and Company* (1803-05), and Hegel was at last honored by public refutation. At Niethammer's urging Hegel may well have written a review of it for the Halle-

based literary review [67], though it was never published and has been lost. Hegel mentions the review in his May 1806 letter to Niethammer [61].

Hegel notes in March 1805 [54] his promotion from *Privatdozent* to a nontitular professorship (*ausserordentliche Professur*), though he did not become salaried until 1806 [61]. He had presented himself for promotion in September 1804 [49] to Goethe, the poet-minister of Weimar. Jakob Fries, who had got public attention with a polemical writing entitled *Reinhold, Fichte, and Schelling* (1803) and was promoted with Hegel, became Hegel's archrival. Fries called for a return from the speculative license of the Schellingian philosophy to the rigor of Kant's critical method. He was no sooner promoted in Jena, however, than he obtained a titular professorship (*ordentlicher Professur*) in Heidelberg. Not happy at being outdistanced so soon by Fries, Hegel turned to Johann Heinrich Voss, the distinguished Homer translator who also had been called from Jena to Heidelberg in 1805 to give new direction to the university there. Hoffmeister dates three drafts of a letter to Voss [55] in March 1805.

Themes we find repeated in all three drafts are the academic decline of Jena and rise of Heidelberg, the complementary relation of philosophy and the special sciences, and the unfinished nature of Hegel's previous publications. The relation which Hegel sees between philosophy and the sciences disconfirms the common view that he viewed philosophy as a closed system: philosophy is moved to grow in extension, to compensate for its congenital and finally irremovable abstraction by contact with the special sciences. But now the objection is the opposite of the common complaint as to the system's allegedly closed character. For Hegel now invites the charge that the system's openness lands him in the same situation of "endless progress" against which he protests in the case of Kant and Fichte. A possible Hegelian reply is that though the system may forever gain in extension, it does so only by repeated enactment of the same dialectical method. An infinite mathematical series can be grasped without going through the infinitely numerous members of the series so long as one grasps the principle of the series by which new members are always generated. The Absolute itself can accordingly be grasped without grasping its infinitely numerous aspects so long as the principle of the infinite series, in this case the dialectical method, is grasped. Yet such a reply would contradict Hegel's claim that the dialectic terminates in absolute knowledge. The openness of the system to endless empirical findings is best reconciled with the finite number of stages in the dialectic by construing such findings as endlessly new points of departure for testing and finding fresh expressions of an ever finite dialectical reconstruction of the present.

The third draft contains Hegel's famous statement of the goal of teaching philosophy to speak German, a related plea for "general culture" in the French tradition, and an attack on the scholastic fragmentation of culture. Those who find Hegel obscure may be amused to realize that his aim was the very opposite. It was this aim that most impressed Voss in his reply of August 24, 1805. Though Voss was pessimistic about Heidelberg's financial ability to offer Hegel a post, he did encourage Hegel's project of philosophical translation:

May the genius of Germany bless your decision to bring philosophy down out of the clouds and place it once more in an amicable relation with childlike men of eloquence. It seems to me that inner perception and feeling are not possible outside the familiar language of the heart, and that our rich original language is suited to give either form or subtle plasticity to the freest and most delicate movements of the spirit. An Olympian appearing in the guise of a shepherd would accomplish greater miracles than by appearing in superhuman forms. [56]

Hegel also enlisted the aid of his students in his overtures toward Heidelberg. Karl Wilhelm Gottlob Kastner, who had studied under Hegel in Jena, became in 1804 a professor of chemistry in Heidelberg. In November 1805 he wrote that his inquiries on Hegel's behalf had come to naught, though he still held out some hope and would continue his efforts. He urged Hegel, if at all possible, to send a copy of his promised systematic treatment of philosophy to university administrators. Kastner noted that Schelling also awaited this system. Niethammer had remarked on Hegel's forthcoming work nearly a year before in connection with his own deteriorating relationship with Schelling: "There is a wish I cannot help expressing, and which finds its place here by an association which is not unnatural: it is that very soon you give us something of your. . . labors to read" [53]. Kastner urged Hegel to write to a Heidelberg university official, Johann Baptist Hofer, but cautioned: "Try in your letter to *Hofer* to take the posture of showing that your philosophy absolutely protects *religion* and in no way works against it! In Karlsruhe people are more or less bigots, and at least respect tradition" [57].

Another of Hegel's students who tried to help his cause in Heidelberg was Christian Friedrich Lange, who in 1807 became a pastor in Baden. Like Kastner, Lange laments the failure of his efforts but still holds out hope. Lange especially notes the interest Hegel's writings, as few and incomplete as they may have been, aroused in Karl Daub, professor of theology in Heidelberg: "Daub is very interested in you. . . . Daub knows your writings, and is trying to go further. Speed up publication of your work—it is awaited with impatience, and its imminent appearance will not fail to have great effect" [58]. In Daub Hegel won a lifelong advocate.

The migration to Napoleonic Germany could not stop in Würzburg. For in December 1805 the Treaty of Pressburg deprived Bavaria of the city, which it had acquired only three years before. Würzburg now fell to Ferdinand III of Tuscany, an Austrian prince. Schelling, Paulus, and Niethammer were among Protestant professors at Würzburg who declined allegiance to the new regime, and who were thus provided for elsewhere by Bavaria. Yet in a January 1806 [59] letter, Hegel was willing to consider an offer from Würzburg—though not under any conditions. This letter also refers to French-inspired reforms in Württemberg. The Duke of Württemberg became King on January 1, abolished medieval privileges, confiscated the property of the clergy, and secularized the University of Tübingen. Hegel clearly welcomed such rational—even if nondemocratic and externally induced—reform in his own homeland.

Regarding Seebeck I can no longer permit you, my dear friend, to labor under an error into which you have fallen in part due to your own fault. You fancy he has been here since his trip to Brunswick, and that a letter which you sent to him from Heidelberg has probably reached him. Not so. He is presently in Switzerland and had written two letters to you in Liebenstein and then Würzburg to invite you to the Society. Alas, all in vain! One knew nothing of you here, and the letters have either reached you not at all or too late. He further traveled via Würzburg to meet you there, but you were not there either. Schelver and I wanted to accompany him and come see you in Liebenstein. The plan was to surprise you. But how could you leave Liebenstein without expecting us? Did you not realize we wanted to visit you there? We fortunately learned of your departure the evening before we wanted to leave for Liebenstein. With everything packed, we gave up the trip.

Mr. Frommann has returned here with his family healthy and well, and has thus laid to rest all the apprehensions spread by false rumors of his and his whole family's fate in the floods that have devastated Silesia. It was even said that their dead bodies had been found. . . ., and Mr. Frommann's head washed ashore amid . . . , the nose on his, pressed to her chaste heart [text unclear]. One had lamented the young creature who had brought her female existence to no higher enjoyment than Mr. Frommann's nose, etc. As I stated, all this has proven wrong. But this is the world infected with lying.

Since you are in Heidelberg, I would like to change the subject and ask you to inquire into the climate as to the university there. You would show your friendship for me if you informed me of the course matters are taking there, and see if something could not be done for a philosopher *qui s'était retiré jusqu'ici du monde*. I hear that a chair is still vacant there. It surely depends on what standards are used and also on the method of having one's name introduced. As little as those standards have been touted thus far, general rumor has it that they are now destined to be enhanced, in the prevailing opinion, by Savigny's appointment. Such opinion is often so capricious that at times one can count precisely on such capriciousness. You would perhaps allow yourself to be easily persuaded to establish residence there, for I hear that you find it much to your liking.

By the way, we hope to talk to you soon in person and thus to tell you how much I likewise remain your faithful friend, Hegel.

Your letter to Seebeck has been en route for eleven days. I hope mine goes faster. I will prepare an envelope for [Konrad] Stahl.

I have, my dear friend, postponed replying to your kind letter in order to have the satisfaction of simultaneously reporting to you the payment of my [monetary] debt, which through my delay has come to weigh heavily; but I do not yet have this satisfaction. I wrote at once to Stuttgart to reroute the money which I had originally instructed to be sent to Würzburg, and hope that Swabian lethargy has finally

become satiated in the four weeks which have already passed and that people there have at least risen to their feet. Yet for fear of incurring a new debt to you I did not want to delay this reply to you any longer.

Let me first express my joy at hearing from all sides how much both you and Mme. Niethammer like your new domicile [in Würzburg]. This did not surprise me, for the main part of such contentment to us always seemed to depend on the situation one creates for oneself through one's own character and conduct, and I thus knew in advance that you two dear friends, as I have the honor of calling you, would not bed down other than well. Yet as well as you may feel in your bed of feathers, a change of scenery certainly also has many attractions; and a small side trip always increases the comfort of one's situation. I am not without hope that come spring you will at least for a short period try to see how it is to sleep in Wenigenjena again. In fact, from time to time you have to look after your estate, which otherwise will surely fall into ruins. And so that I can give you a true account of it I will throw a few stones into your garden the first nice day that comes along.

For currently one is confined to one's room. Practically the only time I get out all week is when I leave the house for the lecture hall. The number of my students is the same as last winter, and given such weather I continue to be satisfied with it. I thank you for your sympathetic interest in my aspirations. I have not heard anything further here about my current hopes locally since what happened when [Karl] Breyer was still here, which he has probably recounted to you. The festivities in honor of the Hereditary Princess [Maria Paulowna, daughter of the Tsar who married the Saxony-Weimar's Crown Prince Karl Friedrich in 1804] had pushed all other doings into the background for a while. I hope nothing unfavorable has since occurred. Circumspection about this was in part what kept me from taking a few initiatives with a view to Erlangen, where a prospect has indeed again opened up. I hear locally from several quarters that Schelling plans to go there, which accords with the dissatisfaction with which, from what you write me, he has allowed himself to be seized. Perhaps you know something generally about Erlangen and are kind enough to inform me. You mention another possibility, but since it is so very tentative I will say nothing further, knowing that with you it is in good hands.

Yesterday I heard of Marcus's triumph over Kilian and feel sorry for the latter, who despite his actual legal victory is the defeated party.

I cannot write much news to you from here. We continue on the same old well-beaten path. Every two weeks there are small dinner parties, *thés chantants* at Frommann's, Knebel's, and Seebeck's. Mme. Knebel bears the main costs.

[Philosophy *Privatdozent* Johann Gottfried] Gruber and [theologian Johann Christian Wilhelm] Augusti allegedly want to leave the editorial staff of the local literary review [*Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung*] for good. His Excellency the Director and Friend of the Arts [Goethe] is expected today and will no doubt put everything right again. Otherwise Jena offers nothing special in either social or literary matters. The large number of novelties, it appears, has left everything as it was before, and has brought forth no fermentation. The new almost looks as if it were itself old—at least so far; yet something will surely come of it.

I ask you to tell Mme. Niethammer many a nice thing in my name. In my name, I say, since in your name it is surely already done. May I also ask you to please remember me to Mr. and Mme. [Gottlieb] Hufeland as well as to Mr. and Mme. [Heinrich Eberhard Gottlob] Paulus. I do not know if my compliments to the Schelling family can be given to you, since I do not know if they will be delivered.

[in the margin:] Here in the margin I further commend myself most highly to your cherished friendship and remain your sincere friend, Hegel.

Hegel to Niethammer [54]

Jena, March 4, 1805

I am finally, my dear friend, paying a debt I owe you in so many respects that I must remind you in advance of being able to give you but little relative to your own kindnesses. To settle temporal matters first, I am finally able to pay almost half the money I owe. Following your instructions, I shall forward 30 thalers to Dr. [Johann] Heiligenstädt [Niethammer's counsel] in the coming days. I have finally received my money but not the whole amount, and so I must set up a budget—which I have also ventured to do in the case of what I owe you, since you write to me that this sum as well has been assigned to me here. Within a month, or no more than a few months, I will be able to pay back the rest.

I thank you in particular for your invitation to the sermon marking the new ecclesiastical year. I am much obliged. I have already written to Mme. Niethammer how much I have been edified by it. Your boldness in selecting this theme pleased me as much as your execution of it. Only one thing: do not let [the Würzburg printer] Nitribitt print your works again. His name calls for salt [*Nitrit* is nitrate in German]—which is wanting in his manner of printing. [Niethammer, *Sermon and Program Marking the Dedication of the Protestant Church in Würzburg*, 1805]

Your last letter has afforded me a closer view of the Spanish screen [i.e., Christian Fischer] and everything behind it. Of what good to us are all the quarantine regulations against yellow fever when it is already raging among you. The screen itself has of course not brought on the fever, but it has caused a susceptibility to it, and it is conducive, it seems, to its packaging and hence to its further spread. I know you to be safe from the danger of contagion, and for me that is enough. Those afflicted may keep their bellyaches to themselves. Thus we recently learned of a ministerial reply [by Count von Thürheim] to a certain letter [by Schelling]. The reply no doubt contains a blunt admonishment which surely will not be without effect.

Without a doubt, some fine clarifications are still to be expected from Kilian and Marcus. Kilian at least does not appear to be as completely laid out on the floor over against Marcus as it seems, and at least apparently is still able to lay Marcus low. But a good story, which you will have found in the Leipzig newspaper [*Briefe* I, 456], is the origin of Weiller's philosophical work [Kajetan von Weiller's *Guide to a Free View of Philosophy*, 1804] introduced as a textbook in the gymnasiums. The vehemence with which the curriculum is being defended in the Munich newspaper shows that these gentlemen did not expect such a reception of their plan, and the light cast on Weiller's book cannot fail to increase their irritation.

In our own area there are no such brilliant, enviable movements. [Biologist Jakob] Ackermann is leaving for Heidelberg, and Weimar seemed quite perplexed over it. After being privately alerted by one of Ackermann's friends, [Christian Gottlob] Voigt himself immediately arrived [in Jena from the Weimar government]. Another big shot here is said to have had offers from Heidelberg that have not been unfavorably received. If this completely materializes, if the blow is really delivered, the perplexity will resemble butter in the sun.

Finally, all four decrees necessary for my [nontitular] professorship have arrived. The promotion has been bestowed on [Jakob Friedrich] Fries together with me. [Karl] Krause already made it through, I hear, last fall.

You will have probably heard that Goethe has been dangerously ill, and that Schiller [who died on May 9] has been very ill as well. I could not fail to follow such great examples, and suffered an interruption of some fourteen days. You will likewise know that Mme. [Thomas] Seebeck has given birth to a son.

What is more is that we have been snowed in again today. This Jena winter does not want to end. I see no ray of liberation for me.

Yet the one thing that interjects hope in the situation is that I hear we can look forward to seeing you and your family here for Easter. This hope is too pleasant for me not to regard it as well-founded, and I am furthermore convinced that you and Mme. Niethammer would not have the heart to postpone your visit any longer. And one should not do violence to one's heart. Please remember me most kindly to Mme. Niethammer. I hope to be able to give her in person my written thanks for her kind remembrance at Easter.

Finally, I ask you to extend greetings to Mr. and Mme. Hufeland. Please let me hear from you soon and preserve your treasured friendship for me. Your sincere friend, Hegel

Hegel to Voss [55]

[first draft]

Had I still been fortunate enough to converse with you personally, perhaps I would have taken the occasion to talk to you about a wish I am now forced to convey in the form of a monologue.

Your kind permission, distinguished sir, to converse with you in writing, which you graciously gave me before your departure from Jena, is too valuable for me not to avail myself of it as soon as I can [safely] suppose you have at least provisionally settled into your new place of residence and thus would not be disturbed by a letter. I venture to do so all the more inasmuch as in the more immediate motive of my writing. . . . [Incoherent lines, stricken by Hegel, follow.]

. . . if my wish might be fulfilled and I might thus have the good fortune of drawing near to you and no longer being burdened by the embarrassment I feel in entering upon a monologue with you, as an open and upright man, on a matter regarding in the first instance only myself. It is my wish to join the Heidelberg faculty, and to this end I ask you for advice and even intercession. Jena has lost the interest it formerly had: the free pursuit of art and science in a living and active

ambiance, emboldening every person of earnest striving with confidence to try himself out and put himself to work. This was the only interest that Jena could have for me, since I do not have a titular professorship here.

I entertain this hope because I can only think that my science, philosophy, will enjoy cultivation in Heidelberg. In fact, the intention is evident there of activating the sciences and maintaining them in a state of mobility—for otherwise they languish. Yet such mobility in the first place lies in the concept [*Begriff*] elaborated by philosophy. Philosophy, however, is in turn driven forward by the sciences, which hold before it the image of the world as a totality, thus permitting it to overcome the abstraction of its concepts and ever remove its deficiency in content.

As far as my intentions in philosophy are concerned, I of course necessarily wish that the only thing capable of providing a basis for judgment—my works up to now—were [already] laid down as a foundation. For I myself recognize them as [only] slightly finished. Everybody knows how to judge what is finished, but from what is unfinished it is impossible to tell whether it contains a seed capable of producing something. I might rather recall my silence during the years devoted to working. I shall give an exposition of the result of this labor by publishing my system of philosophy, from which it at least should become clear that I oppose the mischief of formalism [see Preface to *Phenomenology* on this ostensibly Schellingian "formalism," *Werke* II, 22, 47-48]. Employing a scientifically useless schematism, this formalism serves only to conceal ignorance, and to boast before the ignorant while saying nothing of the matter itself. Yet this formalism has been pushed so far that it is no longer necessary to recall any objection against it, and that it is beginning to outlive itself. . . .

[second draft]

Your kind permission, distinguished sir, to converse with you in writing is too valuable for me not to take the liberty of making use of it. For it was no longer possible for me to become personally acquainted with you and to talk about a matter which, I confess, concerns in the first instance myself.

Jena attracted me because I was selecting a place of residence which, inasmuch as I have dedicated myself to science, would uplift me through the intensity of scientific activity there. For even if it is but the community of a place of residence defining a locale in which art and science activate themselves with zeal through their own impetus, such efficacy is capable of holding up more truthfully to the striving mind a higher concept of its own endeavor. That Jena has lost this interest you yourself know best, since you have helped diminish this interest by departing. Yet what has been lost here we see flourishing once again in Heidelberg. To be in the vicinity of men such as are gathering there is inevitably my most ardent wish. In Heidelberg my science—philosophy, more particularly the new philosophy—will not be the object of any unfavorable opinion. Men who place themselves above the individual sciences are certainly convinced that philosophy—the soul of all sciences—elevates all the sciences and drives them

forward; that without mobility the sciences languish; and that they derive such mobility from the concept. In the end this concept proceeds from philosophy, which activates science in its own proper domain while receiving in return from the sciences a nourishment and wealth of material whose actuality cannot be evaded. Philosophy, which is thus driven to expand, is driven by the sciences to make up for its own inadequacy in point of realization [*Erführung*], just as it drives them to make up for their conceptual inadequacy.

I cannot express what ability I might have to accomplish something in this regard. What every individual is he must prove by deed and effect on others. I can only point to unfinished works. Jena has been elevated in part through the fact that the germ could be seen. . . .

[main draft]

Your permission, distinguished sir, to converse with you in writing, which you had the kindness to give me before your departure from Jena, is too valuable for me not to avail myself of it. . . . [text unclear].

. . . Since a new hope is arising for science in Heidelberg, and since you certainly have as much interest in science as you yourself devote to it, I dare place in your hands my wish to take an active part in it and ask you to espouse my cause. This hope has strengthened in me the confidence that I had already mustered to allow myself to speak to you of a matter which interests me all the more because it would, were I to conclude it, give me the invaluable opportunity of becoming acquainted with you personally and seeking out your company.

You yourself know best that Jena has lost the interest it formerly had—through the communality and currency that the progress of science there enjoyed—of vivifying and stimulating in an individual who is trying himself out in science his confidence in the matter and in himself.

What is lost here blooms in Heidelberg even more beautifully. And I cherish the hope that my science, philosophy, will there enjoy favorable reception and attention. For it is clear as day that the sciences themselves ought to flourish and prosper, since from want of mobility they rather languish. Philosophy is in fact the queen of the sciences, as much because of herself as because of the interaction between her and the other sciences. Just as the mobility conveyed to the other sciences stems from philosophy, whose essence [is] the concept, so philosophy receives from them the form of completeness of content. Just as philosophy pushes the sciences [to compensate] for their conceptual deficiency, so they drive philosophy to give up the lack of realization [*Erführung*] stemming from its abstraction.

If I should speak of what I could accomplish in this science, I have been silent before the public for the three years since my first outings.¹ But a fair judge should not view these outings so much for what they are—namely first efforts—as to see whether a germ lies in them from which something finished will come. In these years I have been lecturing on the entire science of philosophy—speculative

¹Yet Hegel's unsigned publications in the *Critical Journal* continued into 1803.

philosophy, the philosophy of nature, the philosophy of spirit, natural law. And, moreover, I would wish to cover a particular field of philosophy not yet represented in Heidelberg, i.e., to lecture on aesthetics in the sense of a *cours de littérature*. I have long cherished this project, and I would like all the more to carry it out inasmuch as I hope for the good fortune of enjoying your support in it. By fall I will give an exposition of my work as a system of philosophy.² I hope at least one thing may come of it, namely, the point that I have nothing to do with the mischief of formalism currently promoting ignorance, in particular through a terminology behind which hides ignorance boasting to the ignorant. . . .

Luther made the Bible speak German, and you have done the same for Homer—the greatest gift that can be made to a people. For a people remains barbarian and does not view what is excellent within the range of its acquaintance as its own true property so long as it does not come to know it in its own language. If you will kindly forget these two illustrations, I may say of my endeavor that I wish to try to teach philosophy to speak German. Once we get that far, it will be infinitely more difficult to give to shallowness the appearance of profound discourse.

This leads me directly to another subject, which stands in close relation to the preceding. For Germany, the time seems to have arrived for the truth to become manifest. In Heidelberg, a new dawn for the weal of the sciences could arise, and it is you, dear Privy Councillor, who above all gives me this hope. It appears to me that a basic deterioration sets in when the sciences lack publicity—and this regardless of the external liberty promoted as much by the state as by the useless tongues that always keep up the general twaddle. It is a deficiency very earnestly nurtured by the scientific castes.

Permit me to express further my thoughts about the hope for a more effective activity of art and science taking hold of general culture, a hope that is so closely connected with my stated wish because I believe myself permitted to behold its fulfillment in Heidelberg, above all in you. Concerning this hope, I present to you my general view for your appreciation.

The general constellation of the age seems necessarily to give rise to this hope. The school of Jena has split up. Yet the sciences and the compilations of scientific findings, which by their very nature must make up a part of general culture, are still schools closed off within themselves, formed around an all-the-more-privileged circle, outwardly representative and yet perpetuating their essence, withdrawing from publicity. . . .

The generally prevailing. . . .

Moreover, your activity on behalf of general culture is noteworthy in that you not only will continue in Heidelberg your past and present activity on behalf of such culture, but, I am certain, will give it greater extension, thereby making it your business to tear apart these privileged circles of authorities and mannerisms. In connection with such circles, those laymen who endeavor to acquire the science and knowledge belonging to general culture have the wool pulled over their eyes,

²Hegel's *Phenomenology* did not appear until 1807.

as if apart from what is to be attained through honest endeavor an entirely hidden knowledge is still preserved for the caste as a closed secret. For the behavior of such privileged individuals—who know perfectly well among themselves the true nature of these doings which they confess to one another, while keeping face before the outside world—is incomprehensible in the light of all that is true and recognized as normal. The layman becomes discouraged. Because he sees what he honors as true treated rather as something common and contemptible, he gives up before he has a chance to notice [either] that these unprincipled doings, instead of being genius, are now merely a shallow absence of thought, now arbitrariness and presumption; [or] that, if one looks more closely, what he honors as true is *not* generally known to those who seem to pursue much higher things; or, if it is known, this truth—fulfillment and knowledge of which constitute the first condition of enabling one to go further—is dismissed with impertinence by their higher pursuit. The destruction of this rude system is at once effected by the illumination and evocation of the simpler cause of truth, which is no sooner highlighted than made immediately understandable to all. . . [incomplete].

Hegel to Niethammer [59]

Jena, January 14, 1806

Since your departure [after a visit to Jena], my dear friend, you have given no sign of life—and, in fact, you were silent even during your departure. Above all, however, you have been completely silent in the face of the ever-so-interesting current events [in Würzburg]. I can see that if I am to receive news from you I must explicitly induce you by making an express request. Yet I want in particular to ask Mme. Niethammer—please transmit the request—to put pressure on you to write.

I of course see that, given the intervening circumstances, there will be so much to do or not do, or at least to be awaited, that you cannot turn your attention much to the outside world. Your kind plans for me, as well as our beautiful hopes, have no doubt now collapsed, at least if things have taken the turn [through the Treaty of Pressburg] indicated in the public press. Perhaps, however, this reversal of affairs will open up for you a wider sphere of activity and further opportunities to do something for a friend—a friend who would like to thank you for this favor in particular among all the others already received from you.

Has the fate of the University already been decided? Is more known about it in Würzburg than here? What is clear is that Bavaria needs another university, or at least an expansion of the one that exists. Has anything perhaps been decided about this? The fact that Würzburg is to be turned over to an Austrian prince at once gives the terms of peace an air of patchwork—despite their glitter in other respects. It is a patchwork not made to withstand the test of time, and which in any case will not extricate Germany from its precarious condition. I wonder if the new Prince will be obliged to leave the University as it is. If a new university is established in Bavaria, it is possible that not everyone from Würzburg will transfer there. Should not a prospect there possibly open up for me?

Perhaps you have more news from Württemberg than I. The Provincial Diets have been abolished. Should not the University of Tübingen be deprived of its

[corporate] privilege and at long last a new institution be established, [embodying] interest in a more active reversal of the state of science? I have thought about writing to [Württemberg Privy Councillor] Baron [Ludwig Timotheus] von Spittler, but really do not know if he is still active in university matters. You could no doubt supply information about this.

Finally, as for us here, we do have a strong contingent, but of Prussians rather than students, which is not at all the same thing! The Senate and the General do not seem to have hit upon the praiseworthy idea of transferring to us here a garrison of officers obliged to occupy themselves with the sciences until they espy an enemy, which anyhow will not happen so soon. I fear no way will remain to increase the number of students if such a remedy is not found.

You will have read [Christian Gottfried] Schütz's *letter* to me in his literary periodical [*Hallesche Literatur-Zeitung*, 1805, no 282, columns 181ff], for this is how I interpreted the review of my publication [the *Differenzschrift*, on the difference between Fichte and Schelling] of five years ago.

Finally I ask you to please remember me most kindly to Mme. Niethammer, as also to Judicial Councillor Hufeland and his wife and whomever else remembers me. I also ask you again for a reply, and for the preservation of your friendship. Your sincere friend, Hegel

Hegel to Niethammer [61]

Jena, May 17, 1806

I have postponed writing to you, my dear friend, until I could announce completion of the assigned review. . . .

Next Monday I will start my lectures. The misfortune is that there probably will be students, although a mediocre number, to whom I cannot refuse to lecture *but* who will not *pay much*. And the little this does pay will fall to a strict minimum due to the uncertainty of payment. After making the suggestion last fall, this spring I have been given hope of receiving a salary. The Minister's [Goethe's] goodwill does not seem to be lacking. Yet I am afraid they will not have the courage to talk about it to the Duke before the fall, since he does not like to be approached regarding such matters. And then it will perhaps not be decided until next spring that I *could* receive something by the following fall. Anyhow this is no time for favorable hopes, seeing the uncertainty of the prince's [Karl August's] political independence [from Prussia].

So much for my situation here. But how are things with you, both with you yourself and with Mme. Niethammer? . . . Your most devoted, Hegel

ON THE PRINTING OF THE *PHENOMENOLOGY*, 1806

As printing of the *Phenomenology* proceeded in Bamberg, Niethammer's transfer to the city proved useful in view of Hegel's mistrust of his publisher, Josef Anton Göbhardt. Hegel's situation was becoming critical. He was mistaken in supposing Göbhardt was secretly operating as his own printer [67]. Yet Göbhardt had contracted to pay him 18 florins a page for the *Phenomenology* when half the manuscript was submitted, and then demanded the entire manuscript so he could

see what constituted half. Hegel was still writing the *Phenomenology*, so the request could not be fulfilled. But he needed partial payment to get through the winter. Niethammer threatened to take Göbhardt to court. Hegel continued to look for a university post elsewhere. The territory of Nuremberg, which included the Protestant university town of Altorf, fell to Bavaria in 1806, but instead of being reorganized the University of Altorf was closed in 1809. Hegel would still go to Nuremberg in 1808, but as a rector implementing Niethammer's reforms to the city's gymnasium (Chs 7-8).

On October 3, Niethammer wrote to Hegel of a new agreement with Göbhardt [71]. Niethammer agreed to pay Göbhardt for the printing of twenty-one pages at 21 florins a page in case Hegel should not deliver the remainder of the manuscript before October 18. He warned Hegel not to make his last mailing later than October 13. If correction of the manuscript was not yet finished by that date, Niethammer advised, Hegel should himself come to Bamberg. Hegel received Niethammer's letter plus copies of the agreement and correspondence with Göbhardt on October 8. A letter of October 6 [72] responds to one from Niethammer of September 29, which is missing.

Hegel to Niethammer [67]

Jena, August 6, 1806

From the fact that your wife is now away from Bamberg it results that you, my dear friend, are now back. What kind of marriage is that? Legally, you should be where she is.

I have also seen that your trip has fulfilled its purpose. Julius [Niethammer's son] has arrived here hale and hearty and is taller than last time. I met him by chance in the street as he was just coming from his [step-] brother's [Ludwig Döderlein's] lesson. I hoped to receive a few reports from you on what else you have seen or encountered on your trip, but now Mme. Niethammer will be kind enough to do this even more pleasantly—as much as I value your letters.

If you had been in Bamberg four weeks ago, I would have wanted to ask you to bring my publisher to his senses. I have now entered into a written exchange with him and still prefer to await his reply. Yet I probably will soon have to ask you to intervene, for he usually shows his bad manners by not replying, ignoring what I have written and proceeding at his own pleasure. The printing was begun in February, and according to the original contract this part was to have been finished before Easter. I then yielded, giving him until the onset of my lectures, but even this deadline has not been kept. . . .

In the meantime, however, you will perhaps be able to find out from the printer in all secrecy how many copies were printed. I have reason for distrust, partly because of his demeanor but surely in part because he himself during negotiations decreased the number of copies from 1,000 to 750. This resulted in a cut in royalties, a fact which aroused suspicion only when I learned he had his own printing shop, a circumstance he carefully concealed, even though it would have been the most important point he could have cited against my request that the printing be done here. Yet I do not understand at all why an author should not be

permitted to seek proof in such matters—just as, if I agreed to [allow] someone to cut 100 cords of wood [from my forest], I would count to make sure he had not taken more.

Excuse me for going into such things with you and, more than that, for requesting your help. Still a few other things. I am pleased to hear you are anticipating a final resolution of your situation soon—hopefully to Munich itself. Lord, remember me when you come into Your Kingdom. That will be my prayer! Fichte, I hear, is not in Erlangen but in *Göttingen*! That is an even better proof of Prussian affection for Göttingen than the gift of Wolf's Homer.³ I have finally received here a salary of 100 thalers. I have not yet read the review of Salat in the Halle paper. It probably will not appear, either. Among other things, it suffers from excessive length. Although the best source [Niethammer's wife] is right here, I hope to hear a few things from you concerning the state of our dear fatherland [Württemberg]. Women cannot be expected to pay attention to such matters. Mme. Niethammer promised me a letter to you today. In case it does not come I want to finish by telling you she has arrived safely.

Looking forward to a reply from you, your most devoted friend Hegel

Hegel to Niethammer [68]

Jena, September 5, 1806

I am, my dear friend, most obliged to you for your letter, and for the introduction to the situation with Göbhardt indicated in it. I completely agree with all the conditions you have imposed. . . .

I have already told you how utterly necessary prompt settlement of this matter is for me economically. Should it turn out as expected, I will perhaps spend part of the proceeds to visit you, if you permit, either accompanying Mme. Niethammer alone or, should you, as we hope, pick her up yourself, accompanying both of you—which would still be nicer. I then could negotiate the overall agreement with Göbhardt myself. But you shall have to conclude a partial agreement, for without it I can hardly even exist here, much less travel. Yet this wish to spend a few days in Bamberg I at once make contingent on your advice as to whether it could be of advantage to me in another respect, whether in the meantime something in the way of a university, perhaps the reorganization of Altorf, is under foot, or whether an appeal to Count [Friedrich] von Thürheim [now Bavarian regional president in Bamberg]—should he have anything to do with it—might be of use. Yet it is time for me to be moving. I am already obliged to spend this winter here, but rely on Göbhardt to do even this. This fall and winter, however, I must make a decision about a position other than the one I have or can expect here. Since political conditions do not look very promising—here in Münster *charpie* is already being ordered, tents set up, and so on—and since war, should it break out, certainly would at least result in the quartering of soldiers here, in such an eventuality I really would have to think of finding accommodations elsewhere. For I could not

³In fact Fichte did not transfer to Göttingen; nor did Halle Homer scholar and classical philologist Friedrich August Wolf.

bear the burden of quartering French soldiers, which nobody is spared. In view of this I must press all the more for a settlement with Göbhardt so as to be secure in these times of need, and head elsewhere—to Bamberg, if, as hoped, things remain quiet with you. For my work is not bound to any one place. And regarding lectures, which even now are of no importance and which I have been able to justify only for the benefit of my study, they would be completely eliminated. . . .

Hegel to Niethammer [70]

Jena, September 17, 1806

I have received without a hitch your kind letter of September 12 with enclosures, and have seen from both the benevolent interest with which you are pursuing my cause *contra* Göbhardt. . . .

Since Mme. Niethammer has found a fitting opportunity for travel, my wish will probably thus remain but a wish, and I will have to do without the pleasure of spending a few days with you, especially if, as has every appearance of happening, war—may God be with us—breaks out. That this one worry is devouring everything else, with you as everywhere, most of all sets us scholars back. A happy settlement with Göbhardt will give me money to tide me over for the time being, and then we shall have to see what comes next. I have long been planning a literary journal—in the manner of the French ones—and South Germany does not yet have any. If you could spare the time from your official duties, I would know of no one with whom I would rather be associated. Otherwise it would have to be nobody, or [at most] a few collaborators. It would not be in the same spirit as the review journals which contain only judgments on books and authors and nothing or little of the content. Nor would it have the much ballyhooed aim of completeness, but would rather restrict itself to what has significant impact on the sciences and is important for general culture. In particular [it would]—without becoming really polemical, i.e., merely disparaging and unfavorable—[take aim at] the wretchedness of present-day philosophy, as likewise theology, physics, and even aesthetics, etc. . . .

Hegel to Niethammer [72]

Jena, Monday, October 6, 1806

I am replying to you, my dear friend, with a few lines of thanks for what I regard as your completion of the matter, and with word that I have received your letter with its contents only today. Though the letters which leave here Mondays usually do not arrive in Bamberg sooner than those leaving Wednesdays or even Fridays, I did not want to miss this mailing, thinking that perhaps this time chance might be more favorable, just as in the case of your letter it was less so.

The essential thing, the dispatch of the entire manuscript, shall take place this week *without fail*. . . .

Regarding my journey [to Bamberg], as much as I would like to accept your kind invitation the present times do not permit it. Lectures are to begin on the 13th or surely the 20th of October. Naturally they will not amount to much. Yet quite apart from that, I would risk not being able to get back, and perhaps not [even]

being able to reach you. The mail coach is more likely to be sent back or stopped than the mounted mail, so that if I wanted to deliver the manuscript myself I could more easily delay arrival than if it were dispatched by mounted mail. But war has not yet broken out. The present moment seems decisive. In a few days breezes of peace could just as well waft their way upon us, and then I will not shrink from the October Zephyrs, and shall travel to [see] you. . . .

THE BATTLE OF JENA, OCTOBER 1806

Hegel thus entrusted the sole copy of sections of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* to a postal courier riding through French lines from Jena to Bamberg on the eve of the Battle of Jena. On October 7 the Prussians, occupying Jena, issued an ultimatum to Napoleon, who issued marching orders to his troops the same day. Hegel sent a packet to Göbhardt on October 8, and another on October 10 [73]. In the night of October 12 Napoleon bombarded Jena, and the next day entered the city. Hegel marked the occasion with another letter to Niethammer [74]. He had missed the October 13 deadline for mailing the entire manuscript. Postal communications were interrupted, and on October 18 [76] he reported still carrying the last sheets in his pocket. But his legal counsel in Jena, Ludwig Christoph Asverus, assured him he was not responsible for a delay due to acts of war.

On October 27 Napoleon completed his victory by entering Berlin—all to Hegel's approval in letters to Niethammer [77, 78, 79]. He had told Niethammer in mid-October [76] that he contemplated joining him in Bamberg to oversee the printing of the *Phenomenology*. The disruption of academic life in Jena freed him from the obligation of his courses, allowing him to leave a month later for Bamberg, where he stayed until the year's end. Once in Bamberg, he wrote a letter somewhat more critical of the French to the editor Karl Friedrich Frommann back in Jena [81].

Hegel to Niethammer [73]

Jena, October 8, 1806

I have received your dear letter of the 3rd [71] today, and answer by return mail. I received your letter of September 29 last Monday the 6th, and notified you the very same day [72]. I at once see from your letter the cause of the delay [in the arrival of Niethammer's letter of September 29]; in this respect, it has arrived in due time. How happy I am that you have brought this confused matter into the clear! And how indebted I am to you! The declaration or rather completion of the contract corresponds to all that I could wish. That you have so intervened and offered to take upon yourself the entire printing is a truly heroic act that deprives me all the more of further excuses, and I have thus become all the more indebted to you. If I were perhaps to speak of it to Mme. Niethammer, I would say that two *rights* have confronted each other, but that Göbhardt has found his master in you. . . .

I could fully express the extent of my gratitude for your friendship only if I were to describe to you the perplexity I have been in over the matter. We shall at

once try to hope it may be brought to a happy conclusion. You are receiving herewith half the manuscript. Friday you will receive the other half, and with that I shall have done my part. Yet should a part of the manuscript be lost, I would scarcely know what to do. I would be able to reproduce it only with difficulty, and the work could not yet appear this year.

In the meantime farewell, and give my best compliments to Mme. Niethammer. Should—God still willing—peace be preserved, I would soon be at her feet. Your most devoted friend, G. W. Hegel, Dr. and Professor of Philosophy

Hegel to Niethammer [74]

Jena, Monday, October 13, 1806

—the day the French occupied Jena and the Emperor Napoleon penetrated its walls.

From the timing, you yourself can gather an idea of the trepidation with which I mailed my manuscript last Wednesday and Friday. Last evening toward sundown I saw the shots fired by the French patrols from both Gempenbachtal and Winzerla. The Prussians were driven from Winzerla in the night, and the fire lasted until after twelve o'clock. Today between eight and nine o'clock the French advance units forced their way [into the city], with the regular troops following an hour later. It was an hour of anguish, especially because of general unfamiliarity with the right which everyone enjoys by the will of the French Emperor himself not to comply with the demands of these light troops but just quietly to give them what is required. Through clumsy behavior and a lapse of caution quite a few have landed in difficulties. However, our sister-in-law [Mrs. Johann Heinrich Voigt], as well as the Döderlein household, came through with nothing worse than anguish and has remained unharmed. She asked me, as I was talking with her this evening about the departure of the mail, to write to you and Mrs. Niethammer. She is presently quartering twelve officers. I saw the Emperor—this world-soul—riding out of the city on reconnaissance. It is indeed a wonderful sensation to see such an individual, who, concentrated here at a single point, astride a horse, reaches out over the world and masters it. As for the fate of the Prussians, in truth no better prognosis could be given. Yesterday it was said that the Prussian King [Friedrich Wilhelm III] had his headquarters in Kapellendorf, a few hours from here. Where he is today we do not know, but surely further away than yesterday. The Duchess [of Weimar] and her Princess had decided to remain in Weimar. Yet such advances as occurred from Thursday to Monday are only possible for this extraordinary man, whom it is impossible not to admire.

. . . If I get through today alright I shall perhaps still have suffered as much or more than others. From the general outer appearance [of things], I must doubt whether my manuscript, which went off on Wednesday and Friday, has arrived. My loss would indeed be all too great. My other acquaintances here have not suffered anything. Am I to be the only one? How dearly I wish you had arranged for cash payment to be made for merely part of the sum, and that you had not made the final deadline so strict! But since the mail was leaving from here, I had to risk sending it. God knows with what a heavy heart I am now still taking the same risk,

though I have no doubt that the mail is now circulating freely behind the French lines. As I [myself] already did earlier, all now wish the French army luck; and, in view of the immense difference that separates not only its leaders but even the least of its soldiers from their enemies, luck can hardly fail it. In this [manner], our region will thus soon be free of this deluge.

Your sister-in-law Mrs. Voigt told me that she would not let the postillion leave before early tomorrow morning. I spoke with her about asking the general staff, now lodging in her house, for safe conduct, which will not be refused. So God will, I hope, deliver my scribbles to you within the deadline. As soon as you learn how some money can be sent to me, please dispatch it most urgently. Before long I will have absolute need of it.

[P.S.] It is now 11:00 p.m., at the home of Head Commissioner Hellfeld, where I am now lodging and where we have a view of the French battalions in row-upon-row of campfires covering the entire marketplace. Wood for burning has been taken from butchers' stalls, rubbish bins, and so on. Yours, Hegel, Professor in Jena

I recently wrote you that [Johann] Heiligenstädt [Niethammer's counsel in Jena] died a week ago, but since this news is inevitably so important to you I repeat it just in case that packet did not arrive. Yet most of all I implore you to write me soon. The letters which have arrived today have not yet been sorted. I thus have no idea whether letters from Bamberg are among them.

Hegel to Niethammer [76]

Jena, October 18, 1806

Since the War Commissioner is offering us a chance to send letters, I want to take advantage of it to write you a few lines.

Starting yesterday and again today things are beginning to quiet down here. The army is far ahead; only the wounded remain, along with a few guards. You will perhaps receive a letter conveyed by a student later than this one. Your house on Leiterrasse—in which I stayed for a few hours—was indeed threatened by fire. It was only the good fortune of low wind which saved it and the entire city. It had been said that Bonaparte or at least [General Alexandre] Berthier lodged in your sister-in-law's house. Though I talked to her often, I forgot every time to ask about this. She has had much expense and even more domestic unrest from quartering and is very exhausted, but has otherwise suffered no loss. [Dr. Christian] Gruner suffered very greatly. Anyone who maintained decorum, spoke French, and stayed at home saved himself from plundering. I just talked to Asverus. They are quartering soldiers, and are unharmed. Goethe has also just written to us [75] and asks about us—he has remained unharmed. That the two Duchesses [of Weimar] have remained has been very useful. The city has fared as badly as we. . . .

Concerning my affairs, I asked Asverus about the legal aspect. He states unequivocally that such conditions take precedence over all obligations. Monday the first mail is leaving again both by coach and by horse. With this mail I thus send the last sheets, which I have been carrying around in my pocket along with a letter [74] since the terrible night before the fire. If the mailings of a week ago

Wednesday and Friday have arrived safely, the printing has not been delayed. Nor then can Göbhardt raise objections in the case of a delay of these last *few* sheets caused by *intervening circumstances*. Seeing that I have been plundered here, and that as far as the academy is concerned there is nothing to retain me here this winter but inconveniences due to the inevitable inflation, thievery, etc., my presence in Bamberg can render very essential services in correcting [proofs], speeding up [the work], and reinserting of what has been omitted. The principal consideration is that I will find you and your family in Bamberg, and thus I intend to spend at least part of the winter there. . . .

The money I am to receive will fully enable me to get through the winter without hardship. If one of the packages of the manuscript is completely lost, my presence will be imperative. The knaves have, to be sure, messed up my papers like lottery tickets, so that it will cause me the greatest trouble to dig out what is necessary. How ardently I hope for some news about the matter! I am compelled, however, to ask you to send me money without fail. I need it most urgently. [Karl Friedrich] Frommann has welcomed me with hospitality and meanwhile provided for my subsistence, even though his household has borne a terrible burden and in part continues to do so. I am seated at their table as I now write, and am asking if I should send their regards. I have been charged to do so not only by them but by the [Thomas] Seebecks as well, who are also seated here. I am also charged to congratulate you on not having lived through this affair with the rest of us. The result is to ask you nonetheless for money, if only for six to eight carolins. I would ask you for this favor even without my prospects [of revenue] from Göbhardt—which, however, I think are good.

Remember me to Mme. Niethammer most kindly. How very pleased she must be to have taken Ludwig [Döderlein] along. The second great battle took place near Naumburg. Pforta may well be in a pretty state as well. Farewell. Your Hegel, Professor of Philosophy

Hegel to Niethammer [77]

Jena, October 22, 1806

What a consolation and help your friendship is for me in this general calamity! Where would I be without this help? . . .

Things here are quieting down, but of course it is only in calm that everyone accurately begins to sense his loss. I heard from Asverus that Wenigenjena, too, has fared badly. The gates are burned, and the garden has been made into a bivouac for horses. Otherwise there is no place where one can know less about the army than here. Today the Senate has had a great proclamation printed, which you will probably read in the public newspapers. On November 3 we will act as if lectures were going to start. As soon as I have money—which will be in a few days—and as soon as, mark my words [NB], the mail coaches are running again, I intend to take up your invitation and come see you. The good weather must also hold out. What good fortune for the French and us this weather is! Windy weather would have reduced the entire city to ashes! . . .

Hegel to Niethammer [78]

Jena, October 24, 1806

. . . We are now in somewhat quieter circumstances. According to an *ordre du jour* that arrived here the day before yesterday, the Emperor was in Dessau already last Monday, [Marshal Joachim] Murat was four hours away from Magdeburg; [Marshal Jean Baptiste] Bernadotte and [Marshal Nicholas] Soult were at Wittenberg over the Elbe; there was peace with Saxony, and [Prussian diplomat Girolamo] Lucchesini was in Prussian [territory]. The Emperor gave the territory back to the Duchess, but her husband [the Duke of Weimar], who let the deadline of six days for coming over from the Prussian army expire, is excluded. We await news that the Emperor is in Berlin. Most Prussian generals have fallen or were wounded; the same is being said of the King himself, who seems to have moved not to Magdeburg but toward Berlin. Things went terribly in Halle, as bad as or worse than here; yet details are still lacking. The students have all been sent away with one Prussian thaler and the threat of arrest the following day should any let himself still be seen. It is said that about 600 [students] still remain between Halle and here. Court Commissioner [Karl] Otto and Schneider W. [?] have left today to invite the students here. What marvelous prospects for us! Let us pray to Heaven that the Prussian thaler, which certainly contained no special blessing before, is for Jena's sake now endowed with a fertility comparable to that of the barley-breads in the Gospel. . . .

Had the French army been defeated all Jena would have had to emigrate in unison, walking stick in hand, all those with children carrying them on and about their arms. Nobody has imagined war such as we have seen it! . . .

Hegel to Niethammer [79]

Jena, November 3, 1806

. . . We are gradually starting to recover from the shock. To be sure, there are still bad episodes. Because the Municipal Council does not have enough people for the hospital, which still contains 800 Frenchmen and 400 Prussians instead of up to 4,000 who were here at first, the dragoons one day picked up all who let themselves be seen on the streets and took them to the military hospital. However, everything is now being rearranged again. The [French] Commander and the [Weimar] Commissioner—the latter lodges with the Frommanns, where I often see him—are very good people. We have to be very thankful for this stroke of luck, given the inanity of the Municipal Council, which due to the circumstances has sunk into complete inactivity. Young [Anton] von Ziegesar has finally been sent here from Weimar as Commissioner, which should have been done right at the beginning; so things will now be put in better order. Food is now far cheaper than when the Prussians were here. The want, however, will not become apparent until winter and spring.

Yesterday I visited beloved Wenigenjena, looked at and inquired into circumstances there—there had been no great damage. . . .

No Halle students have arrived here. We hear it being said everywhere that no house has remained standing in Jena; the city has not fared so badly, however.

[The Justus] Loders in Halle have been spared, but they were both absent. The [Christian Gottfried] Schützes have had much distress with one or both cashboxes lost; the Prussians and French have been romping around in their house.

Otherwise we know nothing more of the war than what we read in the Hamburg newspaper. Jena is no longer on the supply and communications route, so nobody from the army comes or passes by here. I only heard one noteworthy [piece of news]: yesterday a student who was an eyewitness told how, to the beating of drums, it had solemnly been read off everywhere on the streets of Erfurt that the people of that city were henceforth Imperial French subjects.

Nothing is yet known of the fate of our country here. Mr. [Karl Emil] von Spiegel was sent from Weimar to the Duke [Karl August]. He met the Duke in Wolfenbüttel, where he was commanding an army of 12,000 men, an assembly of scattered troops. The Duke replied that first he had to deliver these troops to the [Prussian] King, and that he had asked for his discharge and hoped to receive it.

Hegel to Frommann [81]

Bamberg, November 17, 1806

Your sympathetic interest, my dear friend, permits and even demands from me a brief report on my fate since leaving you. I must at least tell you that it is not worth talking about it. During the trip, I was reminded each time while repacking of the caution expressed by your Commissioner from Leipzig, for I traveled in the company of a half dozen barrels of cash, whose voyage was as free of incident as my own. To be sure troops of soldiers, armed to the hilt, were encountered, but what sort of troops do you suppose? See if you can guess in three tries. Austrian recruit transports!⁴ The paths are those of a mountainous region but are infinitely better than, for example, those from Jena to Leipzig. During the whole trip I have heard praise enough of the French. Everywhere they have spared people the monotony of using every day a little of their grain, straw, hay, and other domestic items, and of repeating the same act over and over again. What this slow people otherwise would have needed years and days to accomplish the French have dispatched in a single day. Because, however, it is not good that man be without work, they have left behind for them the work of reconstructing their houses, thus enabling them now to furnish them in more modern fashion.

Here in Bamberg I have moved into a small room close to the Niethammers, who have no room to spare in their house. I board with them, however, and have found them well. I have already made a few nice acquaintances and have played *l'hombre* [a Spanish card game] with ladies. This shows how advanced culture is here, since even the ladies of Jena have not reached this stage. For the rest, I have got my business underway and find everything better than I had thought. I hope in the future this will occur more often than the opposite, contrary to my past experience.

⁴The Austrians, who made a separate peace with Napoleon at Pressburg in December 1805, did not join the Prussians in the war against Napoleon.

I read in the Hamburg newspapers what a disaster the Prussians have brought upon Lübeck. Mme. Frommann's alarm and grief over this must in particular have been great! Do you already have news from there? Of what we encountered in Jena we have had our fill. It is a consolation to know places and branches of one's family that have remained unharmed, but nothing is to remain intact.

You have probably remained in Jena, and no doubt intend not to leave. Has Seebeck come to a decision? He will no doubt stay alternately with you and us, without deciding. My intention of being back in Jena at the start of December will have to change, but only by one to two weeks. Is Monsieur Bigot [French War Commissioner in Jena] still in your house? Please remember me to him. Wood is somewhat cheaper here than in Jena, but this time is proving costlier to me than there. Tell Mr. and Mme. Seebeck that I have remembered them en route with the greatest gratitude—I have spent twice twenty-four hours at it. Also send my regards to the [Karl Ludwig von] Knebels. Above all, however, remember me to Mme. Frommann and Mlle. Minchen [Frommann's daughter]. Tell them I would gladly enjoy their company even though they do not play *l'hombre*. Finally, I once again press your hand, my dear friend! As you can see, the news from my household is passable. Here there is no news, except perhaps that Nuremberg's petition to have the regional government and university transferred there has been denied. Of conditions in Austria we know nothing more than what we read in the newspapers. Please write to me soon. Your friend, Hegel

TOWARD A SECOND EDITION OF THE *PHENOMENOLOGY*

Back in Jena in January, Hegel corrected the proofs of his manuscript. On January 16 [84], already seeing need for a second edition, he reported being almost finished with his work on the first edition. He distributed copies of it from his new journalistic post in Bamberg in April 1807 [94, and 95 to Schelling]. A second edition of the *Phenomenology* was not undertaken until 1829, when Göbhardt's successor, Wesche, cavalierly proposed simply to reprint the first edition. Hegel sought redress through his brother-in-law, Guido von Meyer, in Frankfurt [605a]. In the end the first edition was not reprinted, but Hegel did not begin revision until a few months before his death, and in fact never got beyond a beginning.

Hegel to Niethammer [84]

Jena, January 16, 1807

Your last letter, my dear friend, reached me Saturday morning instead of noon due to having been sent by special delivery. I have honored it by sending the very same day the manuscript of the Preface [to the *Phenomenology*] to Göbhardt. . . . [Lines missing here in the Hoffmeister edition deal with corrections in the manuscript.]

So much of this. Soon, but not quite yet, I will be able to say *bon voyage* to the child. But while reading through the manuscript for printing errors this one last time I truly often wished I could clear the ship here and there of ballast and make it swifter. With a second edition to follow *soon*—if it pleases the gods! [*si diis*

placet?/]—everything shall come out better. I shall put both myself and others off until then.

Political circumstances to be sure do not exactly favor second editions, or rather they show great favor only to editions of a different kind. The Halle faculty's request to be allowed to accept students and at least to be paid like other Prussian civil servants was turned down. All this, by the way, is of no use to us. The Duke will soon return, but even that will not ease the burden.

Yet I must stop. You will have already received a letter from Dr. Asverus today. I expect, on the other hand, one from Julius [Niethammer] with a detailed account of the comedy's performance. Something new has appeared: *The Poet And His Fatherland* [: *A Funeral Proposal For All Poets, Both Deceased And To Be Deceased*], Leipzig [1807], in three acts by Johann St[ephen] Schütze. You will like it. Have it sent to you. The thought is very good and the whole is done, except for the ending, in a lively manner.

Please remember me very kindly to Mme. Niethammer. Every day, while eating and going to bed—two inevitable functions—I am reminded of her. Greetings likewise to my dearest [*mihi carissimus*] Julius Niethammerus. Farewell. Your friend, Hegel

Hegel to Niethammer [94]

Bamberg, Tuesday, April 7, 1807

I am writing you, my dear friend, for two reasons. First I have not told you the more exact disposition of the copies [of the *Phenomenology*] you kindly took along, and want to make up for this now. Of the three paperbound copies, one on vellum is for Goethe, the one on writing paper is for Privy Councillor [Christian Gottlob] Voigt, while the second on vellum is for you. Kindly send one of the unbound [copies] to Frommann. Time, as you know, did not permit having them stitched or bound. I would like to ask you, further, to bring back the two remaining unbound [copies]. On the other hand, I will include here instructions for two printed copies for Frommann, which Göbhardt will send me still today. Of these please be so kind as to have one forwarded to Major von Knebel and the other to Seebeck. . . .

The day before yesterday we played *l'hombre* together at the [Christoph] Dirufs and were wondering what you were doing at that moment, and above all how you managed through the Thuringian forest with the bad weather which we at least had here—rain and snow. Perhaps the coachman is still going to bring us some news of you today.

[Johann Friedrich] Fuchs will have told you that Paulus is arriving here. I really need not make a point of adding that I send my best regards to Mme. Niethammer, and that the friends you have left behind [after Niethammer's move from Bamberg to Munich] have asked me to send you both their warmest greetings. Your Hegel

Hegel to von Meyer [605a]

Berlin, August 9, 1829

I was about to visit you, my dear brother-in-law, this fall in Frankfurt and thus to settle on the spot the matter about which I now trouble you in this letter. For now, however, I must forsake any plans requiring extensive travel, and thus am led to ask you a favor. It is simply to make sure the publisher Wesche—as I do not doubt—has received my reply of June 29 to his letter of the 15th, to let him know that so far I have awaited a reply in vain, and kindly to request a reply as soon as possible.

At issue is a new edition of my *Phenomenology of Spirit*, which he tells me has become necessary. Mr. Wesche had purchased the remainder of the first edition from the estate of Göbhardt's publishing house. Because of this I was gladly disposed upon his declaration to assign to him the second edition, although in the contract for the first edition nothing was stipulated about a further edition. The circumstances surely entitle him to nothing more. In my answer I spelled out my conditions, but thus far have received no reply from him.

I was inevitably struck in his letter by the fact that, in mentioning an earlier letter written to me which I never received, he states that I could not have objected if he had reprinted the work forthwith, seeing that he had no reply from me. Moreover, he said he still intended to do so in case he received no definite reply to his second letter. His attitude here seemed to be that he considers my consent and agreement to conditions for a new edition to be strictly unnecessary. He does not even take into account the fact that I regard revision of the work to be necessary. The fact that my letter of June 29 has not yet reached him—which is unlikely, since I sent it by mail, not by the uncertain chance circumstances he used in sending his first letter—or even a mere indication from him that he has not received my reply might appear reason enough for him to carry out his stated plan without further consultation with me. This, however, would result in further steps on my part.

This, my dear brother-in-law, is the basis of the matter. I have explained it to you so that from an indication of the meaning and importance of the favor you will be doing me you may see the motive of my request. Since you are a diplomat, I hardly need tell you in so many words that I am requesting you first merely to restrict the inquiry to whether Mr. Wesche has received my letter, and to express my wish for a speedy reply. From your discussion with him you will be able to assess the sort of reply he gives. Any distrust aroused in me may well be completely unfounded. However, I could not totally ignore the circumstances. Moreover, to be able to negotiate with other publishers available to me I would like to see my offer to Mr. Wesche settled through an explicit statement on his part. For I am really not bound to him by this offer if he does not reply. It only remains for me to apologize for calling upon your kindness in this way, and to express our most cordial and sympathetic greetings, especially to your dear wife who, we were sorry to learn, was ill this spring. The bearer of this letter, my dear friend Professor [Heinrich Gustav] Hotho, can give you further news of us. Your sincere brother-in-law, Hegel

We have not yet received direct news from [our] dear mother-in-law in Teplice. Only through friends have we learned that she has arrived there.

THE BATTLE OF JENA IN WORLD-HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

The first edition of the *Phenomenology* completed and the heat of battle safely past, Hegel reflected on the meaning of events in a January 1807 letter [85] to Christian Gotthold Zellman, a student of his [94a]. A number of things may be noted from it. War, far from being glorified, is implicitly seen as a threat to philosophical endeavor. Yet philosophy is capable of making intelligible and even justifying the seeming injustice of war. Hegel clearly acknowledges contingent events ("accidents of the moment") such as occur on the battlefield but downplays their importance in relation to underlying spiritual causes. Most importantly, it becomes apparent that the support which we have seen Hegel give to the French cause in Germany was not a betrayal of Germany. It rather expresses a desire to see oppressive institutions already eliminated in France swept away in Germany as well. Hegel is not uncritical of the French Revolution. He anticipates in this text a thesis which will later be developed in his Berlin lectures on world history (*Werke* XI, 564): France had a revolution ("externality") without a reformation ("inwardness"), while Germany had a reformation without a revolution. If only Germany, influenced by the French example, were to proceed to external revolutionary action while conserving its traditional inner depth, the French achievement would be surpassed. The Reformation, the great achievement of the German North, makes the North impervious to encroachments by nominally Catholic France. Hegel questions whether the German people will be galvanized by feudal fealty, traditional rights, or even nationalism. Only religion, the Protestant principle of inwardness, appears as a plausible rallying point. History of course quickly proved Hegel wrong. The explosion of German nationalism was only a few years away. Arising in the struggle against Napoleon, it would repudiate the Great Revolution in France rather than build on it.

Hegel to Zellman [85]

Jena, January 23, 1807

It was not until late December in Bamberg that I received your kind letter of November 18, 1806. I had gone there on a trip of a few weeks. My return trip and other business have postponed my reply, and I apologize for the delay.

Your remembrance of me during your absence has pleased me. But I was even more pleased that you are devoting this winter of solitude to the study of philosophy: both in any case remain united, for philosophy has something solitary about it. It does not, to be sure, belong in alleys and marketplaces, but neither is it held aloof from the activity of men, from that in which they place their interest, nor from the [sort of] knowing to which they attach their vanity. But you also direct your attention to current history. And there can indeed be nothing more convincing than this history to show that education triumphs over rudeness, and spirit over

spiritless understanding and mere cleverness. Science alone is the [true] theodicy, and she will just as much keep us from marveling speechless at events like brutes—or, with a greater show of cleverness, from attributing them to the accidents of the moment or talents of an individual, thus making the fate of empires depend on the occupation or nonoccupation of a hill—as from complaining over the victory of injustice or defeat of justice. That which is presently lost people believe they possessed as a treasure or divine right, just as, on the other hand, what is being won will be possessed with a bad conscience. Their thoughts on justice are as wrongheaded as their opinion on the means, or on what makes up the substance and power of spirit. They seek it in circumstances bordering on the completely ridiculous, overlook what lies closest at hand, and take the very things that lead directly to their ruin to be excellent supports.

Thanks to the bath of her Revolution, the French Nation has freed herself of many institutions which the human spirit had outgrown like the shoes of a child. These institutions accordingly once oppressed her, and they now continue to oppress other nations as so many fetters devoid of spirit. What is even more, however, is that the individual as well has shed the fear of death [cf *Werke* II, 155-56 for *Phenomenology* on fear of death and bondage] along with the life of habit—which, with the change of scenery, is no longer self-supporting. This is what gives this Nation the great power she displays against others. She weighs down upon the impassiveness and dullness of these other nations, which, finally forced to give up their indolence in order to step out into actuality, will perhaps—seeing that inwardness preserves itself in externality—surpass their teachers.

North Germany surely has nothing to fear from Catholicism. It would be interesting if the subject of religion came up for discussion, and in the end it could well happen. Fatherland, princes, constitution, and such do not seem to be the lever with which to raise up the German people. The question is what would happen if religion were broached. Doubtless nothing is to be feared as much as this. The leaders are separated from the people, and neither side understands the other. What these leaders know how to achieve the times have fairly well shown, and you will have seen best in your own vicinity [?] how the people pursues matters when it takes matters into its own hands [Ch 8].

Farewell. Give my regards to your friend Köhler; I will be very pleased to see you here again soon. Concerning your debt, do not worry. Very respectfully yours, your devoted friend, Hegel, Dr. and Professor of Philosophy

Hegel to Zellman [94a]

Bamberg, April 30, 1807

You will, my dear sir, find in my changed place of residence for this summer my excuse for not having earlier sent the recommendation you requested in your letter of April 8. Since you announce in the same letter that you will be in Jena within two weeks of that date, I have addressed this recommendation to Jena hoping it will find you there. I am sorry I will not be able to have the pleasure of seeing you this summer among my students, and that such encouragement in my work—for to work for such students is the greatest encouragement to a

teacher—will be missing. However, the ruling force of circumstance has obliged me to renounce this pleasure and occupation this summer.

If otherwise you should have a message for me, Frommann's house will gladly take charge of it. For the rest, it will please me to receive news from you. I respectfully remain your obedient servant, Professor Hegel

VII

The Bamberg Editorship: Hazards of Private Enterprise with a Public Function

WHEN NIETHAMMER wrote on February 16, 1807 [88], conveying the offer of a newspaper editorship in Bamberg, the dispatch with which Hegel accepted was not due merely to the disintegration of academic life in Jena after the Battle of Jena. For other faculty members remained. Hegel hoped as late as the end of January that funds released in Jena by Schelver's departure might be allocated in part to himself [87]. He preferred to let others in Jena believe he would stay on [89].

In part the reasons for his departure were no doubt financial. He complained to Goethe of his salary at the end of January [87]. Yet his finances were no doubt exacerbated by the birth in Jena of his illegitimate son, Ludwig. The child's mother was Hegel's housekeeper, and the attendant embarrassment was a further motive to leave the city (Ch 16).

But there were still other reasons as well. Hegel had been trying to leave for a number of years, as Jena's luster as an academic center declined. His pro-French leanings may also be recalled. Weimar was an ally of Prussia. Bavaria, on the other hand, had been reorganizing since 1803 in alliance with France, and letters from the present chapter show it continued to do so.

Hegel's departure, moreover, occurred as he was seriously thinking of founding a literary review, and he hoped he might advance this project as a newspaper publisher [98]. Though he clearly preferred an academic position to a journalistic one—both of which might favor his projected review—the newspaper offer came just as he was increasingly captivated by the march of world events. Though letters to Karl von Knebel show this interest was dulled upon becoming a professional obligation, it becomes clear that arbitrary state control of the press was what finally soured him on newspaper editing—even though he himself defended the principle of such control. The implicit moral is that, since journalism is intrinsically public [98], unpredictable public interference—in the place of steady regulation—is the inevitable hazard of abandonment of journalism to the private sector, where it is treated worse than “any factory or other trade” [127].

But to military, financial, political, personal, and avocational causes of the move to Bamberg must be added reasons of career. Niethammer mentioned confidentially in his letter of February 16 that he expected to be called to Munich to help work out a new plan for the Bavarian secondary schools to replace the 1804 plan of clericalist Kajetan von Weiller, a follower of Jacobi. Von Weiller was a

known opponent of Schellingian-Hegelian speculative philosophy. Von Weiller and other like-minded Bavarians put an empiricist-utilitarian imprint on the Bavarian Academy of Sciences—much to Hegel's dismay. With Hegel's support, Niethammer championed classical humanism over empiricism and utilitarianism in his new secondary school plan, and it is this plan which is referred to as "Niethammer's cause in Munich." With Niethammer's growing influence in Munich, Hegel could hope for an eventual role. Yet resistance to Niethammer's plan arose because it appeared to some Bavarians as a foreign imposition from the Protestant North. The Protestant Church was only now being officially founded in Bavaria; and, at least to Niethammer, Hegel did not hesitate to express his sense of the cultural superiority of the Protestant North to Bavaria. The dialectics of North and South (Ch 4) had yet to result in a stable equilibrium.

THE MOVE TO BAMBERG, 1807

The newspaper whose editorship Hegel assumed was the *Bamberg News* (*Bamberger Zeitung*). The owner, a certain Schneiderbanger, urgently needed someone when his editor, French emigrant Gérard Gley, left to join the entourage of Marshal Louis-Nicholas Davout. Gley's temporary successor was followed, also temporarily, by Bavarian Privy Councillor Josef Du Terrail von Bayard. Von Bayard offered the job to Niethammer. Niethammer in declining proposed Hegel, who accepted:

Hegel to Niethammer [89]

Jena, February 20, 1807

I reply by return mail, my dear friend, to your friendly expression of goodwill, which arrived today. I first thank you for the offer, which I owe to this kindness of yours and which I am resolved to accept. I need not in this connection tell you in detail how I view this business, nor the extent to which I am prepared to take it up, for I am in total agreement with the view which lies at the basis of your goodwill. I cannot in fact regard this engagement as definitive. And since the monetary conditions turn out to be less than either of us had hoped and prayed, I must look beyond in this regard as well. For, as I can calculate precisely, I will not be able to manage on 540 florins. You yourself are kind enough to mention here your own prospects—for which I congratulate first you, secondly Bavaria, and finally your friends—and to tell me I may take them into account in weighing my acceptance of this offer.

The occupation itself will interest me, since, as you know, I pursue world events with curiosity. From this perspective I should rather have fear for myself on account of this interest, and withdraw from it. I soon hope to be able to reconcile myself to the occupation. What tone and character may be given to the paper, I note in passing, must be seen on the spot. For the most part our newspapers can all be considered inferior to the French. It would be interesting for a paper to approximate the style of a French one—without, of course, giving up a sort of pedantry and impartiality in news reports, which above all the Germans demand. It will be a very advantageous circumstance in this regard for me to deal with Privy Councillor von Bayard.

Yet there is one condition against which I should like to defend myself, namely that I assume the editorship as early as March. To do so I would have to join you in February, and indeed would have to board the mail coach tomorrow. You hold a knife at my throat by telling me that Mr. von Bayard is presently tending the editor's office in order to keep the position open. Each delay I thus cause prolongs the burden for him. But since I cannot avoid a delay, Mr. von Bayard should not know that I know of this circumstance. It is just not possible for me to be in Bamberg right at the beginning of March, though I will do the best I can.

I must, as already mentioned, stipulate that the engagement into which I am entering be of such a nature as not to bind me firmly for any length of time. You recently noted this point yourself. I cannot be entirely without hope of being formally called to Heidelberg, or at least of assuming the editorship of a journal that may be established there. My work would undoubtedly benefit more from that than from editorship of the *Bamberg News*—not to mention the relationship into which I would thus enter with the University. I tell you this openly as our friendship requires, and the owner of the paper with whom I am entering into the agreement could not, given its nature, complain should I soon surrender the position for this other vocation. Thus, in his case as well it is unnecessary that he be told beforehand of this circumstance, which in any case is only a possibility.

Weimar, I have heard, has made dispositions concerning Schelver's salary: Dr. [Friedrich] Voigt has been appointed his successor [as Director of Jena's Botanical Gardens], and [Gabriel] Henry [a French Protestant emigré who joined Napoleon's forces in 1806] has received part of the salary. Yet others here do not want to hear of this, and I beseech you not to mention anything of it to Mme. Voigt unless she writes to you of it herself.

In leaving Jena I shall likewise say I have not entered into any firm engagement in Bamberg but simply have business there [see letter 92, to Goethe], and I ask you not to write anything different about me to anyone here. Until Easter it is necessary to avoid any chicanery over my salary, which must be recognized as quite possible in this time of budgetary difficulties.

Later we can talk more definitely about what you can do for me and how you can advance me. For the time being, without regard to my own interest, I am happy about the likelihood of your transfer to Munich. You cannot believe what interest I take in this. It is only now that [the power of von Weiller and] the Curriculum Office [*Studien-Bureau*] has been broken that I can have confidence in Bavaria's scholarly establishments. This negative feat coupled with the positive achievement of your appointment will for the first time give Bavaria academic respectability. The misunderstanding about the abolition of the Academy [of Sciences] in Munich [which in fact was being reorganized—see letter 102] has caused foreigners to be even more snooty.

That you have refused the correction of the Preface to the *Phenomenology* has not surprised me, as it is very tedious to deal with this printer.

I have received this evening the excellent letter from Julius [Niethammer's son] as well, and for the present I also thank him for the invitations it contains.

Please give my best regards to Mme. Niethammer. I will write to you again next Monday, as I see there are still several incidentals about which I must consult you. For the time being you have my acceptance of the offer and my gratitude for your cordial friendship. Hegel

WHEN HEGEL WROTE Niethammer in early May he had been in Bamberg for over a month, while Niethammer was already in Munich:

Hegel to Niethammer [96]

Bamberg, Saturday, May 2 [1807]

[Judicial Councillor Georg] Pflaum died but two hours ago.

This news—which I did not want to delay sending you, dear friend, since I know how much this family interests you—will surprise you as well, since no one expected it. His father told me that the day before yesterday he wrote you convinced that Pflaum felt better—a conviction shared by doctors, acquaintances, and even the patient himself. The illness was a painful gout moving about in the members. He suffered from it greatly, and his wife no less. . . . [Hegel's description of the illness and its treatment by Bamberg physicians Johann Ritter and Adalbert Marcus are omitted by Karl Hegel, our only source.]

All I can say is I hope you have arrived quite happily in Munich. You have had better weather than has prevailed in the Thürringian forest. I also hope you will find it pretty much to your liking there, and that you will soon feel at home.

I must also tell you how much the conversation among your acquaintances since you left has been about how much we all miss you and Mme. Niethammer. But you yourself have seen and enjoyed—especially in the last days of your stay here—the feeling of affection and respect that all who know you nurture for you. The certainty that you will continue as always to cherish the remembrance of your Bamberg friends has made the loss of your presence easier for us all to bear.

Jolli's wife [Ludwig Jolli, Bavarian officer] sends her compliments. She tells me that she will write to you, i.e., to your wife, in the next few days. [Councillor Karl] Fuchs as well sends his regards. I kiss Mme. Niethammer's hands a thousand times, and send Julius my kindest regards, too. Your sincere friend, Hegel

NIETHAMMER'S CAUSE IN MUNICH

Hegel remained editor of the *Bamberg News* only until fall 1808, when he became Rector of the Nuremberg Gymnasium. Niethammer led him to consider a gymnasium appointment as early as his second month in Bamberg. The letter to Georg Friedrich von Zentner mentioned in the first paragraph of Hegel's May 30 communication to Niethammer has been lost. It concerned Hegel's views on an eventual post in a lyceum or gymnasium, and was ostensibly written at Niethammer's urging. A lyceum was a college which prepared students for the university. Von Zentner, to whom Niethammer reported, became director of the Educational and Instructional Department of the Ministry of Interior in 1808. But Hegel on May 30 could not yet assume that Niethammer's cause in Munich was secure. The

continuing influence of Jacobi, the major opponent of the Schellingian speculative philosophy in Bavaria, was attested by his protégé Friedrich Köppen's appointment to the University of Landshut. The disdain Hegel shows for this university, which in 1826 was transferred to the Bavarian capital with the founding of the University of Munich, had been voiced in Schelling's letter of January 11, 1807 [83], which underscored the university's theologically backward character as "the guardian of the land" (*die Landes-Hut*).

Hegel to Niethammer [98]

Bamberg, May 30, 1807

I have in part delayed replying to your kind letter of May 9, dear friend, until I could send along the enclosed to you. But in part it was to talk with you more precisely about another matter, and ask for your advice or rather decision. As for the enclosure to Privy Councillor von Zentner, its tendency and content are self-explanatory. I have preferred you to seal it so as to leave you at liberty, and ask you to cancel my letter should you notice on reading it anything ill-advised. I am not at all sure in the matter myself. You thus have the choice of kindly forwarding it directly from yourself or allowing it to reach the Privy Councillor without letting him know by whom.

As to what you kindly told me of conditions in your area inasmuch as they may immediately affect me, I have found in it confirmation of what I feared. You are, to be sure, kind enough to keep up courage for me, but at the same time the condition at once seems to be added *sine qua non* that I should become reconciled with Jacobi, that from my side I must do something or other which—however delicate the turnabout might be—could only, I fear, be a "Father, forgive me!" [*pater peccavi!*] You know that you can command me unconditionally; but I am convinced you will spare me this. You yourself say that Jacobi's relationship to me is more [a matter of] pain than opinion. If it were only a matter of opinion, some alteration would be possible. But the pain would be hard to alter—without transferring it to me instead, without receiving coals of fire upon my head, which I would even help to heap on myself.

Köppen's call to Landshut is, of course, quite characteristic; and what seems to me his complete incapacity for any solid thought is all the more shocking because it shows how great is the power he [Jacobi] has courted.

Yet the conclusion [*Konsequenz*] from all this is not yet settled—which may be inferred from the inconsistencies arising everywhere. On the other hand, I know I have your support, and know the worth of this support as well.

Now as to prospects close to my heart. Your friendship both allows and requires me to place them before you. Since my purchase of Mr. Schneiderbanger's establishment was impossible for me, he has generously proposed that I assume the management of the whole business and divide the net profit with him. I have inspected the books. After having first estimated the expenses on the high side while reckoning the proceeds exactly, half the net profit yields 1,348 florins. This is an offer not to be sneezed at. First, my tasks would not be much increased, perhaps

not at all. . . . [Considerations for and against the offer omitted by Karl Hegel.]

Moreover, the engagement I am entering into is only temporary. I can fix it for two to three years, and I can stipulate as a condition of its annulment a call to any important post. Furthermore, I will have the opportunity to carry out my plan for a literary establishment, which I have often talked to you about [e.g., letter 70]. This is an opportunity which is not otherwise available to me more conveniently and in which I may hope to be supported by Paulus, who, when threatened with [the University of] Altorf, contemplated something similar. I also count on your support. . . .

That is what I can tell myself in favor of accepting the newspaper offer. I can add that this work leaves some time for me to sustain my scientific work further, whereas any position but a teaching post would restrict me much more in this. What counts against it is that such work cannot be regarded as a respectable position. More particularly, as seductive as independent isolation is, everybody must maintain a connection with the state, and must work on its behalf. The satisfaction one thinks one finds in private life is after all deceptive and insufficient. But, for one thing, I will not really be leading a private life, for no one is more of a public man than a journalist; and moreover, literary labors are precisely public, though neither, to be sure, is an official function.

I have nothing more to tell you of this than that I simply await your decision in the matter. . . .

If you do not already have something completely definite for me, for which you think you absolutely must employ me and have need of me, please allow me to accept this offer. Even if Landshut were still vacant, you could not consider that position sufficiently important to the university there—even supposing public regard for the utility of the position. For such utility, on such a basis, would be very restricted, and life would be vexatious. Being near you would all by itself be the nicest aspect, and indeed almost the only valuable aspect in such a situation.

I must break off here; the mail coach is about to leave; the enclosed letter is for you from Mrs. von Jolli. I have reproached you here for having reserved correspondence with the ladies for yourself, so as to enjoy all the more the pleasure of receiving a few highly treasured lines from Mme. Niethammer. I will answer her by the [mounted] mail service and write to her of social affairs in our circle of acquaintances [see letter 99 below].

Next time—this letter was completely taken up by my affairs—I will ask you for a description of what we have to expect generally in the area of curricula. In the meantime, farewell until then. Your sincere friend, Hegel

Hegel to Mrs. Niethammer [99]

Bamberg, May 30, 1807

I cannot tell you, my dear friend, how much the proofs of kind remembrance shown me in your letter have pleased me. How often have we all said to one another since your departure that you should have stayed in Bamberg! Now you turn the whole matter around and invite me to come to see you soon in Munich. But

since your kindness is more ethereal than carriage wheels, and since my wishes do not have the strength of coach horses, I am reduced to imagining your company and kindness, and to seeing it brought closer sometimes through a few lines. In hoping, like all of us, not to be forgotten by you, I hope also to hear from you soon that you have come to feel at home in Munich and, which cannot fail to be the case, have found a new circle to replace the intimate, merry, and innocent circle of acquaintances you left behind. You have a place to live with which you are satisfied, and that is already a lot. But you are creating domestic cares for yourself, and Niethammer will probably either have the cares of his office or else create them for himself. As for your domestic cares, in view of your self-sufficiency, prudence, and circumspection I have no fear. And Niethammer will know how to overcome his worries, too, in part because you will help lighten them and in part because in the very conduct of business he will work himself more into what may be considered the real basis of Bavarian affairs and public life. This basis is alleged to be a sort of life of idleness and luxury that comfortably maintains itself and its affairs without interruption because, despite all the trouble and activity, there is no real desire for anything new to come of it.

Niethammer will probably already have told you how for the time being I intend to start providing myself as well with a piece of this life of idleness and luxury; and I would like to request most humbly your protection, so that—should Niethammer start giving more serious thought to it—you may stand by me in obtaining my final goal. I am only waiting for Niethammer's reply to make my final decision; between profitless work *with* vexation and profitless work *without* it, the latter is obviously to be preferred. The [Bavarian] Academy is really in quite a situation. I can still do something in that connection and make myself useful in my own way.

Enough of this. Now about another matter, in particular Mrs. von Pflaum. Indeed, what a consolation it would have been to have had you at times by her side. I can assure you I never saw anything more moving than this woman. I saw her for the first time about ten days after her husband's death. She had been violently ill and was still so when I was with her. Her physical illness had come purely from within, from the violence and suddenness of this stroke of grief, and was due entirely to her nerves. She lacked the strength for a grief that screams, storms, sobs, or even just weeps; she was quite broken up—you know her tenderness—into a soft, trembling, spineless gelatin. She was still incapable of fixing her mind [*Vorstellung*], even if only for a moment, on anything but the last hours and scenes of her husband's life. She felt relieved by repeating the account of it in conversation, and by the reflection that she had neglected nothing, that everything at all possible had been done. When she then came to mention the last catastrophic blow and the impossibility of it being otherwise, she mustered a deep sigh from the innermost recess of her heart and directed her beautiful blue eyes heavenward. She was the most moving image of the perfectly humble and actually quite hopeless mother in grief [*mater dolorosa*]. Just when she was able to leave her bed again she was struck by stomach cramps which lasted five days. During the first days of the attack I saw her again and thought her to be very dangerously ill. The doctors were

greatly perplexed. Afterward she could not find words strong enough to describe to me the pains she endured. But with that the worst seemed over. She has since felt better, and last week she took to the carriage and went out quite frequently. I have not seen her but have heard that she is now feeling quite well. She is now my neighbor.

I felt I could take the liberty of writing you extensively about your friend because you take such a lively interest in her and because she, too, was so pleased when I spoke to her of your sympathy. She told me repeatedly how often she thought of you during her illness, and how beneficial and comforting this remembrance and the assurance of your friendship had been for her.

Of our other friends, I wish only to say generally that nothing in their circumstances has changed. I meet Fuchs at times. I see the Bengels at times while taking a walk. The tea circle is not as organized during the summer. I am frequently at Ritter's [a physician] and at Mrs. von Jolli's. I also frequent [Medical Councillor Christoph] Diruf's house. If I only wanted to cultivate my acquaintances, occasions for such distractions would not be lacking, and one finds here greater temptation for it because there are in fact many families that are as good-natured as they are respectable. I have been made acquainted with the Countess Rotenhahn as well. She is a particularly respectable woman, and her daughters are likewise as natural and good-natured as they are educated and full of talents.

What is more, Bamberg has made a new acquisition. [Judicial Councillor Johann] Liebeskind from Ansbach has come here. I do not know if you know him. But his wife at least will not be unknown to you. Her friendship with Mrs. [Caroline] Schelling might perhaps—depending on *one's* judgment of the latter—add some timidity to one's curiosity to get to know her. She seemed good-natured to me, and he is indeed quite a charming man. The manners and culture of the rest of Bamberg are perhaps not completely suited to this family, and are perhaps even somewhat opposed to it. So I am all the more inclined to think I will find an interesting, free and easy circle of friends here. Paulus's family is not yet here.

You see that I had as much to tell about my acquaintances as only one who really goes about among them could tell. I wanted to talk to you of your acquaintances, but could do so only partially and in relation to myself, for I otherwise know nothing about them.

I must ask you to please forward the enclosed letter to the Central Councillor [Niethammer]. I will betray to you at once that it is from Mrs. von Jolli. My charge was really to deliver it to Niethammer myself. But since this did not happen, you see how much I trust your indulgence by asking you to serve as the intermediary. I do not want to boast over having performed the same service myself. I want Niethammer to be assured also that delayed dispatch in the case of a friend such as he is not due to any envy [of him] for receiving a letter from such a pretty lady or displeasure at having been the one to dispatch such a letter. Please present to him on my behalf all manners of apology. Yet I could not refrain from revealing this envy at least to you. But you have to thank the paper, which is running out, that I do not keep on writing. I must yield to this higher power and break off my

conversation with you. Still, I must ask you to give Julius my fondest regards. I hope he will write me from Munich, too, of the royal stables and other such splendors, and that you will write of the [Gottlieb] Hufelands [law professor in Landshut] and [Karl] Breyer [former Tübingen seminarian, history professor at Landshut]. Please convey my compliments to them as the occasion arises. Farewell, my dear friend. Your sincere friend, Hegel.

EMPIRICISM IN THE BAVARIAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES

Niethammer's reply approved Hegel's decision to enter into partnership with Schneiderbanger and yet held out the imminent prospect of a gymnasium professorship. Hegel, responding on July 8, just months after completion of the *Phenomenology*, was already at work on the *Logic*. The festivities to which Hegel refers in the letter celebrated the French victory over the Russians in the Battle of Friedland on June 14. The battle concluded the Napoleonic war against the Prussians and Russians which had begun with the Battle of Jena. As Hegel was writing to Niethammer on July 8 of the difficulties created for a journalist by the conclusion of peace, Napoleon was meeting with Prussia's Friedrich Wilhelm III and Russia's Alexander I on a raft in the Nieman to finalize the Treaty of Tilsit. The *Bamberger Zeitung* reported how the "glorious victory" was celebrated on July 5 by a mass and a parade attended by an extensive assortment of noblemen, councillors of state, and officers. Bavaria was a more or less forced ally of the French. Count Friedrich von Thürheim, who had publicly censored Schelling's criticism of von Weiller's clericalist secondary school program three years before, presided over the district government in Bamberg and was of course aware of Hegel's relation to the impudent Schelling. The "superiors" to which the Count was accountable, i.e., the French, might be suspected of displeasure over von Bayard's mocking reportage.

Hegel to Niethammer [101]

Bamberg, July 8, 1807

I have postponed replying to both of your much appreciated letters, my dear friend, until I could report to you settlement of the Diruf bill. . . .

Your reply to my principal inquiry was so friendly and kindhearted that you have raised my resolve, which I had thought of as a rope extended to a drowning man, into a real choice. I was delighted to find that my views regarding a lyceum or gymnasium post were so much in harmony with your own, and was even more delighted that you pointed to the prospect of such a post as something imminent. But most of all I could only be delighted by the fact that you not only hold such a possibility within your power but have already won a victory of general principle and have slain the hydra in two squarely down the middle. I wish you, Bavaria, and science good fortune in the enterprise, and I hope to hear more about it from you soon. This linking of both bourgeois and peasant instruction with scholarly education [see *Briefe* I, 468-69] was of course the sore point, which, being what was worst of all [about the old plan], was—as always happens—just what its inventors [i.e., von Weiller] most flattered themselves about. I only hope your

public victory may at once be total. Bayard asked recently how you were. I told him of your satisfaction with your activity and impact, without, however, making the slightest reference to its object and content. He claimed to infer from this that you are not following his advice against involving yourself too much in activity among individuals there who cannot be bothered with well-laid plans calling for real work. I do not know how far these views are due to chagrin over some personal experience, or to a certain indifference and indolence which is in any case characteristic of him. In the meantime, even if frivolity and a sluggish absence of thought do not stand in your way in the particular field in which you labor, you may have to contend all the more with the underhanded devices of clerics and a wounded feeling of inferiority that comes to light. You may meet with a secret subversion that conceals itself under a stubborn silence, and which knows how to put a matter off so that through forgetfulness and habit it eventually completely vanishes from the agenda without ever coming up for action. Only recently there have been examples of this mode of political operation which avoids all external honors. But the greater the difficulties in kind and degree the greater is [your] triumph and honor.

You speak in one of your letters of your intention—which does me great honor—of commissioning me to work up a logic for the [pre-university] *lyceums*. I hope at least that you will not make the request too soon and that you will not ask for rapid completion. I am working as much as possible on my general *Logic* and will not be done with it soon. I feel it will cost me still more toil to master the thing to the point where it becomes elementary. For as you know, it is easier to be unintelligible in a sublime way than intelligible in a down-to-earth way. The instruction of the young and the preparation of material for this purpose are the ultimate touchstone of clarity. To the extent that my views are new the teacher must, on top of that, first study the subject more than the blessed pupils. But if I finally receive a charge from you, I will see how I make out with it, and you in turn will have to see how you make out with my work.

I have entered upon my new occupation. It is not difficult, and the work load is not much greater than before, although I am thinking of extending it, in particular through building up the book-publishing end. I have free lodging and—if things continue as they are—1,300 florins income. Of things temporal what more could I ask in this world? If only it were not for this damned peace! Admittedly the conclusion of peace fills up its sheet of newsprint for the day. But the year is long, and in particular I also hope to get support from you, seeing that the works of peace—both in fact and in the telling—will furnish copy, and that you are playing so significant a role in such an important part of these works. But Munich seems neither to like nor to seek public exposure [*Publizität*]. Not a word has yet been whispered about the Academy, its goals and regulations. Yet publicity is such a divine power. Once printed a thing often looks quite different from when it was merely said or done. Its imperfections come to light then, just as its excellence only then attains its true sparkle. In order to maintain this clear and impartial mirror in its proper purity, I have made my own contribution by procuring somewhat whiter paper for my newspaper.

Otherwise everything is well with us here in this fine weather. The Liebeskinds are a great acquisition for me. I visit almost no other house. Mrs. von Pflaum has been on a trip for two weeks. She is coming back the day after tomorrow. It has really pained her that the best of women has not yet written to her. I have long since not known what to say in consolation. She clings to this best of women with much trusting affection. If you could exert some influence at least on her will to write—for you will do well to let her will for the rest remain free—you will be doing a good deed of friendship. Mrs. von Jolli was very pleased to receive a letter from you, but—in order not to flatter you—she was almost more pleased to receive one from Mme. Niethammer. The city is saying—and the way people are here they are even saying it to my face—that I am courting Mrs. von Jolli! Otherwise there is nothing new here. Yet if it would not take so much time I could tell you a long story of Court festivities, the nature of which you will have seen in my newspaper—for I hope you do read it. I could tell you of how His Excellency the District President [Count von Thürrheim] has tried to upset me with little annoyances, I should almost say because he has something against me, though I would not know what [Ch 5]! The only other explanation is simply an eager servility and spirit of submission [*soumission*], but it has taken such a superfluous form that I almost turned back to the first supposition. Yet, as he may often be finding out now, it has been without result for him—note the official acts [*ad acta*]. Just between us, the best of it was that Mr. von Bayard had done the entire article, i.e., the two [articles] which were cited. He was as little edified by those Court festivities as by the attempt to create bad consequences for the newspaper out of their clumsiness. But what satisfied a divine sense of justice was that in the sequel the Court Marshal [Baron von Egcker] was buried today. His remains passed before the newspaper office. The Duke [Wilhelm von Bayern] himself joined the procession. Mr. von Bayard remains, in general, uniformly well-disposed toward me, quite open and trusting, in fact.

Beyond the above request, please give my regards a thousand times over to the best of women. With trust in your continuing friendship—as also in that of Julius—I remain truly yours, Hegel.

Still a hundred kind regards from Mrs. von Jolli, Fuchs, etc.

By AUGUST 8 the curiosity which Hegel expressed to Niethammer just one month before concerning reorganization of the Bavarian Academy of Sciences was in part satisfied by publication of the Academy's new constitution with its disappointingly pedestrian utilitarian-empiricist preamble.

Hegel to Niethammer [102]

Bamberg, August 8, 1807

I hope, dear friend, you have already returned to Munich healthy and well-fortified from the spa. . . . But it is no doubt a chalybeate spa, in which case it would have perhaps been more sensible for your colleagues to prevent *your* trip there lest it add still further to your energy! In this respect I was very pleased with the explanation of your course of action and of its relation to the stone wall of

indolence and lack of discernment blocking your way. But you fortunately know by your own action precisely how to satisfy your colleagues' interest in not having to be active themselves. I anxiously look forward to your plan for the gymnasiums. It is indeed already most interesting that you are going to start with the gymnasiums, the hub of scholarly education. I hope that as the occasion arises you will give me a few crumbs to enjoy in advance. You can rest assured of my total reticence concerning confidential disclosures of this type. So I hope you will not hold back as you did about the Academy. I was pleased to hear that you are on an intimate footing with the Academy through its president [Jacobi]. I have already read its constitution. To be sure there were no particularly surprising arrangements in it, and so there was in fact nothing special to learn from it. The debatable points about which one could quibble in the preamble, which ought in such cases to be the really brilliant part, I need not mention to you. *Experience* has proven it—experience, the empirical! You know! And proven what? That potatoes, horseradish, teapots, energy-saving ovens, etc., all prospered well where the sciences flourished. You know! So let us promote the sciences! May they have utility [*prosit*] and make for progress [*proficiat*]. Now that the government has done its part, the Academy will not fail to do its part either. Among the members one can distinguish two types, one which makes the reputation of the Academy, and the other whose reputation the Academy is to make. Further observations, at least the better and more exhibitable ones—among other things, grateful recognition of the praise of philosophy [*encomii philosophiae*] contained in it—I will save for my newspaper if space permits. But what has fate dealt one of the members, our friend [Karl] Breyer? A bridegroom of the heavenly bride, i.e., of the Academy, he lusted for an earthly bride as well, but finds himself restricted merely to the former. What a loss! 80,000 florins, not to speak of the wife! I do not know which of you is more to be pitied, for you will have some consoling to do! You and Mme. Niethammer will naturally do what you can to find him perhaps another treasure; in the past few days I went to see Mme. Paulus, too, with the intention of engaging sympathy and active assistance. She will probably not fail [to cooperate]. I cannot quite make out, however, how far your story is meant to be taken only metaphorically, and how far literally. You speak of the lost keys of the Kingdom of Heaven [Matthew 16:16]. Did he perhaps lose his voice as he was about to sing? Or if female fickleness and infidelity are the cause, the matter is all the more noteworthy. For as we know, as far back as the beginning of the earth's existence, no example of it has been found in the entire history of mankind. I hope that next time you will tell the rest of this interesting story.

Hail to the President of the Academy [Jacobi], since the Academicians have found him to be just as you described him to me. The picture that you draw of him surprised me. I had not imagined him like that. By the way, what you add to establish your impartiality about having to look askance at the charm which your wife, too, finds in him has rather struck me as somewhat suspicious. For as it stands we have no way of knowing that you are not merely following your wife's judgment no matter what [*bon gré mal gré*]. This is said at times to happen in marriage, though of course I cannot know for certain. Experienced people have

assured me, however, that on occasion it is the case. What might serve to confirm it in this case is the fact that your wife asks you to find Jacobi's sister [Charlotte] amiable. This request is really all too jealous. Here in Bamberg, however, she was more liberal toward you. Here she left you a choice among three—I do not know exactly how many—pretty young ladies. In Munich she wants you to stick to a sixty-year-old spinster! As I have said, this is to push jealousy too far! I can hardly believe it, knowing her kindness as I do. But now I understand that first impressions deceived me and that her present wish is rather the peak of generosity. For since three times twenty makes sixty, she grants you in a single fell swoop of years three twenty-year-old ladies at once. A truly exquisite generosity and concentration of kindness.

I have so far read only a few lines of Jacobi's address ["On Scholarly Societies, Their Spirit and Aim"] in the Munich paper. Here—as happens also with Fichte [*The Basic Characteristics of the Present Age*, 1806], among others—the age is being hounded out once more, though I do not know why. But I hope this is only the reverse side of a coin that will be properly turned over in the hopefully better times that are now beginning for the Academy. I ask you quite urgently to please send me by mail coach a few copies of this speech. . . .

What will happen in Munich and what our lot will be remains uncertain even with the return of peace. You are kind enough to point out the prospect of a salary for me in all this. I am very grateful to you for that. But why then should it be meager? Meagerness is not a necessary attribute of a salary. A salary can also be fat. I will take the opportunity to express myself on this interesting point in my future *Logic*. Apart from making the meagerness of salaries superfluous, peace is said to make tiresome comforters superfluous, too. I do not believe I exaggerate here in blaming such expectant gloating on the ugly vice of an envy that comes to appreciate the position I have reached only to withhold support. For you would unfortunately not have much more to envy me for; and the above-mentioned generosity [of your wife] may indemnify you for it, indeed amply so!

Otherwise there is not a lot I can write you about your acquaintances here. I see almost no one in this heat. Anyway you will be getting letters from most of them. I see from a distance that the dispositions of those who have newly arrived and those who were here before have gradually become adjusted to one another. The Pauluses are connected through [Adalbert] Marcus and the wife of the Commercial Councillor with one branch of the [District] President's [Thürheim's] family. Young [Miss] Fuchs's father [Karl Fuchs] has a splendid garden and hothouse in Bayreuth, but his daughter's hothouse warm feeling in Bamberg perhaps does not meet with a similarly hot embrace by others. A few days ago I played a game of *l'hombre* with the Countess [Julie] von Soden hosted at Mrs. Liebeskind's. Mr. von Schrottenberg, Grand Marshal of the Court, was sitting at another table. But philosophy cannot set its heart on such temporal things. And so I content myself with drinking an occasional glass of wine after dinner with the honorable Privy Councillor [Johann] Ritter, who sends his cordial regards.

By the way, much governing and managing of the district has been going on here for a week. One day *Sechser* and *Groschen* have dropped in value, the next

day increased, the third day up a half or down a half, on the morning of the fourth day up three-quarters, the next noon down, in the evening two-thirds up or down—I have lost count. Patrols have abounded in the city for several nights and days. I have not dared cross Mr. von Bayard's path at such a time. I heard from a distance that he was virtually going mad in all this with a quiet internal rage. I gather that he withdrew from all the managing. Anyone who claimed to the people of Bamberg—you know how they are—that the district government showed much intelligence in operations that contradicted and canceled one another every hour would have gained the reputation among them of having a mania for paradox.

Yet, since a letter should not be a newspaper, I want to cut short such matters. Only my amicable regards to the best of women and dear Julius [remain]. I have said so, and will always say so: you should have, alas, stayed with us—or all of us, at least I, should have moved with you. Farewell, and please let me hear again from you soon. Yours, Hegel

NIETHAMMER'S CLASSICIST NEOHUMANISM

To voice criticism in a private letter was of course one thing, while to do so in the columns of the *Bamberger Zeitung*, which was politically censored, was another. We see from Hegel's letter of August 29 that he did not always heed the warnings of Niethammer. Hegel as a journalist in Bamberg was acquainted with an uncritical "German" submissiveness to the authoritarian state paralleling the "good Catholic's" [103] submission to the Creator. The editorializing which caused Niethammer concern dealt with the constitution of the Academy. Hegel, we saw, rejected its empiricism [102]. For Hegel there was a connection between empiricism and authoritarianism, both illustrating submission to what, since Bern, he called "positivity." Hegel's disdain for empiricism is apt to appear perversely wrongheaded to twentieth-century Anglo-American readers, but for him "empiricism" had the conservative and even reactionary implication of a blind attachment to historical tradition inconsistent with rational judgment. In its defense of free rational inquiry, Jacobi's speech, Hegel writes, contradicted the opening empiricist declaration in the Academy's constitution. To us "empiricism" may connote a commitment to open-ended, nondogmatic inquiry; to Hegel it meant the very opposite.

The second paragraph of Hegel's August 29 letter responds to pedagogical research which Niethammer was undertaking to justify a rationalist and hence "anti-empiricist" program for secondary schools. Niethammer's research resulted in publication of *The Contest of Philanthropinism and Humanism in the Educational Theory of our Time* (1808). This work was quickly followed the same year by Niethammer's appointment as Central School Councillor, with responsibility for reorganizing the gymnasiums, by Bavarian Prime Minister Count Maximilian Joseph Montgelas. The philosophy of education behind von Weiller's program of 1804, for which Niethammer coined the term "philanthropinism," viewed man essentially as an animal and largely sought to dispense useful vocational training. Von Weiller's program was dismissed as medieval scholasticism warmed over by

the spirit of the superficial utilitarian Enlightenment. "Humanism," which Niethammer defended, viewed man as a spiritual being and sought to develop his rational faculties without regard to a particular profession. When on July 8 [101] Hegel described the connection of scholarly education with bourgeois/peasant education aimed at securing a place for the individual in the labor market as what was worst in the previous system, he was condemning von Weiller's philanthropinism. "Humanism" as Niethammer understood it did not completely neglect animal needs which in modern civil society could only be satisfied by vocational training, but it did subordinate subject-oriented vocational training to the development of rational faculties without restriction to perceivably useful subject matter. Mere memorization of facts, the epitome of the "empiricist" idea of education, was especially disparaged. Niethammer's plan assumed two types of secondary school: the humanistic gymnasium, which stressed the humanities conveyed by the study of classical antiquity, and the modern gymnasium (*Realgymnasium*), which stressed practical studies connected with the "real" world, without, however, neglecting ideality. Thus even the *Realgymnasium* was to be retained within a humanistic, nonphilanthropinist framework.

Hegel's last paragraph of August 29 concerns the larger institutional reforms in Napoleonic Europe, which provided the context for Niethammer's educational reforms. Bavaria was part of the Confederation of the Rhine, which was created in July 1806 under French protectorship and which ended the 800-year-old Holy Roman Empire. The administrative reorganization of Bavaria according to the French system of prefectures, which Hegel expected, was actually carried out in 1808 in a system of administrative *Kreisen*. Napoleon, whom Hegel calls the great professor of public law in Paris, understood sovereignty better than did the German law professors pouring forth writings on the "sovereignty" still theoretically claimed by states like Bavaria, which entered the Confederation under the pressure of foreign occupation. Though Napoleon, who elevated the Duke of Württemberg to King, vented his displeasure at the dissolution of the provincial estates in Württemberg by saying he had made the Duke a sovereign rather than a despot, his own despotic efforts to found an imperial federation of free constitutional monarchies deprived the monarchs—the German princes—of real sovereignty. Yet the bombardment of Copenhagen by the British Navy and the surrender of the Danish fleet to England in early September—a consequence of Danish refusal to join the British blockade of the Continent—were reminders that Napoleon's own sovereignty was not secure.

Hegel to Niethammer [103]

Bamberg, August 29, 1807

I have now two letters from you to answer, dear friend. One was dictated by your kind concern over the publishability of the comments on the Constitution of the Academy [that were] to appear in my newspaper. I certainly am not about to assert that your concern was unfounded—leaving censorship aside. I would not have wanted just to reprint the whole thing; or, since that would have taken too much space, merely to print extracts cold, so to speak, without any praise. But you

have alerted me in good time to the fact that praise of a few parts might appear to imply criticism of other parts—even if wholly unexpressed. And indeed I could hardly have refrained from praising some of it and then starkly juxtaposing other parts composed in a tone quite opposite to the praiseworthy parts. Even praise in our [German] states can appear *disrespectful*. We are still perhaps much accustomed to this traditional German habit of gawking admiration, this heaping up of praise like the good Catholic singing the praises of his Creator, instead of the sort of intelligent discernment and recognition that shows insight. So it was thus certainly better to avoid all mention of it. In any case, with the English [fleet] before Copenhagen and other such things plaguing us, one is often at a loss as to what to do with all the articles. The Constitution of the Duchy of Warsaw was revealed at the same time, which necessarily takes precedence over an Academy of Sciences. But now I find that to support the publishability of my comments I could have used as an unimpeachable authority the presidential address itself, i.e., the inaugural speech, which must be looked upon as official. I received it the day before yesterday. You see that I was serious about ordering it, and have now become even more so. I have had six copies sent to me to put on sale—money has a good smell no matter where it comes from [*lucri bonus odor ex re qualibet*]. I did not think of this side of the matter right away when I spoke to you of it [102]. The address expresses so completely, and almost uniformly, the contrary of the Constitution's opening statement that one cannot fail to be struck by it. People were even saying here that the sale of the speech was to be suspended, that the president would be stripped of his office, and so on. The speech was moreover of a different character than I imagined from extracts published in the *New Bavarian Gazette* [*Bayrische Neue Zeitung*]. Setting aside Jacobi's way of quoting the likes of [Friedrich] Bouterwek—of whom he cannot seem to get enough—and [Johann Friedrich] Herbart—from whom he borrows a motto—the noble sentiments expressed in it on science and so on are to be heartily approved, and I have recited your biblical text: if this is what happens to dead wood, what will befall green wood [reversal of Luke 23:31]?

Your second letter was a true balm for the wounds which many a worry has inflicted on me, and beyond that it contained balm provided by the human kindness of your wife for wounds of another kind, which I conveyed to its indicated destination [presumably to Mrs. Pflaum—cf 101]. I have just learned that [Jakob] Salat has gone to Landshut, and that [Theology Professor Patricius Benedikt] Zimmer was on the verge of being removed from office. What an exquisite pie has been or is to be exclusively fabricated in Landshut! How is one to keep from breaking out in howls over such a situation! It is just too much! Is no help or improvement to be expected? Against it you can point to the appointments of [Christian] Jacobs and [Christoph] Martini; and, even more reassuring, your new school plan is there to hold the line. At a time when only backward steps were to be seen, you on the contrary have donned seven-league boots and plowed ahead, putting the old school program on the back of the Prussians. This last stroke was a felicitous one in the circumstances: to have someone on whom everything can be dumped without further ado—as in the old days upon the Devil—allows everyone

else to remain untouched, and at present the Prussians are eminently qualified for the role. What seems even more felicitous to me is how you distinguish between classical and modern pedagogy as “humanism” and “philanthropinism.” This latter term recalls the sorry end the poor thing has come to wherever it had been tried, and it offers the advantage of referring to actual past experiences.

Director [of the Royal Library Adolf] Schlichtegroll and Privy Councillor [Paul] Feuerbach [jurist and father of Ludwig] have passed through, but I did not get to see them. I hear these gentlemen know nothing about the One Big University which was spoken of recently and which was to be located in Regensburg. The King has, I hear, earmarked 300,000 florins for education, of which 45,000 florins are to fall to the province of Bamberg. I have suggested to [the rationalist theologian] Paulus that he should get hold of some of it for me as well, since I also belong in education. The only question is whether he is sufficiently in command of the *empirical side* to do so insofar as it may lie within his power. But I must confess that so far I do not see any very clear connection according with *reason* between this money and me. Still, your amicable acuity of mind will ferret out such a connection, and I am at once convinced that any use made of me at your initiative will appear—and be—more rational than empirical.

Everyone here awaits the reorganization soon to break in upon us. I have reported in my own newspaper that the land is to be divided into prefectures. There is, moreover, talk of a great assembly of the princes and magistrates of the Empire. The crucial decision will surely come from Paris. Already the crowd of little princes who have remained in northern Germany makes a stronger tie necessary. The German professors of constitutional law have not stopped spewing forth masses of writings on the concept of sovereignty and the meaning of the Acts of Confederation. The great professor of constitutional law sits in Paris. Delegates of all estates have been dispatched from the various regions of the Kingdom of Westphalia to Paris. In Berg the Provincial Estates Assembly continues. Upon the dissolution of the Provincial Estates Assembly of Württemberg, Napoleon said in a fit of rage to the Württemberg Minister: “I have made your master a sovereign, not a despot!” The German princes have neither grasped the concept of a free monarchy yet nor sought to make it real. Napoleon will have to organize all this. Much will turn out quite differently from the way one imagines. Through it all, however, our friendship remains constant. Convey my greetings a thousand times over to your kindly wife and to my pal Julius. Yours, Hegel

I have heard that people at the *South German General Literary Review* [*Oberdeutschen Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung*] are after me. I have read how Salat has embraced Jacobi's cause as well as mine, and also how for Jacobi's sake Salat stole that [issue of the] *Literary Review* from the reading room in Munich. He will get himself hanged yet for the good cause!¹

¹The postscript concerns an unfavorable review of Hegel's *Phenomenology* in the *Oberdeutschen Allgemeine Literatur Zeitung* (vol 20, 1807, pt 2, columns 121-28). The review complained of his heavy style and arrogant self-satisfaction, and claimed to find more fantasy than science in the work. Jacobi was criticized for following the same wayward path.

The day after sending the above letter to Munich Hegel wrote to a former close acquaintance in the circle around Goethe in Jena, the critic-translator Karl Ludwig von Knebel, then working on a translation of Lucretius's *On the Nature of Things*. Weimar and Jena had been occupied by the French since the Battle of Jena, and in the Treaty of Tilsit the Prussians ceded Jena along with all territories west of the Elbe to Napoleon. Hegel alludes to the attendant difficulties of adjustment in his second paragraph to von Knebel, who was a retired Prussian officer.

Hegel to von Knebel [104]

Bamberg, August 30, 1807

Am I to begin, my dear friend, with apologies for my long silence and parade my whole string of excuses before you? I confess it cannot be entirely excused, but at the same time I feel sure that you are convinced even without the token of this letter that you still enjoy my high esteem and affection, and that your sentiments toward me are too amicable for you not to be moved to forgive me by this token of my remembrance, late though it is.

From time to time I have learned that you and your dear family are well. You were certainly stricken by a hard blow earlier in the year, but you will have recovered from this once more, and will have shared in the improvement of the general situation, which has mellowed after all and become bearable. A main purpose of this letter is to ask for news of yourself, your activity, and your fortunes.

You know my present occupation and why I am pursuing it. You know also that I always had a penchant for politics. But this interest has been weakened by journalism far more than it has found sustenance in it. I have to look at political news from a different point of view from that of the reader. The important thing for the reader is content. For me a news item has interest as an article filling a page. But the diminished enjoyment afforded by the satisfaction of my political curiosity has its compensations. In the first place, income. I have convinced myself by experience of the truth of the biblical text which I have made my guiding light: "Strive ye first after food and clothing, and the Kingdom of God will fall to you as well" [reversal of Matthew 6:33]. The second advantage is that a journalist is himself an object of curiosity and almost of envy, in that everybody wants to know what he is holding secretly [*in petto*]—which, according to the universal persuasion, is surely the best part. But just between us, I never know more than what appears in my newspaper, and often not even that much. However, I do not want to let you go away empty-handed, without any secret political news. So I can tell you privately [*sub rosa*] that Lucien Bonaparte is to be King of Portugal and Spain, and that [Alexandre] Berthier will be King of Switzerland. As for the war between Bavaria and Austria, that is widely known anyway [!]

Do not let such a disclosure go unanswered. Having been initiated into high politics, you should be able to raise somewhat the level of the lower sort of journalistic politics. Support your friend with generous contributions. Apart from

the interest of the content, such articles, being a favor to a friend, would bear circumstantial value surpassing the worth of the content, even should the subject matter be made up of emperors and kings and the distribution of realms and princesses. In this sad time of peace, which is to the journalist what fine moonlight and good police are to thieves and to —, I have need of all available assistance in feeding the curiosity of the public. Of course your region is not very fertile in great political events—with the exception of that all-too-great event which was the Battle of Jena, the sort of event which happens only once every hundred or thousand years. Meanwhile great political events and news for the press are not exactly the same thing, and the latter is not lacking. The comings and goings of a marshal, or of [French] Ambassador Reinhard,² the departure of the Ducal family, and especially the new Principality of Jena make for articles well worth the effort. I know full well that the composition of newspaper articles is like eating hay in comparison with the feast of turning out well-chiseled Lucretian hexameters rich in deep philosophy. But since in the Epicurean philosophy the digestion of one's food cannot be left unattended, and since reading newspapers is thought to help digestion, I should think that a short quarter of an hour at this time of day might be devoted to the composition of newspaper articles, and that the exchange of a passive concern with newspapers for an active one would actually increase the benefit. But I see a still greater advantage in acceding to this favor which I ask of you: will it not allow Karl [von Knebel's son], to whom I send warm greetings, to practice that *objective* writing style known as journalistic style, which can best counterbalance youth's penchant for giving free reign to imagination, feeling, or wit? Beyond this educational advantage there will be still another for Karl: for every article a pitcher of good Bamberg beer will, assuming he likes it, be credited to his account, and once a certain quantity has been accumulated it will be delivered to him in full.

So consider my request. It would be a great help for me to find a correspondent in those parts. An official report on events involving the Weimar contingent at Kohlberg was once dispatched to me from Weimar—though without indication of what individual or officials sent it. I am indebted but do not know to whom. I have already thought of turning to [Johannes] Falk or Dr. Müller [?] for this help. You are acquainted with them both, and would perhaps be kind enough to arrange something with one or the other, or to advise me as to whether I might approach one of them. We should quickly come to terms on payment. Yet I rely most affectionately on Karl. But to sum up, please abstract completely from the content of my request, and consider only the service you would be doing me by honoring it.

A further word concerning my situation here. You perhaps know that I made a request to Weimar for a leave during this half year. I have now become more deeply involved with this journalistic enterprise and shall thus renounce the stipend

²Karl Friedrich Reinhard, the French Minister Plenipotentiary whose comings and goings Hegel mentions here, was a fellow countryman of Hegel's from Württemberg—a naturalized French citizen who entered the French diplomatic service after going to France in 1787 as a private tutor. In 1794 [6] Hegel mentioned him to Schelling as having an important post in the Department of Foreign Affairs in Paris.

granted me by the Duke, though the gesture is perhaps superfluous, since the quarter for May to July to which I believed myself still entitled has not been paid. Apart from that, I shall esteem it an honor to be considered a Professor at Jena still and to go on using that title. But I can no longer return to my previous situation. Should its economic aspect someday change, I would not hesitate to give up newspaper editing for the philosophy lecture hall. I even long for such a change. The prospect of coming once more into close and amiable association with you is by no means the least reason for this wish of mine. I would gladly give up the extensive communication in which I daily stand with the whole world for a few hours of conversation with you every week. The beer is good here, but if you came here and drank it at the source, in a cave tavern [*Felsenkeller*], you would help accent its taste. I implore you all the more urgently, in view of this pressing need, for the stimulation of a few lines from you. Please give my warmest regards to Mrs. von Knebel and to my other friends. Your most devoted friend, Hegel

VON KNEBEL, replying to Hegel on September 11 [105], sent a poem by a shoemaker on the fire set off in Jena by the 1806 battle. He also sent an inventory by Goethe of rocks found in Karlsbad (*Zur Naturwissenschaft überhaupt*, 1817, vol 1, no 1, pp. 35ff). Hegel replied on November 21 with two "gifts" of his own: a book von Knebel had lent to Paulus, and Schelling's speech to the Bavarian Academy of Sciences: "On the Relation of the Fine Arts to Nature." When Hegel praises Schelling's success in making himself understood by a wide audience, a contrast to his own *Phenomenology*, whose Preface von Knebel regretfully found unclear in places [105], is present. Hegel's reply to von Knebel's regret, which invokes the "abstract" subject matter of his book, shows that Hegel sometimes contrasted the "abstract" to the "concrete" in the usual manner: even the "concrete thinking" of Hegelian philosophy was somehow abstract. Hegel concludes on the 21st by thanking von Knebel for local political news communicated, at Hegel's urging, as an informal correspondent for the *Bamberger Zeitung*.

Hegel to von Knebel [109]

Bamberg, November 21, 1807

I am thinking of having a standard opening for all my letters typeset in my print shop containing apologies for my delay in replying to letters from friends. So I may put off until then, esteemed friend, the presentation of my apologies to you. Yet to you such an apology would not suffice. I should have to add special apologies as well. For—beyond the amicable sentiments attested in your letter, which, coming from you, are particularly treasured—you had the kindness to adorn your letter with delightful literary gifts which are of intrinsic interest, but which are even more interesting when contrasted: one of them is the work of a cobbler become a poet, the other the work of a poet who wishes to condescend to prose and even cataloguing. The one has for its content the unspeakable destruction of Troy [*"infandum excidium Trojae"*—see Virgil, *Aeneid* II lines 3-5], the horror and burning of the city devoted to the spirit and its productions, while the subject of the other is the birthplace of a sort of firewater—or rather sparkling mineral water—salutary for the abdomen and its constipations.

Accept my thanks for these wondrous presents. I would have wished to have underscored my gratitude by replying in kind. But I enclose herewith what chance permits me to offer. In fact I have waited for this chance longer than I would have wished. Both are products of Bavaria, but otherwise very different. One is genuinely Bavarian, or rather God grant that it may *have been* genuinely Bavarian. It is personal property of yours which I came upon and claimed on your behalf in such a manner that Paulus, its timely possessor, was delighted for a chance to return it and convey his greetings to you. We assumed that you had not given it away but had only lost it and thus might well wish it returned. The second item likewise saw the light of day in Bavaria, though it was conceived in Jena. You will perhaps find something to interest you, and you will find that—at least for the most part—the effort at popularity has succeeded, that its content is beautiful and beautifully expressed.

In your letter you were kind enough to give some praise of the Preface of my book. I see that you have borrowed the Preface. I do not know what misfortune caused you not to receive the copy intended for you [94]. I surmise, however, that this copy as well was incomplete and perhaps for this reason was not given to you. As for the wish you express for greater intelligibility and clarity, I would gladly have fulfilled it, but it is just this which is most difficult to achieve and is the mark of perfection, at least when the content is of the more solid type. For there is a content which carries clarity along with it, such as the sort with which I am principally occupied every day: e.g., that Prince so and so passed through today, that His Majesty went boar hunting, and so forth. But no matter how clearly political news is reported, it is still more or less true nowadays that neither the writer nor the reader understands events any better. From this I might on the contrary [*per-contrarium*] conclude that so much the more will be understood through my obscure style, which is what I would like to hope but do not therefore believe. To speak seriously, however, even if an abstract subject matter does not permit that clarity of exposition which discloses the object in a finished state and clear light at first approach, and which is possible in the case of a concrete subject matter, still I find justice in your censure, and I can only lament—if indeed it is permissible—that I have been hindered by what is called "fate" from bringing forth by my labor something in my science capable of satisfying men of insight and taste such as yourself, my friend, and of affording me the satisfaction of being able to say: "For this have I lived!"

I refrain from adding anything more about the world political situation. I concern myself with it out of duty, and so can excuse myself from writing to you about it. To the attempt you made at journalistic style in your last letter I can only respond with the just praise it deserves. I hope my appeal to you for more of the same will not be in vain. To be sure, not much is happening in your region, and I have no wish for it to become more newsworthy. Still, troops will not fail to come marching through. And whatever empties houses and warehouses fills newspapers all the more.

The work of organization, which actually has never stopped, is now beginning afresh here. In the old days one distinguished in matters of government between business as usual and extraordinary dispositions, i.e., organic alterations.

It almost appears now as if the work of organization has become the usual business of the day, and as if, in order to overturn completely Dr. Humdrum, about whom so much ill has been spoken, every day has to bring forth something new and different.

But the Muses have the right not to bother themselves much about that and, in the manner of [Johann Peter] Uz, to leave such trivia to princes [Uz, *Werke*, 1760, Pt 1, pp. 3-7]. Just as little is friendship concerned with such mundane affairs. And so farewell, and give my best to your family. Your most devoted friend, Hegel

P.S. Please pardon my liberty in asking you to convey the enclosed [?] to its address. I especially ask to be excused this once. I address these lines through you because one or several letters sent directly, containing messages of interest to me, apparently have not arrived. Thus once more, *pardon*.

A YEAR LATER, on September 28 and October 7, 1808 [128, 130], von Knebel sent Hegel, at the urging of Karl Friedrich Frommann, accounts of Napoleon's visit with other Crown Heads in Weimar. Von Knebel was now captivated by the French Emperor:

... the great Napoleon has conquered the hearts of all men here, particularly the most intelligent, in a manner completely independent of his greatness and power, which concerns more the man even than the Emperor. In the features of his countenance are found—apart from a certain expression of melancholy, which, according to Aristotle, lies at the basis of every great character—not only traits of his high spirit but also a true goodness of heart which the great events and exertions of his life have not been able to efface. In a word, there is enthusiasm for the great man. He has already conversed a few times at some length with our Goethe and thus perhaps gave an example to the German monarchs, who should not be afraid to recognize and honor their most distinguished men. Today the Emperor visited the field on which the Battle of Jena was fought, taking lunch on Mount Napoleon, where he encamped the night of the 13th and 14th of October [1806]. ... From the top of the Mount [he] showed the Emperor Alexander the dispositions which had been taken for the battle. He also promised a deputation from Jena, it is said, to indemnify the city for losses suffered in the fire. [130]

Von Knebel told Hegel he was free to publish anything he wanted from the above reports, adding: "Just do not in any way compromise me." Hegel replied a week later:

Hegel to von Knebel [131]

Bamberg, October 14, 1808

The kindness and willingness with which you have striven to fulfill my request as transmitted to you by Frommann has pleased me deeply, my dear friend, for it is further proof of your kind remembrance of me. It is really not an appropriate request to ask you to sit down and record the sort of political news doormen dispense. I would much rather have beseeched you for a Lucretian air, an elegy by [Albius] Tibullus, or the sports of your Muse. But any such request would have put me under obligation; you would at least have been entitled to expect a reply in

kind. I am, however, less than ever able to produce one. Here there are no laurel groves, only forests bearing fruit to enliven and reward those capable of mere grunts. With us here Hippocrene is merely the beer barrel. Tolls, police, or organizational reforms are not material for elegies in the manner of Propertius. If this age is on the whole an age of iron, here it is still mixed with lead, nickel, and other base metals. Things are indeed always being reorganized to produce a nugget of gold as well. It is characteristic of gold, however, to grow all too slowly, and with all our sprinkling and greenhouse exertions no steady growth ensues. Happy you are to whom it is granted to remain by yourself in such a tranquil sphere and rummage about in a treasure eaten neither by mold nor by rust. What I dig up is tomorrow either no longer true or else forgotten. But an occasional word of friendship from you makes old chords sound again and adds to them a lovely, distantly resounding echo evoking the memory of a better time—the object of at least my wishes if not actually my hopes.

[Johann] Gries is in Munich. According to what he wrote at the beginning of the summer, he wanted to return by way of Bamberg to Jena, his fatherland. I will be most happy to see once again a remnant of our prior life. The acquaintances I had here, especially Paulus, are being once more dispatched elsewhere in the [mis]organizational shuffle. Paulus will go to Nuremberg as School Councillor; others are off in other directions. I congratulated him on the basis of your recommendation of the people of Nuremberg. But I hear that much of their livelihood has been organized away from them.

Returning to politics, were you at the rabbit hunt at Apolda? Have you had breakfast in the *Plateau-Pavillon*? What did Napoleon talk about at the ball with [Christoph Martin] Wieland and Goethe? You have also seen [French actor François Joseph] Talma [see Ch 24 on French stage]? I ask you all this not for my newspaper but for my personal edification. Tell me about it when you feel inclined. And tell me whether there was any delight in it for you, and whether even some honor slipped in along with it—I do not want to say for the Germans, but rather for those individuals of such great merit.

I have to write crosswise [on the sheet] my gratitude for your kind remembrance of me; I trust you will not take it that way.

Ever since hearing your wife sing I have not heard a single note properly sung. Please remember me to her most kindly, and no less to Karl. Yours, Hegel

THE PROTESTANT CHURCH IN NAPOLEONIC BAVARIA

Protestants in Bavaria, like Hegel and Niethammer, were frequently sympathetic to the French cause. Alliance with France had resulted in the acquisition between 1803 and 1806 of new territories embracing Protestant populations, accelerating the legal emancipation of all Bavarian Protestants. In 1807 the Protestant Church was formally organized in Bavaria. Hegel's letter to Niethammer of October 13 [106] was written on this occasion.

Niethammer had to work with Catholic colleagues in Bavaria, i.e., with a hierarchy placed above the people. When Niethammer suggested that Hegel teach

theology in the local schools, Hegel expressed—with a frankness that would diminish in his later years—his aversion to the hierarchically organized Protestant Church which would supervise such instruction [108]. To Hegel the “neo-Catholic” hierarchy included the Protestant Church itself in Bamberg. This same letter of November 1807 characterizes all Germany as “neo-Catholic,” inasmuch as the authorities lacked sufficient confidence in the people to allow them the constitutional freedom to act, judge, and decide autonomously. External authority would have to withdraw for the “Kingdom of God,” which had already begun to descend to earth in France (*Werke* II, 448), to begin its descent in Germany as well. And Hegel only half jestingly calls upon Niethammer to realize it [112].

Hegel to Niethammer [106]

Bamberg, October 13, 1807

Have you forsworn sending any further word to your friends in Bamberg, my dear friend? I have asked this to myself for quite some time and can no longer refrain from doing so now in writing. Wherever I have asked others in Bamberg I have met with the counterquestion whether I have heard from you. We are of course not quite without news. At least I hear at second- and third-hand that friends from here who were in Munich have seen you, spoken with you, and brought back splendid news of you, crediting if not you then at least the best of women with a certain nostalgia for Bamberg still.

But even without this specific news, you have not gone unnoticed in general events [of the day]. Among other things the decision to give the Protestant congregations in Bavaria a joint organization and unifying point was surely not taken without your cooperation and support. Beyond this most important first step toward the constitution of the Protestants into one body—by which they [can] alone receive the necessary guarantee of their rights—you have, so it is said, taken the initiative of [instituting] a prize for a [new] German grammar, a prize *contra* [Josef] Wismayr, so to speak. Such a grammar will not come very cheaply. However, this is not the first time in the world that something is paid for dearly where something less expensive could do the job just as well. But Mr. Wismayr especially must feel very flattered that to furnish something better than he could produce is rated so highly. In both the literal and the figurative sense, the bitter pill has thereby been sweetened.

Paris does not yet seem to have made a final decision, a decision which, as may be presumed from various circumstances, not only affects the external distribution of territories but will also influence internal organization for the good of the peoples. Only then shall we find a way out of this state of uncertainty. Your own labors, however, at least those which concern the gymnasium, will not greatly depend on it. They can stand on their own because even under different regimes the same need remains, assuming the same functional relations. We are waiting with great interest to hear more about this soon.

As for my own work, should you perhaps ask about it, I cannot really call its fruit “works.” Journalism takes its unhindered course without pleasure, but also without annoyance. But I now find I must put somewhat more spirit into my

activity, and for this reason I turn to you with a request for assistance. I think a [Benjamin Thomson] Rumford coffee maker would be of great use to me in this connection. And since the best of these coffee makers are exclusively manufactured in Munich, I dare ask you or that best of women to be so good as to order one and forward it to me along with the bill. I believe my existence will be substantially improved by such a piece of equipment, and I will be much obliged to you for its purchase.

I cannot write much—and certainly nothing new—about our acquaintances and friends here, which is probably all for the better, since there is usually more bad than good news. . . . From the provinces to the capital very little can be written at all. All the more, however, can be written from the capital—to which all eyes are directed—to the provinces. But I hear matters will not stop at merely directing eyes to the capital. For, beyond wishes, several *legs* have gone off in that direction as well, and you will shortly have some of them there for your enjoyment. What is Schelling doing at the moment? It has been a long time since I heard from him.

The brewers, who are behaving very obstinately, are currently being subjected to much regulation. If this noble product, the beer of Bamberg, should suffer as a consequence, it would be a great pity for dear Bamberg. Yet who knows but that its corpulence would not be somewhat reduced and driven over into the spiritual. However, for the time being, until the matter is settled, I shall have recourse to my coffee maker.

Greet the kindhearted wife a thousand times. . . . Your sincere friend, Hegel

NIETHAMMER REPLIED to the above query about Schelling by sending the speech by Schelling—“On the Relation of the Fine Arts to Nature”—which Hegel in turn sent to von Knebel on November 21 [109]. Hegel thanked Niethammer for the speech in a letter dated the same month, and then commented on Niethammer’s research with a view to ecclesiastical and educational reform in Bavaria.

Hegel to Niethammer [108]

[Bamberg, November 1807]

I must thank you, my dear friend, for so many other gifts besides your letter. What will we see next? Just as the ocean produces grain, the Arabian desert wine, and Gotthard oranges, so Munich flourishes with pentameters and hexameters—as L. in Jena [Ludwig Döderlein] called distichs by way of definition—as also with aesthetic-philosophical addresses [i.e., Schelling’s speech]. Beyond that, you give promise of what is best of all, namely the self-knowledge which is beginning to emerge at least in one field—and that field a very central one said to be the beginning of all wisdom [Niethammer’s *Pasigraphy and Ideography*, 1808, also given to Hegel]. The wife of [vom] our friend Paulus—since this is how she wants to be known, not as Mrs. von Paulus—is in the habit of saving [the honor of] the Swabians by saying: it is not that the people are dumb, but that they are asses, not people! The conceit of people in Bavaria and Salzburg, or perhaps more generally of the neo-Catholic [temper], of course contrasts greatly with what may be declared up and down about the inhabitants of *Barbaria*—which I have often heard pro-

nounced so softly that it almost sounded like *Bavaria*—and certainly is still something else again than what applies to us Swabians. You have already achieved much once you can attain insight of this sort—not indeed insight into the objects of inquiry, but into the leaders in whom a high opinion of their own intellectual and moral qualities has been induced by the incessant smug, sneering, hypocritical, sermonizing jabber of this people. I congratulate the *bad cause*—for the *good cause* is that of this people, if we are to believe their own incessant assurances—[now] that you have been charged with [the task of] its examination. You write that you accordingly plan to take inventory of this people, and first want to identify the individuals you can use, the more distinguished talents [*excellentiora ingenia*]. There is a certain land, I think, in which you would mean those who can correctly spell “ordokravisch.” For I now forget of what country I once heard it said that, among those who there correspond to what we call “district governmental councilors,” it is rated a high distinction to be able to spell “ordokraviesch” [*sic*] correctly. But in Bavaria you will of course demand quite different qualifications. Yet perhaps you are too stringent, given that people who have not yet mastered the elements aspire to the more sublime callings. It is perhaps this that explains the fact that you are, as you say, viewed as a bogeyman, though you have no wish to be seen in this light. You must not take it badly if a poor innocent pigeon [*Tauber*] like [Professor] Täuber [Hegel’s predecessor in the Bamberg editorship], who could not even write a newspaper as I can, becomes timid in your presence. Yet fortunately he seems to have had within him something with which to move you, and it does not surprise me that it was precisely the fact that every male pigeon has a dove [*Taube*]. I have no doubt that Mr. [Johann Baptist] Graser has similarly touching dimensions to soften you. He is still in Munich, I assume. . . .

From you I learn that Frommann or perhaps even I am to come out with a logic text. You must know that to give theological instruction—making sure that it is properly filtered so as to reach a broader range of the people—while writing a logic [text] is like being a whitewasher and chimney sweep at the same time, or like drinking burgundy on top of tea. Must I—who for many years nested on the free cliffs with the eagle and who have been used to breathing pure mountain air—now learn to feed on the remains of dead thought or modern stillborn thought—and vegetate in the foul air of empty twaddle? I would have gladly taught theology in the university, and after a few years of sustained philosophy courses I would surely have done so. But [to teach], *a*, an *enlightened* doctrine of religion, *b*, intended for the *schools*, *c*, here in Bamberg, *d*, with the prospect that claims be made upon me as a result by the local Protestant Christian Church—the very thought of how this would affect me upon contact makes me shudder in every nerve, as if the Christian Church were a charged galvanic battery, and so on. Lord, let this cup pass from me [Matthew 26:29].

I have of course mentioned in the above your gifts, but the trees have kept me from seeing the forest. I have not yet thanked you for such fine gifts. *Critical* comments, it may be said in passing, will not accompany my thanks, for you also have sent the eggs without the cackling. Of still other eggs, not yet laid, you do not even wish to speak. It may be acceptable for some third party to say that he cannot

talk about them, but it surely will not do for the one who lays them to say so. This would at most be acceptable from someone in whom that blessed natural instinct is alone active which has been unmistakably present in the wind-eggs of our adversaries. Those who laid them surely cackled profusely, but were not therefore able to say anything, while others delivered an oration—in fact, a funeral oration. But one who has brought these geese to their grave, so as to make their burial the birth of swan eggs or the like, has no difficulty speaking of it.

Here as everywhere, we would be even more eager to learn something of the far-reaching general reorganization to which everything has long pointed. It should be remarked that the allegories with which, it is said, the subject has been weighed down are almost worse than complete silence. For images of food held before one’s eyes stimulate an appetite they do not satisfy. Since you have already had to take up the organization of the schools, by now surely matters must have advanced further. But I hear that even quite distinguished persons here, a [district] president for example, still know nothing. And we must take their word of honor for it, just as even the Kings know little about what the Emperor decides. What I am not only curious about but anxious to know is in what spirit this important—or perhaps most important—work is being carried out. So far we have seen that in all imitations of the French only half the example is ever taken up. The other half, the noblest part, is left aside: liberty of the people; popular participation in elections; governmental decisions taken in the full view of the people; or at least public exposition, for the insight of the people, of all the reasons behind such measures.³ It is an omission through which the half that is copied is entirely distorted, being transformed on the one side into arbitrariness, rudeness, barbarity, above all dumbness, hatred of publicity [*Publizität*], exploitation, and wastefulness, and on the other side into torpor, ill-humor, indifference to every public interest, servility, and baseness. The intelligence required to make a constitution is great and deep—all the greater and deeper the more feasible and even splendid it now seems in Germany to govern without a constitution and be done with it. For in Germany no official has his own [defined] sphere of activity. Instead, the higher authorities take it as their duty to do what should be the business of their underlings, so that there is nothing present or known of that sacrifice by which higher authorities leave something to be done at the lower echelons. Nor is anything known of the state having sufficient trust in itself not to interfere with its parts—which is the essence of liberty. But Germany has already learned much from France, and the slow nature of the Germans, *les allemands*, will in time benefit from still more. Everything cannot be achieved at once. I have just heard that a beginning has been made with the curatorship of the funds. If [Albert] Schlehleim had lived to see that, he might have retained his sanity. Others, however, may perhaps prefer to lose their sanity over it.

That Schlehleim, it may be added, is now completely mad, that he was held at

³The then-current French Constitution of 1804, without eliminating universal suffrage, limited the role of the legislative body elected with popular participation to discussing—i.e., “publicizing”—laws which it could neither propose nor vote.

Seehof for a week and that it has now been arranged for him to make a trip to Bayreuth—where a number of people from Bamberg, including High Judicial Councillor Haak, are to be found—is an infinitely sad event for his family. One can hardly suffer more than dear Mrs. Pflaum has in the past six months. Mr. von Jolli will arrive in Bayreuth in a few days. You will then see whether Mrs. von Jolli can do more than have a thousand cordial greetings and so on conveyed to you.

That the best of women is in Landshut I learned yesterday. No people anywhere can compare with those of Jena, and especially with the Swabians of Jena. Just do not whisk Paulus, too, away from here in the organizational shuffle. Establish that Millennial Kingdom soon from which devouring wolves masquerading as sheep are excluded, in which all of “us” will be reunited—but found it in the actual world, for in thought I have already inhabited it a long time now, notably alongside you. Yours, Hegel

HEGEL'S REFERENCE to himself, Paulus, and Niethammer in November 1807 [108] as the “Swabians of Jena” indicates their ambiguous position in the religious and regional divisions of the time. As Swabians they were South Germans, and yet by their Protestant culture and education they belonged to Jena and the North. Hegel's December 23 letter defends Jacobi against the attacks of “Old Bavarian” Catholic Karl Rottmanner, who wrote poetry in the Bavarian dialect and edited Bavarian folksongs. Protestants like Jacobi, Hegel, and Schelling—whom the Bavarian Government had recruited in the course of modernization and reform in alliance with France—were resented in the Catholic South. Yet at the same time a Romantic current, typified by Friedrich Schlegel, was undergoing a conversion to Catholicism inspired by an idealization of the Middle Ages. The new Romantic ideology, largely Northern in origin, allied itself with nationalism and opposition to Napoleonic Europe. Schlegel—a Northerner, Protestant, and former colleague of Hegel's in Jena—acquired an influential position at the Austrian Court the same year he converted to Catholicism. In his December 23 letter [III] Hegel states without equivocation his attitude toward “empty talk of the excellence of the Catholic Middle Ages” and “the altar of the Fatherland.” Even years later in Berlin he would suggest that “so-called” German literature might with advantage be dropped from the gymnasium curriculum (Ch 14 on philosophy in gymnasium).

Hegel to Niethammer [111]

Bamberg, December 23, 1807

The carrier pigeon service by which, through wind and sleet, you sent me your last letters has the bad habit of not delivering the letters until up to a week after their arrival, especially when the carriers hurry back upon the wings of love, if not upon the arrival of the torch-bearing [divine] Hymen. It seems to me from your letter that Graser has spoken to you more precisely of his kind sentiments in my regard than is warranted by the facts, seeing that you say the report on the matter has not yet arrived. From what I understood, the report or budget should have dealt with this staff position [?] in general terms without designating any particular individual to occupy it. Be that as it may, I thank you as much for your

one negative consolation—namely, that I need not fear being used in this post in the organizational shuffle—as I do for your positive one. Bayreuth, by the way, has indeed been occupied by your [Bavarian] troops, but only as a part of the *Grande Armée*, and it has already been completely evacuated again by them. So at least for the time being it is not being allocated to Bavaria in the reorganization. At any rate that is what my newspaper reports. No doubt the King will return from Italy with it in his pocket.

Your intention to obtain an appointment in philology for me here deserved my special thanks. I even see that you had already undertaken steps in this direction with the Minister, and had received assurances. I recognize your friendship at work in the whole matter. I cannot completely regret that nothing has come of it. Since a *local* and, what is more, a *Catholic* would have been sacrificed, you yourself know only too well the awkwardness which would have attached itself to such a situation. Just as I would have been viewed as having intruded [*intrusus*], you would have been considered the intruder [*intrudens*]. Whether such considerations still carry weight in higher spheres I do not know. But at least they are still popular—see below—and indeed at higher levels than I should have expected. So, my good friend, you will surely still obtain or make ready for us a more or less Protestant university; and then, in this your Kingdom, think of me! Do not just leave me here holding this newspaper.

The above on “locals” and “Catholics” has been reinforced in my mind even more by a brochure which I have seen; Rottmanner's criticism of Jacobi's [inaugural] address [as president of the Academy] [i.e., Karl Rottmanner's *A Critique of F. H. Jacobi's Essay on Learned Societies*, 1807]. You know that I was not upset by it because I belonged to Jacobi's party in advance. From what I have heard this product has caused great pleasure—not only in Munich but also here, where it has been passed from hand to hand. It is said to have gone through three editions. Mr. von Bayard, who has close connections with Munich, had spoken to me earlier about the fine young Bavarians who are already giving the *foreign* Academy a hard time, and will give it an even harder one in a few years time. This Mr. Rottmanner is one of them, it appears. He has associated himself with all the vulgar Bavarian views, and has passed off their expression as the duty of philosophy. If not a man for the times he is certainly the man for Bavaria, and just for this reason the publication is very noteworthy. The most he is capable of is to have learned how to construct a sentence—an art transplanted to Bavaria not long ago. All he can say against Jacobi's philosophy amounts to five lines of the most commonplace prattle. What Jacobi calls reason is the capacity for final ends—p. 6; *therefore*, Jacobi does not grasp reason in its totality; so his conception of it is a mere concept of the understanding, and is *consequently* deficient and unphilosophical. To have done with someone like this is truly to vaunt one's ignorance. To present to you the sort of criticism or views which have occurred to me, and which as a journalist I can neither send to press nor repress, is comical, just as it is also comical to belabor as he does the difference between South Germans and North Germans, thus annoying the foreigners while trying to flatter the locals. For this twaddle was invented and developed in North Germany, and the solid original

South German character is—now as before—merely picking it up from the disdained North Germans, parroting it now as ever. The South Germans have most insolently pirated the writings of North Germans, have openly robbed them and still rob them to this day. This disciple parrots this talk about the virtue of the Catholic Middle Ages in the same way—talk which, as everybody knows, was invented nowhere else but in North Germany.

At least we have not been so hard on Jacobi as to send him to school to [philologist Georg Anton Friedrich] Ast! That is a little too much. Worse still, and somewhat unusual, is the miserable way this Catholic twists and turns around the Reformation, its value and effect. No hypocritical priest would have behaved differently. What is worst is the base insinuation that Jacobi seeks to hold back and hide what he really thinks, but that a philosophical and discerning observer easily notices it: namely, that he is only interested in the Protestant Church, and that he speaks out against something only because it is Catholic. With that this gentleman has spoken both for himself and for all others like him. If you talk about the ignorance of this or that person, or of the baseness of this or that publication or curriculum plan, you find yourself talking to blockheads on whom, due to their close-mindedness, everything runs off without effect. “No matter what you chose to attack,” they keep repeating in their heart, “you cannot seduce, deceive, dupe us; we know full well that your real target is Catholicism and that all the rest is but a smoke screen.” They hold to this thought, make the sign of the cross, and recite it to themselves as a “Get thee hence, Satan” [“*Apaga Satanas*,” Matthew 4:10] regardless of the circumstance, so stupefying themselves with it that they hear nothing of what is said to them. We must not forget to mention here that the “spring flowers” are likewise not to be overlooked [Rottmanner, *Spring Flowers*, 1807]. Nor should we forget the “costs” [*Kösten*]: this patriot with his foolish earnestness thus deposits his flowers on the altar of the Fatherland and, as high priest of this altar, slaughters Jacobi, the foreign President of the Academy which costs so much to the Fatherland, offering him up as a cleansing sacrifice to God and the people for sweet incense. Other aspects of his critique—Jacobi’s use of quotations, his style, and so forth—are not worth mentioning. Even the blind could see this and easily say something better about it. However, the young man should have passed over Jacobi’s preacherlike tone in complete silence, for very often he resorts to descriptions in which one would only need to change a few substantives to believe that the passage had been cut out from some tedious sermon. What would equally lend itself very well to travesty is how, from Jacobi’s secret thoughts expressing the *arrière-pensée* of Protestantism, he sinks to asserting that there is nothing for us to object to in specific norms of faith, indeed that we *even* respect them as befits all educated people—especially philosophers, the very duty of philosophy being to discover such norms. This is more than the tone of a preacher, it is hypocrisy in the manner of Salat and old wives. I will not comment on how Rottmanner puffs himself up over Fichte’s banishment [from Jena], and over the *free terrain* opened up for philosophy in South Germany, i.e., over Schelling’s projected and anticipated dismissal [as General Secretary of the Bavarian Academy of Fine Arts] and [Patricius] Zimmer’s actual dismissal [from Landshut University

in 1806], and over the baloney confected in Landshut out of Köppen, Salat, [Ignaz] Thammer, and [Matthaus] Fingerlos. The South is, to be sure, a *terrain free of philosophy*. *Apropos*, could you get me speeches and [course] programs by Köppen [i.e., Friedrich Köppen, *On the Aim of Philosophy*, 1807] and Salat which I recently read about? Fichte was not dismissed because of philosophy, but Schelling and Zimmer in the one case should have been and, in the other, has been dismissed on account of philosophy! Much is to be gained from such a parallel. I now regret that I did not carry out my plan or wish to establish a literary or even patriotic periodical. If some day you were to draw Paulus and me both into your reorganizational shuffle, something might still come of the plan.

I must stop. . . . Mme. Niethammer’s letter has caused much delight. Mr. von Jolli is staying on now in the garrison here. A thousand compliments for Mme. Niethammer as also for Julius. Yours, Hegel

HEGEL’S PLEA FOR A STATE PRESS

By January 22, 1808, Hegel had received the Rumford coffee maker which he had requested of Niethammer on October 13. He used it in his January letter to Niethammer to comment on Bamberg’s industrial underdevelopment. But the letter also continues the theme of the letter of December 23. Hegel now argues that the way to put a stop to the nonsense of a Rottmanner is for the state to publish a newspaper like *Le Moniteur*, which, founded in 1789, became an official organ of the French Government in 1800. Hegel’s proposal is to extend the political authority of a state paper over even literary criticism. In part, Hegel’s attraction to the editorship of a state publication may reflect his sense of greater honor in working for a state [98]. In any case, Hegel here voices reservations about freedom of the press during a period in which he himself, as a newspaper editor, was subject to state censorship. These general reservations will be repeated in the *Philosophy of Law*, ¶319, while the specific proposal of an officially sponsored literary review will be repeated in a report to the Prussian Government in 1819-20 (*Berlin Schrift*, 509-30). Yet his January 1808 call for a state press is not a call for one that is exclusively public. Idle nonsense is to be shamed off the printed page by the authority of the pace-setting state press, not strictly forbidden. Yet, in the Napoleonic context, the regulation of the press accomplished what direct state control did not. From 1805 all newspapers in France were subject to financial control by the police, while book printers operated on revocable state licenses.

Hegel to Niethammer [112]

Bamberg, January 22, 1808

In addition to giving my thanks, dear friend, I must apologize for my delay in doing so, and in simply answering your letter. But I wanted to be able to tell you how exquisite the coffee tasted from this coffee maker which we owe the sciences. I also wanted to tell you how much my scientific activity is already indebted to this coffee. But since in Bamberg the sciences have not yet had any influence on industry, it seems impossible to talk of a reciprocal action of industry on science.

Perhaps [the Academy of Sciences] ought to offer a prize for the best essay on how this [vicious] circle might be attacked! In short, my domestic help and the [local] tin guild have not yet found how to provide me with a tin water-kettle. The manufacture of the contraption that was delivered to me merits no further mention. I also wanted to report to you the deed of mercy whose sweet scent would rise from this coffee maker, and which you are kind enough not to claim for yourself but to ascribe to the magnanimity of your wife toward all God's little creatures. Only—no doubt because no coffee has yet arisen—this deed of mercy has not yet sprung forth either. . . .

From one perspective, this is how things are going or rather not going in Bamberg; yet, looked at from another angle, things are at least going. Among the things viewed from this brighter side I include the New Year's party that [physician Adalbert] Marcus gave in Michelsberg in honor of the District President. You have the right to expect a detailed account of it, and no doubt you have received one. I was pleased with a remark by Miss Franz [?], who said that you and your wife would have been very welcome at this festivity, and that your presence would have contributed much to the party's success. The majority of the seventy guests came in costume. No one knew the disguises of the others. We were treated to processions of goddesses, Dr. Luther and Catherine, Saint Stephan, a doctor and pharmacist, bears and bear trainers, and so on. And most guests recited a verse to the guest of honor, who was taken quite by surprise. Afterward there was a most exquisite supper, a ball, and so on. Against such idealization [*Idealität*] I opposed a note of realism [*Wirklichkeit*] by donning a valet's uniform coat belonging to the Court doorman, along with his wig. During the whole three-hour supper I conversed in this attire with Cypris by my side. Everyone—including myself—realized that this was who she was, but I leave it to you to guess her identity, though [for us] she wore no mask and thus incarnated Cypris all the better.

I had to rack my brains to realize from what I recollected of my last letter that it contained enough about Jacobi that was presentable for it to be shown to him. I am pleased it has had a good effect. You write that there will be no reply from Munich to that upsurge of patriotism [by Rottmanner]. You of course have no way of making a reply. Jacobi cannot, or rather he probably could not very well reply himself, nor could he write a pamphlet on it. A critique in an ordinary literary review has a private character, which licenses the young man to reply again in a quite boorish way. The real means to counter such wantonness is not available to you because you have no *Moniteur*. The advantage of the French *Moniteur* is that it has the authority to put adolescent insolence in its place, to tame and shut up impudent mouths. The contents of reviews in the *Moniteur*, though lacking an official character, have a noble tone of superior knowledge just because they appear in the *Moniteur*—a tone that at once enforces proper regard for the public position of an author. This aspect of such reviews of course may cause an outcry about repression of the freedom of thought and the press, the cry that in the realm of science authority has no place, and so on. Yet in the present case, and, indeed in all cases where such an outcry commands authority, it is not a question either of thinking or of the sciences. For thinking and science have nothing to do with the

wanton immaturity which is alone impressed by such talk, and which can be held in check only by authority of some kind. We in any case have to start out from authority, e.g., from the belief that in virtue of their fame—as in the case of others by their standing in a state—Plato and Aristotle are, even if we do not understand them, more to be trusted than our own thoughts; in other words, even if we find what they said to be worthless, inasmuch as our present thoughts and theirs are opposed. The literary side of a *Moniteur* must, after all, appear secondary. Political matters remain, both foreign and domestic. Yet it is precisely this that lends an aura of authority to its literary function. But you do not have a political *Moniteur* [in Munich] either. To put it pointedly, you have freedom of the pen and press—I almost said *Fress-Freiheit* [the freedom to feed on any prey one wants] instead of *Press-Freiheit*—but you lack all *publicity* [*Publizität*] leading the government to lay before its people the condition in which the state finds itself, the allocation of public funds, current indebtedness, the bureaucracy, and so on. This dialogue of government with its own people, about its and their interests, is one of the most important sources of the power of the French and English peoples. Much is required for such a dialogue; but, above all, courage. With the forthcoming reorganization, however, we will no doubt obtain much. Here we only know or talk of twelve prefectures at first. A council of state, too? And popular representation as well? And so on.

But I am jumping from one thing to the next and forgetting my starting point. So, set up a political-literary *Moniteur*, and give me something to do with it. If the Academy is to exert influence on the state of the sciences in Bavaria, it will principally acquire that influence only through such an organ. A writing by Rottmanner and Munich literary reviews are not without effect if left to themselves. On the contrary, they have enormous edge of speech over speechlessness. But the Academy will achieve such influence neither through its own literary review, nor through an annually printed collection of deep scholarly essays on this or that special topic [i.e., *Monographs of the Academy of Sciences*, 1763-], nor through its mere existence.

The local Protestant Church will be opened in a week. [Karl] Fuchs is having an invitational text printed [Karl Fuchs, *On the Essence of the Church, A Sermon Marking Inauguration of the Protestant Cult in Bamberg*, 1808]. I have just read the proofs. You will receive it with your next mail. Mr. von Bayard, with his good head, surely has little to do with the [vulgar Bavarian] attitude cited above, but he is such a completely practical administrator that he has often explained to me that he puts no stock in theory if it does not have a so-called practical use. He shares the usual Bavarian ideas in other ways as well: that Bavarians have an excellent [basic] nature, and that it would not be easy to find elsewhere peasants with such native wit, and so on. This is the sort of reply one hears when the scientific standing, culture, and knowledge expected of every educated man come up for discussion, and when the lack of it in Bavaria is remarked. I told him on one occasion that Bavaria has been a real blot on the luminous painting that is Germany. He thought this was nothing but a self-conceit of Saxons or Protestants who do not want to hear of [Andreas] Lamey, the founders of the Academy, and so on. There were, he

maintained, excellent monographs in the annals of the Academy, and so on. I replied that everything noteworthy appearing in France, England, Italy, etc., is known and put to use in Saxony or among Protestants, but that of Bavaria nothing further has ever been heard. These are not isolated judgments of only this man, but general, popular persuasions. Such persuasions can only be counteracted by continuous public efforts, and only insofar as efforts of the spoken word are pursued in tandem with governmental action. Large salaries and fringe benefits merely awaken envy, for they evidence what may well be external regard for the government, but do not prove that this regard is deserved; inner respect they have no power to command.

You see that in wishing to give you news I have fallen into thoughts. To return from thoughts back to news, rumor has it that Vice-President [of the Bamberg Appellate Court Christoph] von Seckendorf will marry Klärchen Steinlein. Mariane [Steinlein] has long been formally betrothed. . . . I have read in French newspapers, moreover, that the fusion of the Catholic and Protestant schools in Augsburg, despite initial prejudices against it, has enjoyed the greatest success.⁴ As someone has probably written to you, sinister news is said to have been gathered here of how the public schools are faring. You know who is involved.

So that the good order which seems lacking in this letter may at last be retrieved, I shall end it. Thus at least it will have a beginning, a middle, and an end. And the contents of the end shall be what is most precious to me: best wishes for your good health and for preservation of your sentiments of friendship toward me. Greetings a thousand times over to the best of women and to dear Julius. Yours, Hegel

NAPOLEONIC INSTITUTIONS IN GERMANY

On February 11 Hegel thanked Niethammer for the inaugural address by Friedrich Köppen, the Jacobian realist, which he had requested on December 23 [111]. But the major interest of the letter is its continuing commentary on the introduction of revolutionary French institutions in Germany, in this case the Napoleonic Code. Enactment in France of the *Code civil* of 1804 had been followed by the *Code de procédure civile* on January 1, 1807, and the *Code de commerce* on January 1, 1808. The victory of 1806 at Jena and the Treaty of Tilsit in 1807 had deprived Prussia of all territories west of the Elbe, most of which were reconstituted as the constitutional monarchy of Westphalia. French institutions were introduced more systematically and completely in Westphalia, which was ruled directly by Napoleon's brother Jerome, than in states like Bavaria belonging to the Confederation of the Rhine, which were still governed by German princes. The depth of Hegel's

⁴The "fusion of Catholic and Protestant schools" to which Hegel refers was an euphemism for the secularization opposed by representatives of the numerically predominant Catholic population. In December 1807 secondary schools in Augsburg were secularized on an experimental basis by being reorganized by curriculum rather than religious denomination. In the place of Catholic and Protestant schools, the new system—generalized under Niethammer's leadership throughout Bavaria from December 1808—introduced classical (humanistic) and modern gymnasiums similar to the *lycées* instituted in France from 1802. (*Briefe* I, 479)

Bonapartism is seen in his February 11 proposal of Westphalia as a model for Bavarian reform. The personal "political orientation" which he clearly reveals to Niethammer in this letter took the more disguised form of an unattributed report of "imminent" reforms in an article published three days earlier in his *Bamberger Zeitung*: "in several states of the Confederation of the Rhine, introduction of the Napoleonic Code and the constitutional forms that have served as the basis for organization of the Kingdom of Westphalia are being spoken of as imminent" (*Briefe* I, 481). Although the Napoleonic Code was at the time of its enactment conservative and even reactionary relative to the France of the early years of the Revolution, in Germany it was unambiguously revolutionary. In the relatively unindustrialized feudal conditions of Germany, the Code's repression of organized labor and promotion of the rights of employers over those of employees were less important than its denial of traditional rights to landed aristocrats. Feudal landowners, such as a certain von Welden whom Hegel reports teasing on February 11, had reason to be concerned. Yet the legal emancipation of the peasantry did not have as great an impact in Germany because it was not accompanied, as in France, by a redistribution of lands to the peasants.

Hegel to Niethammer [117]

Bamberg, February 11, 1808

I see, my dear friend and administrator, that you punctually answered my letter mainly to point out to me, with so much the greater justification, my negligence with respect to the philosophical gift you kindly sent me. . . .

To speak first of that dear little book, what is most real to me in this "realism" is that I thank you for the gift. I suppose I forgot to do so because of the rest regarding this realism—which is due to Mr. Köppen [its author]. I further suppose, remembering my psychology, that I have so converted it by digestion into the body's own blood and juices [*succum et sanguinem*] and made myself one with it that I could no longer distinguish it from myself and thus was at once incapable of recalling it. For of oneself, of one's pure ego, one has no recollection.

But you write of still another book, the Napoleonic Code. This Code is admittedly the sort of invitational writing that brings with it an offer that cannot be refused. According to what you say, people do not seem to have expected the invitation. But this is quite comprehensible in view of the incomprehensibility of many things and persons. Half a year ago I teased a Mr. von Welden, who as a landowner was especially frightened by the introduction of the Napoleonic Code. I told him that the German Princes could not possibly be so discourteous as not to pay the French Emperor the compliment of adopting and welcoming a work upon which he himself has labored and with which he is personally identified—especially since there had been so much advance publicity and announcement of its coming. But the Germans are still blind, just as they were twenty years ago. The merit or grace that one could attribute to oneself then has quite fallen by the wayside now. But the importance of the Code still cannot be compared to the importance of the hope which we might draw from it, namely that further parts of the French or Westphalian constitution might also be introduced. This will hardly

happen voluntarily or out of our own insight—for where is this insight to be found? It is only from heaven, i.e., from the will of the French Emperor, that matters can be set in motion, and that the characteristic *modes of centralization* and organization prevalent up to now will disappear—forms in which there is no justice, no guarantee, no popular participation [*Popularität*], but only the arbitrariness and sophistry of a single individual. I do not know whether you will want to pay particular attention to this point in your reply. But I beseech you to take my hopeful inquiry as to whether we are to undertake further imitations [of the French] as a small point upon which my entire political posture depends. A well-informed source has already given to understand something of this sort in my newspaper.

You write that talk of [the University of] Erlangen is now getting more serious. May God grant fulfillment of our common wishes in the matter. I depend on you. I must confess that if this last prospect, so to speak, were to disappear I would not know what to do next. In my present state here it is not in me to produce anything. For two weeks I have been advised to keep to my room because of a catarrhal fever. Yet I am no worse off than if I were in health. But in a few days I hope to be as fit as is possible for me here. . . . Yours, Hegel

BY MARCH 28 Hegel had read the pedagogical treatise by Niethammer on humanism and philanthropism, developing themes to which Hegel responded in August 1807 [103]. The book was published by Hegel's friend Karl Friedrich Frommann in Jena. But on March 28 Hegel put Niethammer's pedagogical writings and reform plans in the context of newly decreed legislation reorganizing the entire educational system of the French Empire. A law of May 1806 embraced all education—including primary and secondary as well as postsecondary levels—under the "Imperial University." All levels were subjected to at least nominal supervision by the state. Hegel now for the first time expresses a reservation about the Napoleonic influence in Germany. The "higher authorities" whose good graces Hegel as a newspaper editor is concerned to keep are presumably the French. When Hegel says that he finds these authorities intolerant of "scientific activity" and then questions the need to push imitation of the French to the point of integration into the Imperial University, we detect distaste for the political regimentation of the new French educational system. The decree giving details of this new system had been issued in Paris just ten days before, on March 18, 1808. French intolerance for what Hegel calls "scientific activity," e.g., speculative philosophy, is traceable to Napoleon's distaste for "ideologues." Napoleon never understood the need for philosophy. France, which had a revolution without a reformation, was in Hegel's view second to Protestant Germany in its universities. Germany's genius for speculative philosophy was alone capable to comprehending and completing France's revolution (*Werke* XI, 564). Hegel preferred to see imitation of the French restricted to the economic and political spheres; on the level of absolute spirit France ought rather go to school to Germany.

I have just received the enclosed [notice] from Frommann concerning a work you are about to publish, my dear friend. I thus learn for the first time of this interesting news. I find in this work of yours, moreover, an explanation and even reassurance regarding your long silence. Finally, however, I wanted to communicate this notice to you in advance, which admittedly is quite undistinguished as far as publishers' announcements go. Frommann left it up to me to make alterations in it, from which I conclude that you have not seen it and moreover perhaps have no idea that such an announcement is already appearing in the public press—and thus of course in the Bavarian press, too. I await your decision as to the How and Whether.

As for the matter itself, this publication pleases me very much inasmuch as I may regard it as public justification of your plan—issued simultaneously, I hope, with its introduction in the lyceums and gymnasiums. But quite apart from this hope of immediate impact, we will gain something instructive and stimulating. Of stimulation in particular we surely have most urgent need. . . .

My journalistic life is vegetating rather quietly without further vexations. The tempers which a decree or ordinance from Munich yesterday tended to arouse have been somewhat calmed down again by Mr. von Bayard, whose kindness makes the otherwise often difficult relationship of a newspaper to higher authorities altogether easy and smooth. If only a newspaper were as favorably disposed to the pursuit of science, but I find it tolerates science rather poorly.

Apropos, does not the organization of the new French Imperial University interfere with your plan? Is imitation to go so far? Mr. von Bayard, who is politically very astute, is convinced we are in for more than the Napoleonic Code.

Have you enjoyed welcoming our fine friend [the anti-Schellingian physician Konrad] Kilian, who is again threatening Bamberg? But please allow me still a couple of questions on items of news. How are [Johann Wilhelm] Ritter and his [Francesco] Campetti doing vis-à-vis the Academy? Is something coming of it, or is the Academy weary of the whole thing? The Commission should at least be dissolved. Is it to be feared that Ritter and Schelling have compromised themselves and, by implication, the Academy as well? But what generally is Schelling doing with himself? Is he working privately as energetically as before?

I received from that best of women the nicest testimony of friendship on March 9. . . . Your friend, Hegel

ON BAVARIAN CULTURE

Hegel's long letter of April 21 to Niethammer is devoted first to Niethammer's 1808 book *On Pasigraphy and Ideography*. Hoffmeister surmises that the small book was among the gifts Hegel acknowledges receiving from Niethammer in November 1807 [108]. The text, which concerns the notion of a universal language available to all peoples, in which primitive signs would refer to ideas rather than sounds, was written in letter form. Hegel would later himself criticize the basis of

pasigraphic language in criticizing the alleged deficiencies of the Chinese language as a vehicle of creative thought (*Werke* X, 347-52). Yet he praises Niethammer's expository style and ability to round off a subject matter without endless tangents. Hegel—all too aware that everything in the Absolute in fact has such tangents—confesses an inability to resist them. Such comment is an implicit criticism of his own procedure in the *Phenomenology* [95].

The remainder of the April 21 letter is a reaction to Lorenz Westenrieder's History of the Bavarian Academy of Sciences. The work was commissioned by the Academy itself. Hegel's comment concerns Part Two, covering the period 1784-1807. The crux of the matter is again [see 111] Bavarian wounded pride in the face of the literary preeminence of the Protestant North.

Hegel to Niethammer [120a]

Bamberg, April 21, 1808

How far behind I am this time in my correspondence with you, my dear friend. I owe you a reply to three letters, for notes can be regarded as letters. They leave the question unanswered, indeed entirely unposed, as to whether three notes perhaps constitute but a single letter—all the more so seeing that letters in the form of notes are bolstered with such substantial books in the form of letters [i.e., with Niethammer's book on pasigraphy].

To begin with the latter, for the time being please accept at least my preliminary brief words of thanks. I have looked through your book of letters. But the letters are still too fresh for me to speak to their author of more than their clarity of presentation, and of their firm penetrating course coming straight from the heart—which grabs the opponent by the collar, follows hot on his heels, and calmly sticks to the point without losing itself in the pursuit of illusory goals or succumbing to the death of a thousand qualifications. But you give us still another gift, for in your lively and good-natured manner you distinguish the precise concepts at issue. Through this precise discrimination you rescue the matter from the confusion in which it delights to be shrouded, and by virtue of such clarity you attain insight and mastery. I am perhaps not mistaken in regarding the contents as closely related to the nature of elementary instruction, and in believing that in the treatment of the content some of the basic principles of such instruction are in fact likewise being treated. Yet, as I said, I dare not say anything further about it, since I know that I have not sufficiently familiarized myself with the content. I merely add that however ingenuous your appearance before the public is, and however much more ingenuous to me you in a sense are when you cite [former Tübingen seminarian Christian Friedrich] Klett [in the dedication] and—may God be with us!—the cloister, we on the other hand—the Bavarians and I—are not so naïve: we look for something further hidden beneath the surface, and we regard Klett and pasigraphy as but a cover. Instead—and here I can no longer speak collectively—these others take what lies hidden to be something merely intended, while I take it to be something that is *also* expressed.

There is a peculiar talent—which is especially striking to me because I find it lacking in myself and which I much appreciate particularly in the French—which

consists in treating a determinate object in an appropriate compass so as to exhaust it, but without rambling digressions that leave the object behind, even if everything is connected with everything else. It is precisely here, however, that a great difficulty lies: that of developing or expanding upon an object in a manner that does not sever all connection with it and yet—despite this restriction to which the development is subject but which is purely relative—that overcomes all obscurity, i.e., insufficiency in the grounding, even though the grounding can never be absolutely complete, since it would then have to exhaust all science. What I have in mind is the talent for *finishing* with something, so that it is at once encompassed. It is this exhaustion of a content, this state of properly having done with something, that has pleased me so very much at first glance in this small book.

I congratulate you on attaining the honor of membership in the Academy. I would at once congratulate Bavaria, and not be surprised in the least by this honor of yours, if had I not learned only now from your present colleague Westenrieder's history of the Munich Academy what an abundance of science, scholarship, and taste has long been so greatly at home here among, as it were, the *earthborn* [in Greek], so that they could very well dispense with foreigners—*barbaros* in Greek, *hostes* in Latin. Please give President Jacobi my most appreciative thanks for the insight I have gained through his kind and friendly gift. And please add, if I may ask it of you, that coming from his hand the gift takes on a supremely precious and even touching quality for me. You might also tell him that his cheerful willingness to indulge my fondness for Barbarian [*Babarischen* as compared to Bavarian, *Bavarischen*] patriotism—a willingness which according to your letter it has pleased Mr. Jacobi to express in this way—has been brought to the most perfect fruition.

I read this history with pleasure, and learned from it that I was mistaken if I perchance believed that Salat, for example, was noteworthy for his comic zeal and wrath on behalf of the Good and the Fatherland. I see he shares this trait with others and that this comic appearance is perhaps a Bavarian *gout du terrior*. I cannot help remarking here a few points that have especially struck me, in part because they perhaps have not even noticed this ballast. I begin with a journalistic [*publizistischen*] remark which comes to mind because it would not pass censorship here even if it should perhaps pass in Munich. Mr. Westenrieder is used to simply saying "Bavaria" when he means only one province. Just as we still say that the art of printing was invented in Germany although Strassburg and Mainz now belong to France, so today Bavaria requires justification for the antiquity of its literature and art far less than before now that Augsburg, Nuremberg, Ansbach, Ulm, Memmingen, and so on belong to it. Out of modesty I do not even mention us here in Bamberg. It is not without significance that, when they say "Bavaria," these *earthborn* [in Greek] Bavarians still chiefly mean themselves, and still regard themselves as the ruling people—much like what for a long time was true and perhaps still is true today of the French in the *départements* of the Rhine. The logic of this justification of Bavaria often in fact sounds as if its validity derived solely from the fact that we earthborn creatures [in Greek] have made it up. Note at once who the real power behind the proofs is. When in 1750—Mr. Westenrieder may

be better at Bavarian history than he is at the history of what is admittedly North German literature—or a few years before, say in 1748 and 1749, the love of the German language and humanistic literature at last awakened in North Germany, Bavaria did not lag behind *either*, but was seized by a similar love, as is shown by the astonishingly lively sale of North German publications in Southern lands. If the luxuriant, warm-weather vegetation of the Mollucas is praised and Germany's vegetation is labeled cold and poor by contrast, we might reply that a large quantity of pepper, cloves, nutmeg, etc. is sold by the Mollucas to Germany, and that our plant world is therefore not inferior to that of Mollucas. One might as well argue that medieval literature was as excellent as any literature has ever been, since copies of Homer, Sophocles, Plato, etc. existed then as well. Equally astute is the naïveté of *first* proving by quotation of a sullen passage from a journal article by Wieland [*Der Deutsche Merkur*, March 1779] that already by the year 1770 the good literature of North Germany had completely perished—the year in which [Lessing's] *Nathan the Wise* appeared, and in which in other respects, too, an excitement prevailed in North Germany that was soon to yield splendid fruit; and of *then* going on to boast that literature in Bavaria had on the contrary been preserved in the most excellent state because—and this is indeed a rank “because”—at that time Mr. Westenrieder's own Bavarian contributions both to *utilitarian* literature and to *belles lettres* had more than 700 subscribers, and furthermore because a translation of the *Iliad* by [Friedrich] Stolberg announced in Amberg—no doubt a reprint—had 700 subscribers. As for the first-mentioned contributions of utilitarian literature and *belles lettres*, since I do not know them I have no judgment [*Urteil*] about them, only a prejudice [*Vorurteil*]. Especially if it is the Count [Kaspar] von Larosée, now in the local asylum, who was the former director of the fine arts section of the Academy. In the second place, I do not doubt that if Mr. Westenrieder discovered a chronicle of how some Jews fled with stolen jewels to Bavaria, where they managed to dispose of them, he would cite it in his history of Bavaria as proof of how mineralogy flourishes and is fondly cultivated in the land. It was no less surprising to me to find it frankly admitted by Mr. Westenrieder that these monuments to the Bohemians [*monumentis boicis*]¹—which I have seen praised, cited, and adduced by Bavarian academicians and nonacademicians alike as the clinching argument for the immortal merit of the Academy—have been shown by *a*, a North German and *b*, a Protestant scholar, Dr. [Johann Salomo] Semler in Halle, to be very deficient and untrustworthy. Mr. Westenrieder is grateful to Semler for this, and is grateful, too, that someone else had, it seems, fared no better with his history of Bavaria. You see his disinterestedness in this. Mr. Westenrieder sacrifices himself, his standing as a historian, and perhaps even each and every tree, as long as he can keep the forest—Bavaria. You yourself will have noticed the sound rebuke addressed to the Protestant theology professors, who are paid not to overshoot the mark [by departing from orthodoxy] but do it anyway. It is a lesson I have also brought home to Paulus. *Any fool*, says Mr. Westenrieder, can disparage a country. I see that not just any clever man can defend it. I also believe there is another way of writing the history of an academy than that in which this history of the Munich Academy is written. But perhaps this history is worthy

of such a historian—in which case only the practical application, which would highlight and express the concordance, is lacking.

I believe I have now given you proof enough of my pleasure in this gift, of my interest in Bavarian art and science, and of my endeavor to Bavarianize myself.

Since my note is beginning to become a letter, I will only mention further the fine hope you raised in us of perhaps soon seeing the best of women here, and I may be allowed to hope also that you will at least take a side trip here, either to accompany her or to pick her up.

The notice on your *Contest* has been taken care of. Much has already been gained if the church persecuted [*ecclesia pressa*] is raised to the level of the church militant [*ecclesia militans*]. Its further elevation to the church triumphant will not take long. For the battle, I think, consists merely in assuring these thick-skinned schemers, and in convincing them, by the very firmness of this assurance, that they really do not exist and in fact have never existed. It cannot be so hard to elicit this conviction in them, since their entire activity consists merely in yelling: “My donkey and I are also there!” The yelling no doubt elicits a faith in the donkey, but it stems from anxiety over the existence of the “I.” For, as is generally known, if we are not objective we are not subjective either, and he who is not seen is invisible.

Farewell, and keep up your friendship for me. And since you have already reduced me to a daily allowance of written notes, please let me at least beg for their delivery. Yours, Hegel

WARTIME PRESS CENSORSHIP

In summer 1808 Niethammer began to implement his secondary school reforms in Munich [see 122]. Hegel's letter of August 20 to Niethammer followed a visit by Niethammer to Bamberg. By August 20, however, the precariousness of the Napoleonic edifice within which Hegel as well as Niethammer worked became clear. Imperial armies had just suffered their first defeats in Spain. This emboldened the Austrians to challenge Napoleon again in central Europe. It is to these events in Spain and to the threat of a new front in central Europe that Hegel refers on August 20 as “this wretched war.” Hegel also refers to Napoleon's mobilization of Bavarian troops in defense of the Empire. Bavarian Germans were sent to Spain, while French troops took up positions against Austrian Germans. Through a tenuous alliance reached with Russia's Alexander I in September and October at Erfurt, Napoleon was able to hold off the Austrians long enough to reestablish his position in Spain in November and December.

Hegel to Niethammer [126]

Bamberg, August 20, 1808

I have learned, my dear friend, of your—and more especially your wife's—safe arrival in Munich from Fuchs. If the happy memories of our reunion could write themselves down on paper all by themselves, as on pianos which record all by themselves fantasies played upon them, I would have to send you a large batch

of documents, a diary repeating and continuing in thought the pleasant, comforting and stimulating company which I enjoyed those few days with you. The more pleasant these hours of friendship have been to me, however, the more I feel what a meager substitute letter writing is. And so it has been all the harder for me to get to it. I am still living off the rich capital accumulated in those hours. But the present gradually regains its rights, and the pleasure which lies in their recollection is transformed into a longing for their renewal. Because it is no longer any help to go up Stephansberg, to Bamberger Hof, or even to ride to Nuremberg, I have of course finally been obliged to resort to pen and ink as my materials—a surrogate for your personal presence that is as good as yellow carrots in the place of mocha coffee.

You have, I hear, met with much business in Munich. I hope the main business, the final and formal approval of your curriculum, has by now been settled. It is also my wish that you be spared what usually happens to a plan made as a whole in one piece, namely that it is ruined by removals and additions, and is thus changed into a motley aggregate almost less desirable than a plan based on the opposite principle that is at least coherent. I have no doubt at all, however, that you have been victorious in this battle, too, and have won for yourself the crown of a triumphant humanism.

You may well imagine how pervasive are the eagerness and impatience for organization and misorganization [*Verorganisierung*] here. I can report to you that nominations [for district general commissioners] were made in Munich on the 18th. But what you may be able to tell us of it could easily be more satisfying than this report I am able to give you. My candidacy, for sure, will not be on top. However, as is only human, I would consider it one of the most important. If only this wretched war would not obstruct what is best—namely, the arts and sciences; or at least not obstruct their financial support. The prospects are getting dimmer. On Wednesday our troops here are moving out. On Thursday a French division 10,000 strong in four groups is going to be marched in and “stationed” in the province of Bamberg—to use the official term. The French camp near Berlin has been broken, and Marshal Victor [Claude Perrin] is going to Dresden. Once Napoleon puts his troops on the march, he does not mean to have done so in vain. But it seems these prospects of war may perhaps become a motive for accelerating introduction of the new organization. I am looking forward to my deliverance from the yoke of journalism, which has become even more oppressive for me through observing your own activity with a longing matched only by my confidence.

Paulus went to Schweinfurt yesterday to put to work as much as is still possible of this year’s [i.e., six week’s] 650 florins. Fuchs’s child is dangerously ill.

In asking you to remember me to the Central Councillor’s wife I mean to express my heartfelt joy in the feeling that I have no better lady friend than she, nor a better friend than you. Your sincere friend, Hegel

P.S. Upon further reflection I must now make amends by asking you to present respectively to President Jacobi, as to Schelling and Breyer, my highest regards and most amicable compliments. Mr [Franz Wilhelm] von Asbeck will visit you in Munich in a few weeks. He has been so extraordinarily kind as to pay

me another visit just now. See to it that he becomes General Commissioner in Nuremberg.

Second P.S. Monday. I have just now inquired after the health of Fuchs’s child. This morning the child feels better. This forenoon a courier has arrived announcing another 25,000 men in addition to the 10,000 announced Thursday. Tomorrow 4,000 will arrive. They are going to be transported on 1,200 wagons; the day after tomorrow 6,000! We hope they will be on time, before the Austrians are in Munich like last time.

HEGEL DID NOT RESTRICT such reports of troop movements to his private correspondence. Despite his Bonapartist politics, he ran afoul of the authorities for being too free with these reports in the *Bamberger Zeitung*. In the paper’s July 19 issue he reported the encampment of three Bavarian divisions at Plattling, Augsburg, and Nuremberg respectively. On September 14, when Hegel wrote to Niethammer about the “inquisitorial” investigation that followed, the political and military situation was still tense. Spain was yet to be pacified, and the Austrian menace not yet checked. Hegel was threatened with the suspension of the newspaper. The “journalistic yoke” of August 20 [126] became the journalistic “galley” of September 15. The “arbitrariness” from which Hegel expected Napoleon to free Bavaria on February 11 [117] remained as the “hazard and caprice” of September 15. He was playing a game of uncertain rules, and, by his letter of October 1 [129] to Niethammer, was all the more determined to get out.

Hegel to Niethammer [127]

Bamberg, September 15, 1808

I surely ought to have replied earlier to the letter which I received already a few weeks ago from you, my dear friend. I see with a certain horror as I pick it up that it is dated August 22. . . . Yet we here are generally on the receiving end in relation to you, the Giver. Here, hope and worry have of course meanwhile alternated. To use an expression taken from official use, however, hope has maintained itself *all the more*, inasmuch as I see that nothing decisive has yet happened with respect to school and curricular organization either. As long as you do not write that the plan has collapsed I assume that it is still in navigable waters, even if here and there a shoal or sandbank may lurk in the vicinity. For you are at the helm. Take my skipper into your favor, oh ye Stars, so that he may guide my little boat safely to port. Yet my own concern is really only a small boat in the wake of the flagship. Of this ship—i.e., your comprehensive plan—you have still given no report. We do not doubt that it has been adopted since your return home.

I am all the more anxious to break away from my journalistic galley, because a short time ago I was subjected to another inquisition, which reminded me more precisely of my general situation. This newspaper provides a considerable part of the income of one family; my subsistence depends entirely on it, as also that of two married workers and a few other people. All that is put in jeopardy by a single article which is found offensive. I am the one who may have accepted the article, and yet what is apt to give offense is more uncertain than ever. A journalist gropes around in the dark. Like last time, there is no mention of censorship. The Ministry

merely eyes the paper and bans it. That the welfare and subsistence of several families depend on it lies further from their mind than would be the case with any factory or other trade. And when one takes the trouble to bring this side of the matter to their attention—which would not be necessary with a commercial enterprise—the success of the appeal depends on chance. Even if the appeal is successful, the suspension of a newspaper has done more harm than that of a commercial enterprise. In the latter case, the customers are supplied with items only one at a time during the suspension, and upon the resumption of the enterprise they can return to their regular tradesman. But anyone who supplies himself with another paper during a newspaper's suspension has made an arrangement for three months or even half a year, just as the present newspaper currently draws advantage from the suspension of the Bayreuth-Erlangen paper, so that in view of the particular interest of the present moment my paper would be endangered doubly, even sixfold, should misfortune strike just now.

I am writing you about this latest business of mine in case you should be able to learn whether the affair is apt to have further consequences following upon the report sent to Munich from here. In an article on the three Bavarian camps, which—note well—appeared in my newspaper only after the essentials had already appeared in other Bavarian newspapers, I made use of a fragment torn from a copy of the Royal Decree in which only a part of the Decree was contained, thus modifying the pertinent passage of the article. The foreman of my print shop, who presented the fragment to me, told me, and repeated under oath during the inquiry, that he had found it. Munich, in particular the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, then demanded upon the threat of suspending the newspaper's license that the editorial office reveal from whom in the military it had been able to procure the Decree containing the words produced *verbatim* in the published article. I could only identify the person who brought me the fragment after the original article had been composed. I of course hope the Ministry in Munich will not pursue the matter further, since witnesses have already provided formal statements on everything. But should this not be the case, or should the suspension of the newspaper even follow if the Ministry is not satisfied, I would be most embarrassed. And since a rapid solution would be necessary in such a case, I would not know what to do but go to Munich and plead for clemency in person. Whether matters will go to an extreme or only result in further general inquiry I cannot know or even guess with confidence, since in such nebulous matters accident or the mood [of an official] is often decisive. If you could do something or learn something and advise me, you can see from the nature of the case how much I would be obliged to you. My hope is that you will simply be able to reassure me that higher-level politics, which are becoming more tense daily, will leave these gentlemen no time to pursue such an affair at length.

Since I have gone on at excessive length about this headache of mine, I can only briefly mention still other matters. In your letter you said the best of women is convalescing. This *present* tense will by now long have become *past*, and the best of women will by now surely have been reestablished in her true presence.

Paulus has recently been on the road for school and curriculum inspections. I

am sure the trip showed what an impact a good example can have. He has had occasion to visit Nuremberg with his wife and is impatiently awaiting something in the offing there. [Johann Baptist] Graser recounts *sub rosa* that he will be remaining here. There is a real earthquake going on here. No one stands fast in his present position. Anyone who has not just been appointed is about to leave, wants to leave, or fears having to.

So what is Julius doing with himself? Are you going to send him to the University with me? Who is the philology professor of whom you are thinking *in petto* as my colleague?

Whoever it is, make it a condition that he should believe that small things can be the equal of large ones, and that your so-to-speak mini-university must aim at bringing already established universities to shame simply because it is *your* university and must view itself as such.

Farewell, and write but soon! Soon, I say, even if only a few words. Yours, Hegel

Hegel to Niethammer [129]

Bamberg, October 1, 1808

Today is the first day of the new budget year, and still no word, not even a syllable from you, my dear friend! For me it is the first day of a new newspaper quarter—another quarter year in a situation of indignity I have now been made to feel from a new angle due to the sordid affair about which I recently wrote you in detail. The affair has gone back and forth between Munich and here, returning here once again today or yesterday.

In the meantime [Karl] Roth in Nuremberg has been employed otherwise than you intended. Thus your plan for [the University of] Altorf is thwarted as you had envisioned it. As for my prospects, they become an individual matter and so all the more difficult. Tell me in but one line if there is still hope [*spes*], or if I have to renounce such hope and, with it, Bavaria. If you believe yourself unable to do something immediately for me regarding a university, do not let the reorganization of the gymnasiums or lyceums pass by in the uncertain hope of achieving something better for me later. The future is uncertain, and will be even more so should you leave the educational system to go over to the church. And for me a half year or more is lost again. For every minute of my existence as a newspaperman is lost—wasted time for which God and you will have to render account and make compensation.

Be herewith implored to pour a drop of oil or water into this damnation, at least for the time being. Better still, pour rather the whole pot over my head as soon as possible. Farewell. Yours, Hegel

AT THE END of October Niethammer answered Hegel's plea by appointing him Professor of Preparatory Philosophical Sciences and Rector of the reorganized classical gymnasium in Nuremberg [133]. But difficulties with the authorities over the *Bamberger Zeitung* continued:

Bamberg, November 9, 1808

Declaration by Newspaper Editor Professor Hegel concerning the article in No. 300 of the *Bamberger Zeitung*

To justify himself in accordance with the most gracious order issued the 7th of this month by presenting the official source of the article from Erfurt in No. 300 of the *Bamberg News* published on October 26, the undersigned Editor of the Bamberg paper is most humbly obliged to indicate that this article was taken *verbatim* in part from the *General German State Gazette* [*Allgemeinen Deutschen Staatsboten*], No. 42, October 19, appearing in *Erfurt*, and in part from *The National Gazette of the Germans* [*Nationalzeitung der Deutschen*], published in Gotha. The first source is most humbly enclosed. The second, which according to the issues still in hand must have been No. 42 of October 20, cannot be furnished at this time because already on October 26 it was handed over to the Royal Postmaster in Baligand, who forwarded it on to the higher authorities—as is clear from the enclosed attestation by the Postmaster. Moreover, no further copy of this paper comes here through the Royal Post Office so as to allow me to submit the issue in question. Since the Erfurt paper appears in a state under the Government of his Imperial French Majesty, since the Gotha paper appears in a state belonging to the Confederation of the Rhine, and since both are published under public censorship, the undersigned has had no scruples about using them for articles which are explicitly presented solely as *rumors*.

Soon, however, the Editor learned to his dismay that, through just such a rumor contained in the article in question, misinterpretations had arisen which he was at once most emphatically eager to remove. Therefore, upon similar rumors from Erfurt, afterwards also proven false, contained in the *Publiciste Parisien* of October 18, the Editor announced in the next issue of the *Bamberg News*—No. 31, October 27—the following: “Time will tell whether these reports are any better founded than the various legends circulating in Germany, such as those indicated yesterday in this paper as taken from a public German paper: e.g., that Erfurt will remain a free city, that a change in the present organization of the postal service is to take place, etc.—which legends are to be counted as *entirely empty rumors supported by no authority*.” It was hoped that this declaration would serve to cut off misinterpretations and to indicate to the public the true worth of such rumors.

Trusting that I have most respectfully presented in the above-stated mitigating circumstances the justification ordered by the Royal General Commissioner, and striving in all cases to avoid most carefully the displeasure of the higher authorities and fulfill punctually all orders received in editing the paper, I persevere with the deepest of respect as the General Royal Commission’s most humble servant, Georg Friedrich Wilhelm Hegel.

Hegel’s Nuremberg Rectorship:
The Universal Class vs. the People

IN NUREMBERG Hegel returned to the public sector to work for eight years on behalf of the neohumanist movement in secondary education. This chapter begins by documenting his transfer from journalism in Bamberg to a gymnasium rectorship in Nuremberg, while a second, smaller group of letters—written much later—contains recollections of Nuremberg as a city. The next group goes to the heart of the chapter: Friedrich Immanuel Niethammer’s implementation of a neohumanist reform plan for the Bavarian schools. One obstacle Niethammer faced was the distraction of war brought on by Bavaria’s alliance with Napoleon. Yet both Niethammer and Hegel were Bonapartists; Hegel dismissed a popular revolt in Nuremberg against Napoleon as the work of the rabble. A second obstacle was the opposition of the Old Bavarian Catholics to Protestants like Niethammer and Hegel. A third threat to neohumanist classicism was the growing popularity of utilitarian, vocationally oriented education. In all three cases Hegel sided with “reason” against widespread popular sentiment, i.e., with the universal civil servant class against untutored democracy.

HEGEL’S APPOINTMENT TO NUREMBERG

Niethammer asked Hegel if he would be interested in a gymnasium rectorship on May 8, 1808 [121]. Aware that Hegel was then working on his *Logic*, Niethammer at once inquired as to whether Hegel’s research might provide Bavarian secondary schools with an officially adoptable text in the subject. When Hegel responded on May 20, Niethammer’s wife had just passed through Bamberg and visited Hegel. She was en route to Jena to expedite the printing of her husband’s book on *philanthropinistic* versus *humanistic* theories of education. Fresh from Munich, she found herself at the center of attention, making Hegel sense more acutely his provincial isolation. The issue of the day was the recent nationalization and centralization in the Bavarian capital of private charitable foundations, i.e., the emerging welfare state of which Hegel would become the philosophical advocate (*Phil of Law* ¶1230).

Responding to Niethammer’s first question, Hegel was curious about the eventual conditions of a rectorship. The rector of the experimental school in which he showed interest—Daniel Eberhard Beyschlag, whose teaching load Hegel envied—taught four hours of preparatory philosophical instruction a week, plus

Hebrew. Though preferring a rectorship in Munich, Hegel was even more attracted by a professorship in Erlangen—to which Bavarian authorities might eventually be happy to banish him. Yet Erlangen—under French military government since 1807—would not return to Bavarian hands until 1810.

Responding to Niethammer's second question, Hegel explains that the unconventional *Logic* he was writing disqualified it as a text for secondary schools. Aristotelian syllogistic logic had fallen into general disrepute as being "fruitless." Deductive logic was viewed as an academic exercise of repeating in new ways what one already knows. Since Peter Ramus, in the sixteenth century, philosophers had been seeking a "logic of discovery" which, unlike scholastic logic, would permit real extensions of knowledge. Hegel's dialectical logic, exploiting the resources of Zeno's method of indirect proof, was to become just such a logic of discovery. More precisely, it was to be a logic of error correction, and yet at the same time was to remain deductive. The ambition was thus to transcend and at once preserve the classical logic of the schools.

A second way in which Hegel's *Logic* innovated was in its fusion of logic and ontology. In Jena Hegel had lectured on "metaphysics and logic," a standard part of the curriculum in German universities. Possibly this accident of nomenclature was not without influence on Hegel's advocacy of metaphysics as logic and logic as metaphysics in the *Logic*. But his *Logic* would not be published until 1812-1816, and in 1808 he was not yet fully clear about the "transition" between the "negative element" in the old logic and the "positive element" of the new. Yet the promise to write a synoptic textbook version once he had finished the voyage of discovery recorded in the *Logic* has never been fulfilled by anyone in the Hegelian tradition. Hegel never reduced his logic to the "child's play" [101] he himself deemed necessary to write a text on the "elements" of a subject.

The suggestion that he become the established philosopher-logician of Bavaria was especially tempting as an opportunity to reestablish philosophy. The philosophy of faith championed by Jacobi and his epigones Kajetan von Weiller, Friedrich Köppen, and Jakob Salat—the philosophy reflected in the ill-starred school reform of 1804—was non-philosophy, judging from what Hegel found in the course offerings at the Bavarian University at Landshut [122]. The exclusion of philosophy in favor of a skeptical treatment of its history, which Hegel notes in the 1804 secondary curriculum, harmonized with the sway held by Napoleonic France over Bavaria. Napoleon himself had suspended the philosophical section of the French Institute in 1803, although the empiricist philosophy which he knew and despised as "ideology" was equally despised by Hegel. The Emperor never learned of Hegel's concept of philosophy, and never issued to Hegel the call to Paris for which Alexandre Kojève surmised this lover of capitals [122] secretly longed (Kojève, 69-70). Napoleon wanted an uncomplicated philosophy which would support civic morality by supporting essential points of traditional religious faith: God, immortality, and free will; and in that respect he would surely have preferred the Jacobian current in Germany to Antoine de Tracy and the *idéologues*. Napoleon spoke approvingly of Pierre Royer-Collard's commonsensical defense of faith along lines reminiscent of Jacobi. Despite Hegel's Bonapartism, Napoleon would

not have approved of dissemination of Hegel's arduous and hence ambiguous philosophy from a Parisian lectern. And despite Hegel's appreciation of Napoleonic authoritarianism in curbing the impudence of a Karl Rottmanner [112], Hegel was less appreciative when the same authoritarianism was used against his own newspaper [127]. More generally, Hegel opposed the political control and use of philosophy implicit in Napoleon's Imperial University [166, 171]. Despite the *Atheismusstreit* of 1799, Hegel believed the German university afforded greater freedom for philosophy than the Napoleonic university. Kojève notwithstanding, Hegel was not an uncritical admirer of Napoleon.

Hegel to Niethammer [122]

Bamberg, May 20, 1808

It was, my dear friend, the abundance of material about which I must write to you that delayed my reply to your two so-called letters. The first communication, which to be sure is not really a letter but rather a word of amicable remembrance, has been most enhanced by the fine occasion [of seeing your wife again] that came along with it. I cannot possibly tell you how much it has pleased me—and, in fact, all your good friends here—to have the pleasure of such an occasion. The best of women has come to look much stronger, more full of life and more cheerful than when she left Bamberg. She is an excellent recommendation of the Munich climate. That she has also taken on something of the ministerial manner that reigns at the seat of government likewise became apparent from how the district governmental councillor and consistorial councillor both managed to corner her—for I could not break in—and lay before her, with complaints and recommendations, their headaches over the centralization in Munich of charitable foundation funds. To this petition of the provincial authorities she could only reply by handing out good counsel and consoling them with the hope of better times. When you yourself come, as the best of women has led us to hope you will, you will face the presentation of a report full of bitter complaints. Since I had no such official purpose with your wife, she merely whispered an amicable word into my ear. I think I heard mention of Munich, but your second letter then provided the necessary clarification.

You solicit as a friend my response to your kind intentions [in my regard]. My view is necessarily very simple even if my exposition of it should become more lengthy. Regardless of one's function in a state it is best to exercise it in the capital. Sojourn in a provincial city may always be considered a banishment, even if one has banished oneself. Only a university that succeeds in likewise making itself into a highest center of activity and interest can rival a capital and indeed make itself into one. Except for this general preference, however, I can have no more specific wish than—inasmuch as you are disposed to graft me onto some branch of your sphere of activity—that of drawing near to you and enjoying, beyond a friendly milieu, your own guidance, of which I have such great need given my inexperience in specific personal relationships, especially among strange and thus perhaps on occasion unfavorably inclined people whose mode of education and accepted concepts are perhaps unfamiliar to me. You write that you still see difficulties in

this plan. I must confess that I considered such difficulties to be so significant that your thought surprised me greatly. On the one hand, it inevitably pains me to have to leave the task of overcoming these difficulties completely to your friendship; but, on the other hand, I can console myself with thought that obstacles do not frighten you as they would me, and also that you would not force matters, for to do so would spoil things for you even more than for me. You know, by the way, that even when the creature is finished and standing on its own legs the creation [*creatio*] requires a conservation [*conservatio*] which is a continuous creation [*continuata creatio*].

Before speaking as it were of the subjective side I should perhaps first have spoken of the objective side of matters, of the official duties awaiting me. In fact, however, I believe at least this one condition to be necessary with me: since you talk of either Munich or a major provincial city, at least at the beginning of what to me will be a new position, in which I am put at the helm of a [teaching] institution, I would want someone standing by me like you or an immediately available high commissioner whose relation to me might be about the same, for example, Heinrich [Eberhard Gottlob] Paulus. For I would not have any idea how I would fare with a high commissioner like [Josef] Wismayr or [Johann] Graser, whom I would not understand and who would not understand me, assuming, of course, that he would even take up a matter [I might bring to him].

I have perhaps not been able to ascertain much of the more specific duties of the office from the Bavarian educational materials with which you have supplied me, since you promise us a new curriculum. If you allow occasional public talks to stand, these duties perhaps need not be exactly like those of Rector Beyschlag. Concerning instruction, the rector may have some choice as to the content of the curriculum, which, by the way, is already more satisfying at the Augsburg experimental school than in the other lyceums and gymnasiums. The supervisory responsibility and hierarchical authority that the rector shall have to exercise will likewise be specified by your new statutes. The rector's teaching load in Augsburg is not heavy; nor is it heavy in the case of the professors. I fear you will become harsher in this respect. Yet you indeed have enough personnel to employ, among whom the work is to be distributed. Given that the appointment would preferably be in Munich—was not a literary periodical to be established there?—and that you say you are not losing sight of Erlangen, I know of no situation which I would desire more and for which I would at once more wish to be in your debt. Since you mention Erlangen, the university [there] seems destined to remain on a foundation of quicksand. Is [Bavarian] occupation [of Erlangen] so greatly delayed? Might not this occupation coincide rather closely in time with the associated greater possibility, arising from the initial establishment, of imposing a solution for [the University of] Erlangen, and with the new organization and thus curriculum? Perhaps an opportunity would thus arise having the merit of getting me again out of Munich. In Bavaria a relocation is usually, in a manner both fine—indeed how fine people are!—and gracious, transformed into a promotion, so that the double advantage of getting me to Erlangen and out of Munich could be attached by way of justification to my transfer to Erlangen.

I would almost like to thank you even more by being able to consent in full to your second, equally friendly and honorable thought of charging me with working out a logic for Bavaria. But! I have to confess it would displease me most greatly to see this singular opportunity escape of making [my] philosophical views into the general doctrine [of the land] or putting them to the test. Nothing can be more desirable—among other things for economic reasons, as much with respect to the book itself as indirectly with respect to other writings—than in a single bound to raise one's philosophy thus into the ruling philosophy of the realm. However, even such a sovereign means does not help if the substance does not carry and support itself. Regardless of such means the philosophy of Weiller will never become the ruling philosophy. But I do not quite know how to get a handle on such a task. The main idea of a textbook to me seems to be that it contain what is generally acknowledged in the science in question. A textbook is first and foremost destined for use in gymnasiums. In textbooks at the university level, which are immediately only used by this or that professor, originality is more easily allowed.

But logic as it is generally recognized is a subject for which there are already enough texts, but which, at the same time, cannot possibly remain in its present state. Nobody knows anymore what to do with this old logic. One drags it around like some old heirloom only because a substitute, the need of which is generally felt, is not yet available. The kind of definitions that are still allowed to stand in the old logic could be written in two pages. What goes beyond two pages, some further detail, is considered totally useless scholastic sophistry. Or, alternatively, to allow this logic to become more corpulent it has been expanded by pitiful psychological considerations—e.g., [Gotthilf] Steinbart, [Johann] Kiesewetter, [Gottlob] Mehmel [Steinbart, *Everyday Guide for the Understanding in Methodically Thinking for Oneself*, 1780; Kiesewetter, *Logic for Schools*, 1797; Mehmel, *General Pure Logic*, 1797, being vol 4 of his *Attempt at a Compendious Exposition of All Philosophy*]. A new science cannot be taught in a textbook for gymnasiums. The teachers cannot be handed a book which is as unfamiliar to them as to the students and which, as a compendium, could not contain the developments necessary for complete insight. The intermediate solution of presenting the old logic along with the beginnings and hints of further advances and views going beyond it can probably, as one says, be thought of and seems, at first sight, to be the most appropriate way out, [indeed] just what is needed. No doubt only Fichte could lecture on [Ernst] Platner saying something completely different on every paragraph [of Platner's textbook on *Logic and Metaphysics*, 1795] from what is contained in it, completely demolishing the original. But I would like to see the compendium he would have written for such lectures. I would probably want to lecture in a similar fashion on any logical compendium, but do not know right off how I should approach the task of connecting the old, the transition to the new—i.e., the negation [*das Negative*] of the old—and the positive new [logic] in a manner that would be generally acceptable, as in a textbook. If I had lectured for a few years on my logic as it is now beginning to take form—in Jena I had hardly laid the foundation for it and had not lectured on it in detail—perhaps I would know better how to help myself out now. If it were possible for you to keep this

assignment open for some future date, i.e., not to consign it to a Greek calendar [*Calendas graecas*], I would very much beseech you to do so. Meanwhile I would complete my more detailed and comprehensive logic. By later on making a more popular extract from the relevant part—an extract can be done more easily after completion of the whole than before—I could publish the textbooklike [compendium] and further elaborations in conjunction with each other. If your friendship succeeds in involving me in your plans for Munich or Erlangen, the writing of such a textbook would by itself constitute a major purpose of such an appointment. It could almost be asked whether such an appointment is not absolutely necessary to its composition. Might not the connection of these two things be introduced as a motive with higher authorities? Even if the authorities might not notice the connection in its inner [necessity], they could at least be led to view an appointment as an external [means of] assistance for [such] an undertaking.

Such is my view, as requested, of your kind plans. Summa: decide my fate, use me as you find feasible and as your friendship prompts, and I shall then, in any case, obtain a situation offering, both inwardly and externally, the opportunity and invitation for [future] scholarly activity.

I still want to thank you for many things. Yet, because of its connection with the above, I must first remark that I have to my dismay seen from the Landshut lecture catalogue that in this university of the land neither philosophy nor even logic—you see, everybody considers this science to be beneath himself—is being taught anymore. As far as I know, there is not even a single philosophy professor in Altorf. If Innsbruck [which with Tyrol became Bavarian in 1806] did not do its part, philosophy would simply cease to exist at Bavarian universities. Oh, what barbarous times! [*O tempora! O Barbaria!*] And this under your rule and auspices! [*te consule et auspice!*] Until now philosophy was forbidden only at lyceums, where only the history of the systems was allowed so that the free Bavarian genius would avoid getting a system—i.e., a nail—in its head. For it was assured [in the Bavarian school plan of 1804] that, of all evils, a system is the worst. Now this freedom from system is being extended to the university, and nothing remains but history. But since the state wishes now to set a good example and to introduce an organization, which is tantamount to a system, there is hope the same might be granted again to philosophy.

Thank you for the Bavarian literary gifts which you have cleared off your shelf for me. They were no doubt cleared off when, in straightening up your study, you condemned them, as it were, to the waste bin. I beseech you for more such contributions. I am thinking of setting up a patriotic library. Just now I have received an original Bavarian piece by [Josef] Rittershausen on Schelling's address [on the relation of nature and art] [i.e., Rittershausen's *Examination of Professor Schelling's Speech*. . . , 1808]. Here is a completely rank fellow. Somewhere he speaks of lectures on the arts he gave and had printed [Munich, 1802]. If he thus perhaps falls within your Department you will be able to assign him a position in the scholarly world, perhaps as a bookprinter's apprentice. He can hardly be used as a typesetter, and in the end writing will probably be completely forbidden to him without anyone raising a finger.

How the ordinance regarding the three teachers' college students worked its

way into the government paper [see Niethammer's letter 121] I did not quite understand myself. I saw from it, however, that dispensations are off to a good start, and I do not doubt that in your curriculum you will likewise waive agriculture, politics, pedagogy, and most all sciences named in the ordinance for all teachers' college, lyceum, and gymnasium students. Will you in your new program *incidenter* allow these upper lyceum classes to stand, this unholy arrangement—neither fish nor fowl—on which one seemed to pride oneself so much? I do not believe I have seen it in the Augsburg experimental school.

Since I am, as is known, much interested in Bavarian literature, I have already often wished to find a notice which you should be in a position to give to the scholarly world. Namely, how many and which classical authors, both Greek and Roman, came out in about the last fifty years in editions [published] in the provinces of Bavaria, Neuburg, and Amberg, including or not including school editions—most of them castrated—by the Jesuits? Could not there be found in the Munich library, in which a copy of every writing has probably had to be deposited, or elsewhere in some old censorship office, a complete collection of Bavarian literature, or at least a list of this literature from which such a notice might be extracted? Can you not assign someone, say your diligent librarian [Julius] Hamburger, such a task—even *ex officio*? It should provide a good line for a scholarly periodical, or perhaps a preface for one or another new school author: "How greatly indebted we are to the enlightened Bavarian government for stimulation in particular of the study of ancient literature is chiefly evident from the dreadful past neglect of this study constituting the source of all genuine erudition, taste, noble sentiments, etc. This neglect has been so bad that for fifty or respectively a hundred years—I suppose [*supposito*]*—no scholarly edition of any classical author has appeared in Bavaria!*" At least I surmise that the result would turn out rather poorly. Such data, which are historically quite definite and which cannot be gained by reasoning, are chiefly useful for highlighting and underscoring. Should it not belong to your office to have it reported to you what editions are current in Bavaria, [it may be asked] what in general has been done in this branch?

I am hoping to receive soon your *Controversy* [*Between Philanthropinism and Humanism in the Educational Theory of our Time*, 1808], since good fortune will have peaceably brought the result to me here. If, to be sure, the peasants of the Thuringian forest, who once were spared by you, had known what goods were to pass through, your contest [i.e., Niethammer's *Controversy*] might have been contested with the peaceable woman [i.e., with Mrs. Niethammer]!¹ Farewell now. Please allow me to use you indirectly to remember me most kindly to the best of women and to send my cordial regards to Mr. von Julius [Niethammer's son]. Yours, Hegel

ON OCTOBER 26 [133] Niethammer announced Hegel's nomination as Professor of Philosophical Preparatory Sciences and Rector at the Nuremberg Classical Gymnasium.

¹Niethammer's book, published in Jena, had to pass through the Thuringian forest to reach Hegel.

Each of your letters, arriving one after another in quick succession, is more pleasant than the last, revealing the goal to be ever closer. How greatly I am overwhelmed with joy and gratitude by your kindness and active concern you can judge, my dear friend, by how long I have been waiting and yearning. It has already been many a year, and each day has eaten into me further. I learn from your letter received today that the Cause was threatened with shipwreck just as it was about to come to port. I thus do not want to be completely jubilant, since even now it is not yet safely anchored.

The modification you have made in the form of my employment I owe to your concern for my greater security as well as for expediting my entry into public service; and no place can be more desirable to me than Nuremberg, both for itself and because I will have Paulus as School Councillor there. A few days ago he picked up his family here, and the day before yesterday moved there with them. You have not indicated whether the reorganization of the gymnasium begins with the appointments, or whether I will have to assume the position under present conditions. At least you will not fail to let me know soon.

You inform me that the assumption of my duties could be required at short notice. I am, of course, already into the fourth quarter of the newspaper this year. A resignation before October or after December would have facilitated matters. Yet this difficulty is not to be taken into account, especially if the reorganization coincides with the appointment. Assumption of duties in the middle of a school semester already under way surely is not proper either. The essential difficulty is to find an editor to replace me, as I have pledged to help out in this matter and am in all honesty bound to do so. I hope chance—for it is on this that I must alone count—will favor me in a matter which in no ways allows an interim [between the two appointments]. The responsibilities of my new office are directly linked to my literary activities, and at least do not differ in nature even if they do differ in form. In this connection you yourself noted repeatedly and explicitly that you are keeping the prospect in Altorf open. Upgrading this institution in general is certainly of the greatest interest to you as a way of finally procuring a university for the Protestants. It is something they absolutely need if they are to cease viewing themselves—along with scientific education itself—as stepchildren. What is even better, however, is that you wish to take a personal interest in this institution. Any prospect you would hold out for me there would by itself be most appreciated, but what completely elevates this prospect above all others is the hope of thus joining you in a common life of teaching and active endeavor. Inasmuch as I know you in this respect, I hope there is no need to ascribe this prospect to some momentary frustration. Given the necessary conditions of professional activity in your field and your own mentality, I believe it is these conditions and not some isolated disfavor into which you may have fallen which has engendered this thought in you and that something solid lies at the basis of the plan. You first complete installation of this mechanism of your invention, then set it in motion, and due to its design it continues to operate on its own. All that needs to be done thereafter—dusting,

oiling, etc.—are activities that can safely be left to others. You need not worry even if here and there something gets out of whack, which would happen anyhow even if you were overseeing matters personally. Upon your return to science after concluding such organizational activity, your work will remain closely connected with this activity—of which scientific work is the true foundation and consolidation. What a great future would be promised me if this plan were to materialize! I am daily ever more convinced that theoretical work accomplishes more in the world than practical work. Once the realm of representation [*Vorstellung*] is revolutionized, actuality [*Wirklichkeit*] will not hold out. And practical activity would not be lacking either: you have built a house for yourself and laid out the garden, and when you are finished with yours you will help me with mine. But heed the inclinations of the best of women in doing so. I am certain that she is not opposed, but is rather herself a partisan of those who live for themselves. . . .

The affection of my friends, together with the love of my science, constitutes my entire happiness in life, or rather constitutes this happiness all by itself should my scientific endeavor not meet with success. This affection I will strive to preserve, and as for the rest I shall entrust my happiness to time and to my heart independently of circumstances, which are not determining.

Farewell. Be lenient toward my long-windedness as toward the rest. Do not let your secretary [*Herrn Sekretär*] take any further part in your letter writing, since this way I will be assured you are no longer suffering headaches. I do not mean, by the way, to infer from this that headaches and a wife mean the same thing! On the contrary, I rather extend my most cordial greetings to her. Tell her I am right now gazing into the joyful eyes with which she beholds the fulfillment of her wishes for me. [Johann] Gries was here yesterday. Tomorrow I will write to [Johann] Huscher [gymnasium professor in Bamberg]. Yours, Hegel

Bamberg, October 29

It was too late yesterday to send off this letter. Just this morning I received your letter containing the final decision. Through a variety of incidents, through so many crises [*per varios casus, per tot discrimina*], you have crowned your work.

I have already talked with Privy Councillor [Josef] von Bayard. He will give me full assistance in soon freeing me from this editorship. The only thing that can still detain me here is my bookkeeping, which contains much detail; but I hope to be able to leave next Tuesday or Wednesday.

I cannot fully express my satisfaction here in writing. I am thus today entering upon that existence in which nothing more is required of fate to accomplish what one is capable of, and in which fate can no longer be blamed for what one has not accomplished. You are my Creator, and I am your creature, who will respond to your work with feeling and, God willing—which now means “if / so will”—with works as well. And I *do* so will. I bid you farewell out of both the friendship I owe you personally and the respect I owe you as my superior. Your most devoted Hegel

THAT HEGEL ADOPTS a relationship of “bondage” to Niethammer and frequently attaches obsequious, somewhat unctuous endings to letters clashes with his funda-

mental critique of lordship and bondage. Hegel's behavior may seem to be a case of cultural lag. Yet the forms of lordship and bondage belonged to an *ancien régime* which for Hegel was hardly very ancient [142 below].

On November 4 [136] we see Hegel exercising characteristic caution, what Paulus [138] calls Hegel's "practical skepticism."

Hegel to Niethammer [136]

Bamberg, November 4, 1808

I must, my dear friend, give you an account of my expedition to Nuremberg—albeit briefly. I had put my house in order here and gone there Wednesday to assume my post according to the instructions received from you, or at least to expedite my assumption of it. I learned right away that my presence was still superfluous and that the day before, according to an ordinance dated the day following your letter to me, the courses had begun on the basis of the old plan. So far my position here in Bamberg is still unfilled. Paulus, to be sure, does not believe the postponement [of the new plan] means the beginning of any modification of the reorganization and appointments previously decided upon. Yet the expression you use with regard to my employment is only "nomination," not "decree," and examples are not lacking of "nominations" that have been later revoked. But this doubt is put at ease in part by the definiteness of your tone and in part by your silence. I am now awaiting further word here, where once more I have returned with bag and baggage. In the meantime I am trapped between, on the one hand, my concern for securing a replacement for me as newspaper editor and, on the other, the danger of giving up this post too early. I implore you to tell me quite definitely if I need have no fear about entering negotiations concerning the editorship. I also beseech you, at the instigation likewise of Privy Councillor von Bayard, to advise us if you know someone. I am thinking of [Johann] Stutzmann, if you have not already put everyone to use, seeing that all the subjects of the realm, whether utilizable or not, pass through your hands. Please suggest someone just in case I can leave and especially should have to do so *on short notice*.

For the present I also request you to pay my high respects to Privy Councillor von Zentner, expressing the gratitude I feel I owe him for my nomination. In the meantime, farewell. I hope to hear from you soon, if only a single line. Most hurriedly yours, Hegel

AFTER THE GENERAL Commissariat of Nuremberg sent a letter of appointment to Hegel on November 15 [139], Niethammer teased Hegel for being a "friend of little faith" [140]. Hegel defended himself as best he could on the 22nd [141].

Hegel to Niethammer [141]

Bamberg, November 22, 1808

If you call me a friend of little faith, you have not wished to do so, my dear friend, in reference to yourself. Nor will you blame me for having little faith in a certain element [*Ding*] in which you—unlike those thistleheads the Spinozists—admittedly do not in general view man as a portion of seawater sealed off in a

bottle floating adrift in the ocean. Rather, you view him as actively moving forward in it, as in an element [*Element*] which everywhere gives way before your advance. Yet, because of its very nature, this element also at once runs together again in your wake, and in isolated moments can even rise to the surface again. I do not, on the other hand, wish to flatter myself by [wondering] whether I have constituted such a moment of your selfhood, which you write has postponed the drawing up of the decrees. For such vanity would at the very least lead to nothing. On the other hand I would wish it not to be so, since I would then be responsible for still another preoccupation besides all the troubles I have already caused you.

Paulus writes to me today, in a note dated yesterday, that I will now have in hand the official [letter of appointment] from Nuremberg. Yet I still do not have it. Stutzmann [Hegel's successor as editor of the *Bamberg News*] will arrive here in a week, and I can then leave for Nuremberg without embarrassment. The [new] school program, Paulus writes, has not yet arrived there. No official duties will be asked of me before the arrival of this program, since they could only consist in assuming for a few days the loose ends of the old rector's school consisting of five or six pupils. Even after the program's arrival at least a few days will be necessary—and more for the teacher of philosophical preparatory sciences than for others who receive a definite plan and guidance from a [textbook] author, though even they will need some time—to gain a preliminary overview of the coming half year's curriculum. Neither do I yet have any idea which philosophical subjects or sciences are to be taught in a gymnasium, nor which texts will have to serve as a basis and give me some guidance. Nor do I know if my teaching will be distributed between different classes and thus will itself vary, as I almost must fear from the conditions of [Georg] Klein's appointment [as professor of philosophical preparatory sciences] here.

Paulus takes assignment of the rector's residence to me so completely for granted that he has already had a few rooms held ready for me by the [present] rector. Quite apart from the fringe benefit, the arrangement by which the rector resides in the gymnasium itself is advisable if not necessary for [proper] supervision. It was Paulus's main concern to get money for whitewashing—not the rector's lodging but the gymnasium, which has not been done for fifty years. I doubt if he has been successful. I shall first have to reach Nuremberg, however, before a [final] decision is announced, and in the meantime cannot quite bring myself to accept the offer of being so-to-speak a temporary guest in the house. I had hoped you could write more details about the salary. I have no doubt that inasmuch as you cherish the wish to see me married you have arranged my salary accordingly.

It would have surpassed all my wishes to see you come to Nuremberg for the inauguration of the new establishment. How happy I would be to see you and testify to the full extent of my gratitude. If you have visited Augsburg and Ulm, why treat us as stepchildren? How glad I would be to see you, and to express to you the full extent of my gratitude. There are so many things I would like to consider and discuss with the best of women!

[Johann] Lichtenthaler has been here for three weeks; Huscher has been back

here for a few days but is still spinning his wheels. He arrived here soon after my return from Nuremberg. I sent him back, just as Paulus sent me back from Nuremberg. Lichtenhaler is an upright and honest schoolman. He told me much about the sensation your appearance caused in Amberg. Those leaving greatly resisted doing so. One of them had to support a mother and sister and another to be supported by a sister and mother. They wrote to the King, to the Minister, and no doubt to you as well — “ils l' ont dit à Dieu, à la terre, à Gusmann même” [paraphrase of Voltaire, *Alzire* III, 4]. I hear the reply has come back today: they have met with deaf ears.

A report has come here from Munich that you have become Church Councilor, and in fact the first [in rank]. Is there something to it? It is neither my hope nor my wish that the prospect of our cohabitation on the [firm] earth of science—in Elysium—be obstructed by a gilded partition which for you could only be a prison, however glittering.

You will not hear anything from me about the principal matter: the edifice you are building in which I am to be but a single stone and which is destined to be the guiding spirit of Bavaria, embracing the extent of the Realm's spiritual life. In any case, so far I have so-to-speak seen only the base or peak of the pyramid, i.e., [at most] fragments of it. To be sure, these fragments are the claws by which the lion is recognized; not, mind you, the old-Bavarian [lion], but the Lion As Such. The rector's role is even endowed with solemn dignity. You have even sought to found a cult indigenous [to Bavaria] around the gymnasium. We are still awaiting more detailed instructions. With particular satisfaction I have found in certain clues the main idea to be carried through: the separation of scholarly and vocational [*reelen*] education. I can only form an incomplete idea of the amount of work and bustle you have had and still have. But come get some rest with us; i.e., come work with us in a different way. The complete transformation of Nuremberg's school and curricular system, the establishment of a normal college, the procurement, transubstantiation, and reallocation of funds, building activities, and a thousand other things! As much as all your concerns will have a representative in Paulus, they will require your immediate presence as well, for it is from such presence alone that creation of the new world must spring. In this hope, which likewise extends to the best of women, to whom I ask to be remembered most kindly, I remain your most humble friend, Hegel.

THE SEPARATION of scholarly and vocational instruction which Hegel cites resulted from Niethammer's institution of a modern gymnasium (*Realinstitut*) for students who previously attended the classical gymnasium but who were oriented more to mathematics and the natural sciences. The classical or humanistic gymnasium which remained, and of which Hegel became rector, was thus less hindered in its stress on ancient languages and literature. Hegel defended the separation in an 1810 report (see last section of chapter).

Hegel was still on leave from the University of Jena. He now asked the government in Weimar to release him from his position in Jena to accept the one in Nuremberg [142].

Hegel to Duke Karl August [142]

Bamberg, November, 1808

Most Exalted and Gracious Duke and Lord:

Concerning the most humble petition of a Doctor and nontitular [*ausserordentlichen*] Professor of Philosophy at the all-faculty Ducal University in Jena for release from his position.

His Royal Majesty of Bavaria, by his most gracious decree of the 4th of this month, has most nobly deigned to name me Rector and Professor at the Nuremberg gymnasium. But I cannot accept this post prior to release from my duties as a nontitular Professor of Philosophy at the general Ducal University of Jena. Thus my most humble request directed to Your Ducal Highness is for most gracious release from these duties.

Permit me in this connection, Your Ducal Highness, to express the pain I feel in leaving an Academy where the noble favor of its most Exalted Benefactor bestows on the sciences and those dedicated to them such generous protection and encouragement, for which I will always be indebted and which I as well will always most deferentially and gratefully remember. I remain with the most dutiful reverence Your Ducal Highness's most humble servant, Georg Friedrich Wilhelm Hegel

NUREMBERG

By mid-December 1808 Hegel had arrived in Nuremberg, a city with a rich artistic heritage. A few months later he would tell Niethammer of his desire to marry [151], and it was in Nuremberg that he eventually would find a wife, Marie von Tucher. Years later, in 1826, as she and Hegel's sons Karl and Immanuel visited her hometown, Hegel carefully guided his sons through its treasures and sights. The two letters [516, 518] in which he did so are presented here because they show what was prominent in his recollection of the city. Only the last paragraph of each letter need be read in the context of the Berlin period (Chs 14, 19, 24).

Hegel to Wife and Children [516]

Berlin, Saturday, July 29, 1826

I cannot, my dear wife and children, write you wholly without reprimand: *today at last* I have received your letters of the 23rd and 25th. I was about to worry. For I have had no news of you since you wrote from Jena on Monday. Mother's letter, to be sure, is dated *Berlin*. But I did not allow myself to be deceived and have noted not only from the contents but also from the boys' letters that it was really written in Nuremberg! With that I remarked to myself how indelibly Berlin must be fixed in her mind, so that even in Nuremberg no other city can flow from her pen.

A hearty welcome to Nuremberg! I share your delight in enjoying the company of such dear friends. Immediately upon receiving news of your safe arrival despite a lack of passports I was curious about the next installment of your

travelogue. Though I still have not received further details from Karl, the travelogue I do have turned out very satisfactory! Yet you did not give notice from Jena whether you have seen the [Gustav] Asveruses there; nor, if you have not seen them, why not. You have in any case at least had to let them know you were there. Now on with the itinerary. To be sure, I see you have taken a detour. So the coachman did not know the way well enough. You have accordingly come through Schwarzburg—what Immanuel calls the “creek” is the *Schwarza* River, which bears gold dust. The town is quite an attractive, noteworthy sight. Starting out from Jena, it is our place of refuge for indulging romanticism and sentimentality. If you had leafed through the registration book there you would have probably found my name as well in it, with an aphorism or declamation affixed. Not so? This forested Thüringian mountain range has beautiful scenery. Immanuel has written of it very well. Not far from Schwarzburg is Paulinzelle, or rather the ruins of it—a former monastery in late Romanesque or Byzantine architecture, still *pre*-Gothic. Mark well the chief Nuremberg churches: Sebald, Lorenz, and above all the Catholic Church on the marketplace. The home of Mr. [Benedikt] von Schwarz [a brother-in-law of Hegel’s] is said to be in the same style, at least insofar as it is possible for a residence to apply such forms. They are *Gothic*, as one calls it; i.e., truly German architectural styles. *Schönbrunnen* is also in this style. The small chapel at the castle, especially the lower part, has columns which are not Gothic, but are rather in the style of those at Paulinzelle. For the rest I have noticed that you have been attentive and diligent during this trip in seeing things of note. Have you not seen in the Ilz Valley, on a mountain between Gleussen and Bamberg, the former monastery of *Banz*? It now belongs to the Duke of Zweibrücken. The many crucifixes along the way and around Bamberg must have been placed there after my time. When I was there they had been removed. But if you return to Bamberg, look around well atop Michelsberg, for example. It is very beautiful in and around Bamberg. The *licorice root*, by the way, grows there—the sort from which licorice extract is derived. I lived there a year and a half.

In Nuremberg you boys should especially look about for the churches, paintings, stained glass painting, and the like. There are quite a number of singular things to be learned and seen there which are not to be seen elsewhere. Report to me about it. The fact that I already know them must not deter you. So now you are safely in Nuremberg. You have also made use of the beggar’s coach! Good enough if it serves the purpose!

But how shall I be able to keep count of all our dear relatives and send greetings to them all? I have no choice but to lump them all together and send collective greetings—especially to gain a few more lines and moments to write something further here; for after three o’clock I must accompany my dear companion and friend of our home Mr. [Captain] von Hülsen to [Georg] Reimer’s art exhibit to raise money for the Greeks.

To be sure I have been able to get a little more work done since you have left, though it is not going to become all that strenuous. In the evening I have [Eduard] Gans [Ch 19, first section] or some other friend over—tonight it is whist with [Johann] Rösel, [Karl] Zelter, and [August] Bloch. Or once in a while I go to the

theater. [Pius and Amalie] Wolff, with whom I spoke, have again appeared to warm applause as host and hostess in *Hermann and Dorothea* [presumably the stage version by Karl Töpfer of Goethe’s epic] along with Mme. [August] Stich. But this does not help much, since Mme. Stich is going to leave the day after tomorrow—the queen is out of the play; thus no more visits with her! Today Imperial Russian Privy Councillor [Karl Ludwig] von Blum took leave of me. Tonight he will be on the road with [composer Karl] Graun’s *Passion* for [jurist Anton] Thibaut. [Painter Christian] Köster has since not shown himself! Something is definitely bothering him. You have a pretty good idea what! I visited the home of [painter Johann] Schlesinger. Mrs. von Hartwig [who lived in the same house as Hegel] asked me about you today, but there was not much I could tell her. The lesson scheduled from eleven to twelve at Mr. [Georg] Daumer’s [a Nuremberg student of Hegel’s] is somewhat inconvenient. Does that not come as a small hitch? A greater hitch, to be sure, would be attending Latin classes. My cordial greetings to [Nuremberg gymnasium] Professor Daumer. Greetings to you from your Hegel

Hegel to His Wife and Children [518]

August 10 [1826]

As to the hitch, you boys have understood well where the shoe—or rather the seat—pinches; yet I have also recognized with satisfaction that the private lessons are the lesser evil. I can see from what you write that you are working. It is important that what you have learned be not too greatly forgotten. Mother understood in her own way the hitch to staying longer. As for staying longer, if it is without any great hitch I suppose it would also be agreeable to you, for according to your accounts you are fine and have many agreeable, heartfelt, and pleasurable things to enjoy thanks to the love and friendship of our dear relatives. You, Immanuel, must give my thanks as well for the watch you have received as a gift from grandmother, and must also do so for all the affection and kindness shown you.

Among the things you have written to me about I single out your description of the Lorenz church. It is good that you have observed it well. One does not often see something like that. Such a sight gives you real enrichment and profit. You will either already have seen or will see the Sebald church. Note the Kulmbach painting in the Tucher chapel with the eternal—and incidentally merely *external*—plain Catholic light. The Kulmbach painting is superior to the wooden *Angelic Salutation* [by Veit Stoss] you have seen in the Lorenz church. The high Gothic structure on a pillar no doubt houses the sacraments. I also single out the old stronghold you visited. You have seen [Albrecht von] Wallenstein’s stone. It serves to recall important events from the Thirty Years War. I have never been to the stronghold; I must still get there someday. There Nuremberg bravely upheld our Protestant [*evangelisch*] faith, and thus upheld truth and freedom for all of us. That was a high point in history.

It has been hot in Nuremberg just like here. It was the hottest of all on our King’s birthday [see 524]. You write nothing about it. You do not mention having

toasted to His health. If you have not done so, make amends, for His health is worthy and dear.

SCHOOL REFORM IN BAVARIA

The first letter we have from Nuremberg is dated December 14, 1808. Hegel both comments on Niethammer's General Directive for the Bavarian school system and takes stock of the local situation. The "gymnasium" which he was to oversee actually embraced three geographically separate schools: the primary school for pupils ten to twelve (or thirteen) years old, a progymnasium (*Progymnasium*) for those twelve to fourteen (or fifteen) years old, and the gymnasium proper for pupils from fourteen to eighteen or twenty. The newly instituted modern gymnasium was lodged in the same building as the humanistic gymnasium and was placed under its "aegis." Yet Hegel found that the school reorganization had been approved without securing funds. Still, he was appreciative of Niethammer's directive. Greek was to be taught seven hours a week in the progymnasium, six hours in the first year of the gymnasium, and four in the two middle classes and the upper class of the gymnasium. Hegel's suggestion that laboratory science be excluded from the university and relegated to the modern gymnasium reflects more the German practice of restricting university instruction to lectures than any blindness to the role of experiment in natural science.

The directive was in a sense tailor-made for Hegel. Niethammer had been active in the founding of German idealism in the 1790s—which explains his directive that the gymnasium pupils be introduced to "speculative thinking" in preparation for the systematic study of philosophy at the university. The lower class was to study religion, social ethics and morality, and logic; in the first year of the middle class the pupils were to pass on to cosmology, including natural theology and the Kantian critiques of the cosmological and teleological arguments. Third-year pupils were to take up psychology, understood in a sense embracing ethical and legal philosophy. As a logic text Niethammer proposed writings by Tübingen Professor Gottfried Ploucquet. The directive recommended texts by Karl Gustav Carus for psychology, while Kant was to provide the texts for ethical and legal philosophy. Finally, the upperclassmen were to be taught "a philosophical encyclopaedia" embracing and relating all the work of the three previous years. In the light of experience Hegel would eventually introduce certain modifications in this program. Yet the directive conforms in outline to Hegel's own system as it would be expressed in his *Encyclopaedia* of 1817—embracing first the logic and then the philosophies of nature and spirit.

Hegel to Niethammer [144]

Nuremberg, December 14, 1808

The day before yesterday classes began in our gymnasium. That such an event gives me much to tell will be obvious to you. This work of your friendship for me has thus been consummated; above all, your official endeavor here with regard to the whole establishment is, along with my own function, now under way. I should

have spoken to you at greater length of the many different ways in which I am content with the situation you have given me, for the extent of my gratitude to you would thus find expression. I should rather touch upon [your] official activity, and for that you are to be thanked far more profusely than for what you have done for me personally. The previous state of affairs here you know better than I, just as you also know best what you have instituted in its place. I will limit myself to a few observations on what has happened in implementing your intentions.

Paulus inaugurated the new gymnasium a week ago yesterday with a speech before the General Commissioner [Count Friedrich von Thürrheim] and other notables. I then took the oath of office, and afterward began the preliminary examination. This examination, in all grades of the gymnasium and sundry schools [*Trivialschulen*], has taken the entire week. The pupils were then distributed between the different classes. The gymnasium has thirty pupils, of whom eight are in the upper class. Instruction in the gymnasium thus began this week. The progymnasium, however, will be opened only next week because a locale has not yet been found, but also because the public is not yet sufficiently informed of the way the whole system works. The directive has only recently been received by us teachers. Paulus's speech, which in a few days will appear in print, should satisfy the aim [of informing the public]. This week is devoted to registering the pupils wishing to attend establishments associated with the gymnasium. You see that the chief object seemed to be to make a beginning. This is now done. Yet I could not begin with my own curriculum because of the preliminary affairs of the lower-level establishments. You already know how much is needed from the economic standpoint before a real beginning can be made. This situation looks bad. The government would appear guilty of considerable lack of foresight for not yet having secured the necessary means if, which is perhaps even worse, the problem did not have its source in the plan of organization itself. An advance of a few thousand florins would have covered many a need, given that the government is reimbursed by whatever agency has to suffer this expense, whether it be itself or some other body. That the professors at Altorf have received no salary for eight months is as bad as the fact that the lecture halls of a brand new institution of learning have not even once been whitewashed. This should not be. Paulus will have complained to you of this need in all its ramifications. Yet he hopes for the best. You no doubt have in hand the work he did with the local commission. Finance Councillor [Karl] Roth spoke of this matter when I visited him. Perhaps it is superfluous—but then again perhaps not—to write you of his view, since he knows conditions very well. He is, in particular, of the opinion that the proposal of the local commission—which wants to protect its claim to all the former capital [of the private foundations] originally allocated to pious ends [*piis causis*] but in fact not entirely used for them—will prevail only with difficulty. . . .

Since this matter really lies outside my sphere, I ask you to excuse what I have written about it as well-intentioned. It would behoove me infinitely more to speak of your work, of your directive engraved in stone. Yet, apart from not having found any stone here, I am still too busy imprinting this work in my own mind and heart and in that of others to be able to pass judgment on it so soon. And even if you

allowed your friend to pass judgment, still judgment and haggling are so clearly the worst enemy of all that is excellent, as of its actualization, that I would not like to come before you with such a pretension. Apart from my duty of office, I would fight for it as for altar and hearth [*pro aris et focis*] if I had cause, and if there were need to do so. Yet—beyond the fact that the people here are good sorts with whom it is traditional to take up what is good in whatever comes along—in view of the previous notoriously bad situation they all feel grateful for the general improvement. On the other hand, recognition of the principal merit of the new plan based on a contrast with the old one is not generally present among them, though they are in no way active against it or ill-disposed toward it.

I give you my thanks not merely for the whole but in particular for upgrading the study of Greek. For that feat you are to be given three, nay three times three cheers; likewise, negatively, for the elimination of all the frivolous classes in technology, economics, butterfly chasing, and so forth; for the wise distribution of classes and so on; and for the fact that you have not relegated these [frivolous] classes to the division of modern [*real*] studies but rather have at once instituted basic study of true knowledge in the field: the natural sciences [*wissenschaftlichen Realkenntnisse*]. If the program of modern studies [*Realkursus*] seems so richly endowed as here and there to cause concern for the [classical] gymnasium, my faith in the nobility of classical studies is so great that their divorce [from more practical studies] alone gives me real hope for their future. If I may express but one wish, it would merely be for a few more hours of physics, without, however, taking away an hour from any other subject; yet perhaps this can be achieved in liaison with the physico-technical institute, though of this it is generally too early to speak. My thoughts on this would generally be that a gymnasium should be richly endowed with scientific equipment so that the young may quickly have done with such things at an age when a nontheoretical outlook on these phenomena and their application in manifold games is still appropriate. I would allow hardly any such instruments in the university, since scientific theory, mathematically treated, scarcely needs them at all. And this alone is what is appropriate at the university level.

Yet what concerns me more than all this is the curriculum in my own field, and it is to this that I really should turn my thoughts almost exclusively, rendering account to you that I have applied myself to the task. But due to both the unique needs of this institution here and, as you yourself must realize, the newness of my situation, I confess I am still not entirely clear about this. Both the directive in general and the later supplement have left a certain latitude. The supplement, which refers to the right to introduce local modifications, has led me to remove professor [Christoph] Büchner, who understands nothing of algebra, from teaching mathematics to the upperclassmen and to put him in charge of religious studies and the doctrine of obligations for the lowerclassmen. In this way before the upperclassmen go to the university they can be equipped as much as possible with the essentials of mathematics. I link transcendental and subjective logic to the philosophical encyclopaedia in the upper class, as can easily be done according to my plan for the encyclopaedia; all the more so since this class has had hardly any

instruction in it. This is accordingly what the upper class most needs. In the middle class I am giving some thought to teaching psychology, more particularly the theory of spirit rather than that of the soul in the as-it-were natural-historical, totally unspeculative, or conceptually unconnected sense current up until now. I believe I shall thus be fulfilling, with respect to both content and form, the intention of your directive, which is that speculative thought be introduced to the pupils; and I shall thus also accomplish what you intended in your reference to [Karl Gustav] Carus and the Kantian critique. You once expressed to me confidence in my composition of a logic compendium for the gymnasiums. By placing me in a gymnasium you have at once given me a chance to gather experience and to learn. This opportunity, as well as the leeway permitted by the directive, may in part serve to justify and in part excuse my pedagogical work.

Other needs and circumstances will be communicated to you in part by Paulus and in part by my report [unavailable] to be submitted most humbly to you. Paulus has lodged me in the residence overlooking the street [i.e., the parsonage above the classrooms] in part to allow good old [Leonard] Schenk [Hegel's predecessor] to find new quarters at his convenience. Retain my present lodging for me. Should you not consider it advisable for purposes of supervision to transfer the progymnasium to this building as well, and thus to locate the modern gymnasium elsewhere?

Mr. [Ludwig] von Jolli [a Bavarian officer] is now also based here. His wife will move here as well in the coming days and sends the warmest of greetings to you and the best of women. I have not yet seen Mrs. von Siebein [wife of the Bavarian commander]. Please convey my most amicable greetings to the best of women, as also to Julius, who is no doubt also in the progymnasium now. Your devoted Hegel

[P.S.] [Philology] Professor [Ludwig] Heller has asked me to send his greetings as the occasion arises. You have made a first-time acquisition for us in him, both absolutely speaking and in contrast to the traditional sluggishness of the Nuremberg character.

If you could arrange for a number of copies of your directive to be sent here and put on sale, this would be very important in making the new course of studies known to the local public, which still has very little knowledge of it.

By FEBRUARY 1809 [145] Hegel's administrative problems were compounded by the threat of a new war. The Austrians had taken advantage of Napoleon's entanglement in Spain to challenge him in central Europe, although hostilities would not break out until April.

Hegel to Niethammer [145]

Nuremberg, February 12, 1809

You have, dear friend, recently sent me greetings through Paulus and at the same time mentioned the cause of your long silence: the mountains of paperwork. Compared to Aetna or Atlas they surely cannot be all that large. I certainly have no fear that their weight will crush you; still I do fear you may be inordinately

oppressed and burdened by it. And no doubt we in Nuremberg are contributing our share as well to making life difficult for you. My general report [unavailable] on teaching establishments under the aegis of the gymnasium, along with a supplement from the District Commissioner, by now must be in your hands. If overall we are already prospering, there still remain a few situations crying for attention. You will find them in the report, and I do not want to fill your ears with them here. About two matters, however, I cannot remain completely silent. One is an arrangement for getting schoolbooks for the pupils less expensively through the school bookdealer. This is the last time I will believe it when a form of relief to be provided by a public organism is announced. I had the books sent and sold them at the discount granted by [Karl Friedrich] Frommann. But when the bill from the school bookdealer finally arrived, the present arrangement [granting a monopoly to the school dealer for the sale of schoolbooks] turned out to be a mere front for profiteering and swindling.

A second matter is the external [amenities] of our schools. It is, in general, pointless to waste one's breath on this. Yet I cannot overlook the fact that in two localities, the Sebald and Lorenz schools—i.e., in our progymnasium and in the primary and adjunct schools—there is no toilet. This situation is perfectly disgraceful, even atrocious. I have repeatedly addressed myself both orally and in writing to the administrator of church properties, who is still in charge of these buildings, and to the building inspector to have this deplorable state of affairs corrected. Thus far nothing has been done. According to Paulus, you have decreed for us a second intermediate class in the gymnasium and a second primary school. Two toilets would be a *müch* greater blessing—provided, of course, they are actually installed and not just decreed. In registering pupils, each time I have to ask the parents if their children have enough skill to take care of their needs in a seemly manner without toilets. This is a new dimension of public education, the importance of which I have just now discovered—so to speak, its hind side. I have turned to the General Commissioner to obtain assistance from the police because in one of the localities the military and night watchmen are in possession of the needed facility, and we shall now see how far we will get. But you will be able to imagine for yourself how little such shabby external conditions, extending even to the present disgusting state of affairs, are geared to instilling the confidence of the public, seeing that provision has been made for nothing, and that money is lacking everywhere.

As to this latter matter, our salaries are now being paid to us because, as chance would have it, some foundation capital has arrived, which we are at once consuming instead of the interest. We hope this capital as well as any further capital that still might be consumed will be replaced. But what will happen if war breaks out? As for myself, to be sure I have faith enough. Beyond myself, however, there is perhaps only one other person or even none with such faith, and I have still to see anything which might shore it up. It is sad that, because of the way in which it is given, people do not know how to give thanks for what they have received, for they view it much as an act of theft which they have luckily gotten away with this time without knowing whether they will be so lucky next time.

I have not yet given you the thanks I owe you for my salary; it came out about as I had imagined, even larger if one clause has the sense I hope it has. Specifically, the ordinance mentions a 900-florin salary as professor and a 100-florin salary as rector *with* free lodging. The administrator has the considerateness to interpret this to mean 1,000 *florins* including free lodging, meaning that the lodging is to be deducted and, to be sure, valued at 100 florins. If this is the case I must confess I would gladly cede the rectorship to anybody. In any case, should an army come here and quartering be imposed, I would hand over the lodging to the General Commissioner, since by quartering two men the 50 or 60 florins with which I could get a rented apartment would be eaten up in three weeks. You may easily calculate what advantage the free lodging would be to me in three months time, or a year. In view of the above construal, the administrator has made an inquiry with the higher authorities. If the answer should be that the lodging, valued at 100 florins, constitutes the rector's salary, I would have to request you to take the rectorship away from me. Even assuming the more favorable construal, the salary bears little relation to the wasted time which the rectorship entails, especially if one takes into account the sort of matters on which time is spent, such as my headache over toilets. Neither writing materials—I have already used up eight reams of paper—nor similar necessities, nor a copyist—e.g. for the school library, the catalogue, etc.—are yet provided. But I still hope help will eventually come. As I said, I will not let myself be influenced too much for the time being, before the year is up, by the widespread view that the salary is too low. The supervision of the lower-level schools might have been taken more into account. Such supervision is necessary; I will make it my business, but only as much as my lectures permit. Speaking of lectures, I hope you will approve of my taking over mathematics in the upper grades—Büchner does not understand a thing about algebra—in exchange for ethics in the lower grades. Without this exchange I would indeed have been at a loss with all my lectures and official duties. It also should be taken into account that life is more expensive in Nuremberg than in Passau and Bamberg, where I had about a third more income than here. For my administrative work I longingly await an assistant. I cannot do without one here because the two other schools are each so far removed from the gymnasium. I need one to be in continuous contact for supervision, giving instructions, making announcements, etc.; copying is just as necessary a function of such an assistant.

I must further make a special inquiry as to whether there is a real philological institute with financial aid in Munich. There is a most excellent young man in the gymnasium of the name of [Johann Christoph] Held. Of the 160 pupils there are only two younger ones who will one day approach him. He has hope of being admitted to the philological institute in Heidelberg, where the lectures are free and he would have 50 florins yearly in benefits. He will concentrate chiefly on philology and philosophy. And yet to be able to make a living he will, on my advice, also concentrate on theology. If a similar opportunity is not available to him in the Realm—which in all likelihood will not be the case, among other reasons because the Munich Lyceum must at first be intended for beginners—I want to ask you about eventual permission to study in Heidelberg. This permission should no

longer, I hope, be so difficult to obtain; it is said to have been already granted to others, and will now be granted even more frequently since you are dismantling Altorf University, especially in theology. Even if you do not want to reply to my letter otherwise, I would yet beseech you to do so regarding this excellent young man.²

I do not want to write any more extensively about the Old Franconian, antique, Gothic, yes, even Noric [derived from *Noricum*] nature of the people here. They seem good-natured, and even well-meaning and grateful for progress, especially in school institutions. And if this shabby situation [cf 145] were not hampering the growth of confidence, our institutions would already have earned the delight and gratitude of the public, which—for I do not want to give up hope—God willing still will occur someday, just as I will be able to write you more extensively about something better than toilets. But for the time being we still have to contend with the plight being encountered by the little sheep entrusted to us.

Finally, I ask you to please remember me many times over to the best of women. The first savings I am able to put aside I will use for a trip to visit you, the best of women, and Julius. Your sincere friend and rector, Hegel

A LETTER of February 1809 [146] shows that despite Hegel's statement of November [137] the proceedings against the *Bamberg News* had not been dropped—though by May [147] Niethammer had averted suspension of the paper. But the letter largely concerns school finances. Hegel's sense of participating in a revolutionary venture in Nuremberg is not exaggerated, for the idea of general public education was still recent. Hegel personally lived through a trend away from the aristocratic idea of education exemplified in his own private tutorships in Bern and Frankfurt in the 1790s to the bourgeois idea he was helping to implement in Nuremberg. The provision of tuition-free education in the grade schools was first decreed in Bavaria in 1803. Hegel now urges [147] that tuition be abolished on the secondary level as well. The problem was financing, though the uncertainty of funding did not reflect so badly on the Bavarian government at a time when war costs were depleting civil budgets and when state funds were for the first time being extended to an extensive school system.

Hegel to Niethammer [146]

Nuremberg, February 20, 1809

I wrote you about a week ago. A more recent matter moves me to bother you with a letter again, though I do so without hesitation since Paulus has informed me of your kind invitation to write you regardless of your silence and other preoccupations. The matter is the suspension of the *Bamberg News* and the sealing of its presses recently ordered by the highest authorities, according to what Stutzmann writes me without explanation. In a number of respects this incident regards me personally. As a first step Stutzmann himself will already have probably turned to you, and I have nothing else to add except—if you can take this into

²Held did go to Heidelberg [157].

consideration—that I urged him to give up his post in Erlangen just as permission to resume publication of the Erlangen paper arrived, using as my main argument the claim that there was always a danger that the [Erlangen] paper might again be suspended, and that here he would live under a just government where proceedings regarding property rest on a legal rather than a military basis. But beyond that—though I have heard oral reports of a French officer in Bayreuth who had the correspondence of the *Bamberg News* sent to him because of a certain article—I begin to fear that an older affair of which I already informed you last fall may have been the cause—or one of the causes—of the government's preemptory procedure. This incident, which at the time brought on an investigation, is now half a year old. But the investigation dragged on until Christmas. The last report on the most recent inquiry may have reached Munich seven to eight weeks ago. This date should be reflected upon in estimating the likelihood as to whether only after the intervening delay such a blow could ensue. This whole investigation is so unpleasant that I will not be at ease as long as I have reason to fear it is not yet over and might be reopened anew. If this is one of the causes of the suspension or suppression of the paper, it will no doubt be taken up again. In this regard my request to you is that if possible you find out the cause of this measure, whether it be a requisition from the French Ministry or something else, i.e., the affair surrounding that article. This affair is probably the sort that juridically offers no avenue of redress. Often, however, the simpler a matter is, the less is the anticipated result—which one might have probable cause to expect—forthcoming and confirmed, and so one gets all the angrier. I thus make this request of you for my own peace of mind, which depends on this inquiry not being opened up again. For the inquiry is not likely to be reopened if the reason for the ban is something else. I can wish nothing more deeply than reassurance in this matter. A disclosure concerning the affair might at once suggest steps I could advise the owner of the newspaper to take to save his property. I am much obliged to him, and even if I were not I would want to do everything I could for this upright man. He is most deserving of an effort on his behalf, and I am doubly obliged to make such an effort if this affair is the cause of his predicament, or if the cause is a subsequent article written by someone else but which I placed in the paper. Stutzmann, who seems clearly predestined to misfortune as a journalist, must hate himself for getting into this business. He must be in the most dire of predicaments and can certainly be put to use somewhere. Could he not be of use in a normal college, since he has dedicated himself especially to education? Yet what I might add about this is superfluous to you. Still, I repeat, give me the reassurance I need *soon*. If what you might tell me were not reassuring, I would have to look further to see what is to be done and seek out your advice. . . .

So much for my immediate personal predicament. It is a singular fact that one writes more extensively about one's problems than about one's good fortune. It upsets me to write you about the former. Yet your friendship allows me to do so, and to obtain the relief which is already found in writing to someone from whom help may be expected.

It was in this spirit that I recently wrote to you about our school needs. The

explanation of these needs has also turned out to be more extensive than what I will have written about the prosperity of these schools. It can well be said, in passing, that they are prospering, and even more that they will continue to prosper. The teachers are diligent, and on the whole one can be quite satisfied with the staffing. There is a trusting, gentle tone, without harshness, and everything is in pretty good order. Indeed nothing can be seen here either of corporal discipline or of the rudeness of youth, insolence, or the like. The pupils respect their purpose in being there, demonstrate much zeal and eagerness to learn, and generally are good-natured. If at last the German public elementary schools become in particular more *affordable*, i.e., if they are free of charge, we will probably lose a residue of students who really belong there. It occurs to me in this connection that it would be much better if the government would once and for all declare the secondary schools tuition-free. It is indeed strange that I could not tell parents who inquired at registration how much or even whether tuition was to be paid. Since in the past one paid only for the gymnasium, and since nothing else has been demanded up to now, it would be most desirable for no further payment to be required from now on. It would look altogether too Bavarian [*bavarice*] to display liberality and generosity right from the start and then reduce it later to a mere appearance and broken promise. Even if nothing further should be required thereafter, it would have a much nastier impact on people than if money were required right from the start.

The school for singing, which is related to the pecuniary side of things, also cries out for decision. You no doubt know or will soon find out—for I hear from Paulus that the report has not yet left the chancellory for Munich—what for the time being he has done about this singing business, which he is attributing to the Ministry of Education and Ecclesiastical Affairs even though the street singing continues to be carried on by students who have dropped out of the gymnasium. It is not possible to make participation obligatory for the gymnasium students. Those who took part before still draw money from it but only participate on Sundays, and when they come up in the rotation for street singing they pay substitutes from among the above-mentioned dropouts. It continues to be an ambiguous arrangement in need of your help. Moreover, we still have to give up our school facilities for singing lessons, enabling those learning to sing to assemble every morning in the warm room and cause commotion for an hour. So much for singing instruction, etc.

The budget will soon reach you. On this score we are lacking everywhere. Why can an exception not be made for Nuremberg so that necessities can be arranged and procured before the budget is determined, since Nuremberg's school system does not in any way yet fall into the same category as other establishments of the Realm. Arrangements that more or less already exist in the remainder of the Realm here have to be set up anew only now. A new household cannot wait for the fair a half year off to acquire pots and pans like an already established household that only has a few items to catch up on; it can do so no more than it can wait on interest payments due only in half a year. It must, on the contrary, procure a sum for such expenses immediately. The expenditure to be made now is not to be

regarded as a continuing one. If nothing more is decreed for us than what is calculated to cover continuing expenses, we cannot possibly make out. We look longingly forward to help in this regard. If nothing is arranged and provided for, the whole matter will forever appear to the public like an owl on a branch whose stern look scares everyone away, and who himself as well may fly away at any moment. If they can at all afford it, parents will not quickly abandon the private arrangements they have set up for their children. They will not send them more frequently to the state-supported schools until they see that state-supported education is established and shows promise of being here to stay—and this quite apart from the fact that conditions I have recently mentioned [145] are present which, with all the confidence parents would like to have, might positively prevent them from sending their children. I am anxious to know how far I will advance this week in this matter of toilets. If something does not happen soon, we will shortly be receiving complaints from neighbors whose houses are being filled with secret guests. Also, troops will be quartered here someday soon. If, as only recently happened quite burdensomely, this extends to school buildings, school would again have to be suspended. Yet I hope the District General Commissioner will take measures in time to prevent such a crying outrage as to quarter troops in schoolhouses.

So much for this time; once more my compliments to the best of women. I hear Julius attends a private establishment in Munich. Send him to us here but, naturally, not before the toilets have been installed. Yours, Hegel

NAPOLEON CHALLENGED, 1809

By May 7 war had broken out. Friedrich Schlegel, recently converted to Catholicism and working for the Austrians, had drafted the Austrian declaration of war against Napoleon. On April 23 Napoleon beat back the Austrians at Ratisbon; Hegel congratulates Niethammer for this "deliverance" [147]. Nuremberg itself had only recently been attached to Bavaria, and harbored pro-Austrian sentiment. The city once owed fealty to the Holy Roman Emperor, who was now the Austrian Emperor.

But the war was not over. Napoleon, who had been slightly wounded in April, lost his first battle at Aspern on May 20-21 and was not able to reestablish his position until the Battle of Wagram in July. Meanwhile inhabitants of Nuremberg rose up against their French-backed Bavarian government. Hegel's disapproving comment [148] on the popular revolt in Nuremberg speaks of *rabble* (*Pöbel*) instead of the *people* (*Volk*). As long as popular action served the revolution emanating from France, Hegel viewed it as an action of the people [11, 85, 108]. When popular sentiment clashed with his ideology, the people became the rabble.

Hegel's Bonapartist response to popular disenchantment with Napoleon's Empire provoked an ambiguous attitude toward the Rousseauian doctrine of the popular or general will. This doctrine had of course helped inspire the original French Revolution. As late as Bamberg (1807-08) Hegel still wrote in the populist tone which marked his letters to Schelling in 1794-96. Yet the Napoleonic context in

1807-08 had already modified the nature of his populism. Universal suffrage had a very limited role in Napoleonic France, where the legislative body elected by popular participation was restricted to discussing and publicizing legislation which it neither proposed nor voted. Hegel never abandoned the Rousseauian view that the state must be founded on a *general will* directed to the common good, but he was increasingly insistent that this general will also be a *rational will*. If it is not rational, the rational citizen cannot identify with it, and thus cannot attain the positive freedom which motivated the general will doctrine in the first place. But Hegel was increasingly skeptical as to whether popular majorities had the requisite practical wisdom. As a Protestant in Catholic Bavaria he was newly sensitized to the claims of minorities. In the *Philosophy of Law* (1821) he would seek to check Rousseau's assertion of the legislative sovereignty of national assemblies, and to maximize the influence of that corps of "privy councillors" and associated state functionaries to which he himself belonged. He thus sought to wed popular aspirations for the common good expressed in the assemblies to the trained intelligence of the "universal" public servant class (*Phil of Law* ¶300).

Hegel to Niethammer [147]

Nuremberg, May 7, 1809

I must, my dear friend, thank you for two letters and apologize for having gotten behind with you. But with you I am generally so far behind that I could not by a long shot catch up with a single letter.

In the first place, nobody can more eagerly congratulate you on your deliverance from the enemy forces than I. It must have been a very happy day, this Jubilate. Only it seems to me that Munich experiences too many such days of liberation. On the other hand, the opposite liberation of Friedrich Schlegel with his Catholicization of us all has gone down the drain, and he may consider himself lucky if only the gallows remain liberated from him. Since Schlegel has here many of his kind—jobless and homeless scoundrels—this rabble, mainly youths off the streets, greeted the lance of the uhlans who entered Nuremberg with a "Long live our brothers!" The noise was enormous, but rang hollow and immediately died away. The entire mob is surely now once and for all off our backs. You, along with the other sections in Munich, however, will now be charged with the new work of placing a new organizational hat on a large stretch of territory. Indeed, in keeping with the times a local hatmaker is offering to the public hats in the current fashion, which he calls "organizational hats." I have no idea whether he provides new organizational heads as well, though I doubt it.

For us in Nuremberg, by the way, the war in Bavaria came quite unexpected. The newspapers contained nothing of the conditions of the armies. We were thus restricted to private reports. Shortly before the outbreaks of hostilities, soldiers from Nuremberg were still writing home to their relatives here—with the most painful profusion of farewells for all eternity and renunciations of all hope and meeting again—that according to reliable reports everything was settled with Austria, and that they had marched through Bavaria long ago and were now already in Turkey, for they were now marching against the Turks. As it turned out, these people had not even reached the Bavarian border! Thus they took Bavaria

itself for Turkey, and the Old Bavarians for Muslims! Here is but further proof of the necessity of teaching the geography of the fatherland in the public elementary schools, so as to prevent similar blunders in the future.

With respect to the newspaper situation in Bamberg, your first letter [missing] was a great consolation to me. I have to be all the more grateful to you for this letter because your friendship was tried by ill health as well as by the unpleasantness of the matter. I recently heard from [your assistant] Rössler that occasionally you had not been feeling well. I imagine that with your work load it unfortunately could not be otherwise: you sacrifice yourself in place of us [*tu sacrificaris pro nobis*]. In the summer, however, you will probably take time for recovery. But I hardly dare delude myself with the hope of seeing you here. In his initial dismay, Stutzmann went off to Leipzig. He wrote me some time ago, however, that he is back in Erlangen and asks me to appeal to you for renewed efforts on his behalf—which as I see from your last letter is superfluous since you are already so very much intent on his welfare.

You are raising our hopes that in time something will be done for the external appearance of local establishments. How are matters proceeding in this respect? At least many a thing that in the beginning is deemed unbearable arouses only indifference as time goes on, though one never exactly gets used to it. What people above all do not understand is that there is no local authority that disposes over even a paltry sum to meet a most urgent need. Of the toilet system I do not want to talk any more. At present, for example, the sun is shining in a number of classes on the pupils' books, writings, eyes; or, if not that, they are seated so that, looking into their teacher's face, they see the sun literally rather than symbolically. That it is impossible to do anything about inconveniences of this sort is a peculiar type of impotence vis-à-vis that all-powerful and immovable Fate known as the *course of affairs*. I still find something contradictory in funding Nuremberg routinely—although, to be sure, no other city or region is more suited; for it is first necessary for a system to be established or created before anything exists to be routinely maintained. The other establishments of the Realm could be dragged along by such routine treatment because they already exist. But that we are being treated this way already before our birth is quite in character for Nuremberg, which abandons the unborn as well as the born to the same fate.

But what is most necessary would without a doubt be for me to get a *clerical assistant*. I can no longer dispense with one. Recently you raised our hope of receiving a disciplinary code. I am awaiting it impatiently. Yesterday, I received a memorandum on the school bookdealer. I see that what I noted in my general report—about the other bookstores selling schoolbooks no more expensively than the school store, which buys from other publishers—has had no effect. I do not say this as if I expected any result, for I am familiar enough with the practices of business life—of which I have a small portion in hand—to know that no result may be expected, but that one has to act out of sense of duty for duty's sake. But I do not see how rectors are to report their needs for the coming school year before the end of August, for exams have not yet given, and thus registration for next years' classes and the enrollment increase cannot be foreseen.

Recently you asked when I think I might finish with a philosophy teaching

manual for the gymnasiums. If charged with this, I can not promise it before next Easter. When I see further ahead and can get to the point of working it out, I want to submit to you the general plan for your judgment and decision beforehand. More about it then.

In [Gotthilf] Schubert [professor of natural science, and former student of Schelling's and Hegel's] and [Johann] Kanne [professor of history] you have sent me a couple of good men whose friendship and companionship are valued, and who are quite able teachers for the modern gymnasium. Incidentally, transferring the modern and classical gymnasium into separate locations would be of essential advantage. It would not hurt our classical gymnasium to have a few of this type also. The Kingdom of God is not to be won merely by the incantation of the words of Latin and Greek.

Mrs. von Jolli and von Siebein send their best regards to you and especially to the best of women. The husband of the former was just discharged from the military and will move to Mannheim with his wife. The latter mentions the hope of visiting you in Munich. When can I enjoy such good fortune? Our vacation arrives in one week; if this were the only determining factor, I would be with you in a single leap. So for now, as always, my most cordial greetings to the best of women and to Julius as likewise to you. Yours, Hegel.

Hegel to Niethammer [148]

Nuremberg, June 26, 1809

A long time has already passed, my dear friend, since I last received a letter from you, though official memoranda, on the other hand, arrive all the more frequently. Something of this sort has just now arrived. The more, however, I recognize your activity in such official correspondence and thus realize you have not forgotten us, the less do I find myself permitted to count on frequent conversation by letter on your part. . . .

You are guiding the organization [of our school system] to completion at a tremendous pace. I hear that orders have arrived for new construction as well. Our clerical assistant has not yet arrived, and from what I hear we must almost pray to God that he does not. I had hoped perhaps to use him to fill the urgent need for a copyist in the rector's office. But nothing of this is contained in his job description. Nothing would be more desirable than that the rector be given assistance of this nature. Perhaps the rector's assistant named in Bamberg has combined this with his other function. This copying of all manner of reports, attestations, memoranda, lists, and so on is the most annoying aspect of my office, and I would think such business would not be expected of a rector; it is dreadful and most repugnant waste of time. I do not know whether other rectors help themselves out by using their students for such tasks, but to me this seems an abuse, since in any case precious little can be confided to them. There are enough pensioners here, any one of whom—he need not exactly be a former mayor—could be assigned this work. Anyway, such a person has been assigned to help out the District School Councillor, and the clerical assistant in Bamberg is likewise said to have been employed in this way; the regular chancellory, it is said, was hardly in a position to contest [the

need of] the district school system. Perhaps a way might thus be found to relieve us rectors of the drudgery of copying. I hardly have time for any other work and, in any case, the next three months will be spent with these official distractions. Beyond the fact that the District School Councillor needs an assistant in school matters, one is also needed here for the admissions exam, which would still leave enough time for him to do the necessary copying for the rector's office. Yet it would be more natural for the gymnasium's clerical assistant to be assigned this task.

The latest thing I have received is the memorandum on vacations. I see from it that our Mr. District School Councillor [Paulus] aimed to squeeze something out of us even here, that he has offered five weeks after having granted six to us, but that you have warded off the threat and thwarted his aim in the gymnasium's regard. Yet you have allowed another of his schemes to pass—namely, burdening the gymnasium teachers with two more hours of class. On the one hand, I find it unfair that the local gymnasium teachers are to be singled out among all others in the Realm to teach three consecutive hours in the forenoon. On the other hand, our pupils are being loaded down with classes. Besides, I do not know why we have a directive if at every turn it is to be abrogated. No one can talk of private study [hours] for our pupils, since if the subject is broached with the District School Councillor he considers them completely superfluous. His only concept of educating the young is the misery of endless inculcating, reprimanding, memorizing—not even learning by heart but merely the misery of endless repetition, pressure and stupefaction, ceaseless spoon-feeding and stuffing. He cannot comprehend that in learning a young mind must in fact behave independently.

I hear that the construction plan has finally come back here approved. . . .

Paulus's family, you know, could not stand it here any longer and thus has been transported to Stuttgart. The Master has accompanied them there. The undoubted opinion of a few was that he was going there to "work things out." Perhaps after he gets his domestic cross off his back he will overcome this dissatisfied mood of his, assuming his family has not completely made up its mind that it is able to end its days only in Stuttgart—i.e., among the other Pauluses and the associated wasteland—as the only element in which it can endure matters after its obligatory years of military service [abroad].

Kanne recently married. I was present. Immediately after the wedding he began behaving unpleasantly toward his wife, and became so rude to her up until the evening that she ran out of the house at that point while he left for Würzburg, returning after six days to woo once more his new wife—who meanwhile had also traveled off—and to bring her back home. How good women always are. He now lives with her more or less satisfactorily [*taliter qualiter*].

June 29

I had gotten this far in my letter when it was interrupted by shameful events that have taken place here in the meantime. On Monday an Austrian patrol force arrived here. The municipal militia made no move to maintain order; its commander has been shamelessly mistreated, beaten up, and disarmed by the rabble at the city's gate. This rabble opened the gates and with the most dreadful and vociferous

cheers brought in the Austrians, stormed the police station, destroying windows, files—everything. The people tore down everywhere the Royal coat of arms. [General Commissioner] Count von Thürheim was lead from his residence on foot through the streets by lancers. The rabble seized him by the chest, crying out “You damned dog, you shall not leave our hands alive!” etc., pelting him and covering him with all manner of insults. The night before last the Count, Police Chief [Christian] Wurm, and General Postmaster [Ernst] von Axthelm were taken away by the Austrians, who themselves withdrew yesterday at two o’clock in the night, dragging off with them 50,000 florins in contributions along with obligations for another 50,000 florins, not to speak of requisitions for cloth and so on amounting to about 20,000 florins. Yesterday at twelve o’clock 600 French dragoons arrived, leaving again at half past five in order to chase down the Austrians—all in all 700 men, counting the territorial militia, with 200 horses. Another regiment of French dragoons is said to have simultaneously taken another route. We are awaiting the outcome today. The civilians lost no time saying in the face of such events that the French were in retreat. In short one cannot imagine a more abject civilian attitude and behavior. The first thing the municipal militia did upon reassembling at night after the Austrian retreat and strutting its uniform—but not its deeds—was to occupy our Sebald school, preventing classes from being held there since yesterday. The school is generally considered a choice guard post. Such violations occur continually, and Paulus has not yet been able to take energetic measures against them.

A few days ago I incidentally received a letter from [Johann] Erhardt in Schweinfurt. He had arrived here last winter already full of rage about the post he was assigned, and his experience of the post since then seems not to have improved his mood. I should indeed regard him capable of something better than the beginners’ class. Your judgment of his effectiveness is probably likewise that he is capable of more. . . . Your kindness and justice during this time of his testing will not keep Erhardt too long in suspense, in a drillmaster’s vale of tears, in Schweinfurt.

In looking over this letter, I find it does not contain too much in which to take delight. I hope all the more to hear from you soon, for all good gifts come from on high. My best compliments to the best of women; I especially want to ask her to include me in her prayers. Some time ago I heard of Julius that you are not entrusting him to the gymnasium establishments of Munich but to your own [private] arrangements. If our gymnasium could inspire you with the confidence you deny the establishments of Munich, your fatherly duty would require you to move here with you family. Most sincerely yours, Hegel.

HEGEL’S CRITICISM of rote memorization in his commentaries [148] on Paulus reminds us of Hegel’s virtual equation of memorization and desecration in the youthful poem of 1796 to Hölderlin [18]. Hegel was then smarting from the still fresh recollection of the rigors of his own seminary education. And elsewhere Hegel is critical of a hounding out of philological minutia that kills the spirit [211]. He notes that Luther and the Church Fathers quoted Scripture with free abandon, taking liberty with the letter if the cause of edification and enlightenment could thus

be served. Hegel himself took such liberties, not hesitating to quote classical authors imprecisely from memory [e.g. 141]. And yet as a pedagogue he recognized the necessity of mechanical memorization in early stages of a child’s education, defending a limited role for such memorization in his school addresses of 1809 and 1811 (*Werke* III, 231ff; 264ff). Thus his criticism of Paulus is not based on a one-sidedly Romantic conception of childhood and education, but on a quest for balance between the discipline of the schoolmaster and free development of his charges. Once more, Rousseau—in this case *Emile* rather than the *Social Contract*—was moderated but not repudiated.

NIETHAMMER VS. OLD BAVARIAN CLERICALISM

In September the outcome of the war was clear, but school finances were not improved. Hegel acknowledged a 50-florin raise, but along with all public employees and pensioners now had to subscribe to government bonds. And Niethammer’s archenemy von Weiller, though no longer in control of the school system, was still free to attack Niethammer publicly from his post as president of the Munich teaching establishments.

Hegel to Niethammer [150]

Nuremburg, September 2, 1809

. . . After an ordinance from the highest authorities—which cannot be praised and appreciated highly enough—decreeing that the budgets are to be prepared by joint action of the District School Councillor and the foundation’s administration, the Royal General Commissioner now issues instead ordinances stipulating that budgets be established on the one hand by us—though our unilateral formulation will be neither very accurate nor well measured—and, on the other hand, by the foundation administrative office. But the administrative office, which in any case already has its hands full and has not been informed of our exact needs, is threatened with a . . . fine in Imperial thalers. Yet the office has its hands tied because it is not instructed to deliver a budget to the General Commissioner but rather to formulate a joint statement along with the responsible councillor who, however, refuses to condescend to such work. As matters now stand the administration, which ordinarily is and would be very cooperative, has already registered a complaint here and will have to do so in Munich as well. The old time-consuming shuttle by which inaccurate and poorly fashioned budgets leave the General Commissioner for Munich only to be sent back here for examination by the foundation administration seems about to return. Thus one side holds onto the matter while the other refuses to let go. We, however, are the Greeks being punished in the matter [*Achivi, qui plectuntur*].

Yesterday I told my pupils at the end of the lecture that I would be away on a trip until Tuesday. But they all vehemently objected in a general clamor that the exam was on Tuesday. In this way I found out, according to habitual procedures here, that on this day the exam will indeed begin, and thus I can now report this to you as well.

You know better than anyone how harassed we rectors are, since it is you who

have put us in our present situation. But I gladly put up with it out of insight into the utility and necessity of it all. For about three months, I might add, I have hardly been able to do justice to my lectures let alone work on something else. Oh beneficent gods! [*di meliora!*] I recently discovered something of this *beneficence*, namely, that for us rectors 50 florins have already been added to the budget. I express my heartfelt gratitude to the powers that be [*Deus in machina*] who are responsible. Now I only have to work to bring this little treasure safely to port, shielding it from the voracious appetite of the public bond issue—alongside the free lodging which I have already obtained over and above the 1,000-florin salary. I hope this time to evade the dragon which immediately opens its jaws to devour what your generosity has procured for us.

Among the rumors circulating here is the one according to which the three foundation administrators want to lay down their offices, while other rumors have it that another thirty administrators from the region intend to do the same. It now looks as if the numbers of items on the agenda is expanding beyond what can possibly be handled. One of these administrators is said to have indicated it was presently his responsibility, among other things, to do 9,000 tables; it may be said in passing he did not know how he was going to get it all done. . . .

September 4

Yesterday I took a side trip to Altorf along with City Administrator [Paul Wolfgang] Merkel and Finance Councillor [Karl] Roth, who is going to marry Merkel's daughter in a week. I saw the university there for the first time. I found the professors there wearing a hair style of powdered pigeon-wings and a catagon. They have a botanical garden which cannot be compared with the vegetable patches between Kamsdorf and Wenigenjena, for it is smaller. Nor have I seen any horseradish in it. The houses, on the other hand, are rather like those in Kamsdorf and Wenigenjena with one exception among the latter. The surrounding meadows, by the way, are quite attractive, and there is an enviable promenade site, Grünsperg. Roth will be able to decide on resuming a university career only with difficulty. As far as I am concerned, I look forward to your ulterior employment of me with confidence as well as patience. Your greeting I extend in the interim [*vale interim*] to our whole intermittent era [*Interimistizität*]. . . . Yours, Hegel

So is [Councillor Karl] Fuchs with you, seeing that you send me his greetings? Last night he was here; the most interesting thing I, and nobody but I, heard from him was that your situation is unfortunately still far from being put right and that you are still far from content. I had hopes based on the step you took in this regard and the Minister's attitude. I cannot say how sorry I am, first because of the Cause, which is like a chain in which every link depends on you; and secondly because of your personal situation, caught as it is between the demands of the Cause and what your own honor requires. The whole situation looks all the more suspicious to me because Fuchs has obtained a copy for me of Weiller's speech, which is supposed to be malicious, but which is at once capable of no more than a mere attempt [in this direction], of the triviality of malice. I must confess I do not understand how a person could have the insolence to speak in this malicious tone in

the first place, and, what is even more, in the immediate presence of the very highest authorities of the Realm; nor, secondly, how he was permitted to print it; nor, thirdly, how authorities can fail to rebuke such a violation of respect toward you, such a spirit of outspoken opposition from an organ which has the absolute duty of expressing itself publicly only in your support. That the whole thing is miserable, commonplace, empty, and dull is not to be taken as an excuse or motive for contempt but rather, on top of spitefulness, adds proof of general stupidity and incapacity.

Today, the 7th—for this letter has still been left lying around—our oral examinations start. They have been postponed due to the illness of President Paulus, who, if necessary, will be able to attend today for an hour. Colleague [Ludwig] Heller's miserable petty vanity is almost more ridiculous than annoying in its equally petty effects on us. *Apropos*, the list of prizes we submitted has not yet been ratified. If ratification does not come on time, we cannot award the prizes before vacation! In any case, it will hardly be before Michaelmas. Prizes from French [literature] and on the fine arts have been forgotten by Paulus—or myself. If you do not still add them we will not be able to distribute any.

Yet now I definitely have to end this letter, which I see contains complaints or annoyances with which I should not trouble you in the least, since surely you already have enough. With regard to me, I should add, do not suppose they affect me greatly. Far from it! At most for a moment. So I am no longer troubled by them and can calmly gaze at whatever of this sort goes amiss, be it in me or in my surroundings. My interest in it is aroused only insofar as I believe myself thereby able to achieve something. The rest does not interest me, and so I am on the whole content. Once again a hearty farewell. Yours, Hegel

ON SEPTEMBER 29 Hegel gave the first of his official addresses to the graduating class and assembled parents. It was an occasion to explain the classical gymnasium centering around the studies of ancient languages and literature, especially Greek (*Werke* III, 231-45). A copy went to Niethammer on October 4 along with a letter expressing pessimism about Niethammer's prospects in Bavaria. The University of Altorf, where he had only recently hoped to follow Niethammer to a faculty position [135], had closed on September 24. And von Weiller's speech in Munich [150 above] aroused talk that Niethammer's curriculum might be reversed. In August [149] a Jena student of Hegel's, Peter Gabriel van Ghert of Holland, offered to help Hegel escape by means of a faculty appointment in a Dutch university. The only good news was that the peace treaty with Austria was imminent. It was signed ten days later. The news seemed particularly good because Bavaria could expect to receive French-occupied Erlangen and its university.

Hegel to Niethammer [151]

Nuremberg, October 4, 1809

At long last, my dear friend, our examinations and prize distributions are over; we are probably the last ones in the Realm. You will receive very soon the school yearbook [*Katalog*] containing my address, which extols the study of an-

cient literature but does so on a rather general level, first because a public school address implies the right and even duty to expound commonplaces, but also because I am currently so distracted by wearisome official duties that any orderly connection of thoughts is impossible. To be sure we are now on vacation, but I still have to spend most of my vacation on such matters. Only now have I really experienced the vexation of combining administration with a scholarly appointment. If one is but an administrator, well and good—for the time being one puts scholarship aside, perhaps coming to it subsequently [*in horis subsecivis*] for enjoyment. Yet if at the same time the business of teaching is connected with that office, neither leaves the other in peace. One always has before one's eyes the contrast between scholarly endeavor and the wretched formalities of administration. In France *lycées*, gymnasiums, have a *proviseur* who is to be sure a scholar but who has only to take care of the externals of administration, so that the teachers are spared this kind of work. The headmaster [*proviseur*] thus has total peace and quiet to fight his way on every paltry matter through all those wretched formalities and pressures imposed by various authorities. Yet my last letter was so full of complaints that I do not want to start in again now. Our hopes that construction would get underway have not been fulfilled. Since it has started to turn cold I suffer continuously from rheumatism, and gave my speech with a toothache and swollen cheeks. For the draft in my room is no doubt capable of eliciting pleasant sounds from an aeolian harp, but can only cause me torment. As for the other school sites, urgent assistance is needed so that courses can begin. But these locales have not yet even been transferred to the foundation's administration for public instruction, so that nobody is really taking care of the matter. . . .

So Altorf has been abolished. A short while ago it was said here that you had voted for a special theological school, and that this plan, along with the counter-proposal which Privy Councillor von Zentner supported to establish a Protestant theological faculty at Landshut, had been presented to the Minister. Weiller's speech and his visit with you are causing much talk among functionaries at the lower levels about a meeting of the school sections convoked without you and a forthcoming new school plan. If you abandon ship, I shall go to *Holland*, where a prospect has recently arisen for me. I want to reply one of these days, and do not want to turn down the services offered by a friend [van Ghert]. Yet I will of course let everything depend completely on you. Köppen is said to be going to Munich and is to pass through here shortly. Is there something to this? One might well prefer going to Holland over Landshut, I might add. In the ordinance concerning Altorf I noticed that only two solutions were indicated for the theologians there: a university either where there is already a theological faculty or where one could easily be established. The special theological school thus seemed to have been dropped. God willing we will soon have or perhaps already do have peace, in which case the first solution will be fully present in Erlangen.

We are now of course on vacation. I also have your kind invitation to come see you in Munich, but, among other things, lack money for it. For the last two months we have received no salary. I would also like to take up and successfully conclude another business, namely, to take a wife, or rather find one! What do you

say to that? If only the best of women were here I would be asking her incessantly to help locate a wife for me. For in anyone else I would not have confidence, least of all in myself. Soon I will be forty years old, and I am a Swabian. I therefore wonder whether I should not take this step quickly before I irrevocably turn forty, since afterwards it might no longer be possible; nor do I know for sure whether my forty Swabian years [i.e., the Swabian age of reason, according to common opinion] have not already taken their toll on me. . . .

I kiss a thousand times over the beautiful hands of the best of women. God may and shall preserve her as befits her merit ten times longer than the woman of whose death we recently learned here [Caroline Schelling], and of whom a few here have enunciated the hypothesis that the Devil had fetched her.³

Farewell, and may the clouded political horizon of the schools clear up, giving rise to a pure empyrean. And do give me a slot to peek through from time to time, so as to give orientation not so much to my actions as to my hopes or cares. For the sake of all of us, take care. Yours, Hegel

Hegel to Niethammer [153]

Nuremberg, December 21, 1809

What, my dear friend, is causing the long silence you have been keeping in letter writing as also in official ordinances? . . .

At present there is really nothing much to write about. As is known, the administration of our educational foundation has been dissolved. Since the reason was insufficiency of funds for the normal support of an administrator, for the time being there is no prospect of an increase in funds. There are at once reports that an end has been put to the administrator's disbursement for our salaries of monies placed in the fund expressly for this purpose. He has thus explained that from now on he can no longer pay us anything; yet the amount which he requests be deposited in the fund is so great that everything deposited in two years would perhaps hardly suffice. We are thus left high and dry but must accordingly believe help is all the closer.

However, we were still able to start with the lectures, since the day before the new classes started wood was delivered and the stoves painted. . . . Conditions inside our school have improved. May God but preserve its existing organization; and, inasmuch as this is so closely connected with your person, we must hope you are inclined to expend all due energy to this end. . . .

The [Bavarian] Crown Prince is expected to arrive here only today. I had started this letter earlier and wanted to wait to be able to fill it with news of His stay here, perhaps with regard to the schools. But since the mail coach is leaving tomorrow, I do not want to wait any longer to send you a small sample of the well-known products of our local [baking] industry. The detailed, well-written story of the Crown Prince's diversions in Bamberg—and even more so the school president's—you will have read in the local district correspondence. Hardly so much of it will be related here. Whatever state property is still here in the way of

³She married Schelling in 1803 after divorcing August Schlegel.

old paintings has been collected, along with the products of local artistic industry. The women are having *Court* gowns made. As for the rest of us, we are not yet in uniform for the eventuality of our being presented. Actually, a part of my staff looks quite gouty, as befits schoolmasters; and the black attire with white gloves which is usual among them is perhaps most suitable, though we rather resemble, when parading by, a procession of gravediggers.

People are preoccupied here with the imminent demise of the name of our fatherland, so that we will all come from a land which no longer exists; our dear compatriots, however, may fall into such a daze that they will long be driven around by their loss searching hopelessly for themselves. They will be [even] more startled by the [territorial] divorce of the left and right banks of the Neckar than by Emperor Napoleon's divorce [from Josephine on December 16], which has won him disfavor and disrepute among all the local women.

P.S. I have missed the mail coach. For the present I shall thus let this letter go [as it is], for it has been much too long since I have been in touch with you. The Crown Prince arrived here at nine o'clock last evening.

Yesterday I found out by chance that the general report on the curriculum has not yet left the local General Commissioner's office for Munich! In the meantime, I cordially wish you farewell and present my most respectful compliments a thousand times over to the best of women. Your most loyal Hegel. Nuremberg, December 28, 1809

THE CONTENT of Hegel's letter of mid-March [154] continued to be chiefly political. The "stupidity of Munich" which Hegel mentions is a writing by Christoph von Aretin, an Old Bavarian adversary of the North German Protestants. Von Aretin denounced Jacobi, Niethammer, Schelling, and others to Napoleon as friends of the Prussians and English (von Aretin, *Napoleon's Plans and His German Opponents*, 1809). Jacobi, with Niethammer's support, filed suit for slander, though the Bavarian court limited itself to relieving von Aretin of his librarianship in Munich.

Hegel to Niethammer [154]

Nuremberg, March 15, 1810

The kind letter you last sent gave me not only the pleasure of hearing from you again but also the even greater pleasure of [looking forward to] seeing you here in person. . . .

March 16th. Having written this much, I now receive another letter from you. Your instructions will be followed on the spot. In this letter you express more hope of improving our condition. . . . You write that the modern gymnasium is very dear to your heart—maybe because parents are said to love most of all their weak and deformed children. I will not fail to inform [Gotthilf] Schubert of your consolation. Such earthly comfort will moreover be good for him alongside the heavenly comfort which he is beginning to seek from the Pietists, and which, God help him, he may perhaps only find in the One True Church outside of which there is no salvation. [Johann] Kanne was more markedly deranged than I knew him to be. I do not know if he has improved much in the half year that has now passed since I

saw him on his wedding day, when a few hours after the ceremony he ran away for a week—though afterwards reconciling himself with his wife. Paulus is thus of the opinion that a few energetic strokes are still needed if our idea is not to go completely to the dogs here on account of personalities, since it surely has not been supported so far on the material plane. Yet you will best see everything with your own eyes when you come.

Speaking of "the One True Church," it occurs to me that we were amply astonished by the one true church of Munich beastliness. Had it been my job to write something about it, I would have demonstrated that the people causing this vile noise are neither donkeys, oxen, sheep, nor foxes, nor any other animal. For all these animals retain a certain consistency and orderliness in their respective kinds of stupidity and rudeness, according to their various natures. These people are rather swines whose nature it is, piglike and devoid of all modesty, to produce a swinish mixture of understanding and stupidity, ignorance and insolence, meanness and cowardice, craftiness and banality, East and West—it is all such a swampy stinking mess that those against whom the mess is concocted must offend all their senses if they wish to attack this swinery properly. One might credit these people with cunning and merit if it were not the nature of muck to make it difficult to know how to handle it. The latest we know here is the order of silence, and the rumor that the Municipal Court has declined to hear the complaint. By the way, this order coming only now—together with both the recent edict proscribing membership in foreign scholarly societies without prior notification and many [other] indications here in the course of the summer—shows that these [von Aretin's] charges have been spreading in high places. It may not be too much to say, however, that the envy which academics arouse in all administrators—an envy directed above all against a certain humiliating superiority of academics generally, accompanied by a peculiar habit of always conceding something to a higher authority which degrades him [*deprimiert*] or is apt to do so—probably licenses the assumption that with the decree of silence the matter may more or less be over, that serious consequences are hardly to be feared, and that since one has had and heard enough of the matter it may be with it as with a joke or diversion [*Seguade*] which is finally at an end and which would cause boredom and actually spoil the interest perhaps earlier attached to it as a diversion were it still to be taken seriously.

Since the Minister is to return now, we may soon expect information on many matters. Here we do not know anything more definite about the catastrophe said to have threatened the foundation's [educational] section. All we have been assured is that instructions were received to put its accounts in order, and that it was facing liquidation. Both of these reports are alleged to be certain. But the prevarications and surely infamous rumors that Mr. [Ferdinand] von Hartmann is to be hanged have been dissipated. What is most to be desired is that the manner of administering the foundation's property—combining formal strictures, a pedantic preoccupation with tabulated order, material dishonesty, spoliation, and total disorder in the matter—finally cease. As regards the only expense which we occasion, namely our salaries, we live from hand to mouth. We owe every installment we receive, as

it were, to chance, and with every installment paid by the administrator comes the probability of perhaps not receiving anything more for six months. It is even worse in Ansbach. I do not know how things are in Ulm. Is the fate of the *Catholic* establishments left dangling like that of the Protestant ones? For comparison, conditions at newly established institutions, perhaps in Passau or Tyrol, would of course have to be noted. A few months ago I noted with envy that the ever so deserving university in Innsbruck, where a few professors preached rebellion from the rooftops and on the streets, was solemnly consecrated by being awarded the university seal.⁴ Here I still have no official seal.

Since Paulus wishes to rid himself of school affairs, he has assigned me the task of working them out here and, what is more, has assigned me his daughter as well. However, I am the right man for neither. A professor in Munich wrote to one of our professors here that the faculty at establishments there, in Augsburg, and here are to receive both a salary increase and the rank of councillor. The second item makes the first as well look suspicious to me. I asked those who told me this to keep it quiet so as not to make fools of ourselves.

In your next letter, which I look forward to receiving soon, I hope to find the day of your arrival fixed. As judged by the numerous affairs awaiting you here, your stay will not be less than a month. Anyhow, your love of construction, which I assume has not become rusty from being confined to offices, will here be given an extensive field of application. I am indeed confident that our local planners will reach no general agreement [covering all contingencies], and that a higher authority is definitely needed on the spot to bring matters to a solid decision and thorough ordering. For otherwise only the most urgent needs will be taken care of. The higher authorities suppose that everything, and even more, has been done when in fact a fourth or half remains in the same old state of ruin which has been developing for a hundred years but which will surely not be removed before yet another hundred years.

There was a man who said that a pretty woman had eyed him, to which it was replied: "So has the sun shone on a dunghill." Pass quickly through the part of the zodiac you still have to cover so as to put the sign of the pig behind you and reach your own sign, that of the pelican, which tears open its chest to give drink to us—to its young, who are sufficiently thirsty and hunger. For we as well have attained closely enough the status of dunghills. In this latter capacity you have no need to bring our affairs to complete putrefaction since they are already quite rotten, and your effect will therefore merely be the more enjoyable one of fertilization and cultivation. And in our capacity as young pelicans, who owe their life to the blood you continuously pour out for us, we yearn with inexpressible longing to bring to you our filial thanks and veneration. . . . Yours, Hegel

A LETTER of May 11 found Hegel and his faculty defending the recent secularization of the school system against reactionary threats. Hegel's reference to eternal bliss if he does not suffer rejection is at first more cryptic. When Niethammer had

⁴Tyrol rebelled against Bavaria and Napoleon in 1809.

urged marriage on Hegel just before assumption of his new duties in Nuremberg, Hegel did not object [141]. Paulus, shortly after Hegel's arrival in Nuremberg, spoke of "finding a slow but faithful girl from Nuremberg" [143]. By October 1809 Hegel expressed the desire to bring the matter of finding a wife to a happy conclusion but is reluctant to proceed without advice [151]. On May 11, 1810, he is relying in part on the intercession of Nuremberg businessman and city father Paul Wolfgang Merkel to help gain entry for him into patrician circles in Nuremberg, where, a year later, he will report having won the heart of Marie von Tucher [188; Ch 9].

Hegel to Niethammer [156]

Nuremberg, May 11, 1810

Your wife is here, my dear friend, but not you. Yet your better part is here [*pars melior tui*], is it not? For she represents your role as a private individual, husband and father, which at least is more agreeable to you than your roles as administrator, Protestant, and North German. The best of women arrived here yesterday afternoon in good shape, fresh and healthy. What a pleasure it was to speak with her this morning! You and she together constitute the major portion, the substance of my existence. [Josef] Bayard, [Karl] Fuchs, and [Johann Friedrich?] Krafft have been here for five to six days. She will be accompanying them tomorrow [Saturday] to Bamberg if we fail to retain her here longer. She has already recounted a lot, and things after all are beginning to look better than we imagined here, simply because they had become worse, more awful, than could have been imagined.

And you, my dear man, want to come here only at the end of the school year. But your wish and our hope of seeing you here on business, the best of women tells me, are not yet abandoned and put off.

If I ask and implore you above all to carry out this idea when the Minister returns, you may suspect that my wish to see you plays a greater part in my urging you than the exigencies of the case, and, in a sense, you would be right. For although everything essential—or [rather] many an essential matter—falls through when you are not personally present, I must say that this headache does not after all lie as close to my heart as does the pleasure of seeing you again. You, on the other hand, should allow this headache to be taken increasingly to heart, and from what has been done and from what is proper [*ex actis et protocollis*] you should convince yourself and everyone else that a trip here is simply unavoidable for you. The most important motive is that you will be escaping for a few moments the general swinery and will remove yourself from your usual sphere. Our local little honest domestic swinery—as much or as little as you wish to look into it—will be real relaxation for you.

I have already told the best of women that I am at a turning point: if only I am not turned down I will accede to eternal bliss. Yet why could I, or can I, not discuss this with you? Besides I am not acting in the matter on my own; the matter rather is in the good though still very general and distant [*weitwändig*] hands of City Administrator Merkel. I told him in this regard, in the hope that you would soon

come here, that I neither could do, or would wish to do, anything more definite without your advice and consent. It is not a subject that permits of being much written about. Come soon, so that I may still receive your consent, and your not so much temporal as eternal blessing. I have not yet been able to ask the best of women whether she knew anything of the temporal blessing projected by you, or how matters stand with it.

In short, reasons and interests do not lack to bring you here very soon. In the coming week [New Testament scholar Johann] Griesbach will arrive with thick [beer] mugs [Steine] and a thin wife.

Still another little headache! The professors at our progymnasium, etc., are extremely displeased at having to go to church for religious instruction. What is essentially at stake is the former subordination of the teaching profession to the clergy and the clerical estate. All took courage from your oral promise two years ago that they would be liberated from this, as also from the later actual arrival of this liberation. This role of pawns, of overseers in the service of the clergy, a service which no one performs for them in their own teaching fields, they see as a return to the former state of affairs—but even then this sort of thing never occurred—and they are quite incensed. Yet I know that you do all you can in favor of liberality.

I have no message to convey from your wife since I forgot to tell her of this letter. Farewell. Yours, Hegel

P.S. This letter was too late to depart with yesterday's mail. But seeing that wives are always more expeditious than us, your wife did mail a letter, and thus has reached you before me with this. I still spent yesterday afternoon in her company. The suitcase has arrived safely and was sent off. The best of women resumed her trip at six o'clock this morning, naughtily abandoning us just as things here were about to please her; as for herself, she has been and is everywhere found to be pleasing.

WHAT HEGEL ON March 15 had referred to as the "beastliness" of clericalist Christoph von Aretin and the Old Bavarian party he stylizes in an August 7 letter to the antiphilanthroponist Niethammer as hoggishness (*hyozoism*).

Hegel to Niethammer [161]

Nuremberg, August 7, 1810

Since I have not written to you for a long time, my dear friend, I have not received a letter from you in a long time either. . . .

With us there seems at present to be a method to Fate, whereby it puts off [fulfillment of] our expectations so long that whether they are fulfilled or not becomes a matter of indifference. As with many other things, Fate achieves its purposes here as well; it has been able to dull all desires except the longing for your presence. I hope—without wanting to count on it—that you hold to [your promise] for the beginning of September. If you do, you will still in part come for examinations at the modern gymnasium. Our examinations here start August 13. I

above all associate your arrival with them because they constitute the objective concern which all of us here necessarily share for the time being, and to which we assign the greatest interest—though without knowing your opinion of it. Other more subjective interests are so completely relegated by this and still other objective interests to the background and even—through the above trick of Fate—to the past that I will wait upon your arrival before bringing them to life again. As for the capacity in which you will be coming—be it *only* as a friend or in some official capacity as well, *though* I would in any case regard the former more highly than the latter—just do not come as a mere bird of passage viewing our city as a mere relay station. I suspect an official capacity from the fact that, among the many dispositions to be taken regarding our establishments, not a single one has yet been decided. I presume everything has been reserved for your personal judgment. Yet, as I mentioned, these dispositions as well belong to those things over which expectation itself has become dulled. The same was true in the case of Erlangen and Bayreuth, the transfer of which [to Bavaria] in the end created a pleasant sensation only because the news of this transfer now finally stopped arriving.

As for Erlangen, it was assured here that the King had promised the deputies from Bayreuth that the university would be maintained. Yet the question is whether its maintenance is going to mean any more than that it is not to be knocked down. Is the question being addressed? Or are you addressing it? Is the university to maintain its character, or to be given a new one? Or is it to be drawn under hoggishness and be thoroughly combined in with it? There was talk here of a university at Regensburg as also of a comprehensive university in Munich. If it is not too late, I want to ask if you can think of me, and want you to take under counsel the question as to how I could at least be freed of the rectorship and merely retain the professorship so as to draw closer to what I am accustomed to consider my true vocation and to devote myself [more] to it—even if I am unable to return to it as soon as I might desire.

You will tell us of the further course the outbreak of fanatic hoggishness has taken with you, and whether it has not generally petered out. It was rumored here that those arrested were released, and that the period of their detention was credited to them as punishment. If this is so, a sentence has presumably been passed. . . .

I recently received from the best of women in Jena a letter which at more than one point was written in jest—it seems as if special considerations had given her cause to pull my leg—but which also had some serious content. At that time she still knew nothing definite of your trip either. She found it opportune to take Ludwig [Döderlein] out of the school at Pforta, and she will probably bring him along.

On your arrival it will be most interesting for me to hear from you how you have since specified and set up your sphere of administrative activity, how far you have progressed back from the brink of despair. Do not wait until then, however, to give us a little information about your plans. In the meantime, farewell. Are you not going to bring Julius along, whom you cannot leave alone in Munich and who will also be on vacation? Yours, Hegel

Niethammer's visit to Nuremberg had already taken place when on September 27 [165] Hegel next wrote a personal letter to him. The school catalogue Hegel sent with this letter contained his second annual address to parents and pupils, on the theme of discipline (*Werke* III, 246-63). Likewise mentioned in the letter is a report on the modern gymnasium addressed a week earlier to the local General Commissioner, Count Friedrich von Thürheim. This report also touches on discipline; written in the form of an epistle, it is translated below. The school address of September 1809 had examined the classical gymnasium. The report on the modern gymnasium, however, argues that distaste for the discipline of learning classical languages increases the modern gymnasium's popularity as a way of bypassing the classical gymnasium on the way to the university. Hegel clearly saw the modern gymnasium as a threat to the classical gymnasium—even though the rector of the Nuremberg modern gymnasium, Gotthilf Heinrich von Schubert, was a speculative natural philosopher, not a natural scientist. Hegel's reservations about the modern gymnasium further illustrate his critical distance as a member of the universal class from popular opinion. The classical gymnasium represented wholeness and the integration of culture, while specialized vocational schools stood for the inevitable fragmentation of modern civil society. The modern gymnasium fell in between. It was too theoretical for those destined for specialized training outside the university, and too utilitarian for the university-trained universal class—i.e., the Hegelian counterpart of Plato's philosopher-king class.

Hegel to Royal General Commissioner
[*Nürn Schrift*, 417ff]

Nuremberg, September 19, 1810

A gracious ordinance issued by the Royal General Commission on August 15 this year instructs the undersigned rector's office, in compliance with the Royal Ministerial decree from Munich of August 1, "respectfully to report in detail on the results of experience thus far, however incomplete, with the modern gymnasium, as likewise on the public's wishes noted in connection with a few teaching specializations—the whole report being drafted with primary regard to three questions." In following these instructions from the highest authorities, the undersigned convened a meeting on August 18 of the gymnasium faculty and rectors of the two subsidiary schools to consider the matter. Yet because of the intervening examinations and activities surrounding prize distributions, the undersigned's humble report on the subject could be drafted only later.

Both the public's wishes and, more particularly, the experience gained with the modern gymnasium must inevitably have concerned the rector's office of the modern gymnasium itself more than the undersigned. The rectorate of the classical gymnasium, lacking the more exact data necessary for a judgment, can expand on the modern gymnasium only with respect to aspects lying within its own horizon.

We first note that the public's wishes in the matter are generally not to be taken into consideration. For there are parents who merely wish to see their children get ahead in the world with the least effort on the part of the children, and

the least cost to the parents. Such parents unfortunately view required training in higher culture [*geistige Ausbildung*] and science as but a means and painful condition from which they would gladly see their children freed. At the very least they would have their children finish with such training as quickly and conveniently as possible. Of Greek and Latin in particular such parents recall only the bitter toil they had to expend on these languages in their youth due to faulty arrangements and poor methods. Yet in part these parents are ungrateful to such instruction, seeing no utility in it because no direct use is made of the two languages. For they have not come to insight into, or consciousness of, the spiritual [*geistig*] influence which such training has had on them and—unbeknownst to them—continues to have. The better portion of the public remains aloof to the views of this portion which wishes its children to reap the harvest without ever having had to sow or till. His Majesty's Government is even more removed from these views, since it repudiates such wishes *as much* in the requirements it sets for employment in the civil service in its different branches as in its insistence that a civil servant possess the sort of general culture which exerts such great influence—indeed the greatest of influence—on his specialized employment.

The more precise demands the public must make upon establishments of learning viewed as training institutes for employment in the state are primarily fixed by these requirements and the needs of the state. The vocations given to the young are oriented by these requirements and needs, as also is the public's wish to find opportunities of providing the young with a good preparation for such vocations.

In light of the unanimous view emerging from the aforementioned faculty meeting, it now indeed appears that a particular wish of the public may have gone unnoticed, namely the wish for a publicly provided opportunity for young people, after two years' attendance in the modern middle school [*Realschule*], to take a four-year course of study at a modern gymnasium viewed as an intermediary school preparing them for the university. The rectorate of the modern gymnasium will be able to give precise data on this, as to how many and what kind of pupils are found there who do not wish to take only a one- or two-year course but a full four-year course in order to matriculate at the university. Yet the scope of the received instructions obliges the undersigned rector's office to cite most humbly in the present report the following circumstances regarding the extent to which the public may harbor such a wish, or in light of perceived needs may in the future harbor it even more.

To consider more closely the *individual vocations* for which a higher preparatory institute is needed, a classical gymnasium education is by general agreement indispensable for pupils destined for *theology* and *jurisprudence*. Investigation as to whether the same is true of *medicine*—be it the science and art of medicine viewed absolutely or merely in its presently constituted form—exceeds the competence of the undersigned rectorate. It may simply be noted here that even if [classical] gymnasium studies may not be absolutely necessary, the opinion that they are necessary still most definitely prevails among the public. It would be difficult to find a father who does not prefer any son whom he has destined to

medicine to pursue such studies. Even more noteworthy is the positive determination by Royal edicts—*Governmental Paper*, 1808, p. 2894ff.—that the written and oral examination of medical students by the Medical Board shall occur in Latin. The necessity of a classical gymnasium education is also recognized for those who wish to devote themselves to the *teaching profession* in academic schools or institutes.

For other vocations, on the other hand, classical gymnasium studies may appear more dispensable. To be sure the completion of such studies is required by the authorities for those who “in the fields of political economy and public finance aspire to positions higher than simple clerks”—*Ibid.*, 1809, 1332. The same requirement goes for *postal candidates*—*Ibid.*, 1808, 937—and pupils in the topographical school—*Ibid.*, 1809, 1657. Yet inasmuch as certification of maturity for university admission may be distributed by the modern gymnasiums, the same opportunity will have been extended to the just-mentioned vocations as well. The extent to which knowledge of ancient languages and classical literature may be dispensable to aspirants to higher posts in political economy and public finance, so that it makes no difference whether they go through the classical or modern gymnasium, is beyond the competence of the undersigned rectorate. What the undersigned does know is that the study of public finance by tradition is often pursued in connection with that of law, as when Royal regulations allow candidates to take examinations for high-level posts in both fields. But the undersigned must let the higher authorities determine how indispensable the study of law is to higher posts in finance, not even to mention the extent to which such posts at once thus might be removed from the higher culture peculiar to the classical gymnasium. What is freely admitted is at least that those to whom the path of the modern gymnasium stands open can also opt for the classical gymnasium. All that can perhaps be said is that in the classical gymnasium they will learn a few things that cannot directly be put to empirical use, but that they will otherwise acquire proper preparation for every specialization that can be studied at the university.

Thus far the experience of the classical gymnasium is that such pupils are either advised by the rectorate to present themselves for admission to the modern gymnasium or *they* decide, by themselves, seeing that they have been making no progress in classical studies, including both ancient languages and the other subject matters as well. In principle the undersigned rectorate cannot attribute lack of ability for ancient languages to the absence of a specific talent for these languages, but only to a lack of talent for higher humanistic [*geistig*] culture as a whole. Those who forsake ancient languages must still learn modern languages, and the lack of talent for the former would imply a lack of talent for the latter as well if it were only a question of languages. But with the learning of ancient languages is connected first the higher study of grammatical concepts, and secondly that of classical literature. It is in this that the specificity of classical gymnasium instruction is to be found. Since such pupils either had no natural ability or suffered from an early neglect of their training, it was not to be expected that they would make much progress in any higher scientific culture, even should it take another form than classical studies.

The rector's office of the modern gymnasium will be able to speak of the character and vocation of those who entered the modern gymnasium directly with the aim of matriculating at the university. The undersigned believes himself obliged to surmise this much: quite a few of them will have been too spoiled by an overly permissive or precious upbringing for, in the first place, their parents and, in the second place, they themselves to seek after learning in earnest and make the effort required by the study of ancient languages.

Whether the number of those who freely wish on such grounds to choose the path of the modern gymnasium is great enough to necessitate a whole establishment for themselves alone; to what extent deference ought to be paid to such free choice; whether many from other parts of the Realm might seek out the modern gymnasiums instead of attending the classical gymnasium of their native or district city which offers preparation for the university or for those other fields; whether many out-of-towners are to be expected—all these questions go beyond the undersigned's horizon and experience. The general decline in the number of pupils due to the ever-increasing cost of study—here due in particular to the interruption of grants over a number of years despite the current resumption of their distribution—will perhaps still come up for consideration. The local classical gymnasium does not have so many pupils that it would not be able to accept those who wish to prepare for the university via the modern gymnasium.

If those who wished to pass from the modern gymnasium to the university were numerous enough, it would be worth noting that such an establishment would function for them more as a *lyceum* than as a secondary school parallel to the classical gymnasium. Since, with the work at the modern gymnasium included, they devote five years to studying mathematics in some expanse—which for medical doctors is surely too much in addition to physics, mineralogy, botany, zoology, chemistry, and so forth—it becomes superfluous for them to undertake an overall course at a university or a lyceum. They can immediately enter upon the specialized course of study in their field. Yet the gaps will remain which classical gymnasium study as the study of the *humaniora*, of universal human culture, serves to fill. Such study has an intermediate position between elementary school instruction and the study of the other special sciences. It is forever to be viewed as in principle the foundation of all higher humanistic science and culture.

Certain isolated individuals who have made physics, chemistry, natural history, and the like their exclusive science are from time to time cited as providing examples of vocations for which classical gymnasium studies are superfluous. Yet such single cases are not to be taken into account. For no father will wish to give his son such a vocation, of which hardly even a few positions within a state have exclusive need. Those who develop such an inclination later can pass over to it from general preparatory institutions, and it will have been useful to have attended such an institution earlier.

Besides the vocations mentioned thus far, there are many pupils for whom a modern gymnasium can be almost indispensable, but for whom whiling away four years there until eighteen years of age is burdensome. Thus someone headed for the *military class* will not easily wish to remain in a general preparatory establish-

ment until such an age, but rather will have had time enough by the sixteenth year to acquire the necessary theoretical knowledge to embark on his career. All the more so in that he finds in the Royal School for Cadettes in Munich a special school with a program expressly stating that, alongside the acquisition of theoretical knowledge, the particular orientation of this calling and its specific practical exercises and skills must be developed and learned early.

Those devoting themselves to *landscaping, waterworks, road construction, and field surveying* cannot pursue a purely theoretical course of study up until their eighteenth year. They rather must receive early practice in the necessary skills and acquire empirical knowledge and dexterity, devoting to this the most considerable portion of their time, especially in short winter days. If no special schools exist in their fields, they will attach themselves as an apprentice to an architect long before their eighteenth birthday. The same goes for those intent on *forestry*. After acquiring the necessary general and school knowledge, they will attach themselves to a forestry officer at sixteen or seventeen years of age, or will go off even earlier to a forestry school of the sort where, alongside theoretical knowledge, they receive early introduction to their specialized field.

Artists, whose works make up an important branch of the local industry, cannot be content up to eighteen years of age with the guidance in drawing received in the modern gymnasium, nor devote themselves so long to a purely scientific preparation for the chief object of their interest. They rather must early exercise hand and eye in ceaseless effort, and in the winter must make economic use of daylight for their art. If this city had the good fortune of receiving an art school from the supreme grace of His Royal Majesty, either the study of ancient and modern languages, history, mythology, geometry, and the like would be dispensed within that school itself, or an arrangement would seem possible whereby the boys might, after completing the course of instruction in the modern middle school [*Realschule*], at the same time attend useful lectures in the modern gymnasium. For only with difficulty will their vocation allow them to participate regularly in all its classes—be it only into the sixteenth year.

Those who wish to learn *business* in this city are in the habit of entering it in their fourteenth year. Even the most respectable commercial families have their sons go through this early and entirely practical course. They allow at most one year for general culture. The learning of modern languages in particular, sometimes begun or pursued simultaneously with an apprenticeship and sometimes later, is pursued in the evening alongside the rest. The mentality of local business folk does not even move them to seek out a business institute, i.e., a specialized school.

This second class of vocations constitutes the middle ground between those which require the higher scientific education to which the [classical] gymnasiums, lyceums, and universities are devoted, and the trade classes [*Gewerbstände*] in the public grade schools. For such intermediary callings there is a great need to work against purely empirical preparation in the branches of public service which they embrace, and against blind training by means of a single routine. It is necessary to provide a scientific basis for the required range of knowledge, and to assure the

ulterior intellectual development of those called to such professions. The Royal Government has recognized this ever so important aim unmistakably in the prescribed conditions for state employment. On the other hand the acquisition of technical skills, empirical knowledge, and practical intuition is to be linked at an early age with theoretical study.

It is natural for the public to desire *specialized schools* for vocations of every sort—the military class, forestry, waterworks, road construction, field surveying, painting, sculpting, copper engraving: schools in which both concerns are related, in which both forms of one-sidedness—the following of blind routine on the one hand and pure theory without praxis [*Praxis*] on the other hand—are avoided. Such specialized schools can, as the program of the Royal School for Cadettes in Munich likewise indicates, begin with the elements of theoretical knowledge; and thus, from such theoretical knowledge onward, parents can have their children follow the study course of such an institution. Yet with most of such vocations it will suffice—and with several be even advantageous—to devote a few years after [such] school instruction to general education and the scientific foundation of knowledge. This general knowledge is no doubt generally the same for all special callings.

What is required is provided in a modern gymnasium, in which mathematics is taught alongside practical geometry, physics, chemistry, natural history, history, geography, grammar, logic, and the more recent sciences, so that the entire study course lasts two years or four semesters. The specialized schools have less need to condescend to arrange for instruction in the first elements insofar as they can count on suitable preparation having been provided by general instructional establishments, secondary schools, and finally these modern gymnasiums. Those who find no specialized school available in their field can, equipped with such preparation, attach themselves with advantage to an official as apprentices.

Even those who devote themselves to business, who rush into a lowly administrative position or office, or who will someday be pharmacists find they can with advantage participate in one or more study courses. If the modern gymnasiums are closed to such genuine pupils because they require every pupil to attend all the lessons prescribed in the program, there will remain many who, like those just mentioned and like artists, will only wish to attend individual lessons. In a large city there is generally need of an opportunity to take a course in physics, chemistry, and so on. Such an institution will be used all the more widely insofar as it takes into account the general needs of business with respect to the hours of the day, especially when it is set up in connection with an art school or takes artists into account.

Having given consideration to these general points of view, the undersigned rector's office now responds most humbly to the following questions—judicious examination of which has been graciously assigned to it: 1. Could the subjects of instruction in the modern and classical gymnasiums somehow be combined so as to save teaching positions in one or the other establishment? Such economies might be thought feasible in one of the following three ways:

a. Teachers from the classical gymnasium might teach in the secondary

school, and vice versa. Since the gymnasium has already been completely set up and expanded according to the school plan, the professors have their stipulated number of hours of teaching. In fact, the teachers for the different classes now have more than the regulation number of hours. The specialized teachers of mathematics and of the philosophical preparatory sciences do not, according to the norm set by His Majesty's directive, teach as many hours as the former. It might be hoped, however, that whoever is charged with the rectorship could be relieved by the grace of His Majesty of a number of hours. For occupations unconnected with this post pile up very heavily, and the responsibilities of the post—among other things class visitations—cannot all be adequately discharged with due regard to the importance of the matter and the interest of the school, especially when the school is large. As for the professors of the modern gymnasium, the case would be the same if the full class size were instituted.

b. The teaching of individual subjects might be given jointly to students of both establishments. The subjects which both schools have in common are history, geography, mathematics, and physiography, philosophical preparatory sciences, the literature of the fatherland, and French. As far as history, geography, and literature of the fatherland are concerned, it is immediately apparent that such subjects can be taught differently, and indeed must be treated differently when taught alongside the ancient languages than when taught in a school in which instruction in them is unconnected with the study of such languages. In the former case, where the study of history and geography is supported by readings in the ancient historians and bears upon them, some topics may thus be treated briefly and others more extensively. Considerable knowledge may be presupposed in such a case. The same holds true for German literature. In the classical gymnasium the pupil is already familiar with poetry, metrics, and the like—in principle with a host of necessary ideas.

Mathematics and physiography are not treated in a classical gymnasium to the extent that they should be treated in a modern gymnasium. Nor are they treated with the same regard for the technological aims predominant in the latter. Mathematics more than any other subject requires the teacher to look after the individual [pupil] in every subject, call on each pupil individually, examine him, and help those in danger of falling behind. Here lies the difference between teaching at a *gymnasium* and at a *university*. Thus experience has frequently taught that one who has not yet been introduced to mathematics in the gymnasium usually learns nothing further at the university—where the professor merely lectures and is not able to examine what one understands and is doing, thus treating the individual as a student [*Zuhörer*], no longer as a pupil. Yet this activity of looking after, stimulating, and helping pupils is only possible with a limited number of pupils. Once a certain number is exceeded, either all such methods fall mostly by the wayside with many being completely abandoned—so that anyone whose progress in mathematics is blocked at some point simply makes no further advance in the subject—or the pupil takes too long, with the result that those who are making progress become impatient and weary. And this is not even to mention the external hindrance of gathering a large group around the blackboard as it is used, and so on.

French should likewise be taught more extensively in a modern gymnasium. The same thing may be said of such instruction as has been said of mathematics, namely that a large number is very detrimental to advancement. Moreover, those who simultaneously pursue the study of ancient languages are in every respect at a great advantage.

With the philosophical preparatory sciences the feeling is inevitably keenest of all that they can be treated in a wholly different manner with pupils who receive a higher culture, whose comprehension has been sharpened by acquaintance with classical literature, and who have been introduced to numerous concepts of spiritual relationships. This influence extends generally over all subjects of instruction, already making for a difference in and for itself—even more so because, as mentioned above, usually only persons who are of meager talent and mental capacity, or who are indolent and who shy away from mental exertion, themselves withdraw from the classical gymnasium or are transferred at the rector's initiative to the modern gymnasium. This lies so much in the nature of things, of the different subject matters making up the special element of each school, that the public has already grasped this. Parents who see that their sons are making but slow progress at the classical gymnasium conclude that they have little talent for academic study and so, following the ill-fated try at the classical gymnasium, look about for a modern gymnasium. Such transfer pupils could not and, given common instruction for both schools, would not advance in humanistic [*geistig*] subject matters along with the other, classical gymnasium students. On the other hand, such pupils are well endowed for mathematics, chemistry, natural history. In these sciences they can render very useful service—sciences requiring, unlike classical studies, no real thinking and, what is still more important, no particular depth of soul [*Gemuts*]. Beyond that, their talent and serviceability extend to technical knowledge and skills, to the empirical [*Realen*] generally. Consequently, in joint instruction with classical gymnasium students little consideration is to be given to the modern gymnasium students, who would be present merely as mute extras. Or, should this prove unworkable, neither group would learn anything.

All the subjects taught in a classical gymnasium partake of the same uniform tone insofar as the establishment is to be viewed as a special preparatory school for higher scientific and humanistic [*geistigen*] education. This uniformity of tone, which is so essential to the whole and can only be formed in a closed establishment striving for the realization of a *single* purpose, could only be disturbed and displaced by mixing its pupils with others who, because of their incapacity, do not receive in its entirety the remainder of the instruction. A special school with such an important purpose rightly deserves its own teachers and its own pupils, so that the teachers may devote themselves exclusively to the aim of their pupils, and so that their pupils may be all of the *same* sort, education, and vocation, so that they may not be neglected due to other pupils of lesser ability pursuing heterogeneous purposes. If such a union is possible at the level of elementary knowledge and occurs in the primary schools, where instruction is at once a time for testing talent, in a higher-level establishment segregation of this sort is necessarily the basis of all that cries out for a different mode of instruction aimed at pupils capable of intellec-

tual [pursuit] rather than those either not destined for such pursuit but merely for sciences containing a sensory element—such as mathematics, physics, natural history—or those destined by nature for the technical skills. Just as a peasant and someone with academic studies behind him can hardly be given military drills together, so just as little can the above two groups of pupils receive the same instruction. Whether in particular or on the whole, an establishment of higher learning intended to suffice for both would suffice for neither.

Such segregation is of equal importance for discipline. Decent behavior and obedience can become the rule in a school only if all pupils in the same school are in all matters under a *single* authority, and share the same objective; only if all subjects of instruction are of equal importance to the student's vocation, or at least are required of him simply because he is a student at that school; only if, generally speaking, all students fall under the same instructional obligations. Students who belong to separate schools, for example, will easily give false excuses for laziness, caprice, etc. when negligent in handling homework, saying they were obliged to do lessons in the other school. They will be more negligent in attention, conduct, etc., and will be careless during lessons not pertinent to the school where their real vocation lies. Positive regulations and formal stipulations to remove such annoyances—beyond the fact that they increase the already more than sufficient range of formalities, complicating conditions still further—are of little effect, since this difference exists in the very nature of things, in the arrangement of what is essential. Young people in any case enjoy creating opposition out of small differences, but even more so out of the differences in question here, which develop into eruptions and annoyances unless the different pupils remain separate from one another and external communication is prohibited.

c. Yet teaching positions are automatically saved if the wishes and needs of the public are met by a smaller number of classes at the secondary school than originally planned. It would appear from the above humble exposition that the vocation of the majority of those who wish to undertake modern studies [*Realstudien*] calls for pursuit of general education perhaps until only the sixteenth year. Such pupils should then shift over to the acquisition of specialized knowledge and the practice of technical skills, either alongside the scientific preparation received within this age limit or immediately thereafter. After such curtailment, perhaps three professors would more than suffice: one in mathematics and physics, one in chemistry and natural history, and one in history, geography, logic, and ethics [*Moral*], in addition to special teachers in modern languages, drawing, and calligraphy. It would in this regard still be possible to combine these sciences differently depending on the individual teacher, e.g. to assign the chemistry teacher physics, the natural history teacher logic and ethics, etc. Two classes require forty to forty-five hours weekly of professorial instruction, which could be given all the more easily by three persons if modern foreign language instruction were expanded. There would still be time left to deliver a few useful lectures both for a more general public and for those who have already entered upon a special vocation.

2. "Can the modern gymnasium enter into a relationship with the classical

gymnasium different from the one already called for by the general directive?" This more specific question, it seems, can only be answered on the basis of intuition and experience of the preparatory relation of the modern school [*Realschule*] to the modern gymnasium—experience which the undersigned rector's office naturally lacks. The modern school is, on the one hand, a preschool for the modern gymnasium and, on the other, an advanced public school for such trades as require more education than is needed for real artisans. Since there are many such artisans here, inevitably such a school is not very well attended, seeing that—as appears from the school catalogues that have been received—it seems not to have found the expected acceptance elsewhere, especially because general public schools continue to be set up here in their old defective form. From this, however, the danger may arise that because of their numbers and the deficient preparation with which they leave the public schools to enter the modern gymnasium without having gone through the primary schools, pupils cannot obtain the necessary preparation for the modern gymnasium. They do not come with the preparation that pupils of the progymnasium would have in transferring to the modern gymnasium. If, therefore, it were a prerequisite that attendance at the progymnasium had to precede admission to the modern gymnasium, the modern school—which is so beneficial in this respect—would completely cease to exist, while the important mission of the progymnasium in preparing pupils for the classical gymnasium would be reduced. And the pupils whom the classical gymnasium would receive from the progymnasium would be all the less prepared inasmuch as heterogeneous and more extensive aims would have been introduced into its program. Yet, as I have said, when those entering the modern gymnasium lack proper abilities it is probably not so much a lack of preparation as of talent—a lack which all the preparation in the world could not remove in a manner enabling the pursuit of scientific aims higher than the indicated vocations of such persons imply. Yet since the subjects of instruction in the modern gymnasium are to be conceived and taught according to higher scientific views, it has the character of a lyceum or university, and the preparation to be obtained in either the modern school or the progymnasium would still be insufficient. The gap which the classical gymnasium fills in the successive stages of education would still remain—the gap defined by the unique cultivation of reason and taste through classical literature, in which at once half the instructional time is devoted to history, geography, mathematics, philosophical preparatory sciences. Only this four-year program of studies as a whole provides thorough preparation for a lyceum or university.

3. The third question concerns "which precise requirements of prior knowledge are to be made a prerequisite for the admission of pupils to the modern gymnasium if this establishment is to achieve its aim in providing, with the expected success, a scientific foundation for practical knowledge." In part this question has already been answered above, while in part it is so specialized that it appears more practical to answer it from intuitive acquaintance with the matter than from general reasons. Thus the rector's office of the modern gymnasium will alone be able to give more specific indications.

Those entering the modern school from primary school already come

equipped in arithmetic with practical skill in the four arithmetic operations using whole numbers and fractions, and in ratios and the problems based on them. In the two-year course of the modern school, arithmetic can be pursued in a more extensive way, along with the elements of algebra and geometry, the mechanical drawing of figures, and planimetry as well. The pupils can further become more closely acquainted in some expanse with both geography and universal history. Further, in natural history and cosmography, they may become acquainted with that considerable range of knowledge which can be transmitted without scientific treatment. They must also have skill in correct spelling, and without of course composing treatises at least have the skill to recount lighter narrations, etc., in both written and oral form. With such knowledge, equipped with the rudiments of French, they will be wholly able to begin the required scientific grounding of practical knowledge: namely, the mastery of algebra, geometry, trigonometry, systematic natural history according to its scientific divisions, physics, and then chemistry and applied mathematics, including also logic and ethics, through which history and geography as well are further pursued. Two courses in four semesters seem sufficient to give them the necessary foundation for their practical vocation, enabling them to transfer to specialized schools.

The undersigned rector, who has here been able to answer the questions submitted to him by the highest authorities only insofar as they enter his sphere of observation, perseveres with the deepest respect. The Royal General Commissariat's most humbly dutiful academic gymnasium rector, Hegel

THE SEPTEMBER 27 LETTER to Niethammer which followed the above report comments on Niethammer's professional difficulties. Niethammer threatened to resign unless a condition communicated orally to Hegel was met. He was still under attack by the Old Bavarian clericalist faction. He demanded the resignation of adversary Josef Wismayr—a member of this party—from his High Councillorship for school affairs [183], and was eventually successful in this [185]. This is perhaps the demand that appeared to Hegel to violate the rules of bureaucracy. Bureaucracy, Hegel cautioned, is deaf to claims pressed for personal advantage. As stated in his school address a few weeks before, he had a sense of participating in an increasingly stable educational institution. He was escaping the morbid desire for things future in order to actualize the ideal of self-reconciliation in the present, to adjust pragmatically to the actual world and find himself therein. The standpoint Hegel assumes is that of ethical life (*Sittlichkeit*) as distinct from moralism. Hegel and Niethammer shared the same "Cause." Yet Niethammer threatened to resign because of lost confidence in his ability to win a decisive victory for his own version of that Cause. To Hegel Niethammer's attachment to the Cause was too personal for the good of the Cause. Driven by a sense of personal honor [176], Niethammer was tempted to withdraw from worldly struggle amidst imperfect, contradictory institutions. He thus risked becoming a beautiful soul (*Werke* II, 504), suffering the guilt of inaction. Hegel, on the other hand, calls for abandonment of the demand for moral purity, for pragmatic acceptance of the work of the world. No doubt one compromises oneself thereby, but the guilt weighs less

heavily if one recalls its inevitability given the conflicting demands made on the individual (*Werke* II, 358-59). Moreover, through it all one serves as a vehicle of ongoing institutional development. For the eventual working out of ethical contradictions one must have faith in divine providence (*Werke* XI, 39-43), and have faith enough in the Cause to entrust its actualization to providence. "In the moral sphere one ought to do one's duty for duty's sake, and thus perform one's functions to obtain a salary without worrying about the consequences or rather absence of consequences" [173].

Hegel to Niethammer [165]

Nuremberg, September 27, 1810

You have not written since your departure, my dear friend—probably among other reasons so as to keep all this school rubbish and related headaches far from your mind. Yet I cannot help interrupting your tranquility and willful forgetting of school affairs with our just-completed school catalogue, pursuing you with it all the way to Jena. I am enclosing a few extra copies for Mr. [Karl Friedrich] Frommann, Mr. [Karl Ludwig von] Knebel, Mr. [Johann] Gries, and corporation attorney [Ludwig] Asverus—not so much to communicate it or its contents to them as simply to renew thereby their kind remembrance of me.

You in Jena do not deserve to be left in peace by us, for you preferred to stay with us for such a short time, and to present yourself to us only as an apparition. Yet as fleeting as this apparition was as measured by time, it was also as powerful as lightning and has given us an emphatic boost. Your activity and even physical energy, as evidenced by the packet of letters written the night before your departure, have completely astounded us. Mme. Paulus still cannot get over it. For years we have awaited you as our saviour, a saviour who moreover has at least redeemed me from the mania and yearning for things and transformations to come, from the unrest which does not quite make a home for itself in the present among things as they are, since it awaits something else or merely wants to know how matters really stand with the world as it is, and thus supposes some unknown trap and background. Even should the objective have no influence on the total situation, even if one knows its limitation perfectly well, it casts its shadow over the whole merely by virtue of being awaited. Thus I myself would now be put at ease and regard the current trend of events as one which will more or less endure if only your remarks about your personal situation did not drive me away again from such freedom from all expectation into quite the opposite state, indeed into fear. These remarks, together with at last a long nocturnal letter to Mr. von Zentner, lead me to believe you have chosen your absence [from Munich] to make a decision concerning your situation. I do not tremble at this thought for you but for me personally and for the Cause, even more so when I think of the condition on which alone you said you could stay. For I cannot persuade myself that this condition will be met, that a minister can approve it: the stipulated official conditions of a post have validity as something absolute independent of personalities and even of the good of the Cause. The stipulations of this hierarchy are, on the contrary, the most effective tool, resulting from the collaboration of all, that can be used against the personality [of

an individual], for all find themselves therein equally wounded in their self-conceit, even those who remain totally removed from the Cause. If in your personal situation you prefer above all remoteness or isolation, what at once becomes clear in the total context is that the Cause lies too close to your heart, that you have attached yourself too deeply to it to find satisfaction in a milieu excluding this definite interest and activity for which you yearn. And in that case I can only say with a deep sigh: "May, with God's help, everything work out for the best."

I have submitted my report on the modern gymnasium. All that would still be needed to keep you sufficiently attentive to my views on the school system would be to send this as well to you in Jena. I have, however, talked to you enough about my views. You will find the report, God willing, in Munich. . . .

A few days ago the family of [Christian] Jacobs [preceptor of the Crown Prince] passed through. He will join them himself in a few weeks. People are expecting an imminent announcement of the merger of the Finance Office with the General Commissioner's Office, the reduction of districts [*Kreisen*] to ten, and the subordination of fund administrations to the General Commissioner's Office. [Maximilian] Lerchenfeld is definitely going to Innsbruck [as Bavarian General Commissioner].

A thousand, thousand compliments to the best of women. Tell her that I asked her please to encourage you to pass through here, and that we are pinning all our hopes on her and hold her completely responsible if she withholds herself and you from us. If you stick to your plan of passing through Bayreuth let me know the day of your arrival and I will try to meet you there or in Amberg. My best regards to Ludwig and Julius. Likewise my compliments to Attorney Asverus and his wife, to Mr. Frommann, Knebel, Gries, and the rest.

P.S. The government paper, arriving today, contains the [administrative] divisions of the Realm. There are only nine districts. Nuremberg, Augsburg, and Bamberg lose their general commissioners. Do come!

DURING NIETHAMMER'S ABSENCE from Munich the abolition of Nuremberg's classical gymnasium was decided. Hegel's effort in the above report to protect his gymnasium by proposing budget cuts at the expense of the modern gymnasium appeared to have failed. Hegel expressed his chagrin on October 27, upon Niethammer's return to Munich.

Hegel to Niethammer [168]

Nuremberg, October 27, 1810

Strange tales are going on here, my dear friend. Yesterday the steeple of the First District [*egydiar*] Church marched across Dillinghof Square, passed in front of the gymnasium to a position overlooking it, and then—since the sun stood high in the sky—cast such a heavy shadow on the gymnasium that it was totally covered with darkness, while the painters inside were whitewashing head over heels, and while many people were persuaded it no longer existed. It will have been even more widely reported that a whole crowd of people walking on their heads passed in front of the city hall and the former general commissioner's office.

Since local heads become so easily confused, there is much that is obvious to common sense which they do not believe. Higher ideas on the whole penetrate them only with difficulty, for mental inertia has forever been at home here. If something does not become a traditional commonplace on [the banks of] the Pegnitz, it means nothing to them. Care, however, is already taken so that nothing is any longer preserved long enough to become a tradition, so that everything is rather gotten rid of.

On the other hand, what is gratifying for those who look more deeply and penetrate the mystery from a higher standpoint is that the mailing of letters is so extensively cultivated, and that through effective and energetic means the profits of the post office are being so greatly augmented. It is said that the proceeds have recently increased by many thousand florins, but what is most gratifying is that we are assured the surplus is to be allocated to our local school fund, and that for the time being our back-salaries are to be paid from it. To this end, which concerns me as well so closely, I write you so as to do my part to increase the mass of letters streaming into the capital [*Zentrum*] from all sides. Before back-salaries are paid, however, I cannot permit myself to take on more and to travel personally to the capital, and thus cannot contribute to improving the coach business, which is [also] prospering. Since here as elsewhere there is no vintage in our land, whatever I might contribute is inexpensively replaced each fall by some new innovation or other, and thus the circulation of money as of men is stimulated at a time when substitutes are being used for everything.

You write that you also work at night. According to local arrangements and designations—and as you know we people from Nuremberg only know our own—night workers are toilet cleaners. Clean work! One must admit that you pursue your work energetically, and to be sure we must put up with the role which your work assigns to us: we have been made of clay, we are of clay, and clay we shall remain [*ex luto factis sumus, et lutum sumus, et lutum erimus*], to cite both Scripture and philosophy. Or again: we are shit [*stercus sumus*]¹—in Paulus's house everybody is presently coughing on the bear shit they are drinking. His wife thought that was the best one could do in these apocalyptic times. I could only reply that if you do not put it in your mouth yourself others will put it—or something similar—in for you. Fortunately the substitute is already on the spot just as we are cleaning the municipal system out.

How little does man know what he does! When six weeks ago I put everything together at some length [in the report on modern gymnasiums] in writing it was not to cut our own throats, but that is, it seems, to be the result. There will always be people who prefer to sell and drink carrot juice rather than coffee. The dark brown broth made from carrots is called "patriotic coffee." In the nocturnal side of nature—which is reality-based [reference to to modern *Realgymnasium*] and which is likewise the nocturnal work of a colleague [Gotthilf Heinrich von Schubert], although perhaps one whose effect is quite the opposite of cleansing—there is talk of *dignified decomposition* [Schubert, *Views of the Nocturnal Side of Natural Science*, 1808]. I have declared it the most dignified decomposition to die suddenly with a sound mind and plenty of juices left, instead of wasting away in

decay. The disadvantage of sudden death without confession and sacrament, however, is that it gives rise to an ugly stench, pervading the entire city.

Yet what sustains me are two words received a few days ago [in a missing letter from Niethammer]. There are three words of faith. From you and for philosophy, two are satisfactory; I now understand their connection. The time to forge iron is when it is hot. I ask you in the name of all you have done for me thus far, in the name of all I have, of all the wounds endured and blood spilt, to bring me, your work, to completion, so that I may receive this and only this destiny. Thought might be given to the idea of making me rector and professor of philosophy in the modern gymnasium [*Realinstitut*], but I am simply no reality-oriented man [*reeler Mensch*]. [Ludwig] Heller will have approached you at length regarding his rectorship at [the University of] Landshut! Truth is at home in the universities. He is thus coming into his element, at least if he has not lied here as in other matters and accepted [Friedrich] Thiersch's post [as a gymnasium professor of classical philology in Munich], which you have allegedly "offered" him. So please, please—. . . Yours, Hegel.

I may ask you to let me know soon. I merely ask you for *one word*. You know how important this is for me, both domestically and personally. I will remain as silent as a tomb until official announcement is made.

ON NOVEMBER 3 [169] Hegel associated his criticism of the decision to abolish the Nuremberg gymnasium with a more general attack on the spirit of abstract rationalism behind the French Revolution. Influenced by such rationalism, France's Bavarian satellite was forcing its institutions and even physical attributes into multiples of nine.

Hegel to Niethammer [169]

Nuremberg, November 3, 1810

The bearer of this letter, Mr. [Gotthold] Seidel [founder of a private girls' school in Nuremberg in 1804], will find the words to tell you himself, my dear friend, what a great sensation the allegedly forthcoming abolition of the local gymnasium has created here. The sensation is indeed far greater than that created by the news, which broke at the same time, of the new tariff on sugar and coffee [in connection with Napoleon's Continental System]—and that is saying a lot. It is completely overshadowing this second affair. All social classes, ages, sexes, and persons both official and private share the same sensation of the harshness of this measure against Nuremberg. The gymnasium was the only establishment for which the entire population was grateful to the government. Its abolition is incomprehensible. Funding considerations were probably not the motive, for that is normally not thought of. Besides, counsel could have been found for that. If the number *nine* is to have such magic power, according to Pythagoras as well as St. Martin the number *ten* is of even much greater perfection, not to mention at all the duodecimal system of Dr. [Johann] Werneburg in Eisenach. It is also said that for the sake of even greater uniformity there shall be nine rivers in the Realm. Any beyond these nine shall be guzzled down as a coffee substitute. If there are fewer than nine, a

urinal is to be instituted where all subjects of the Realm, dogs included, will be urged to pass water for the formation of new streams. The practice will be instituted in connection with the modern gymnasiums and with the agricultural association.

Formerly Nuremberg had four Latin establishments, perhaps in part bad ones, but each affording the possibility of transferring from it on to the university. And beyond that there was an institution of higher education, a real lyceum, almost a university, which until the reorganization still had its salaried staff of professors. Bamberg [and] Amberg [each] have: 1. a gymnasium, 2. a lyceum. Nuremberg, which is twice as large as either of these cities, is not yet equally endowed even with two institutions. The local residents all infer from the fact that Nuremberg is being put behind other cities that one has it in for their city [presumably due to Austrian sympathies in Nuremberg in the 1809 war].

What annoys me most of all is that it is this modern gymnasium which has cut our throats, for if we had no such gymnasium here no one would have thought of abolishing the [classical] gymnasium. To think that I should have done my bit for the modern gymnasium, so that it might return to cut the throat of the classical gymnasium. If Nuremberg retains both a classical and a modern gymnasium, the latter being restricted to about two classes—more would be superfluous if not harmful—it will have what it needs and will still be relatively less well-endowed than the above-mentioned cities as well as others.

You yourself know better than anyone how highly the Protestants esteem their scholarly educational institutions, how these institutions are as dear to them as the churches. They are certainly worth as much as these churches. Protestantism does not so much consist in any special creed as in the spirit of reflection and higher rational education, not in the spirit of drill serving this or that utilitarian purpose. One could not have attacked a Protestant population at a more sensitive spot than its schools. No doubt you thought and said all this and more when the majority vote prevailed. I only say it to explain the sensation which has been felt here.

The effect of the oral and written protests from Nuremberg has still to be seen. All here speak with but one concern and one voice.

To be sure one needs, or seems to need, fewer civil servants than before, but there are never enough classically educated persons. Even less are there ever too many persons on whom the experiment is conducted of seeing if something may come of them. Ten students, even ten at a [classical] gymnasium, do not make ten civil servants; fifty such students would rather perhaps be required. This consideration as to the decreasing number of civil servants—as likewise of Protestant schools—puts the future of Erlangen under a cloud, as also does the fact that no words have been exchanged on the matter between you and Mr. von Zentner. At present I feel like Adam must have felt in the religious satire [?] when, early in the morning on the sixth day of creation before the act of creation has been performed on him, he appears with an aria that begins: "Oh, if only I, too, were now created!"

In a French maritime report I once read the expression: "*Le vent ayant été longtemps sans exister.*" I to be sure already am [*bin*]; but I no longer, nor yet,

exist [*existiere*]. In these windy November days I hope from you the breath of a living zephyr that you may soon blow my way. With the most cordial compliments to the best of women, yours, Hegel

AS HEGEL TELLS Karl Ludwig von Knebel in Jena, the gymnasium was spared only when Nuremberg consented to carry the financial burden itself.

Hegel to von Knebel [171]

Nuremberg, December 14, 1810

Your amicable remembrance of me in your letter has pleased me greatly. The matter with which your letter is in part concerned, i.e., Mme. [Johanna Sophia] Bohn's desire to get her son into a local business concern, has been supported here by Mr. [Gottlieb] von Holzschuher and myself with a recommendation to Mr. Merkel. You can rest assured that the matter is in the best of hands. He already had in view a few possible positions, none of which, however, has yet materialized. He presents his respects to you and one of these days is going to write to you himself in sending a shipment. To be sure he also has lived through the coffee war, but you know his vitality, which is capable of enduring even such a blow as this. The "war," as you call this measure, has been waged here in literally military fashion. For three weeks Mr. Merkel had a guard in his house, who on a small scale displayed quite as much bravery as has been seen elsewhere on a large scale, stealing from him—in accordance with his rank—only a few hundred florins from the barrels he had to guard.

Our local gymnasium has received for now a grace period in which the funds for our salaries and for the material needs of the whole shall be furnished by the city here. Should it seem harsh to withdraw from the local inhabitants such an educational facility for their children, still they must recognize the exceptional favor that has allowed this institution to exist for already two years. For due to lack of funds it could just as well have been closed a week after its opening. For funds at that time were not more considerable than now or even before its establishment. You will not be at all surprised by such measures, for it is not unknown to you that, on the one hand, many institutions are set up [*eingerrichtet*] these days without looking about for the funds beforehand and that, on the other hand, schools in these times are generally being ruined [*hin-gerichtet*] according to external utility and the purposes of the state.

Your consolation in the present state of the world is that things are not any better elsewhere. I only hope I am permitted to refuse this consolation when it comes to comparing others with yourself. Otherwise I gladly let the consolation stand. Even the damned in Hell—of which quite a few, like your friend the Epicurean Lucretius himself, have very respectable heads—are no better off. I am looking forward to Lucretius's appearance [in print] by Easter in accordance with hopes you yourself have raised [reference to von Knebel's translation of Lucretius's *On the Nature of Things*]. Only I do not fully understand why at the present time you do not feel like making notes and glosses [see von Knebel's letter 170].

I had hoped that [Thomas] Seebeck, since he is in our neighborhood, would

visit us here. However, he has not yet shown up. There was talk that he should finally have taken over the professorship in chemistry at Jena. You write of a few young men by whom the University has been enriched. Even if the old fullness of fruit is no longer there, the old drive which makes young sprouts thrive is still to be seen. In these parts we have many terrains and scaffoldings of dry wood to which we nail and crucify such sprouts. We also keep tables on them, straitjacket ourselves, testify, attest, verify, examine, and stamp. In all this we do not understand why the right [result] is not achieved despite our always working ourselves to the bone to accomplish something, why from so much sheer improvement the good is not attained, why the fever of ameliorism is not the highest [state of] health.

Be that as it may, just give us hope that for once you will perhaps soon visit us here. You will find that your old friends, who often remember you with that wish in mind, have remained faithful, and will also find that sufficiently numerous external distractions are available. For the last few months we have indeed had a very nice museum [of horrors] here, which has replaced the harmony of old—which, however, is at once still preserved. Recently a Mr. [Court Assessor Johann] von Haller shot himself through the head. The wife of Senator [Christian] von Strömer has dragged the child of her unmarried daughter into the water, and now sits in the tower. In the next few days a man guilty of incest with his daughter will be broken on the wheel; the daughter will be beheaded, too, since together they also killed the child. Other unwed ladies are still pregnant. Earlier the fourteen-year-old girl of an acquaintance of mine eloped with an actor, [and] a few days later another followed. Here and there one finds dead females in the water, not counting natural casualties. We have concerts where we only miss a singer such as your wife, and of course theater as well. Not to speak of all the organizing and misorganizing, which often cannot be distinguished. In short, as you can see, we, too, are not lacking in incidents and caprices.

In the meantime, until I have the good fortune to see you again in person, I ask you to transmit my compliments to your wife and son, and to preserve your amicable sentiments in my regard. I also ask you as the occasion arises to pay my most humble respects to Privy Councillor von Goethe, and Dr. [Friedrich] Riemer. I have space left here only to sign as your most devoted Hegel.

TO HEGEL, the reprieve for the gymnasium meant postponement of his transfer to a university.

Hegel to Niethammer [173]

Nuremberg, December 22, 1810

Often the more one has to say the less one writes. It is accordingly just when one is full of thoughts that one is unable to find any words at all. I have not written you for so long, my dear friend, precisely for this reason. Only when the thoughts are gradually lost am I able to write a few lines.

The reprieve granted to our gymnasium is already such old news that nothing further can be said of it. I was only surprised by the ingratitude of the people of Nuremberg, who did not recognize that they had already been given such a well-

instituted gymnasium for two years. It could just as well have been shut down a week after its establishment as two years afterward, since funds at that time were no greater than now. The people of Erlangen do not fare as well: a university is not immediately set up for them, but is delayed until funding is investigated. If one had not been so well-disposed toward the people of Nuremberg and taken a chance in this regard, perhaps they would still have no new gymnasium. We were just in the middle of building when news arrived of the [gymnasium's] abolition. I already considered myself a Moses who was to get to see the Promised Land only from afar. But I can thus hope that, since most everything is now ready and only the stoves are to be installed and started up, I will be able to move into my renovated lodgings in spring when the stoves are no longer needed.

My destiny elsewhere has likewise been postponed by that reprieve. I hope, however, that to postpone is not to cancel. Abolition of the gymnasium would surely have been an excellent occasion. My personal self-interest and patriotic [duty] to Nuremberg were to be sure in contradiction. I thus had personal experience of the absurdity of the way of the world, for what I myself contributed to generate interest in the institution's future has come to number among the reasons for my own failure to advance.

A few weeks ago [School Councillor] Paulus left for Ansbach [new seat of the local Bavarian General Commission]. His entire family was medicated, and he himself was doubly in need of it. He was in a nasty mood. You know him. He overworks himself believing something must come of it, and that should something come of it it will not be blown away again by the next organizational wind. I made it clear to him that matters bodily are no different: nothing comes from eating and drinking either, since a few hours after, one is no further than before and has to start all over again. In moral matters one must likewise do one's duty for duty's sake, performing one's official duties for the sake of the salary without regard to the consequences or perhaps absence of consequences. I do not know how far such representations have made an impression. I fear, however, that in the end, perhaps soon, he will simply leave the entire school pie behind and go off to the temple. He recently received a very advantageous call to Greifswald. I learned by accident that he is really of Jewish origin. I remembered, moreover, how he once told that on a trip from Bavaria to Stuttgart the body tax [paid by Jews for passage] was squarely demanded of him. In this I find the full explanation of his antipathy to certain animals that, according to their comparative anatomy, are said to have a striking structural similarity to human beings—a similarity that does not, to be sure, make them human beings. Such antipathy can frequently be noticed in others as well. In Germany there must be many disguised Jews, just as in Portugal.

In Ansbach, there is serious talk of transferring the [District] General Commissioner's office here again. [Christian] Jacobs came through here the very day Paulus left, too late for them to speak. On the other hand, I had the pleasure of making his acquaintance.

As for our salary, things are no better than ever; we are still four months behind. I hear the budget for 1809-10 was submitted a few months ago. Its ratification will authorize the bursar, among other things, to pay me emoluments for the [printed]

program and so on. Such authorization, based solely on ratification, is of course not yet itself payment. Yet disbursement can be expected even less, so long as ratification has not occurred. If it does occur, I will have to return to the attack to receive the same for 1808-09 as well, a year for which no budget at all was made. It looks even worse for the current year, for which payment of salaries depends on locating the funds, distributing the deficit among the citizenry, and so on—a task which, if we are lucky, will hardly be terminated in a year.

To sum it all up [*Summa summarum*]: only a *deus ex machina* can help us out. Who will be our saviour? In the meantime, even if you can help out only with the ratification, this would at least be something. To this end [I know] I am offering a sprat to catch a herring. But to show that I am not of Jewish blood I am sending you a few gingerbreads, and wish you happy holidays as well. Please remember me to the best of women most kindly, to your two Greek sons, and as the occasion arises to Thucydides and to High Financial Councillor [Karl] Roth. Your most devoted friend, Hegel

THOUGH HEGEL rejected Old Testament theology, his commitment to natural rights and universal emancipation is inconsistent with anti-Semitism. Still, the language of the above letter was affected by the anti-Semitic atmosphere in which he lived. In a letter of July 11, 1804, to Windischmann (*Briefe* I, 504), Schelling expressed a similar suspicion regarding Paulus, the theological rationalist known for his radical denial of physical miracles. Paulus's wife, Caroline, makes an allusion to Paulus's Jewish background in a letter of January 8, 1811, to Hegel [174], explaining that Paulus, recovering from illness, will himself be resurrected on Easter, "since Jews do not believe in the resurrected Christ."

As Councillor for school affairs Paulus was transferred to Ansbach due to the reduction of Bavarian administrative districts—each governed by a General Commissioner—to nine and the consequent elimination of Nuremberg as the seat of such a district [165]. Hegel was mistaken in supposing on December 22 that the General Commissioner's office would take up residence in Nuremberg again. Yet Nuremberg was subsequently assigned a Municipal Commissioner; and Hegel himself in 1813 was appointed School Councillor in Nuremberg, thus filling a post similar to the one that had fallen into abeyance by Paulus's 1811 reassignment. On February 10, 1811, Niethammer called his attempt, already underway, to find a councillorship or alternative administrative appointment for Hegel a rabbit hunt [175]. This explains Hegel's reference to "the rabbit you are hunting for me" in the following letter of February 23, written when Niethammer's mooted resignation and possible transfer to a professorship still hung in the balance. Hegel's indignant statement that the victory of Niethammer's Old Bavarian enemies "should not be" provides a minor counterexample to the oft-repeated claim that for Hegel might makes right. Such indignation is a recurring note in Hegel's letters [e.g. 571a]. As appears from the letter's conclusion, Hegel hoped a victory by Niethammer might open the door to a post at the University of Erlangen, now under Bavarian control [161]. However, budgetary limitations continued to stall development of this university.

I cannot but agree with your wife—as obviously women are in all matters always right regardless of the reasons, excuses, pretexts, or turns of phrase men may bring up—when she chides you for having written last of all your letter to me. For in this way only a small portion has fallen to me of the awesome quantity of your letter writing that day. It was all the more annoying to me because I no sooner received this quantum than, like a cashier, I immediately had to give this wealth away again. By the way, what is easily the most important part of the entire treasure has come to me, for it was important enough. But it was a treasure as the Devil distributes to those who sell him their blood: at first they only come upon pearls, diamonds, and gold, though if they take it out of their pockets again [it is only] dry leaves—at times even something worse which decency forbids me to mention. For I must accordingly believe that the flurry of all your activity—insofar as it is identifiably yours—will be transformed before your very own eyes, and then we shall both see how the temple of schools and curricula which you have built will fare. I dare not yet contemplate how I would fare under the rubble of its collapse. There would be much to say about this. Once you have positively put your blessed foot forward, your personal honor will no longer suffer you to pull it back, to let it drop or merely fall asleep, unless of course circumstances undergo essential changes—which neither will nor can happen. The sad fact, however, is that, as it has turned out, a certain people [*Volk*] has the glory of victory, of having attained the upper hand. This people [led by the Old Bavarians] should not have had this satisfaction. The most pleasant part, if something pleasant in it were still possible, would be for us to become neighbors in the same vicinity and for you to direct your attention to this goal. Of the little hare you have been chasing for me, so far I have seen nothing. I do not even understand to what extent it has run about only in past history, or is to continue to run about and perhaps end in [a post on] a permanent examination board, even if under the changed circumstances.

Our friend [Caroline] Paulus was deathly ill. Since yesterday there are reports that she is now out of danger, assuming nothing else interferes during the period of convalescence.

From what I hear [Heinrich] Stephani has become our District School Councillor. I do not know to what extent he will want or be able to bring us back to spelling. When we are beyond this high wisdom he will perhaps think we are still beneath it. I will then feel some self-pity, as indeed we all will.

[Thomas] Seebeck will bring you this letter and will himself tell you everything about his current life and eventual plans. He will, in particular, call upon your advice, and moreover will expect much from your assistance. One important thing will be to introduce him to Jacobi. Since Jacobi is president of the Academy, Seebeck should already be quite well known to him.

Remember me most cordially to the best of women, with whom I believe I harmonize on certain important points more than with others. Also remember me cordially to High Councillor for Finance [Karl] Roth, and to the Spinozism of his wife. Hegel

P.S. Monday. We were yesterday in Erlangen and heard important news from the Consistorial Councillor [Christoph] Ammon, who had just returned: 1. He will stay in Erlangen, so that if you presented a demand for his departure it could not presently be honored; this impossibility completely satisfies the subjective side of things, i.e., your personal [interest] in it, just as it must be devoutly wished for the sake of us all and for the Cause. 2. There is an intention of transferring to him the local school and church system, which for us would at least be better than the alternative. 3. The examination board about which you wrote is confirmed; the decree has arrived today. 4. The authorities are thinking of seriously organizing Erlangen by Easter. 5. There is talk in this connection of a philosopher being needed there; there is talk of me—but also of Schelling. May God and my destiny—and to me you are my destiny—touch rather the former!

Hegel's Idea of Marriage: Science or Ideology?

IN A POEM [178] to his fiancée, Marie von Tucher, Hegel affirms his belief in equality within the marriage bond (Ilting, III, 534). Marriage is not a contract (Ibid, III, 513-14). Instead of being negotiated between persons, it is based on the mutual surrender of two persons dissolving into a single personality (*Phil of Law* ¶158). Hegel based the ethical superiority of Western monogamous marriage on such equality. Polygamous marriage, in which the members of the harem are practically reduced to slaves (Ibid ¶167), is despotic or "patriarchal" by contrast (Ilting, III, 533). The modern Christian concept of marriage thus transcends lordship and bondage in favor of reciprocity and mutual recognition.

After asserting equality in marriage, however, he introduces a division of labor within the couple which assigns science and political judgment to the husband (*Phil of Law* ¶166). Despite enigmatic exceptions (Ilting, III, 525) provided by the emancipated and self-educated women of Hegel's time—e.g., Caroline Schelling or the novelist Caroline Paulus [114-16, 134, 189, 256]—women were typically intuitive but nondiscursive [241]. Yet since the couple is not autonomous—essentially depending on the larger civil society and state in which the husband's science and judgment enable him alone to participate—the alleged equality of the marriage partners is seriously undermined (*Phil of Law* ¶171). Unlike the wife, the husband has a role in civil society and the state which prevents his marital commitment from being total (Ilting, III, 535; *Phil of Law* ¶164).

Hegel's concept of equal sacrifice in marriage may appear more ideological than scientific. The concept of history as emancipation in this case seems to impede emancipation by masking current forms of patriarchal despotism. Biology is invoked to negate the liberation of women. Schools for the scientific education of women are said to be money thrown out the window [229]. The standpoint of lordship and bondage is inescapably self-contradictory (*Werke* II, 153-58), but the wife's bondage appears natural.

Hegel's statements, read in the context of the late twentieth century, inevitably appear sexist. His disbelief in the educability and thus in the genuine equality of women was disconfirmed by direct and indirect knowledge of some very talented and accomplished women. He neither considered the repressive role of culture in typical sex differences, nor supported schooling for women even as a test of their educability. Though genuinely identified with the world-historical actualization of freedom, he apparently failed to perceive the inauthenticity of his commitment in this one field. Perhaps for reasons of career and personal inclination he required the

sort of wife whom he took to be typical of her sex; his caustic friend Paulus wrote to Hegel in 1808 that his wife, Caroline, wished to begin searching for "a slow and faithful girl from Nuremberg" for him [143]. Hegel's courtship and marriage with Marie von Tucher is at the very least a case study in the contradictions of the Kierkegaardian *ethical man*. Hegel was not always faithful to his principle of marital equality, but was sensitive enough to recognize the fact. His bad conscience surfaces, for example, in his travelogues. His wife accompanied him on none of the three major educational trips he took in the Berlin period. From Vienna in 1824, after having "luxuriated in intellectual pleasures," he wrote to her:

I was often disturbed by the thought that while I was enjoying so many beautiful things and living amid utopias, my Marie might not be as fortunate. If she is at least well, then my conscience is set at ease. But you have foregone many pleasures I have had alone. If only I could bring back to you all the beautiful things I have seen and heard, but at least I will bring myself back, and this, my dear, will have to do. [483]

For Kierkegaard such bad conscience is of course resolved only beyond ethical life, in religious faith. For Hegel, however, resolution lies in the further development of ethical life itself, in a public educational process to which we contribute even if the contradictions holding us captive are not resolved in our lifetime.

Hegel's concept of monogamous marriage, however sexist from our perspective today, of course represented ethical progress relative to the ancient polygamy of the Orient, in which the husband made no complete self-sacrifice to each wife comparable to that received from her. More pertinently, it was ethically superior to the fashionable Romantic concept of free love championed in Hegel's own time by Friedrich Schlegel (*Phil of Law* ¶164). Polygamy left love at the mercy of the capricious impulse and feeling of the husband. Modern free love extended such license to women, making the absence of total commitment reciprocal. Opposition to the emancipation and education of women helped preserve the family as an ethical institution from the corrosive effects of romanticism—including capricious divorce. But it of course also had the opposite effect of ethically undercutting marriage, subjecting the couple to the economic and political hegemony of the husband. Basic to marriage for Hegel is total mutual commitment. Yet insofar as this commitment is incomplete in Hegel's concept as well as in his practice of marriage, his concept remains a dialectical problem, not a solution. It is a problem he might have recognized more explicitly if he had been as concerned to ferret out the objective, institutionalized contradictions of the present as he was to justify the present as a rational triumph over the contradictions of the past.

Hegel married because he reached the stage where a wife seemed for him the chief remaining requirement of a full life [196]. In 1811, with Napoleon at his apogee and the survival of the Nuremberg gymnasium once more assured, Hegel's professional life was reasonably on course. True, he did not have a university professorship, but the reputation of the *Phenomenology* was beginning to earn him consideration for one. Yet in private life he proceeded less confidently. In October 1809 he had already announced to Niethammer his wish to take a wife, but had no idea whom, or how to choose [151]. When by April 1811 his choice fell on the patrician Marie von Tucher, his previous calculativeness—quite unromantic for a

Romantic age—did not prevent a poetic revival of Romantic sensibility. Still, his poetry was tied to didactic philosophical content, and his courtship of Marie ended in the inevitably renewed rejection of romanticism. His distaste for the celebration of individual feeling—expressed in his attitude toward Romantic philosophers like Schlegel and Schleiermacher—in fact all but contradicted the nature of courtship. The ethical earnestness with which he pursued *marriage* was indeed resisted by his fiancée's more innocent romanticization of *love*. Marie finally yielded, but not unmockingly. Yet there were other obstacles on the path to marriage. In 1811, social class could still be a barrier. But the final and greatest obstacle was money, the most mundane.

THE SPECULATIVE POETRY OF LOVE

The theme of the first [178] of two remaining love poems to Marie coincides with that of his speculative philosophy: spirit's self-alienation and self-reconciliation. Love was itself essentially identical with spirit for Hegel (*Werke* XVI, 27). Hegel uses the phoenix arising ever anew from its ashes as a conscious symbol of spirit, and invites Marie to partake in its truth without having followed his own path of arduous "exertion" and of "teaching" and "knowledge." The second poem [180] asserts that knowledge conveyed in language is not only dispensable but is incapable of fully expressing spirit or love. That Hegel's repudiation of the prevailing philosophy of feeling was not a panlogist denial of feeling or reduction of the Absolute to a conceptual system becomes very concrete. Hegel here comes closest to the Romantic celebration of the unique other—a felt presence beyond description—traditionally required by the idea of courtship.

Hegel to His Fiancée [178]

April 13, 1811

Come to mountain tops with me.
From clouds below tear yourself free;
Here in the clear air may we stand.
In Light's colorless womb take my hand.

What opinion has in the mind injected—
From truth and madness equally collected—
Has as a lifeless mist lifted,
By the breath of life, of love, evicted.

The valley below of narrow nothingness,
Of vain exertion repaid in an exertion endless,
With dulled senses to desire bound—
There your heart never has been found.

Lifted out of this valley's night by higher longing,
You beheld Good and Beauty self-revealing,
as from an inner light.
You took your path to the morning height.

The mountain airs redden in the sun's glow.
Vague foreboding, from what is taught or there to know,
Works on such vapors, which it weaves
Into the image to which longing cleaves.

But in this image no heartbeat is found.
As longing receives its own reflected sounds,
Soullessly it returns whatever echos it does find,
Remaining to itself confined.

Feelings that have at yearning stayed
Are the breath of flattery to the self conveyed.
In this haze the soul must die, as if to choke
In a poisonous breeze, in sacrificial smoke.

See the altar here atop mountains,
On which Phoenix dies in a flaming fountain,
Only to rise in youth everlasting—
this fruit of its ashes endlessly winning.

Phoenix's brooding, turned back on itself alone,
Was now preserved as merely its own.
The point of its existence shall vanish,
And the pain of sacrifice weigh on it in anguish.

But the feeling of striving immortal
Forces him beyond his self's narrow portal.
May his earthly nature quake.
In flames this striving comes awake.

Narrow bands dividing us, fall away!
Sacrifice alone is the heart's true way!
I expand myself to you, as you to me.
May what isolates us go up in fire, cease to be.

For life is life only as reciprocated,
By love in love is it alone created.
To the kindred soul abandoned,
The heart opens up in strength gladden.

Once, the spirit atop free mountains has flown,
It holds back nothing of its own.
Living to see myself in you, and you to see yourself in me,
In the enjoyment of celestial bliss shall we be.

A FEW DAYS LATER Hegel was confident of having won Marie's heart [180].

You are mine! A heart as yours I may call mine.
 In your look may I divine
 Love's look returned, oh bliss,
 Oh highest happiness!

Oh, how I love you I may now impart.
 What in my oppressed heart
 Has so long beaten for you concealed
 Will now, listen, be pure joy revealed.

Yet the poverty of words I address,
 Whose power love enchanted to express—
 A love which from within presses with force
 O'er to the heart—is frustated in its course.

I could envy, Nightingale,
 Your throat's power, making mine pale.
 Yet, spitefully, Nature has merely lent
 The language of sorrow an instrument so eloquent!

Yet if Nature did not grant the lips
 Expression in speech of love's bliss,
 For lovers' union it has given with just finesse
 These lips a token of greater tenderness.

Souls touch in the kiss—more profound than speech.
 My heart overflows into yours, within mutual reach.

MARRIAGE AND SOCIAL CLASS IN 1811

The next day Hegel wrote to Niethammer of the good news—though Marie's father was understandably concerned about the irregularity of Hegel's salary as rector.

Hegel to Niethammer [181]

Nuremberg, April 18, 1811

It has been a long time, dear friend, since I have received any news from you. Yet I would already understand why without further explanation. But I understand it more definitely now that I have heard about your relations with [the University of] Greifswald. These relations—more than all other considerations—make you the master of the situation, whether you remain there [in Munich] in conditions acceptable in view of your sphere of activity and personal situation or accept the advantageous position offered you at Greifswald. I naturally prefer you to stay on, in part for the sake of the Cause and in part for my own sake. And if the interest of the Cause and my own interest coincide, you [still] know my wish is completely sincere. For what is just as essential, indeed most essential, is what you wish for

yourself and consider preferable. This you have to settle with yourself and even then with your wife, who has the right sense in such matters. I learn that if you stay you can be more active on behalf of the university system than in your situation thus far. Since the matter is still pending, my letter would really seem doubly superfluous.

But I have a more precise motive for writing: namely, my bond with a good and very dear girl. My happiness has in part been made contingent [by Marie's father] on my faculty appointment [at the reorganized University of] Erlangen. Since the day before yesterday I have been certain of calling this dear heart mine. I have your warm wishes for my happiness. I have told her moreover that I would first write to you and the best of women. Her name is Marie von Tucher. You and the best of women have seen her here. How nice it would be if we could be united in Erlangen. You and the best of women would certainly come to have great affection for her. I spare myself a description of how happy I feel. Supply the image of it from your own memory and present. Oh, if only the two of you were here for a few hours, or if—accompanied with my Marie—I could go see you for but a few hours! But do not as yet tell anybody anything of this. Due to the external conditions [mentioned above] and her father, we cannot yet talk aloud of it. At most Roth and his wife [may be told], but they should likewise keep it in confidence.

Paulus has finally come here, a few days ago. The report on the gymnasium funds by Paulus and the local Commissariat will now at last leave here. In the meantime, however, we famish. We have not yet [received] our December salary. If we are to wait until these funds are secured, it will still be long. I talked with Paulus earlier about Heidelberg [where Paulus had just been appointed Professor], namely with regard to myself. He himself has the notion that a philosopher is still needed there, and considers the matter to be very possible and feasible. I will recommend it to him anew and all the more urgently. If both of you leave the country, I will no longer have a point of contact and support. My Marie will go anywhere with me.

Farewell, a thousand, thousand greetings to the best of women. Yours,
 Hegel

NIETHAMMER ADVISED HEGEL not to make marriage conditional on a university appointment which, in the case of Erlangen, was not yet imminent. In the year of Napoleon's marriage to Marie-Louise, Niethammer found a timely lesson for Hegel. Instead of viewing this marriage as a reactionary move by Napoleon, Niethammer sees it as a progressive move by Marie-Louise:

Do you as professor and rector of the Nuremberg gymnasium perhaps not consider yourself sufficiently respected and worthy to be publicly and solemnly received as a member of a family which, it is true, has assumed a very respected position in the former glory of the Imperial city of Nuremberg? . . . At a time when even kings themselves are no longer expected to prove their ancestry to win the right to court royal daughters, at a time when the personal merit and rank one has acquired on one's own without ancestry ennobles more than all proofs of hereditary nobility, there is nothing to fear from public opinion in a union such as

yours. Besides, I am of the view that even if we go by the criterion of the [social] relations of former times which now have been dissolved, the status you have as rector and professor in one of the most respected Royal gymnasiums, a status which puts you on the same level as a district Royal councillor, is not beneath what even in former times would have given you entry into the family to which you now belong. Moreover, I absolutely cannot imagine—and my wife, who already last year came to know the family of your *fiancée* more intimately and who already at that time, in her letters from Nuremberg, greatly praised the modest reserve and domestic life she found there, agrees with me in this—I absolutely cannot imagine, I say, that from the side of this family you should be given reason for such concern. So do not allow such idle worries—not to speak of a certain vanity on your part, which so ill befits a philosopher—keep you from concluding your marriage as soon as possible. [183]

In the same letter Niethammer urged an early marriage for a second reason. He noted that the chief question in deciding to grant a marriage license to a public servant was the funding of a widow's pension, and that this question had been more clearly resolved at the Nuremberg gymnasium, which already had a "regular budget," than at the University of Erlangen. Hegel used the letter from Niethammer to persuade Marie's father to consent to an expeditious marriage date [190].

Hegel to Niethammer [185]

Nuremberg, May 30, 1811

It is your letter's [183] wealth of gratifying content, my dear friend, which has kept me silent for so long, and my head is still so filled with it that I can hardly put it into the usual language of a letter. Your staying on at your present post, the altered circumstances in which you are doing so, your anticipated arrival at the wedding reception, the reception itself—everything is so intertwined that it will be difficult at first to pick up a thread from such a tissue. To be sure, I see my Marie unwind many a ball of yarn, and I help [her] all the more diligently to look for the ends, inasmuch as completion of the trousseau and acceleration of [preparations for] the wedding depend on such things. For, as you know, women want to have such important matters in order from one end to the other, and do not take to the suggestion that something like that might equally be done afterwards. But I notice that these threads have taken me right to the heart of the matter, and thus continue [to say] that the necessary arrangements will in any case not be in place before fall. So now it is only a question of having her father—for the rest of the family has agreed—give his assurance that, even if I am to be still a gymnasium rector, the wedding will take place in the fall. The excellent explanations which you have handed on to me [as to why Hegel had no university appointment] have not gone unused. One objective reason, namely the greater difficulty of obtaining Royal authorization from Erlangen, I have not been able to use for all it is worth. For as you know, even fanatics and liars can persuade others only inasmuch as they have persuaded themselves of the reasons to be used. But undoubtedly I can go to Erlangen only if the university is organized, in which case funding will also be taken of, and thus funding for the widow's pension as well. You moreover know

people here in Nuremberg. If all imaginable reasons counsel these people from Nuremberg to buy a horse, their first deliberations always bring them to the point of buying—for the time being—a packet of horsehair. But since the rest of the nag adheres to this hair, the whole animal must likewise little by little be drawn into the stable. Disclosure of the engagement came about by itself. Marie's father introduced me to her grandfather. He who first says *A* now goes on through the entire alphabet. We thus comport ourselves as engaged before the entire world. You know anyway that one who has founded one's cause on the goodness of women, especially in such matters, has not built on sand. I am wholly expecting [to receive] the final impetus from your arrival here. On the other hand, however, my wish is for everything to be settled before your arrival and, if you cannot make two trips, for you to keep your visit simply for the wedding reception. Your presence would be a most essential part of my happiness. At the wedding, I, for my part, will stand alone opposite the entire assembly of family relations on the other side. But if you and the best of women are present I will have such an abundance of friendship to place on the scales as would at least counterbalance the other side—all the more so since my side as well will then not lack a baroness [Mrs. Niethammer, born von Eckardt], whom I would have the right to present as a kind of mother. Anyhow, all joking aside, I must note and appreciate the fact that this issue of social class [*Stand*] into which your own letter greatly delves has not been taken into consideration or, if you wish, has been considered only slightly. For the issue has indeed not come up more than a little, or is not coming up at all. The wish for better employment has never been attested in me as a wish for higher employment. Be that as it may, Marie and I—to say nothing of the others—hope for the best, or rather for everything, from you. Between ourselves, there has already been so much talk about Erlangen that our union has come to be completely fused with the city in our imagination, much as man and wife. The improvement of my economic situation is necessary due to my lack of means because my Marie, whose grandfather is still alive and whose father still has seven children apart from herself, can obtain an annual sum of only 100 florins beyond the dowry. Moreover, thanks to its status as a large city Nuremberg offers nothing but small-town mentality on a larger scale, and we can only look upon escape from the chitchat of Marie's ubiquitous acquaintances as absolutely essential to our domestic tranquility.

Please forgive a groom for talking first of his own concerns, and not first congratulating you on the change in your own position, which you have so ardently desired. How—and to what extent—I am to congratulate you I of course really do not know, since you have not informed me in detail of what has been accorded. I was happy to note in the government paper the promotion of our colleague [Joseph] Wismayr. You have perhaps not informed me above all because you may have sacrificed yourself for the Cause more than you have merely looked out for yourself. Good fortune, however, is to be wished for your cause and friends most emphatically, and it is in these two things that your satisfaction will lie. In Greifswald you would have heard about it only from a distance; in Erlangen you would have seen the largest part of all you have instituted collapse.

I also must thank you for another project which, it is said, has been on the

verge of being carried out, namely, charging me in an acting capacity with the management of school affairs here. In the opinion of people this to be sure would have carried some weight. But I am not yet sure how creditably I would have discharged such an honorable mission. For a moment my little faith instilled in me the untrusting thought that you entertained the plan of opening a niche for me in administration in the event that—or fearing that—difficulties might arise to block an academic career. Yet I shout to myself: Away with it! [*Apagel!*] Away with this fear!

It was said that a principal item among the conditions of your staying on is that you will acquire direct influence on the university system. For me this presently is the main consideration. Has this point, Erlangen, or already even myself been talked about more precisely? In the summer everybody in Munich usually leaves for the spa, while you leave on a commission. But you wanted to go to Swabia in the fall. We will have seen reorganizations, dated October 1 and planned for this date, made public in late November. Of other reorganizations, supposedly to take effect on April 1 or so, we have seen assurances on March 30 that they are still to be made ready. But by April 2, because it is now too late, they are postponed by half a year if we are lucky, or a whole year. What a future of uncertainties, of expectations for this day or the next, of hopes and so on—and all this during my engagement, thus linking my marriage to all these uncertainties, disappointments, and expectations! Here is truly a confusion of a different order, calling for a mighty blow cutting it apart.

I still have lots of smaller concerns of a different nature. I enumerate a few of them: 1. No resolution has yet been passed on remuneration for examiners in the examination of our candidates for teaching positions last fall. The request from the local commissariat has long since been submitted, but still even less has any money been received. 2. There has not yet been any decision on my petition for a supplement of 50 florins to cover the program and copying fee for 1808-09 and 1809-10 which certainly all rectors in the Realm have long received, despite the report submitted by the local commissariat. . . . Under present circumstances one must be sparing with everything one has—if perchance one should have something—but especially must seek to procure everything one does not have but should have.

Yet enough news, both joyful and distressful. My dear Marie charges me to pass on most cordial compliments to you and the best of women. How often have we both wished to be with you for a few hours. Likewise present my compliments above all to the High Councillor of Finance [Karl Johann Friedrich] Roth and his wife. His father-in-law, [Paul Wolfgang] Merkel, who apart from my Marie is still my only company here, often addresses me kind words of friendly sympathy. I thank him very much.

Clearly you will bring along the best of women on your commission. When you were here last time, I had intended to be able to lodge you next time at my house. There is no lack of room, and now none of white walls either. Yet I am now closer to the prospect of advancing far enough in my life [to receive you]. But I have given up [the hope of ever] advancing far enough to be able to repay my friends what I owe them. Farewell. Your sincere friend, Hegel

Hegel had been confident of Marie's heart since the middle of April [181], but in summer 1811 he was still locked in a contest with her mind. Though they were both in the same city, Hegel felt it necessary to smooth over in writing wounds occasioned by his "pedantic" censure of her Romantic opinions. She espoused something close to what is familiar from Kierkegaard as the aesthetic point of view: when duty enters love absconds. Hegel preferred "spirit" over Hölderlin's "love" in designating the Absolute because "love" was too subjective, purely affective or aesthetic in connotation. Feeling, precisely because of its insistent reality, was dangerous when divorced from conceptual comprehension. Hegel responded to Marie from a Kierkegaardian "ethical" standpoint, thus ending courtship prior to marriage [195]. In his second poem [180] he had courted Marie with a celebration of the ineffability of "love enchanted." In his letter below, Romantic love is an antichamber to the duties of marriage, and an imperfect anticipation of the Infinite Love offered by religion—and philosophy.

Hegel to His Fiancée [186]

[Nuremberg, Summer 1811]

I have written to you in thought, dear Marie, almost all night long! What was at issue in my thoughts was not this or that isolated matter between us, but rather, inevitably, the whole thought: are we thus going to make ourselves unhappy? From the depth of my soul came the reply: "This cannot, ought not, and must not be. It shall not be!"

However, what I have long told you is to me summed up in the conclusion that marriage is essentially a religious bond. To be complete, love requires a still higher moment than that in which it consists merely in and for itself. What perfect satisfaction—i.e., being entirely happy—means can only be completed by religion and the sense of duty; for only therein do all particularizations of the temporal self step aside, particularizations which in actuality could cause trouble. Such total satisfaction [by itself] remains imperfect and cannot be taken as ultimate, though it should constitute what is called earthly happiness.

I have before me the draft of the lines which I added to your letter to my sister. My postscript, to which you certainly attached too much importance, is missing. I was thus reminded of exactly what occasioned the frame of mind in which I wrote that postscript even while recopying the draft. Had we not talked the evening before and definitely agreed that we prefer to call what we were certain to attain together "satisfaction"? And did we not say: "There is a *blessed* satisfaction which, all illusion aside, is more than all that is called being happy"? As I wrote the words now before me, whose meaning is so dear to me—"You may see from it how happy I can be with her for the rest of my life, and how happy winning such love, which I scarcely still hoped for in this world, has already made me"—I added, as if this happy sensation of mine and its expression had been excessive over against what we had already said: ". . . *insofar as* happiness belongs to my life's destiny." I do not think this should have hurt you! I remind you, dear Marie, that your deeper sense, the formation of what is higher in you, has taught you as

well that in nonsuperficial natures every sensation of happiness is connected with a sensation of melancholy. Furthermore, I remind you of your promise to heal me of any disbelief in satisfaction that might remain in my nature, i.e., to reconcile my true inner self with the way I too frequently am toward and for the actual. I equally remind you that this point of view gives a higher dimension to your destiny, that I credit you with strength for it, that this strength must lie in *our* love. Distinguishing your love for me and mine for you, if I may be so emphatically explicit, would separate *our* love: this love is solely *ours*, merely this unity, this bond. Turn away from reflection within this distinction, allow us to hold fast to this One that can alone be my strength as well, my new love of life. Let this trust be the basis for everything, and then all will be truly well.

Oh, how much more I could still write—about my perhaps hypochondriacal pedantry, which led me to insist so greatly on the distinction between satisfaction and happiness, a distinction which is once again so useless; or about how I have sworn to you and myself that your happiness shall be my dearest possession. There is still much that passes away, is forgotten, and remedied merely by not being evoked.

One more thing: I have long doubted whether I should write to you, since everything written or spoken again depends solely on explanation; or, since I feared explanation, which once embarked upon is so dangerous. But I have overcome this fear and have the highest hope that your heart will know how to receive these words.

Farewell until, *dear Marie*, we see each other today again untroubled. I would still like only to be able to tell you this: what feeling, how very much—my existence as much as it is—lies for me in the words: *dear Marie*. Your Wilhelm

HEGEL HAD HAD a recent object lesson in the relation of love and duty in the birth of his natural son Ludwig—or “Louis” (Ch 16). On May 18 Hegel had written to the Frommanns in Jena asking that his engagement be kept secret for fear that Ludwig’s mother, Mrs. Burkhardt, would find out “before everything is settled with her.”

Hegel to Mrs. Frommann [184]

Nuremberg, May 18, 1811

It has pleased me greatly, my dear friend, to learn of such a satisfactory outcome for you and your nephew’s mother of the negotiations concerning the young man. I enclose a note to your sister about it. I am curious to find out how a young man from Lower Saxony will view my dear hometown of Stuttgart and its Swabian inhabitants. At first he will doubt whether they actually speak German.

I thank you for the good news you send me about Louis and even more for all the love and kindness you are showing him. It is only such intelligent and loving care as he enjoys that has been able to free him of the bloated sickliness, lethargy, and obtuseness of mind caused by his previous upbringing, and to give free reign to his natural character, which, you write, appears good.

I cannot conceal to you a change which my destiny now awaits. I have found

a dear girl whom I am to marry—perhaps in the fall. How long have circumstances prevented such happiness for me! How completely altered I feel my relations with myself and the world to be through this relation, which alone gives a human being to himself and gives him completion. I ask you still to keep this circumstance a secret, since otherwise it might incite even more the impudence of that Burkhardt woman, should she find out about it before everything is completely settled with her. However, I would wish you to speak of it precisely in this respect with the [Jena University] corporation lawyer [Ludwig Christoph Ferdinand] Asverus. Paulus left for Heidelberg a week ago. His daughter—who is now known as Emmi and whom you have to imagine as tall and pretty, good and yet somewhat capricious—had a suitor even before her departure, though he could not arouse any interest in her ever-indifferent heart.

Please remember me to Mr. Frommann. Your devoted friend, Hegel

My cordial greetings to Fritz and Alwine, both of whom I, to be sure, would hardly recognize anymore.

MARIE MAY STILL HAVE been unaware of Hegel’s natural son and the affair with Mrs. Burkhardt. In any case she interpreted Hegel’s first letter [186] as a reproach against her character. Hegel tried to explain in a second letter [187].

Hegel to His Fiancée [187]

[Nuremberg, Summer 1811]

... I have hurt you by a few things I said. This causes me pain. I have hurt you by seeming to censure moral views I can only repudiate, as if they were principles of your own thought and action. About this I now say to you only that I reject these views in part inasmuch as they abolish the difference between what the heart likes—i.e., what pleases it—and duty; or rather inasmuch as they completely eliminate duty and destroy morality. But likewise—and this is the most important matter between us—please believe me when I tell you that I do not attribute these views, insofar as they have this consequence, to *you*, to your self; that I view them as lying merely within your reflection; that you do not think, know, or gain an overview of them in their [Ihrer] logical connection; that they serve you as a way of excusing others. To justify is something else, for what one may excuse in others is not therefore considered permissible in oneself. Yet what one can justify is right for everyone, and thus for ourselves as well.

With regard to myself and my manner of explanation, do not forget that if I condemn maxims, I too easily lose consciousness of the way in which they are actual in determinate individuals—in you, for instance. Nor should you forget that such maxims appear before my eyes too earnestly in their universality, in their logical consequences, extended results, and applications. Far from taking these things to be entailed for you, you give them no thought. At the same time you yourself know that, even though character and the maxims governing insight are different, what maxims govern insight and judgment is not unimportant. Yet I know just as well that maxims, when they contradict character, are still less important in the case of women than men.

Lastly, you know that there are evil men who torture their wives merely so that their behavior, along with their patience and love, may be constantly tested. I do not believe I am that evil. Yet although no harm ought ever be done to such a dear human being as you, I could almost be free of regret for having hurt you. For through the deeper insight into your being that I have thus gained I feel the intimacy and depth of my love for you have increased. So be consoled that what may have been unkind and harsh in my replies will all vanish through the fact that I feel and recognize ever more deeply how thoroughly lovable, loving, and full of love you are.

I have to go lecture. Farewell, dearest, dearest, most lovely Marie. Your Wilhelm

MARIE HEGEL'S MARITAL COMPROMISE

But by the middle of July Hegel's relation with Marie had stabilized. They were hoping for a university professorship, in Heidelberg if not in Erlangen. Paulus suggested a few months before that a philosopher was needed in Heidelberg and that Hegel's candidacy was not impossible [181]. With Marie at his side, Hegel wrote on July 13 to Paulus's novelist wife Caroline, hoping for further encouragement from the Pauluses, who were already in Heidelberg [189].

Hegel to Caroline Paulus [189]

Nuremberg, July 13, 1811

Even if you have neither time nor leisure to remember your friends here, of whom you have left so many behind, you will certainly have time and leisure to read a letter to you. And I hope you will thus consider yourself invited to send news of yourself by way of reply. The clearly worst hypothesis to explain your silence was that you were ill. But Mr. [Friedrich Wilhelm] von Hoven [Paulus's physician] has refuted this hypothesis by your silence toward him. The very worst hypothesis of all, namely that along with Bavaria and the files you have forgotten Nuremberg and us, I will not even consider.

I, for my part, am of the view that after the many mental and physical sufferings you have endured you are feeling too well to want to trouble enjoyment of your present natural environs and satisfaction with your condition through the effort of letter writing. Immediately following the exertion of mental productivity, authors in any case fall into asthenia as far as writing is concerned, until they gradually recollect themselves again. Without, I hope, disturbing your present good life, I can no longer refrain from forcing myself, like some old article from Nuremberg or family heirloom, into your Heidelberg milieu. I do so to ask just how life is treating you. How are you feeling and generally faring? But I really ask only to receive confirmation of the good news we suppose and wish from you.

Here everything is as it was before, but anyhow *no one* in this world expects a return to something better. I enjoy with my dear Marie a quiet, ever deepening happiness. The principal beginning, which is still to be made, will with heaven's help come this fall.

We have not heard from Niethammer for an eternity. You know and knew he was not able to get out [of his present position]. He has, as far as I hear, not received any special salary increase, but has only now received by decree the pay of 500 florins which as high church councillor he should have had long ago, along with a 400-florin increase connected with his second position as high school councillor, which fell to him due to Wismayr's transfer [from school to church affairs in May 1811]. It has frequently occurred to me that I have forgotten to tell your husband as well my opinion of a matter you have broached with me. If you have not yet done so, make up for it by telling him my confident belief about the attempt to make him uneasy and suspicious in the matter of Niethammer's behavior toward him regarding Erlangen. Let him consider the source as well as the circumstances from which it has come, as also the probable intention.

Of everything otherwise which was formerly of interest to your husband, nothing has yet come forth. No academic or school funds have been established. Our salaries are four to five months behind. The promise to charge [Christoph Friedrich] Ammon with school affairs here has not yet been fulfilled. Ammon, furious, is said to have entered negotiations again with a view to Greifswald. As for the organization and endowment of Erlangen, total silence [*altum silentium*]. Ever since Niethammer raised hopes in me two months ago, I have heard nothing more of it with regard to myself. Perhaps the hot summer has not let the gentlemen get to work yet. It is entirely possible, moreover, that at the end of November arrangements may be published with a decree that they be implemented October 1! Throughout all these circumstances I have not forgotten that you and the lord and master [Paulus] are in Heidelberg, and have thought I perhaps might be needed there.

What do you think now that you are on the spot? Even abstracting from your presence there, my dear Marie would *rather be there than here or in Erlangen*.

That work is diligently being done on shirts, beds, cabinets, etc. you can well imagine. Where we shall put it and use it all is still in the hands of fate and, predominantly, of good friends. What further proof of friendship for me the lord and master has given in saying goodbye to Mr. von Tucher Marie has already told me, and we are both grateful. I may ask you to ask the master his opinion as to whether I might think of Heidelberg, whether his friendship might accomplish something there, and whether he would view conditions there as favorable to me and to be preferred. How great would be my good fortune to find at last in Heidelberg my port of destination! You will not leave me without a reply, will you?¹

Is the [Badenese] Grand Duke's [Karl Friedrich's] death [in June 1811] to bring any changes in reference to [Heidelberg] University [of which he and his successors were rectors]?

Merkel and his wife often ask me about you. I still could tell them nothing of you—nor they of you. I likewise have no need to renew Mrs. and Mr. von Tucher's compliments to you.

¹Caroline Paulus replied on July 18 [1811] that, with Johann Jakob Wagner and Hegel's old Jena rival Jakob Fries staffing philosophy at Heidelberg, Hegel's prospects were dim.

Above all I hope to receive from you a portrait of the master's pleasure, of how—freed from the dust of documents—he has returned to the youth of university life. May he be praised for his good fortune in this and cordially greeted.

But what is the good Virginia of *many names* doing in Heidelberg?² I send her a kiss on her beautiful hand.

My greetings likewise to Wilhelm.

Farewell, dearest friend. Your faithful Hegel

MARIE INTERJECTED comments in the margins and between the lines of the above letter, calling Hegel “one of these people who live without hope and neither expect nor desire anything” due to his complaint that no one in this world expects the return of better times; Hegel confirmed the contrast between his melancholy and Marie’s “gaiety” the next day [190]. Hegel’s characterization of the cantankerous Professor Paulus as Caroline’s “lord and master” inspired further marginal comment by Marie:

Despite the length at which my lord and master goes on in his epistle, and as humble as the little corner he assigns me may be, I nonetheless know that the good Caroline Paulus will not lose sight of me. I have already raised my little voice in the course of my master’s discourse. But each time I respectfully silenced myself again, though I would have gladly confirmed many a thing at greater length.

The equilibrium which Hegel and Marie struck was of course a compromise. Caroline remarked in reply:

The lines added by her [Marie’s] gracious hand have doubly pleased me, and I must expressly praise you both. You [Hegel] because you have laid preparations for the main objective so well, and have already had yourself proclaimed the future lord and master of the house; and sweet Marie because she recognizes so readily your despotic claim and, already before marriage, humbly addresses you as master [191].

The battle of mind and will was not completely won, Marie’s ironic words conveying an inner denial of the submission she professed.

ON MARRYING WITHOUT A SALARY

When his future father-in-law finally consented to the marriage, Hegel’s unpaid back salary led him to fear the marriage would still be impossible as scheduled. Yet the marriage license he reported having requested in mid-July [190] was granted by the Nuremberg General Commissioner Kracker a month later [193]. Hegel used the occasion to ask Niethammer to help correct the irregularity of salary payments [194]. Niethammer replied with a promise to lend funds if the salary owed Hegel

²*Adolf and Virginia* was the title of a novel on which Caroline Paulus was working (*Briefe* I, 486). The words in italics are in Greek. The reference seems to be to the Pauluses’ daughter Emmi. (*Briefe* I, 486, 509)

was not paid in time. Hegel, who had already borrowed from Merkel, thus went ahead with the ceremony [195].

Hegel to Niethammer [190]

Nuremberg, July 14, 1811

It has been a long time, my dear friend, since I have heard or seen anything of you. . . . If you have delayed coming here in order to come to my wedding, I cannot praise the motive enough. For what I had earlier hoped from your presence here, namely that it should give impetus to a more precise determination of the wedding date, has, among other things, been settled due to the aftereffect of your letter [183]. I have submitted my application for the marriage license. It is understood that the wedding will be in the fall. It could not have been arranged earlier because of the [necessary] preparations and fittings [for a new household]. Another reason the wedding could not have taken place earlier was because in our present circumstances—being constantly up to four to five months in arrears in salary payments, not to mention the payment of other emoluments which are two to three years behind—no household can be started up. Frequent disbursements by the [bride’s] father have no doubt also made the wait long for him. He, like the groom but for different reasons, is willing for the period to be shortened—though not mother and daughter, who want to put everything completely and properly in place.

Recently I had asked your advice as to what could be done for those emoluments: the yearly 50-florin program and copying fees, writing materials, the library. I counted on this income and must count on it. Three months ago I submitted a petition for the first item, since I could base myself on the excerpt from a decree for the sum. No decision has since come from Munich, where the report [missing] was sent on May 2 or 3. Can nothing be obtained before a decision is made on the foundation? I hope that will not cast in doubt compensation for writing materials from the past years. I imagine you delayed your trip here in part because the cargo of cash you want to bring us is not yet packed. In the company of such cargo, many more singular effects will ensue in future dispositions and displays than occur when a chorus of distress calls provoked by this-worldly needs replies echolike to ideal, other-worldly aspirations.

As for Erlangen in general and for me in particular, there is of course *altum silentium* in this region, and perhaps where you are as well. The rumors about Regensburg [becoming a university] have been renewed here. Our arrangements and wedding necessarily depend on news about this in accord with all the hopes and prospects with which we delude ourselves. Just imagine the sad state of a bridal pair or married couple that does not know if it can set up a household since it can visualize having to take it down again in two weeks. Paulus thought that a prospect for me might well open up in Heidelberg, that I would be needed there. Since his departure we have heard nothing from him. I have written to him in recent days about the matter, and am anxious to hear of the situation he has encountered there. It looks attractive from a distance. In Heidelberg there exists something [already] made, secure, set up, and completed. There the generally prevailing tone is rather that once something is good it will remain.

Ammon in Erlangen is said to be very irritable to talk to because no action has yet been taken on the promises he received. He has undertaken negotiations with a view to Greifswald again, or wants to do so.

How much my Marie wishes to be remembered to you could be deduced from all the above. She is very happy to get to know you and your wife better, and I am certain you will happily extend to her your friendship for me. I love her so greatly in part because, in the temper and disposition of her generous good cheer, and in the naturalness of her sense and sensibility, she so greatly resembles the best of women—whose beautiful hand I now kiss. Faithfully yours, Hegel

Hegel to Niethammer [194]

Nuremberg, August 16, 1811

You have never, my dear and best friend, been so tightfisted with me. And in what circumstances! The day before yesterday I received the Royal marriage license. My Marie, her parents, affairs, and finally I—even exams and the like—in short everything is arranged so that in three weeks, with the beginning of vacation, the wedding can take place. Now, after everything has been brought this far with great pains and difficulty, I must be the one who deeply wishes a delay, who is embarrassed by the granting of the license, and who must soon make public the thought of such a delay. For the best thing of all is lacking, namely funds. If I do not soon receive payment of my salary, now five months in arrears, and if I do not receive the emoluments owed me, or at least do not receive definite assurance about the date of payment, I shall in any case hardly be able to sustain daily life [*sustentare vitam quotidianam*] as a hermit, much less as a pair of hermits. In two weeks the Tucher family will move into the city and everything will be scrubbed. The beautiful gamecock has already been fattening for two weeks. It will either suffocate in its fat or must be eaten in vain [*frustra*]. So this time I do not inquire even once about Erlangen, nor even about whether you are coming to the wedding, but only whether you can say anything definite about a decision on the gymnasium foundation forthcoming within three or four weeks, and thus whether I can count on something certain by then.

Throughout the entire summer I have not received the slightest word about Erlangen from you. Since these hopes of which I have spoken [to others] have not, in this sultry summer heat, been renewed by any breeze from you, suspicion of the entire prospect and pretext might insinuate itself with certain people. So please authorize me to say something about it myself one way or another.

There has been talk of you coming here at the beginning of October. Is there finally something to the talk? Are you not able to come here with Roth or around that time?

But a chair varnisher has just interrupted me, and I must go give exams.

Now still my most heartfelt respects to the best of women, the model for my Marie! I hope, alas, she will not stay behind when you come, but that I will have the good fortune of seeing both of you in my "hermitage for two." I have thus implored you for a couple of lines, and by *return mail* if at all possible. In the meantime farewell. Yours, Hegel

Hegel to Niethammer [195]

Nuremberg, August 27, 1811

Your very kind letter calls for a speedy reply. First of all, I must announce that the wedding is definitely set for the 16th of September, and that we all await your presence with longing. Inasmuch as I now look forward to the imminent fulfillment of my longstanding wishes, it will be incomplete if you are not there.

I also have to thank you for the marriage license, which provided the immediate possibility and occasion for the above determination. But I give you my heartfelt thanks above all for your kind offer of credit. Mr. Merkel has helped me out for the moment. I am still not free of this situation of having to burden my friends with such proofs [of friendship]. However, I hope to receive from you as well the means of relief from this deplorable state of affairs. You raise more definite hopes in this direction through news of the decision about local school funding. You have become ministerial in this matter as well, since I myself was less fearful than you of what would have happened if the defrayal of costs had been shoved over onto the citizenry. People like us are beginning to look only to their private advantage, and who knows whether the citizenry would not have put up the money before other sources. The trial which you have won is that of the Cause itself. When one enters matrimony it is the interest of the [individual] person that prevails. I thus postpone for still a few years my full pleasure over the fine success of your steadfast endeavors for such an important Cause—both in itself and as it is for the city here.

You will, I hope, be no less successful in the realization of funding sources at the level of cash flow, and even more so in procuring temporary aid. For if this funding depends in any way on Nuremberg's system of indebtedness and on a grant from the community, we may well wait for years. The worst thing would be for funding to be granted only for the coming budget year, for how would we fare with arrears which now amount to *six months*? You have almost frightened me with your remark that nothing has been decided on indemnifying the rector's expenses. For the annual 50 florins were in fact already decreed in 1809 to cover program and copying costs, just as stationery and the library expenses were included in the budget at the same time. It is also mentioned in the main report that the budgetary requirements of the establishment have already been determined. It would thus seem that decisions have in fact been made on those benefits. At least I hope they will not once more become uncertain, for I have counted on this extra money beyond my regular salary to cover expenses occasioned by my marriage. To force the issue and get a decision, I intend to appeal directly to the department of education in Munich [*Nurn Schrift*, 387ff].

Monday, September 2, is our distribution of prizes [with a speech by Hegel—*Nurn Schrift*, 317ff]. Vacation will thus be over by the first or third of October. Is a decision on Erlangen possible or to be hoped for by then? Your ministerial bearing and air of mystery on this issue have reminded me that such things are as subjective as they are objective, and that the things one most easily keeps secret are those about which there is nothing at all to be known. Since the new curriculum will start for us already in October, the second or at least supple-

mentary organization of the gymnasium should already be completed by then. I would need all the more to know the decision as to my prospects in Erlangen, among other things because of the matter of finding a replacement for me here in case of my transfer. There would thus be no time to lose.

To be sure I am still writing as a fiancé. Yet judging from my worries you may detect that I am doing so as if already in the state of matrimony—in which, among other things, one's wife is mentioned merely at the end. . . .

In the meantime, as a fiancé as well as a husband, I remain your faithful friend, Hegel

X

The *Logic*, 1811-1812

NOWHERE IN HIS LETTERS, as he mentions an introduction to his speculative logic, does Hegel suggest that the *Phenomenology of Spirit* suffices for this purpose. He rather casts the *Phenomenology* as a psychology text, and the *Logic* as a logic text. By 1812 Hegel concluded that his readers could not be gradually led from the conventional formal logic to speculative logic but should be plunged into the strange realm of speculative logic directly. The reader is thus asked to begin by an act of hermeneutic self-alienation; to understand the text he must wrest himself away from his own contemporary understanding of logic and abandon himself to the life of an apparently alien conceptual perspective. This in part is what made Hegel's logic so difficult for gymnasium pupils. However, the initial interpretive self-alienation which the reader undergoes finally cancels itself as the apparently alien dialectical development to which he abandons himself finally reveals itself as the self-reconstruction of his own interpretive present out of its analytically abstracted moments. Hegel's methodological position may be understood as a symbiosis of the analytic-synthetic method dominant in modern epistemology since Descartes and Newton with the hermeneutic method of empathetic understanding developed in Germany since Herder. Having analytically broken the whole down into its moments we relive its phoenix-like rebirth, its spontaneous self-reconstitution. History, whose dialectic Hegel seeks to reconstruct and relive, commences with the fixation on analytic abstractions and ends with their dissolution into concrete thinking. In the physical world the units of analysis are externally related units or atoms, but in the realm of spirit they are internally related but abstract moments. The very inseparability of the moments means that their analytic abstraction from one another, instead of being fatal to the whole, is ultimately revitalizing.

This hermeneutic-dialectical method implied an intermediary position between Romantic-classical self-abandonment to the past and modernist attachment to the present. As a gymnasium student in 1788 Hegel had himself once extolled the modernist ideal of learning from direct experience in contrast to what Lessing called "cold book learning" (*Entwick*, 48-51). The ancient Greeks surely did not learn like gymnasium students struggling with Greek. Yet as a gymnasium rector Hegel was no longer a Romantic would-be imitator of Greece but an interpreter of its literature and thus himself a champion of book learning. The study of a dead culture no longer sensuously present stimulates the imagination and exercises

abstract thought. Study of a foreign tongue inculcates not only grammar but also the categories of logic, which usually go unnoticed by the pupil in his native tongue. Greek is the foreign language of choice, however, not only because of the unrivaled beauty of Greek culture but also because of the very limitations of classical Greece. For we in the West achieve self-understanding only by first projecting ourselves empathetically into the life of Greece and then reenacting the dialectic by which our own world has constituted itself in the immanent self-criticism of that life, and in its ultimate self-transcendence into our own life (*Werke* III, 241). The *Logic* employs such a dialectical-hermeneutic method to reenact the idealized, self-moving conceptual development underpinning the external history of Western philosophy.

In the following sections we encounter an interweaving of philosophy, polemics, pedagogy, critical response, and biography in the year of Hegel's most intense preoccupation with the *Science of Logic*. The 1811-12 academic year, following Hegel's marriage, saw publication of the first book of Volume One of the *Logic*, while Book Two appeared later in 1812. The account of this year traces Hegel's development for the most part chronologically. Polemically, it first becomes apparent how, in writing the *Logic*, the old rivalry with the Jacobian philosopher Jakob Friedrich Fries—who had just published his own logic—served as a goad to Hegel. Pedagogically, we are alerted once more to Hegel's identification with classical studies over against modernism in education, even though the very method of the *Logic* implies that self-loss in antiquity is not an end in itself but is a prelude to the self-recovery of modernity. A second pedagogical factor surrounding the *Logic*'s composition is that Hegel was obliged by the gymnasium curriculum to view his own speculative logic as a subject of instruction for pupils—but with increasing reluctance. Most interestingly, however, the correspondence gives us the first critical response to the *Logic*. Since Hegel was not at a university but was the sole philosophy instructor at a gymnasium, we should not be surprised that the only interchange on the *Logic* documented by the correspondence in 1811-12 was with the Nuremberg mathematics professor, Pfaff. An expository account of Pfaff's criticisms and Hegel's replies is given here in lieu of at least one letter by Hegel which has been lost. After the end of the 1811-12 school year, personal tragedy—the death of his first child—intruded on Hegel's philosophical and administrative concerns, as Napoleon's future hung in the balance in Russia. When Hegel's letters returned to professional concerns in the fall of 1812 it was to communicate to Niethammer, among other things, conclusions about the place of logic in the gymnasium curriculum which had already taken form in the previous academic year.

ANTI-FRIESIAN POLEMICS

The Niethammers were unable to attend Hegel's marriage. When Hegel wrote them on October 10, he reflected that with his marriage and his post he had attained all that he had a right to expect from life. In the same letter, however, his attention returned to pedagogical and philosophical matters after months of administrative and personal preoccupations. He used the occasion to unleash a scathing assault on

the superficiality of Jakob Friedrich Fries, who had preceded him to a professorship in Heidelberg. Fries had just published his *System of Logic*, while Hegel was still working on the first volume of his own *Science of Logic*, which, over three years before, he had suggested he might condense for a teaching manual [122].

In his assault on Fries Hegel anticipates those who have charged Fries with psychologism for denying the "autonomy" of logic. Fries grounded logic "anthropologically" in introspection, hence in experience (*Erfahrung*)—not, as in Hegel's case, in the development of pure thought. To be sure, Fries did not try to ground logic in "empirical psychology" understood as a science of intuitable sensory data, but he did seek to base it on the introspection of immediate thought data, on nonintuitable knowledge of "metaphysical principles" contained as a brute matter of fact in the human mind. He made a stipulative distinction between "demonstration" (*Beweisen*) and "deduction" (*Deducieren*): what is derived from immediate sensory knowledge is "demonstrated," while what is derived from introspection of nonintuited but immediately known metaphysical principles is "deduced." Yet the "deduction" of logical principles is ultimately circular for Fries, so that such principles finally have to be simply accepted as "facts of consciousness," givens of human reason. Since Fries shared his "superficial" metaphysical empiricism with Jacobi and since Hegel by 1811 was on congenial terms with Jacobi [112, 126] despite his unaltered philosophical differences with him, the vitriolic nature of Hegel's attack on Fries seems due at least as much to personal rivalry as to the "superficiality" of the Friesian philosophy.

Hegel and Fries had a number of things in common. Both had been tutors in Switzerland before arriving in Jena as *Privatdozenten* in 1801, both were promoted in 1805, and both coveted the professorship in Heidelberg that Fries got. Philosophically, both built their positions on the basis of Kant's third critique and on the intimation of identity between the finite and the infinite. Yet each accused the other of unscientific procedure: Fries because Hegel's speculative system dogmatically claimed to have knowledge of what can be only dimly felt, and Hegel because Fries lacked even a dim feeling for "scientific connection" in the development of his thought.

Hegel to Niethammer [196]

Nuremberg, October 10, 1811

In reply I must tell you above all, my dear friend, what great pleasure you have caused me by sharing in the happiness of my new situation. Yet I cannot simply thank you for sharing in my happiness, for in fact you are at once the creator of this share of my happiness. On the whole—apart from a few modifications still to be desired—I have now reached my earthly goal. For what more does one want in this world than a post and a dear wife? Those are the main things one has to strive for as an individual. Other matters no longer make up chapters in themselves but perhaps only paragraphs or footnotes. There is really not much more I wish to tell—or have to tell—about the weeks of my married life thus far. You have given me until the end of the honeymoon to reply, but you yourself assume that in the course of one's honeymoon one cannot be concerned about its

end. Having entered upon the honeymoon with calmer views and having gone through the period since the wedding with few illusions, I am of the opinion that the same degree of satisfaction and more particularly the same intimacy of confidence can be maintained. Yet however that may be, since you were not at our wedding—though in our minds you were represented and present—it is my fondest wish that you soon visit us here with the best of women. Do not postpone too long giving me the pleasure of finally being able to lodge you in my home.

Please accept my most obliged thanks for the 100 florins extra compensation for the rectorship. It has been put aside for a time when it can be best used. I hope something will finally be obtained for stationery and the library as well. However, I would wish you to know more about the release of our salaries than merely that you have heard about it. Recently we received a sizable lump, but are now again three months in arrears. What is essential for our gymnasium has been obtained, but so far only the grain surtax has been indicated among sources for the municipal endowment. School expenses, among other things, are to be supported by this endowment, but our gymnasium has not yet been mentioned by name. Even less has any definite budget been mentioned, and no budget for the gymnasium is yet in evidence.

Concerning the public schools, I have communicated your proposal to Mr. [Paul Wolfgang] von Merkel. But do not fool yourself into believing that even the best people of Nuremberg will be content without leaving every worm-eaten board, every rusty nail, every cobweb sacredly in its place.

My colleague [Ludwig] Heller has since been to see you in Munich in order, as he told me in the greatest confidence along with everyone else, to obtain something there for himself. Assuming you have not already long appreciated his merits, you will have seen from his *Lecture on Homer's Hector* [*Programmen de Hectore Homeri*, 1806]—of which he has taken along a dozen copies to serve as his recommendation—his deep erudition, his substantial Latin style, his not at all superficial taste and learning, his wealth of ideas, etc. Heller has perfected himself here even much more than in Ansbach. Since arriving in Nuremberg he has read at least one tragedy by Sophocles of which I am certain, since he has lectured on it. He had previously read nothing of Sophocles, Aeschylus, Aristophanes, or the lesser authors, not to speak of Plato, Thucydides, and Herodotus. He has since looked up actual excerpts of these authors. Moreover, he still has many manuscripts in his desk, such as the translation of a few Ciceronian speeches.

If people even more learned than he are to be proposed for university professorships in philology, I might mention both young [Johann Christoph] Held, who spent two years in Heidelberg after leaving our gymnasium, and young Ludwig Döderlein [Niethammer's stepson], presently in Munich. Upon his return, Heller came to see me and told me that someone whom your wife perhaps knows even better than you has assured him that his wishes will be fulfilled. A few days later—probably not out of any scruples but only because he feared I might write to this "someone" about what he told me—he came back to say he had perhaps expressed himself too enthusiastically about his hope, and that only such and such had been said. Yet his vanity and blustering led him to make utterances hardly less

boastful than the first time. I learned from him, however, that you had showed a little more hope than when [Karl] Roth left of further upgrading the University of Erlangen this fall, and that you no longer found yourself obliged to send Ludwig [Döderlein] elsewhere, i.e., to Heidelberg.

Heidelberg, however, brings me to Fries and his *Logic*. Stein's bookstore knew nothing of a copy ordered for you but let on that it would receive a copy in three weeks. I have since received one from another bookstore. But my feeling in connection with it is one of sadness. I do not know whether as a married man I am mellowing, but I feel sadness that in the name of philosophy such a shallow man attains the honorable position he holds in the world, and that he even permits himself to inject such scribbblings with an air of importance. On such occasions one can become angry that there is no public voice to speak with integrity in such matters, for certain circles and persons would greatly benefit from it. I have known Fries for a long time. I know that he has gone beyond the Kantian philosophy by interpreting it in the most superficial manner, by earnestly watering it down ever more, making it ever more shallow. The paragraphs of his *Logic* and the accompanying explanations are printed in separate volumes. The first volume of paragraphs is spiritless, completely shallow, threadbare, trivial, devoid of the least intimation of scientific coherence. The explanations are [likewise] totally shallow, devoid of spirit, threadbare, trivial, the most slovenly disconnected explanatory lecture-hall twaddle, such as only a truly empty-headed individual in his hour of digestion could ever come up with. I prefer to say nothing more specific about his miserable thoughts.

The main discovery, for the sake of which he has written his whole system, is that logic rests on anthropological foundations and completely depends on them; that Kant, like Aristotle before him, was deeply steeped in the prejudice of the autonomy of logic, but that they were of course right about it not being based on empirical psychology, for nothing indeed can be demonstrated from experience. Yet it is still alleged to rest on anthropological foundations, and it is moreover claimed that there is a difference between demonstration and deduction. *Logic* can be deduced, and indeed can be deduced from anthropological presuppositions based on experience. So babbles on this individual about his basic ideas. His pure general logic in his system starts out: "the first *means* employed by the understanding in its process of *thinking* are concepts," as if chewing and swallowing food were a mere means of eating, and as if the understanding still did much else besides thinking. This is the sort of shallow slovenliness with which this man babbles on—encompassing everything from A through Z twice over, if I am not mistaken, without the least precision even in matters known to everyone, such as definitions of the faculty of imagination, of memory, and so on. I heard that his lectures were not well attended because by the time one had understood a single word, he had already sputtered out twelve more. I find this quite believable. For his shallowness drives him to pour out twelve new words on top of each word he utters, so that he may drown in himself the feeling of the misery of his thoughts, and likewise drown the students in such verbiage that they become incapable of holding onto or noting any thought whatsoever. It has been said that the higher authorities have talked of

calling Fries to Erlangen to have textbooks fabricated by him. Apart from the fact that I might ultimately have reason to be quite happy about this, since perhaps a slot might thereby open up for me in Heidelberg, one would have to be curious about a university in which, next to Fries, our friend Heller is called to teach philology and aesthetics, in which—as has been assured—[Johann Baptist] Graser is called upon for philosophy of education, our local secretary [Johann Karl] Kiefhaber for diplomacy, the former librarian Mr. [Christoph] von Aretin for the humanities, and [Johann] Harl for finance and public administration [*Polizeiwissenschaft*].

I hope to be able to bring out my work on logic by next Easter. My psychology [*Psychologie*] will follow later. It might not be ill-advised for the authorities to wait upon further treatments of logic before sanctioning and publicly introducing for instructional purposes the old logical shambles which already in and for themselves have become flat and threadbare, but which in Fries's hands have been completely trampled and washed away like some old last-remaining, used-up paper towel. No professor at a classical or modern gymnasium in the Kingdom of Bavaria can be in such misery as to cling to such shallowness. By fall my own labors for the lecture hall may likewise result in a more popular and easily accessible form, displaying more of the tone expected both of a general textbook and of gymnasium instruction. For I feel every year more inclined to make myself accessible, especially since my marriage. At the same time, I am every year more persuaded that there might be almost too much philosophical instruction in the gymnasium. That one hour is being dropped on account of religion helps some. In the meantime there is [still] almost too much of a good thing. I realize, of course, that the highest authorities have decreed that instruction should consist, in part or predominantly, in practical exercises. Yet I have no clear representation as to how one could engage in practical exercises in speculative thinking. Practical exercises in abstract thinking are already extremely difficult, while due to its manifoldness empirical [thinking] is most dispersive. The situation is much like learning to read: one cannot start right off reading entire words as some super-clever pedagogues [e.g., Heinrich Stephani] have wished to do, but must start with what is abstract, with individual letters. So in thinking, in logic, the most abstract is really the easiest of all, for it is completely simple, pure, and uncompounded. Only gradually, as those simple sounds have penetrated as distinct from one another, can one proceed to mental exercises in what is sensory or concrete. I just now recall that a few days ago I read an excellent lead article for a third public school curriculum, which succeeds previous ones [i.e., von Weiller's and Niethammer's] as the third just as Christ the Lord joined the buyers and sellers as the third man in the Temple. Explanations of such excellence I call truly classical. Thank goodness simple common sense and an actual earnest will to learn something are finally to be allowed to break through. As I see from the newspapers, Mr. von Zentner is back. Thus the decision about Erlangen can probably be expected soon—namely, that it has once again been postponed. . . . Yours, Hegel

THE LAST PARAGRAPH above [196] alludes to pedagogical works of Heinrich Stephani, who had replaced Paulus as District School Councillor in Ansbach [176].

Stephani had published books on methods of teaching children to read. Whereas on February 23 Hegel assumed that these works propounded the "high wisdom" of the alphabet, by October 9 he lamented that it was not with the abstract elements, the letters of the alphabet, but with complete words as concrete wholes that Stephani wished children to begin. We note Hegel's general commitment to the analytically deconstructive/synthetically reconstructive method of comprehending a composite concrete whole.

The October 10 letter concludes rather pessimistically with regard to new professional appointments in Erlangen. By December 28 [197], however, Hegel has learned that he was being considered for a professorship in his alma mater, the University of Tübingen.

Hegel to Niethammer [197]

Nuremberg, December 28, 1811

. . . I have received a letter from Württemberg to the effect that my name as well has been mentioned in connection with the replacement of [Jakob] Abel in Tübingen, whose position is to be refilled. As I am generally without great hopes, I shall likewise wait and see if anything is to come of this without getting my hopes up.¹

Perhaps you have seen our plea to His Royal Majesty's Department of Education regarding the status of our unpaid back-salaries. The administration of the local fund is calling upon the financial services and we upon His Majesty's Educational Department so that Scripture may be fulfilled: "The depths call upon the depths" [*"abyssi abyssos invocant,"* Psalms 42:8]. We are faring badly here, very badly, all too badly. . . . Yours, Hegel

MODERNIST VS. CLASSICIST PEDAGOGIES REVISITED

Hegel debates his prospects in Tübingen and Erlangen back and forth to Niethammer on February 5, 1812 [198]. The letter is also notable for its comments on pedagogue Johann Baptist Graser, author of *Divinity or the Principle of the Only Truly Human Education*, 1811. Hegel had come to know Graser personally when they were both in Bamberg: Graser was the District School Councillor there [127]. He came to be publicly known as an opponent of Stephani's nonalphabetic method of teaching reading, criticized by Hegel on October 10. Yet Hegel seemed unable to get along with Graser [122, 196] despite Niethammer's [108] and Paulus's [138] apparently congenial relations with him.

Along with the better known Johann Heinrich Pestalozzi, Graser stressed the pedagogical importance of direct intuition, and hence of learning arising from immediate experience within one's life situation. In 1809 Hegel had already noted an implication of such an approach: namely that the growing mind can exercise itself on any subject lying within reach (*Werke* III, 237-38). Hegel maintained, in education as elsewhere, that form and content could not be separated, and that the human mind can no more easily find nourishment in just any arbitrarily selected material than a plant can. Proper sustenance he of course found in Greek antiquity, expressed in a foreign tongue.

¹The Tübingen vacancy was filled by the Schellingian natural philosopher Adolph Karl Eschenmayer.

Two letters at once! What rich compensation for a silence admittedly long. I received the letter of the 22nd, transmitted by Mr. Schneider [?], simultaneously with the second. However, with the first letter I raised my hand to my forehead and exclaimed "I am a poor servant without Oedipus's gift of sight" ["*Davus sum, non Oedipus*"]—especially in response to the striking [notion] that my escape might be incidental to the moves of certain others. Yet I renounce my gift of divination—I in any case have nothing to do with [Graser's] *Divinity*—and patiently await the promised time "when you no longer speak in proverbs whether of yourselves or others" but speak only of myself. You, more than anyone else, will know how astonished I was by the proposal of my name in connection with the call [to Tübingen]. But I hasten to present the essentials of my view of the matter to hear your response. 1. Abel had, *a*, 850 florins as professor, *b*, 550 florins as overseer of new construction, *c*, 50 florins as pedagogical director—[a post] said to have already been abolished—and *d*, as much as 200 florins in faculty and lecture fees. 2. I could not refuse the position with *a* and *b*—but would have little trouble refusing it with *a* and *d*. 3. Under such conditions I must prefer it to my position *here* in every respect. Mr. [Karl August] von Wangenheim has been informed that I am inclined, and that my position here comes to 1,200 florins. Paulus has since been asked about me, and testified on my behalf in the middle of January. 4. Yet I would prefer it to the *regularly budgeted* position in Erlangen since, *a*, this latter position is for 1,200 florins, since, *b*, one can probably obtain promises for more, for this or that further function—but what good are promises?—and since, *c*, to decree a salary *before* the overall organization of the university is in any case an empty gesture, while *after* its organization—which formally speaking and with regard to nominations can no doubt soon be completed—there begins the litany of petitions for funds, budgetary revisions, levies, collections, solutions for cash flow problems, and supplementary funds for cost overruns; to which corresponds, on the subjective side, the same litany of need, hope, vexation, delay, expectation, disappointed expectation, and so on. This state of affairs I have already known now for four years, and even in the fourth year I see no end in sight. Or if it at last came to an end here, it would only start all over again there. I have now for once, so to speak, irrevocably lost my faith that things will improve. . . .

So this, at length, is my view. You ask me not to act precipitously and to hear you out before I make any decision. There is nothing as urgent for me as to ask for your advice and view. "Wherever you draw me I am drawn after; I shall follow" ["*Quo tu me trahis retrahisque, sequar*"]. . . .

As for the state of our local gymnasium, long ago, as soon as our [salary] arrears first seriously hit us, I pressed for a remedy through an advance from the local municipal endowment, through a grain surtax and so forth. But since this endowment only starts October 1 this year, I was told there was no money available for an advance.

The day before yesterday the decree arrived announcing that for three years no

interest is to be paid from Nuremberg's state capital funds. I do not know if the capital of foundations is included here. If something like this happens to green wood in peacetime what will happen when the wood is dry [Luke 23:31]—in the time of war awaiting us?

Our General Commissioner subscribes to a formalistic doctrine of finance which is merely concerned to cover bills and balance books without administratively remedying any new need. The *six* foundation administrators who are here—yesterday the *seventh* joined them—have, along with the District Foundation Councillor, all secured their own salaries without a hitch. A more recent attempt to procure an advance in the above manner was met with the same stubborn reply.

That you will be officially given [Graser's] *Divinity* for review—which I have not seen, since I have no report to give on it—and that it is to provide the pretext for a pompous review in a literary journal fits in with the rest. With [Heinrich] Eichstädt [editor of the *Jena Literary Review*] absurdity is a very minor consideration. Yet baseness, which is easily more apparent than absurdity, may in part be due to sychophancy—in the French *Journal de Francfort*, a paper that considers itself very distinguished, there were a few articles about Graser's excellent [pedagogical] method, which has been presented to the King; but it may in part also be out of regard for you. Communication of your review would edify me greatly.

Nine sheets of my *Logic* have been printed. Before Easter perhaps another twenty will be printed. What I can say about it for the time being is that these twenty-five to thirty [galley] sheets are only the *first* part, that they do not yet contain anything of what is usually called logic, that they constitute metaphysical or ontological logic: the first book is on Being, and the second on Essence, if there is still room for the second book in Part One. I am in it up to my ears. It is no mean feat in the first half year of one's marriage to write a thirty-sheet book of the most abstruse contents. But the injustice of the times! ["*Injuria temporum*!"] I am no academic [*Akademikus*]. I would have needed another year to put it in proper form, but I need money to live.

For the time being I cordially thank Julius [Niethammer's son] for his letter, which was as lively as it was erudite. In the meantime I am reading Cicero in order to be able to reply more eloquently than in my first letter. I will neglect nobody in my circle [of acquaintances] on behalf of *Wandsbecker Boten* [which had ceased publication in 1775 to reappear only in 1828], though the new series to be sure interests for the most part only those possessing the old one. My most cordial respects to the best of women. Likewise from my wife. Yours, Hegel

SPECULATIVE LOGIC IN THE GYMNASIUM

Hegel's comments on his *Logic* in the above letter [198] and in the one of October 10 are expanded upon on March 24. Niethammer, in an 1810 elaboration of his original directive of 1808, called for "practical exercises" in speculative thought rather than the teaching of a "systematic whole" [200]. On October 10

Hegel was at a loss as to how to give such exercises to pupils who had not yet learned the discipline of abstract thought. One might as well ask a child to read words before letters in the manner of Stephani. For speculative thought unites abstract elements in the concept of what is concrete. Part One of the *Logic* was published in 1812 and 1813. Despite Hegel's uncertainty of February 5, it contained the second book on Essence (*Wesen*) as well as the first book on Being (*Sein*). Part Two, on the Concept (*Begriff*), was not published until 1816. The first two books presented his "objective logic," in contrast to the "subjective" of "transcendental" [144] logic of the concept. On February 5 and March 24 he calls this "objective logic" an "ontological" or "metaphysical" logic, admitting that it has little to do with logic as ordinarily understood, which will be only treated in the third book. In 1808 [122] Hegel was not yet sure how to effect the transition from the "negative element" in logic as commonly understood to the "positive element" in the "new" speculative logic. His solution of 1812 was not to start out with the defective school logic at all, but rather to develop speculative logic in apparent independence of the conventional "old" logic, finally showing in Book Three that this development in fact embraces and critically illuminates ordinary logic.

The *Logic* thus begins on the level of concrete speculative thought, though within the speculative sphere it moves from the relatively abstract categories of Being to the relatively more concrete ones of the Concept. Hegel thus abandons his quest of 1808 for a transition from conventional to speculative logic. What Hegel in the 1808 letter called the "new logic" becomes the "metaphysical or ontological logic" of 1811-12. It is really the most ancient of all logics, since it commences with pre-Socratic cosmology, i.e., with the logos of the objective world. The *Logic* thus bears the fruit of Hegel's first lecture series on the history of philosophy in Jena during 1805-06. What he offers is a dialectical interpretation of the usual school logic; he exhibits its emergence in the dialectical logic of discovery underlying the history of philosophy. Yet he also shows how the school logic is transcended in the German idealist movement and, ultimately, by the principle of Hegel's own philosophy, the logical idea. Hegel repudiates the notion that philosophy is applied school logic, the analysis, evaluation, and artificial construction of deductive argumentation (*Räsonnieren*); dialectical logic is a spontaneous, internally motivated development, not an artificial construction. It is an empathetic reenactment of an idealized, purely self-moving history of philosophy.

Hegel's problem in the gymnasium, however, was to introduce concrete speculative thought—not merely abstract thought. He was to do so by practical exercises preparing the way for, but not providing, systematic instruction. The directive of 1810 called for such exercises as early as the lowest of the four gymnasium classes. In the 1809-10 school year Hegel tried to start right off teaching the "basic concepts of logic" to first-year students, but with little success. His problem in satisfying Niethammer's directive was that he could not give exercises in speculative thinking without teaching the theory of such thinking systematically. In subsequent years he preferred to start with the philosophy of law, morality, and religion rather than logic. This gave pupils exercises in abstract

if not speculative thinking. Although the abstractions of logic constituted the objective starting point for speculative thought, a solution to the pedagogical problem required discovery of a relevant subjective starting point accessible to Hegel's charges. And this he found in the more concrete subject matter offered by the pupils' own immediate institutional and cultural world. On the level of pre-philosophical instruction Hegel thus himself came to make a concession to Graser's and Pestalozzi's principle of intuition.

On March 24 Hegel advocated eliminating philosophy as much as possible from the gymnasium, just as on October 10 [196] he welcomed the 1811-12 substitution of an hour of religion per week for the middle- and upperclassmen. The gymnasium should largely restrict itself to the practical though systematic teaching of the categories of abstract thought. These categories can be learned mechanically, just as one memorizes and practices the parts of speech and other grammatical distinctions. Indeed, to teach grammar is to teach the abstract categories of thought (*Werke* III, 241-42). What lies beyond such instruction is first the negative dialectic by which absolutized abstract categories contradict and thus annul themselves; and second, the positive dialectic of speculative thinking by which self-negated abstract categories yield to more concrete categories in which the original abstractions appear as nonabsolutized moments (*Werke* IV, 17). Yet on the gymnasium level this immanent "beyond" can only be approached in an occasional manner.

Hegel to Niethammer [200]

Nuremberg, March 24, 1812

Hope lets [no one] come to shame, the Bible says. But I add: it often keeps us waiting long. Once again Easter is here, and I am still no further than before. . . .

A first part of my *Logic* will appear by Easter Fair this year. It contains the first book, on *Being*, a branch of ontology; a second book is on the theory of *Essence*, and the third book is on the theory of the *Concept*. I am still vacillating between working up a version for gymnasium use and doing one for the university. I have no more idea how to write something of a preparatory or introductory nature than I would have a concept of how to introduce geometry without actually teaching it myself. In the official explanations added in fall 1810 to the directive it is clearly indicated that one is not to lecture systematically on a whole but is to institute practical exercises in speculative thinking. Yet this seems to me what is most difficult. Transposing a concrete object or actual circumstance into the speculative [key], drawing it forth and preparing it to be grasped speculatively—all this comes last just as much as does judging a composition by the bass line in music instruction. By "practical exercises in speculative thinking" I can only understand treating actual pure concepts in their speculative form, and this is the innermost [content] of logic itself. *Abstract* thinking, the understandable abstract concept in its determinateness, can or must precede speculative thinking; but the series of such concepts is once again a systematic whole. Gymnasium instruction might be limited to this. On the whole there is probably already too much philosophy taught in the gymnasiums. In the lower class it very well could be eliminated. At this level I lecture on abstract legal concepts, and then on those of ethics

[*Moral*]. And inasmuch as the pupils grasp these concepts in their determinateness, formally speaking they obtain training in abstract thinking, though I cannot yet call this speculative thinking. In the middle class I lecture one year on psychology—under which I take up first the doctrine of consciousness—and the other year on logic according to the above division into Being and Essence. It would seem sufficient to me if, in the middle class, the theory of law and duties were taught in the first year and psychology in the second year, with the encyclopaedia taught in the upper class, beginning with logic. Yet there should be no talk of the Absolute, the [point of] indifference, intellectual intuition, and such sublime topics. Quite generally, the aim should not be to teach youth at this age the absolute standpoint of philosophy. The true [philosophical] content is to be sure contained in what I have indicated should be taught, just as no formal exercise, as I have mentioned, can occur without [bringing in] the thing [itself] and content. One can neither think without thoughts nor conceive without concepts. One learns how to think by receiving thoughts into one's head, to conceive by acquiring concepts. Thoughts and concepts must be *learned* as well as the distinction between the singular and plural, that between first, second, and third person, and such and such parts of speech; or as well as the Creed and catechism. It is in such a spirit that I would undertake this work. Dialectical [reason] introduces itself here on its own; and within it—insofar as what is positive in [negative] dialectical [reason] is apprehended—lies speculative [reason]. Dialectical [reason], on the one hand, could only be taught on an occasional basis and, on the other, could be taught more through the deficiency of this or that thought determination than according to its real nature, since what counts for youth is primarily positive contents. Let me know your thoughts on these views of mine so I can orient myself more precisely as to what is to be done. I would have long ago wished to compose an outline for the *theoretical* teaching of geometry and arithmetic as it should be given in the gymnasium, since in the course of my teaching both in Jena and here I have found that—without mixing in here philosophy, which absolutely has no place—this science can be treated more intelligibly and systematically than is typical. In the usual case one simply fails, for want of a theoretical guide, to see how everything is derived and where it leads.

Our friend [Gotthilf Heinrich] Schubert never ceases to insist that his only wish is to be free of his rectorship [in Nuremberg's modern gymnasium]. Yet he is never persuaded to take any official step in this direction, no doubt because if he took such a step he fears the supplementary income he receives as rector would be withdrawn—which could not very well happen if the initiative were to come from above. It is amazing how clever the saints can be. Is our local modern gymnasium to continue on its present basis? . . . Yours, Hegel

J. W. A. PFAFF'S INTERROGATION OF THE LOGIC

The publication in spring 1812 of the first book of the *Logic*, the logic of Being, elicited a lively response from Hegel's Nuremberg colleague Johann Wilhelm Andreas Pfaff, professor of mathematics. Though we have three letters written by

Pfaff shortly after Book One's publication [202-04], the letter Hegel wrote in response to Pfaff's second letter is lost. Still, something of the lost letter is apparent from Pfaff's third letter. Pfaff is critical of Hegel's "new logic" [202] and its "new manner of construction." Hegel's method, we have seen, moves from analysis to synthesis. It begins deconstructively with the analytic elicitation and reliving of some dead standpoint from the past defined by one-sided abstraction; it moves reconstructively by stages to a comprehension of the abstracted aspect in its concrete living context in the present. Pfaff is concerned with the logical status of this movement. He distinguishes the construction of philosophical concepts from mathematical construction [203], e.g., of a line from points. He maintains that the dialectic of the *Logic* fails to live up to Hegel's claims: instead of finding "proofs" Pfaff finds "mere postulates of abstract thinking, and mere definitions, which are entirely arbitrary [*frei*], or mere analyses: no system or singular self-contained [whole]" [203]. He protests that Hegel, in explaining dialectical transitions, uses categories that have not yet been dialectically derived and justified. Hegel replied that the categories invoked would be derived later, but Pfaff retorted that this was to admit the postulatory character of the exposition: ". . . I have to take all the above [i.e., the dialectic of "quality" from Book One of the *Logic*] to be postulates and [stipulative] definitions within the *Logic* until the terms and concepts needed for their explanation or development again arise in the course of the *Logic*, as you promised they will arise in your comment on my comment. . . . Yet if we allow these concepts, used in such elucidation, to be presupposed and thus to be *borrowed* from some other theory, . . . a genuine [self-contained] whole in your sense of the term fails to arise" [203]. Because the opening sections of the *Logic* apply categories derived only in later sections, they are not self-contained. Hegel thus falls into vicious circularity: categories derived in the later sections from what is given earlier are assumed in those earlier sections, so that nothing is ever proven: ". . . you necessarily move in a circle. . . . You proceed from a given point, you posit such and such operations that come to the fore only later. If everything is thus to be quite proper you have to come back again to the point from which you start out" [203]. Pfaff traces such circularity—said to be typical of philosophy in contrast to mathematics—to the philosopher's explication of his derivations in a natural spoken language: "The fact that you are obliged to move in a circle. . . planetlike as gods in a figure returning upon itself, is to be explained, I conclude, by your need of language. The mathematician by contrast is entirely dumb" [203].

Pfaff moreover sees arbitrariness not only in the beginning but also in what is deduced from it: a new category emerging in the dialectic. "I thus designate. . . a *postulate*, for I could just as well have done something else and even more and in an entirely different connection" [203]. The claim apparently irritated Hegel. Pfaff writes later: "That you became annoyed over my statement that it is entirely arbitrary to allow [the category of] determinate being to arise out of [that of] becoming is not particularly justified. . . . For all postulates are arbitrary. . . ." [204]. Once one adopts a set of premises, deduction of course restricts one's freedom to infer further statements, but it never entirely eliminates the freedom to

choose between different lines of inference; thus each new inference is a new postulate which is in a sense arbitrary. The dialectical path followed in the *Logic* is not determined solely by the rules of deductive logic. These rules permit the dialectic to veer off in different directions, between which an external "authority" (*Werke* V, 13)—such as the "author" of a book—usually arbitrates. There is no rational motive to infer most of what deductively could be inferred from a given starting point. Usually one simply trusts a teacher/author to choose a line of inference which will pay off later if not now. Yet Hegel in his systematic works disowns such authoritarian authorship. The success of the *Logic* depends on the extent to which it writes itself. The dialectic is indeed conceived as deductive, not as arbitrary. But it is not simply deductive. Hegel's annoyance at Pfaff was understandable. The dialectic is not simply deductive because it is rationally deductive. To use Hegel's own term, it consists in "immanent deduction" (*Ibid*). The necessity of its course depends on there being, alongside numerous lines of deduction for which there is no good reason, one line that is internally or rationally motivated by premises already accepted and inferences already made.

Pfaff holds that no philosopher can ever prove his system, since he would have to begin by using a natural language presupposing a whole battery of concepts and assumptions not yet proven. Hegel gets started by postulating his assumptions, Kant by postulating different ones. What each philosopher first postulates then obliges him to draw certain conclusions and not others [204]. Hegel is a Hegelian, just as "Kant was certainly a Kantian" [203]. Yet since each philosopher starts from different postulates none can prove anything to the others: "mathematically speaking, *everyone* [i.e., every philosopher] is wrong who wants to prove something; but he who once has his proof really has it!" [203] Mathematicians escape circularity, on the other hand, because they do not present proofs in ordinary language with all its implicit presuppositions. The artificial notation of mathematics permits strict control over the number of postulates and premises, and the mathematician thus moves "in a straight line" [203]. If the philosopher could derive his entire system from a single principle in the Cartesian and Fichtean manner, the number of premises could be controlled even with the use of natural language; but Pfaff denies that any single premise is so powerful: ". . . from a *single* proposition no second thought follows without the addition of another thought" [202]. The explication of each formal postulate, whether in mathematics or philosophy, requires a series of informal postulates, but circularity is avoided in mathematics because no mathematical deduction claims, like deduction in a philosophical system, to deduce all truths. The mathematician, unlike the philosopher, can thus placidly admit informal presuppositions.

Hegel admits in the lost letter that the dialectic begins with informal postulates: ". . . you have retorted. . .," Pfaff writes, "that helps enter the picture but that they are not the essence of the matter, i.e., that they are not at that point being objectified. . . for example, the fact that I am now thinking by writing in ink. . . . The method will make a way for itself [*sich herausbohren*]. . . . You admit that reflective thinking, the whole of psychology. . . seeing, hearing, recollection are 'postulated'. . ." [204]. Thus although the dialectic uses unjustified arbitrary

postulates, Hegel insists the "essence of the matter" does not consist in such postulates. What is said about the essence of the matter by means of such postulates are mere asides based on external reflection. Yet he holds that the nonpostulatory essence of the matter is the "ground" of what subsequently emerges in the dialectic, so that in the emergence of a new category "only a new word is used" [204]. Hegel grants here that the dialectic is deductive or, to use Pfaff's term, "analytic." Pfaff's question, then, is how it can also be a synthetic logic of discovery. After reading Hegel's reply to the objections which appear in the above paragraph, Pfaff still wonders: "*How* does the thinking [subject] develop? *How* does the new, which is not already present in *thinking*, arise or break forth out of the old? *How* is synthesis possible? *How* does thought *progress*, etc.? *How* do freedom and necessity, creation and construction, invention and *proof* interpenetrate?" [204]

The answer to Pfaff's question depends on seeing how the analytic fixation or absolutization of an abstract category, and the consequent negation of the "other" from which it is polemically abstracted, serves to elicit "synthetically" the concept of that very other. In replying to Pfaff, Hegel had sought to direct attention to essential distinctions, on which the whole *Logic* turns, between abstract, reflective, and speculative thinking. The dialectic begins with abstraction, and indeed that is why the starting point is "in essence" not arbitrary: the starting point is ineluctably the simplest or most abstract category, for all further categories presuppose the abstraction of prior categories (*Werke* IV, 69-84). The categories which thought abstracts are "fastened upon" and "fixed" in the mind with the help of language [204]. Yet the dialectic effects a gradual release of such abstractions back into that from which they arose [204]. The abstractions are thus not maintained: "The abstracting [subject] must remain fast in the saddle, must not become faint, must pull the reins always in the *same* direction through the entire ride which it is undertaking, so that it always *abstracts* itself—*abstrahit mentem*—from everything of which it is not to think. . . . If this is neglected we have ever new imperfect abstractions and yet continue to make use of the same word" [204]. But if our initial abstractions are not maintained, Pfaff suggests that the result is equivocation, which in turn makes valid "proof" impossible: "If in the course of the matter the initial abstracting is by and by gradually transcended through new acts of mind . . . this is surely a very free and powerful expression of mind, but nobody will call it *science* or speak of proofs" [204]. Pfaff may also have objected to this Hegelian concept of proof on the basis of the established Aristotelian view that science proceeds only from true premises; any discourse not starting from such premises—such as Hegel's dialectical use of indirect proof in which contradictorily and thus falsely fixated abstractions become unfixed in giving rise to a concrete thinking free of contradiction—is accordingly not a genuinely "scientific" proof.

Turning now to "reflection," Pfaff's last letter [204] shows that Hegel admitted that the categories of reflection are simply "postulated" within the logic of abstract being. Pure abstract being, for example, is characterized as immediate being, but immediacy is a category of "reflection" inasmuch as it bears explicit reference to its mediation by an "other," its identity lying in its exclusion of mediacy. Immediate categories like pure being, on the other hand, refer to their "other" only

implicitly. Pfaff notes that the term "reflection" is borrowed from optics, where it consists in a relation between three terms: 1, that which reflects something, 2, the source from which that which reflects receives what it reflects, and 3, that onto which it reflects [204]. Pfaff asks what the three terms of philosophical reflection are. He suggests that the "thinking subject in general" is the source of intellectual illumination, which is reflected off "the object thought" onto the particular subject thinking "something determinate" which is other than the object initially thought. Thus someone contemplating his left hand may presumably encounter a mental light reflected from his left hand onto his mind determining the mind to contemplate his right hand instead. Pfaff suggests that this "rebounding movement," by which thinking is reflected from one objective determination to another within a particular mind, exhibits "reflection" in the clear sense established by optics only if a third term, a universal or transcendental subject, serves as the source of the referential activity of mental reflection.

As for "speculative thinking," Pfaff notes that etymologically it means "mirror thinking." Mirroring differs from simple reflection in that what is reflected from the reflecting object is an image of the very subject onto which it is reflected, so that the subject self-consciously sees itself in the object. Pfaff quotes a seemingly panlogistic formulation from Hegel's lost letter: "Outside my thoughts there is nothing to the thing, and my thoughts are nothing apart from the thing" [204]. Pfaff had already granted "that the subjective is totally objective, that my thought is the thing itself, and that outside my thought there is nothing at all to the thing" [202]. Yet in his third letter Pfaff notes that, though speculation is a species of reflection, beyond the subject and the object in which the subject sees itself reflected it contains no third term. In speculative thinking the distance between the particular subject and the transcendental or "universal" subject is canceled. A subject is speculatively identified with an object from which it receives a reflection insofar as its own power of thought has illuminated the object and thus caused the reflection. This appears as a variation of Vico's principle that the subject can identify with an object insofar as it has made it. The particular subject comes to see itself in the whole world insofar as it itself becomes the universal subject and source of all reflective activity revealing a world. And "for the universe," Pfaff says, drawing on Hegel's *Logic*, "there is no longer any other." Still, Pfaff's interpretation of speculative thinking seems more Fichtean than Hegelian. Hegel denied creator-creation oneness, for creation is created, not creative. Speculative thinking affirms the subject-subject oneness of Spirit, not an inevitably false subject-object oneness.

The last topic broached by Pfaff is the speculative proposition in which the predicate gives the subject a mirror reflection of itself. Pfaff objects that the equation of pure Being and Nothing in the opening section of the *Logic* turns out to be rather an identity statement once the meaning of "Nothing" is explained as synonymous with "nothing determinate." An identity statement cannot be a speculative proposition, since the latter requires difference as well as identity between subject and predicate. Speculation is preservation as well as transcendence of the difference of subject and object contained in simple reflection. Yet Hegel

would probably agree that, given such a definition of "Nothing," "Being is Nothing" is an identity statement. An example of a truly speculative proposition is: "Pure indeterminate being is determinate being."

HEGEL'S DAUGHTER

It is apparent from the first paragraph of the letter Hegel wrote to Niethammer on July 19 that the *Logic* was preoccupying him then as well. It is surely the most scientific of his many explanations of the failure to respond to correspondents. He uses a conflict model for explaining psychological dynamics, and views his letter as a result of the transformation of quantitative into qualitative change (*Werke* IV, 459), i.e., as a qualitative reversal of the quantitative ratio between the forces inducing him to write and those holding him back.

The reference in the second paragraph to Niethammer's "voyage through the swamps" refers to his recent trip to Tübingen [205]. Niethammer had advised that Hegel for the present not pursue a professorship in Tübingen, that he patiently await something better in Bavaria [197, 198].

Hegel to Niethammer [207]

Nuremberg, July 19, 1812

In undertaking to pay off my debt to you by replying to your kind letter, the debt weighs upon me all the more heavily due to my long delay. As an excuse I note that I started a letter long ago in which I [wanted to] let you know of my wife's successful delivery. Yet I did not want to send this notice all by itself without adding a reply to your letter, but at the same time such a reply was delayed because of my wife's confinement and my own paternal preoccupations. Both circumstances [the debt and the birth] drove me forward, and indeed toward one and the same goal [writing]. And yet the second circumstance blocked the first, thus preventing the goal from being achieved—and this precisely insofar as the second circumstance was nonetheless also directed toward the same end as the first. Such an odd circumstance can only be explained by philosophy, although experience does not lag behind in familiarizing us with such counterthrusts and in providing numerous examples of it—as, for example, in school affairs. . . .

I thank you very much for news of your further trip [not only] through the swamps [but at once] already away from them and back again. I was curious to receive your general notice about conditions [in Tübingen] and will take your advice to heart. As for my paternal and other concerns, I have forgotten both despair and hope, and will try to maintain myself in this state as long as possible. Thank God, so to speak, the budget has finally arrived; I say "so to speak," for it is now up to God to grant its implementation as well. Here all expenses for academic institutions seem excessive, and we will probably not receive much more for these institutions with the budget than without. And even to receive that there will still be more than enough remonstrance and bitter tenacity. We must submit a petition again for our back-salaries. . . .

I heard here that [Gottlieb] Hufeland is intended rather for Erlangen than

Landshut. To treat somebody like that is tantamount to holding a pistol to one's head. I wish him success, as indeed all of us, especially myself.

Jacobi will probably not return until the end of July. I have to thank you for his kind sentiments and friendly reception of me, and I consider my debt to you in this very great.

Schelling, I learned afterward, passed through with his [new] wife [Pauline Gotter]. He only stayed a few hours, and due to rheumatism did not see anybody [Schelling's first wife, Caroline, died in 1809]. On the other hand, when the Count [Johann] von *Scopoli* [Director of Public Instruction in Italy] was here, I caught up in providing him with what he had expected from official sources in Munich. He received here a letter from the Minister addressed to Regensburg, which contained another letter addressed to Landshut. The day after he left a memorandum arrived at the [district] commissioner's in his regard. The day before I had tried to do everything to show him what he wished to know. What especially interested him was the school organization with regard to the public schools and the instruction. In Munich he to be sure could and indeed should have found out more about this from their author. Due to his presence I was not at home during my wife's delivery, but found the dear package already there upon my return. A week later [Karl] *Fuchs* passed through on his way from Regensburg; he would have wished very much to talk to you. He has a very dim view of the school system in Regensburg. I have also heard from other rectors, but am still waiting to hear from one who likes his situation. Has official word of the [Johann Baptist] *Graser* affair reached Munich yet, namely that the Episcopal Vicar-General's office is conducting an investigation of the clergymen who are rumored to have married him? [Graser had been a priest.]

I will instruct my wife to settle the account with the messenger. We have heard here of *Paulus's* severe attack. I conclude this letter in haste with the most cordial regards. Do not make me pay for having taken so long to reply. Yours, Hegel

IN THE NEXT two months Hegel suffered two severe personal losses. In August 1812 he wrote Niethammer of the death of his daughter born the previous month:

Hegel to Niethammer [208]

Nuremberg, August 13, 1812

I had postponed too long informing you of the joy with which my wife and I were blessed by the happy birth of a baby girl. It will, however, always be too soon to write you as I now must of what brief duration this joy was. As happy, or indeed overly happy as she [Hegel's wife] was, no less was she shaken by the loss of this dear child. And I suffer doubly, from the loss I have suffered and from the pain she feels. Yet her physical condition is starting to improve and her mind to compose itself. Your dear wife would have had a sad stay with us.

I was already beginning to get more used to the idea of taking up your kind invitation to visit you this fall. But under present circumstances, I am less than ever able to leave my dear wife alone. The lonesomeness into which she has again fallen is doubly hard on her.

Our examination starts next week. I hear [Heinrich] Stephani will not be joining us because daily [expense] allowances have been canceled. Since we have no examination hall, the examination has to be held in the classrooms, thus rather privately!

High Councillor of Finance [Karl] Roth told me that President [of the Bavarian Academy of Sciences] *Jacobi*, along with his sisters, has returned to Munich from his trip and, moreover, that the trip was refreshing and enjoyable for him. Be so kind as to present cordial regards from me and my wife to them. The afterglow of their visit with us often cheers us up, and interest in the beautiful gift from the President may serve to take my wife's mind off her pain. Farewell for the present. Your sincere friend, Hegel

MANY YEARS LATER, Hegel recalled the death of his daughter in an 1831 letter of commiseration [682] to his Berlin friend Heinrich Beer, who had just lost a son. The alternatives which Hegel puts to Beer—either never having had the child or having it but briefly—may not seem exhaustive. Hegel's own logic would teach that every actual fact is fated to perish (*Encyc* ¶146), so that even the survival of a child, when viewed in the light of all its natural characteristics, is its passing away. Yet that is hard fact, a ground for general sympathy but hardly consolation. Despite Hegel's initial disclaimer, his letter ends in consolation—as according to Hegel must be the case for a Christian philosopher (*Ibid*, ¶147). Grief is compensated by past joy and present memory. (See also 637.)

Hegel to Beer [682]

September 1, 1831 in Grunow's Garden

It is with incalculable pain that I learned tonight of the crushing blow of misfortune, my dear friend, you and your fine wife have suffered. It was concealed from me until evening. Otherwise I would have tried to talk with you right away, not to bring you words of consolation—for I would know of none that at present could have any effect on such a recent and immediate sorrow—but rather merely to offer my sympathy, share your grief, and lament with you such an irreparable loss. I could only have asked you what I myself asked my wife in the face of a similar though early loss of what was then our only child. I asked whether she could bring herself to prefer never having had the joy of knowing this child at all to the happiness of having had such a child at its most beautiful age and then losing it. In your heart you will likewise confess you could not have preferred the first of these two alternatives. You thus prefer the very situation in which you in fact find yourself. Your joy has now passed. Yet there remains with you the feeling of that happiness, your memory of the dear boy, of his joys, his hours of happiness, his love for you and for his mother, his childlike sensibility, his good-naturedness and friendliness toward everyone. Do not be ungrateful for the satisfaction and the happiness you have had; keep its memory alive and steadily before your gaze over against your loss of his presence. In this way your son and your joy in having had him will not be lost to you.

This is a moment in your life, in the hard experience of life, in which your good-naturedness and human kindness, as precious as they are in the normal course

of life, must show proof of an inner strength drawn from a still deeper source, so that the power of spirit to endure grief even such as this can give proof of itself.

I hold your hand in the depth of a pain borne of friendship. I will see tomorrow morning if I can talk with you. Please convey my deepest sympathy to your dear wife.

My wife, deeply shaken by such news, charges me with assuring you and your wife of her most sincere sympathy. Yours, Hegel

A SECOND MISFORTUNE followed closely on the death of Hegel's daughter: Hegel's only brother, Georg Ludwig, a Württemberg officer taking part in Napoleon's Russian campaign, fell in Russia [209].

PHILOSOPHY IN THE GYMNASIUM

With the beginning of the new school year in October, Hegel's thoughts returned to academic matters. Given the difficulty his mathematician colleague Pfaff had with speculative thinking, it is perhaps not surprising that Hegel reiterates in even stronger terms on October 23 [211] his skepticism of March 24 about teaching speculative philosophy in the gymnasium. Hegel's October letter accompanied a private report to Niethammer on the role of philosophy in the gymnasiums. Hegel had commented on Niethammer's instructions in the matter four years before when he first assumed his duties in Nuremberg [144]. The report of October 1812 reflects his further experience. Whereas Niethammer's directive called for treatment of religion, morality, law, and logic, Hegel expresses a preference for treating the first three topics in what is to him the more natural dialectical order of law, morality, and religion. And, secondly, he repeats his March 24 recommendation that logic (more specifically "practical exercises" in "speculative thinking"—200) be eliminated at the introductory level. Law, morality, and religion are of course main divisions in Hegel's philosophy of spirit. Though logic is objectively prior and thus constitutes the absolute starting point of the system, his pupils required a subjectively accessible starting point. Concessions had to be made to the student's need for relevance. Hegel's method of introducing philosophy led the pupil forward from his immediate institutional environment to religion, which lies dialectically on the threshold of philosophy. A direct leap into philosophy, on the other hand, would require an act of empathetic self-detachment and self-projection backward into a long-forgotten standpoint, but the relevance to genuine self-comprehension of such seemingly irrelevant self-detachment would emerge only after the long dialectical reconstruction of the self out of that standpoint.

In the two-year philosophy program for the middle class, logic and psychology were taught in alternate years. Niethammer's directive had originally suggested a text by the Schellingian natural philosopher Karl Gustav Carus [144] for psychology, but by October 1812 Hegel does not hesitate to tell Niethammer that he finds Carus "tedious." He prefers to introduce psychology through the first three stages of his own *Phenomenology of Spirit* (consciousness, self-consciousness, and reason), understood as the "psychology of emergent spirit," and then to conclude

with a treatment of the so-called mental faculties of "feeling, intuition, representation, imagination, and so on." These are of course the faculties of theoretical reason. The propensities falling under practical reason—e.g., the desire for economic gain, or the parental instinct—are adequately treated, "since the same thing has already come forth in its truth as the theory of law, duties, and religion" (e.g., the duty of earning one's living, or of rearing children). Hegel thus assigns a historically situated, institutional basis to the psychology of individual impulses.

Hegel's comments on his treatment of logic for middle-level pupils should be read in connection with the *Logic* he was then bringing to publication. He insinuates a reservation concerning the Kantian metaphysical skepticism he detects in the directive—despite his profession of general agreement with Niethammer on December 20 [216]. For all his respect for Kant, Hegel could hardly view the Kantian critique of the transcendent metaphysics of the understanding as destructive of cosmology and rational theology in general. Yet he agrees with Kant in developing metaphysics within logic. For Hegel, ontology becomes logic; cosmology becomes the philosophy of nature; and rational psychology combines with rational theology to become the philosophy of spirit. Rational psychology becomes the philosophy of subjective and objective spirit, while theology becomes the philosophy of absolute spirit. But neither rational psychology nor theology remains as a branch of special metaphysics. Theology, treating truly infinite subject matter, absorbs rational psychology and cosmology, and thus becomes the fully developed form of logic or ontology, and "onto-theology" (White, 154). The main divisions of Hegel's logic—Being, Essence, and Concept—parallel the main divisions of Kant's transcendental logic: the transcendental aesthetic, the transcendental analytic, and the transcendental dialectic. Kant provides Hegel with a precedent for including in his *Logic* much (i.e., metaphysics, ontology) that is not usually contained in treatises on the subject. Yet, not sharing Kant's "embarrassment" about metaphysics, Hegel does not so much disparagingly reduce metaphysics to logic as he raises logic to the dignity of metaphysics or, more precisely, to ontology in the sense of a system of categories each offering a definition of the Absolute.

That Hegel invokes the authority of the Eleatics and the "dogmatist" Aristotle is significant. The first two books of Hegel's *Logic*, on Being and Essence, constitute his "objective logic." He treats here, first, the categories of the sensory, aesthetic given (Being) and, second, those of the analytic understanding which transcend this given through reflective thought (Essence). These two books are construed in the pre-Kantian Aristotelian manner as objective "determinations of being." It is only from the retrospective standpoint of the logic of the concept, in Book Three of the *Logic*, that the precritical objective logic or ontology undergoes the subjective turn of the Copernican revolution and is incorporated within a Kantian transcendental idealist position as a transcendental aesthetic and analytic.

Hegel's endorsement of the Kantian critique of classical metaphysics is clear. Hegel's system never reverted to pre-Kantian metaphysics. Pre-Kantian metaphysics was distinguished for Hegel as well as for Kant by a bogus claim to scientific certainty on transcendent matters. Hegel's own system is an immanent

metaphysics of categories which claims scientific status in the sense of certainty and logical necessity. But his Kantian allegiance does not exclude a non-scientific transcendent metaphysics which is post-Kantian and inductive, claiming probability but not dogmatic certainty; in which, for example, the recognition of transcendent selfhood stems from an epistemological use of charity, a form of love. Hegel did not remain captive to a subjective idealist solitude capable of grounding a science of constructive (but not reconstructive) dialectical thought. But Kantian limits precluded any demonstrative knowledge of the transcendent objectivity of nature or other selves. The recognition of an authentic (not merely postulated) *other* can only be made by the extraphilosophical feeling which Hegel attacked when it was paraded by Fries and others as sufficient for systematic philosophy; "... far more important than attaining it [conviction] by knowledge is recognizing and conceptually grasping this solid foundation that already exists for the heart. . . . If one's conceptual grasp is not satisfying, such certitude does not suffer. . . whether one attributes the failure of knowledge to the particular path followed or to the nature of knowledge itself" [450 to Duboc].

Hegel of necessity disagrees with the Kantian formulation of transcendental idealism: Kant's "cosmology of antinomies" and "dialectical natural theology" are "not so much metaphysics itself as the dialectic thereof." Metaphysics itself falls in the province of speculative rather than dialectical reason, and after Kant's dialectical destruction of the metaphysics of the understanding he failed to carry through its speculative reconstruction. It was such a reconstruction that Hegel undertook, basing himself, in the wake of Hölderlin, on Kant's third critique of aesthetic and teleological judgments. It was plausibly of Hölderlin, among others, that Hegel was thinking when in October 1812 he mentioned to Niethammer the "common" form in which speculative thinking expresses itself in imagination, heart, the self-moving life of nature, and love. "Love" was the key to Hölderlin's thought of 1797 (Ch 2), and it was Hölderlin's loving embrace of beauty in all nature that Hegel sought to raise to the level of thought in the speculative philosophy whose first part is the *Logic*. The speculative metaphysics of love (spirit) which resulted revived the old claim to scientific certainty (dialectical necessity), but at the price of remaining a subjective or immanent metaphysics of experience and its categories. Yet Hegel is carried from subjective idealism to objective idealism on the wings of that very same love, since only objective idealism can convert the self-alienation of the self/not-self relation into the self-realization of a true community of selves. But he is carried extrasystematically, by a complementary transcendent metaphysics of feeling and the heart which he himself never systematically developed.

After examining the branches of philosophy viewed as a *subject*, Hegel turns attention in his October report to philosophy as a method or *activity*. In rejecting the idea that philosophy can be simply defined as "what philosophers do"—i.e., as a method or activity independent of any determinate subject matter—and in insisting that the methodical activity of philosophizing must be redirected to its historical content, Hegel shows the imprint of Goethe: philosophy "is a treasure of hard-won, ready-prepared, formed content. This inheritance ready at hand must be

earned by the individual, i.e., learned." (See *Faust*, Pt I, "Night" for Goethe's well-known formulation of the same idea.) This imprint in fact appears on the most central Hegelian project: the attempt to create for the present epoch a power of self-comprehension by leading it to relive empathetically its heritage.

Hegel concludes his report with his own analysis of the activity of philosophy into abstract, dialectical, and speculative thinking. Though in a sense all thought is "abstract," in a more narrow sense "abstract" thinking is contrasted to the two other types of thinking and is the more immediate concern of gymnasium instruction. Dialectical thinking, which is more difficult, apprehends the self-negation and breakdown of fixed abstract determinations. Speculative thinking, which apprehends the inseparable oneness of different abstract determinations, is the most difficult but is also the only truly philosophical thought form, the only form capable of grasping the one truly philosophical content: the Absolute, which itself is identity-in-difference. Hence the inclusion of the form of philosophy within its content. What philosophers do follows from and perfects what they seek to comprehend. The instability of religion—i.e., the Christian religion—lies precisely in the fact that it has a speculative content that is apprehended in the form of picture-thinking and is thus not speculatively comprehended.

Hegel to Niethammer [*Werke* III, 301-16]

Nuremberg, October 23, 1812

The teaching of philosophical preparatory sciences in the gymnasium has two dimensions: subject areas and the methods. I. Concerning subject matter and its distribution between the three class levels, the directive definitely specifies, 1, religious knowledge and a knowledge of law and duties for underclassmen—although it is also indicated that practice in speculative thought might be begun here with logic; 2, both cosmology and natural theology—in connection with the Kantian critiques—and psychology on the intermediate level; and, 3, the philosophical encyclopaedia for the upperclassmen.

Since the teaching of the theory of law, duties, and religion is, I dare say, not to be united with that of logic in the lower class, I have thus far confined myself here to a treatment of law, duties, and religion, reserving logic for the intermediary class where in fact I have taught it alternately with psychology in the two-year course of study for this class. Then came the prescribed encyclopaedia in the upper class. If I am to give my general opinion of the overall distribution with a view to the matter itself as much as to my own experience, I can only say that I have found it very suitable.

1. Taking up the question now more closely with respect to the first subject matter for instruction, the expression "theory of religion, law, and duties" is employed with the supposition that between these three doctrines it is with religion that the beginning is to be made. Insofar as no compendium is at hand, freedom must surely be left to the teacher to establish the order of succession and connection according to his insight. As for myself I can do nothing else but begin with law, the most simple and abstract consequence of freedom, proceeding thereupon to morality, and progressing from there to religion as the highest stage. This procedure

corresponds more closely to the nature of the content to be treated, but a more extensive elaboration is out of place.

If the question were asked as to whether this subject matter is suitable for beginning an introduction to philosophy, I can only answer in the affirmative. The concepts of these doctrines are simple, and yet they at once possess a determinateness which makes them entirely accessible to the age group in this class. Their content finds support in the natural feeling of the pupils, and has actuality in their inner life, for it constitutes the side of inner actuality itself. I thus by far prefer for this class the present subject matter to logic, for the latter has a content which is more abstract, is particularly removed from this immediate actuality of inner life, and is purely theoretical. Freedom, law, property, and so forth are practical determinations with which we deal on a daily basis, and which beyond such immediate existence possess a sanctioned existence and real validity as well. For the mind not yet at home in thought, logical determinations of the universal, particular, and so on are shadows as compared with the actuality to which it [habitually] returns when not yet practiced in holding fast to and contemplating such determinations independently of such actuality. The customary demand placed on the teaching of introductory philosophy is indeed that one should begin from what exists [*vom Existierenden*], and should from that point lead consciousness to what is higher, i.e., to thought. Yet in concepts of freedom, the existent and immediate are present and are at once already thought without any prior anatomy, analysis, abstraction, and so on. Thus in these doctrines a beginning will in fact be made with what is sought: with the true, the spiritual, the actual. I have always found in this class greater interest in these practical determinations than in the little theoretical content which I had introduced as preliminary. And I felt the qualitative difference in this interest still more sharply when for the first time, following indications in the explanatory part of the directive, I made a beginning with the basic concepts of logic. I have not repeated the experience.

2. The next highest stage for the pupil is the theoretically spiritual stage: the logical, metaphysical, and psychological. If the logical and psychological are to be immediately compared, it is the logical which on the whole is to be seen as easier, because it has as its content simpler, abstract determinations, while the psychological on the other hand has a concrete and in fact even spiritual content. Yet psychology is too easy if it is taken so trivially as to be merely empirical psychology, as perhaps in Kampe's psychology for children. What I know of Carus's manner is so tedious, unedifying, lifeless, and spiritless as to be completely unendurable.

I divide the teaching of psychology into two parts: *a*, the psychology of emergent spirit and, *b*, [the psychology] of spirit as it is, in and for itself. In the former I treat consciousness in accordance with my *Phenomenology of Spirit*, though only the first three stages of the *Phenomenology*: Consciousness, Self-Consciousness, and Reason. In the latter I deal with the succession of stages from feeling through intuition, representation, imagination, and so on. I distinguish these two sections such that spirit as consciousness acts on determinations as upon objects, and so that its determining becomes for it a relation to an object; while spirit as spirit acts only on its [own] determinations—alterations in it being determined as its own activities and being so viewed.

In that logic is the other science in the intermediate class, metaphysics thus seems to go away empty-handed. Metaphysics is, moreover, a science about which one is nowadays accustomed to some embarrassment. In the directive the Kantian exposition of the cosmology of antinomies and of dialectical natural theology is mentioned. It is in fact not so much metaphysics itself as the dialectic thereof which is thus prescribed. And with that the venture comes back again to logic in the form of dialectic.

According to my view, metaphysics in any case falls entirely within logic. Here I can cite Kant as my precedent and authority. His critique reduces metaphysics as it has existed until now to a consideration of the understanding and reason. Logic can thus in the Kantian sense be understood so that, beyond the usual content of so-called general logic, what he calls transcendental logic is bound up with it and set out prior to it. In point of content I mean the doctrine of categories, or reflective concepts, and then of the concepts of reason: analytic and dialectic. These objective thought forms constitute an independent content [corresponding to] the role of the Aristotelian *Categories* [*organon de categoriis*] or the former ontology. Further, they are independent of one's metaphysical system. They occur in transcendental idealism as much as in dogmatism. The latter calls them determinations of being [*Entium*], while the former calls them determinations of the understanding. My objective logic will, I hope, purify this science once again, expositing it in its true worth, but until it is better known those Kantian distinctions already contain a makeshift or rough version of it.

With respect to the Kantian antinomies, their dialectical side will be evoked again below. As for their remaining content, it is in part logic, in part the world in time and space, i.e., matter. Inasmuch as their logical content alone arises in logic—namely the antinomical categories which they contain—the fact that these antinomies concern cosmology falls by the wayside. Yet in fact that further content—namely the world, matter, and the like—is at once a useless ballast, a misty image contrived by the power of representation, wholly lacking in value. With respect to the Kantian critic of natural theology, one can—as I have done—undertake it in the doctrine of religion where such material is not unwelcome, especially in a three- and, respectively, four-year course. It holds interest in part in giving knowledge of the ever-so-famous proofs of the existence of God, in part in providing acquaintance with the equally famous Kantian critique of the same, and in part in permitting this critique to be itself criticized.

3. The encyclopaedia, since it is to be philosophical, essentially excludes the literary encyclopaedia, which is moreover devoid of content and not yet of use to youth. It can contain nothing but the general content of philosophy, namely the basic concepts and principles of its particular sciences, among which I count three principal ones: logic, philosophy of nature, and philosophy of spirit. All other sciences, which are viewed as nonphilosophical, are in their beginnings indeed included in this encyclopaedia; and only in their beginnings are they to be considered in the encyclopaedia insofar as it is philosophical. As appropriate as it now is to give such an overview of the elements in the gymnasium, upon closer examination it can still be viewed as superfluous; for, the sciences to be briefly considered in the encyclopaedia have for the most part already been taught at the gymnasium

in more developed form: thus the first science of the encyclopaedia—logic—has been spoken of above, while the third science—the doctrine of spirit—has already been dealt with in, 1, psychology and, 2, the doctrine of law, duties, and religion.

Psychology as such—which falls into the two divisions of theoretical and practical mind, intelligence and will—can for the most part dispense with elaboration this second [practical] part, since the same thing has in its truth already come forth as the theory of law, duties, and religion. For the merely psychological aspects of this theory—namely, feelings, desire, impulses, propensities—are purely formal; in their true content—e.g., the propensity to economic gain, the desire to know, the parental instinct directed to children, and so on—they have already been treated in the doctrine of law and duties as necessary relations: e.g., as the responsibility for economic gain within the limits of legal principles, the duty to educate oneself, the duties of parents and children, and so forth.

The third science of the encyclopaedia embraces further the doctrine of religion, but special instruction is devoted to this as well. So it is mainly only the second science, the philosophy of nature, which is left over from the encyclopaedia. Yet the observation of nature still has little attraction for the young. They feel, with some justification, that interest in nature rather constitutes a theoretical pastime in comparison with human and spiritual activity and formation. And, secondly, such observation is difficult. For spirit, in conceptualizing nature, has to change the very opposite of what is conceptual into something conceptual, a feat of which thought is capable only when it has grown strong. Yet, in the third place, the philosophy of nature as speculative physics presupposes acquaintance with natural phenomena, with empirical physics, an acquaintance which at this point is not yet present. When in the fourth year of the gymnasium's existence I received students in the upper class who had gone through the three courses of philosophy in the middle and lower classes, I could only notice that they were already acquainted with the greater part of the philosophical scientific cycle, so that I could dispense with the greater part of the encyclopaedia. I then restricted myself chiefly to the philosophy of nature.

On the other hand, I would feel it most desirable for another aspect of the philosophy of spirit, namely the branch dealing with beauty, to be further developed. Beyond the philosophy of nature, aesthetics is the special science still missing in the scientific cycle, and it appears in essence capable of serving as a gymnasium science. It could be taken over by the professor of classical literature in the upper class; but this literature, from which it would be quite harmful to take away hours, is already quite enough to occupy him. Yet it would be most useful if the gymnasium students received, besides a better concept of versification, more definite concepts of the nature of epic, tragedy, comedy, and the like. On the one hand aesthetics could offer better, more recent views on the nature and ends of art; on the other hand, it must of course not remain mere idle talk about art, but must, as I have already noted, go into the particular poetic genres, and into the special ancient and modern poetic modes, leading to a characteristic acquaintance with the most noted poets of the different nations and times, and supporting this knowledge with examples. The course would be as instructive as it would be agreeable. It

would contain only knowledge of the most suitable sort for gymnasium pupils. It can be viewed as a real deficiency that this science is not instituted as a subject of gymnasium instruction. With that the encyclopaedia would, in point of content, be present in the gymnasium—apart from the philosophy of nature. Perhaps only a philosophical view of history would still be lacking, which, however, can in part still be dispensed with, and which in part can equally well find its place elsewhere, for example in the science of religion with the doctrine of providence. The general threefold division of the entire subject of philosophy—pure thought, nature, and spirit—all the same must often be invoked in determining the particular sciences.

II. Method. A. One generally distinguishes between the philosophical system with its special sciences and philosophizing as such. According to the modern craze, especially in pedagogy, one is not so much to be instructed in the content of philosophy as to learn how to philosophize without any content. That amounts to saying that one is to travel endlessly without getting to know along the way any cities, rivers, countries, men, etc.

In the first place, one who gets to know a city and then comes to a river, to another city, and so on in the process also learns to travel. He not only learns to do so but indeed really does so. Thus in learning the content of philosophy one not only learns to philosophize but indeed really philosophizes. Moreover, the aim of learning to travel is only to get to know those cities, etc., i.e., to know the content.

Secondly, philosophy contains the highest rational thoughts on essential objects, harboring within it what is universal and true in those objects. It is of great importance to become acquainted with this content and receive these thoughts into one's head. What results from the sad attitude of pure formalism, of perennial empty searching and wandering about, of unsystematic argumentation or speculation, is minds devoid of substance and thoughts, capable of nothing. The theory of law, morality, and religion encompasses important content. Logic as well is a substantial science; objective logic—i.e., Kant's transcendental logic—contains the basic thoughts of being, essence, power, substance, cause, and on and on. The other [subjective] logic contains concepts, judgments, inferences, and so forth, basic determinations of equal importance. Psychology contains feeling, intuition, etc. Finally, the philosophical encyclopaedia encompasses the entire sphere universally. The Wolfian sciences [cf Baron Christian von Wolf]—logic, ontology, cosmology, etc., natural law, morality, etc.—have more or less disappeared. Yet philosophy is not therefore any less a systematic complex of substantial sciences. However, knowledge of the absolutely Absolute—for those sciences are to come to know their special contents equally in their truth, i.e., in their absoluteness—is only possible through knowledge of a totality forming in its stages a system. And those sciences are its stages. Aversion to a system makes one think of a statue of a god who is supposed to have no form. Unsystematic philosophy is accidental, fragmentary thinking, and its direct consequence is a rigid attitude to true content.

Thirdly, the process of coming to know a substantial philosophy is nothing else than learning. Philosophy must be taught and learned as much as any other science. The unfortunate urge to educate the individual in thinking for himself and being self-productive has cast a shadow over truth. As if, when I learn what

substance, cause, or anything is, I myself were not thinking. As if I did not myself produce these determinations in my own thought but rather tossed them in my head as pebbles. As if, further, when I have insight into their truth, into the proofs of their synthetic relations or dialectical transitions, I did not receive this insight myself, as if I did not convince myself of these truths. As if when I have become acquainted with the Pythagorean theorem and its proof I have failed to know this theorem and prove its truth myself! As much as philosophical study is in and for itself self-activity, to that degree also is it learning: the learning of an already present, developed science. This science is a treasure of hard-won, ready-prepared, formed content. This inheritance ready at hand must be earned by the individual, i.e., learned. The teacher possesses this treasure; he pre-thinks it. The pupils re-think it. The philosophical sciences contain universal true thoughts of their objects. They constitute the end product of the labor of genial thought in all ages. These true thoughts surpass what an uneducated young man comes up with thinking by himself to the same degree that such a mass of inspired labor exceeds his effort. The original, peculiar views of the young on essential objects are in part still totally deficient and empty, but in part—in infinitely greater part—they are opinion, illusion, half-truth, distortion, and indeterminateness. Through learning, truth takes the place of such imagining. Only when the mind is full of thoughts does it become capable of advancing science and winning true personal distinction in it. Yet this is thus not to be done in public educational institutions, especially not in gymnasiums. Rather, philosophical study is essentially to be directed to assuring that something is learned, that ignorance is hounded out, that empty minds are filled with thoughts, and—that the natural peculiarity of thought—i.e., accident, caprice, oddness in matters of opinion—is driven out.

B. Philosophical content has in its method and soul three forms: it is, 1, abstract, 2, dialectical, and 3, speculative. It is abstract insofar as it takes place generally in the element of thought. Yet as merely abstract it becomes—in contrast to the dialectical and speculative forms—the so-called understanding which holds determinations fast and comes to know them in their fixed distinction. The dialectical is the movement and confusion of such fixed determinateness; it is negative reason. The speculative is positive reason, the spiritual, and it alone is really philosophical.

In teaching philosophy in the gymnasium the abstract form is, in the first instance, straightaway the chief concern. The young must first die to sight and hearing, must be torn away from concrete representations, must be withdrawn into the night of the soul and so learn to see on this new level, to hold fast and distinguish determinations.

Moreover, one learns to think abstractly by thinking abstractly. Either one can try to begin from what is sensory or concrete, working it up through analysis into abstraction, thus following the apparent natural order, as also the order which proceeds from what is easier to what is more difficult. Or one can begin right away with abstraction itself, taking it in and for itself, teaching it and making it understandable. First of all, in contrasting these two ways, the first is certainly more conformable to nature, but just for that reason is the unscientific course. Although

it is more natural for a disk from a tree trunk that roughly encompasses a circle to be gradually rounded off by stripping off uneven little pieces that protude, this is nonetheless not the way in which the geometer proceeds; he rather uses a circular instrument, or straightaway a free movement of the hand, to draw an exact abstract circle. And because what is pure, higher, and true is by nature first [*natura prius*], the procedure conforming to the matter itself is to make it first in science, too. For science is the reverse of merely natural, i.e., nonspiritual, representation. What is pure is first in truth, and science ought proceed in accordance with truth. In the second place, it is a complete error to assume that the path which begins naturally with the concrete sensory [content] and from there progresses to thought is easier. It is on the contrary more difficult. Analogously, it is easier to pronounce and read the elements of spoken language, the individual letters, than entire words. Because the abstract is simpler, it is easier to apprehend. The accompanying concrete sensory [content] is to be stripped away. It is thus superfluous to take it up along with the rest, for it would only have to be got rid of again and could only distract. The abstract as such is understandable enough, as understandable as it is necessary. Real understanding, moreover, can of course enter only with philosophy. What is to be done is thus to receive into one's head thoughts of the universe. Yet thoughts in general are abstract. Formal reasoning without substance is of course also sufficiently abstract. Yet it is being presupposed that one has hold of substance, of true content. On the other hand, empty formalism, abstraction without substance, is best driven out even if it is about the Absolute, and indeed precisely through the above, i.e., through the teaching of a determinate content.

If one now stops at the abstract form of philosophical content, one has a philosophy—or at least so-called philosophy—of the understanding. And insofar as in the gymnasium what matters is an introduction and breadth of material, such understandable content, such a systematic mass of abstract substantial concepts—i.e., philosophy as a subject matter—is introductory. For subject matter is generally first for actual thinking in the process of emerging. This first stage thus necessarily appears predominant in the sphere of the gymnasium.

The second stage or form is the dialectical. This stage is more difficult than the abstract; and is at once the stage in which the young, eager for material content and sustenance, are least interested. The Kantian antinomies are specified in the directive with respect to cosmology. The antinomies contain deep fundamentals of the antinomical [content] of reason. Yet these fundamentals lie concealed and are recognized in the antinomies so to speak unthinkingly and insufficiently in their truth. On the other hand, the antinomies really constitute all too poor a dialectic. Nothing beyond tortuous antitheses. I have, I believe, elucidated them in my *Logic* according to their true worth [*Werke* IV, 226-38]. Infinitely better is the dialectic of the ancient Eleatics and the examples preserved from it for us. Since every new concept in a systematic whole really arises from what precedes by dialectic, a teacher acquainted with the nature of philosophizing everywhere enjoys as often as possible the freedom to advance the inquiry by means of dialectic; and where dialectic finds no access, he is free to pass on to the next concept without it.

The third form is the truly speculative form, i.e., knowledge of what is

opposed in its very oneness, more precisely the knowledge that the opposites are in truth one. Only this speculative stage is truly philosophical. It is naturally the most difficult; it is the truth. It is itself present in twofold form: 1. in its common form, where it is brought closer to representation, imagination, and the heart, as for example when one speaks of the universal self-moving life of nature molding itself in endless forms. Or, to cite another example, pantheism and the like, or when one speaks of the eternal love of God, Who creates for the sake of love in order to contemplate Himself in his eternal Son, and then in a son given to the temporal order, i.e., in the world, and so on. Law, self-consciousness, the practical in general already contain in and for themselves the principles or beginnings of the speculative. And of spirit and the spiritual there is, moreover, in truth not even a single nonspeculative word that can be said; for spirit is unity with itself in otherness. As a rule when one uses the words "soul," "spirit," or "God" one is speaking all the same only of stones and coals. In speaking of spirit only abstractly via the understanding, the content can nevertheless be speculative, so much so that the content of the perfect religion is most speculative, in which case instruction—be it inspired or, if not inspired, then, as it were, narrative—merely brings the object before representation, not into the concept.

2. What is philosophical in the form of the concept is exclusively what has been grasped conceptually, the speculative proceeding out of the dialectic. This can be only scantily present in the gymnasium. It will generally be apprehended only by the few, and to some extent one cannot even really know whether it is apprehended by them. To learn to think speculatively, which is specified in the directive as the chief purpose of preparatory philosophical instruction, is thus surely to be seen as the necessary goal. Preparation for it is first abstract thinking and then dialectical thinking, and beyond that consists in attaining representations of speculative content. Because gymnasium instruction is essentially preparatory, it can consist chiefly in working into such dimensions of philosophizing.

THE ABOVE FORMAL communication was accompanied by a personal letter in which Hegel suggests the abolition of all formal philosophy instruction in the gymnasium.

Hegel to Niethammer [211]

Nuremberg, October 23, 1812

You had assigned me the task of putting in writing my thoughts on teaching philosophy in the gymnasiums and presenting them to you. Some time ago I committed the first draft to paper but could not find enough time to work it out properly. So as to not delay too long sending you something on the subject as requested, I am having it recopied for you in the form it has assumed after some reworking, and am now sending it along. Since the essay has a merely private aim, the present form will suffice to fulfill it. The abruptness of the thoughts, and even more, their occasionally polemical character, you may kindly lay to the incomplete form which, for a purpose other than presenting my opinion to you, would admittedly have required more smoothing over. The polemical aspect may often seem

out of place seeing that the essay is addressed to you, and that you would thus seem to be the only one against whom I might be polemicizing. Yet you will take this polemical aspect merely as an occasional enthusiasm that for no apparent reason befell me out of the blue while evoking this or that attitude or opinion.

One final observation, moreover, still remains to be made, though I did not add it [to the report] because I am still not of one mind with myself on it. It is that perhaps all philosophical instruction in the gymnasium might appear superfluous, that the study of the ancients may be best adapted to gymnasium youth and, *in point of substance*, may be the true introduction to philosophy. Yet how am I, professor of philosophical preparatory sciences, to fight against my own discipline and post, undermining the basis of my own livelihood? On the other hand, since I am also to be a philosophical pedagogue, as rector it would even be my official duty to do so. Finally, my more immediate interest would be for professors of philosophical sciences to be declared superfluous in the gymnasiums and either given another task or sent elsewhere. One thing, however, draws me back again to the first side of the matter: and that is philology, which is becoming so erudite and is tending to mere word-learning. The Church Fathers, Luther, and the preachers of old quoted, interpreted, and manipulated the biblical texts with a freedom which, as regards historical scholarship, was for the most part devoid of scruples so long as they could thus read all the more instruction and edification into the texts. After the aesthetic quackery of *pleasingly to the point of charm* [*pulcre, quam venuste*] of which we still hear significant echoes, the scholarship of text criticism and metrics is now the order of the day. I do not know if much of it has already gained ground with the personnel under your supervision. Yet the tendency no doubt awaits them, too, and in either case philosophy will go out rather empty-handed.

I do not want to plague you much with our local headaches. Things here are as ever. The basic evil, however, is that we are without advocates against the administration because we have no District Councillor here. Due to the Councillor's remoteness [in Ansbach], nothing is communicated to him of a predominantly administrative nature. . . . Concerning the [salary] arrears from 1810/11, there is total silence [*altum silentium*]; we must now come up with a lithographic representation [of our position].

All this and other matters as well so completely deprive me of *hope* without works that I must again talk to you about the thought of my taking a step in Württemberg. . . .

From your last letter I must yet note that you speak of an end to the foolishness. You know how it fared with Sancho Panza [in Cervantes's novel *Don Quixote de la Mancha*] as he fell down from the peak of his folly. According at least to the assurance of his master [Don Quixote], he plunged from that peak into the abyss of his stupidity and was as badly off as before.

Most cordial greetings to you and your wife from mine as well as from yours truly, Hegel

I would like to ask you to convey my best wishes to [Academy] President Jacobi upon his retirement. Rest is the highest terrestrial blessing. If it were already granted to me as well, I would doubly invite him to find lodging in our city of rest.

Schelling has paid me a friendly visit here. Philosophical matters were not touched. Please forward the enclosed copies of the annual [school] report [*Nürn Schrift*, 391ff] to the [proper] addresses.

As NIETHAMMER counseled Hegel to wait for something better in Bavaria [205], Hegel's patience was wearing thin. He was still considering a prospect at the University of Tübingen in his native Württemberg. Niethammer replied on December 3 [214]:

As regards your plan with respect to Tübingen, I have no right to demand of you faith in my own faith, which has recently been lacking in works. . . . I can only say what my judgment would be in your place. For me a professorship in Tübingen would be intolerable, if only because of the ridiculous hood I would have to wear in public. I would in any case prefer to be a rector and professor with honor in Nuremberg than a professor in Tübingen with such shame. . . . Yet there is something I know which I am most confidentially bound to disclose to you to guide your decision: I have not failed here to tip the balance in my direction by succeeding in having you named to the [Municipal] School Councilorship attached to the [Municipal] Royal Commissioner's Office in Nuremberg with an official salary of 300 florins.

Niethammer's letter, however, also shows that he interpreted the first paragraph of Hegel's October 23 letter to imply that the accompanying report polemicized against Niethammer's own directive. Hegel's prompt reply of December 20 sought to correct this misunderstanding.

Hegel to Niethammer [216]

Nuremberg, December 20, 1812

The contents of your letter, my dear friend, have aroused such extensive feelings and thoughts in me that I would not know where to begin or end except for the fact that I may fortunately presuppose these feelings and thoughts to be already known to you, and that the upshot is so very simple, namely my constant inner and ever-renewed gratitude for your continued kindness to me. My wife has been so dazzled by the salary accompanying the post which you lead me to hope for that—alongside its starlike rays—all else has paled, which might well make me pale, too. I want to attach myself to her as much as possible and take everything except my new duties more lightly. For the hoped-for supplemental salary is just about what, based on the experience of one year, would be needed for household expenses which would be difficult to do without any longer. . . .

With respect to the second matter, my polemic in the occasional thoughts I submitted on philosophy instruction in the gymnasiums, the way in which I expressed myself in the letter must have given rise to a misunderstanding. I tried precisely to prevent you from taking this polemic as directed against your own opinions and principles, but—how clumsy of me!—I have apparently led you, through my very explanation, to attribute such an aim to it. My explanation was wholly motivated by the fact that, as I read through the essay, I found it combating this or that attitude. It only then occurred to me that, since the essay is destined

solely for you as a private communication, to polemicize in this way was as inappropriate in such a report as it would be for me in a letter to you to counter challenges to me from a third party rather than from yourself. I thus wanted to ward off in my letter any such misinterpretation of the incidental assertion of opposing views occasioned in me by the subject matter. From the very content of the issue you will have seen for yourself that not once do I have any need to differentiate between you and the author of the directive. For you will have found me to be very much in agreement with this author as well—with perhaps one exception, namely the recommendation of *speculative* content, which I consider too difficult for gymnasium instruction if taken in its stricter sense. Thus I wished instead to give currency for the most part only to *abstract* thinking. For with my teaching, precisely this point is the thorn in my side. I cannot get on without speculative content, but I sense its difficulty. Yet I find here and there it does find access, and I console myself with the thought that those on whom it is without effect are anyway quite hopeless.

Ciceronian philosophizing would no doubt be ideal for the gymnasium level, but it is against my nature. And Plato, who has Socrates as well philosophize with the dear young, has him do so chiefly in a dialectical and speculative mode. This point, which I make in my explanation, against speculative content is really directed most of all against myself, for on account of my pupils I am unable to get by with speculative [thinking], while on account of myself I am unable to get by without it.

The second part of the first volume of my *Logic* is just off the press. As soon as the copies are available for mailing I will send you one, asking for favorable reception. . . .

We send our warmest regards to the best of women. Yours, Hegel

Isaak von Sinclair and the Refusal of Self-Surrender

AMONG THE CORRESPONDENTS who commented on the first part of Hegel's *Logic*, Isaak von Sinclair deserves special mention. He was a voice from Hegel's past, from 1797 to 1800, years spent in intimate association with Hölderlin which were decisive in Hegel's development. Von Sinclair had been a law student in Tübingen in the early 1790s, when Hegel and Hölderlin studied there. Von Sinclair grew especially devoted to Hölderlin, with whom he was united first by enthusiasm for the French Revolution and then by enthusiasm for Fichte's lectures in Jena. The greetings Hölderlin conveyed from von Sinclair to Hegel in November 1795 [15] indicate that Hegel and von Sinclair also knew each other in Tübingen. But Hegel's most intimate association with von Sinclair dates from Hegel's arrival in Frankfurt in early 1797. Since June 1795 von Sinclair served the liberal Count Friedrich Ludwig V in nearby Homberg. In 1797 von Sinclair and Hegel joined Hölderlin in forming a "pact of spirits" occupied with the reconciliation of Fichte and Spinoza, with beauty as the reconciliation of self and world, with poetry and politics. Von Sinclair's letters reveal nostalgia for these Frankfurt years [162, 199].

Philosophically Hegel opposed an immediate, essentially pre-Socratic starting point in pure being to the Cartesian starting point in von Sinclair's later system [218]. Von Sinclair illustrated the modern Cartesian-Fichtean refusal to surrender finite selfhood. His insistence on judging Hegel's system by the standard of his own pointed up the modern, perversely individualistic insistence that every thinker have his own system [e.g. 278]. In understanding Hegel's system, von Sinclair violated Hegel's hermeneutic dictum of self-abandonment to the life of the object (*Werke* II, 50-51). In practical life one judges from one's own standpoint, but science differs from practical life. Theoretical understanding begins in an act of hermeneutic self-alienation in which the interpreter abandons himself to the practical or theoretical life of an alien subjectivity. Von Sinclair, a lawyer, civil servant, and onetime revolutionist, remained an essentially practical man even in science, which is perhaps why Hegel referred to him as a "stubborn Fichtean" [167] fixated on "endless progress." Ostensibly, von Sinclair's philosophy did not incorporate the critique of Fichte which his friend Hölderlin developed in Frankfurt and which proved so decisive for Hegel (Ch 2).

Consistent with Fichte's idea of endless progress is von Sinclair's notion [217] that, just as every contradiction in the dialectic is resolved, so every resolution dialectically issues in a new contradiction. So long as the Absolute and the system

are distinguishable, the system remains abstract, and generates contradiction if absolutized. When the dialectical method leads to the discovery of actual contradictions behind existing resolutions, it is the criticism of current illusions, exhibiting the "cross of the present" (*Phil of Law*, Preface). But if it leads to the discovery of actual resolutions, it justifies the present as the resolution of past or even still-existing contradictions, exhibiting the "rose in the cross of the present" (Ibid). To be scientific, it must be open to both uses. Restricted merely to one or the other use, the dialectical method is ideological—in the one case on the right and in the other on the left. Hegel's predilection for understanding the present out of the past over predicting the future out of the present (Ibid) carries the risk of an ideological deformation of the method—as for example in Hegel's view of modern European marriage as a triumph over polygamy but not as a new form of despotism (Ch 9). Short of a willful arresting of the very dialectic to which he has abandoned himself, however, it would seem that Hegel can escape endless progress only by denying that dialectical process seeks to exhaust the Absolute.

The correspondence between von Sinclair and Hegel falls in two periods: 1806-07 and 1810-13. Only two letters by Hegel, both drafts from the second period, remain. In 1806-07 von Sinclair was preoccupied with his efforts as a dramatist, and as a literary theorist in the wake of Hölderlin. He had just written a trilogy in Berlin glorifying an uprising of French Protestants against Louis XIV which took place in the Cevennes in 1702-04. The work evidenced von Sinclair's sudden conversion to German nationalism. The Huguenot uprising was presented as an example for Germany against Napoleon. As late as January 1805 von Sinclair had been arrested for contemplating a revolutionary *coup d'état* in Württemberg during 1804 conversations with friends in Stuttgart. Hegel took a sympathetic if not uncritical interest in von Sinclair's plays, apparently censuring the lack of plasticity in the characters [63], but he no doubt had reservations about what von Sinclair himself called "the political tendency" [63] of the trilogy. Though early in 1806 Hegel apparently asked von Sinclair if there was any prospect for him in Berlin [60], Hegel's glee over the Prussian defeat in October at Jena left little doubt about the political chasm now separating them.

The second series of letters was initiated by von Sinclair's inquiry as to whether Hegel might be interested in a vacant position near Frankfurt. Writing about this on August 16, 1810 [162], von Sinclair also announced his own forthcoming system of philosophy, *Truth and Certainty* (1811, 3 vols.), and expressed interest in Hegel's *Phenomenology*, of which he had read part of a review in the *Heidelberg Yearbooks*. He congratulated Hegel for avoiding the charlatanism and absence of method characteristic of Schelling and his consorts. Von Sinclair anticipated general agreement with Hegel in conclusions despite differences in arriving at them. "I should be most delighted," he continues, "if this bond of truth were still to consolidate the bond of our old friendship, for the others are now gone, and among those who held the idea of truth in common with us only you remain to me" [162]. Hegel replied two months later.

Mid-October, 1810

I must indeed greatly reproach myself for my neglect in not replying earlier to the friendly invitation I received from you [*du*] a few years ago in Bamberg. I was all the more delighted to learn from your recent letter that my silence has not offended you and that your sentiments toward me remain unaltered, but especially that you remain faithful to philosophy, that you are earnest about living in her and will continue to be so.

What more directly prompted you to write me last time, namely the disclosure and offer of the prospect of a post in your vicinity, I acknowledge with warm thanks. I am presently Professor of Philosophical Preparatory Sciences and rector at the local gymnasium with, moreover, the hope of eventually getting to a university. And so I already have what personally counts the most for me: a fixed career and, for the rest, at least for the most part, an official occupation linked to my study. If I were to throw away these advantages or give them up for greater ones, I would bring back into my outer activity a disturbance that would set me back for quite some time. It would surely be nice if we lived near each other, recapitulating old times and stimulating each other in the exchange of what is new. Why do you not come visit once our old Nuremberg? Your situation surely allows you more easily than me to make an excursion. I do not know whether you have seen at close hand our regions, Franconia, and our Bavarian situation—which always has its peculiarities. Meanwhile, until I can talk with you personally I await your philosophical work. You have made a good beginning with three tragedies in your dramatic career as well as three volumes in philosophy. These latter I await with great expectation so as to see whether you are still the stubborn Fichtean you were, and what role infinite progress still plays in your thought. If there were still time and I were to give you counsel, I would absolutely advise against having them printed at your own expense. You can only suffer considerable damage thereby. I am at last sending you a copy of my beginning [*Phenomenology of Spirit*], which I did a few years ago. See for yourself what you wish to make of it. It treats a concrete aspect of Spirit. The science itself is to come only afterward. How will your free if not anarchical nature accept the torturous rigor [*Spanische Stiefel*] of the method within which I let Spirit move?

Yet I see that amid the would-be philosophical twaddle which is the order of the day, or rather was—for it seems gradually to be dying down—you also censure the lack of method. I am a schoolmaster who has to teach philosophy, and perhaps this is why I also hold that philosophy must assume a regular structure as teachable as geometry. But knowledge of mathematics and of philosophy is one thing, while inventive and creative talent in mathematics as in philosophy is quite another. My sphere is to invent that scientific form, or to work toward its development.

Your account [162] of the heroic death of your friend [Jakob] Zwilling touched me deeply. I ask you to pay my highest compliments to your mother, who has the kindness to remember me. My regards likewise to [Franz Josef] Molitor

[Frankfurt gymnasium teacher and romantic author], who was once kind enough to send me an essay of his on history [*Ideas on a Future Dynamic of History*, 1805], which in my accustomed negligence I left unanswered.¹ I can only ask forgiveness. Greet for me Mount Feldberg and Altkönig as well, toward which I so often and enjoyably gazed from unhappy Frankfurt, knowing that you were at their feet. Farewell, and do not repay my neglect in kind. Let me hear from you again soon.

ON APRIL 16, 1811, von Sinclair sent Hegel his three-volume work *Truth and Certainty*. The accompanying letter [179] shows he hoped Hegel would help introduce the work to the public. He also thanked Hegel for having sent the *Phenomenology*, “whose good fortune,” he noted, “was already assured” so that it required no similar introduction. Von Sinclair characterized his own work in the same letter:

I believe I have grounded knowledge more deeply than has been done thus far, and have deduced it from life itself. I believe I have derived the method from the object itself. . . . It seems that up to now the method has been chosen arbitrarily, and followed even more arbitrarily. For example in Spinoza, with the geometric method. Further, premises were everywhere posited gratuitously, and the most essential distinctions—such as that between expression and the thing expressed—have been neglected. One merely raced on to the results. I believe I, on the contrary, give exposition to a system from beginning to end. And if my premises had been false they would not have led me back to life, and my results would not agree with the most common truths. . . . for the rigorous path I have followed has not permitted me, so to speak, to go beyond my ideas, using the second idea as it were to plug up the gap in the first. All freedom has been excluded from the detail, being manifest only in the whole. It is true that there is no trace of polemic in my writing. . . . [179]

Hegel's reply, with his judgment of von Sinclair's work, has been lost, though in February 1812 [199] von Sinclair thanked Hegel for his “sympathetic and penetrating” judgment of the volumes. In the meantime, however, von Sinclair had studied the *Phenomenology* and was ready with his own judgment:

I feel first of all that you will have wanted to have the beginning of your work judged only from the standpoint of the whole still awaiting completion. . . . But this first part, considered as an introduction and beginning, is already in itself capable of being judged, and in particular of being compared. And I undertake all the more easily a comparison with my own system because mine has been brought to conclusion. . . . I find most excellent what you say in your Preface in a critical and polemical vein regarding non-philosophy, and in particular against the fear of form, natural philosophy, and the arrogance of the mathematicians, as also what you say in the Introduction against Kant and his critical philosophy. . . . In the style and exposition I recognized well you and your zeal, . . . and thought of the times when our spirits had concluded that pact from which fate has

¹Hegel had known Zwilling, a friend of Hölderlin's and von Sinclair's, since 1797 in Frankfurt; he died at the Battle of Wagram, serving as an Austrian officer. Molitor, also of Frankfurt, was a gymnasium teacher and romantic writer influenced by Friedrich Schlegel.

torn away the other members. From all you say in your Preface and Introduction of phenomenology, I believe you assign to its entire exposition merely the value of an introduction to the constructive standpoint. . . . I [in my own system] pass immediately to philosophical construction from the fact of doubt in general, which I consider in purely historical fashion, i.e., narratively rather than constructively, showing that there exists but a single doubt, and positing this single doubt hypothetically—which seems all the more correct to me inasmuch as it is the most general opinion of all held regarding science, which is that it is a hypothesis in life. But in paragraph nine I say that this same doubt could also be developed from everything, and this seems to be the path you have taken in your *Phenomenology*. For although you do not strictly proceed from doubt, you do proceed from the uncertainty of things, of sensory perception, which in truth is doubt in the concrete, doubt as experienced. And since you have not yet entered upon the path of construction, you were unable to abandon the standpoint of experience, which expounds truth still schematized as a whole, without its distinctions. Your *Phenomenology* is thus strictly speaking a historical exposition showing how science arises out of life, how beginning with the doubt of sensory perception the most profound doubt is formed, which is close to its own resolution. And even the rules accompanying your exposition are not grounded in construction but come to be expressed as facts of consciousness. . . . The execution of the *Phenomenology* has astonished me, and I cannot admire enough the penetration of mind which has replaced the guiding thread of construction. I followed you with the greatest delight through the first section until you treat self-consciousness. . . . Given the freedom of your procedure, it is in fact incomprehensible to me how you have been able to probe the depth of enigmas to which, in my opinion, only the necessity of construction could lend me the key. From the point where you spoke of self-consciousness I lost the thread, and it seemed to me that representation [*Vorstellung*] had led to consciousness too quickly. . . . What I could only dimly understand from what followed was that you seem to enter an excessively historical and, if I may so express myself, pathological viewpoint, where your guide is the power of combination more than quiet observation as before. I especially regretted that your course did not lead you to the distinction between expression and what is expressed, which seems to be the point of the matter [*cardo rei*], though no thought thus far has touched upon it. In your Preface where you speak of the relation of the augmentative [*raisonnierenden*] to the speculative proposition, you seem to me very close to recognition of this relation. . . . Yet in the end you again seem to have attained the goal I set my sights on, namely exhibition of the highest doubt, and to begin construction you seem able to invoke the proposition as to how being distinguished and yet not distinguished can come to be, which surely entails the highest opposition. I thus expect everything from your speculative philosophy. . . . [199]

Von Sinclair—perhaps encouraged by Hegel's letter of October 1810 [167]—misconstrues the relation between the *Phenomenology* and the *Logic*. He mistakenly views the *Phenomenology* as an external, historical introduction to speculative construction. In fact it is as constructive or speculatively systematic as it is historical, just as the *Logic* is historical as well as constructive, articulating the inner dialectic of the history of philosophy.

When von Sinclair wrote again on October 12, 1812 [210], he had studied the first part of Hegel's *Logic*, which he took to be Hegel's constructive philosophy. Judging this new work by his own system, von Sinclair criticized Hegel's method despite its perspicuity, marveling at how Hegel could reach conclusions so acceptable with a method so faulty:

Your point of departure seems incorrect to me, since you rather surreptitiously introduce gratuitous premises, and quickly once again abandon the correct posture announced at the beginning, [the posture of presenting] a purely historical genetic exposition, allowing itself to be interrupted by nothing. You pass over into the dogmatic attitude of reasoning [*Raisonnierens*] about the object, which likewise in the sequel alternates in the course of exposition with the genuine, philosophical development. The exposition of the whole thus cannot pass for justification of suppositions made at the outset, for it is not a selfsame whole throughout. I had believed your *Phenomenology* was to be taken as, so to speak, a historical introduction to metaphysics, even though it had seemed to me something infinite, arbitrary, and thus unsuited to the purpose. But I now see that in your *Logic* you afterwards appeal to it as something independent and foundational, and this appears to me to be circular. [210]

Hegel's reply has been lost, but he likely responded to the charge of circularity and arbitrary presuppositions much as he did to Pfaff earlier in the same year (Ch 10 on Pfaff). Von Sinclair's letter of December 29, 1812 [217], indicates that he found Hegel's replies worth serious consideration. His reflections to Hegel now assumed a more defensive posture:

Since, as I have told you, I expect everything in philosophy from method, the beginning as you very justly remarked gives me much trouble. . . . It is in effect true that the philosophical standpoint requires an introduction [*Isagoge*] drawn from life, and to this extent the beginning must be completely free of bias. All standpoints proceeding from principles are pure dogmas. But I would find it just as wrong to try to push innocence to the point of not presupposing even the need for philosophy, of starting entirely out of the blue. This would be to fall short of the truth. In such a case one might, against [dogmatic] conclusions based on fiat [*mandatum hinc clausula*] at the start of philosophy, file a charge of concealed exceptions [*exceptionem subreptionis*], of factual circumstances passed over in silence—just as, from the first [dogmatic] standpoint, one might object to the use of deceitful exceptions [*exceptionem obreptionis*] based on fictitious circumstances. But when from life, consciousness, representation—or whatever one wishes to call it—one merely takes, in order to make a start in philosophy, what is implied by the need for philosophy, namely the presupposition of doubt, nothing prevents one from proceeding historically—in which case the only question is whether this or that is as a matter of fact present—and from doing so until one matter of fact is found to contradict a second. For at that point all factual and historical certainty ceases, insofar as no matter of fact can any longer claim interdependence with another or validity for a fact other than itself. There then appears the moment of acknowledging something that is not factual, the moment of nonhistorical demonstrated acceptance of something that does not exist immediately on its own account but rather mediately on account of something else.

So, it seems to me, does the speculative arise genetically out of the historical—the speculative, which as you yourself excellently say, although not in this connection, is the inner dialectic and essence of the progression, in which the object's own contradiction gives itself over to further self-movement and makes itself into the genetic result. The speculative resolution of the factual contradiction, to be sure, contradicts itself anew, but we can suppose that it contradicts itself only insofar as we accept it as present. That [first] contradiction is thus annulled, so that we are authorized to presuppose a second resolution only because the first resolution is already there. And we indeed subsequently find the [second] resolution. Inasmuch as opposites thus exist only through the existence of their correlates, they themselves are; and the fact that they contradict each other in no way detracts from our acceptance of them. Yet the germ and at once original type of all this lies merely in the first supposition of doubt, which was indeed factual and unconditioned, but which was likewise a movement out of itself, a genesis. But your apparent reluctance to permit me, in the first still purely historical stage where I analyze doubt, a *comparison* of its contents—along with your reference to such analysis as the work of *external* reflection—seems to me a little severe, especially so soon after you had spoken so well of the *breadth* of the object permissible in its treatment. For so long as I have not left behind the historical standpoint I can still lay claim to all that exists for me as a matter of fact. I claim to have gained admittance for it solely from consciousness. Moreover, there cannot yet be any talk of *external* reflection where everything still appears in a single undifferentiated interconnection. I believe I have clearly indicated my point of entry into speculation (paragraphs 52-65). From this moment on I no longer abandon the synthetic path, and nothing immediate any longer comes forth. [217]

To this we have Hegel's reply:

Hegel to von Sinclair [218]

[draft]

[beginning of 1813]

I clearly see I am in a difficult position with respect to you, since in you I must deal with not only a philosopher but also a jurist who leads me through a path of legal procedure as in a trial, with its exceptions, riders, and procedural errors [*vitiorium*]. I must see how I make out with it. For the present, however, I am first of all pleased by the friendly reception my reply has found with you. I wanted at least to begin to fulfill your request. And, as incomplete as what I said about it was, I nonetheless see it has had the good effect of leading you to present very interesting outlooks which hit the mark, though their discussion would admittedly require extensive development. Yet you conclude to me that in a letter my explanation may be fragmentary and desultory, in the manner of evocative and yet more intensive conversation. Indeed, this pleases me all the more, because you believe oral communication to be indispensable, so that in this further way you do not weaken the desire for a personal reunion. It is rather my wish to see this desire thus strengthened.

We have, as is reasonable, begun with the beginning, and have conducted ourselves methodically enough in connection with it. But I hold generally that,

however much trouble one is justifiably used to taking in philosophy about the proper beginning, in another respect one ought not to make so much fuss over it. The antiphilosophers [*Nichtphilosophen*] in particular foolishly demand a beginning which is absolute and against which they cannot immediately quibble—an incontrovertible first principle. Foolishly, or rather cunningly. For they would have had to have suffered a hard fall on the head not to know absolutely from the start that surely nothing could be brought before them to which they could not object and oppose the wisdom of their sound or argumentative [*räsonnierenden*] common sense. But it would show little cleverness for a philosopher to let himself be tricked or misled into honestly wishing to make such a beginning. For the beginning, precisely because it is the beginning, is imperfect. Pythagoras demanded four years' silence of his followers. The philosopher at least has the right to ask the reader to keep his own thoughts quiet until he has gone through the whole. He can assure the reader from the start that everything the reader will find to which to object he himself has long known, and better. The philosopher himself will let the objection arise for the reader at its own time and necessary place. His entire philosophy itself is nothing but a struggle against the beginning, a refutation and annihilation of his starting point. I naturally grant you that one cannot start out of the blue, but that the beginning ought rather essentially be the beginning of philosophy. Further, one need not and ought not conceal that what one is doing is philosophizing. I thus demand for the beginning of philosophy still more than you, namely, that in deed and substance it be philosophy, and that it recognize itself as such. So I demand more than that the beginning be merely the need for philosophy, but *not more* than what the beginning of philosophy can possibly be. Those who from the very beginning have the idea of philosophy itself, who know from the start the Absolute and the Lord Our God in all His Glory, are obviously ill-informed in the matter. Doubt, I grant you, is a great and noble beginning. But cannot one accuse it of the vice of deceit [*vitium subreptionis*], in that its use at first pretends to be the mere need of philosophy, while it is itself in fact already a case of philosophizing? Doubt, or the analysis of doubt into its *éléments primitives* by which the internal contradiction of doubt is manifested, tries to smuggle in philosophizing while claiming its own innocence, as if it were not itself philosophizing. But smuggling is forbidden by [Napoleonic] Imperial decree, and a court of law would already have to recognize such *métaphysique* or *idéologie* in that ingenuous act, and would have to condemn the would-be philosopher for contraband and the vice of deceit, all quite legally. You admit in another connection that you take doubt to be first of all a fact. I likewise hold that the beginning can only have the form of a fact or—better—of something *immediate*. For it is precisely because of this that it is a beginning, i.e., because it has not advanced. The advance is alone what brings about what is no longer immediate but rather mediated by another. However, doubt is in point of *content* rather the opposite of all facts, or of what is immediate. It is already far more than the beginning, being the middle reality [*media res*] between the beginning and the end. I do not know but that this is not both the vice of deceit [*vitium subreptionis*] and the vice of underhandedness [*vitium obreptionis*].

The Fall of Napoleon

But I break off here to thank you for the kind sentiments contained at the close of your letter. As for my own wishes, I have none except for the thought which you yourself have. My single and last goal is to teach in a university. I was given some hope for Erlangen. The Senate there proposed me, but nothing is being realized with us. Here I have a salary of 1,200 florins, and something beyond. A change would have to be based on some reason, as also on increase in pay. Because of its greater proximity to you, Giessen would please me highly. So far in the face of mere organizing and formalism we have come to naught here. And if something is a. . . . [incomplete]

But what hope do these present uproarious times give, when all the money that might largely be devoted to tranquil science, above all to *philosophie* and *métaphysique*, is used for other ends? A ministry is concerned to have good lawyers, doctors, and perhaps even good theologians on the ground that it finds itself so greatly hindered in its work by mediocrity. But how few people realize that the study of philosophy constitutes the true foundation of all theoretical and practical education! The position in Giessen is filled. In any case philosophy passes for something that has outlived itself. Anyone who has learned nothing well is considered competent to be a professor of philosophy, having failed to qualify for anything better. The private tutors of ministers are commonly promoted to such positions. By the way, I know the terrain in Darmstadt and would wish you to find something better, a terrain that you yourself would come to cultivate. And I would. . . . [incomplete]

THE LETTERS translated below document Hegel's struggle with the greatest challenge to his world-view he would ever experience, the Restoration. In the 1790s his commitment to the original French Revolution was severely tested by the reign of terror and the invasion of German territories, but it nonetheless survived. His identification with the Revolution—specifically with Napoleon, the organizer of the Revolution—now faced the equally severe test of Napoleon's downfall, and again survived. This chapter deals with Hegel's jaundiced response to the German wars of national liberation in 1813, and with the crisis in his own psyche brought on by Napoleon's original fall in 1814. That Hegel was so shaken is evidence that he regarded a major thesis of his philosophy of history—i.e., that modern history is the story of reason's progress in the world—as *empirically* falsifiable. His confidence in the actual presence of reason in history, however, was soon recovered. A Kantian theological rationalist like Paulus [241] or Heinrich Stephani [252], separating the phenomenal and noumenal, could both condemn the restoration of political and religious superstition and retain his philosophical identity. But Hegel, holding that the noumenal thing-in-itself not only had to express itself in phenomenal existence (*Werke* IV, 605) but was actually doing so in the contemporary world, could repudiate *neither* the Revolution *nor* the movement of post-Napoleonic history without a fundamental philosophical transformation. The personal break between Hegel and Paulus in 1816 [313, 314], was preceded, perhaps necessitated, by a philosophical distance between them, which the Restoration made only more obvious. Hegel continued to uphold the Revolution. The negation of a limited truth enriches it, while the Restoration's repudiation of the Revolution, he asserted, is ultimately an embrace of it [271]. Revolution and Restoration, reason and superstition, had to be reconciled. Reason was the substantial content, but the Restoration was its outer form. Hegel accordingly moved from a skeptical critique of the Congress of Vienna to a grudging personal endorsement of the Restoration. Later, in the 1820s when the Restoration—which Hegel had come to view as window dressing—proved more substantial than reason itself, the Hegelian philosophy of contemporary history would face a renewal of the same empirical challenge posed by Napoleon's defeat. Yet this time Hegelians would have to face the challenge with less personal leadership from Hegel (Ch 24).

When Hegel sent Niethammer the second book of the *Logic*, Napoleon had just recently managed to hold off the allies by a victory at Gross-Görschen on May 2:

Hegel to Niethammer [219]

Nuremberg, May 21, 1813

I have instructed the publisher to mail you, my dear friend, a copy of the second part of my *Logic* [Vol I, Part Two]. You may blame the long delay in replying on this work. It gives me a good excuse, though in truth it was already printed in December. . . .

We have finally received the monthly arrears in our salaries from two years back. It was bread already eaten in advance, for of course it has been necessary for me to borrow as much. It required no small expenditure of energy to get this money. But it was no small power that helped us do it either—several hundred thousand Cossacks, Bactrians, Prussian patriots, and the like were approaching. From then on, everything went smoothly. What is best of all is that we received this money without the Cossacks and Bactrians, or any of those other excellent liberators. Only three years ago no such effort was yet necessary. Several hundred Austrian militia then sufficed to get us our back-salaries. Thus things go well for us only with the approach of the enemy.

My father-in-law has been ill since the beginning of December. He has now been weakened to the point that all hope is lost. He retains but little coherent consciousness. How hard this is on my mother-in-law and my [expectant] wife in her condition you can well imagine. He still has no wealth, in part because his father is still alive and in part because the main income depends on a family trust and on his person, which fall by the wayside along with him.

Jena is said to have again gone through a lot. Farewell. . . . Yours, Hegel

IN JUNE Hegel announced the birth of his son Karl (1813-1901) against the backdrop of Bavarian mobilization against the allies. Fresh victories in May permitted Napoleon to reestablish his position until August.

Hegel to Niethammer [221]

Nuremberg, June 11, 1813

I recently wrote you of the news we were then awaiting in our household. Since what was delightful in it has come to a happy conclusion, I rush to give you a brief account. The day before yesterday, or rather already Monday night, my wife happily delivered a healthy boy, and since then mother and child have been doing fine. What was anxiously awaited and hoped for has thus happily arrived. I know you and your wife share our delight.

The only fortunate thing in my father-in-law's condition, however, has been that his end did not, as was feared, coincide with my wife's delivery. On the other hand, each day that passes is a hopeless prolongation of his sufferings, and of the sorrowful situation of my mother-in-law—who had an especially hard time during

the two days of my wife's confinement when she had to fear her husband's demise at any hour. He is mostly in an unconscious, completely deranged state. Each day leads us to expect his end more than the previous one, today more than yesterday. . . .

Things must be very lively around Munich, since I note from today's paper a camp of 21,000 men there. . . . Yours, Hegel

How is Hufeland?

IN JULY Niethammer raised Hegel's hopes by suggesting two competing prospects for him: a professorship at the University of Erlangen, which Niethammer wished to establish as a Protestant university in Bavaria alongside the Catholic university at Landshut, and the school councillorship in Nuremberg:

Hegel to Niethammer [223]

Nuremberg, July 4, 1813

I naturally could not have foreseen that something so close to a prospect would arise so soon; nor that such a kind query, presenting me with a sort of choice, would ensue so quickly. Concerning the choice itself, I prefer without hesitation the prospect in Erlangen. My salary here amounts to 1,000 florins. The lodging, examination board, compensation for copying charges, and so on amount to between 200 to 225 florins. I was told by the professors in Erlangen that the budgeted salary amounts to 1,200 florins. There would be no objection, I hope, to my receiving that much as well, for I would not see why in my case there should be a deduction or decrease in the normally budgeted salary. Therefore, I likewise surmise that you had not the 1,000-florin but the 1,200-florin figure in mind when you limited the prospect to no more than what I am receiving in my present position. In any case, this is not a matter that would stop [me]. In a promotion there is, on one hand, the presumption that one can use the promoted person in his new position and, on the other hand, that one does not want it to be to his disadvantage. Quite apart from your amicable concern and protection, I am all the less frightened by [the thought of] what might happen to one encountering two prospects: namely, that he end up sitting down between two chairs. For, according to the [nature of] administrative organization, two divergent prospects can be pursued side by side even if they concern the same individual. As good fortune would have it in such proceedings, both positions might be offered to an individual at once, so that one [offer] could be invoked to argue for an improvement of the second. Just such good fortune very recently presented itself to my immediate neighbor: *a*, The man has been dead for two years; *b*, two years before his death he became mad, and *c*, two years before his madness he retired. Favored by the course of affairs, a few days ago he received an increase in his pension of a few hundred florins. If something like that happens to dead wood, what is to become of green wood [reversal of Luke 23:31]? On the other hand, one should not at all get one's hopes up because of the luck experienced by *a*, a dead man, *b*, a fool, and *c*, a retired Senator. Yet I believe myself at least able to infer that neither of these two possibilities shall destroy the other, and I thus contemplate such hopes all the more confidently. In sum [Sum-

ma], the prospect of the university is personally [*privatim*] in all cases preferable to me. If some external loss [of income] were at issue, I at least would retain the right to make an official appeal for compensation. As to why in particular administrative activity would be disagreeable to me precisely here, you yourself know from the nature of school affairs and the personalities involved. . . . For the time being, my most cordial thanks for your friendship. Oh, my liberator, the purveyor of my happiness, how in my delight will I hopefully soon thank you? For delight is generally not my strong point. Through Mrs. von Roth I have heard nothing but good news of you and your family. Everything is fine with us. Yours, Hegel

NIETHAMMER'S PLANS for Erlangen failed, but Hegel's appointment as School Councillor became official on December 13 [224]. Hegel thanked Niethammer on December 23 [225]. By then the Napoleonic forces, after their decisive defeat at Leipzig in October, were retreating toward the Rhine. In February 1813 the Prussian King called for volunteers for a patriotic war of national liberation against Napoleon. Many students responded. On November 3 [223a], Hegel wrote a note to Niethammer's stepson, Ludwig Döderlein, who—like Niethammer's son, Julius—had strongly anti-Napoleonic, patriotic sentiments of which both Hegel and the older Niethammer disapproved. Döderlein was then a student at the University of Erlangen.

Hegel to Döderlein [223a]

Nuremberg, November 3, 1813

I cannot tell you how sorry I was, dear Ludwig, that I was not at home last night. But do make the trip from Erlangen to visit me all the sooner. Regard Nuremberg and my house for the time being as a home away from home, where you always have a standing invitation. Since you wanted to stay here yesterday only for a few hours, I console myself over my absence by reflecting that the time would anyway not have been sufficient to hear everything worth telling. But do come all the sooner. How would it be if you came next Saturday and Sunday? What can stand in the way? You may come by foot or, if the occasion arises, in company by coach. There is usually an opportunity these days. The content of your father's brief note much pleases me. But you can no doubt tell me much more. In the meantime, farewell. Yours, Hegel

I address this note to the Privy Councillor Gross, through whom I have no doubt it will reach you. Please remember me dutifully to him.

ON DECEMBER 23 Hegel mentions to Niethammer that Döderlein had been in Nuremberg "to see our liberators pass by." Julius Niethammer, whom Hegel also mentions, was then a gymnasium student in Munich, and had penned a manifesto entitled *A Summons to the Defense of the Fatherland*.

Hegel to Niethammer [225]

Nuremberg, December 23, 1813

Not only has the lost envelope arrived containing the letter to Schubert, but, what is more, the [Royal Commission's] decree [224]—which had almost been

given up for lost—has also at last reached me. Convinced that you at least officially place more lasting confidence in a Royal Commission than in a house cook, I considered you assured of its arrival and thus did not hurry to report it to you. You are likewise assured, dear friend, of my gratitude for all that you do for me. The delay was merely due to the fact that it went first to Ansbach, and from there was no doubt returned by chance a few days later for me to respond. On the 25th of last month I entered upon my new duties. You have probably already seen proof of my strenuous official activity at least in the form of signatures on vellum paper. May God now merely help me rise to the task and not discredit you. I have already mustered more courage in the last three or four weeks that I have been on the job. As is commonly known, when one finally finds oneself in the inner circle of mysteries they no longer appear as terrible and impenetrable as they seemed from the outside. To chew on the two main bones of contention, i.e., the public elementary school system and the matter of stipends, such a solid construction—so well suited to the purpose—has been put in place from on high that the whole system, having lain rather fallow or been given over to undergrowth, will now gradually submit to arrangement. It seems to me I may hope in general for well-intentioned benign neglect, at least if nothing awkward intervenes. This is what is of *extremely great value*, often far more so than one-sided interest. I thus hope you likewise might be satisfied with us, just as I at present seem to have reason for satisfaction with my circumstances. Indeed, I have reason to be much more than satisfied in these times of liberation. They are times in which, above all, material deprivation and indeed even barbarism are of necessity in control, and in which I reflect on my good fortune with most sincere gratitude to you for this post—especially since you reserve an even better office for me in the future. If the book trade had been better, I would have asked to be spared and would have placed the rectorship at His Royal Majesty's feet while retaining the professorship. Yet, because of my new situation, even the rectorship has lost something of its former unpleasantness.

You also will have probably seen the results of the activities of the commission-that-examines-candidates-for-teaching posts [*Studienlehramtskandidatenprüfungskommissionsgeschäften*]. . . .

I am expecting Ludwig [Döderlein] for the holidays. Your recent letter just reached him here. He was here, among other things, to see our liberators pass by—if *par hasard* there are any liberated individuals to be seen I myself will stand up and watch! I am drawing his attention in this regard to the sort of company he would enter into if he were to join them as a volunteer. That Julius [Niethammer] has also placed a letter on his father's table has surprised me less than the fact that his mother should have been so hospitable to it. But a mother's heart must, it is true, give its blessing even to such an enterprise.

The price of quartering in the taverns is 1 florin 12 crowns for one Russian; sometimes as much as 1 florin 30 crowns, or even 2 florins; 52 crowns for one Austrian—for one Frenchman it was 48 crowns; for one Bavarian 36 crowns; for one Bavarian recruit 24 crowns. What a temple of gradations! The Russian, however, is three times more expensive than a Bavarian recruit in three respects: stealing, lice, and the awesome guzzling of brandy. As to the first point, however,

it is to the honor of the Russians that I can testify to having been robbed by an Austrian. I have not had any Russians in my house yet! But elsewhere the Russians have, so to speak, ransacked villages. It still should be mentioned that here as elsewhere a good paddle helped much against the first and third complaints, forcing the culprits to their knees, but the remedy was admittedly ineffective against the second complaint. The quartering was one of the burdens most severely felt; no other imposition was as heavy. Concerning the behavior [of recruits] in other regards, an honest townswoman recently assured everyone that, having had two Russians in her house, she would prefer six Frenchmen to one such pig; on the other hand, she would prefer three Russians to any of the forty-four volunteers recently supplied by her own city!

Liberation should, I think, be a liberation from the burdens of the previous system. Yet the better part of it comes only later. The excellent gains achieved thus far are still too remote from what interests me. For example, that the formerly free Republic of Holland has received a *prince souverain* instead of a *roi*. I merely think of myself: if we obtain what we wish to obtain [*erlangen*], I will consider *that* to be a most generous fruit of oppression banished—all the more so if the local pie should again flourish in its former splendor. Despite the noble fruit of the new liberty to fill newspapers as well as letters and accounts frankly and freely with utter lies, we may rely on at least this: namely, that [municipal representative] Mr. [Ludwig Franz] Günderode, now *chef*—formerly juror [*Schöff*]¹—in Frankfurt, wrote to someone nearby that in one week he saw and spoke with three emperors, plus several kings and princes; that Leipzig, Nuremberg, Augsburg shall each obtain its own special constitution much as Frankfurt, where a beginning is now being made, and Hamburg, etc.; and that this is to occur with the special support and guarantee of the *English*. Surveying circumstances from my post here, I have seconded the resolution of a municipal councillor who, after careful reflection on the importance of current events, has decided to observe events for one more week and then let them take whatever course they will.¹ For the time being, however, some gingerbread from Nuremberg, having remained faithfully the same through all revolutions, is enclosed. I know I may compare it in this regard with the constancy of your friendship. Farewell for the present. . . . Yours, Hegel

HEGEL ON THE FALL OF NAPOLEON

The institutional bases of Napoleonic Europe, which Hegel had taken for granted since the aftermath of the Battle of Jena in 1806, were crumbling. World events were challenging both his interpretation of history, and the meaningfulness

¹The reference to Holland concerns the popular revolt against the French following the Battle of Leipzig: after the French withdrew, Prince William of Orange was appointed the provisional ruler of Holland on November 30. Frankfurt is where Napoleon briefly set up headquarters at the end of October, only to be forced to retreat shortly thereafter by the advancing Austrians, Russians, and Prussians. The municipal councillor whose decision Hegel was determined to follow was Paulus, who expressed himself along such lines on May 23, 1813 [220]: "The world with its sterile agitation is heartily antipathetic to me. I have thus decided to watch for another week and then let everything take its course without concerning myself with anything."

of his work in Nuremberg. Hegel expressed his inner turmoil in a January 1814 account [227] to Niethammer of a dream he had had. The dream appears to have responded in part to a lost letter by Niethammer [see 226, 231]. The politically sensitive nature of the letter had led Niethammer to send it through a friend instead of entrusting it to the postal service. Niethammer himself refers to the philosophical and political as well as pedagogical nature of the letter [231].

A psychoanalytic interpretation of the dream Hegel reports is hard to avoid. Hegel's conscious self appears as the physiologist who defends humanism and the excellence of apes over pigs, while the physiologist who upholds the virtue of pigs represents the Old Bavarian Enlightenment utilitarians Niethammer called philanthropinists. "Pippel" (compare to *Pöbel*), who upholds human rights and constitutions, represents the people who undertook both the Revolution and wars of national liberation. "Pippel" is similarly used by Hegel in letter 241. The moderator in a debate with tragic overtones, who acts as "Fate" and rules Pippel out of order, returns the discussion to an academic interchange between humanists and philanthropinists. The "super-clever" individual, whose interpretation of Fate seems irrelevant to Hegel, may be the voice of Hegel's unconscious, astutely suggesting that popular revolution and self-sacrifice are futile, that the people are unwitting pawns in an eternal power struggle. Hegel's characterization of this pessimistic interpretation of history—an interpretation which challenges Hegel's consciously held interpretation—as "irrelevant" is likely a reaction-formation: Hegel is defending himself against the suspected irrelevance of his own academic humanism.

The naturalized Swiss historian Heinrich Zschokke was, like Hegel, an early critic of the Restoration. He was a citizen of Argovia, whose independence was threatened by the efforts of Bern to achieve restoration of its historical rights. Monasteries and the Inquisition—then being restored by the newly independent Papacy—point up the injustice and irrationality of purely historical "positive" rights and traditions. Zschokke's voice reinforces that of Hegel's own ego. But the difficulty in lecturing on law that Hegel felt on awakening may have expressed fear that the humanistic philosophy he taught was irrelevant, that this philosophy was impotent to assure the triumph of human rights and save the common people from a tragic fate. Yet Hegel's fate was to continue expounding this humanism despite the self-deception of the people, his original solidarity group (see letter 11 from 1794). Recognition of this self-deception is marked by the substitution of the disparaging term *Pöbel* for *Volk*.

In his April 10 letter, dated four days after Napoleon's abdication at Fontainebleau, Hegel—still unaware of the Emperor's downfall—wrote Niethammer largely of his preoccupations as a recently appointed school councillor. The secondary school for girls which he mentions was created by District School Councillor Heinrich Stephani in October 1813, but by Easter had been closed for budgetary reasons. The gymnasium of which Hegel was rector was an all-boys school. His disparaging attitude toward the education of women reflects less concern for human rights in this area than was shown by contemporaries such as Fichte, Schleiermacher, or Kant. Hegel was personally acquainted with emancipated, highly culti-

vated women of his day, such as Caroline Schelling and Caroline Paulus. Although he spoke in a disapproving tone of Schelling's wife, who had divorced August Schlegel [99, 151], he was on friendly terms with Paulus's wife. Yet his own wife was a traditional housewife. His attitude toward the girls' high school was a logical consequence of his view that woman's vocation was in the home; secondary education was to serve as a bridge leading boys from the family to a vocation in civil society or the state (*Phil of Law* ¶166).

On April 18 [230] Hegel had learned of Napoleon's fall but was still at a loss for an account. By April 29 [233], however, he was able to render an account to Niethammer. Though lamenting the popular craze to restore the irrational positive rights of the Old Regime, Hegel cast Napoleon in the guise of a tragic hero bent on self-destruction. In fact Napoleon had repeatedly refused to compromise in ways that would have preserved his regime. As late as February he refused a peace offer that would have reestablished the French frontiers of 1792. More remarkably, however, Hegel proceeds to claim that he predicted the whole reversal of events in the *Phenomenology* (1807). Hegel's treatment of the French Revolution in the *Phenomenology*—"Absolute Freedom and Terror"—indeed precedes a treatment of the "moral world view" typified by Germans such as Kant and Fichte. Hegel's claim of prediction seems confirmed by an 1807 letter:

Thanks to the bath of her Revolution, the French Nation has freed herself of many institutions which the human spirit had outgrown like the shoes of a child. These institutions accordingly once oppressed her, and they now continue to oppress other nations as so many fetters devoid of spirit. What is even more, however, is that the individual as well has shed the fear of death along with the life of habit—which, with the change of scenery, is no longer self-supporting. This is what gives this Nation the great power she displays against others. She weighs down upon the impassiveness and dullness of these other nations, which, finally forced to give up their indolence in order to step out into actuality, will perhaps—seeing that inwardness preserves itself in externality—surpass their teachers. [85]

Referring to Germany by name, Hegel wrote in November 1807: "Germany has already learned much from France, and the slow nature of the Germans, *les allemands*, will in time benefit from still more" [108]. Germany was to achieve the unity of institutional revolution and moral inwardness, of revolution and reformation, political transformation and religious comprehension, that France had not attained. A revolution without moral, religious, and philosophical comprehension of its world-historical meaning was not enough. The Old Regime had already been in principle surpassed before 1789; so the Napoleonic system had already by 1807 been essentially surpassed by the German idealist tradition to which Hegel himself belonged—and of which Napoleon himself remained ignorant. Hegel's main concern was to prevent the reaction from eliminating the positive gains of the French Revolution, gains Germany needed to preserve precisely in order to surpass them. Hegel, like Niethammer [231], thus braced himself for the "floods of blessedness" [233] expected to mark the arrival of the new era.

... All this I am still getting done this morning by lamp so as to be able to add what Held will express himself, and to send this letter on time. I cannot help mentioning to you that I am starting to have often very confused fantasies. I have just awakened from one such dream, which allows nothing else to come to verbal expression in me. Thus I will probably have to recount it to free myself of it. It appeared to me quite vividly in the dream that I was in a large group attending a disputation in which two physiologists—I now believe the entire dream stemmed from the fact that a medical student handed me your letter—discussed the relative merits of apes and pigs. One confessed to being an adherent of philanthropinism. With a loudmouthed corpulent fellow named Pippel standing at his side, he went on to defend the well-known physiological thesis that, among all the animals, pigs most resemble human beings in their digestive and other intestinal organs. The other physiologist declared himself a partisan of humanism. He belittled the similarity of digestive organs and extolled apes, on the contrary, for their drollery, humanlike appearance, mannerisms, imitative ability, and so forth. That fellow Pippel, however, continually wanted to bring up still other matters, even juridical matters such as human rights, constitutions, government, and so forth. But the moderator, who, so to speak, played the role of fate throughout the whole proceeding, treated all matters of this sort as mere irrelevancies, mere packaging. He disallowed them from being seriously discussed, and remained firm in his insistence that the topic was merely the relative virtues of the two species of animals. But a super-clever man, murmuring in the corner more or less to himself, then asked the moderator—in a manner that seemed to me quite unrelated—whether he meant that Pippel, should he someday feel a swelling in his heart and head, would, as is well known, risk the shirt off his back; that aristocrats would put this to their advantage; and that Pippel would thus play the fool in a game [of their invention]—as in fact occurs quite legally in the name of the Devil, and has always occurred from time immemorial. The historian Zschokke then ran up to jump in, shouting that the people of Bern had already received an answer at least verbally from Zurich, but that there were still many other considerations—some of them already presented and some of them about to be presented—to which there was still no reply in sight; that the Spanish and Portuguese Inquisition, monks, and an infinity of other things Spanish and Portuguese also militated on his behalf; and so on. At that point I woke up. But it seemed difficult to me to have to go to class and lecture on law.

P.S. I have spoken with Held. His reply is in complete accord with the views you yourself have formed in his own best interest, so that it would be very painful for him at present to be torn away from his quiet and his studies. . . . Hegel

The best opportunity of sending you a letter makes the letter mostly superfluous. I do not have to expand on how enjoyable the surprise of your dear wife's

visit was for us. It was just as enjoyable to hear so much about you, Julius, and Jacobi; to hear of the well-being of such friends and of your kind remembrance; and to spend a few days in a relation with you that, through the intermediary of such an immediate and living organ, at least approached [living] presence.

You will not have been exactly surprised at our dawdling in regard to the public school system, since you know in general that you have to deal first with the people of Nuremberg, second with civil authorities and clergy, and third with people who for five years have been accustomed to being inactive, who are now having difficulty returning to such a so-to-speak commonplace matter, and who are surprised that something is indeed to be done. Since the beginning of December the local school commission has been reproached for the matter of the poor-school, which I have in advance excluded from the rest. But despite urgent exhortations, the commission has not yet submitted a report on any subject.

A few examples will meanwhile have reached you of how I had to justify, settle, or improve matters previously left unfinished or in disarray. You have perhaps seen how improperly and unfairly presentations have been handled—yet the people from Castell, Schwabach, and the like could have been taken care of—and you have perhaps also seen that I am of course seeking to change matters when necessary. Otherwise, however, I go about my work objectively.

I want to mention, among other things, my discovery that funding for the schools is thus also chronically insufficient. And the minute one requests something for it, the hue and cry goes out that the insufficiency is due to advances from the educational fund made to support the clergy. Immediate needs have been taken care of from available means. Thus help seems to have been provided. Nobody complains. Justice [*Recht*] is an abstract and mute person. The object is simply to procure treasure, and those who suffered real distress and injustice are used to the view that everything has gone to the dogs anyway.

A botched job of Stephani's—a local secondary school for girls—collapsed the other day; and the money unjustly and improperly used, God knows how, for the school has been as good as thrown out the window. Our boss allowed himself to develop an interest in this venture, and to this extent I would have liked to help. You yourself know best how things stand with the boss. From time to time he does something administratively on his own—as with the girls' school, though in my tenure all he has really done here is to drop the whole thing. Since such things are done in a haphazard way, it is necessary afterwards to make up for the contradictions and obstacles. Yet these are in fact trifling matters, and so far my modest labors have met with approval. So far I have not had the slightest annoyance, which is surely all one can ask to be content. . . .

I am enclosing here that substantive letter of yours which was shared with me.² I have already thanked you for it and made known my complete agreement. The final momentous decision [on the battlefield] has not yet ensued. Yesterday [news of] a victory of [March] 25th arrived, which should bring with it the

² This letter, which is unavailable, is the one to which Niethammer [321] attributed Hegel's "philosophico-politico-pedagogical dream" of early January [227].

[moment of] decision. But we have so often been lied to in the past about this—and indeed all the more eloquently the worse matters were—that for all we know this victory only means that the Allies have escaped ruin, so to speak, by the skin of their teeth. Our government has now exercised possession of its newly won freedom, and has demonstrated to all the world—its subjects included—the sovereignty violated by the yoke of the French: the French Emperor had not suffered smaller powers to have a field marshal. Even his King of Holland had to retract. But now after such a total reversal of events, after such brilliant victories, heavy burdens, and profusely spilt blood, we have one! We shall try to wait quietly and see whether we are to obtain still further results of Liberation and fruit of burdens borne.

The only result I want for the time being is fulfillment of the beautiful hope of seeing you pass by our home this fall, even should it remain only in passing. I bid you a warm farewell. Yours most faithfully, Hegel

THE ALLIES had now invaded France, inflicted a series of defeats on the Napoleonic forces in March, and entered Paris by the end of the month. The battle of Fère-Champenoise on March 25, which Hegel mentions, was the last major encounter, precipitating Napoleon's abdication at Fontainebleau on April 6. But Hegel, unaware of the fact, suggested on April 10 that Napoleon still might prevail. The Bavarian forces, now fighting with the allies, were commanded by Field Marshal Count Karl Philipp von Wrede. By April 18 news of the abdication had reached Hegel.

Hegel to Paulus [230]

Nuremberg, April 18, 1814

A young student from here, Fuchs, the son of a deceased clergyman [Karl Heinrich Fuchs] whom you perhaps still remember [from Bamberg], is going to Heidelberg to study philology. In urging you to assist him if something can be done for his support—for his mother is very much in need—I cannot pass up the opportunity to ask you how you are feeling and getting on. There is otherwise so little communication between our regions, at least as far as I am concerned, that rarely even a peep reaches me from your side. Our friendly exchanges of old, however, have left in me a longing to renew them from time to time, and not to allow them to waste away completely. The last news of you I heard was Döderlein's pleasant report of your continued good and indeed improved health, as well as of the good health of your wife and daughter. Regarding them I had read the rather cheerless report of a sort of dispute: your daughter had allegedly put up window drapes, but her mother did not like the sight of the strange things—which were not from Bielefeld—and had them removed. I hope, however, that with the current restoration of all things this dispute has also been completely removed from the scene, and will prove susceptible to purely allegorical interpretation.

I do not want to ask what you have said of the great Napoleon. There would still be many things to be asked about this Liberation of ours which is said to have taken place.

But what do you say to the fact that I am to continue—to the end—the work you have so meritoriously begun here—the organization of the local public school system? Who could have hoped or wished for this? It goes without saying that the good people of Nuremberg count on their Liberation to bring them liberation from such school tribulations as well. For six months I have held unmeritoriously the office of Councillor for local school and curricular affairs in addition to my rectorship. I hope I will not hold the post for so very long. My wife and boy are fine. She conveys her cordial regards to you and joins me in bidding you to persevere in—and occasionally give report of—your kind remembrance. With respect and affection, Hegel

NIETHAMMER'S LETTER of April 24 [231], however, reveals that the 300-florin salary for Hegel's councillorship was not yet secured. The Bavarian government had decided that the post should be eliminated if the salary was not paid from local Nuremberg funds. Niethammer reluctantly consented, but sought other ways to relieve the city's burden. Hegel responded to Niethammer's confidential account of these proceedings on April 29. Niethammer sent this account, too, by private channels, expressing the hope that it would have the same "brilliant" effect as the January letter that led to Hegel's dream. Hegel replied instead with an account of a dream by his wife [233].

Hegel to Niethammer [233]

Nuremberg, April 29, 1814

You will not be surprised, dear friend, that your kind report of the threatening danger has not left me unaffected, and that my wife has, on the contrary, been struck with actual horror. It would be difficult for us to do without the 300 florins for which we are indebted to you. As a compensatory supplement to my income it is of such great benefit, just as the greatest value is attached to the keystone of an arch, not because it is any more indispensable than the other stones, but because it is the one by which the others are first formed into a whole.

Since I am so deeply plunged in actual and temporal matters of my immediate present, my fantasy has not been free for dreaming. But my wife's fantasy has, by contrast, been all the livelier. She dreamt she found herself in a large encampment near Paris full of wild soldiers, Cossacks and Prussians, all mixed together. She was completely taken with fright. However, you rode through the tumult and made way on all sides. My wife approached you on foot; and as she was about to be thronged, you kindly extended your hand down from your steed and gave sign that she was under your protection. She thus escaped safe and sound, full of joyous gratitude. She then found herself with you in a temple where all was joy and contentment. I was not indifferent during this account to the fact that I did not enter into the story even once. My wife wanted to excuse the fact by saying that I was enveloped in her. I am quite willing to be protected by you, through her, against all Bashkirs and Tschuwasschens, and to be brought into the haven of peace.

God knows what is to be made of all these Tschuwasschens! I have already noticed that the public hopes that Imperial freedoms will be won back again, and

the rabble [*Pöbel*] is convinced. They hope to have back the good old days. It will then once more be permitted, as one man puts it, to give a box on the ears for sixteen pennies—for that is what it cost under the Old Regime—while a second man thinks he will be free again to have his ears boxed. The chief of police is too great an eminence to occupy himself with school affairs, but the police commissioner replied a few days ago to [Nuremberg gymnasium professors Johann] Wolf and [Christoph] Büchner—who, when pressed by me, pressed them—that in three weeks we in any case will no longer be Bavarian. And there the authorities wish to let the matter lie. In fact the reports of the local school commission, which were assigned in December, have not yet come in. And I had hoped the schools for the poor could be opened in March! If—which I of course am hardly able to suppose—there possibly were something to those rumors, I would then call out from the depths of my soul: Draw me unto Thee, draw me unto Thee! [*Trahe me post te, trahe me post te!*] People would indeed still need a gymnasium rector and professor, but would reduce us to perhaps half salary, and for the rest point to [free] lunch and the six pennies [*Batzen*] placed in the palm of the hand. If by means of obsequiousness and friendliness we should earn three times our salary like the clerics, people would grant us such revenue more readily than a more paltry but independent income earned without obsequiousness. Not to speak at all of a rectorship. *Trahe me post te*, I would again and again call out.

Great events have transpired about us. It is a frightful spectacle to see a great genius destroy himself. There is nothing more *tragic* [in Greek]. The entire mass of mediocrity, with its irresistible leaden weight of gravity, presses on like lead, without rest or reconciliation, until it has succeeded in bringing down what is high to the same level as itself or even below. The turning point of the whole, the reason why this mass has power and—like the chorus—survives and remains on top, is that the great individual must himself give that mass the right to do what it does, thus precipitating his own fall.

I may pride myself, moreover, on having predicted this entire upheaval. In my book [*Phenomenology of Spirit*], which I completed the night before the battle of Jena, I said on page 547: "Absolute freedom—which I had previously described as the purely abstract formal freedom of the French Republic, originating, as I showed, in the Enlightenment—passes out of its own self-destructive actuality over into *another land*—I had in mind here a specific *land*—of self-conscious spirit, in which, in this inactual form, it passes for truth itself, and in which it takes refreshment in the thought of this spirit, inasmuch as such spirit *is and remains thought* and knows this being contained in self-consciousness to be the perfect and complete essence. The new form of *moral* spirit is at hand."³

From the streams of blessings necessarily flowing from these great events, just as showers must follow lightning, that brown rivulet of coffee already flows from the pot for the likes of us, and indeed does so with more taste and perk than ever. For we have now been liberated from substitute drink, and from our supple-

³"Another land" is not highlighted in the German original of the *Phenomenology* as in Hegel's self-quotation; see *Werke* II, 459.

mentary income as Councillors we can now procure real Java coffee. May God and kind friends preserve it for us. . . .

. . . May the alleviation of my every headache over all current events big and small be attainable in connection with Erlangen [*sich Erlangen lassen*]. Yours, Hegel

Hegel to Niethammer [234]

Nuremberg, July 1, 1814

I cannot refrain from entrusting to High Councillor of Finance [Karl Johann Friedrich] Roth a few lines addressed to you, my dear friend. He, by the way, will be able to give you a report of our bearable living conditions here. But there are so many great things either in the wind or already in place that one becomes talkative even where it is superfluous. Just as the Russians have been called "beasts of Liberation," the organizational beasts are said to have long been chomping at the bit to fall on the hoped-for prey. Yet in recent times the lands have been so often reorganized through and through, and thus brought to such a scrawny orderliness, that very few flitches of bacon remain to be trimmed off them. . . .

It is said that if the devil gets you by the hair you are his for eternity. I think what you have in mind for me is not that my hair should grow out into a bun, but rather that it should as soon as possible be torn out again and reorganized amiss if the opportunity should now present itself. I leave the matter to God, you, and your fair lady.

As he took leave of us today, I told Roth [from Württemberg, like Hegel] and his wife that the pleasure of his amicable presence included as well the delightful riches of making up, beyond his own immediate presence, the presence of half the dear circle of which he is a member; and thus that as he travels with his wife here to his homeland, he at once brings along a choice piece of real estate from my own homeland. . . . Yours, Hegel

THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA

The coming Restoration rekindled Hegel's desire to abandon the administration of uncertain institutions for a professorship. Hegel's name had been mentioned in connection with a possible position at Erlangen, but the finances of this university precluded new appointments. Fichte's death in January created a vacancy at Berlin University. Hegel wrote to Paulus in Heidelberg [235] about prospects there as well as in Berlin. But his job queries are spiced with derisive sidelights on the rise of German nationalism, and on a *Rawlsian* pretense of princes at the Congress of Vienna at dropping the "veil of ignorance" over conflicting interests to legislate as agents of the general will [245].

Hegel to Paulus [235]

Nuremberg, July 30, 1814

It has already been quite a while since I received any news from you, my dear friend. Yet I have heard secondhand what is essential—for such things one picks

up in your regard [*de te nam cetera sumit*]: namely, that you continue to be well. In the [Heidelberg] *Yearbooks* I from time to time find words and signs of vigilance on behalf of Protestant liberty, words taking notice of *other worldly* statements and endeavors.

In your region the press of troops on the march and of quarterings will likewise have tapered off now. We thought of you often during this unforeseen turn of events by which the theater of war shifted to your vicinity, which previously had been considered so completely safe from it, and did so even more so as the prospect at one point seemed to arise of you becoming a Bavarian fellow countryman again. Still more often, however, have I had cause to reflect on my loss in no longer having at my side such a kindly disposed and experienced friend. Yet despite the distance that separates us, you will allow me recourse to your advice and, if possible, assistance. You know from a letter from me [230] which the student [*Studiosis*] Fuchs will no doubt have delivered to you that the councillorship in educational and curricular matters has been assigned to me beyond the position I already had. As much as my situation has thus improved, my wish to return to a university remains insurmountable. For several years I have been proposed by the Senate in Erlangen for the [philosophy] professorship there. In present circumstances we may, to be sure, hope that many a measure thus far delayed will finally be enacted. However, this hope remains uncertain, and there is moreover another prospect to which, were it to open up for me, such a hope would have to yield. To be reunited with you remained but a wish. But Fichte's position in Berlin is not yet filled. According to the public press the University [in Berlin] is to be maintained, which earlier had been indicated as uncertain due to the restoration of Halle. Would you have the occasion to kindly obtain for me information about what intentions are harbored for that position, and to mention my name [in this connection]? You know that I have occupied myself too much not only with ancient literature but also with mathematics and recently with higher analysis, differential calculus, physics, natural history, [and] chemistry to be affected by that humbug in natural philosophy which consists in philosophizing without [wide] knowledge by the [sole] power of imagination, and in regarding empty brainstorm born of conceit as thoughts. This might at least serve negatively to recommend me.

I trust your kind friendship not to reproach me for making this request.

I ask you further to give my best regards to your dear wife and daughter, as also to Wilhelm [Paulus]. I eagerly look forward to hearing from you again, and respectfully remain most humbly yours, Hegel

I must add my wife's warmest regards.

PAULUS'S AUGUST 14 reply [236] was not encouraging with respect to Heidelberg, where Jakob Fries taught both philosophy and physics. And, in light of what Paulus called "the infamous footnote" in the Introduction to Hegel's *Logic* of 1812 dismissing Fries's own *System of Logic* as "superficial" (*Ges Werke* XI, 23), a recommendation from Fries was hardly to be expected. Of Berlin Paulus said:

According to what I hear, no one has yet appeared in Berlin who might occupy Fichte's chair, or even dare undertake the propagation, beyond the very latest

philosophy, of what is to an even higher degree the "very latest" philosophy. . . . De Wette has come out for Fries's doctrine of faith and feeling [*Ahnen*]. Yet he is so scholarly in this regard that he would hardly reach agreement with Schleiermacher's religion without morality or faith—although 'feeling' could become a comfortable common basis on which both might attain not only commonality but at once commonness. [236]

Paulus denied any influential connections in Berlin. He somewhat facetiously suggested that Hegel contact Wilhelm von Humboldt, who as the Prussian director of public instruction at the Ministry of Interior was active in the founding of Berlin University in 1810, and who would "soon attend the Congress of Vienna with the Iron Cross." Hegel had no Iron Cross, but on September 25 Marie bore him a second son, Immanuel:

Hegel to the Niethammers [239]

Nuremberg, September 27, 1814

The day before yesterday, the 25th, dearest friends, a son was born to me. My wife spent two days in delivery. . . . Being convinced of your friendly interest in this doubly happy event—given the initially doubtful appearance [of matters]—I furthermore solicit from you, my friend, beyond the many proofs of friendship and considerateness already shown me, the kindness of being the godfather of this boy of mine. Since you are not from Nuremberg—where people are quite exclusive in such matters—I will likewise ask Dr. [Thomas] *Seebeck*, my sister, and perhaps still a fourth person to demonstrate the same friendship and share godparenthood with you. . . .

Please inform Privy Councillor Jacobi, his sisters, Finance Councillor Roth and his wife—this whole dear but alas so distant circle—of my wife's delivery, at once extending to them our most cordial compliments. Hegel

ON OCTOBER 9 Hegel responded to Paulus's letter of August 16 [336]. Hegel was not ready to take the direct path of addressing himself to Humboldt with respect to Berlin. His attention was rather caught by Caroline Paulus's note attached to her husband's letter of August 16: "according to my theory of destiny, you are fated for nowhere but here with us. . . . We were together in Jena, in Bamberg, in Nuremberg, and I hope that things will work out once more in the same way" [336]. Hegel was hopeful that even without the support of the derisively footnoted Fries a prospect might open up for him. Without retracting the basis of his criticism of Fries, Hegel expresses regret for its polemical sharpness, and he would omit it from the 1831 edition. Yet he thought he still might have a future in Heidelberg if the Congress of Vienna were to incorporate Baden along with the Rhine Palatinate into Bavaria [235]—though these Bavarian claims were not to be honored. The rest of Hegel's letter largely deals with reviews in the *Heidelberg Yearbooks* by Paulus on nationalistic writings promoting a cult of traditional Teutonic dress and customs. Hegel subjects German nationalism to his most biting satire.

Hegel to Paulus [241]

Nuremberg, October 9, 1814

I cannot delay any longer replying to your letter of August 16. Your amicable sentiments, my dear adviser and guide, highlighted yet another approach to the matter about which I am again taking recourse to you. I hesitated to take the direct approach, and other more indirect approaches seemed to me rather peripheral. Yet a hint of something analogous, which must now be left to the will of God, has emerged from it all.

I have seen with indignation from your letter, however, on what wobbly legs—i.e., indeed, instead of two, only on *half* a leg—philosophy stands in your parts. Only half [the effort] provided by the officially designated faculty member [Fries] belongs to philosophy, and the other half to physics! Regarding that half, there is in any case nothing I have to add to what I have already vented quite sufficiently in the frequently cited note to page xvii. It is only in a subjective vein that I would like to mention, if I have not already done so, that a reading of the first draft of this footnote would make the revision appear moderate in tone, and would not fail to evidence in me the virtue of increasing leniency and mildness.

But I must prefer to hold to the intuition [*Ahndung*] and wishes of your wife rather than to the disagreeable formulation of this note which, despite having been merited, is still disagreeable. God, as is known, has endowed women from the start with a deeper, more implicit understanding, the gift of prophecy in presentiment, dreams, and the like, in contrast to our explicit understanding. This has long been known, but recently philosophy [i.e., Fries] has come forth to prove to us that faith and presentiment [*Ahndung*] are the essence of philosophy and true knowledge. Thus let us accede most lovingly to the omen of having found ourselves together in Jena, Bamberg, and Nuremberg which your wife proclaims, and which in her view points to our finest and best reunion of all in the southerly paradise by the Neckar. Should a footnote pose an insurmountable obstacle? We have just recently seen faith in insurmountability collapse, and the congresses may overturn it even more. Is there to be but a single route, i.e., the one leading through a footnoted man? Should not physics fully use the overcoat which Fries has provided to cover its nakedness [*Friesrock*], and a special overcoat for philosophy then not be needed to keep it warm in these cold times? So many questions whose happy resolution I in part wish to place in the hands of friendship, but partly in the hands of the Great Congress as well! Ever more precise designs upon the Palatinate seem to be expressed. How would it be if we were to become compatriots again? How has the nightcap on your head again fared? . . .

All the world, myself included, surely expects much of that great Congress. I would even expect more of it if the individual [Paulus] collecting the written preliminaries of the Congress in the [*Heidelberg*] *Yearbooks* and arranging the conclusions were one and the same person, *puissance*, or whatever it is which sets right the era after the Congress of Vienna. I have seen from these *Yearbooks* that, among other pleni- and semi-potentiaries, even the Lord our God Himself has opened His mouth and spoken; and, to be sure, has done so on the most important of subjects, namely, the attire of German women [*Frauen*] and maidens

[*Jungfern*—I almost caught myself saying German *dames* [*Damen*] and damsels [*Mamsellen*]. The love He once showed his Chosen People by telling them where they should sew yellow or brown silk He has now shown us as well! May God only grant us not to be so stiff-necked as that dearly beloved people of His; and not to have to—due to ingratitude for such blessings—carry around as many lice with us and even be scattered from the promised land of dumb Teutonism [*Deutschdumm*] into particularisms. We may soon expect from the same High Author further elaboration of the words of Moses in Deuteronomy or Numbers: “and you shall dig little holes outside”—all under the title: “The Complete Art of Outhouses, or the Water-Closet as It Should Be.” Concerning the further course of the congresses, a few are of the view that the pre-congress of written statements will soon be declared closed, and that stragglers and copycats might be employed among those disabled in the fortress or elsewhere. But according to a few rumors, the era after the Congress of Vienna is—apart from the political aspect, which does not concern us—to be assured by an interesting literary-artistic idea: the erection of the great memorial column dedicated to the Nation along with a comprehensive national archive for the conservation of Old German monuments and patriotic relics of all sorts, including the song of the *Nibelungen*, Imperial treasures, King Roger’s shoes, election capitulations [imposed on the Holy Roman Emperors], free constitutional charters, Albrecht Dürer’s woodcuts, Norica, and so on. It will be built on a quiet spot, so that its enjoyment will be more secure from the noise of the rest of reality. It is already suggested that [Johann] Kiefhaber [of Nuremberg] has great hopes of being employed for the purpose. The entire Congress, however, is to be concluded with a great ceremony, a torchlight procession with the ringing of bells and roaring of cannons to the “ultimate rule of reason” [*ultimarum rationum regum*] in which the German people [*Pippel*] will be trampled in the dirt. Behind Pippel there follow, as valets and attendants, a few tame house cats, such as the Inquisition, the Jesuit Order, and then all the armies with their asundry commissioned, princely, and titled marshals and generals. “The house cats now having been no doubt tamed, why should they be retained?” it was said in objection to this accompanying procession. But just for that reason, it was replied, brambles should be placed under their tails. All the better to excite their desire to scratch Pippel, should he—out of lust for the paper [*papiernen*] fleshpots of Egypt—get the notion of wanting to turn leftward.

But in the face of all the noise of events that are to be, of all the festivities and wearisome twaddle, one never gets around to oneself, and to the main point. I can thus no longer speak of your loyalty—so rare among theologians—to free philosophical inquiry despite all threats, nor of the attacks of which you have been the object—which in any case I do not read—nor even of my wife’s delivery of a son six weeks ago. Both are well, and in the child the word of Scripture has been fulfilled: “And he shall be called Immanuel.” They, as I, present most cordial greetings to you. Yours, Hegel

HEGEL COMMENTS further on the Congress of Vienna in October 26 and December 14 letters to Niethammer:

I do not, dear friend and godfather, want to put off very long thanking you for having kindly accepted my request [239] that you be godfather to my newborn son. My wife and I both hope, in keeping with the general supposition, that not only the legal relation but also a good bit beyond may come to him from his dear godfather. At the baptism I stood proxy for you. I took care to behave negatively during the ceremony, so as not to place myself between your godfatherhood and its effects upon him, but rather to allow everything to flow smoothly and properly without hindrance. His name, about which you inquire, is Thomas Immanuel Christian; we have taken “Christian” from my sister, “Thomas” from Seebeck, while “Immanuel”—the name by which he is known—has been taken from you. He shall be known as “Christian” because he is baptized a Christian; his name is also “Thomas” because he shall pass over to the other extreme of unbelief. But by virtue of his middle name these extremes shall be fused in friendship and philosophy, and shall be moderated and equalized as the point of indifference-in-the-other.

So far the child has not belied the blessing he has received. He is thriving, thank goodness. Although my wife is not breast-feeding, she is likewise healthy. Still, the restoration of her strength is slow.

As for other matters, we are presently engaged here in the work of public grade school examinations. I follow them all completely in order to survey the entire inner workings [of these schools]. The dear clergy has caused the local school commission many annoyances over them.

Such a great and long wait upon events has locally reduced talk and hopes in the matter almost to complete silence, especially because here as elsewhere one knows so little of what will happen. *Les idées ne sont pas encore fixées* I have translated as “The gentlemen still do not know what they want.” Hopefully, however, they will know by the first of November. Elsewhere, I now see still perhaps one or another philosophical professorships open at universities outside Bavaria. And since elsewhere people even in university and scholarly affairs both know what they want sooner than here and know how to get things done, it is to be thought that new appointments may be in the works. It seems that a few friends want to intervene on my behalf. May God help! [*Faxit Deus!*] I from my side cannot let the matter go unnoticed either. . . . Yours, Hegel

An old acquaintance who is traveling to Munich and will take the liberty of introducing himself to you gives me the opportunity to renew sweet remembrance of me [through Hegel’s annual gift of a Nuremberg cake], and to wish you, dear friend, a Happy New Year. Since I have just enough time to do this, I must refrain from adding anything about scholastic and congressional affairs except that the common predicate “deficient” must undoubtedly be attributed to their progress. It is a new, unforgettable experience for the peoples to see what their Princes are capable of when they convene to devote themselves in mind and heart to discussion

of the welfare of both their own peoples and the world—all, to be sure, according to the most noble declared principle of universal justice and the welfare of all. For centuries we have only seen action taken by cabinets or individual men for themselves against others. The present phenomenon, however, is unique and calls for a brilliant result. . . . Sincerely yours, Hegel

THE CONGRESS was still in session when Hegel wrote Niethammer on February 21 of the slight he had suffered at the hands of the administrator of Nuremberg's school fund, who did not consult him as municipal school councillor in the formulation of the annual budget request for the schools. The Restoration was beginning to make itself felt. Bavarian sovereignty over Nuremberg, the secularization of education, Hegel's appointment in the city—all were expressions of Bavaria's recently reversed ten-year alliance with Napoleon. Hegel is tempted by an exchange of posts with the gymnasium rector in Ulm, but still waits upon the Congress of Vienna to see if Heidelberg is to be Bavarian.

Hegel to Niethammer [246]

Nuremberg, February 21, 1815

I cannot resist the temptation to bring you up to date, my dear friend, on a circumstance or two affecting my official capacity, just in case something should occur to you or strike you enabling perhaps you as well to exercise influence, either helping me or making it possible for me to give a hand should the occasion arise.

The budgetary request of the local schools for 1814-15 is, according to regulations, to be elaborated by the administrative and school councillors working together. It was *not* communicated to me and has been forwarded to Munich without my cosignature. Since this was the *first time* I felt able to have any real impact on the matter—last year I had assumed the councillorship just a few days before the proposed budget was presented and had meager knowledge of the core of the matter—I found my expectations disappointed by being denied [my power of review and signature], just as I can regard this procedure in other respects as unsound. As rector I have reported on the matter to the administration, and this perhaps might provide a pretext for declaring any further statement of mine superfluous. Yet in my advisory capacity I had quite a few proposals to put forward that I could not make as rector. Incidentally, I have heard that the administrative report could not be communicated due to its offensive nature in my regard. Ever since I have been a councillor, the administrator has missed no opportunity to bring forward accusations, insinuations and defamations against me before the commission. He is a rude and impetuous man. One of my Nuremberg colleagues characterized him, no doubt most accurately, as an *arrogant scribbler*. His report may well not have left for Munich. But his budget, which I have looked into, likewise seemed to me to be filled with innuendos or indirect accusations against the rector's office, and at least in that matter he has had the last word against me. Neither do I know to what extent the report on the matter that went out from here adhered to his thinking. It all may well have happened in part out of sensitivity toward me, to spare me the irritation, though it was more likely to avoid irritation in general by

cutting short the unpleasant complications I would have to resort to, and thus really to spare the administrator. This administrator is such a good Nuremberg patriot that his conscience persuades him he acts meritoriously by removing what he can from the Royal Bavarian school system, and allocating Nuremberg revenues rather to city accounts for services, emergencies, and central administration. He considers whatever Royal Bavarian professors receive to be robbery. . . .

Four days ago I finally handed in the report [unavailable] on the organization of the poor-schools. One main point that concerned me in it was that there are nineteen buildings belonging to the schools which the administration is simply transforming into church properties. I had incorporated into the report an argument about it which my administrative superior demanded be left out. I consented because he showed me a report from the third of the month to the Foundation section in which the separation of instructional buildings from those designated for religious worship is requested. . . .

But what do you say of my official activity? After over one year the report on the poor-schools is finally submitted, but not yet even one general report on the public grade schools! Nor any annual report yet, whether on the grade school system or on the normal school. The latter two reports have yet to arrive here; thus officials at the lower levels are supporting us. In the annual reports a few other minor pieces of evidence will no doubt also have to be cited. . . .

In all this vexation, Rector Göss in Ulm suggested to me a few days ago an exchange of positions. Since it is apparent from his calculation of the economic side that he knew nothing of my promotion to a councillorship, he sees an advantage for me in this regard. If he had known of the promotion and honor I thereby procure, he perhaps would have seen even more profit for me in the exchange! In fact, should honor demand even abandonment of that honor, I could do no better than to accept this exchange if the two governments would agree. For the time being I still want to wait on the Congress. We on the outside are now hearing that something is about to come of it [*paturiunt*. . . ; see *Briefe* II, 380 on allusion to Horace in the German]. The result [in territorial adjustments] which thus far has reached the light of day seems at first only to be Lausitz with a few mangy pieces of land adjacent to it. May God ward off the omen [*Deus avertat omen*], may the rest not be the same sort of foolishness. Yesterday I read in the *Moniteur* that the Duke of Braunschweig had demanded a sum of money from his newly installed provincial diets and, when they refused, had them arrested; a good omen. They say here that Landshut is to march backward crablike to Ingolstadt. If one day those exalted highnesses [*Montes*] are finished with the business of engendering [*Parturieren*], it will be your turn to bear witness. Good luck with it. For the time being at least the already engendered [*Partus*] Immanuel, whom you have carried only in baptism, prospers quite well, though tonight he is screaming miserably. My wife is now fairly well, and as I write is allowing herself to be charmed by Miss Brizzi. And I, I continue to take joy in my wife and children. I also have a good appetite, and at most still strength and desire enough to read the newspapers.

The warmest of greetings to the best of women. Yours, Hegel

THE FOLLOWING LETTER was postmarked a day before Napoleon entered Paris on his return from Elba, to plant—according to his proclamation before reaching French soil—“the eagle, with the national colors, . . . from steeple to steeple, even on the towers of Notre Dame.” In the remobilization that followed, and that Hegel suggests might even include professors, Marie’s brother, Johann Siegmund Karl von Tucher, had little difficulty in his efforts to serve in the Bavarian artillery [248]. The paralysis which Hegel surmises may be overcome by Napoleon’s return was not merely at the Congress of Vienna. On November 29 Niethammer had written of one in Munich, which prevented him from promising any imminent professorship for Hegel in Bavaria [244].

Hegel to Niethammer [247]

[postmarked March 19, 1815]

. . . I am writing this in response to your kindness toward me in general as likewise toward my brother-in-law, to whom you have so generously extended a helping hand during his stay in Munich. He reported to the artillery service a number of months ago. . . .

The lameness [of the times] you mention in your letter, which can be found without as well as within the walls [*intra muros*], now receives through dispatches from Lyon etc. a good kick in the sides, and a thorny brier on the behind [*podex*]. But unfortunately the drastic force of such a stimulus causes a rush in all directions but the desired one. This lameness might turn at first into a total apoplexy and catalepsy of all interest in the sciences and in scientific institutions should I—along with every other professor, schoolmaster, and school councillor—have to sling a rifle over my shoulder. But this would assume that the matter became more serious, which for the time being I do not yet believe nor even can believe, even if eagles are planted on the walls of Paris.

So what could I write, especially now, of the particular hopes and wishes I would have had? So far nothing at all. The simple reason is that there has been nothing further to write, for I generally find that the reasons—especially these non-events and non-destinies—are quite simple. But I also have reason to believe that no negative decision has been made either. We send our warmest regards. Yours, Hegel

THE RESTORATION

Hegel came to interpret the whole Restoration as a “non-event”—a nominal surface phenomenon. He was no doubt wrong. In the test of wills between Hegel and the Restoration which was to follow—a classical contest between philosophy and political power—it was Hegel who yielded (Ch 24). He was surely unable to use the Prussian state as he suggested by his supremely confident letter of July 5, 1816 [271]. In a time of censorship it was perhaps more feasible to remain theologically or, even better, metaphysically radical while compromising politically. But since Hegel’s metaphysics and theology laid the foundations for political philosophy, heresy in first philosophy—which he never surrendered—held the seed of an eventual political heresy as well. In his youth he had claimed that church orthodoxy

taught what despotism willed [8]. By the same token, the neo-Gnostic attachment of his speculative theology to the primacy of the Spirit over the Father tacitly challenged despotism politically as well as theologically. In the short run Prussia used Hegel; in the long run it is less clear that Hegel’s confidence of July 1816 stands disconfirmed.

Hegel was better able to reconcile himself with the Restoration than some of his colleagues. Heinrich Stephani, the District School Councillor whose educational ventures on behalf of women Hegel derided [229], was a radical theological rationalist like Paulus. His contempt for popular religious superstition cost him his councillorship in 1815 [252 below] at a time when superstition generally appeared in the process of restoration. Hegel had criticized the French utilitarian Enlightenment and the related theological rationalism of Germany in the *Phenomenology* (*Werke* II, 415ff). Though he sympathized with Paulus’s renewal of the struggle of the Enlightenment against nationalistic as well as religious superstition [241], he held that the two sides failed to understand each other, that at a deeper level they coincided. In public he avoided an abrasive attitude toward political and religious superstition, though not always toward demagogical ideologues of popular superstition such as Fries.

Napoleon’s view of the Restoration was also that it never took place. Hegel believed, moreover, that had Napoleon not been defeated militarily he might in any case have been conquered philosophically by the culture of the Protestant German university [309]. A world-historical transition from French to German leadership was thus implicit even within Napoleonic Europe. Yet in all but name [271] European institutions remained essentially Napoleonic for Hegel, and precisely for that reason the return of peace gave German idealist culture an unparalleled opportunity to undertake the completion of world history.

But such sovereign assurance emerged only gradually over the 1815-16 academic year. A letter of May 1815 from Niethammer sought to reassure an anxious Hegel that his authority as School Councillor was not being undermined:

. . . I have seen to it that your *desiderata* were provided for as much as possible. . . . moreover, the commission in its reports is in no way hostile to your views; on the contrary, your proposals have been defended against those of the administrator wherever such a defense seemed necessary. At least to this extent you have no reason to develop an aversion to your function. Will destiny permit you soon to be entirely free of this function? Who can say in a time which threatens a great reversal, and when no one even knows if he can remain steady on his feet? [248]

But Waterloo was past when Hegel wrote Niethammer on July 17, asking for an invitation to come to Munich to defend his position [249].

Hegel to Niethammer [249]

Nuremberg, July 17, 1815

A fellow countryman, Dr. [Christian] Hochstetter—the son of the former District Judicial Councillor, who was much respected in Württemberg—is going to Munich. He served as house tutor for Minister [Karl Siegmund Franz] von

Altenstein [Ch 14] in Berlin, and studied botany under Wildenow with free use of the garden there. It is known to me that he was much respected by Mr. von Altenstein, both generally and in the field of botany. He would like to find a prospect in Bavaria in this field. Since he is planning to introduce himself to you, I take the opportunity not so much to recall myself to your memory as rather to discuss the various outlooks serving to renew your remembrance of me. . . .

Most important of all is that I receive your personal permission to visit you this fall, while next in importance is official authorization. In Munich I should be able, among other things, to bear testimony appropriate to and even required by the circumstances, or [at least] the testimony most urgently required. I do not know any better justification to cite than "private business." But since the matter will probably pass through your hands, whether you wish to allow this justification to suffice for official authorization will entirely depend on your personal permission.

Apart from that, I hear that the plan for the universities is in fact to be presented this month. Kindly remember me, please, in this regard. If the modern gymnasium is to find itself on shaky ground, a further motive would be provided for seeking a position for me. For my place would need to be vacated in order to find a place for [Johann Simon] Erhardt [philosophy professor at Nuremberg's modern gymnasium]—who is very highly qualified for it, and for whom an improvement in his situation is in other respects as well not only desirable but most necessary.

Despite my scruples about taking trips, I am going to Ansbach tomorrow. My sister wishes to visit me here [Ch 15], and I want to pick her up there. Farewell. . . . Yours, Hegel

HEGEL MADE the trip to Munich for which he sought permission, and on returning home wrote to Niethammer on September 20. Though reassured about his councillorship, he awaited the reorganization of Bavarian universities [249] that would allow his transfer to Erlangen.

Hegel to Niethammer [252]

Nuremberg, September 20, 1815

. . . Our most sincere thanks a thousand times over for all the kindness and friendship we enjoyed in your home. Our most serenely pleasant memory is the echo of those beautiful days spent with you. The affection and cordiality of friends such as you, along with the complementary treasures of art and nature, form an image still too powerful to let me turn to something else. My joy lies solely in seeking out people to whom I can truly say I could not possibly express how pleased I was. How truly good and beautiful it was to be with you, dear friends! How much kindness and affection both of you have shown us! Once again, a thousand heartfelt thanks.

Please deliver the enclosed writing⁴ to our dear, most excellent Privy Councillor [Jacobi] and his sisters with my warmest regards. I also ask you to transmit my

⁴Hoffmeister's hypothesis that Hegel refers here to the second volume of the *Logic* (1816) appears excluded by the closing paragraphs of letter 272.

compliments—which I wanted to give through dear Therèse [Döderlein, daughter of jurist Gottlieb Hufeland and wife of Ludwig Döderlein since 1815] to her parents—seeing that they now will have taken our place in your home.

As soon as the Lord has arrived at some decision as to Erlangen please give me preliminary notification. Many a school headache now occurs to me which I wanted to bring forward, and indeed should have, but which in Munich I completely forgot. It has since occurred to me that my future situation could be improved 1, if the Board of Examiners for candidates for teaching posts, which is indeed emigrating almost in its entirety, could naturally and without difficulty take this its function along with it, and, 2, if I were to continue to fulfill my duties as councillor from Erlangen. These duties could be performed by me there just as well as from Ansbach [where they were performed by school councillor Heinrich Stephani]. On the contrary, because of the proximity I could do it better. This very important work occasioned by implementation of so difficult a school reorganization requires someone in the vicinity familiar with local conditions.

Stephani has here 1, already been suspended, 2, gone to Munich—people were surprised that I know nothing of it and had not seen him, 3, become a minister, and 4, been replaced by me. However, I have explained both to [Johann] Kracker [Royal Bavarian Commissioner in Nuremberg], who is very well disposed toward me, and to others as well that I did not want to have my trip spoiled by the predictable gossip arising out of its juxtaposition with the Stephani affair, and that no matter what, I would never allow the beautiful feeling and happiness of this trip to be spoiled.

[Gymnasium professor Christoph] Büchner is standing behind me; I have to finish. Yours, Hegel

TWO MONTHS LATER Niethammer began to feel the onslaught he had been expecting [231] since Napoleon's first abdication:

Just as worms, frogs, and other vermin often follow the rain, so the [Kajetan von] Weillers and their ilk follow the dark day now spreading over the entire civilized world. In this universal flood—the wages of sin—in which all that has been cast aside returns, this literary and pedagogical rabble, following the example of all other rabbles, believes it has finally found its hour. . . . What I told you in person concerning proposals to suppress the primary schools has spread further, and they have become so impudent as to declare teachers of philosophy and even mathematics to be not only dispensable but harmful in the gymnasiums. . . . But they must not be allowed to settle accounts with us in silence. And they must not mutilate our Protestant educational establishments on the model of the former schools for monks. Against this I want to defend myself to the last man—who I myself still hope to be. And as you are one of my men, I hereby mobilize you. I have obtained promulgation of a general appeal, a memorandum which requests all rectors in the Realm to present a general account of the advantages and inconveniences of the existing curriculum. . . . I can be assured even of the agreement of a few Catholic rectors. . . , and thus hope Weiller will remain as shamefaced as he deserves to be. [254]

Hegel now sought to reassure Niethammer [255].

Julius [Niethammer] has arrived in these parts, my dear friend. Since nothing more was possible, at least his presence in the vicinity has greatly pleased us. . . . The very latest reorganization in Munich is by now too old for anything still to be said of it. The essential point is your belief that it will not get so bad we cannot put up with it. Your view coincides pretty much with my own belief that we cannot hope for something good enough to merit any particular praise. This colorless, tasteless intermediary state, which allows nothing to get too bad and nothing too good, for once rules our world. Assuming one cannot be a minister of state, I myself still praise the sciences, in which one at least has done his own work—even if what one brings to realization is the same intermediary state as exists elsewhere. For, in all other cases, no doubt in that of a minister as well, meddling by others introduces a portion of their own mediocrity and baseness. The entirely positive side of these other cases belonging to practical life, however, is a good salary, at least insofar as, God forbid, meddling does not introduce *paper* money. The instinct of sound common sense thus gradually follows this tendency. It no longer takes all that much to heart further interest in the matter, nor interest in honor, even if it still takes these interests in hand and—insofar as is necessary and possible—in head. A salary is still treasure eaten away neither by moths nor rust, and neither dug up nor stolen by organizers.

You know how theoretical philosophers badmouth *experience* saying especially that one can invoke it on behalf of the most contrary assertions and views. I had an example of this in connection with the latest reorganization. I expressed the sincere belief that, since we had now come to know by oft-repeated experience what was wrong, we must likewise come to understand what is better. What do you suppose the other person inferred from the past experience to counter me? That experience up to now had only proven that organizers do not understand organizing!

That the Berliners do not want to have any worse philosophers than Bavaria is a noble trait which does honor to both. Yet as I have said, honor and the like aside, I would rather cling to the hazy break of day which you perchance see opening up for me in the distance. . . .

Have you not seen the Bavarian play from the '70s, *Father Facilitator* [*Der Pater Umgang*]? It seems to fare with him as with the devil; when one thinks one has killed him, he comes to life again in a new form. If Facilitator is done away with as a preacher, he seems to run rampant all the more vehemently in another form, keeping his archenemy Definitivus in check, and on the other hand providing for his changelings the Provisoria. Even the death of [Erlangen philologist Gottlieb] Harless—whom Definitivus wanted to seize, perhaps to fasten a thread of silk upon him—will probably fall to Father Facilitator for further treatment. And why not, one may ask, since in Bavaria there is no longer a Ludwig [Döderlein, newly appointed in Bern], who would alone have been the one to be fastened to this thread of silk? A pity ten times over!

In the annual report [*Nürn Schrift*, 408ff] I gave a more extensive exposition

as to how a more restricted *modern gymnasium* of perhaps two classes would be very suitable. But the administration handed the proposal over to Father Facilitator in Munich, and everything is alright with me. The reason I could not resist very well was that whenever we submit such an application for the preservation of something it is no doubt completely granted, though Father Facilitator is left to pay the price at the center of authority, while we are left to pay it here. . . .

From our ever so dear Jacobi I longingly await the second part of his works, so as once again to be reminded of and stimulated by philosophy. Please remember me as cordially to Senior Finance Councillor Roth and his wife as to Jacobi and his sisters. . . .

People are presently assembling to the sound of drums. In half an hour the Crown Prince and his spouse will pass through here on their way to Ansbach.

A warm farewell. Yours, Hegel

AS APPEARS from the above letter, Niethammer's son Julius was unable to visit Nuremberg in November. When he did arrive in the Hegel household for Christmas, the letter below to Hegel's officer brother-in-law Johann Sigmund Karl von Tucher shows Marie Hegel recovering from a miscarriage. Writing in the place of his wife, Hegel expresses himself more than usual about domestic matters. Julius became a student at the University of Erlangen not far from Hegel in 1815, after his enthusiasm for the wars of national liberation had caused his father concern in 1813 [225]. Hoffmeister considers it likely that Julius participated in the radical nationalistic German student association—the *Burschenschaft*—in Erlangen and consequently came into conflict with the authorities. This would explain Hegel's letter of December 28 [258].

Hegel to von Tucher [*Studien* 17, 42-43]

Nuremberg, December 24, 1815

Your letter to my wife, dear brother-in-law, concerning a gift for mother [Hegel's mother-in-law, Susanna Maria] arrived at a time when Marie was very weak. She had a miscarriage [*fausse couche*] and precisely a week ago found herself in a very alarming state. She has been confined to bed now for two weeks, though yesterday and today she has, thank goodness, been much better. Only because of a heavy loss of blood will it take her some time to regain her strength.

She has been and so remains completely incapable of undertaking anything. She charges me with telling you that mother had already asked her beforehand, in case such an inquiry should come her way, to tell you that you should leave the whole matter aside, or else that mother would most appreciate some memento without value. My wife's only suggestion is that you have a portrait done of yourself. There is a paintress in Vienna who has done an oil portrait of Karl—as also of [Paul Christoph Sigmund II] von Praun and of other cadets. It costs eleven florins, my wife thinks. She will be known to [Bavarian Royal Privy Councillor Franz Arnold von der] Beeke [Beke]. She believes this will probably give mother the greatest joy.

We all regret that you are not with us for the holidays. Because of Marie's

illness, mother has abandoned the idea, about which she said she wrote to you, of inviting [Royal forest ranger Karl Ferdinand?] Seippel. Marie is spending Christmas at home in bed. This evening we are with grandpa [Marie Hegel's grandfather]. Farewell. Your faithful brother-in-law, Hegel.

P.S. Give my regards to Mr. Beeke [Beke]. As far as I know, Niethammer is in Landshut for the holidays. Julius [Niethammer] will probably arrive here today.

Hegel to Niethammer [258]

Nuremberg, December 28, 1815

. . . Julius is thus here for the holidays, and will return this afternoon to pick up the letter which has just now reached him from Landshut and which he was expecting this morning. A couple of times—not often—he has visited us from Erlangen, acquainting us with his activities there, with student life, and with his minor local interests. He has also informed us of the apprehensions you and the best of women have had, both in point of form and of substance, due to a little [political] flirtatiousness and courting on his part. Given his open, cheerful and yet very sober character, and the frankness with which he informs us of all such philandering and courting, I find I can sincerely assure you there is no need for worry about the matter. . . . He has surely avoided partaking in rough manners and tasteless customs, and is certain to do so in the future as well. I consider him so far above all this as to view it merely as a subject of pleasantries.

At least in a preliminary way, my wife and I send Jacobi our most heartfelt thanks for the kind gift of the second volume of his works, received shortly before my wife's illness. I have only given it a first reading, mainly to appease curiosity, and have found much that is excellent and new in the fine supplement, which casts a new, illuminating, and warm light on the entire idea. I could not help wishing that the painful side of polemics might be forever eclipsed for the dear old man, and that the enjoyment of his noble spirit and magnificent heart might be preserved untroubled for him and entirely severed [from the rest].

Nothing has yet reached us concerning the request for a report on the curriculum [254]. I will not fail to oblige from my side. I almost would have wished instigation for it to reach us here in its full crudity. The others would then have seen more clearly where it was all tending, and the crudity would have allowed direct attack on its authors. . . . Yours, Hegel

ON FEBRUARY 27 Niethammer replied with respect to Julius: "Let us hope that what has happened will serve as a warning to him and make him come to his senses" [260]. At the same time Niethammer reported mounting opposition from the Old Bavarian party:

The "Special School Commission"—which I am trying to get people to call the "School Destruction Commission"—has submitted its statement of position, which along with my opposed position is now under arbitration. . . . [Gothilf] Schubert's call elsewhere pleased me deeply. If only all those whom I so purely enticed to this country could leave as fortunately as he, myself included. [260]

The school commission had six members, including both von Weiller and [Josef] Wismayr. Niethammer was the lone Protestant member. On April 26 the commission passed a motion calling into question all Niethammer's efforts in Bavaria. Niethammer responded by appealing to the King. He wrote to Hegel on May 21 that should the commission not be reversed his only hope was "that the rush of Bonapartist administrative activity [*Polizeitreiberei*] at least will still have left a sufficient remnant of dignity in our communes to oppose energetically such an unworthy act of violence" [264]. Hegel in his June 8 reply [266] suggests that the Napoleonic bureaucracy was indeed dragging its feet. The decision to ask gymnasium directors for an evaluation of the curriculum—of which Niethammer had informed Hegel on November 19 [254] but of which Hegel had received no official word by December 28 [258]—had by June 8 been watered down into an innocuous request to evaluate expansion of the primary school system, which Niethammer [254] took to be the most important element in his whole school program.

Hegel to Niethammer [266]

Nuremberg, June 8, 1816

. . . All indications even a month ago, as before, were that in school affairs we could look forward to significant, more up-to-date eruptions of the old but—it would appear—volcanically still active spirit of reorganization. Yet at present everything has remained quiet. Instead of an upheaval, what is now encountered is only a modest demand for expert statements and reports on the primary schools—even on where schools need to be created—together with a strict ban on the abolition of existing ones.

Two other items are thus presently of greater interest. One is the hope of seeing the best of women here at our house. . . .

The other is that the local school commission here and the rectors' offices are to report on filling the professorship in philology. The appointee is to be someone already holding a post in the Bavarian schools or clergy. What would you say if I plucked up the courage to propose myself for the position? In obtaining a professorship in philosophy, I in any case wanted to give lectures on philology as well. It would be odd for me to receive a post and salary that in all fairness you ought to have claimed as God-sent for Ludwig [Döderlein]. I want likewise to write to Mr. [Georg] von Zentner about this. One motive I can invoke is that my post here would be freed for professors at the modern gymnasium who are to be taken care of; or it could also be freed for still others should cutbacks be desired in the gymnasiums, whether in the faculty for philosophical preparatory sciences or elsewhere. [Johann] Kanne, who is the best philologist here, would in other respects as well do singular things at the university. . . . It is a pity that, from what I hear, Paulus has compromised himself, along with Martin and Fries, in the cause of freedom, and thus would only be allowed to tread softly. Schubert has found a nice mess in Ludwigslust. Upon his arrival he found the hereditary Grand Duke, along with the entire court of hangers-on, converted to Catholicism. Another sign of the times. The wife of [Romantic poet] Ludwig Tieck, Dr. Möller's sister, is active there. Yours, Hegel

DR. NIKOLAUS MÖLLER, a Norwegian who had studied under Schelling and who in 1815-16 taught in a Nuremberg primary school, had once sought to convert Hegel himself [50]. The three professors compromised by "the cause of liberty"—Paulus, Martin and, Fries—all taught at Heidelberg. Paulus had written reviews critical of the Restoration and the nationalistic movement [241]. Fries was foremost among philosophers calling for constitutional government, in 1816 taking a professorship in Jena, where Karl August became the first German sovereign to grant the promised constitution. Christoph Reinhard Dietrich Martin, who taught law, had sought enactment of the Congress of Vienna's decision that all German states receive constitutions providing for provincial diets, despite the resistance of the Badenese Grand Duke. Caroline Paulus wrote Hegel from Heidelberg on December 12:

Our local Badenese have likewise stretched their powerless hands out toward the provincial diets, pushing audacity to the point of presenting a humble petition on the subject, composed by Judicial Councillor Martin, to the Grand Duke. But the cause was nipped in the bud. The government sealed Martin's papers at 11:00 p.m., and sent a commission of inquiry from Karlsruhe. Martin, offended by such a procedure, asked to be relieved of his functions. . . . Such are the fruit of this legendary German liberty conquered by arms. . . . to which its champions have rightly assigned an [Iron] Cross as its symbol. The Crucifix will follow. [256]

On June 16 Niethammer reported that the King had rejected his objections to the School Commission vote:

It is in any case a singular document, this decision from the Highest Authority. . . . It gives me proof that Protestants are formally without rights in this country. [The Bavarian Constitution of 1808, with additions from 1809, gave Protestants equal rights with Catholics.] . . . a claimed infringement of the rights of Protestants, and which is really directed against the Minister of Interior, is rejected forthwith by the accused himself. . . . That shows sufficiently well how the rights of Protestants are protected by the Constitution. . . . Since, seeing how the decision has colored the matter, . . . any further step I might take would violate the letter of the Constitution and thus appear revolutionary, I of course do not want to deprive myself of the advantage given me by this brutal procedure through action that could justly and with full authority be called "inopportune." . . . The peoples today struggle for political liberty just as three hundred years ago they struggled for religious liberty; and the princes, blinded almost in the same way as then. . . . try to set up dikes to counter the impetuous flood. [270]

In his striking reply of July 5, 1816, Hegel sought to reassure Niethammer that the reaction against Napoleon could not reverse the Napoleonic achievement. The claim was important if Hegel was to vindicate his view that Germany was destined to surpass the world-historical French achievement.

Hegel to Niethammer [271]

Nuremberg, July 5, 1816

. . . There is so much that has deeply interested me, and that leads me to unburden myself at greater length. But there is too much material for me to go into

it more deeply right now, as it is likewise too important to have done with it briefly. I will thus save it for another occasion.

More general events and expectations in the world at large, just as in more immediate circles, move me most of all to increasingly general considerations, which push particular details and immediate happenings further aside in my thoughts, however much these hold interest for feeling. I adhere to the view that the world spirit has given the age marching orders. These orders are being obeyed. The world spirit, this essential [power], proceeds irresistibly like a closely drawn armored phalanx advancing with imperceptible movement, much as the sun through thick and thin. Innumerable light troops flank it on all sides, throwing themselves into the balance for or against its progress, though most of them are entirely ignorant of what is at stake and merely take head blows as from an invisible hand [cf Adam Smith]. Yet no lingering lies or make-believe strokes in the air [like those of von Weiller or Wismayr] can achieve anything against it. They can perhaps reach the shoelaces of this colossus, and smear on a bit of boot wax or mud, but they cannot untie the laces. Much less can they remove these shoes of gods—which according to [Johann Heinrich] Voss's *Mythological Letters*, among other sources, have elastic soles or are even themselves seven-league boots—once the colossus pulls them on. Surely the safest thing to do both externally and internally is to keep one's gaze fixed on the advancing giant. To edify the entire bustling zealous assemblage, one can even stand there and help daub on the cobbler's wax that is supposed to bring the giant to a standstill. For one's own amusement, one can even lend a hand to the enterprise that is being taken so seriously.

I have anticipated the Reaction of which we presently hear so much. It wishes to impose its right. "*La vérité en la repoussant, on l'embrasse*," as a deep saying of Jacobi's goes.⁵ The Reaction is still far removed from genuine resistance, for it already stands entirely within the sphere over against which resistance stands as something external. Even if it intends to do the opposite, the will of the Reaction is chiefly restricted to matters of vanity. It wishes to place its own stamp on the events it thinks it most vehemently hates, so as to read upon them: "This have we done!" The essential content remains unaltered. The addition or subtraction of a few small ribbons or garlands changes matters as little as actual injury that is no sooner suffered than healed. For when such injury pretends to a more significant relation to the whole substance than it is capable of having, it proves ephemeral. Thus—if we largely ignore all the fuss and paltry paper successes of human ants, fleas, and bugs—has this most fearsome Reaction against Bonaparte in essence changed so much, whether for good or evil? We shall allow these ant, flea, and bug personalities to appear to us just as the good Creator has destined: that is, chiefly as a subject for jokes, sarcasm, and malicious pleasure. If need be, what we can do, in light of this provident design, is to help these poor vermin along to their destiny.

But enough of this and, indeed, too much. . . . Yours, Hegel

⁵See *Werke* XI, 452, for an echo of this letter in Hegel's lectures on the philosophy of history—with specific reference to the Restoration absent.

NIETHAMMER REPLIED to this apparently amoral vision of world history with Kantian reservations a month and a half later, as Hegel prepared to depart for Heidelberg:

It is possible that the giant you describe advancing with his seven-league boots respects good intentions as little as bad, and that he is right to trample down the work of all equally as something miserable. In any case, it is only by the result that the individual can know whether he is marching with or against him. But since the giant merely strides on, leaving to the individual the task of making [something], pain or joy over the destiny of individuals is inseparable from hope in the *pleroma* [in Greek]. At least to me it cannot be a matter of indifference to lose those with whom I had hoped to act in common. [288]

Only a week later, however, Hegel sought to confirm his lofty view of history by considering the substance of Niethammer's claim, now repudiated by the King. Hegel argued that the rationality of Niethammer's position made it invincible. His enemies could at most reestablish, under new names, the institutions they rejected. His achievement preserved him from being truly cast aside by the world spirit.

Hegel to Niethammer [272]

Nuremberg, July 12, 1816

I still owe replies, my dear friend, to most of your many different communications. In my recent letter I merely wanted to take up the purely general views that can be held in this regard—saving the rest, which is really closer to my heart, for a later occasion. The rest concerns your personhood and the proceedings against you. I need not tell you how painful the offense you have suffered has been to me. What is most painful is not seeing any legal recourse, whether with respect to the Cause or your person. But the mob with which you must deal, unable to defend its cause through legal and reasonable views and procedures, must resort to power plays by appeal to authority and seek assistance from this quarter. . . .

I do not quite understand, moreover, how the Ministry can totally fail to consider the *content* of your earlier petition. If the two upper-level classes of our gymnasiums, which have no [preuniversity] lyceums alongside them, are to be abolished, they must somehow be replaced. A student who recently arrived here from distant parts brought along the rumor that a lyceum is to be established in Nuremberg. The presently existing lyceums are shown by their low enrollment to be probably superfluous, and you would have abolished them long ago. If one wants them, a logical consequence would be abolition of both upper-level gymnasium classes. It would then be a merely terminological question as to whether the last two preparatory classes for the university are to be called upper gymnasium classes or lyceum classes. But how do things stand with us? What is in the works there? Is there any truth to the above rumor? Are the students attending our gymnasiums in order to gain the last two years of preparation to leave for existing lyceums before attending the university, or are they to leave directly for the university from the lower intermediate grades? These are the three alternatives. Which one is being considered? Or are we not yet being considered at all? All three will provoke a general outcry against the eternal malleability of institutions—a

main cause of annoyance. The third alternative is totally untenable. People would get very annoyed by the second option, and would undoubtedly protest. The first one is to me very unlikely because no one has gathered any information concerning funds, localities, etc. Or is the cost to be handled as something general to be defrayed from the school endowment? This seems highly improbable to me.

Earlier entrance in the progymnasium is likewise untenable. Anyhow, age is no positive criterion. It is rather a question of knowledge, and in practice such a criterion *inevitably* balances out by itself according to the very *nature of things*. One of two things then happens. Either vanity will find satisfaction in having done something different—in that those who have done it, whose vanity had so far been suppressed, have done it *themselves*. But in substance the matter takes care of itself, and thus tends to fall back into the old pattern. The other possibility is that those who do it end up simply confusing themselves and the matter at issue. The greater this confusion, the greater the satisfaction and, so to speak, the malicious joy it affords us. What I recently said about reactionary tendencies applies here: the fine gentlemen, released from their captivity, come forth with a terrible outcry, voicing the opinion that everything must be changed. But as they set to work, one thing after another eludes their grasp, and apart from the vanity of affixing their own etiquette on it the matter has preserved itself through its own weight. If you have seen my report [*Nürn Schrift*, 412ff] on the separation of the primary schools you will have found how I seized a remote opportunity to talk about the spirit of our gymnasium's constitution. The main reproach is always that one devotes so much time to Latin. Here lies the difference between Catholicism and Protestantism. We have no laymen. Protestantism is not entrusted to the hierarchical organization of a church but lies solely in general insight and culture. I would like to add this consideration to that of the need to improve training of the intellect for Protestant clergy. It even seems to me to be the most important consideration. I want to take the opportunity to apply it and carry it out. Our universities and schools are our church. It is not the clergy and religious worship that counts as in the Catholic Church. But enough of this, and indeed too much!

You ask about my *Logic*. The very last page of the manuscript will very shortly be sent to the printer. You and Jacobi will each receive a copy at once.

May God grant us really bad weather! For in that case I hear you are not going off to the Nordic wastelands, but are to come here, where the friendship awaits you with which I remain forever yours, Hegel.

Have you heard nothing at all about my prospects at the university of Erlangen? The [1815-16] Preface to [Friedrich Wilhelm] Riemer's [Greek-German] dictionary can lend support to my claim to a calling in philology.⁶ How the dedication to our Greek Crown Prince contrasts with schemes against gymnasiums!

Frommann wrote to me that he wanted to come here this summer, and then to Munich.

⁶The Preface mentions Hegel.

HEGEL REITERATES what he takes to be the essential difference between Protestantism and Catholicism on October 10 [309].

Hegel to Niethammer [309]

Nuremberg, October 10, 1816

The pleasant prospect, my dear friend, of seeing you in the course of our trip, which was fixed for the 11th and which would have reunited us on the 13th with you in Weinsberg, unfortunately disappeared the day before yesterday. . . .

Among the many other things I wanted to discuss with you, I wish here to touch upon only one. Our curiosity about a new curriculum is still not yet satisfied. Either, I thought, they wish out of deference to you to wait for your return before making appointments with which you are especially conversant, or they lack *full* confidence because of the issue of Protestantism which has been raised. With respect to this latter issue, I would consider a further intervention to expedite matters very important and—I should think—not without effect. For on the one hand it is still a sore point one hesitates to touch upon, while on the other hand the reasons to be put forward on the issue are capable of further development. The training of our clergy is an essential point, but I look at the matter from an even more comprehensive perspective. The Catholic community has in its hierarchy a fixed center which the Protestant lacks. Moreover, in the former everything depends on how the clergy is instructed, whereas in the latter the instruction of the laity has equal importance. For we really do not have a laity, since *all* members of the community have the same right and role in the determination and preservation of church affairs in doctrine and discipline. Our safeguard is thus not the aggregate of council pronouncements, nor a clergy empowered to preserve such pronouncements, but is rather only the collective culture of the community. Our more immediate safeguard is thus the universities and institutions for general culture. All Protestants look upon these institutions as their Rome and council of bishops. If the Protestant clergy had more authority in the community as it sometimes would like to have—[Johann] Schuderoff's *Journal* [1802-14; 1815-32] may serve as an example—we would return to the Protestant clericalism we have indeed known in the past. The sole authority is the intellectual and moral culture of all, and the guarantors of such culture are these institutions which Napoleon hated but—witness [writings by Charles] Villers and [Georges] Cuvier—learned to view in this light alone, and thus to fear and treat with deference in such places as Holland, Göttingen, etc. The result, attested by a mass of data and circumstances, is that *general* intellectual and moral culture is what is holy to Protestants. To Catholics, however, it is something optional, since what is sacred is in the church, which is separated off in a clergy. I should have liked to discuss with you the extent to which this issue could be dealt with publicly.

Since it must be, I want to tell you farewell from the bottom of my heart while I am still on Bavarian soil. I say this to you who have brought me here, and to whom I owe everything which has come since, including the improved prospects I now have. Bear up in your present position or follow me soon. I will forever preserve and show the same thankful affection and faithful friendship for you. Yours, Hegel

I received a very respectful and gracious letter from Mr. von Zentner the day before yesterday in addition to a very honorable release from [Bavarian] duty.

Roth will arrive here tomorrow. He abandoned the trip to Swabia.

A FEW DAYS AFTER this last letter to Niethammer, Hegel departed to assume a long-awaited professorship in Heidelberg.

Heidelberg and Romanticism

THE TWO YEARS Hegel spent in Heidelberg helped integrate him into the post-Napoleonic world, which in July 1816 was still a topic of disdain for him [271]. The imperial federal state having become a pure abstraction, he now opted for the sovereignty of geographically or nationally limited states such as his native Württemberg. But his return to the university in Heidelberg—then the most vital center of academic romanticism as well as one of the most romantic locales [324] in Germany—was also a stimulus to further intellectual development, especially in aesthetics. He shared the Romantic concern to understand the spirit of a work and opposed the growing emphasis in philology on purely technical linguistic interpretation. Within the Romantic movement, he appreciated the historical, scholarly romanticism of Heidelberg (e.g. Boisserée and Creuzer) more than the earlier Jena romanticism (e.g. Friedrich Schlegel) with its pseudophilosophy and lack of self-restraint. He endorsed hermeneutic romanticism—the attempt to understand creative genius at work in history. But—with the exception of Napoleon—he repudiated the romanticism of the contemporary individuals who took their individuality to be a fount of such creativity, of artistic, political, or philosophical genius above established law. Yet as a birthplace of the German nationalist student associations (*Burschenschaften*), Heidelberg was a center of *political* if not *artistic* romanticism. Hegel would oppose the Romantic tendency in the *Burschenschaften*, i.e., the temptation of the individual to pose as a political genius. In jurisprudence he supported Heidelberg's Thibaut and the non-Romantic natural law tradition against von Savigny and the historical school of law. And in philosophy he rejected the Romantic presumption that every true thinker should pride himself on creating his own system [278].

Heidelberg contributed not only to Hegel's development, enriching his Berlin lectures, but also to the emergence of Hegelianism as a school. When he went to Berlin in 1818 he left behind Hermann Friedrich Hinrichs to teach the Hegelian speculative philosophy (Ch 18). More importantly, Karl Daub—a senior Heidelberg professor—soon converted to Hegelianism. Yet, before reaching such a culmination, the epistolary record of the present chapter roams through Hegel's courtship of the University of Heidelberg, the negotiation of his transfer, of his release from Bavaria, etc. The highpoint of these negotiations is without a doubt a letter to the Berlin historian von Raumer: Hegel's interest in Berlin even during his courtship of Heidelberg is apparent from his careful analysis of the current state of philosophy for the Prussian professor [278].

The return of peace after the Napoleonic wars proved the opportunity Hegel needed to obtain a university appointment. On April 14, 1816, he wrote to Karl Friedrich Frommann in Jena to inquire as to the prospects for a professorship there [262]. But after learning that his rival Jakob Fries in Heidelberg—whose more ostentatious liberalism attracted him to Weimar—had accepted a call to Jena, Hegel wrote to Paulus in Heidelberg to check prospects in the Grand Duchy of Baden.

Hegel to Paulus [263]

Nuremberg, May 2, 1816

I have just learned from Weimar that, according to the Minister [Ernst von Gersdorff]'s own words, *Fries* has been *hired* by Jena. An effort had been made a few months ago to *recruit* Schelling there. The occasion is too beautiful for me to stifle my desire to ask you, my dear friend, how things stand in Heidelberg, and to ask your advice as to whether I should take a step in that direction. Above all, I appeal for your assistance and advocacy. That news is positive. You know my wishes too well for me to have to say anything further. I only add perhaps this: From my first effort at giving lectures in Jena a prejudice against me has remained with respect to the freedom and clarity of my delivery. To be sure, I was still strictly bound to the letter of my notebook. However, eight years practice in gymnasium instruction at least has helped me gain a freedom in my lecturing that probably can be attained nowhere better than in just such a position. It is an equally good way of attaining clarity, and I think I have become self-assured about this as well. It befits me even less to speak of other considerations, and I touched upon those two points [only] because they could easily be invoked against me. It would be most desirable from my standpoint if no initiative from me were required for my name to be introduced. Otherwise, if some such step on my part should be necessary, perhaps a letter to you to be passed on might suffice. But who could be better suited to advise me on how to compose such a letter than you? And of whom could I presume kinder sentiments in my regard?

Please commend my cause most highly to your wife. I will do so soon myself. My most cordial greetings to dear Emmi [Paulus's daughter] and to my merry namesake [Paulus's son Wilhelm]. My wife, who has recuperated from a severe attack, joins me in greetings to everybody. Yours, Hegel

You know that [Gotthilf] Schubert has left. Recently [Ludwig] Heller showed me a letter from him. I hear that [Sulpiz] Boisserée is here, though I have not seen him.

Present my greetings as the occasion arises to [Franz Josef] Schelver; give likewise to Professor *Fries* my compliments in reply to those sent to me through [Thomas] Seebeck. May he accept them just as warmly as I have accepted his. We have a magnificent mutual friend in Jacobi in Munich—where I spent two weeks last fall.

HEGEL'S DEFENSE of his competence as a lecturer was also offered in his April 14 letter [262] to Frommann. That the defense was not gratuitous is apparent from the

August 14 letter addressed to Hegel by the Prussian Minister of the Interior, Kaspar von Schuckmann [284], who frankly admitted that his only reservation in considering Hegel for Fichte's vacated chair in Berlin concerned Hegel's teaching:

The philosophy chair is vacant, and in view of the reputation and esteem you have acquired through your philosophical writings the Ministry will gladly consider you for this position. Yet, for the good of both the institution and yourself, the Ministry finds it necessary to eliminate first an objection which is openly laid before you as an honest and loyal man for your examination and response. Since you have now taught no university courses for a considerable period of years, and since even before you had not been a university teacher for very long, the doubt has arisen in several quarters as to whether you still fully command the skill to teach your science in a lively and penetrating manner. This, I am sure you will be persuaded, is so greatly necessary inasmuch as today, when it is everywhere noticeable that education is perniciously orientated toward earning a living, it is precisely in this science essential that the spirit of young people be especially awakened and guided by lively teaching. [284]

When Hegel replied on August 28 he had already accepted an offer from Heidelberg and thus could not pursue one from Berlin, but in answering von Schuckmann he repeated his previous statements to Frommann and Paulus and contemporary one [291] to Karl Daub.

Hegel to von Schuckmann [292]

Nuremberg, August 28, 1816

To Your Excellency's kind letter of the 15th of this month, received on the 24th, I must reply that, after I had the honor of speaking with Privy Councillor [and critical historian of Roman law Berthold Georg] Niebuhr, the Grand Ducal Government in Baden offered a Titular Professorship so attractive I could not refuse. I can now regret having sent off my binding reply a few days before receiving Your Excellency's gracious communication, and thus having already renounced the prospect of a more far-reaching position at Berlin University. I may thus refrain from elaborating further upon the [extensive] practice I have had in free delivery as a lecturer in the eight years at the gymnasium that followed my first timid effort [in Jena]. In fact, I may regard such practice as in this respect more advantageous to me than even a university professorship. I only permit myself to mention most humbly what a deep impression Your Excellency's graciousness has made on me in leaving reservations about my teaching up to my own self-examination and judgment. Your gracious manner of proceeding fills me with a reverence that is pure and deeply felt. I may still ask Your Honor to accept most graciously an expression of the deepest devotion and most grateful respect with which I am honored to remain Your Excellency's most humble servant, Hegel, presently Rector and Professor at the local Royal Bavarian gymnasium.

BARGAINING FOR THE HEIDELBERG PROFESSORSHIP

Paulus replied encouragingly to Hegel's letter of May 2 on the 28th of the same month [265], advising him to send two letters: one to be shown to officials and a

second, stating his present income, purely for Paulus. Hegel addressed the two letters on June 13 [268, 269]. Just a few days before, however, on June 8, he had written to Niethammer suggesting his interest in a vacant chair in philology in Erlangen [266]. Negotiations with Heidelberg thus did not become earnest until July [268].

Hegel to Paulus [268]

June 13, 1816

It would take too long to explain why the answer to your kind letter has been so greatly delayed. In part the cause is my awkwardness in writing letters to be passed on, and in diplomatic undertakings. The enclosed letter might perhaps lack this or that for purposes of presentation. How it would please me to see my hopes fulfilled and find myself close to you. Your wife and daughter in the meantime have no doubt returned. Please remember me and my interests most warmly to them. I have especially great confidence in the initiatives of the former. Please give Schelver my cordial regards and thank him for his friendship. In such a matter it is often important to know by whose authority an initiative is being taken. You will know best how matters stand with Schelver.¹ Professor Daub's kind sentiments in my regard are known to me. I would have dared address myself to him if I did not know that with you everything is in the best of hands, and that you will appeal to him yourself if you consider it advantageous. Since I hear he is Vice-Rector, there may be further reason to do so. I may ask you to convey to him my most respectful regards.

I have discussed various sides of the matter with [art historian Sulpiz] Boisserée, who has come here again. This saves me the trouble of mentioning still many a thing here. He intends to be home in about two weeks, and is very amicable toward me.

My fixed income here is 1,050 florins as Professor and Rector, 300 florins as School Councillor, 150 florins free lodging—from what I hear this would have to be calculated higher for Heidelberg—and 60 florins from the Board of Examiners for Candidates for Teaching Posts: for a total of 1,560 florins.

Inasmuch as there seems to have been an assumption that the fixed salary in Heidelberg is lower, the question would be how to estimate the extent of lecture fees. They seem variable to me and, from what you tell me, do not bring much income. I might add that I am not without [such] variable income here either.

My wife, who, to be sure, has the sentiments of any good woman from Nuremberg, sends her most cordial regards to you and your dear ones in the matter. She would be very pleased if she must leave Nuremberg to go to Heidelberg, where she is certain to find such compensation for her loss. I send my cordial regards once more. Yours, Hegel

P.S. In Ludwigslust [Gotthilf] Schubert has met with a nice mess. The hereditary Grand Duke and the entire court had converted to Catholicism.

¹The Schellingian natural philosopher and Heidelberg Professor of Medicine had introduced Hegel's name in accordance with Hegel's suggestion [263].

The great kindness and affection you have already shown me in various official and friendly connections, my dear friend, give me license to turn to you concerning an idea of mine entailing the pleasant prospect of our personal reunion. Having learned that Professor Fries is leaving Heidelberg and that the professorship held by him up to now is becoming vacant, my never-abandoned desire to resume the academic career which I began in Jena moves me to inquire about the nature of that post. Mr. Fries combined the two teaching posts of philosophy and physics. I have, to be sure, occupied myself extensively with the latter, and the philosophy of nature would again form part of my philosophical lectures, but I do not have enough experience with my own hands to lecture on experimental physics. In case there is thought of abolishing once again the present unusual union of these two professorships and setting up each independently, I may express to you my wish and willingness to return nowhere more than in Heidelberg to the academic teaching of the science to which I have devoted my entire life. Around here much is, as people say, "afoot" in academic affairs. The school councillorship entrusted to me a few years ago in addition to my other functions may open the prospect of further entry into administrative work. Yet I seek no salary increase by returning to the university, and will be content with the equivalent of my present salary.

In hoping that out of your old friendship for me you will forgive me for having troubled you with my thoughts and concerns, I eagerly look forward to good news both of you and the well-being of your dear family, and respectfully remain your most devoted friend, Hegel

I received on the 16th your kind report of the 11th informing me that I may now look forward to definite assurances. I ask in haste your advice beforehand, since your amicable assistance will not be immediately available, though I would very much need it, especially for diplomatic negotiation on such questions as how much *travel money* I might ask. I do not want to ask for less but likewise not for more than is proper. I will be quite satisfied with a 1,500-florin salary. My income here is somewhat higher, and 300 florins for rent [in Heidelberg] already consume a large portion. If I estimate my lodging here at that figure, I am probably better off here by 200 florins. You do not promise much from lecture fees, but perhaps time will improve. Concerning another matter, the widow's pension, I believe I remember hearing from you that arrangements already exist. I wonder if I should make a point of raising the issue.

I thank you a thousand times over for your kind interest and amiable efforts on my behalf. My wife will be genuinely glad to follow me if destiny so determines and is ready to console herself by finding beyond the mountains people who love her. I do not really want to express gratitude for your wife's kind offer, for that would mean acceptance of it—an admission that we need her. But should we come to need such assistance, I will quickly return to that offer and seize upon it with sincere pleasure.

For the time being from afar, I send affectionate and faithful greetings.

Your book orders for the auction have been taken care of. May I ask you in return to subscribe for me to [Johann Heinrich] Voss's [translation of] *Aristophanes*? We can see how our respective debts balance out later. Yours, Hegel

My most grateful thanks, my dear friend, for your kind report, and for all your sympathetic interest in my cause [expressed during Boisserée's visit to Nuremberg in early June; see letter 268]. I have since received from Paulus a similarly hopeful assurance of my prospects. According to him, matters have gone so far that I may now look forward to definite declarations. On receiving your notice I renounced for the time being further pursuit of other prospects. Please thank Dr. Daub most gratefully for his kind interest and sentiments in my regard.

We now just want to wait quietly to see how the decision in Karlsruhe will come out.

I have also seen from your letter that you have arrived safely, and hear through Seebeck that the art treasures have also arrived undamaged. Currently, a few hundred codices of papyri and parchment [*Codd. cartacei et membranacei*] have been auctioned off and sent to every corner of the world. What remains but the wish to be sent off oneself with equal dispatch?

If something decisive, whether in my regard or otherwise, should be heard, I would much appreciate it if you would kindly let me know.

My wife sends her cordial thanks for your kind remembrance, and I add assurance of my most complete respect and devotion. Hegel

P.S. A scholar recently traveling through from Berlin gave assurance that the establishment of a university had been decided for Cologne.

SULPIZ BOISSERÉE AND ROMANTIC ART

Sulpiz Boisserée, to whom this last letter was addressed, was a well-known art historian, then a member of the Romantic circle in Heidelberg. With his brother Melchior he had established the largest collection of old German and Dutch masters, and was negotiating with Berlin for a permanent home for it. The collection ultimately went to Munich. It was owned by the Boisserée brothers together with Johann Baptist Bertram. Sulpiz Boisserée's scholarship helped reawaken interest in Gothic architecture. He wrote at length on the Cologne Cathedral, and was a prime instigator in its restoration. Among Hegel's Heidelberg friendships, his friendship with Boisserée was second only to that with Friedrich Creuzer—the noted historian of mythology and symbolism—in its influence on Hegel's lectures on fine arts, which would highlight the medieval Gothic cathedral as the epitome of Romantic Christian architecture (*Werke* XIII, 337ff). Letters from 1820 [371a] and 1827 [553] show that Hegel retained contact with Boisserée after leaving Heidelberg.

I cannot let my dear friend [Prussian] Judicial Councillor [K. L.] Krause take a trip to Stuttgart without giving him a few lines for the amiable and brotherly threesome. I need not especially ask you to take good care of him, since your kindness for itself equals the excellence of the objects adorning your abode. But I shall regard your kindness toward him and his two companions [including Amalie Krause, Councillor Krause's wife] as one toward myself as well. These companions are both very fine singers; they can tell you about, among other things, Goethe's *Faust* as composed by Prince [Anton Heinrich von] Radziwill, and can perhaps even sing from it. But above all, these lines are to serve as a friendly greeting to you to renew your remembrance of me. Mr. Krause can likewise tell you of life with us here, assuming you want to hear of it. For some time now we have been letting people hear quite a bit about us, though from the outside its appearance may have varied [359]. Here, after the first false alarms, we see matters settle back into their old mellow rut, just as was traditional in the old German Empire and in fact as happens most everywhere. You know that the spectacles of smaller cities make everything [local] look smaller, that distant events of which one reads in the newspapers are represented as close to us and indeed as concerning us very greatly, so that they at once seem on the contrary colossal. The horizon of a large city, however, places such events at a greater distance, and the individual thus places himself in a more accurate relation to them. The individual accordingly attaches interest far more calmly to his own sphere of activity, and for this I have found on my present terrain stronger stimuli than I would have found elsewhere. A benefit at once to be added for people like us is that probably nowhere else is as much being spent for scientific purposes, collections, art as here. Finances are being established on a solid basis; saving and ever more saving is to be sure now set up as the basis. But in the above sphere no rupture is to be detected.

I have often heard with pleasure that things are going quite well for you in Stuttgart, and that your collection has received the fitting honor of exhibition. I hope soon to hear of your literary works as well, just as moreover the entirety of your artistic endeavor will surely soon be viewable. But not wanting to dwell further on this old wish of mine as of so many others, I only add my equally old wish to continue to be remembered in friendship by you. A fond farewell, and much happiness. Yours, Hegel

Hegel to S. Boisserée [553]

Berlin, August 9, 1827

It has been a few months, dear friend, since I received the beautiful lithographed pictures [lithography by Johann Strixner, published between 1825 and 1837] which were sent from your collection without date [*sine die et consule*]—without any further earmark. Ever since, I have been waiting in vain for some explanation. I finally had to arrive at the surprising conclusion that this mailing in itself was to contain what was decisive. I thus at last took heart in recognizing in your kind and amicable remembrance of me, and on this assumption I now may

and even must, convey my warmest and deepest gratitude. You have greatly delighted me with these very excellent prints. You have even sought to select the best of the best. For themselves an inspiring and pleasurable sight, it reminds me of the originals—with so many of which I became intuitively acquainted thanks only to you—and of the threesome of dear friends which had become the second soul of these noble creations. But separation from such familiarity [*Inwohnung*] of course inevitably has something painful about it. Yet such separation is by its very nature incomplete. By my congratulations I have long since shared in this success for which you have wished.

You once not only took but sparked interest in a passage from my *Encyclopaedia* [322]. I know of no better way to return your kindness than with the revised printing [second edition] of the same work, which follows along with the further additions.

My warm thanks once more to the entire amiable threesome for its kind remembrance of me. My wife insistently joins me in expressing my gratitude and in conveying my regards.

I hope to be able to see the [van] Eycks, [Hans] Memlings [*Hemlings*], and others in the Netherlands a few weeks from now if I can get there from Paris, and if as planned I can first get to Paris [Ch 24].

PHILOSOPHY IN THE UNIVERSITY

Negotiations with Berlin were conducted by Hegel simultaneously with those with Heidelberg, but were only less advanced. On August 2, 1816, Hegel addressed a statement of his views on philosophy instruction in the university [278] to the historian Friedrich Ludwig von Raumer, an associate of the Prussian reform minister, Karl August von Hardenberg. The letter to von Raumer bears comparison to Hegel's 1805 drafts to Voss [55]. Despite the legend transmitted by Schelling that the system for Hegel is the Absolute, in 1816 as well as 1805 Hegel affirms the essentially open and hence relative character of his system: "... a scientifically developed philosophy. . . immediately leads. . . to the positive sciences, which manifest it in concrete form. . . to such an extent that conversely their study proves necessary for a thorough penetration of philosophy" [278]. Even while attacking the philosophy of feeling, Hegel does not dissolve sensory feeling into the philosophical concept. In 1816, however, he strongly repudiates the Romantic anarchy of everyone insisting on having his own philosophical system. In the Orient the individual dissolves into the collectivity; in the West he is tempted by the opposite error of asserting himself to its exclusion (*Encyc* ¶151, Addition). In the 1805 draft Hegel announced to Voss "the publication of my system of philosophy" (italics added). Von Sinclair illustrated in a 1812 letter to Hegel the hyperindividualism which Hegel came to attack in 1816: "you. . . will find it natural, I hope. . . that I judge your system by starting out from my own system" [210]. In 1819 Hegel will reiterate the denial that his system is his own in any proprietary sense [357]. There is only one perennial system of philosophy, which is an impersonal dialectical growth of the entire history of philosophy. (Yet Hegel himself continued to make the sort of proprietary claim implicit in a charge of plagiarism [605]).

The occasion of our conversation, dear sir, moves me now to take the liberty of setting forth my thoughts on the teaching of *philosophy at universities*. I must really ask for your indulgence regarding the form as well, and must request that you not ask for more detailed development and coherence than is possible to give in a hasty letter, which should reach you while you are still in our vicinity.

I begin immediately by asking how this subject could come up for discussion at all? For it may otherwise seem a very simple matter: what is true of the teaching of other sciences must also be true of philosophy. I do not wish in this regard to dwell on the demand that the teaching of philosophy, too, unite clarity with both depth and appropriate elaboration; that it share with the teaching of other sciences in a university the fate of being treated in a fixed time period, as a rule six months; that the science taught must accordingly be expanded or condensed, and so on. The particular sort of embarrassment presently observed in the teaching of philosophy surely has its source in the new direction this science has taken, giving rise to the current situation in which its former scientific development and the special sciences into which its subject matter was divided have become more or less antiquated in form and content. Yet the idea of philosophy which has taken their place still finds itself without scientific development, and the subject matter of the special sciences has been transformed and integrated with this new idea only incompletely or not at all. That is why we see *scientific form* in sciences *without interest*, and elsewhere *interest* without *scientific form*.

Thus on the average what we still see taught in universities and writings are a few of the old sciences: logic, empirical psychology, natural law, perhaps even ethics. For *metaphysics* has disappeared even for those who still hold on otherwise to older ways, just like German constitutional law for the law faculty. If, however, the other sciences of which metaphysics used to consist are not missed so very much, at the very least *natural theology* must be missed, the object of which was the rational knowledge of God. As for those sciences which are still retained, in particular logic, it almost seems that only tradition and regard for the formal utility of training the understanding are still maintained. For the content as well as the form of these and other sciences contrasts all too sharply with the idea of philosophy to which interest has turned—as also with the manner of philosophizing adopted along with it—for these sciences still to give any real satisfaction. When the young begin the study of the sciences they have already been touched if only by the uncertain rumor of other ideas and methods, so that they approach this study without the requisite preconceived idea of their authority and importance. Thus they do not easily find in such study the “something” they have been led to expect. Once this contrast has imposed itself, I should like to say, even the teaching of these sciences is no longer conducted with its former ease and total confidence. An insecurity or irritability results which does not help provide access to or credit to such teaching.

On the other hand, the new idea has not yet satisfied the requirement of fashioning the vast field of objects belonging to philosophy into a whole organized

in and through all its parts. The requirement of determinate cognitions and the truth acknowledged elsewhere that the whole can truly be grasped only when one works through the parts have been not only evaded but cast aside with the claim that *determinateness* and *manifoldness* in *knowledge* are *superfluous* to the idea and indeed even *contrary* or *inferior* to it. According to such a view, philosophy is as compendious as was medicine, or at least as therapy in the era of [John] Brown's system, which held that the study of therapy could be completed in half an hour. In Munich, meanwhile, you have perhaps made the personal acquaintance of a philosopher adept in this *intensive* method. From time to time Franz Baader [Ch 21] publishes one or two sheets which are supposed to contain the entire essence of all philosophy, or of one of the special sciences which make it up. One who allows himself to publish merely in this way has the further advantage of being thought by the public to be even a master in the development of such general thoughts. But while Friedrich Schlegel was still in Jena I myself witnessed his debut with his lectures on transcendental philosophy [winter semester 1800-01]. He finished his course in six weeks, not to the satisfaction of his audience, which had expected and paid for a six-month course. We have seen a greater extension given to general ideas by the aid of *fantasy*, which, both brilliantly and dimly, has served up a mixture of the high and low, near and far, often with deeper meaning and just as often in an entirely superficial way; and which used in particular for this purpose those regions of nature and spirit which are in themselves dim and arbitrary. An opposite path to greater expanse is the *critical* and *skeptical* path which possesses in material present at hand the element enabling it to proceed, but which incidentally arrives at nothing but the unpleasantness and boredom of negative results. If this path perchance also serves to exercise cleverness, if moreover the employment of fantasy might have the effect of a temporary fermentation of the mind, if perchance it might also awaken what is called *edification* and light up the general idea itself in a few, nevertheless neither procedure achieves what is to be achieved, and what constitutes the *study of science*.

Youth, at the outset of the new philosophy, at first found it agreeable to be able to polish off the study of philosophy and even the sciences in general by means of a few universal formulas that were supposed to contain all. But, confronted with the demands of the state and of scientific education otherwise, the consequences of this view—*lack of knowledge*, *ignorance*, as much in *philosophical concepts* as in the *specialized vocational disciplines*—met with too serious a contradiction and practical repudiation for this presumptuousness not to have fallen out of credit. Just as its inner necessity demands that philosophy be developed scientifically and in its diverse parts, to me this equally seems the standpoint adapted to the times. A return cannot be made to the sciences of which philosophy once consisted. But neither can the mass of concepts and the content which they encompassed be purely and simply ignored. The new form of the idea also demands its rights, and for this reason the old material must undergo a transformation adapted to the current standpoint in philosophy. I can only, it is true, consider this view of what the times call for to be a subjective judgment, just as I must initially consider as subjective the direction I took in my elaboration of philosophy through

early assigning myself that goal. I have just completed the publication of my works on logic and must now wait to see how the public will receive this approach.

I believe, however, I am able to accept this much as correct: namely, that philosophy instruction in the universities can accomplish what it ought—an *acquisition of definite knowledge*—only if it adopts a *definite methodical procedure*, encompassing and *ordering detail*. In this form alone can this science be *learned* like any other science. Even if the teacher may avoid the word, he must nonetheless be conscious that it is first and essentially this that is in question. It has become the prejudice not only of philosophical study but also—and indeed even more extensively—of pedagogy that *thinking for oneself* is to be developed and practiced in the first place as if the *subject matter were of no importance*, and in the second place as if *learning were opposed to thinking for oneself*. For in fact thinking can only exercise itself on material that is neither a creation or assemblage of fantasy nor a sensory or intellectual intuition, but a *thought*. Further, a thought can only be learned through being *itself thought*. According to a common error, a thought bears the stamp of having been thought by oneself only by diverging from the thoughts of other people. Here the well-known saying that what is new is not true, and what is true is not new, customarily finds its application. Moreover, the mania leading *everyone* to want to have his own system originates from this error. The more absurd and insane a brainstorm, the more it is held to be original and excellent, precisely because it thereby most clearly demonstrates one's peculiarity and divergence from the thought of others.

Philosophy more precisely acquires the capacity to be learned by virtue of its definiteness, insofar as only thereby does it become *intelligible, communicable, and capable* of becoming *common property*. Just as, on the one hand, it requires special study and is not automatically common property merely because everyone generally possesses reason, so its universal communicability takes away the appearance it had, in more recent times as in other times, of being an *idiosyncrasy* of a few transcendent brains. And, in conformity with its true position [in relation] to *philology*—the *first propaedeutic science* for a profession—philosophy becomes the *second* such science. In this connection, it is still possible for a few individuals to remain stuck at this *second stage*, but at least not for the reason that quite a few, because they had otherwise learned *nothing proper*, became philosophers. Moreover, that danger is no longer as great as I have just indicated, and in any case it would seem less than the danger of being stuck right off at *philology*, the first stage. In itself a scientifically developed philosophy already does justice to definite thinking and thorough knowledge. The *content* of such a philosophy—i.e., what is universal in spiritual and natural conditions—immediately *leads by itself to the positive sciences* which manifest it in concrete form, in its further development and application, to such an extent that conversely their study proves necessary for a thorough penetration of philosophy. On the other hand, the study of philology, once one has gotten into matters of detail that should essentially remain only a means, has something so isolated and strange about it that it has only slight connection and few points of passage leading to a science and profession in touch with what is actual.

As a propaedeutic science, philosophy must especially accomplish the formal cultivation and exercise of thinking. It can do this only by totally removing itself from the realm of fantasy through a definiteness of concepts and consistent methodical procedure. Philosophy is necessarily able to provide such exercise to a greater degree than mathematics because, unlike mathematics, it lacks sensory content.

I mentioned above the *edification* frequently expected of philosophers. In my opinion, even as taught to the young, philosophy must never be *edifying*. But it must satisfy a related need which I still wish to touch upon briefly: as much as more recent times have again called forth a tendency toward solid substance, higher ideas, and religion, so much the less—and indeed less than ever—does the form of feeling, imagination, and confused concepts suffice for it. The occupation of philosophy must be to justify what is of substantial value to insight, to express and conceive it in definite thoughts, and thus to preserve it from obscure byways. In view of this as well as of the content of philosophy, I simply wish to indicate the following singular phenomenon: a philosopher, like anyone else, treats within one and the same science a few more or less or otherwise diverse sciences. The subject matter—the spiritual and natural world—is always the same, and thus philosophy breaks down into the same special sciences. Presumably such diversity must above all be attributed to a confusion that does not permit attainment of definite concepts and fixed distinctions. Embarrassment may also contribute its part when one must teach the old logic alongside the latest transcendental philosophy, and natural theology alongside skeptical metaphysics. I already indicated that the old subject matter surely needs transformation to be completed, and cannot simply be set aside. The sciences between which philosophy must be divided are otherwise sufficiently determined: the totally abstract universal belongs to *logic*, along with everything formerly included in metaphysics. The concrete [universal] divides into *natural philosophy*, which gives only part of the whole, and the *philosophy of spirit*, which comprises—beyond psychology along with anthropology and the teaching of law [*Recht*] and duties—*aesthetics* and the philosophy of religion. To this is still to be added the history of philosophy. Whatever differences might occur in matters of principle, the very nature of the object considered entails a division into the above-mentioned sciences as well as their inevitable treatment.

As to external arrangements in support of lecturing—for example, discussion sessions [*Konversatorien*]*—I refrain from adding anything, since I see with dismay how long-winded I have already become, and how much I have drawn on your indulgence. I only add my best wishes for the continuation of your trip [to Italy] and the assurance of my highest esteem and entire devotion. Hegel*

TWO MONTHS LATER, awaiting as he wrote to von Raumer the judgment of the public, Hegel distributed complimentary copies of the just-published second volume of his *Logic*—in which he articulated the philosophy of the concept in the place of the philosophy of feeling, imagination, or obscure concepts perpetrated by Fries, von Baader, Friedrich Schlegel, and others.

Please pack the enclosed copies of the third part of the *Logic* at your convenience and kindly direct them to the following addresses: one copy on velum paper to Privy Councillor *Jacobi* in Munich; one also on velum to High Councillor for Schools *Niethammer*, also in Munich; one copy on writing paper to the publisher *Frommann* [Ch 16] in Jena; one copy on printing paper for Monsieur [Peter] *van Ghert*, *Commissaire Royal pour les affaires du Culte à Bruxelles*, via the *Amsterdam* bookdealership through which you sent him the earlier parts [Ch 22]. Should you wish a receipt for the last-concluded bill, please let me know, perhaps sending it to me ready for my signature. Most respectfully, Hegel

THE CALL TO HEIDELBERG ACCEPTED

Von Raumer replied to Hegel on August 7, agreeing on all points with Hegel's letter, and announcing his intention of sending it to von Schuckmann in Berlin. Yet when von Schuckmann writes Hegel on August 24 he notes doing so only at the instigation of Niebuhr, who Hegel says on August 8 had just recently passed through Nuremberg [282]. Shortly after Niebuhr's visit Hegel received an official offer from Heidelberg in a July 30 letter from a theologian and admirer of Hegel, Karl Daub, acting as Vice-Rector of the university. Daub wrote:

If you answer our call, Heidelberg, for the first time since the founding of the university, will have a philosopher—Spinoza received a call from Heidelberg, but in vain as you undoubtedly know. A true philosopher brings with him zeal, and when that philosopher is Hegel he brings with him a number of other things as well, of which admittedly very few people here or elsewhere thus far have any idea, and which cannot be acquired merely by zeal. Success will not fail to follow when at last people get a chance to hear a philosopher. [277]

Hegel conditionally accepted the offer in his reply to Daub:

Hegel to Daub [279]

Nuremberg, August 6, 1816

I have been greatly pleased, Honorable Vice-Rector, by your kind letter of the 30th of last month, and above all am deeply touched by the friendly sentiments of a man for whom I have long felt genuine respect.

To the honorable inquiry as to whether I would be inclined to accept the position of titular Professor of Philosophy in Heidelberg with a salary of 1,300 florins and the indicated compensation in kind, I hasten to reply that my present salary consists of 1,560 florins. Yet out of love for academic studies I am inclined to accept the call at the indicated salary. But since I occupy an official residence here, which according to the local low rental rates is to be valued at 150 florins, I hope the advantage of the lodging occupied by the departing Privy Councillor Fries might likewise be granted me, since in Heidelberg lodging is said to be somewhat hard to get.

I hope likewise to obtain the government's consent to future improvements in my fixed salary, depending both on its satisfaction [with my work], which I shall endeavor to merit, and on the salaries of other professors. A university, to be sure, offers the opportunity to improve my income by dint of the diligence I owe my position. It must for the time being remain to be seen if such incidental income will exceed what I draw here. I believe I may mention to you that I received your dear letter a few days after being informed that I have been proposed for the vacant professorship of philosophy in Berlin. In exchange for the advantages I give up by sacrificing this prospect, I may hope for compensation in the mentioned advantages with regard to lodging and consent to future increments.

As to the widows' and orphans' allowance, I see from your dear letter that a general provision has already been instituted for public servants. As for moving expenses, I would be at a loss to propose the amount of reimbursement. Since you note that the actual expenses could be covered, I would prefer this and humbly request you to solicit approval of it.

There is nothing preventing me from entering upon my new duties in the winter semester, nor standing in the way of the pleasant prospect of soon being able to express in person the admiration and complete respect with which I remain Your Excellency's most humble School Councillor and Rector, Hegel

IN STIPULATING THESE conditions, Hegel followed the financial advice of Paulus from July 30 [276]. The day after mailing his acceptance to Daub, Hegel replied to Paulus [281] and wrote to Sulpiz Boisserée [282]. A few days later Hegel informed Niethammer of the Heidelberg offer and the prospect in Berlin [283].

Hegel to Paulus [281]

Nuremberg, August 8, 1816

Yesterday I sent Daub something approximating a copy [279] of your last letter, my dear friend. That I was unable to answer you right away is due to the miserable examination of teaching candidates. I had to examine sixty individuals from morning to night four days in a row. Quite a pastime! As for Fries's lodging, I have registered in general my desire to enjoy its benefit. I was unable to discuss adequately the specific rent, but above all I wanted to leave open the possibility of obtaining still further relief since the fixed income I have here will not be equalled even with totally free lodging. I cannot estimate my incidental income here as reaching 500 florins. I have mentioned it, however, in such a way that it can count for something—in case you should have spoken of it. I felt permitted in my letter to Daub to mention my prospect in Berlin, which seems to be very definite indeed. But it is calculated that a thaler there is as much as a florin [*Gulden*] here. And since nothing formal has reached me yet, it would be foolish to compromise the prospect in Heidelberg, which in many other respects beckons so enticingly. I likewise have allowed myself to be guided by your experience concerning moving expenses.

We have now finally reached the point where I may soon be allowed to look forward to deliverance from the headaches of our school system, and to the

pleasure of reunion with my mentor, that affectionate rogue of a fellow countrywoman [Mrs. Paulus], and the lovely virtuoso [Paulus's daughter]. This is doubly pleasant on account of my wife—whose separation from her mother, aunts, etc. and hometown will thus be eased all the more. To her ears, in comparison with the friends we may expect in Heidelberg, the name of Berlin has a doubly discordant ring to it.

Professor Daub wrote about the insertion of my lectures in the class schedule appearing already in August. I still have my reservations as to whether it is proper before I receive my dismissal from the [Bavarian] government. I cannot apply for this dismissal before having in hand a decree from Karlsruhe.

In time I will still have to ask your advice about many things. Above all my wife will lay claim to the advice, help, and efforts of the little woman. The master [of the household] has helped so far, and I thus address myself to him in all other needs as well. And his lady has recently already offered her services so very cordially. Thank you for everything, and especially for your present favors, which are [always] the greatest. I shall now inhale with new lungs and breath.

[Anton] Thibaut's kind disposition toward me, about which you write, has pleased me deeply. Please remember me to him most cordially and thank him. And kindly present my apologies to Schelver for not yet writing to him today.

Mr. [Sigmund] von Reizenstein's [curator of Heidelberg University] letter, which I return, is enclosed. You have never indicated to me that I should write to him, and thus I have not yet done so. If it can still remain undone, that is for now alright with me as well. Niethammer is in Egro. From there he will go to Berlin and Mecklenburg and then to Swabia. Wholeheartedly yours, Hegel

Hegel to Boisserée [282]

Nuremberg, August 8, 1816

I thank you most sincerely, dear friend, for your interest in my cause. Yesterday morning I wrote to the venerable [Vice-Rector] Daub. To me the cordiality and friendly sentiments which this man shows me are not the least fringe benefit in what is already a very pleasant prospect for me. My reply addresses only two further matters not contained in the offer. The first—the government's promise to secure for me in the future a relative improvement [of my situation]—seems at first, inasmuch as it does not mean a great deal in itself, to have been better left out. The second matter concerns the Frieses' former residence. Since I am taking over Fries's position in other respects, it is natural that I also receive his residence. I know he paid rent. Generally I have applied for the advantage of his residence in such a fashion that, by the remission or reduction of rent, I could be granted still further improvement, which I must very much wish, given the nature of the salary. It has in actual fact turned out to be over 350 florins less than my fixed income here, including my free residence, valued at 150 florins. At the same time I lose nothing if Fries's rent is still demanded of me, since an immediately available residence, even at a rent of 200 florins, can still be regarded as an advantage in comparison with other accommodations. Daub's estimate, which includes your note on the hoped-for income from lecture fees, to be sure provides one consola-

tion. It is admittedly something incidental, but even here in Nuremberg such income has not been completely lacking. I have received positive assurance that [Friedrich] Wilken will go to Berlin as librarian. Since, from your letter, he had an income of 2,000 florins, one might think that something of that would become available as relief to me.

You cite him and [Friedrich] Creuzer as examples of salary increases which have been received. My request for governmental assurance in the matter does not seem superfluous to me, since those improvements have no doubt followed calls to other universities. But you know how matters fare with philosophers, the most unfortunate of all scholars. One believes oneself to be well provided for by just anyone. If I had the good fortune to distinguish myself, it would be even worse. For it is only toward the distinguished that no indifference is shown: these are truly detested. I have, I am assured, been nominated in Berlin, and in truth I am the only serious candidate besides Schelling and Schubert. When for such a long time I had heard nothing more from Heidelberg, I directed my thoughts more seriously to Berlin. Since I prefer Heidelberg, this prospect is being lost to me with no personal advantage at all just as it is opening up.

But how are things with you? Niebuhr, who recently passed through here and confirmed the above news [from Berlin] concerning my candidacy, told me of [Karl] Schinkel's mission to you [concerning Prussian purchase of the Boisserée art collection]. He indicated that if I did not accept the position it would not be filled. I fear I will no longer find you and your collection in Heidelberg. Niebuhr inquired about you urgently, and wrote to Berlin right away. I could not yet tell him anything about my call to Heidelberg. It arrived the very day after your visit here. For the rest, I wish you the greatest success. Berlin is probably the only spot for the collection—at least the only one which can give the appearance of wishing to shelter it, and to be in a position to do so.

A warm farewell. Most affectionately, your friend, Hegel

P.S. [Albrecht] Dürer's [portrait of Hieronymus] *Holzschuher* is also for sale. But the excellent gentlemen are so high-minded they want to leave it only to a large public gallery.

Please transmit my most cordial regards to Creuzer and Thibaut, and assure them how much I will treasure their kind sentiments.

Hegel to Niethammer [283]

Nuremberg, August 11, 1816

So far I have waited in vain for a word from you, my dear friend, from the spa [in Franzenbad]. Among the many fluids to be found there, ink must of necessity also be found. Through [Niethammer's son] Julius we nevertheless heard yesterday enough of your life there to know that you are in a cheerful mood. And, since you do not mention at all the health of the best of women, we believe ourselves obliged to conclude she is quite well.

I cannot, however, let you travel further without reporting a few things concerning my fate which have meanwhile become a little more definite. Two prospects are finally just about to open up for me: I have received the call to

Heidelberg, and at the same time I heard that I am also a serious candidate in Berlin. This second prospect was confirmed to me by Niebuhr, who was here a week ago. He wrote from here to Berlin because I told him that another prospect was also opening up for me, and that since I expected more details about this other prospect shortly I would have to accept at once if I came out on top. In fact the very day after his departure the call [to Heidelberg] arrived. Heidelberg pays the salary which Fries last had: 1,300 florins and remuneration in kind in the amount of 69 florins. But since this is not really much, I have set a few more conditions and now await the answer. Thus I am, God willing, looking forward to deliverance from school, curricular, and organizational headaches. But what I wish above all is soon to be able to hear something similar from you.

I want to ask you not to report anything of this to Munich right away—as soon as the matter is settled I will be the first to say something. Further, say in Berlin little more than perhaps that there are designs upon me in Heidelberg. I would very much wish to receive something formal from Berlin so that this prospect, even should it come only a half-year later, perhaps may after all not pass by without advantage for me. Little as my wife wants to hear of it, the post there might perhaps even be the more excellent one—which it would be foolish to place behind Heidelberg.

[Friedrich] Thiersch is said to be proposed by Erlangen. Julius thinks he will probably accept.

It was said that the secretary presented the pen to the Minister to sign the new general reorganization with the remark that it is being awaited with longing. But precisely this remark is said to have enabled him to reply that the reorganization cannot yet take place. You will no doubt meet with the whole pretty mess upon your return [see 309]. . . . Yours, Hegel

ON AUGUST 13 Daub [285] replied with regard to Hegel's conditions—Fries's lodging and eventual salary increments—by stating the position of the Grand-Ducal State Councillor, Johann Friedrich von Eichrodt: since free lodging was not provided for other professors, it could not be given to Hegel; but Hegel would naturally be considered for increments like other faculty members, though no promises could be made. Yet in lieu of free lodging, Daub offered Hegel a somewhat higher salary: 1,500 florins—part of which could be taken in kind [311 below]—rather than 1,369 florins. It was thus possible for Hegel to accept without a significant loss of income, though he would still contest Heidelberg's calculation of the starting date [315 below]. Trusting that Hegel would find the new offer satisfactory, Daub requested that Hegel forward lecture announcements for the upcoming semester. He recommended a course on the history of philosophy. Hegel's reply that he would teach the philosophy of nature as *part* of the whole shows he did not want to be identified as a Schellingian natural philosopher. But the reply [286] again expresses qualms about the propriety of any course announcements.

I am, your honor, answering promptly by return mail your dear letter of the 16th of this month to tell you that the so very liberal approval of an increased salary now amounting to 1,500 florins has wholly removed the last reservations I had from an economic standpoint. I am a family father and, like my wife, have no fortune. Thus I need not tell you how important to me this side of matters is, and how much I appreciate the approved increase. As to how much of my salary I should take in kind—one malter of wheat [according to the Durlach standard of measures] at 5.30 florins and a malter of spelt at 4 florins—State Councillor Eichrodt has let me stipulate this as I wish. I can only suppose that the more I take in kind the greater will be the advantage to me. But I do not wish to appear greedy. I thus know nothing better than to ask you, who have already done so much for me, to stipulate the amount according to what is customary. And so I place the just resolution of the question in your hands.

As for my lectures, since you do not find logic and natural law desirable for the next semester, I wish to lecture on the encyclopaedia of philosophical sciences and the history of philosophy. The former very appropriately will serve to open my lectures by giving both a general survey of philosophy and an announcement of the special sciences to which I intend to devote subsequently individual lecture courses. I wish to expand on the philosophy of nature in greater detail, i.e., as *part* of the whole, without in this case giving a special lecture course. A third lecture course, devoted to the doctrine of spirit—otherwise called psychology—might at the beginning be too much, not only for my audience but also for myself. It may be appropriate to combine a discussion session with the lectures on the encyclopaedia. But I cannot avoid thinking that a violation of due respect to my present government would occur if an announcement drafted by me were to appear publicly before I had received my release, or at least before I had submitted my petition for release. However, since I would have to mention in this petition the call issued by the Grand-Ducal government, I probably will not be able to submit the petition before I have been notified of the Grand Duke's approval, which is likely what you mean by your mention of the "signature." I only add that I have been used to proceeding in such circumstances solely according to the instructions of an experienced friend, and that since I presently lack such a friend here I do not know if my view of the steps to be taken in this regard is proper or too cautious. In any event, I would think we could go ahead with the announcement as soon as either the signature granting Grand-Ducal approval or notification of it has reached you, for I will surely be notified at the same time and will then at once submit my petition for release.

Perhaps I could temporarily set my sights on Fries's present residence, assuming that no disposition has thus far been taken in its regard. The agreement would be treated as an entirely private matter regarding an ordinary rental agreement without any special advantage to me, at least if this residence can be treated as a private residence. I will ask Dr. Paulus to reserve lodging for me, whether this or something else.

I may now esteem myself sufficiently fortunate to be able to count myself in spirit and heart fully as one of you. Younger at heart, I go to embrace not only my vocation of living for the university and the sciences but also the challenge of deserving the kindness it has pleased you to show me, the hope of soon making your personal acquaintance and joining my other dear friends, and the image of the friendliness and cheer which will be Heidelberg's forever. Most respectfully yours, Hegel

May I still ask you as the opportunity arises to convey to State Councillor Eichrodt in preliminary fashion my most deferential regards and heartfelt gratitude.

Finally, please excuse the haste in which I write this letter.

P.S. I have in the present letter withheld full expression of the gratitude I feel toward you for both the interest you have taken in my cause and the sympathy you show for the state of philosophy in Germany and at our universities. Equally pleasant to me is the kindness with which you both view my past works and have hope for even more from my activity at a university. In no other science is one so solitary as in philosophy, and I sincerely long for a more animated sphere of activity. It is, I can say, the greatest wish of my life. I likewise feel all too acutely how prejudicial the lack of living interchange has been to my works thus far.

But how do things stand with theology? Is not the contrast between your own deep philosophical view of theology and what frequently passes for the subject just as glaring or even more flagrant? My work will likewise afford me the satisfaction of having to consider it a propaedeutic to your own science.

I hope my reply, which in any case is meant to be passed on, will cause no difficulty. But I am not completely clear whether announcement of my lectures may appear before my government discharges me. With total respect and affection, yours truly, Hegel

For now please give my other friends in Heidelberg my warm greetings. At present, from morning to night, I am examining school teachers most tediously, and have no free moment to write to them.

Hegel to Heidelberg University Senate [311]

Heidelberg, October 25, 1816

To the Grand-Ducal Restricted [*engerer*] Academic Senate:

The salary conditions most graciously assured me in the terms of my appointment to the local university promised that I would be free to stipulate an optional quantity of grain and spelt—the monetary value of which would be deducted from my salary and would be calculated at 5.3 florins [5 fl. 30 gr.] for a malter of grain and 4 florins for a malter of spelt, following the Durlach standard of measures. Estimating now my household requirements, I can assume that 10 malters of grain and 20 of spelt may suffice. But since a most gracious resolution in this sense has not yet reached me, I humbly hereby request the Grand-Ducal Restricted Academic Senate to settle the matter most graciously in accordance with the above kind pledge by addressing a supporting recommendation of its own to the Highest Authorities. Hegel, Professor of Philosophy [See Ch 14 on corporations.]

Hegel to Badenese Ministry of Interior [315]

Heidelberg, February 15, 1817

Grand-Ducal Ministry of Interior:

This week's payment of the first quarter of the salary granted me most graciously alerts me to the considerable loss which through no fault of my own I would suffer by my appointment to the local university were I not confident that the just and gracious intentions of the Grand-Ducal Ministry would replace this loss.

After applying for and receiving on August 25 last year my discharge from the Royal Bavarian service to accept the most gracious call to the local titular Professorship in Philosophy, the salary payments I enjoyed in that service ceased with the end of the Bavarian fiscal year, i.e., with the end of September, especially because in the Royal Bavarian service salaries are generally calculated and paid out on a monthly basis, as Privy Councillor [Friedrich] Tiedemann also discovered in entering the Grand-Ducal service. Thus if my salary here should be calculated only from October 23, for the greater part of this month I would receive no salary. The scheduling of my lectures to begin on October 21 obliged me in any case to arrive earlier. Apart from that, I could only view my appointment to the Grand-Ducal service into which I have been called as commencing with my actual discharge from Bavarian service. And from the date of my entrance into the Grand-Ducal service I should have claim to the kind assurance of a salary.

Because, due to the reasons most humbly presented above, this loss would now be felt all too painfully, I believe I may most respectfully request the Grand-Ducal Ministry to instruct the local university bursar's office to pay me the salary from October 1 to October 23 of last year, at which time commences the period for which I received quarterly payment.

With humble hopes for most gracious approval of the matter, I continue with the deepest respect as the most humble servant of the Grand-Ducal Ministry of Interior, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Titular Professor of Philosophy

DAUB HAD REPORTED to Hegel on August 20 [287] that the Grand Duke had agreed to sign a letter of appointment, which was thus to arrive shortly. Hegel was then still awaiting the letter when he informed Paulus of the negotiations, on August 22 [289]. Two days later, Daub's August 20 report in hand, Hegel requested discharge from the Bavarian government [290]. Hegel received the letter from the Prussian Minister, von Schuckmann, asking him to evaluate himself as a teacher [284] the same day. Though suspecting Berlin would be more advantageous [283], Hegel wrote to Daub the day after hearing from von Schuckmann that he felt committed to Heidelberg [291].

Hegel to Paulus [289]

August 22, 1816

You will, dear friend, have heard long ago of the liberal response given to my expressed wishes, and it is above all to your recommendation that I must attribute this supplement. The amount to be taken in kind has been left to my discretion. I have asked Dr. Daub to settle on an acceptable percentage. In Württemberg half in

money and half in kind used to be customary. However, I did not dare specify this for fear of appearing immodest in the face of such liberality. Perhaps I can receive a third—at least 200 florins beyond the 1,300 florins first offered. But, briefly, two more matters: 1. Fries's residence, if it is not soon to be put to other use, can perhaps be obtained as temporary lodging, though of course according to the normal rental conditions for a private residence, without special privileges. Otherwise I will have to ask you to look for another opportunity. Moreover, my wife will soon approach the little lady of the house, our longstanding friend, with related requests. 2. My second concern—since unfortunately I do not have you on hand to guide me directly—is to procure my dismissal, especially with regard to announcement of my lectures in Heidelberg. Dr. Daub assured the signature would be sent promptly. By this I understand notification of the Grand Duke's assent, for I will not be able to receive a [final] decree before I have been dismissed from my present functions. However, I would not want to present my petition for dismissal before I could cite this notification. Yet I cannot announce my lectures in Heidelberg before I have at least submitted my petition for release. This is how I conceive the matter. Whether it is the way things really are you would have told me had you been here, and I would have followed your advice. I have written to Dr. Daub that my lectures could well be announced as soon as he received notification of the final approval. For I will no doubt receive notification of it at the same time, and will at once petition for my release. The respect I owe my present government would seem to be violated if that announcement were to appear sooner. By the way, today I gave Mr. von Zentner [in Munich] preliminary notification of my appointment and of my petition for release. Niethammer is in Saxony, very disgusted [288]. May I ask for your guidance as soon as possible, which I am confident would take my security fully into account. I must break off. Suns rise and suns set, but the examination board goes on forever. Yours truly, Hegel

Hegel to Bavarian Ministry of Interior [290]

Nuremberg, August 24, 1816

To the Department of Schools of the Royal Ministry of the Interior. A most humble petition by the present Rector of the Royal Gymnasium in Nuremberg, Hegel, for most gracious release from the Royal service.

Having been called by the Grand-Ducal Badenese Government to the titular Professorship of Philosophy in Heidelberg, and having declared myself willing to accept this appointment both out of love for a university career and out of regard for the considerable improvement of my economic situation, my most devout request is hereby presented to your Royal Majesty to grant me most gracious release from Your Majesty's service and—since the current academic year will soon end—to free me to assume my new duties at the start of the coming winter semester.

Imbued with a lifetime appreciation and heartfelt gratitude for the kindness Your Royal Majesty has always shown me, and anticipating most gracious approval of my humble request, I shall carry to my grave the deepest of devotion to Your Royal Majesty. Your most humble Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, presently

School and Curriculum Councillor to the local Royal Commissioner, and Rector at the local gymnasium

Hegel to Daub [291]

Nuremberg, August 25, 1816

Your dear letter of the 20th, honorable Vice-Rector, informs me of the Grand Duke's approval of my appointment. This last condition now satisfied, I am sincerely pleased that this, too, has been settled so quickly and happily. I likewise recognize here the most gracious and sympathetic interest which Privy Councillor Eichrodt has taken in my cause. Following your suggestion, I have enclosed a letter to him in which I declare both my grateful respect and my readiness to accept [the offer]. Yet how shall I express to you the joyful longing with which I anticipate my happy journey to you. . . .

Yesterday I also received a letter [284] from the Prussian Minister of the Interior [von Schuckmann] in Berlin. I must appreciate very much the fact that the letter leaves it up to me as an honest man to examine and judge the objection to my candidacy stemming from my eight-year absence from the university lecture hall. I can answer [292] that my incomplete and timid beginning in Jena was followed by eight years of study and familiarization with my thoughts—and by eight years of practice at the gymnasium, which, due to the relationship with the students, perhaps provides a more effective opportunity for acquiring freedom in delivery than even the university lecture hall. But my main reply will be that I already regard myself committed to Heidelberg. . . .

I am sorry for causing you so much trouble. For all your kind endeavor on my behalf I can only express my most grateful and sincere respect.

THE DISCHARGE FROM BAVARIA AND THE MOVE TO HEIDELBERG

Hegel's August 24 request [290] for discharge from Bavaria was not immediately granted. Niethammer was outside Bavaria at the time; but von Zentner, director of the educational department in Munich, sought to retain Hegel for Bavaria by procuring his appointment as professor of philology at Erlangen. On June 8 Hegel had himself expressed interest to Niethammer in the position in Erlangen [266]. On September 5 the Commissioner's Office in Nuremberg wrote Hegel noting his requested discharge but asking whether he did not prefer to accept his appointment to Erlangen [295]. Hegel resisted overtures from Erlangen in his September 7 reply to the Nuremberg Commissioner [297], in a September 9 letter [299] to Erlangen theologian Bernhard Bertholdt, and in a September 21 statement to Erlangen's University Senate [303].

Hegel to Nuremberg Royal Commissioner [297]

Nuremberg, September 7, 1816

To the Royal Commissioner of the City of Nuremberg: A most humble declaration by Professor Hegel on his call to Heidelberg:

Responding to the most gracious invitation [295] received on the 6th of this

month to declare in writing whether, having on August 25 been most kindly appointed by His Royal Majesty professor of philology in Erlangen, I do not now prefer this appointment to Heidelberg, I find myself permitted to express most humbly first the deep respect with which I acknowledge this singular kindness His Royal Majesty has shown me. But I take the liberty to note that only an exchange of the teaching of philosophical preparatory sciences at the gymnasium for philosophy instruction at a university could make a philosophy professorship in Erlangen attractive, enabling me to declare my readiness to lecture on philology in addition to my own special field until His Royal Majesty otherwise fills the professorship in philology. For by assuming a philosophical or philological professorship in Erlangen I would suffer a loss of income relative to my present salary, while in taking on philological lectures I would have to burden myself with a renewed study and elaboration of a subject outside the science of my professional expertise. Inasmuch as the Government of the Grand Duchy of Baden offered me the prospect of a university appointment with a considerable increase in salary—an increase doubly important considering my lack in any personal fortune—and inasmuch as I will be charged only with responsibility for my own field, I inevitably found myself disposed to accept the offer.

In view of the declaration thus made [to Heidelberg], I felt compelled to reply to a gracious letter [284] from the Royal Prussian Minister of the Interior [von Schuckmann]—dated the 15th of last month and received on the 24th, concerning my call to the distinguished titular Professorship in Philosophy at the famous Berlin University—that I had given my word of honor to the Government of the Grand Duchy of Baden and was thus already obligated. For the same reason, even if the other circumstances I have most humbly presented were not present, I likewise painfully regret no longer being unable to respond positively to the most gracious intention of transferring me to Erlangen. While I shall forever acknowledge with a grateful heart the favor and grace which have come to me in His Royal Majesty's service both in the past and in this present matter, I take the liberty of most humbly asking you as Royal Commissioner to lay before His Majesty, with your own gracious support, both my most respectful and heartfelt gratitude and the most humbly obliged reiteration of my request for release. This I ask in order to be able to devote myself exclusively from now on to the science of my calling, in order to obtain what is to me a very essential improvement in my economical situation, and in order to honor the commitment I have already made.

I remain, honorable Royal Commissioner, with the deepest respect your most humble servant Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, currently Rector and Professor at the local Royal gymnasium.

Hegel to Bertholdt [299]

Nuremberg, September 6, 1816

Your Excellency's kind letter of the second of this month informs me of my appointment as professor of philology in Erlangen by a decree of the Highest Authorities dated August 25. As much as I thank you for kindly congratulating me for this, and as pleasant as it would have been for me to enter into a closer collegial

relationship with Erlangen [*demselden*], I am nonetheless obliged by my previous commitment to accept the call to Heidelberg issued by the Government of the Grand Duchy of Baden, and to repeat my petition for release from the Royal [Bavarian] service already submitted to the Highest Authorities on the 24th of the last month. I accordingly find myself incapable of complying with your kind request that I forward an announcement of my lectures at the University of Erlangen. In commending myself most highly to your continued kind sentiments in my regard, I have the honor of being most respectfully Your Excellency's most devoted servant, Hegel, Professor Designate.

Hegel to the Erlangen University Senate [303]

Nuremberg, September 21, 1816

Royal Academic Senate:

Replying to the honorable notification by the Royal Academic Senate dated August 19 concerning my most gracious appointment on the 25th of last month as titular Professor of Philology at the Royal University in Erlangen, I have to state most humbly that I submitted already on the 24th of the last month my most respectful petition for release from the Royal service in order to accept an appointment as titular Professor of Philosophy at the University of Heidelberg.

I must state further that—having been asked by the Royal Commissioner of the City of Nuremberg in accordance with His Majesty's disposition of August 30 to declare in writing whether, since His Royal Majesty wishes to retain me for the University of Erlangen, I do not prefer the position offered me there to the appointment in Heidelberg—I have most humbly replied as follows: "Out of love for the academic life I did, to be sure, earlier take the liberty of declaring myself ready to deliver in Erlangen lectures in philology in addition to philosophy if appointed to a philosophy professorship, and that I would do so until His Royal Majesty filled the professorship for philology in another way. However, in view of the commitment I gave to Heidelberg before receipt of His Majesty's appointment to Erlangen, I can only renew my most humble petition for kind release from the Royal service" [paraphrase by Hegel of letter 297].

In taking the honor of replying with this announcement to the respectful notification received on the 19th of this month, I remain with the highest regard the most devoted servant of the Royal Academic Senate, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, presently Rector and Professor at the local Royal gymnasium.

THE COOLNESS of this response reflected the Senate's own coolness in concurring with the Bavarian government's decision to appoint Hegel [302]. There was apparent anti-statist resentment that the appointment was initiated by the government rather than the faculty. Publication of Hegel's call to Erlangen even appeared in the official newspaper of the Bavarian government before he was given a chance to decline. He accordingly wasted little time in reassuring Paulus and Daub of his commitment to Heidelberg. Hegel still awaited official discharge from Bavaria when he wrote to Paulus on September 13; in fact he would wait until October 7 [308].

You will probably have learned from [Franz Josef] Schelver, to whom I have written, that I have now likewise been named Professor of Poetry, of Eloquence, of the Greek and Latin languages, and so on, at Erlangen. My letter to Mr. von Zentner, in which I made a prior request that he approve my petition for release, left here on the 22nd. My appointment came on the 25th, while notification arrived here on the 30th. My petition for release of the 24th left here on the 25th. Yesterday an inquiry arrived as to whether, given that His Majesty wishes to retain me for Erlangen, I would not now prefer this university over the call to Heidelberg. I will answer appropriately. Today my appointment is in the government paper. I know you will not let yourself be misled by all this. Should it be necessary in other quarters to attest to this, I ask you to please do so in my name. Upon learning of your trip, my wife has already asked you, should it be necessary, to kindly charge someone else among our women friends with the errands with which we are obliged to trouble friends. We hope to receive your kind advice and suggestions still before your departure. My wife will probably not be able to get along without two maids. At her delivery, however, a wet nurse will have to be hired, and then a second maid will be dispensable. [Johann] Genssler's lodging is to become vacant. But he leaves it, I hear, because it is too expensive for him. In all truth I am not able to pay as much as he, let alone more; 350 florins is too much. It will be a matter of pure luck if you find permanent lodging for us. For now all that is necessary is temporary accommodations. Should not my fellow countryman [Philip Christoph] Eschenmayer and his wife, who are good old acquaintances of mine, take care of this? He is professor of economics. I would think both would do it very gladly. Otherwise I know you will do your best. I will not fail to express my gratitude in due course to Mr. von Reizenstein, who is presently in Bayreuth, just as I express it to you now. This increase in my salary is a true source of reassurance and strength for me.

Meanwhile, from the bottom of my heart, yours, Hegel

I find myself obliged to notify Your Excellency of the fact of my appointment as Professor of *Philology* in Erlangen, as announced in the Royal Bavarian governmental paper of the 4th of this month, which I received yesterday. No doubt the appointment will by now be repeated in other newspapers as well. I write in case this news should appear surprising in view of the ties binding me to Heidelberg—so as, if need be, to furnish the required account both of the report and of my conduct. I think I have already informed you of my submission of a formal petition dated August 24 for release from Bavarian service, after having in advance asked Privy Councillor von Zentner on the 22nd to grant me his intercession in assuring prompt attention to such a petition—which I said I would submit as soon as I could. Since the very next day I received notification through Privy Councillor Eichrodt of his Regal Highness the Grand Duke's approval, my petition followed immediately on the 24th. Upon my appointment to Erlangen on the 25th, there

followed a related Royal memorandum of August 31, communicated to me on September 6, which stated that since His Majesty wished to retain me for the University of Erlangen I was to reply in writing as to whether I did not prefer such a position over my call to Heidelberg. My reply, submitted yesterday the 7th, was that even if I did not prefer a philosophical chair in Heidelberg to a philological chair in Erlangen—and in fact I have every reason to prefer Heidelberg—my word of honor, which has already led me to decline an appointment to Berlin, simply obliged me to renew my petition for most gracious release.

You thus see from this exposition that my appointment in Erlangen has left my situation unaltered: i.e., both my obligation to the Grand-Ducal government and my request for release from the Royal Bavarian government. This release cannot now be further delayed, and I impatiently await its prompt announcement so as to be able to hurry off to you and my new vocation all the sooner.

The Vice-Rectorate in Erlangen requested a few days ago the submission of my [course] announcement there. I replied that this was no longer possible. Hegel

Our last letters have crossed. The one written by the little woman on the 5th of this month, however, already contained about everything that our letter contained. We thank her deeply for having brought us now safely under cover. The fact that we are the only occupants is, to be sure, very pleasant, as is likewise the small garden, etc. The number of rooms is just what we will need. In short, if God were to destine me already to be able to think of nothing but Heidelberg, I should be most pleased. For the present I am at least most grateful for everything you, your wife, and our other friends have done for us. The rent in Heidelberg is of course higher than here, but my tongue and pen will simply have to earn it! The little woman even promises to hold a maid immediately at our disposal. I am used to the universal headaches over maids, but in this as well as with everything else in Heidelberg I promise my wife the world. I just received, along with your wife's letter, one from our fellow countryman Eschenmayer assuring me of his old friendship and cooperation. It arrived the very day I wrote to him to ask whether he could be of assistance.

We hope by all means, however, to arrange to depart about the middle of October. I only wait upon that confounded letter of discharge. These and so many other Bavarianisms I still simply have to put behind me before I can imagine our house and friends in Heidelberg in a proper and relaxed way. I have written Daub a detailed account that can be passed on [298] about my appointment to Erlangen and my renewed petition for discharge. People here are frequently most greatly delayed in such a matter—though mostly due to mere delay, without any further appetite or aim. If the issue drags on much longer, I shall write to the Badenese ambassador.

In my last letter I forgot to address your apprehensions over [Thomas] Seebeck's genius in connection with a faculty position [in Heidelberg]. There is probably nothing to fear in this regard. He is an intelligent man. If a certain brittleness should perhaps appear in him, it is not exactly due to genius. He has since talked to me of the fact that he had declared himself to Schelver prepared to

accept a *nontitular* professorship, but—so as to have nothing to do with faculty and senate concerns—not a titular professorship. He furthermore declares that if he should have to lecture on astronomy—like Fries—it would be no position for him. Upon my comment that he could not claim much of a salary as a nontitular professor, he concurred. Since chemistry has its own professor, he would be restricted to a single lecture course on experimental physics. I must have advised him a hundred times to go to a university and lecture there, whether publicly or privately, on branches of physics or the entire subject. He would thus have likewise seen for himself how the lectures suit him. To you I may give my opinion of his genius: he has a mediocre mind. He has mastered mathematics—presently considered an essential component of physics—only insofar as he has strenuously worked up elements of the subject arising in connection with the objects of his experiments. I see a possibility of treating experimental physics without mathematics, or with little. But it takes talent to give it such a—if I may use the expression—novel form and elaboration, and to eliminate all the attendant awkwardness. If I am to voice an opinion, there is nothing lacking to establish his usefulness [as a teacher] except the fact that he has not yet proven himself, whether to others or to himself. But this is said *strictly between us*, and not merely in the sense in which one commonly says “strictly between us” to everyone. Schelver and Boisserée will have a completely different opinion. Yet because you have asked me, I have given you my opinion.

I have just learned from your wife's letter that you are departing already on the 18th or 20th. If you stay only two weeks in Swabia we will find you already back in Heidelberg. But do not allow us to deprive you of a single day among the Swabians, who—even if they are not exactly stupid—are yet, despite all that is said of them, particularly in need of intelligence [*Verstand*], alongside much else. Extend especially cordial greetings to dear Emmi. We look forward to her as much as only she can look forward to us. Yours, Hegel

Mr. von Reizenstein is, I hear, in Bayreuth. Seebeck told me that [Prussian] Minister [Karl Sigmund] von Altenstein wants to write to von Reizenstein on his behalf. Seebeck at present has no great hopes for himself in Berlin. I will myself soon write to Mr. von Reizenstein as you have instructed me.

Hegel to Paulus [310]

Nuremberg, October 13, 1816

The coachman was scheduled for the 11th. Assuming you are back in Heidelberg, we were to have been far closer to you, dear friend, than Nuremberg, where I write these lines. I am writing this letter just in case it reaches you there in time for me to receive a reply. My wife, exhausted by the strain of packing, has had a premature delivery. All considered, she is now in pretty good shape. But it is still uncertain whether she will be able to accompany me should I wait until the very last departure date, or whether I shall have to travel alone. I wanted to ask you for exact notification and instruction as to this date. You have written me that the lectures I see announced for the 21st actually begin on the 28th. It is important even from the economic point of view for a new university lecturer to be there on time.

Is not, moreover, an inaugural public lecture [*Vorkollegium publicum*; *Werke* XVII, 19-22] customary to introduce oneself, as it was in Jena? A notice on the bulletin board will in any case be customary. Daub has for the present set the hours for my lectures arbitrarily; their convenience in relation to other lectures will still have to be ascertained more exactly beforehand. I will have to set up a lecture hall with accessories and so on wherever possible in my house, or will have to take care of this elsewhere. So what might be the absolute latest date that would not be disadvantageous for me? My wife could not leave before the 21st or 22nd, and we could then arrive the 24th or 25th. This would be somewhat late. If in a few days I see that she will not be able to accompany me by that date, I will depart earlier by myself without waiting for your answer. If I receive your reply by the 19th or 20th, I can arrive a few days earlier than indicated above. If it is perhaps customary to post notice already on the 21st or earlier, I might ask you to take care of a preliminary notice, in part to confirm the certainty of my arrival and in part to indicate more precisely that I will lecture on the encyclopaedia of philosophy five times weekly and use the sixth hour for a discussion session combined with written exercises. Should you deem it necessary or advisable to indicate other suitable lecture hours—I only have the philosophy section of the lecture schedule before me—please do so. Philosophy must always get out of the way of classes aimed at making a living—particularly, no doubt, in Heidelberg, where the much preferable rule of Bavarian universities making philosophy lectures obligatory is not followed. Is not 6:00 to 7:00 p.m. a customary free hour there? A teaching assistant will likewise be needed. All these conditions and considerations could easily be taken care of in person if I were there on time. By when is my presence necessary? With what matters that unavoidably must be settled earlier might I charge you?

My wife has addressed my personal effects to Mrs. Bauer, Professor [Georg Lorenz] Bauer's wife and a fellow countrywoman of hers. I have likewise written to Mr. [August] Oswald about this, requesting him to take care to unload and shelter our belongings, and to defray incidental expenses. The coachman has to collect [payment for] the freight here. We wanted to arrive the same day by coach. I hope even the smaller effects will be safe in our apartment.

My wife asks your wife in particular to tell the maid of our later arrival. Nothing should be unpacked. If possible a few tables should be procured for everyday use. They should be made of soft wood whether painted or not. It would be a great favor if I could soon obtain a work table to be set up beforehand in my room, one like those found in the chancellory here: about five feet long and made of soft wood. You see in what predicament we are in. I have pointed out a hundred times to my wife how everything on my side has already been made ready, while she for her part has put the fly in the ointment! For the present, farewell. Please remember me to all my friends, and include us in your prayers. Yours, Hegel

HEGEL FINALLY TRAVELED to Heidelberg without his wife. Writing to her upon arriving, he noted rather modest enrollment in his classes. His predecessor, Fries, he later explained, had allowed interest in philosophy to wane [317].

. . . Yesterday I started my lectures, but the number of students certainly does not look as promising as I had been told and fooled into believing. If not perplexed and impatient, I was nonetheless surprised not to find things the way they had been represented. In *one* of my lecture courses I had only four students. But Paulus reassured me that he has likewise lectured to only four or five. . . . In the first half-year upon one's initial appearance, one must be content merely to show up. The students must first warm up to a professor. . . .

THE BURSCHENSCHAFTEN

Hegel's move to Heidelberg in 1816 coincided with the rise of a new German student movement—the so-called *Burschenschaften*. Where in the final Napoleonic years Hegel was critical of the patriotic enthusiasm of the younger generation, after the defeat of Napoleon he was sympathetic with the young men who returned from the wars of national liberation to the universities expecting that promises of constitutional government in the liberated German states would be honored. When this expectation was not quickly fulfilled, an opposition movement emerged in the student subculture. Adolf Julius Niethammer, Friedrich Niethammer's son, in whom Hegel had taken a personal interest in Nuremberg, became—to the displeasure of his father—active in the radical student movement after entering the University of Erlangen in 1815. In 1817 the older Niethammer sent Julius to Heidelberg to pursue his studies under Hegel's watchful eye.

Hegel's second paragraph to Niethammer consummates Hegel's rapprochement with Jacobi, which was first set in motion by Niethammer in 1808 [112]. The rapprochement was more personal than philosophical, however. Hegel continued to view Jacobi's position as inadequate, however decisive its influence on a whole generation. Jacobi's posthumous influence despite the poverty of his philosophy of feeling won epigones such as Fries or Schleiermacher Hegel's contempt.

You could not have given me, my dear friend, any more pleasant news or greater sign of friendship than the announcement in your letter of the 11th that you are going to commit dear Julius to our care. He will be most warmly welcomed. . . . I have grown very fond of him, and you may count on my interest in him and in you. I can imagine you are dissatisfied with the state in which you found him after a year and a half at the university. My father was likewise said to have been incapable of being satisfied with me at that age. Both as a father and in view of your position—with which your earnest will has allowed itself to become too closely identified for your own personal satisfaction—you are obliged to hold to the strict and more abstract demands to be made upon youth. But a third party may also take into account the rights of youth, which has to try out many a thing to learn by experience of its futility. Julius has already been exposed to the stimulus of a

many-faceted life, and in this respect has a maturity normally lacking in one his age. If an interest in science—this scholarly hunger for knowledge and books—was to have been implanted in him, you would have kept him in close confines at home. When one first begins one's studies, a decisive interest is seldom found, and in fact it is better this way. The immediate aim is a definite career, study for the sake of a livelihood. What will happen beyond that is in the hands of the gods—and God knows often with what luck. We know what pains we had to take, and with what ultimate consequences. You and I would like to give something else to our sons, quite apart from the fact that their lives are in any case developing differently. I hope Julius is ready for what is essential, namely to study his subjects diligently, and where possible I will do what I can for the rest as well. There reigns a spirit of diligence and civil conduct among the students here. Our condition is not marked by vast horizons, brilliance, and ambition but by solid proficiency and competence.

After getting this principal matter off my chest, I now pass on to other things and, in the first instance, to my tardiness in writing. Since this winter and vacation I have put off all demands of heart and friendship until I could get to it at my leisure. There is something so sluggish in my nature that even if only a half hour is needed for a letter I cannot get to it until I am freed of other burdens. I cannot make writing letters a business. It is a pleasure, for which I must be free. Moreover, a messenger from you, whom you had led me to expect, has probably been detained en route. [Franz] Baader has not sent a word. Perhaps he still has enough modesty to be incapable of as much bravado by letter as he allows himself orally. But I see that the principal letter [unavailable] I sent to Munich has arrived at its address, and your report that I succeeded in expressing and realizing the intention I had in its composition has given me the greatest satisfaction. I thank Jacobi warmly for his friendly reception of this essay [reviewing the third volume of Jacobi's works—*Werke* VI, 313-47]. But he probably errs about [it displaying] a Prince Eugen-like style, for he is used to a different fare and form from those of a prince and a Prussian queen. [Prince Eugen was an Austrian general]. An *Encyclopaedia* is to be ready by Easter!(?) Six sheets are printed. Copies are ordered for you and Jacobi. What I resent is not so much that God has made us take such pains as that in the end He has not let us complete—according to what we wished and might have been able to do—what we have attained through our struggles.

That [Ludwig] Heller and [Johann] Erhardt have, as I hear, become professors in Erlangen is almost enough to make one die of laughter. By sheer tenacity [*ex ungue leonem*] you have so far felt no further change since the Great Collapse. . . . Another thing is that since I have taken over the editorship of several branches—including theology—of the *Heidelberg Yearbooks*, I urgently and earnestly invite you to collaborate. Last year there was something of a movement among the Protestant ministers in Franconia with a few worthless books which, as insignificant as they may have been in themselves, might nonetheless be of more general local interest. You might perhaps wish to touch on them publicly, whether in your own name or not [no such review by Niethammer available]. Anything else that might interest you should be welcome to me. Just inform me beforehand to

prevent eventual conflicts. I ask you to extend the same invitation to [Karl] Roth in my name. Might I suggest to him Johannes Müller's collected works [*Universal History*, 24 vols, 1818]? Or Friedrich Schlegel's lectures on history [*On Modern History*, 1811]? Would he like to do a resumé of the Pallhusiana [Vinzzen von Pallhausen, author of Bavarian pseudohistories]? As to these latter—and this includes the most recent volume, plus [Karl Theodor] Gemeiner's *Bavaria under the East Franconian Kings* [*History of the Old Bavarian Lands, Their Rulers, and Their Residents*, 1814]—I would wish to receive notification from him beforehand, since we have half promised someone else. The publisher pays a royalty of 16 florins a sheet. As editor I have come to the point of written notification with Paulus concerning his disembowelment of Wangenheim [*Wangenheimium extenteratum*], which with respect to his person [*quoad personam*] was handled spitefully, and with respect to the subject matter [*quoad rem*] was treated in a most philistine and crudely commonsensical manner—even though right on the title page he calls himself likewise a professor of philosophy. But what if he had worked the whole into the *Rhenish Mercury*, which he is in large part writing in Württemberg! I have also seen in it superior samples of Bavariana! He has had the impudence to send his product even to the King and Queen of Württemberg.² He is the God of our Provincial Diets. Tell Roth, if he is still interested, that [Andreas Georg] Rebmann is the new trans-Rhenish support of *Alemannia* [Munich 1815-16]. [Johann Josef von] Görres has been offered a Catholic School Councillorship in Stuttgart!

It only remains for me and my wife to extend a cordial handshake to you and the best of women. Julius will tell us a lot. Lectures will begin on the 28th. Yours, Hegel

CONSTITUTIONAL DELIBERATIONS IN WÜRTTEMBERG

When Hegel replaced Jakob Fries as Professor of Philosophy in Heidelberg in 1816, he assumed editorship of the *Heidelberg Yearbooks* in philosophy and philology. In exercising this function, he rejected the above-mentioned manuscript by Paulus on constitutional deliberations in Württemberg, which was judged too lengthy. The piece—*Philosophical Judgment on von Wangenheim's Idea of a State Constitution and a Few Related Writings*—was subsequently published unabridged by the author at his own expense. Hegel tried unsuccessfully to salvage his relationship with Paulus [313].

The King of Württemberg was displeased by Paulus's privately published essay declined by the *Yearbooks*. When Paulus visited his mortally stricken son in his Württemberg homeland in 1819 he was arrested and deported. Hegel, who was also from Württemberg, devoted the only article—except for the one on Jacobi—he published in the *Yearbooks* to the same constitutional proceedings which occupied Paulus. This 1817 essay shows that Hegel objected to the substance of Paulus's piece, not merely to its length. Paulus supported the Estates in

²Hoffmeister surmises that Hegel means the *Schwäbische Merkur*, J. J. von Görres's *Rheinischer Merkur* having been suspended in 1816.

the conflict, opposing them to the King, while Hegel supported the King. Karl August von Wangenheim, a minister to the Württemberg King, had published *The Idea of a State Constitution*, defending the constitution proposed by the King. Paulus attacked not only von Wangenheim but, indirectly, the King himself in his essay on von Wangenheim's "idea of a state constitution."

Niethammer replied to the first part of Hegel's essay on Württemberg (*Werke* VI, 349 ff) on December 27 [327]. After attacking the Concordat that his government in Munich had recently signed with the Vatican, Niethammer wrote to Hegel: "I bet you would not have written your review [on Württemberg] if you had to face such 'reigning reasons' as I must face." Niethammer congratulated Hegel for defending "a bad cause" with much wit in his justification of the "reigning reasons" of the Württemberg King, but criticized him for failure to appreciate the potential of the new German Confederation, which Niethammer wanted to compare to the Holy Roman Empire destroyed by Napoleon. Hegel had argued in his article that it was impossible to satisfy the wish of the Württemberg Estates to be restored to their old constitution because conditions had radically changed with the disappearance of the old German Empire. The Estates had previously enjoyed control over the so-called "secret treasury," and this had given them quasi-sovereign power vis-à-vis Württemberg's ruler, the Grand Duke. But Württemberg was then an "imperial fiefdom," not a sovereign state capable of decisions such as war and peace. Now, after the transformations introduced by Napoleon and legitimized by the Congress of Vienna, Württemberg was not a duchy but a sovereign kingdom. And sovereignty assigned responsibilities to the state represented in the person of the King that were inconsistent with the former dispersal of power between the Duke and independent self-seeking Estates representatives. Niethammer, however, saw the new German Confederation, presided over by Austria, as a mediator between the Estates and the King, controlling the excesses of both. He accused the King of arrogance in claiming a monopoly on "reason incarnate." The Estates claimed no such monopoly. They, too, wanted to be rational, "but they simply did not want it dictated to them like a preceptor dictates an exercise." It was not only their right but their obligation to put in their two cents worth. But their verbiage was endless, and when they refused to listen to reason and cut short the twaddle, force was the King's only recourse:

Who shall reconcile two courts when both are courts of "last" appeal and yet disagree? I should think that, if they are "rational," agreement could be reached by voluntary appeal to a third party, which—should it not already legally exist as the former Empire—can be made, constituted, and organized out of concrete reason! And, finally, were they not already close to a conclusion when the rude and imperious authority [of the King] intervened "nonrationally" [to cut off further deliberations]? [327]

Hegel replied in January 1818 [329] that whereas the "reigning reason" Niethammer confronted in Bavaria was in the King's government, in Württemberg it was appropriated by a corporation of scribes within the Estates themselves. These scribes or recorders controlled the Estates Assembly and state funds for personal

profit. Hegel elaborates on this point in the concluding part of his essay in the *Heidelberg Yearbooks*, which he sent with his letter. However, Hegel evades the issue of Württemberg's sovereignty raised by Niethammer. During the Napoleonic years Hegel had no difficulty seeing through the pretense to sovereignty made by the French Emperor's satellite states [103]. Yet the premise of the 1817 essay is that Württemberg is sovereign. Hegel's defense of the sovereignty of states against the more democratic pretensions of the provincial Estates Assembly supported by Paulus was noted approvingly by the Duchy of Baden, which arranged for inexpensive distribution of the essay (*Heidelberg*, 623). Niethammer, however, could counter that Hegel's statist viewpoint violated Hegel's own principle of "concrete reason." By Hegelian logic, only a universal state viewed as a compulsory arbiter or middle term could qualify as concretely rational. But Hegel recoiled from a mere "ought" (*Werke* VII, 34). After the Great Collapse [316] of Napoleonic Europe, the nation-state had been spared (*Werke* XVII, 20). To have pursued the Kantian dream of voluntary Confederal arbitration would have been pure romanticism. Hegel now conceded more to the Restoration than the year before, when he dismissed it as purely superficial [271]. Reason had to accommodate itself to positivity, to the fact that in the post-Napoleonic world no universal or even pan-Germanic federal authority existed or was even sought by the Estates, whose cause Niethammer championed. To opt for the sovereignty of limited states is rational if the alternative is the sovereignty of corporations even more limited.

Hegel to Paulus [313]

January 19 [1817]

In sending the material you demanded, I cannot refrain from returning once more to yesterday's conversation. Nor can I refrain from repeating my request that among all the relations your collaboration with the *Yearbooks* has entailed thus far—your relation to the publisher, to the editorial arrangement as it happens to exist at present, no doubt to the government which wishes this establishment to prosper, not to speak of the convenient and readily available opportunity to bring whatever you wish in the literary world before the public for its benefit—it may please you to preserve at least *one* relation, your relation to *one* man, the editor, who in this case, I may assure you, has been free of any personal ill will. As for myself, I would at once view this as a personal kindness toward me. Yours, Hegel

Hegel to Paulus [314]

Heidelberg, January 29, 1817

It can only be with reluctance, Privy Church Councillor Paulus, that we should come to the point of an exposition of legal rights in the place of an attitude which from our side, we are convinced, was completely collegial, and which—even more—had started out most amicably in the offer of one of the editors to take the trouble of abridging the review, which was demed too long, should Privy Church Councillor Paulus have seen this as a means of relief. Following such an offer, the request for return of the review previously submitted to the *Yearbooks* by Privy Councillor Paulus was not to be expected. Moreover, the specific request for

legal clarification has surely been satisfied thanks to a statement rendered by Privy Councillor [Friedrich] Wilken, according to which the very concept of the editorship of a journal implies its right to judge whether a contribution once submitted is acceptable or not for publication. This right is acknowledged by the mere fact of submission to the editors.

Professor Hegel feels moved to declare in particular that publication of the review in question has not been rejected without the concurrence of other members of the editorial staff, and that they were in total agreement with him in judging that in the form in which it was presented as a whole it was impossible to accept it.

In sending herewith as requested the well-known published legislative texts, which have long since been communicated to all the editors, along with the likewise requested individual statement of one of the editors, we present our most polite respects. Hegel, [Friedrich] Wilken, A[nton] F[riedrich] Thibaut

Hegel to Niethammer [329]

Heidelberg, January 31, 1818

... The surprise package [Hegel's 1817 essay on Württemberg] I have bestowed on our "fathers of the people," among whom I include godfathers, will of course not be received so well and warmly. You yourself pay me the left-handed compliment of saying that I have defended a bad cause with spirit. I hope the enclosed [concluding] sheets will increase your satisfaction with me. As far as the bad cause is concerned, I for the present know of no worse cause than to transform a good cause, indeed the most noble one, into a bad one through incomprehension. This seems merely to merit the shedding of angel tears over it. I, however, as a mortal human, do not go beyond indignation over it. The other point is that you will find the very spot where the shoe pinches taken on in these sheets, i.e., the race of scribes and their varieties of reason. The difference between your situation and the one I confront is merely that with you the race of scribes occupies the upper levels and naturally does not want to give intelligent heads among the people a chance to talk, while here this species occupies the people's bench and—which is really unheard of—from sheer twaddle has not given even itself a chance to speak! You will also find that this tribe has given no thought to any Federal Diet, but has rather insisted that Württemberg has constituted a closed entity existing for itself. You will furthermore find that it has acted very wisely not to turn to a Federal Diet for an arbiter, which would have scarcely conceded to it as much as the King, certainly not more.

But what is worst of all, however, is the enormous damage these dear compatriots of ours have done to the good cause in Germany. As long as we have been Swabians we have done many a Swabian prank [*Schwabenstreich*], but never before one like this. If you are interested in following our affairs in this as well I will try to make sure that as a reward you receive all the volumes of [Estates] deliberations, plus those of Estates advocate Paulus, who is already working on a refutation [unknown] of my review, and all the anonymous or signed [*onymen*] published defenses. You will at once be obliged to read through them all. From this you will see how probable it is that these fathers of the people were, when they

were finally scattered, really close to a settlement. I have not yet studied this second period, and also will get to it only with difficulty. But I have at least learned from the first period that the character of such Philistines precisely consists in being incapable of arriving at any settlement. Yet enough and indeed too much of this subject, since there is many another concern closer to us of which it would have been better to write. For that I must still add a small page.

Your wishes for Ludwig [Döderlein], of whom I have grown so fond, are for certain fully mine as well. . . .

As for myself the question has become that of my transfer to the north [Berlin]. It depends upon the answer I will receive to my conditions. However, I request you not to reveal yet anything at all of this. I would like to settle the entire matter before my government hears something of it. To be sure, the south is more beautiful, but not all that much ahead. And with you in your natural wasteland it is no more beautiful either. Had you realized one of your plans of which you had earlier informed me that there was some talk, we would not be as far apart as now. Swiss presumption will by now be sufficiently familiar to you for you to know where you stand on that score. . . .

To Jacobi, Roth, and Schelling as well—who as you write is interested in my very unspeculative incidental work [on Württemberg], though in what way I do not yet know—please extend my cordial regards. Yours, Hegel

HEGEL AND PHILOLOGY

Ludwig Döderlein, mentioned above, was Niethammer's stepson, a philologist who studied in Heidelberg from 1811 to 1813, and who from 1815 taught the subject in Bern. Niethammer sought a faculty appointment in Heidelberg for Döderlein and asked Hegel to intercede. Hegel and Döderlein, however, had already entered in direct correspondence. Döderlein expounded upon his approach to classical philology in a missing letter, but we have Hegel [317]. Hegel approvingly notes Döderlein's distaste for mere text criticism and the technicalities of purely grammatical interpretation. Hegel himself was rather free with texts, citing Luther as his authority [278]. To Döderlein he grants that text-critical and grammatical methods are necessary, but insists on the equal necessity of a spiritual interpretation going beyond the mere letter, affording the reader an empathetic reliving of the organic spirit of the age and culture in which the author wrote. Despite Hegel's criticism of the trend to purely linguistic interpretation among philologists [278], his call for spiritual interpretation was not a voice in the dark, but was characteristic of influential German philologists, including Georg Anton Friedrich Ast at Landshut, of whom Hegel spoke derisively in 1807 [80]; Friedrich August Wolf, with whom Hegel was to become friendly in Berlin [396]; and Friedrich Creuzer of Heidelberg, who was criticized in his own time for insufficiently heeding linguistic minutia. Ast was quite explicit that the purpose of classical philology was to grasp the "spirit" of antiquity as expressed in its literature. In their use of "spirit," both Ast and Hegel drew on Herder's idea of the folk spirit. Going beyond the potentially culturally relativistic romanticism of

Herder, Ast, and von Savigny, Hegel generalized the idea of the folk spirit into that of a world spirit transcending and embracing national spirits.

Hegel writes to Döderlein that the folk spirit attains its highest expression in the life of a great man. Pericles expressed the spirit of classical Greece, but Napoleon performed a similar service for Hegel's own age. Thus the "great man" theory of history (*Werke* XI, 59-61) is consistent with the view that the individual is rather always a reflection of his times. The greatness of a world-historical individual is not measured by his idiosyncrasy or divergence from his contemporaries. Writing to von Raumer Hegel had recently spoken against the Romantic prejudice of his own age, according to which a genius is simply peculiar [278]. The greatness of a political genius is rather measured by the extent to which he internalizes within himself and arbitrates between all the contradictory impulses of his time, so that his individual subjective spirit expands to embrace and bring to self-consciousness what the objective spirit of the age requires.

Hegel to Döderlein [318]

Heidelberg, April 29, 1817

I was greatly pleased, my dear friend, to learn from your March letter such good news from you and your dear wife. But since then I have been so pressed by all kinds of business that I had to postpone every letter and reply—no matter to whom. Give your dear wife and little Emilie a truly warm embrace from us. May your enjoyment of the delights of fatherhood which have now come to you remain undisturbed, and may this first pleasure be often repeated. The unexpected death of your father-in-law [Gottlieb Hufeland, law professor in Jena and later in Bavaria] grieved us deeply, and from the dates of both his death and your daughter's birth I could note that this loss fell in the same twenty-four-hour period as the new addition to your family.

I am delighted that you continue to study Thucydides, and that you confirm my estimate of Pericles—especially since you direct your study to the momentous content of the great men of antiquity. Philology has presently entangled itself in such an erudite cobweb-spinning and labor of barren industry—so fixing itself into [a concern with] means, externalities, and their unraveling—that its true content withdraws ever further from the unlucky souls who become ensnared by it. Soon the science will surely have worked itself up to the same degree of worth as is possessed by so noble a science as heraldry. You who find yourself in reciprocal interaction with the liveliness of youth have a further external reason to remain lively yourself, and at least to make a place—alongside word interpretation, grammar, lexicography, [text] criticism, and so on—for what the young will continue to cherish the most.

Pericles is such a substantial figure, so rich in spirit as in everything, that you have put aside the impulse to occupy yourself with what is, though important, a side issue. The opposition between the view, on the one hand, that like every great man he is a result of his time and, on the other, that he is a personality existing for himself surely finds resolution in the distinction that must be maintained between personality and particularity. For a personality is all the greater the freer it is of

particularity, and the more clearly it has apprehended, expressed, and carried out the true essence of its time.

Plato, from whom you expect much illumination, will certainly not disappoint you. But equally important is Aristotle, whom one cultivates less—though more justice has been done to his *Politics*.

Since your life is so immersed in Thucydides and Athens, and since philology is among the branches for which I have editorial responsibility on behalf of the *Heidelberg Yearbooks*, you might like to undertake a critical judgment of Poppo's *Observationes criticae in Thucydidem* for the *Yearbooks*. From what I hear it is a preparatory announcement for a new edition of Thucydides. Apart from that I propose nothing in particular, but await notification as to what further publications it may please you to review.

I retained lodging for Julius [Niethammer] here, and have awaited his arrival daily for a week. Professor [Hermann] Henke, who will be kind enough to transmit this letter to you and who is leaving tomorrow, has brought me your fine inaugural address. Much thanks for it. Its style and content immediately pleased me—especially with respect to the above in the matter of content [Döderlein, *De Cognatione, quac intercedit inter philologiam et historicam oratio inauguralis—Inaugural Address on the Relation between Philology and History*—Bern, 1816].

Paulus's and Creuzer's remembrance of you remains undiminished. The latter wanted to write you shortly. My wife and children are well, and she sends her cordial greetings. With affection and respect, yours, Hegel

DÖDERLEIN REPLIED ON JUNE 27, 1817 [320], announcing that the proposed review of Ernst Friedrich Poppo's work was proceeding slowly. Ultimately no such review was published. On December 11 Hegel expressed pessimism to Niethammer about Döderlein's prospects in Heidelberg despite Creuzer's sympathy for his cause. Creuzer advised Döderlein to check prospects at the newly created Prussian university in Bonn. Hegel recommended that Niethammer contact the new liberal Prussian Minister of Education, von Altenstein. Finally, Döderlein moved to Erlangen in 1819.

Hegel to Niethammer [325]

Heidelberg, December 22, 1817

... As to the main question, it could cause no one more pleasure than me to have an occasion to be able to help satisfy your wish and Ludwig's. I have talked about it with Creuzer and then Reizenstein, who was here a week ago. I have entered with both, especially with Creuzer, into the conditions which would make it attractive and feasible. I may in any case completely count on Creuzer's sympathy and candor. The situation, however, is this: in the first place there are already two professors of philology at the university, and so the need cannot generally be established. The more definite aim of engaging another assistant for the philological seminar is restricted merely to a few lessons weekly. You know that this so-called seminar is generally of a looser nature, and in its activity and purpose is less comprehensive. Secondly, the need is chiefly restricted to Oriental literature,

which was to be developed here more for the benefit of the theologians. But, in the third place, this aim would in general require a professor specialized in this field. Such a professor is now being sought for philology, and if Ludwig were as much an Orientalist as a specialist in Greek we would have quickly achieved our end. Furthermore, there are a few young and very skillful philologists available who are *native to the country*. If thought were given to further expansion and an increase in the number of classical philologists, these would be given first consideration. . . .

As I have said above, however, the main thing is the distant need to fill or rather create a post suitable for Ludwig. Creuzer has reminded me in this regard of Bonn. You will easily find an opportunity to contact the present Minister, Altenstein. You surely know that he is an excellent man. It is furthermore essential for Ludwig not to be impatient—as can often happen in such a case—and quietly to continue his work. Greek history, to be sure, can only be the work of a lifetime. Even Creuzer has not yet dared to write one. But Ludwig should extract a single segment of it. An important publication would make him sought after and longed for. This, my friend, is the true situation as it in all respects presents itself.

As for myself, I am delivering this winter three lecture series [anthropology and psychology, natural law and political science, and history of philosophy], which will take up almost all my hours. I am only a beginning university professor. The scarcity of my letters, which in other respects is quite reproachable, can be explained by the fact that for the most part I first have to create the sciences I teach. But all the more often do we talk of you among ourselves—and with Julius, about whom I can only write you complimentary reports. With him it becomes increasingly clear—which can only happen after some time of absorbing impressions—that [certain] points of view and questions intrigue him. . . . [Julius Niethammer later entered the Bavarian civil service and taught political science at the University of Munich.]

Our *Heidelberg Yearbooks* will be set up differently beginning with the new year, at least with regard to myself—if they are not to take on a new form altogether, though I do not yet know what. [No record of such a change available.]

Please extend my most cordial regards to my dear friends in Munich. We have been hoping for a long time to hear more about all of you firsthand from Privy Councillor Jacobi. Please give my most respectful compliments to Mr. von Zentner, assuming you are presently on good terms with him. In his letters here he remembers me very kindly. But how are your further plans faring? You have really put down deep roots in Munich. Is [Count Maximilian Josef von] Montgelas again to assume power? If this is true, would it further influence your decision? I should think not.

COUNT MONTGELAS, WHOM Hegel suspects might resume office, was the pro-French Bavarian Prime Minister during Hegel's tenure in Bavaria. He had been removed from office in February, in part for his opposition to revisions of the 1808 Constitution undertaken to assign a greater role to the representative popular assemblies. Montgelas, who had little sympathy for German nationalism, was accused by the Bavarian Crown Prince Ludwig of "un-German" behavior. Hegel's sympathy for Montgelas [390] was not shared by Niethammer [404].

The above letter [325] shows Hegel's confidence in Friedrich Creuzer, the Romantic classical philologist and comparative historian of religion and mythology. Of the friendships formed in Heidelberg, none had greater impact on Hegel than that with Creuzer, then at the height of his career. Hegel's relation to Creuzer is proof against the supposition that the "mature" Hegel underwent no development. Hegel drew on him in the Berlin lectures on the philosophy of history, of religion, and of art. He was attracted to Creuzer's concept of symbolism, i.e., of the symbolic presence of rational content in even the most primitive religion (*Werke* XII, 417). Articulating the idea of symbolism into the concept of symbolic art, through his contact with Creuzer Hegel overcame the simple bifurcation of art into the Classical and the Romantic, a bifurcation that had dominated aesthetic discussions in Jena (Gadamer, Ch 4). From the Jena romantics Hegel abstracted the idea of the postclassical Romantic-Christian death of art. From the Heidelberg romanticism he deepened his historical periodization of art, conceiving Oriental symbolism as the original, preclassical basis of all true art, of all art with genuine truth content. Building on Creuzer, Hegel distinguished unconscious symbolism from conscious allegory (*Werke* XII, 433-81). More clearly than Creuzer, he identified the original art form with unconscious symbolism, not with the conscious allegorization of the Neoplatonists (*Werke* XII, 418). Since Oriental culture lacks a conceptual grasp of the truth, unconscious symbolism is the only access it has to the truth eventually expressed in philosophy. Unconscious symbolism conveys still inarticulate philosophical truth. It is created by thought, and communicates thought—but a thought which remains dim and unselfconscious. Hegel renounces any claim by formal philosophy to a monopoly on truth. He borrowed from Creuzer the idea of a primitive Oriental monism running symbolically through all true religion, expressed in Indian mysticism, preserved in the Greek mysteries, lying behind classical Greek polytheism (*Werke* XIII, 63, 68), implicit in classical theism, and coming to self-conscious expression in Hegel's concept of the Absolute as the infinite Incarnation.

Creuzer, who edited editions of Plotinus and Proclus, stimulated Hegel's interest in Neoplatonism. His influence on Hegel is apparent from letters written after Hegel left Heidelberg. When Creuzer sent Hegel the second edition of his *Symbols and Mythology of the Ancient Peoples, Especially the Greeks*, Part I, in 1819, Hegel replied: "Your new description, as likewise your new way of treating mythology, is a source of endless interest to me and the world" [359]. Responding to Part II of the second edition (1820), Hegel wrote: "... in this work you have entirely embraced this immense subject matter and have done so not only with erudition but also with the Idea [in mind], with philosophy and spirit. . . . I cannot tell you how much I feel myself encouraged in my aesthetics by having such a work in hand. . . ." [389]. Reacting in the same letter to Creuzer's edition of Proclus, Hegel expressed enthusiasm for this last of the pagan Neoplatonists, whose beginning systematization of Plato's speculative, trinitarian dialectic made him "the true turning point, the transition from ancient to Christian philosophy" [389]. (For letters 359 and 389 see Ch 17, on Asverus and the Atheism Scare.)

In the first two letters which follow (September 1821, May 1823), Hegel seeks—in vain as it turned out—to arrange a reunion with Creuzer in Dresden, while in the third letter (July 1825) he advises Creuzer in the question of his possible transfer to a Prussian university.

Hegel to Creuzer [400]

Berlin, September 11, 1821

For three weeks I have been ready to start out any day, but am awaiting notification, dear friend, as to when you and [Karl] Daub wish to arrive in Dresden. I now want to depart the day after tomorrow, and cannot in fact hope to find you already there, but may expect news as to when and—above all—whether you will still get there this fall, and whether I am to have the pleasure there of seeing you again. In all this I assume my letter [389], in which among other things I made this suggestion, has reached you.

Your lecture courses as well as your Proclus—I have everything in hand through the twelfth sheet—will as far as you are concerned now be finished. Should something not be finished, I will help you complete it in Dresden if you can use me.

Resolve for once to leave behind the whole realm of scholarship. You will find yourself refreshed. [Karl] Leonhard, I hear, will finally make it to Berlin. Could you travel in his company, say, to Weimar? Whether you can then accompany him all the way to Berlin we can decide in Dresden. From Dresden I intend to go for a few days to the Bohemian spas. Write to me in Dresden in care of Professor [Karl August] Förster at the Blue Star. I will reserve quarters for both of you there. It is very inexpensive. The rest orally. Yours, Hegel

Hegel to Creuzer [450a]

Berlin, May 6, 1823

The bearer of this letter, Mr. [Albert Friedrich?] von Hagen, has finished his studies and is about to take a trip through southern France and Italy. He is a very well-bred and learned young man, and wishes to have a few lines from me in hand with which to introduce himself to you, my dear friend. In part because of the opportunity of letting you hear from me again and of inquiring about you, I do not wish to refuse him. Dr. [Karl Ludwig] Blum's shortly expected return will bring us news of our friends in Heidelberg and perhaps a few lines as well. We will at least be able to hear from him how our friends there have gotten through this bad winter. I had kept fairly fit, though toward the end [of the winter] I found myself tired. Yet I was restored to strength during the vacation; and I hope spring, which arrived here a few days ago, will do me further good.

The last time we were in communication [400], the question was communication that never materialized. I received the two letters [428, 429] you sent me in which you indicated the decision and arrangements you had already made for a different trip. I cannot say how much I have been pleased by this rapid excursion of mine through Belgium and Holland [Ch 22]. I hear you have likewise been happy with your trip to Munich, and with Munich itself. I thus hope the experience may contribute to making the effort of a trip to Dresden seem easier to realize. I do not

know whether you have already been there. If this will be your first time to get to know Dresden's treasures [Ch 23] by direct inspection, I can guarantee that you as well will go away most satisfied; and to spend a few days in your company will be of the greatest interest to me. If you for your part are able to take Daub along with you, I hope for mine to find [Philipp Konrad] Marheineke [Ch 19, second section] inclined to accompany me.

By the way, last winter I spent much time in your company, and the same holds true this summer. Both my lectures on the philosophy of world history last winter and my renewed occupation with aesthetics this summer are related to your symbolics in so many ways that I am drawing from them the most abundant substance both in materials and in thought content. I have reason to be grateful to you for it in many ways. We no doubt would have much to discuss regarding the relation in which my philosophical activity for the rest stands to many another thing that is here and well received, that is indeed here but not well received, or that is well received and yet is nothing at all. There would also be much to say as to how otherwise this situation is faring in itself. But all this would take too long in a conversation conducted in correspondence. Anyway, I do not really feel a strong inner urge to get things off my chest in this regard. For the diffuseness of our existence here has the advantage of leaving us for the most part untouched by it all—except insofar as one wishes to be touched by it—and of permitting one to keep it pretty much at arm's length. In this connection something or other is always happening, including new items of interest and great significance. It has now been decided to build our big museum. It will begin this spring. The King has earmarked 100,000 thalers for it. In recent days I have gone through General [Johann Heinrich] Minutoli's collection of Egyptian pieces, which the King has now acquired for 22,000 thalers in gold. I wished you were there. The most beautiful mummies, dozens of idols a foot and a half high, hundreds of smaller ones, including thirty in wax a finger's length—the remaining ones of porcelain, clay, wood, especially bronze, and so on [446].

You will have heard of [Friedrich] Wilken's illness. His condition remains unchanged. A consultation between four of the most distinguished physicians a few days ago resulted in no decisive conclusion other than that his illness is a *cachexia nervosa* [nervous breakdown]. To this extent his illness is not just simple madness, since he is physically ill, indeed chronically so—but with an illness the doctors do not know how to characterize except by this fancy label.

From Estonia I have received reports about [Franz von] Baader [Ch 21] that might interest you: he has not received permission to continue his trip from there to Petersburg, but still awaits it from around Polangen, having been turned back across the Russian border. A few weeks ago he sent Marheineke the manuscript of a second volume of *Fermenta cognitiones*. He wants it printed quickly to send it to Petersburg.

[Hermann] Hinrichs [Ch 18], I hope, will do well in Breslau. Surely for the time being he has his work cut out for him procuring room for himself in this forsaken nest of gymnasts [i.e., followers of German nationalist Friedrich Ludwig Jahn] and laying his cuckoo's eggs in it. Now that the friends to whom you have

recommended him there have realized he is not going to allow himself to be enlisted in their gang, he expects little better from them than that they spare no pains in seeking to crack those eggs apart. Should his wife still be in Heidelberg, you could help out in a very good work by assisting her with her departure. My sincere greetings to Daub and [Anton Friedrich] Thibaut. Yours, Hegel

Hegel to Creuzer [493]

Berlin, July 29, 1825

Long ago I admittedly should have responded, my dear friend, to the repeated evidence of kind remembrance and even of growing confidence which you have given me. Yet with each day that passes I fall ever more deeply into a sort of lethargic life of habit—a mood deluding me into trying to wait for the right time, a time of leisure without external distraction, to write a letter to a friend such as yourself, so that I am free truly to enjoy my interchange with you. But I have already waited so long without finding such a time that I must write now, even if less satisfactorily and more briefly [than I would wish], so as not to delay my reply inordinately.

First about your situation and the concern. Nothing could have been more painful to me than seeing the tensions and even outrages casting a cloud over your external situation and frame of mind. But the evil spirit—which rages and spreads poison against you, and now even operates against you in the name of official relations—is in control more or less everywhere. The same spirit has been spreading here just as extensively, and I spare myself annoyance and vexation chiefly by keeping to myself and refraining from working on behalf of interests which would be dear to me. For the attempt to so act would be misunderstood even by the well-intentioned party, seeing that such action exceeds my authority. This well-intentioned party itself treads softly. Above all it takes care not to do anything that would lack a more direct motive, or would meet with great opposition on the level of common talk and gossip if not on that of official action. And even when the well-intentioned are determined to make a stand, they still often give in when things come to a head.

In saying this you have my response to several points on which I would be accountable for an answer—and most immediately my response to your wishes on behalf of [Johann Christian] Bähr. If he were already a *Privatdozent* at a Prussian university, his further promotion would come automatically. But since he would be coming from the outside without any connection with the special needs of some university, it would be more difficult. It is indispensable, however, that he be officially nominated. Since he thus far has no official capacity with us, he can succeed in this only by stating his wishes in a letter accompanied by a book to the Minister or even a councillor—chiefly of course Privy Councillor [Johannes] Schulze, who is in charge of such matters.

Your own situation, on the other hand, is different and indeed quite the opposite—but even for you the most direct approach is a letter to Minister von Altenstein, who at present is at the spa in Kissingen. Such an initiative is useful, even necessary. If anything should ever become known of this in Karlsruhe, only

the force of your indignation could be inferred, and this surely can do no harm. At least I know that there has been very serious talk of you, and that the Minister is said to have declared himself very definitely *against* your opponents—but the necessary funds were lacking, having been squandered little by little for other purposes. Yet resoluteness was perhaps also lacking. It has for the rest frequently happened that a matter has dragged on even for years to the consternation of the individuals involved, at the price of letting opportunity slip away before any deep regret arises—which in any case comes too late. Thus, with respect to taking some initiative, my advise is to write that letter, for it will force a decision one way or another.

Have you heard of [Karl Friedrich] Heinrich's malicious carping in Bonn? You probably have, for the explanations and counterexplanations have been carried forth in the local newspapers. According to what I hear for the time being, he [Heinrich] has been suspended. What happens to him next, whether the matter goes as far as dismissal, depends on the further course of legal or disciplinary procedure.

You write that [philologist August] Boeckh here probably has nothing against you personally. I do not know, but like you, I suppose he does not. An individual after all does not count for so very much. But you as well as I know how oppressive and even embarrassing a loftier view and treatment of the ancients—as also of history, theology, and other subject—is for many when it touches upon their particular fields. Experience has given me sufficient confirmation of this in all fields of specialization.

But enough of this. I have just now received a publication *On the Purity of Music as an Art Form* [1825] and believe I have [Anton Friedrich] Thibaut himself to thank for it [see following section]. I ask you to please tell him so, and let him know of the unanimous approval his writings enjoy among friends. One individual spoke out against it, probably because he took some of the criticism to refer to himself, or at least failed to find mention of himself as excluded from criticism. Please be so kind as to add, along with cordial greetings from my wife to him as well as yourself, that [composer Karl] Fasch's *Mass*, which is the private domain of [Karl Friedrich] Zelter, cannot be procured by inheritance. But Thibaut should come here, and can then hear it performed. Now my cordial farewell. I refrain from inviting you to visit us here. If only heaven were to grant us the unexpected pleasure of seeing you here! But short of that I do not count on it. Yours, Hegel

P.S. Please forward the enclosed to Mr. [August] Oswald [Heidelberg publisher of the 1817 *Encyclopaedia*]. My most sincere compliments to my friend Daub.

HEGEL'S LETTER of May 1823 [450a] to Creuzer is notable for its glowing description of Egyptian antiquities being assembled for display in Berlin. The art treasures were collected by the Prussian General von Minutoli, who had been sent on an official mission to Egypt in 1820. The art historian Gustav Friedrich Waagen was called to Berlin in 1823 to organize the Royal Museum of Egyptology.

Berlin, April 2, 1823

I am sorry, dear friend, not to be able to see you this evening at my home. Tomorrow morning, however, I am promised a chance to see the Egyptian antiquities of General von Minutoli. I have arranged to extend the permission to you as well. If you feel like coming along, kindly be here tomorrow morning [Saturday] before 11:00 a.m. As for myself, I at once look forward to drawing instruction from seeing the collection under your guidance. Yours, Professor Hegel

P.S. By the way, for now tell no one of this visit.

A. F. THIBAUT AND THE HISTORICAL SCHOOL OF LAW

Apart from Creuzer, another lasting friendship formed in Heidelberg was with the jurist Anton Friedrich Justus Thibaut. In April 1817, Hegel wrote to Frommann: "I have amicable, almost familiar relations with Thibaut. He is an upright and honest man" [318]. Hegel and Thibaut had been colleagues in Jena but did not come to know each other well until Heidelberg. While still in Nuremberg, Hegel was called upon by Paulus to assist Thibaut with a bibliographical reference needed to complete a manuscript [220]. Hoffmeister surmises that the manuscript was Thibaut's *On the Necessity of a Universal Civil Law for Germany* (1814). This work sought to build on what was best in the Napoleonic codes, and to develop and legislate a system of uniform law for all Germany, promoting both commerce and German patriotism. The writing called forth a strenuous reply by Karl Friedrich von Savigny: *On the Vocation of the Present Age for Legislation and Jurisprudence* (1814), which attacked the arrogance of presuming to create new law, and which quickly made von Savigny the head of the Romantic historical school of law. This school, founded by von Savigny's teacher Gustav Hugo, strove to take jurisprudence away from the philosophers who, like Hegel, were still responsible for teaching "natural law," and to give it to philologically trained historians. Von Savigny held that the vocation of so-called legislators was restricted to recording the positive law gradually and unconsciously evolved by the folk spirit. The bases of all law is custom. Von Savigny himself, who, like the natural law theorists, was a convinced Romanist in jurisprudence, perhaps did not fully appreciate the relativistic implications of his position. Hegel's follower Eduard Gans in Berlin would seek to restore a universalist philosophy of natural law (Ch 19). Hegel strongly supported Thibaut in his controversy with von Savigny, who was shortly to become his colleague and rival in Berlin. The following note to Heidelberg publisher Christian Friedrich Winter may reflect Hegel's distaste for von Savigny's philological approach to the continuous if unconscious recreation of Roman law through the Middle Ages. But it more likely reflects his greater concern with the law of pagan Rome than with its medieval extensions.

Heidelberg, February 1, 1818

1. On the enclosed slip I send what I committed myself to in shipping expenses. 2. I have been reminded by Professor Döderlein in Bern that the copy of

[Friedrich Traugott] Benedict's *Commentarii Thucydidis* [on Book VIII, 1815] which was ordered from you for him has not yet reached him [see 318]. I thus repeat the order. 3. I here return Savigny's *On Roman Law [in the Middle Ages]* [1815—], since I was mistaken about the aim of this work and had in mind something entirely different. 4. I do request, however, Hugo's history of Roman law [*Manual in the History of Roman Law to Justinian and Manual in the History of Roman Law since Justinian*, 1818 printings]. 5. I wish to keep Bugner, *Skizzen* [?]. 6. I also request Fichte's *On Consciousness* [i.e., *Tatsachen des Bewusstseins*, 1817], which was published a few months ago, likewise to be billed to me. I returned it by mistake. 7. The same goes for Johannes Müller's volumes of *Universal World History* [1817—]. [See *Werke* XI, 30-32, for Hegel on Müller as a universal pragmatic/reflective historian.] Professor Hegel

P.S. I likewise return the copy of the *Proceedings of the Württemberg Estates Assembly*, Sections I-XXXII. I did not receive Section XXXIII from the book-dealer [see letter 329]. I also return a few other things.

WE SAW HEGEL support Döderlein's interest in Thucydides on April 29, 1817 [318]. In the following months he continued such support. He first ordered for Döderlein the above-mentioned commentary on the climactic eighth book of Thucydides' *Peloponnesian War* in August 1817. [324]

Hegel to Mohr and Winter [324a]

August 20 [1817]

Professor Döderlein in Bern has charged me with persuading you to send him review copies of *Benedicti Commentarii Critici in Thucydidem* and the *Notes* to [Gottfried] Bredow's translation of Thucydides, which have appeared separately. Send him likewise No. 41 from the *Heidelberg Yearbooks* of 1815, pp. 641-56 [review of Döderlein's *Specimen novae editionis tragoediarum Sophoclearum*], and [August] Schlegel's review of [Barthold] Niebuhr's *Roman History* also from the *Yearbooks* [1816, pp. 833-906]. The settlement may be made later by being sent, as an occasion arises among bookdealers, to [Heinrich] Sauerlander in Aarau or Jenny in Bern. Professor Hegel

[P.S.] To be sure Marx's [?] review cannot be accepted.

NEITHER CREUZER NOR Thibaut ever became Hegelians. The one Heidelberg colleague who converted to Hegelianism following Hegel's tenure there was Karl Daub. By the time Hegel arrived in Heidelberg, Daub had evolved from the Kantian theological rationalism associated with Paulus to a Schellingian Romantic theology in collaboration with Creuzer. He expressed esteem for Hegel as early as 1805 [58], while Hegel showed some interest in *Studies*, a journal edited by Daub and Creuzer from 1805 to 1810. The following letter, referring to literary critic Karl Ludwig von Knebel's "absence" from his home in Jena, was likely written before Hegel's move to Bamberg in early 1807.

Hegel to von Knebel [690]

[undated]

I take the liberty of sending you two enclosed parcels in accordance with your kind permission. I at once most gratefully return *Confessions of a Beautiful Soul* [?—see *Briefe* III, 473]. On the whole it has made a very favorable impression on me. Its interest, which does not lie in the complication of situations, is increased by clear and often deep reflections. Yet at first reading the contrast between the time in which the story is placed and the surprising modernity of views and manner of expression is especially noticeable—as is the contrast between such modernity or precise awareness and, on the other hand, "self-portraying" "maidenhood." If in your absence you should leave something of the *Studies* put out by Daub and Creuzer lying around unused, I may perhaps request you to allow it to grow on me to the extent of my ability. With that I wish you as well as your entire travel party a pleasant voyage. Hegel

DAUB'S BOOK *Judas Iscariot or Evil in Relation to Good* (1818-) still represented a pre-Hegelian perspective, dualistically defining good in abstraction from evil. Before the second part of the book could be written, Daub's study of Hegel's 1817 *Encyclopaedia* converted him to a Hegelian standpoint beyond the opposition of good and evil. He continued to deepen his knowledge of Hegel's philosophy after Hegel left for Berlin, and wrote to him on September 30, 1820:

I have been particularly occupied with you daily, almost hourly, since you left us; I have been in your company almost uninterruptedly, and only now recognize the full magnitude of our loss in your departure. I have studied your *Logic* with the most intense application, and only thus has the content of your *Phenomenology of Spirit* at last been fully revealed to me. This content counts for me because of dogmatics and ethics [Moral]. I now believe myself to be prepared, and wish to proceed with confidence to work out the system of dogmatics. For the sake of the others, I look forward with the greatest delight to the appearance of your *Natural Law*, which from what I hear is imminent. [372].

Hegel, replying on May 9, 1821 [387], likewise looks forward to Daub's *Judas Iscariot* as well as his promised works on dogmatics and moral philosophy. But Daub, who by then had become interested in the *Philosophy of Law* for his own sake in overcoming the abstract opposition of good and evil, discourages Hegel from studying his work:

A single note attached to paragraph 140 of your *Philosophy of Law* [where Hegel treats the dialectical inseparability of good and evil] has accomplished more than I have in all my notebooks under the title *Judas Iscariot*. I hope, my dear friend, you will leave them unread. For what could you extract from them that you have not long since gone through and beyond? And where did logical method then still lie waiting for me? In your writings! Only since then, through tireless study—which for a man my age required continuous substantial effort—have I succeeded in mastering it somewhat. I gave lectures on your *Phenomenology of Spirit* this summer. [401]

Daub never published the treatise on morality mentioned on September 30, 1820, and September 19, 1821. His dogmatics appeared after Hegel's death as *The Dogmatic Theology of Our Time: Egotism and Its Wares in the Science of Faith* (1833). It was dedicated to "the memory of Hegel, the departed friend, in the joyful prospect of soon following him." Hegel's confidence in Daub is suggested in the latitude he gave him in editing the 1827 edition of the *Encyclopaedia* [519, 531].

XIV

Berlin

HEGEL'S TRANSITION FROM contempt for Prussia in 1806 [74], through support of Napoleon as late as 1814 [229], to a professorship in Berlin under the Restoration in 1818 superficially suggests opportunistic accommodation. Yet it appears in a different light once it is remembered that Hegel was called to a Prussia still under the leadership, however contested, of State Chancellor Prince Karl August von Hardenberg. In a famous memoir written in 1807 in Riga after the disastrous Prussian defeat at Jena, von Hardenberg repudiated the tradition of enlightened despotism, stemming from Frederick the Great, with which in Hegel's mind Prussia had been associated. Von Hardenberg argued—much as Hegel himself argued in the same year [85]—that the revolutionary principles and institutions of France gave it its strength, and that Prussia could not defeat Napoleon except by reforming itself through assimilating those very principles and institutions. As early as 1807 von Hardenberg thus rejected the program of the Restoration. He called instead for a peaceful revolution from above, giving democratic content to a monarchical form of government. He advocated economic freedom, agrarian reform, religious freedom, constitutionalism, the abolition of aristocratic privileges, and the creation of a Prussian national assembly. Prussia thus undertook to reform itself in the Napoleonic period; and though it did not receive its reforms directly from France, the ideas inspiring von Hardenberg's policies came from the French Revolution. Yet conflict between the ideal of democratic self-government and the statist ideal of a revolution imposed from above was predictable. Von Hardenberg's predominance in the Prussian reform movement eclipsed the importance of Baron Karl von Stein, who had placed greater stress on a populist national awakening and on self-government from below, and who was closer to the Romantic tradition. It was a symptom of the times that as Hegel associated with the Prussian reform movement under von Hardenberg, Schleiermacher—who had been in von Stein's entourage—had withdrawn from governmental functions.

Among those at von Hardenberg's side at Riga in 1807 was Baron Karl Sigmund von Altenstein (not to be confused with the Baron von Stein cited above). Von Altenstein wanted to go even further in reforms than von Hardenberg, though they were both sometimes restrained by a healthy respect for the feudal opposition. Von Altenstein advocated elimination of state support for the church, representative popular assemblies at all levels, locally elected self-administered municipal government, and obligatory public education. In seeking to make school attendance a

legal obligation he had to contend with the opposition of economic interests exploiting child labor in factories and mines. When von Altenstein requested that factories be prohibited from employing children under eight years of age, his predecessor, Schuckmann, now the Minister of Interior, replied that children working in factories represented less of a danger than children working to acquire culture. Von Altenstein had taken a leading part in founding Berlin University in 1811. After relative failure as the Finance Minister in difficult circumstances between 1808 and 1810, he found his true calling after his 1817 appointment to the education ministry. Promotion of higher education was close to his heart. He strove successfully to make Berlin University preeminent in Germany. He sought to recruit the best talent, without regard to philosophical, ideological, or theological orientation. He was not deeply religious personally, and his own efforts to arbitrate theological conflicts were politically motivated. In the 1820s he was to help King Friedrich Wilhelm III in the unification of the Reformed and Evangelical (Lutheran) churches in Prussia. Despite his recognition of Hegel's standing in philosophy, he was not a Hegelian and professed personally to have never gone beyond Fichte.

For Hegel, von Altenstein represented the state while faculty senates embodied the limited countervailing power of self-governing corporations. The present chapter focuses on Hegel's relationship to von Altenstein and the consequences of that relationship: von Altenstein's recruitment of Hegel for Prussia, Hegel's renewed contact with fellow Berlin speculative philosopher Karl Wilhelm Ferdinand Solger, Hegel's activity as von Altenstein's appointee to the Brandenburg Academic Board of Examiners, an 1829 trip to Karlsbad funded by von Altenstein, and Hegel's 1829-30 service under von Altenstein as rector of Berlin University. The final group of letters contains traces of Hegel's celebrity status in the Berlin period.

VON ALTENSTEIN'S RECRUITMENT OF HEGEL

Von Altenstein had been the Prussian Minister responsible for religious, educational, and medical affairs for less than two months when, on December 26, 1817, he wrote Hegel renewing an offer of a professorship in Berlin. The offer had already been extended in 1816 [322], but arrived after Hegel had committed himself to Heidelberg. Von Altenstein's letter of December 26 makes the regret with which Hegel declined the original offer clear:

... the oral declaration you then made to me, my dear sir, and to our common friends allowed me to hope even then that it would nonetheless still be possible to win you for Berlin University after a certain length of time. . . . In assuming top administrative responsibility for public instruction, one of the things closest to my heart is to fill in worthy fashion the philosophy chair vacated by the death of Professor Fichte. . . . I do not underestimate the obligations that may retain you in Heidelberg, but you have even higher obligations to science, on the behalf of which a more extensive and more important sphere of action is available to you here. You know what Berlin can procure for you in this respect. But it should surpass all your expectations if, as I hope, various projects to whose realization I am committed take more definite shape. [326]

Financially, von Altenstein offered Hegel 2,000 Prussian thalers and moving expenses. When Hegel responded almost a month later in the letter below, he noted his delight at von Altenstein's recent appointment. Von Altenstein was considerably more liberal than his predecessor in the post, Kaspar Friedrich von Schuckmann. The historian Berthold Georg Niebuhr and Friedrich Ludwig Georg von Raumer [278, 280] were, like von Altenstein, both members of the reform movement headed by von Hardenberg, and the "friends" who, as von Altenstein mentions, visited Hegel in 1816 included both.

Hegel to von Altenstein [328]

Heidelberg, January 24, 1818

Your Excellency's gracious letter of the 26th of last month, received the 6th of this month, awakened in me the most lively gratitude for continued kind sentiments in my regard. But the importance of the position which Your Excellency has reserved for me and the implied change of my present situation, in which I have just begun to feel at home, inevitably led me to all the more serious reflection. Both my delight in seeing Your Excellency at the head of the educational system in the Royal Prussian States and the confidence placed in me have been of especially great support in moving me to declare my willingness to submit myself to Your Excellency's gracious call to assume the professorship in philosophy at Berlin University with a guaranteed annual salary of 2,000 thalers. In light of Your Excellency's simultaneous assurance of appropriate compensation for travel costs, there remains really very little for me still to wish. My responsibility as a father, however, urges me to present these few remaining wishes to Your Excellency openly, and to ask for gracious consideration of them.

General reports of extremely great differences in the price of necessities in Berlin—especially of the exorbitant cost of house rental—have led me to view inclusion in my salary of a quantity of provisions in kind, as is the case with my salary here, to be an essential advantage. My present salary is thus considerably augmented beyond its nominal value, and would be even more if an apartment could be included. But since I do not know to what extent regulations in Berlin allow such an arrangement, I leave the matter completely to Your Excellency's discretion, and restrict my wishes to claims consistent with the analogous situations of other professors.

Even more pressing for me is of course concern for my wife's and children's fate in the event of my death. The prospect of relief for them which I had through the local widows' and orphans' fund of this land, along with the considerable registration fees and premiums already paid, will be lost upon my departure from the Badenese service. Due to my lack of personal fortune I am not able to dispense with reassurance in this matter. I thus take the liberty of humbly asking Your Excellency to obtain a decision on this from the highest authorities.

Although I have felt able to leave the decision as to the promised sum reimbursing me for travel expenses entirely to Your Excellency's gracious judgment, I nonetheless note that just recently I had to assume at great financial loss the cost of setting up a household, and that after a brief interval I am now to face a

renewed expense of this kind. I must therefore avoid uncertainty about sacrifices which might exceed my resources and specify immediately an amount. Basing myself on the compensation accorded by the Badenese government and taking into account the greater distance of the forthcoming move to Berlin, I thus humbly request of Your Excellency a gracious settlement of 200 Friedrich gold pieces.

Duty-free passage into the Royal Prussian States for my personal effects taken along in connection with my move is an additional privilege I believe I may claim.

I thus look forward to Your Excellency's gracious decisions on these matters so as to be able to give my present government notification and petition for dismissal from its service. I have nothing to add but renewed expression of my feeling of respect and gratitude for the kindness shown me in Your Excellency's gracious letter. The sense of duty in my future calling in the Royal service and my zeal to live up to Your Excellency's personal confidence in me will accompany me always. So please kindly accept once more an expression of my deeply felt respect. Your Excellency's humble servant Hegel, Professor of Philosophy

Mr. Sulpiz Boisserée charges me to convey his regards.

VON ALTENSTEIN REPLIED ON March 16, announcing that Friedrich Wilhelm III had approved Hegel's appointment on the 17th [331]. In a more personal letter accompanying the official notification, von Altenstein excused himself for his delay in replying by invoking the "the Constitution's" requirement of Royal approval [332]. All of Hegel's wishes of January 24 were approved except for free lodging, which was said to be scarce and available only to persons with administrative as well as faculty appointments. Von Altenstein met Hegel's request for moving expenses by offering 1,000 thalers, half Hegel's annual salary, plus payment of the salary from July 1, a couple of months before Hegel's actual arrival in Berlin. Unable to offer Hegel free lodging, von Altenstein gave personal assurance of Hegel's future financial security:

The Ministry believes that you have no reason for concern in this regard—seeing that your subsistence will be well secured here and student attendance at your lectures will surely be high. But if such a reason for concern were to appear in the future, the Ministry appreciates all too deeply the advantage gained through such a profound thinker and academic teacher, steeped in solid science and moved by such earnest and proper zeal, not to contribute gladly all that might be necessary to facilitate your tenure here. [331]

In the accompanying personal letter von Altenstein enticed Hegel with the prospect of administrative functions beyond a simple professorship: "I am projecting a vast transformation of the Royal Academy of Sciences, and hope to have occasion to open up for you a very beautiful [field of] activity, augmenting your revenues in the future" [332].

Von Altenstein also conveyed his sister's offer to help Hegel and his wife in moving to Berlin. The offer was taken up: Miss von Altenstein located lodging for Hegel before his arrival in the Prussian capital [343].

In his March 16 official letter von Altenstein asked if Hegel might arrive for the

summer semester. But because summer lectures had already been announced in the Heidelberg schedule of classes, Hegel was obliged to defer assumption of his new duties until fall.

Hegel to von Altenstein [333]

Heidelberg, March 31, 1818

To the Royal Ministry of Ecclesiastical, Educational, and Medical Affairs:

The Royal Ministry's gracious ordinance of the 16th of this month, received on the 26th, informing me that His Majesty has deigned to approve my appointment as Titular Professor of Philosophy at Berlin University with a salary of two thousand Thalers—plus one thousand thalers compensation for travel, moving, and installation costs—gives me the pleasant duty of formally declaring my ready acceptance of His Majesty's call, and thus of expressing my great appreciation to the Royal Ministry for its effort in graciously obtaining His Majesty's approval of my stated requests.

I likewise most respectfully appreciate the Royal Ministry's kind consent to make up elsewhere for the incidental shortfall in the amount to cover moving expenses, and to allow free entry of my personal effects. I am also humbly grateful for having been informed of the existence of a widows' fund for university professors. I recognize in these proofs of Your Excellency's gracious benevolence both an increased possibility and a heightened challenge to devote myself undividedly—according to my duties and capacities—to the vocation to which the gracious confidence of the Royal Ministry has called me in such a distinguished scientific center [*Mittelpunkt*].

But as to the kindly requested announcement of when I might arrive, the Royal Ministry will see by itself that the fast-approaching onset of the summer session and the prior announcement of my summer lectures at this university have made it unfeasible still to obtain for my move a discharge from the Grand-Ducal service here in Baden until after the presently beginning summer semester. Now that I am enabled by the Royal Ministerial ordinance to take the steps necessary to resign my present situation, I look forward to doing so without delay, and will thus arrange to arrive in the course of the coming September at the site of my new vocation. The Royal Ministry's most devoted servant, Professor Hegel

HAVING RECEIVED APPROVAL of his appointment from the "supreme authority" [328] in Berlin, Hegel requested discharge from the Badenese government [334].

Hegel to the Badenese Ministry of Interior [334]

Heidelberg, April 21, 1818

Having received a call from the Royal-Prussian Ministry to a titular professorship in philosophy at Berlin University, and now having received His Royal Majesty's confirmation of this appointment following a declaration of my own, I find myself obliged to notify the Grand-Ducal Ministry. I also believe I may add

that, beyond the considerable salary increase which inevitably is of utmost importance to my family, it was above all the prospect of a greater opportunity of transferring with further advancing age from the precarious activity of university philosophy instruction to another activity, and of being needed in it, that led to the decision to renounce my present position, which in so many regards I appreciate so highly. I may equally add special acknowledgment of the kindness shown me by the Grand-Ducal Ministry.

Since my lectures for the present summer semester at the local university have already been announced in the class schedule, and since the time could become too short now to find a replacement, I have set the condition that I not have to enter on my new duties before the coming winter semester. I thus request most humbly that the Grand-Ducal Ministry graciously grant my release, effective at the indicated date, from my present post at the local university, and that I be kindly notified of a decision in the matter without delay.

Anticipating gracious approval of my most humble request, I remain with the greatest devotion the most humble servant of the Grand-Ducal Ministry, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Titular Professor of Philosophy.

Hegel to the Restricted Heidelberg
University Senate [335]

Heidelberg, April 21, 1818

I hereby have the honor of submitting to the Restricted Academic Senate my most humble request [334] for release from the Grand-Ducal service, for presentation with its support and recommendation to the Grand-Ducal Ministry. At the same time I make the related request that I be kindly exempted from occupations attendant upon the office of Senator, which has been bestowed on me by this supreme authority [the Ministry] along with the treasured confidence of my colleagues. As little as I would normally be of mind to withdraw from such a function, a valid ground for this request may be found, I believe, in the imminent change in my employment—which would in any case remove me from such activity before the completion of my stipulated term. But an equally valid ground is that whatever assistance I could now still render would be all too meager in view of my inexperience in such matters and in administrative dealings. The knowledge and experience which I might still have occasion to acquire in my remaining tenure here would no doubt benefit me but would no longer benefit the local service. With all due respect I remain the devoted servant of the Grand-Ducal Restricted Senate, G. W. F. Hegel, local Titular Professor of Philosophy.

FACULTY SENATES AS CORPORATIONS

The German university senates of Hegel's time provided a paradigm within his own experience for his concept of a self-governing corporation (*Philosophy of Law* ¶250ff, ¶288ff). The corporation overcomes the individual's isolation in civil society and socializes him with a view to participation in the polity. The state in turn counters the tendency to egotistic isolation within corporations, and it is this restriction of their autonomous self-government that distinguishes them from

medieval guilds. Such cooperation of state and corporation is at work in the following letter—as also in the one above [335]. Hegel notes in the above letter that his appointment to the faculty senate was contingent on state approval, and yet asks for senate support of his release from Badenese service. Below, a few months later in Berlin, he supports an unknown petition, which he had submitted to von Altenstein for state ratification, by citing a faculty senate decision. Professional corporations represented a modest German realization of ideals of democratic participation inspired by the French Revolution and espoused by liberal reformers such as von Altenstein.

Hegel to von Altenstein [353a]

Berlin, December 30, 1818

In my petition [?], humbly submitted on the 21st of this month, the Senate's decree addressed to me on the 16th was designated as *attached*. However, I have just come across it among my papers. I thus take the liberty of putting right this oversight by sending herewith the Senate decree. Your Excellency's most humble Hegel, Titular Professor of Philosophy

K. W. SOLGER

On April 30 [337] von Altenstein had requested Hegel to submit his fall-winter teaching schedule for publication. Hegel responded by contacting his Berlin colleague in philosophy, Karl Wilhelm Ferdinand Solger, so that the two professors could coordinate their lecture plans. Solger replied [340] that he had been teaching logic each winter, plus courses drawn from a cycle giving an overview of philosophy much in the manner of Hegel's own *Encyclopaedia* (1817). The courses specifically mentioned by Solger in his own cycle are ethics, the theory of law, politics, and aesthetics. He denied having sufficient knowledge of the natural sciences, encouraging Hegel to take over the philosophy of nature. Though Solger tentatively planned to lecture on political philosophy in 1818-19, in fact Hegel lectured five hours a week on natural law and political science. He taught another five hours on his encyclopaedia of philosophical sciences in his first winter semester in Berlin (*Briefe* IV/1, 114). A November 1818 note [351a] on the *Encyclopaedia* to an unknown Dr. Adler may well have concerned these lectures.

Hegel to Dr. Adler [?] [351a]

[Berlin] November 2, 1818

Despite a thorough search I have not been able to fully assemble the copy of the *Encyclopaedia*. But I have now placed an order to receive a complete copy in a day or at most a week, and I will have it sent to you in remembrance of me as soon as it arrives. Hegel

SOLGER, WHO SUPPORTED Hegel's appointment to Berlin, concluded his letter on a noticeably friendly note:

May I succeed in winning your friendship once you are here with us. I do not want to make any long prefatory speeches on the profound and inner respect your

writings have always inspired in me. I have taken the task in hand in my own way, along another path, and would hope that it in turn may not be entirely displeasing to you. Perhaps we may work with not only concord but also even understanding, and I would value such good fortune all the more in view of the fact that people are so little used to it. [340]

Solger was not unknown to Hegel, who no doubt first made the younger man's acquaintance at least as early as 1801, when Solger came to the University of Jena to study under Schelling (*Berlin Schrift*, 157). Solger later studied under Fichte, and eventually, was attracted to the mystics.

Solger's mature philosophical position was close to Hegel's own. Solger endorsed the basic thesis of speculative philosophy: Christian consciousness of God is God's self-mirroring revelation of Himself to Himself in and through the historical event of divine self-revelation to human consciousness. Hegel, reviewing Solger's work in an essay published in 1828, nine years after Solger's untimely death, acknowledged the authentically "speculative" character of Solger's philosophy (*Berlin Schrift*, 184). His principal criticism of Solger—as of Werneburg in 1802 (*Ges Werke* I, 106)—was that he failed to give proper systematic development to this principle; he sought to convey the content of speculative philosophy without the proper form. For Hegel the necessary form was of course a dialectically deduced system of categories. But one gathers that Solger would not likely have developed philosophy in such form even had he lived longer. For according to Solger's methodological reflections, philosophy suffered from the coldness of purely logical discourse (e.g., the *Ethics* of Spinoza). To breathe life into philosophy, to make it truly accessible to a wider public, it was necessary to unite it with the charms of art and fantasy and present it in the form of dialogue.

In attempting to revive the dialogue as a philosophical genre, Solger takes the *Phaedo* as his model more than the *Parmenides*, though it is the less literary, more discursive *Parmenides* that for Hegel contained a more authentically dialectical exposition of speculative content. A dialogue that is believably conversational must be an exchange between different viewpoints, not the uninterrupted dialectical development of a single viewpoint punctuated by occasional nods from an interlocutor. Dialectic lacks the dramatic interchange of dialogue. In his 1829 review of Göschel (*Berlin Schrift*, 318-25) Hegel himself will countenance an enlivening of logical concepts through art and pictorial representation. Yet he will maintain that the dialectic of the concept must be developed before a transition to such representation—including, presumably, the dialogue of drama—is permissible. If dramatization is premature, the logical concept cannot be conveyed, because it has not yet been discovered. On the other hand, if the concept has been discovered, its dramatic expression is unlikely to attain the level of great drama. For the dialectically accomplished philosopher-turned-artist, dramatization via dialogue is, if not condescension for the sake of a wider public, an attempted extension of the influence of the concept over the philosopher's whole being (*Werke* XIV, 441). In any case, such art lacks vitality, since—like all art after the Hegelian "death of art"—it fails to meet the artist's own need for further

enlightenment. Hegel did not indicate a way out of this dilemma, which is reflected in the mediocre literary quality of most philosophical dialogues. Despite the lingering temptation of a "mythology of reason," the only coherent reconciliation between the Hegelian system and sensibility comes not from Hegelian artists but from Hegelian art appreciation, "from a cognition of the necessity in the content of the absolute picture-idea" (*Encyc* ¶1573).

Solger, from his own point of view, qualified his admiration for Hegel's speculative depth and wide knowledge with the complaint that Hegel mistakenly took speculative thinking to be the only true form of thought, dismissing ordinary thinking as a "deceptive and in every respect futile fragmentation of speculative thought" (*Berichten* 191). Yet Hegel felt close enough to Solger to decide, after accompanying him to his grave, to join him there in eventual burial alongside Fichte [359]. Hegel found much to draw upon in Solger's aesthetics, and admired his classical taste as upheld against the romanticism of Solger's poet friend Ludwig Tieck.

THE MOVE TO BERLIN

After consulting Solger Hegel sent his class schedule to Friedrich Wilken, the Heidelberg university librarian who preceded Hegel to Berlin in 1817. Von Altenstein, who had asked for Hegel's class schedule on April 30 [337], repeated the request on May 25 [341]; on July 17 Hegel replied that the matter had already been taken care of [343 below]. A second letter to von Altenstein, listing baggage to be exempted from customs duties [345], is dated September 10. This list was supplemented by items cited on September 19 [348]. Hegel asked Wilken to secure his baggage upon arrival in Berlin [346]. The "widow Grabow" whom Hegel mentions here was his first landlord in Berlin, from whom he rented lodging on Leipzig Street. Upon arriving in Berlin he addressed an October 4 request to von Altenstein for the payment of moving expenses and back-salary since July 1 [350 below].

Hegel to von Altenstein [343]

Heidelberg, July 17, 1818

I must humbly apologize for not having gratefully acknowledged earlier the gracious measures of which Your Excellency kindly notified me on May 25 concerning a money order to cover travel, moving, and installation expenses, and concerning payment of my salary from July 1. I wanted to wait until I could specify the time and place for transfer of the first payment, which Your Excellency graciously left me to choose. I have now arranged so as to be able to put off this payment until my arrival in Berlin. Already on June 7th I sent announcement of my lectures for the coming winter semester to Professor Wilken, and my reservation about its timely publication in the Berlin University lecture schedule has now completely vanished with receipt of my decree of release from service to the local government.

... I then at once remarked to Professor Wilken that I thought local Privy Councillor [Franz Karl] Naegle and perhaps [Georg Friedrich] Creuzer as well

might, in view of what they themselves have said on occasion, be won for the University of Bonn. I consider it my duty to mention this to Your Excellency as well. You are familiar with the merits and reputation of these two men—about which I need add nothing. Since the fatherland of Privy Councillor Naegele, who is a native of Düsseldorf, is in the Prussian provinces of the Rhine, I believe I may be all the more convinced of his inclination to accept a call to Bonn.

I cannot thank the gracious Miss von Altenstein enough for her kindness in having assumed the difficult task of renting living quarters in Berlin for an absent family, and in having discharged the task so advantageously for us. I take the liberty for the time being of addressing in this connection a few lines to her along with this letter.

Reverend Karbach [of Berlin] not only delivered to me Miss von Altenstein's letter together with the rental agreement but also conveyed the kind sentiments and intentions which You entrusted to him to convey to me. There can be no more satisfactory prospect for me than to fulfill Your Excellency's intention that I be active in free scientific endeavor. I look forward with cheerful confidence to the moment I can attest to Your Excellency the total respect and devotion with which I have the honor of being Your Excellency's humble servant Hegel, Professor

THE GYNECOLOGIST FRANZ KARL NAEGELE, like Creuzer, remained in Heidelberg. Hegel later suspected that his efforts on their behalf might even have been counterproductive [355]. He retained contact with Naegele from Berlin [e.g. 424].

Hegel to Unknown [424]

August 10, 1822

I respectfully ask you, my dear Doctor, kindly to transmit my most cordial greetings to Privy Councillor Naegele and to tell him that I have put aside the dissertations for him. However, during the period of this sad illness which is keeping my wife in bed—in view of which he surely extends his kind sympathies—it is not possible for me to put the dissertations together and pack them for shipment. As soon as I have some peace and quiet they are to be made ready for him.

Wishing you a safe journey, I am respectfully your most humble Professor Hegel

Hegel to von Altenstein [345]

Heidelberg, September 20, 1818

In the Ministerial decrees of March 16 this year concerning my appointment to the Royal University in Berlin, the duty-free shipment of my personal effects was graciously granted on condition that I submit in good time a petition stating the number of packages. Since I was not able to comply before I had finished packing, I now take the liberty of listing for the packages already sent [measured in local weights]: PHE No. 1: 1 barrel of bedding and household utensils weighing 336 units; No. 2: 1 barrel of the same weighing 264 units; No. 3: 1 box of books weighing 586.5 units; No. 4: 1 box of books weighing 382 units; No. 5: 1 chest of clothing and household linen weighing 172 units.

I add that one barrel with bedding and household utensils (No. 6) of still undeterminable weight will not be sent until my departure on the 18th or 19th of this month. I will also have to take some personal effects in a trunk along with me on the trip. Since it is now too late, whether for this trunk or for the packages shipped a few days ago, for kind authorization to reach me, my humble request to the Royal Ministry is that instructions be given to the inspection officials at the Berlin warehouse—or to whomever the responsible authorities might be—that packages arriving before me be left unopened until my arrival, and that the above-mentioned effects be transferred to me duty-free, according to assurances made at the highest level. I humbly remain the Royal Ministry of Ecclesiastic, Educational, and Medical Affairs' devoted servant, Hegel, Titular Professor at the Royal University in Berlin.

Hegel to Wilken [346]

Heidelberg, September 10, 1818

I take the liberty, my dear friend and colleague, of asking you for another favor before my arrival. On August 29 two packages of personal effects left. . . and three more packages on September 5. I hope they will arrive before me in Berlin. I expect to arrive about the 29th of this month, leaving Heidelberg about the 18th. The Ministry has promised to let my effects be brought in duty-free, and to send authorization upon declaration of the number of packages. Inevitably, however, it became too late to receive authorization here. My notice to the Ministry of both the effects already sent and those still to follow left only today, with the request that the packages arriving there remain unopened until my arrival—which surely would happen anyhow—and then be left for me duty-free. This is the situation. My perhaps superfluous request to you is to see that these belongings do not remain in the open but are brought under cover at the warehouse, and to stop customs officials from processing and opening them before my arrival—which will in any case probably not happen. I have addressed these shipments to myself at the widow Grabow's. Payment for the freight and transportation to my premises must anyhow await my arrival.

From the above you will see best of all yourself what needs tending. Since I must leave this to your judgment, I request this favor. I would assume, to repeat, what needs to be done is merely to charge someone at the warehouse to shelter the packages from the elements.

I will thank you personally in Berlin, where I shall enjoy seeing you again in a few weeks. With the most cordial compliments from me and my family to your dear wife, I remain until then very truly yours, Hegel.

Hegel to von Altenstein [348]

Frankfurt am Main, September 19, 1818

I take the most humble liberty of announcing to the Royal Ministry that, while packing my remaining belongings, I found it necessary to add a small box with clothing and utensils to the packets and trunks already listed September 9. This small box weighs about fifty units and will be marked "PHE No. 7." I thus humbly request the Royal Ministry to grant this packet the same dispensation as the

others, extending the effect of the duty-free entry granted for my belongings. The Royal Ministry's humble servant, Professor Hegel

Hegel to von Altenstein [350]

Berlin, October 4, 1818

The Royal Bursar's Office of Central Treasury of local Royal Scientific Establishments yesterday gave me to understand that it had already on May 25th been authorized by the Royal Ministry to make payment for the travel, moving, and installation costs graciously granted me, including my salary from July 1 to December 2, 1818, but that disbursement of this sum awaits further authorization. I thus take the liberty of humbly requesting the Royal Ministry to authorize the Royal Bursar's Office kindly to make payment, since I have now arrived at my place of destination. The Royal Ministry's most obedient servant, Hegel, Professor at the local university

MORE ON PHILOSOPHY AND THE GYMNASIUM

Even while Hegel was still in Heidelberg von Altenstein consulted him on pedagogical matters having little to do directly with philosophy. Hegel evaluated for the Minister a certain Bernhard Durst, whom Hegel had known as a secondary school rector, and who was a candidate for a post in Prussia [338 below]. In this May 1818 letter Hegel shows the same disparagement of utilitarian vocational studies vis-à-vis classical studies which marked his pedagogical work in Nuremberg. He supported the neohumanistic movement in Prussia as he had in Bavaria. Two years after arriving in Berlin, he was appointed by von Altenstein to the Royal Academic Board of Examiners for the province of Brandenburg. At least in a small way, the Minister thus kept his promise of 1818 to augment Hegel's income and open up spheres of activity beyond teaching. Largely due to Schleiermacher's opposition, von Altenstein had been unable to obtain the membership in the Royal Academy of Sciences and the associated stipend to which he alluded in his 1818 letter to Hegel [343]. Though Hegel was happy to accept the 1820 appointment when first made [371], by the end of 1822 [443] he concluded that the distraction from philosophy resulting from administrative responsibility was not worth the modest increment in income. The job required considerable time. Hegel not only took part in the examination of candidates for teaching positions and for admission to the university but also supervised the final examination of gymnasium students, even correcting examination essays. He expressed general conclusions and recommendations based on his experience on the Examination Board in the April 1822 report below to von Altenstein—which may be compared with Hegel's 1812 report to Niethammer on the same topic (Ch 8, last section).

Hegel to von Altenstein [338]

Heidelberg, May 9, 1818

In accordance with the Royal Ministry's kind request for information on Dr. Durst—former rector of the school at Neustadt an der Aisch—from what I know of him from my earlier service, I honorably reply that I did not attend his examina-

tion as a candidate for an academic teaching post. This examination took place before the regular Examination Board was established, and only tested his qualifications for a modern school [*Realschule*] in the knowledge of so-called [empirical] “reality,” excluding the ancient classical languages. He is known to me as a teacher at an upper-level modern school—the preparatory classes for the modern secondary school—to be well equipped with the knowledge required by his function in history, geography, and the such, as also in the elements of geometry and arithmetic; and who is a clear, lively, and well-educated lecturer with talent. I have had no chance to learn more of his knowledge of ancient languages, since at his school no such instruction was given. All I know of this from the course of his education is that he has studied law, has taught ancient languages as a private tutor, and has given private Latin lessons to a number of pupils to make up for the lack of any such official instruction in this school. In Neustadt an der Aisch as well, where I know the gymnasium has long since been abolished and transformed into a so-called supplementary school, he will no doubt have provided the preparatory Latin instruction set up in such institutions—which are intended to be upper-level public schools—for admission to a progymnasium or even gymnasium.

Having indicated what I know relative to Your Excellency's kind request, I remain the Royal Ministry's most devoted Hegel, Professor of Philosophy.

Hegel to von Altenstein [371]

Berlin, June 21, 1820

I take the humble liberty, Your Excellency, of expressing my most respectful thanks for the confidence shown me in naming me [369] to membership on the Royal Academic Board of Examiners for the second half of the current year. This confidence, along with the gracious words which Your Excellency deigned to add regarding my endeavors thus far by way of discharging my official teaching duties, can only give me great encouragement as, to the best of my ability, I strive to comply with Your Excellency's kind intentions in assigning to me this further function.

With the deepest respect I remain Your Excellency's most devoted Hegel, Titular Professor of Philosophy at the local Royal university.

Hegel to von Altenstein [379]

Berlin, December 23, 1820

I have the honor of giving my most humble thanks, Your Excellency, for the gracious trust shown in me by the decree for the 29th of last month, presented on the 18th of this month, appointing me to the local Academic Board of Examiners for 1821 as well. With deep respect, Your Excellency's devoted G. W. F. Hegel, Titular Professor of Philosophy at the local Royal university

Hegel to von Altenstein [443]

Berlin, December 26, 1822

Your Excellency graciously informed me on the 24th of last month of having deigned to reappoint me for the coming year of 1823 to membership on the Academic Board of Examiners. I gratefully acknowledge the encouraging and

gracious confidence thus shown me. Yet, having shown in the past two years my readiness to answer Your Excellency's gracious call, I believe I may muster from this great confidence the liberty to explain most humbly to Your Highness that the subject of my professorship at the Royal University, even more than with many another scientific specialty, so claims my interest and entire activity—especially if the related need of authoring works is considered—that I feel unable to devote myself with the obligatory interest to an occupation bearing no close relation to my scientific vocation. According to my experience of the past two years, such a heterogeneous occupation affects me as the kind of dissipating, distracting annoyance which is in any case not lacking elsewhere in the external circumstances of life and office, and from which I must out of a sense of duty wish as much as possible to be exempted, even at the price of a supplement to my income.

May Your Excellency therefore kindly permit me to decline this responsibility most graciously accorded me for a third year, and to ask most humbly that Your Excellency make other provisions for the discharge of this responsibility—my part in which in any case requires no considerable ability in a particular specialization. I remain most respectfully Your Excellency's devoted Hegel, Titular Professor of Philosophy at the local Royal university.

Hegel to von Altenstein [*Berlin Schrift*, 543-56]

Berlin, April 16, 1822

The Royal Ministry—in the kind memorandum of November 1 last year in which I was charged to report on the discussion sessions held by Dr. [Leopold] von Henning [Ch 17 on von Henning]—at once deigned, in view of the complaint arising from many quarters that students tend to come to the university without the requisite preparation for the study of philosophy, to give the kindest consideration to my most respectfully submitted observations, and to charge me to express myself officially as to how appropriate preparation might be instituted in the gymnasiums.

In this connection I first take the liberty to note that an arrangement aimed at remedying this deficiency in the gymnasiums could affect only those who attend these institutions before going to the university. However, existing laws instruct university administrations to accept as university citizens even uneducated and ignorant youths, provided they bring with them *certification* of their overall immaturity. The former arrangement at the universities whereby the dean of the faculty to which the prospective student applied undertook to examine the applicant, though it had admittedly fallen to the level of a mere formality, nonetheless always left to the universities the option and right of excluding totally uneducated and immature individuals. If a regulation which can be extracted from the university statutes here [in Berlin]—Section VIII, Paragraph 6, Article I, page 43—might appear to conflict with the above indication and practice, the effect of this regulation is nonetheless suspended through the more recent ruling in the edict of 12 October 1812 on the examination of pupils entering the university—to which actual practice conforms. As a member of the Academic Examination Board with which it has pleased the Royal Ministry to associate me, I have been able to see

that the ignorance of those obtaining an academic report to enter the university comes in all degrees, and that what was an all too accommodating preparation for a more or less considerable number of such persons in some cases should have begun with the spelling of the mother tongue. Since I am also a professor at the university here, I can only be alarmed for both my colleagues and my own account in experiencing such a total lack of knowledge and education in university students, especially when I reflect that it is our vocation to instruct such persons, and that we are responsible if the aim and the expense to the universities undertaken by our most respected Government are rarely met with success. The aim is not only that those who leave the universities be trained vocationally, but also that their minds be formed. That likewise the honor and esteem of university studies are not enhanced by the admission of such totally immature youths needs no further elaboration.

I respectfully permit myself to indicate here to the Royal Ministry the experience I have gathered on the Academic Examination Board. The intent of such examinations is that those found not yet appropriately prepared for the university be *informed* by a certificate of the extent of their knowledge, and thereby be at once *advised* not yet to attend university, so as to make up for their deficient preparation first. That aim, however, does not usually appear yet to be attained. For, those who take the examinations and receive certification of their ignorance are not thereby told anything new. Rather, with the full realization that they understand nothing of Latin or Greek, mathematics or history, they resolve to enter the university, and upon taking this decision seek nothing from the Board but to procure by this very certificate the right of matriculation. Such a certificate dissuades such persons from entering the university all the less inasmuch as, regardless of its content, it on the contrary accords them the very condition of university admission.

Passing on now to the more specific topic indicated by the Royal Ministry, namely the *preparation, in gymnasiums, for speculative thinking* and philosophical study, I find myself obliged to start out from the distinction between *more material* and *more formal* preparation. Although the former is at once indirect and more distant, I may consider it, I believe, the true foundation of speculative thinking, and thus cannot pass over it here in silence. Since it is precisely gymnasium studies which I would nonetheless consider the material part of such preparation, I have only to designate the subject matters and to touch on their connection with the aim here in question.

The *one subject matter* which I should like to consider to this purpose would be the *study of the ancients*, insofar as the feeling and representation of youth is thus introduced to ethical principles and piety [*Religiosität*] through the great historical and artistic perceptions of individuals and peoples, their deeds and destinies, as also their virtues. But the study of classical literature can truly bear fruit for the spirit and its deeper activity only insofar as in the higher gymnasium classes formal linguistic knowledge is viewed more as a means. Such [formal] material should come to the center of attention only at the university, where the more scholarly dimension of philology is reserved for those who wish to devote themselves to philology exclusively.

The *other material*, however, not only embraces for itself the content of truth—which at once constitutes the interest of philosophy in the specific sense of knowledge—but also an immediate connection with the formal [content] of speculative thinking. From this viewpoint I would mention here the *dogmatic content of our religion*, insofar as it not only contains truth in and for itself but contains it upheld to such a degree vis à vis speculative thinking that it at once contradicts the understanding and defeats mere argumentation [*Raisonnement*]. But whether this content is to have a preparatory connection to speculative thinking will depend on whether church dogma is treated in religious instruction as something merely historical—so that true, deep respect for those dogmas is not generally implanted—or alternatively whether attention is chiefly directed to deistic generalities, moral teaching, or even mere subjective feelings. Such a mode of instruction cultivates rather an attitude of opposition to speculative thinking. The self-conceit of the understanding and of caprice will be put first, either leading immediately to simple indifference to philosophy or falling into sophistry.

Both of these—classical intuitions and religious truth insofar as it still consists in the old dogmatic teachings of the church—I would view as the substantial side of preparation for philosophical study. Indeed, I would even claim that when the sense and spirit of youth are not filled with it there remains to university study at this late date the scarcely soluble problem of for the first time awakening the mind to substantial content, of overcoming an already established vanity and orientation toward ordinary interests, which otherwise, as a rule, so easily find satisfaction.

The real essence of philosophy would have to be placed in the addition of *speculative form* to such solid content. But that the teaching of philosophy is still to be excluded from gymnasium instruction and reserved for the university needs no elaboration by me, since it is already presupposed by the Royal Ministry's memorandum.

What remains for gymnasium instruction is the middle term, which is to be seen as the transition from representation of—and faith in—solid material to philosophical thinking. This middle term would be placed in a preoccupation with *general representations* and, more specifically, with *thought forms common* to both purely argumentative and philosophical thought. Such preoccupation would in part enjoy a closer connection with speculative thinking, inasmuch as the latter presupposes practice in moving about in abstract thoughts for their own sake, without the sensory material still present in mathematical content. But in part the connection lies in the fact that the thought forms of which instruction is to give knowledge will later be used by philosophy, inasmuch as they constitute a major part of the material which philosophy works up. But precisely this *acquaintance* and *habitual* [association] with *formal thoughts* should be seen as the more direct preparation for the university study of philosophy.

Concerning the more determinate sphere of knowledge to which gymnasium instruction in this respect is to be restricted, I should like first expressly to exclude the *history of philosophy*, although it is just as frequently presented as immediately suitable for this purpose. But the history of philosophy, when it does not

presuppose the speculative idea, usually becomes nothing but a narration of accidental idea opinions, and easily leads—indeed at times one might view such an effect as its aim, the very purpose of its recommendation—to a derogatory, contemptuous opinion of philosophy. It encourages in particular the representation that all has been mere vain endeavor in this science, and that it would be a still more vain endeavor for academically minded youth to occupy itself with it.

On the other hand, among the areas of knowledge to be taken as open to consideration for purposes of preparatory instruction, I would like to mention: 1. so-called *empirical psychology*. The representations from sensations of the outer senses, from the imagination, memory, and the further faculties of the soul, are indeed for themselves something so familiar that a lecture restricting itself to this would easily be trivial and pedantic. But, on the one hand, such matters could all the more quickly be removed from the university were they already dealt with in the gymnasium, while on the other hand they can be restricted to an introduction to logic, where mention of mental faculties of a different sort from thinking as such must be made anyway as a preliminary. Concerning the external senses, images, and representations, and the connection or so-called “association” thereof, concerning further the nature of language, and above all the difference between representations, thoughts, and concepts, there is always much to be said that is interesting and to that extent useful. But if attention were called as well to the participation which thinking has in intuition and so on, the more ultimate subject matter would thereupon provide a direct introduction to logic. 2. Yet the *first principles of logic* should be seen as the chief subject matter. If speculative meaning and treatment are left to the side, instruction in the doctrine of the concept, of judgment and of inference with its various types, of definition, classification, proof, and scientific method, could be extended entirely in the former manner. In the doctrine of the concept, familiar determinations belonging more precisely to the sphere of the former ontology are taken up. In part, such determinations are also as a rule taken up in the form of the “laws of thought.” It would be advantageous to add here acquaintance with the Kantian categories—i.e., so to speak the basic concepts of the understanding—though the further Kantian metaphysic could here be omitted, even if at least a negative and formal view of reason and the ideas might still be opened up through mention of the antinomies.

What argues in favor of including such instruction in gymnasium education is that no subject matter is less capable of being judged by youth according to its importance or utility. The fact that this insight [into its importance and utility] has also vanished more generally is the principal reason why such instruction as was found in earlier times has gradually perished. Such subject matter is, furthermore, insufficiently attractive to induce the young in university years—when it is left to their pleasure to decide on the subjects with which to occupy themselves beyond vocational studies—to study logic. Moreover, there may well be precedent for teachers of the positive sciences to advise students not to study philosophy—within which they as well usually include the study of logic. But if such instruction has been introduced at the gymnasium level, the pupils there have nonetheless at least experienced what it is to get formal thoughts into their heads and [for once] to

have had them. For the young to realize that there is a realm of thought holding forth for itself, and that formal thoughts are themselves an object of contemplation—in truth an object to which the public authority, through the institution of instruction therein, itself attaches importance—is to be deemed a most significant subjective effect.

That this instruction does not surpass the power of apprehension of gymnasium pupils is already indicated by the universal experience of earlier times. And if I am permitted to evoke my own experience, I daily observed the capability and receptivity of these pupils for such instruction while for several years I was professor of philosophical preparatory sciences and rector at a gymnasium. Moreover, I also recall in my twelfth year having, on account of my vocation for the theological seminary of my fatherland, learned the Wolfian definitions of so-called “clear ideas” [*Idea clara*], and in my fourteenth year having mastered all the figures and rules of the syllogism, and knowing them from then on to the present. If it did not mean too great a defiance of current prejudices in favor of independent thinking, creative activity, and so on, I would not be disinclined to propose something of this sort for gymnasium instruction in this domain. For no knowledge—be it even the highest there is—can be possessed unless it is held in memory. It is here where one either begins or ends. But one who does begin here will have all the more freedom and cause to think this knowledge himself. Beyond this, a stop could thus most surely be put to what the Royal Ministry justifiably wishes to avoid, namely to see philosophical instruction in the gymnasium lose itself in a hollow system of formulas or exceed the limits of school instruction.

[Addition to the text:] Knowledge of logical forms would not merely be suitable to the aforementioned aim, inasmuch as occupation with them already gives exercise in dealing with abstract thoughts. Rather, these logical forms are forthwith already provided as the material, which is then handled in its own way by speculative thinking. The twofold task of speculative philosophy—first to bring its material, the universal thought determinations, to consciousness and raise it to the level of acquaintance and familiarity, and second to attach such material to the higher idea—comes to be limited to this second aspect through the presupposed knowledge and habit of such [logical] forms. One who steps thus prepared into true philosophy finds himself on already familiar home ground.

3. This last perspective is connected with higher reasons for *excluding true metaphysics* from the gymnasium. However, there is one aspect of the former Wolfian philosophy which might be considered, namely, what in *natural theology* has been taught under the label of the *proofs for the existence of God*. Gymnasium instruction will of itself not be able to bypass the connection of the doctrine of God with the thought of the finitude and contingency of worldly things, nor with the references to ends contained in such things, and so on. Such connections will always be illuminating to naïve human sense, regardless of what critical philosophy may object against it. But those so-called proofs contain nothing but a formal analysis of the content which appears of itself in gymnasium instruction. To be sure they stand in need of further improvement through speculative philosophy in order to correspond in fact to what naïve human sense contains in its development.

Preliminary acquaintance with that formal procedure would be of more immediate interest for later speculative consideration.

4. Similarly, in the gymnasium instruction in *morality*, correct and determinate concepts of the nature of the *will* and of *freedom*, of *law* [*Recht*] and *duty*, can be brought in. This would be all the more practicable in the upper-level classes inasmuch as such instruction is linked with the religious instruction which goes through all levels, and which is continued from about eight to ten years. Further, there could appear in our times to be even a greater need to work, by means of accurate concepts of the nature of human and civil obligation, against shallow insight, whose fruit—which has already been borne in the gymnasiums—has called forth such widespread public attention.

Such is the tentative opinion which I respectfully lay before the Royal Ministry concerning the extent *in point of content* of philosophical preparatory studies in the gymnasium. As for the extent with respect to the *time* and *sequences of stages* for the instruction of such knowledge, nothing of what has been mentioned about religious and moral instruction needs to be further recalled in this connection. As for the beginnings of *psychological* and *logical* knowledge, it could be said that if *two hours a week* in a *single* yearly course were devoted to it the psychological section would chiefly have to be treated as an introduction and preliminary to logic. If a similar number of hours, which is to be considered sufficient, were devoted to it—perhaps in three or four half-year courses—more detailed notes on the nature of spirit, its activities and conditions, could be taught, in which case it might be more advantageous to begin with simple, abstract and thus easy-to-grasp logical instruction. Such instruction would then fall in an earlier age, in which youth is still relatively obedient and educable relative to authority, and is less infected by the pretension that, in order for its attention to be won, a matter must be adapted to its representation and the interest of its feeling.

The ever-present difficulty of adding still two more classes to gymnasium instruction is perhaps least objectionably sidestepped through cutting out of one or two hours of so-called instruction in German and German literature, or even better through the abolition of lectures on the juridical encyclopaedia wherever they occur in gymnasiums, and through their replacement with logic lessons. This is all the more advisable to assure that *general* cultivation of the mind, which can be seen as the exclusive mission of the gymnasium, does not appear already to have atrophied, and that training for employment and vocational studies does not appear to have after all been introduced in the gymnasium.

Lastly, as to the *textbooks* that might be recommended to the teachers for such preparatory instruction, I would not know how to present any of those known to me as more excellent than the others. But the material is no doubt more or less to be found in them all, and in the older ones is in fact to be found more amply, more determinately, and less adulterated with heterogeneous ingredients than in the more recent ones. An official memorandum by the Royal Ministry could indicate which materials are to be singled out. I remain with devoted respect the most obedient servant of the High Royal Ministry, G. W. F. Hegel, Titular Professor at the local university.

HEGEL'S WORK ON the Academic Board of Examiners implied close collaboration with Johannes Schulze, the Privy Councillor for school and university affairs who since 1818 had been von Altenstein's most influential advisor in reorganizing the Prussian gymnasium system. Schulze was also a dedicated Hegelian. He viewed Hegelianism as an antidote to the populist romanticism which had arisen in the anti-Napoleonic awakening. Between 1819 and 1821 he attended all Hegel's lecture series, discussing them with Hegel on evening walks afterwards. The relationship between the two was social as well as professional and philosophical. They were neighbors on K pfergraben Street. Schulze constituted the most direct link between the Hegelian school and the Prussian state (Toews, 113). Hoffmeister surmises that the note which follows was addressed to Schulze sometime after Hegel's move to the K pfergraben address.

Hegel to Unknown [691]

[undated]

If you, dear Privy Councillor, should be at home at six o'clock, I would pay you a visit for a moment to seek some advice. Most humbly yours, Hegel

KARLSBAD, 1829

Beyond appointing Hegel to the Examination Board, von Altenstein tried to assist Hegel at least modestly by awarding an occasional travel grant. Hegel visited the Low Countries in 1824 on such a grant (Ch 22). In 1829 he requested a grant to visit a spa for his health [599]. The resulting assistance von Altenstein gave allowed Hegel to visit the spa at Karlsbad in the autumn, where he accidentally met Schelling for the last time [607].

Hegel to von Altenstein [599]

Berlin, May 16, 1829

The generous consideration Your Excellency has always shown me in all matters in which I have made appeal emboldens me to make a nuisance of myself with a further most humble request.

A chest complaint during the past winter hindered me for a considerable length of time in the pursuit of my lectures and literary endeavors. Even now it has not sufficiently abated in its consequences that I could regard appropriate remedies in combating the lingering weakness as superfluous. As the most effective remedy my doctor has advised and prescribed a trip to a spa. I need not fear telling Your Excellency, however, that I meanwhile find myself in such unfavorable economic circumstances that I cannot afford such a trip on my own—all the more so because, due to my weakened health and the needed leisure to revise my *Science of Logic* for a new edition, I am giving only one private lecture course this semester, resulting already in a significant loss of income considering my limited means.¹ In the course of my tenure we have been forced to consume the cash savings held by

¹In summer 1829 he lectured an hour a week to 200 students on proofs of the existence of God, and five hours on metaphysics and logic to 132 students.

my wife, since my official salary has not sufficed to defray expenses I had to make here—even though my outlay has never exceeded real need and the requirements of decency. Thus far I have not received the salary increase for which I was led to hope by Your Excellency's gracious promises [343] upon my entry into the Royal civil service, though I have not dared to inquire further about the matter.

Such are the circumstances in which, with a confidence never in the past disappointed, I now submit my most humble request for the exceptionally gracious provision of funds to cover my planned trip to a spa for treatment and recuperation. In so doing Your Excellency may perhaps lengthen the life of a man who, during the nearly eleven years of activity here, is conscious of having always devoted himself faithfully and with strict earnestness to the science which he has been called to teach, and of having responded to the limit of his ability to the high demands Your Excellency rightly places on public teachers of philosophy at the present time. I remain with the deepest respect Your Excellency's devoted G. W. F. Hegel, Titular Professor of Philosophy at the local Royal university.

Hegel to his Wife [607]

Karlsbad, Thursday, September 3, 1829

I was highly pleased, my dear, to find on safely arriving here this morning a letter from you and Immanuel [Hegel's son] dated on my birthday. I thank you for the warm remembrance. Immanuel's letter has greatly pleased me. May the kind spirit of love for his father in which he writes be preserved to his and my satisfaction forever. I thank Karl for his good wishes, too. My letters [missing] from Teplice and Prague have already recounted to you the pleasure and warmth of our common family life. Your mother [Susanna Maria] and aunt [Baroness Eleonora Karolina von Rosenhayn] have treated me to lodging and meals, as did Melniker in Teplice, and likewise your uncle [Baron Johann Georg Haller von Hallerstein] and your Prague aunt [Baroness Wilhelmina Haller von Hallerstein]. I am convinced they all enjoyed having me with them as much as I enjoyed being there. I have become very fond of our uncle in his simple cordial way, and we may well hope to see him someday in Berlin. As earnest money I have left him temporarily the map of the route from Berlin to Teplice. For now you must thank cousin Aldefeld in my name for the map, if you have not already done so. It is very exact, and I am glad to have had it handy.

After having left the depot in Prague last evening, where our uncle had me driven and even accompanied me personally—he has been most friendly and genuine with me—I arrived here in Karlsbad this morning between nine and ten o'clock.

Friday, September 4

I will continue today, and likewise continue this letter for a few more days. My letter will have left Prague the day before yesterday, containing all necessary information of my further itinerary. Yesterday I visited *Sprudel*, and will seek to describe the spring in greater detail orally. I have taken a look at the other fountains and grounds, too, and have also climbed atop *Hirschsprung*. Karlsbad is situated

on the Töpel River, which is as large as the Spree close to our house, but faster and more agitated. On both banks run streets with rows of nice-looking neat houses, mostly three stories. In some cases the houses are directly on the riverbank, although most are across the street from the riverbank as in Berlin. But what is not like home is that behind the rows of houses on both sides of the river are mountains covered with woods. For much of the trip, by the way, the valley is not straight but follows the curve of the mountains and river—everywhere quite charming. The mountains are very accessible due to well-kept and convenient paths. Very pleasant walks have been installed everywhere.

I have been waiting for the ladies [Baroness von Rosehayn and a Mrs. von Wahl, also an aristocrat, *Briefe* III, 444-45], who are to arrive—one tonight and the other Monday morning—and with whom Tuesday I will travel on. Meanwhile, thanks to Dr. Mitterbacher, who alerted me, I had a visit last evening with an old acquaintance—Schelling—who a few days ago arrived here alone to take a cure like myself, though I am not taking one. He is, by the way, very healthy and robust, the use of spring water being only a preservative in his case. We are both pleased about meeting again, and find ourselves together as cordial friends of old. This afternoon we took a walk together, and then at the coffeehouse read in the Austrian *Observer* [*Beobachter*] official disclosure of the taking of Andrianopolis [in the Russian-Turkish war]. We spent the evening together. And so today's work is concluded with these lines to you, and with this remembrance of you three, unless I am still to be diverted by Mrs. von Wahl's arrival tonight.

Sunday. Yesterday I was initiated in mineral water drinking, had lunch with Schelling, and climbed Three Cross Mountain [3 *Kreuzberg*]. In the evening Mrs. von Wahl arrived, checking in at my modestly priced inn. I am summarizing all this briefly since Mrs. von Wahl has just this moment canceled the donkeys, is ready to climb Three Cross by foot instead, and is now waiting for me. During the morning I continued my mineral water cure. After only two or three days I no longer felt any of my chest pains.

We had bad weather this morning, but took a walk even so. We had lunch together at Count Bolza's, i.e., at the Inn of the Golden Shield. After lunch I reserved a room in my inn for the second lady who is pursuing me to Karlsbad. She will arrive here tomorrow morning; and the day after tomorrow, Tuesday, I will set out to bring her to you.

This letter has to be at the post office today in order to leave as soon as possible—along with my embrace and greetings to all. Your Hegel

THE BERLIN UNIVERSITY RECTORSHIP, 1829-30

Hegel's reluctance to continue on the Examination Board after 1822 did not prevent him from accepting the prestigious Berlin University rectorship in 1829-30 [620, 627a]. This function he carried out with a ceremonious sense of its dignity and importance. The high point of his tenure was celebration of the three hundredth anniversary of the Augsburg Confession on June 25, 1830. As rector he delivered an address (*Werke* XX, 532-44) marking the occasion [639, 644a]. The Augsburg Confession provides a classical expression of the Lutheran dogmatic theology.

Although the Lutheran and Reformed churches in Prussia had been united in a single Evangelical Protestant Church since 1817, Hegel continued to express his Lutheran identity [514a].

Hegel to von Altenstein [620]

Berlin, October 16, 1829

I have not ventured to impose myself earlier, Your Gracious Excellency, with my humble request for an audience to pay my personal respects upon being named both Rector and Deputy Governmental Representative at the local university for the coming year. If I may ask you now, I await Your Excellency's kind instructions as to when it would be convenient for me to pay my humble respects.

I remain most deferentially Your Excellency's devoted Hegel, Professor at the local university

Hegel to von Altenstein [627a]

January 13, 1830

I take the liberty, Your Excellency, of requesting permission to pay my most humble respects. Should Your Excellency wish to grant this most respectful request, please be so gracious as to indicate a suitable time for a brief audience [motive unknown]. It is with the greatest devotion that I remain Your Excellency's most humble servant Hegel, Professor and currently Rector at the local Friedrich Wilhelm University

Hegel to von Altenstein [639]

Berlin, June 21, 1830

Honorable Baron and Minister of State:

In the name of the University I have the honor of most respectfully inviting Your Excellency to festivities arranged by the University with Your Excellency's permission upon the third centenary celebration of the presentation of the Augsburg Confession. The festivities will take place at half past noon on June 25 in the Grand Auditorium. At the same time, I most humbly entrust to Your Excellency the distribution of the invitations contained in the attached envelope to councillors in Your Ministry.

With high respect I have the honor of remaining Your Excellency's most devoted Rector of the Friedrich Wilhelm University, Hegel

Hegel to von Altenstein [644a]

[Berlin] August 6, 1830

I take the humble liberty, Your Excellency, of most respectfully submitting my just published address given as Rector to mark the centenary celebration [*Briefe* IV/2, 124] of the presentation of the Augsburg Confession. May Your Excellency graciously accept these pages with the indulgence and kindness you have so often shown me, and for which I am most grateful. I have become accustomed to the need of both preserving and not being unworthy of Your Excellency's grace, and indeed I regard its preservation as an obligation dutifully owed.

Please accept this expression of my deepest respect with which I remain Your

Excellency's devoted Hegel, Titular Professor and presently Rector at the local Royal university.

Hegel to von Altenstein [651]

Berlin, October 24, 1830

I take the liberty, Your Excellency, of humbly requesting an occasion to express in person my most respectful gratitude upon laying down both my Rectorship and the office of Deputy Governmental Representative. I wish in particular to thank Your Excellency for the gracious favor shown me in the execution of my functions, and at the same time to present the new Rector, [Philology] Professor and Privy Councillor [August] Boeckh. Should my request be kindly granted, please fix a time when Your Excellency would wish to see us.

I have the honor of remaining with my most dutiful respect your devoted Professor Hegel

DURING HIS RECTORSHIP, Hegel continued to have a more personal relationship with von Altenstein. The following letter of consolation was written to the Minister upon the May 1830 death of his sister, who twelve years before [343] had assisted the Hegel household in its move to Berlin. The letter expresses the essence of consolation for Hegel: the hard Greek concept of an external fate or blind necessity is sublimated into the Christian concept of a providence which is meaningful (*Encyc* ¶147).

Hegel to von Altenstein [637]

Berlin, May 27, 1830

Please pardon me if I yield to the urge to address these lines to Your Excellency in this time of the most bitter pain to which Your Excellency could still be subjected. All my feelings of respect and gratitude, my extensive acquaintance with the blessings flowing from Your Excellency's exercise of high office, with the labors and difficult conditions of this office, with the exemplary and universally admired virtues of Your Excellency's public and private life, and finally with the deep suffering and tribulations to which Your Excellency has been subjected by a Higher Hand—the cumulative effect of such feelings and memories concentrates itself in my heart at the sight of such a harsh turn of events, with an urgent intensity demanding expression. The sorrow I feel in sympathy over the enormous loss Your Excellency has suffered presses forward to its center, comes to rest where its presence is the most extensive, the most intense, and thus the most rightful, i.e., in the heart, which knows the whole developed worth—experienced over a lifetime—of the being whose loss is the occasion of this pain. Having been able to form an image of her worth belongs among the best and most exceptional experiences of human relations I have had in my entire life. In the image of Your Excellency's late sister, memory becomes occupied with all the virtues that embellish a feminine soul. This pleasant recollection of mine includes a whole series of individual virtues. She had a cultivated mind and was acquainted with the seriousness and principal circumstances of life. Yet she was acquainted at an even earlier

age with the sorrows and sufferings of life. She exhibited a patience and resignation heavenly in its simplicity, and showed loving empathy for all who suffer, sympathetic friendship, and infinite love for her brother—this strongest feeling of a noble feminine heart [see *Werke* II, 349-50, on *Antigone*]. The highest value and singular charm of this wealth lie in a union of undispersed harmony, the simple blossoming of a serene naturalness, straightforwardness of mind, and a maidenly youthfulness of noble character.

I have been enlivened by the freshness of this fount clearly flowing on out of all the streams of life's sorrows. My wife, if I may speak for her, found in the deceased a maternal friend who took part in everything. Yet an inexorable Fate has willed that yesterday nothing more remained to do but to approach her tearfully with a handfull of flowers and earth to bid her a final farewell. This loss of ours is overshadowed by the immensity of the loss which you have suffered. Fate has struck its blow. But Providence has left Your Excellency behind, preserving for you the great Cause which has become yours. And it has preserved Your Excellency's spacious heart, making of it a tomb for this second heart ravaged by a bitter Fate. When the last remaining pain has been absorbed into this quiet vault and consumed, nothing can happen anymore that can truly disturb or unsettle Your Excellency's peace. For such an enterprising and lively heart as yours the womb of future days still reserves a harvest of satisfactions and joys. And so I most sincerely wish, for the sake of this harvest, that Your Excellency may be granted a long life—to which such great interests are at once attached.

Most respectfully, Your Excellency's most devoted servant, Hegel

HEGEL AS CELEBRITY

If there is a hint of anxiety in the above over the future of von Altenstein's cause—and thus Hegel's own cause—in Prussia, publicly Hegel had attained celebrity status. He was pursued by autograph collectors [502b, 548], young graduates and students seeking letters of recommendation [374a, 651a], and struggling students seeking advice [628]. His social life and range of acquaintances included notable literary and artistic figures in the Prussian capital, such as the painters Johann Gottlob Samuel Rösel [448] and Wilhelm Ternite [635], and the satirist Moritz Gottlieb Saphir. In 1826 Hegel attempted to mediate in a feud between Saphir and the poet Karl Schall (*Berichten* 296). This feud provides the background to Hegel's invitation of June 12 extended to Schall to the exclusion of Saphir [513a]. Hegel's social life, however, also included less illustrious persons, such as students [473a] and businessmen like Heinrich Beer [640a]. Followers such as the Reverend Johann Martin Wohlfahrt, to whom Hegel addressed a recommendation for a private tutorship in 1830 [651b], were proud to call him their "friend" (*Studien* X, 129).

Hegel to Buttman [502b]

[Berlin] February 13, 1826

Responding to [classical philologist Philipp Karl] Buttman's expressed wish for me to pass on to him something or other written in my own hand, I need only

write down mention of this very fact—to which I add cordial greetings to my colleague [Friedrich] Wilken, who has relayed the wish to me. Professor Hegel

Hegel to Autograph Collector [548]

Berlin, July 6, 1827

Had the wish of adding something from my hand as well to a collection of handwriting samples reached me directly, I would have requested some kind of content to be dictated to me. I cannot now make this request in writing, for this very act would render the request superfluous. So allow the superfluity of having submitted the request and thereby at once annihilated it suffice. Hegel [H.]

Hegel to Carl Breidenstein [374a]

Berlin, October 11, 1820

Better later than not at all is the thought that first comes to mind, my dear sir, as I undertake to answer your letter, written already six weeks ago. An autumn journey [to Dresden] from which I have only recently returned greatly delayed my receipt of the letter. I subsequently looked up my Heidelberg class rosters but was left uncertain as to which of my lectures you attended. I find you on merely the roster for lectures on the encyclopaedia of philosophy in the winter 1816-17 semester. I have rendered with great pleasure the enclosed testimony on your behalf, and hope to be able to contribute something to the advancement of your aspirations.

Your kind remembrance and continuing interest in philosophy—of which I have learned from your gracious letter [missing]—have pleased me greatly. I will be delighted to hear of your further well-being. Meanwhile, a cordial farewell from your Professor Hegel

IN A JULY 1821 letter to the Dean of the Philosophy Faculty in Giessen, Breidenstein, then a doctoral candidate at that university, cited his recommendation by “the famous Professor Hegel” (*Briefe*, IV/2, 100).

Hegel to Baier [651a]

Berlin, October 25, 1830

I have drafted in accordance with your request, dear Doctor, the enclosed testimony on your behalf [*Briefe*, IV/1, 177]. I hope your aim of obtaining the position about which you write may succeed. Respectfully, your devoted Professor Hegel

TO ANOTHER STUDENT—a Hungarian, Josef Tuppy, who had studied at the Tübingen seminary since 1826 on a foreign student grant—Hegel explains the elementary art of understanding a text. Tuppy in his own letter [627] claimed to have committed the entire Preface of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* to memory. Reiterating the ideal of interpretation by the spirit rather than merely the letter [e.g., 211], Hegel here formulates the so-called “hermeneutic circle” in a form associated with the contemporary philologist Georg Anton Friedrich Ast.

Hegel to Tuppy [628]

[draft]

[Mid January 1830]

What you, my dear sir, have written me on January 3 [627] concerning the attention my philosophical writings have awakened in you could not fail to interest me. If these writings have been exposed to frequent misunderstanding, ill will, and slander—even, as you write, in my native land of Württemberg—it is satisfying to encounter from others sympathy and assent. But the path of the sciences is long, especially because the need for philosophy is gradually dulled toward generalizations, and requires complete development. . . .

[unclear fragments]. . . It is here where part of the difficulty we find in the study of philosophy no doubt lies, namely, attaining the standpoint to which a philosophical exposition belongs. In this regard as well, progress can only occur by stages, and can in no way be forced. I must naturally understand “forcing” to include the rote memorization you cite in your letter.

But you have, you say, penetrated a few pages and sections. These will carry you further, and will disclose the standpoints containing both the need to take further steps and an understanding of them. The matter cannot be assimilated and finished with all at once. Just as what precedes contains the key to unlock what follows later, so what comes later sheds its light on what has preceded, which thus wins fuller clarity only through that into which it has subsequently passed.

I have thought it necessary to make this remark concerning your philosophical study. You may perhaps derive some instruction from it. But as to your further inquiry about stipends which might be procured here for you, I must regretfully reply that there are no stipends at all at the university here, whether for foreigners or natives. In order to spend a half year here, you would absolutely have to arrive with the necessary means of subsistence for the duration of your stay, and living here is not cheap. As keen as this desire may be in you, . . . [incomplete]

Trust your deep earnestness with regard to science, and the penetration of it you have achieved thus far for your further progress. Do not disturb either this progress or your inner peace by steps that might land you in difficulty. Calculate the external steps you take. . . [incomplete]

Hegel to Rösel [448]

April 17, 1823

Since *you* I cannot as sealing wax reclaim,
“Be, greeted, worthy man!” in ink I exclaim.

I now must ask at once: since what time
Have you seen such a style and flood of rhyme?
You command not, as others adept at rhymes can say,
a pair but—nay, mark well—a full array.
Does such honor become you as an old heirloom?
Yet does new wit make for such knavery more room
Merely to wind me into such toil and trouble?
If such be the question, now the answer on the double:

Cunning miscarries! A free man am I,
 Even if no Gracchus, I sigh.
 "Stop," interrupts my wife right here,
 "It is I you shall now hear.
 The real point is what I have to say:
 Do bid a guest so rare for Friday.
 Welcome him and hold him fast,
 For Friday friend Zelter gives his word for whist.
 I'll provide food and wine,
 and for his gambling debts you shall sign."

Hegel to Ternite [635]

Berlin, April 30, 1830

Good Evening, my dear Gallery Inspector. My wife and family are leaving tomorrow morning for Potsdam, while I follow tomorrow evening. It would please us greatly to visit the Gallery under your guidance, should you be there. If you can let me know whether you will be there, and where to inquire, I would look you up and profit from your company. Very amicably, your most devoted Hegel

Hegel to Schall [513a]

June 12, 1826

A beautiful good morning to you! I take the liberty of asking if you are willing to give me the pleasure of spending tomorrow evening with me. In order to avoid in any way troubling with thoughts a cordial get-together, I wish to invite my friends [*meine (?) Freunde*] without Saphir.

Awaiting your kind answer, your most devoted Hegel

Hegel to Grüneisen [473a]

June 26, 1824

I respectfully invite you, Dr. [Karl] Grüneisen, this evening for tea and supper. Professor Hegel

Hegel to Beer [640a]

Berlin, July 3, 1830

Yesterday I did not get to see you as I had hoped, my dear friend. I thus reply in writing to your kind invitation for tomorrow noon, letting you know that I will be there with my wife. Please remember us kindly to your wife. Your most devoted, Hegel

Hegel to Wohlfahrt [651b]

Berlin, November 3, 1830

I am much obliged to you, dear Reverend, for the kind remembrance and associated expression of confidence contained in your good letter of the 15th of last month. In accordance with your wish I have looked around for a student who has graduated and might accept a private tutorship. Mr. Boos, who is otherwise un-

known to me, comes very highly recommended as a talented and well-mannered young man of flawless personal conduct and lively character, and the impression he makes—intelligent, decent, vigorous, and yet not arrogant—has confirmed me in this characterization of him. He believes he is able to meet your requirements in music, but not in French. Considering the salary, surely rather much is being asked for.

He will write to you himself, dear Reverend, and indeed has probably already done so. I hope the negotiations turn out to your and your patron's satisfaction. Please contact me if I can be of any further help in the matter. Entrusting myself to your continued kind remembrance, I remain very respectfully, your devoted servant, Professor Hegel

Pinellian Psychotherapy and Hegel's Sister

CHRISTIANE LUISE HEGEL (1773-1832) was Hegel's only sister. From 1807 she served Count Joseph von Berlichingen in Jaxthausen as a governess, but was periodically afflicted with a mental disorder accompanied by physical complaints. Christiane's affliction and Hegel's responsibility for her were his most immediate occasion for reflection on psychotherapy. His letters point to a dialectical psychotherapy, construing the irrational as fixed abstraction and thus incorporating it into a concept of the concrete reason.

An 1814 episode of what Hegel would later call "hysteria" [365] ended in Christiane's resignation of a post as a governess. In 1820 she was committed to an asylum, but was released the following year. She never thereafter supported herself, though Hegel suspected that overreliance on charitable assistance was a factor in her illness [395]. After her release her mind was troubled by bitterness over alleged wrongs, and she directed resentment against her brother as well. Hegel strove to retain her trust by sympathizing with her complaints, including complaints against Ludwig Göriz, in whose hands Hegel himself had placed Christiane the year before [365]. In 1814 Hegel had likewise sympathized with her complaints against the Count von Berlichingen [238]; yet he retained sufficient confidence in von Berlichingen to consult him concerning his sister in 1820 [367]—though he assured Christiane the year after that he "of course" no longer corresponded with the Count [395].

Any lack of frankness toward Christiane probably reflects Hegel's commitment to the ideas of the French psychiatric reformer Philippe Pinel (*Encyc* ¶408). Hegel stated one such idea as follows: "In psychic therapy administered to the mentally disturbed it is above all important to win the trust of the disturbed. . . . But the surest way to acquire such trust is by, to be sure, maintaining an open demeanor with respect to the patient, but without allowing such openness to degenerate into direct attack upon the deranged representation" (*Werke* X, 229-30). One humors the patient to do him the honor of reasoning with him. Though direct polemical attack on an irrational fixation is avoided, the patient is led to discover by himself its absurdity, by a kind of indirect proof. Hegel once held that philosophical errors of his contemporaries should be criticized with the same deference, internally rather than externally (Ch. 5). Yet his reversion to philosophical polemics suggests that internal criticism was mainly justified in the case of dialectically transcended standpoints of history, to some extent in the case of the

mentally ill and children, but perhaps not in the case of mentally sound contemporary representatives of transcended standpoints.

Since derangement arises from the fixation or absolutization of a single thought in negation of the total fluid thought system defining normal rationality (*Werke* X, 208-16; 223-24), therapy must be dialectical, must negate contradictory absolutizations—"fixed ideas" (*Ibid*, 228-35)—and reestablish by negation of the negation the fluidity of "absolute negativity." A prime condition of removing a fixation is the patient's confidence in the rational authority of the psychotherapist. The therapist does not so much lead the patient from the rigidity of abstract thinking to the fluidity of concrete thinking as strengthen the still-present power of rational concrete thinking (*Ibid*, 229). Respect for the patient's rational personality is thus equally essential to the cure.

Mental illness for Hegel is essentially a regression from reason to the understanding, while its cure is the self-recollection of reason. The speculative philosopher's hermeneutic self-alienation into a long-transcended standpoint—e.g. the Parmenidean standpoint at the start of the *Logic*—might be called voluntary mental illness, just as the dialectical reconstruction of the present standpoint is self-induced therapy. Mental illness in the clinical sense occurs when the regression is involuntary, and when the dialectical reconstruction depends on external guidance.

The fixations from which Hegel sought to free his sister lay in her obsessive absolutization of wrongs allegedly perpetrated by well-meaning friends and relatives [395]. Her manic self-confidence and rejection of all advice in 1821 [395], together with the financial extravagances reported in 1820 [370], contrast with her inability to make decisions in 1814 [228] and with her eventual suicide in 1832, suggesting a manic-depressive condition. Though not excluding physicalistic therapies, Hegel clearly favored the "talking cures" which the Freudians would develop (*Ibid*, 228-29), though he totally lacked the Freudian idea of repression and the unconscious anticipated by such contemporaries as Schopenhauer, Herbart, and Feuerbach.

Four letters from Hegel to his sister concerning her 1814 illness are available [228, 232, 238, 242].

Hegel to Christiane Hegel [228]

Nuremberg, April 9, 1814

Your condition as described in your letter received yesterday, dear sister, touches me and my wife very deeply. There is no question as to what is to be done. If your current illness is such that a trip is enough for your diversion and recovery, by all means visit us and return when you are strong enough for your responsibilities. But if you are no longer up to these responsibilities, we invite you to move in with us permanently, to live with us and receive the care you need. You will receive a warm welcome from us. My wife will be delivering this fall, and if you could lend her a hand your presence would be doubly advantageous. What arrangement will be made for you can further be determined after your arrival here. We can set you up in a small room of your own, a type of garret-room, which is of course heatable.

Above all put your mind at rest. It would seem that your disposition and nature are not to be put especially at ease by the attitude of Mrs. von Berlichingen. You write that if you candidly ask her what you should and should not do, she does not give you a proper reply. You require friendly instruction, even regulation and authority over what you shall and shall not do. I know that character trait very well. It is largely explained by the fact that someone who does not really know what advice and direction to give is pretty well embarrassed when such advice and direction is requested. Nothing is so troublesome as such requests. The most pleasant and even obliging [response] which recommends itself is then to have the other person do whatever he independently wishes. You are all the more in a position of having to assume responsibility for your own actions inasmuch as there are children in the home whom the lady of the house has entrusted to your care, so that she has a right not to look upon you merely as a subordinate. Advice and instruction from others in any case do not help much, since their execution depends on our own character. Your position was an office whose duties must be discharged according to your own knowledge and conscience, and one earns the satisfaction and confidence of others all the more by having confidence in oneself, by acting independently so as to show oneself to others as a support for them.

Seek your reward for your efforts in part in the vocation you have had to follow thus far due to your economic situation, but also in the work itself, in the physical and spiritual welfare of the children committed to your care. Your reference in your letter to your relationship to Mrs. von Berlichingen has occasioned these thoughts. Do not make this relationship, which is something extraneous, the main issue in your mind. Your main concern must rather, as I have already said, be your relationship to the children and your own convenience. For the rest consult yourself and the doctor about what is to be done for your well-being.

In regard to arrangements for the trip, you must first give thought to your health. It will not do to take the mail coach, which travels both day and night. If you are still actually ill, it will not do to travel at all yet. The route to us passes through Aalen, where you can perhaps arrange for your first rest stop at cousin [Ludwig Friedrich] Göriz's house. From Aalen there is a connection to Ansbach. Perhaps, however, you will find company for the entire journey here. Yet the details can be worked out later.

Thus regard my home for the time being as a haven open to you, and ready at any time to welcome you. If you can and wish to remain in your present situation longer, you do so by free choice: you can at any time change your mind and break off. I look forward with sincere satisfaction to being able to repay you to some extent for all you have always done for me, and to offer you peace and contentment in my home. Keep me informed and, in any event, write me before you start out on the journey. Your faithful brother, Wilhelm

Hegel to Christiane Hegel [232]

[Nuremberg, April 1814]

A cause of my delay in replying was the expectation of a chance to reimburse you for the linen you forwarded. An opportunity will now be found to pay you

from Stuttgart. Linen is of course always welcome to women. We were, however, surprised, since my wife had merely ordered flax rather than linen. She has already had three pieces [of linen] made this year.

I am also happy the need to take refuge with us has not yet arisen, since—especially in these times of change—I continue to hope, now more than ever, for a change in my place of residence this fall. The most pleasant news is that your state of health is passable. In all the steps you take, be sure to take carefully into account the advantages you draw from your situation in the von Berlichingen home. However dissatisfied you are in being unable to do some things you would like, the position affords all the greater relief and freedom to care for yourself in peace and quiet following the physical condition you have been through. From what you indicated in your last letters you are very generously treated by your employer. Since so little is asked of you, your position is one you should be most grateful for, and is certainly exceptional.

My wife has already written you about how we are. Our Karl is healthy and is growing daily in intelligence, although he can also be rather ill-bred. He is about to learn to walk and talk. Farewell. Your faithful brother, Wilhelm

Hegel to Christiane Hegel [238]

Nuremberg, September 8, 1814

From your letter of the 28th of last month [missing] from Jaxthausen, my beloved, I see that your thus far undecided relationship to the Berlichingen household has been now decided, insofar as they have accepted your offer to leave their service. But this is only half a decision. I should have expected that Mr. von Berlichingen, in what you call his obliging letter, would mention support for your further subsistence, and remember the promise made to you in this regard. The city magistrate's offer to give you lodging with him, as amicable as it may be from his side, seems at present to have no connection with that obligation. If there were a connection, I cannot see why Mr. von Berlichingen would not have at least generally mentioned the fact in his letter. You are thinking of obtaining an explanation of the matter yourself, and I find such explanation very necessary. You of necessity expected that Mr. von Berlichingen for his part would declare himself inclined, and would explain with definite assurance what he wishes to do for you in view of your many years' service. What the city magistrate wants, for himself, to do out of friendship is a completely separate issue, and you need not let yourself be stopped or restrained from mentioning your claims on Berlichingen's gratitude by the kindness the magistrate has chosen to show. By having yourself come forth with the proposal to leave the household, you have conceded something in point of form, but the real issue—both your long years of service and, I hope, the sentiments of Mr. von Berlichingen himself—nonetheless remains unaltered. But if Mr. von Berlichingen has arranged a stay for you in Jaxthausen with the city magistrate, and if, perhaps, the magistrate's offer has the sense of providing an initial trial period to see how you feel about the arrangement and how both sides get along with each other, I would find it very generous and convenient. Should, however, it amount to nothing but a friendly gesture of the magistrate acting for

himself, it is estimable on his part, but then nothing is being done from the side of the Berlichingen household, and the arrangement perhaps might induce you to start forgetting this side of things, ultimately even to pass it over entirely. So you are right to pursue the matter to the point of a definite explanation. If the arrangement with the city magistrate were merely to amount to friendship, you also have, on the other hand, the friendship of my wife and me, and thus would have to choose between the two. Since your stay in Jaxthausen for the time being leaves you free of responsibilities, it would greatly please my wife and me if you would find a chance to visit us and remain with us this fall. My wife is about to deliver in two to four weeks, or even as soon as tomorrow. It would be a great favor and relief for us if you were to be with us during this period and look after the household. But with regard to your health you would have to feel strengthened; otherwise—with all the work of a large household occasioned by a woman giving birth, an infant, and a boy who cannot yet walk alone but is just learning—you would not feel at ease in our house. Your trip here, as I have said, would have to be arranged soon—in part because of the season. Meanwhile there is perhaps a connection from Mergentheim to Rothenburg and Ansbach.

Before your last letter my wife had written one to you in Ludwigsburg, which you probably will have also received by now. I have paid [Wilhelmina Haller von Hallerstein] the wife of [the Württemberg] Colonel [Baron Jakob Gottlieb Rudolf] von Haller [uncle of Hegel's wife] the money for the linen. She left here twelve days ago and wished to give the money to you in Ludwigsburg, visiting you there at the same time. Since you are in Jaxthausen, you should now let her know where she can have the sum sent in Stuttgart. Your brother, Wilhelm

P.S. If you come here, try to see that your situation is settled beforehand.

My wife is unable to write you. Thus I am the one to send her warm regards along with the above invitation and request.

Hegel to Christiane Hegel [242]

[October 1814]

Your fellow godparent [Friedrich Immanuel] Niethammer sent word to me somewhat earlier than you, instructing me to give you his cordial regards if you still recall when, as a boy [Platzbua], he arranged a ball at the university [Magisterium] in Tübingen which you as well attended.

I add that Mrs. von Haller, wife of the Colonel von Haller, has the money for you in hand to pay for the linen. Since at the time we believed you were still in Ludwigsburg, she wanted to transfer it to you there, or take it to you in person. The simplest and most appropriate thing to do would therefore be to give one of your women friends in Stuttgart instructions to collect the money at home, or to indicate to Mrs. Haller herself how she might arrange to send the money to you without expense.

My wife and the two boys are quite fine except that my wife needed somewhat more time to recuperate this time [from Immanuel Hegel's birth].

I hope the absence of any answer from you is due more to accident—the loss of a letter—than to any indisposition on your part. With warm greetings, your faithful Wilhelm

UPON LEAVING the Count von Berlichingen—who, contrary to Hegel's impression in September [238], contributed to her support (*Briefe* II, 378)—Christiane resided with her cousin Karl Wilhelm Göriz, a Stuttgart postal officer, and then with Ludwig Friedrich Göriz, who was Karl Wilhelm's brother and a pastor in Aalen. In summer 1815 she visited Hegel in Nuremberg [249]. The letter she wrote in November thanking Hegel for the welcome she received suggests jealousy of Marie:

I have disturbed the order of your household, which pains me. But I am put at ease by the thought that I have not disturbed its peace. My condition in the last days of my stay particularly affected you, and for that I give you heartfelt thanks.
[253]

Hegel mentioned Christiane's 1815 visit in announcing his transfer to Heidelberg a year later [294].

Hegel to Christiane Hegel [294]

Nuremberg, August 28, 1816

It would serve no purpose, dear Christiane, to tell you in detail why I have not written to you for so long, for you already know it has not been due to indifference to you. A three-month illness on the part of my wife along with uninterrupted literary activity [i.e., *Logic*, vol 2] on top of my other functions prevented me from thinking of anything else. And recently, as my fate stood before another turn, I first wanted to await success. Since this is now decided, I am letting you know right away. A few weeks ago I received a call to Heidelberg, and a few days ago another to Berlin. The former offer, however, had already been accepted: a commitment in writing on my part left upon receiving word that my conditions had been met. I thus had to send a negative response to the Prussian Ministry. So this fall I will be moving to Heidelberg with wife and children. You cannot believe how happy this makes me. If only my wife, who sends her best regards, continues to be healthy! I hope to hear of your good health as well. My children are fine. Every day Karl comes up to fetch me to eat, and usually remarks in the room in which you stayed: "Auntie has left on a trip."

Give warm greetings to our cousin the [ecclesiastical] Dean [Ludwig Friedrich Göriz]. More soon. Tomorrow we shall have the awards [ceremony] for prizes [in the Nuremberg gymnasium]. Your Wilhelm Hegel

THE COUNT VON BERLICHINGEN wrote in 1814 that Christiane could no longer teach his children because effort of any kind was injurious to her health (*Briefe* II, 378). Yet under the Reverend Göriz's care in Aalen she resumed teaching. It is this employment which Hegel mentioned in July 1817 following a romantic description of the Heidelberg countryside.

Hegel to Christiane Hegel [324]

Heidelberg, July 26, 1817

It has already been a long time, dear sister, since I have heard from you. I hope you have been well, and that the generally fine warm spring and summer—

though somewhat late in coming—has strengthened your health. We are fine here, thank goodness. Heidelberg has been very good for my wife's health. My children likewise enjoy the beautiful region and the revivifying influence of the sun. We are living here in the suburb. Our landlord has a large farm. Around the farmhouse, among cows, horses, and the barn—for the last few days grain and spelt have been brought in—the children do not lack entertainment and exercise in the open air.

I have every reason to be satisfied with my situation. The love and inclination for philosophy are again evident among the students. Thus this past summer I have had a considerable number of students.

The area around here is very bright, romantic, and fertile. We have wandered through it in many directions. A trip up the Neckar, surrounded by pleasant intermittent tree-covered mountains, affords the most beautiful of views, making for a most delightful riverboat excursion. In the other direction, toward the Rhine, there is a splendid plain, forming part of the fertile Palatinate. At the boundary between the plain and the mountain range—or rather directly at the canyon from which the Neckar flows into the valley—is located the mountain road—a continuous road with orchards on the softly rising hills—planted with vineyards, orchards, fruit, and so forth. Like people everywhere we of course have suffered from the inflation. But since I receive a portion of my pay in kind, the rising price of the foodstuffs I thus receive has more or less compensated for increases in the price of bread. Around here it has even been more expensive than anywhere in the area for quite a distance. I have visited Mannheim and Speyer with my wife. Schwetzingen is an especially pleasant spot.

Thus our life has on the whole been enjoyable. I hope you find continuing satisfaction in Aalen with the blessed occupation you have created for yourself. But since the inflation must have been difficult for you as well, I enclose three carolins, which will provide at least some relief.

Dr. [Johann Christian Friedrich?] Fink [seminary classmate of Hegel's] has again left this past spring, though I do not know where. Greet cousin Göriz along with his wife and sister. It is a particular relief for me to know that you have in him such a true and genuine friend and counsellor. Have total confidence in him, and subject your thoughts to his well-intended advice and insights. The most important thing for a human being is to free oneself of one's idle thoughts, and to find this liberation and at once the satisfaction of one's mind in a fruitful activity for a noble cause—an activity you have found under your friend's guidance. Add to this the remembrance of your brother Wilhelm, ever faithful to you even from afar.

[P.S.] My wife and Fritz [i.e., Sophie Marie Friederike von Tucher, Hegel's sister-in-law], who is staying here until fall, send you warm greetings.

HEGEL ANNOUNCED to Christiane his move to Berlin in September 1818 [347].

Hegel to Christiane Hegel [347]

Heidelberg, September 12, 1818

Since the date of my departure from these parts is now set, dear sister, I still want to let you know I will be leaving at the end of next week, perhaps around the

18th. These are, to be sure, beautiful regions I am leaving, but one cannot sacrifice other conditions essential to one's vocation for the sake of a region. Berlin is for itself a large middle point, and philosophy has always been more a need and more at home in northern than in southern Germany. I will receive 2,000 Prussian thalers in salary, about 3,500 florins, but it is admittedly expensive to live in Berlin. This amount, according to usual calculations, is not much more than 2,000 florins around here. Yet the Minister has raised hopes for further prospects, and I will receive an additional supplement for the lectures I will give. Already some time ago the sister of our Minister von Altenstein—Minister of Ecclesiastical and Educational Affairs—reserved lodging for me at 300 Prussian thalers. From all the descriptions given by friends traveling through who have seen it, it suits me just fine; and, judging from prices there, it is not expensive. I am traveling via Frankfurt, Jena, and Leipzig, and hope to arrive in Berlin toward September 30. At first my wife found it hard to leave here, but she is now accepting the fact with courage and confidence.

At the same time I am going to be farther from you, dear sister, but perhaps this very fact will increase the prospect of seeing you sooner. For in a few years I shall have to grant my wife a trip to Nuremberg, and Aalen will then be less out of my way than it is now, and than it was last spring from Stuttgart. I would have liked to have got together with you then, but it was not until the end of vacation that I could travel. And I could not spend more than four days in Stuttgart then, and it was impossible for me to make an additional excursion. I could not even get to Tübingen. Nor could I notify you to see if perhaps you might come to Stuttgart, for it was not until the last moment that I knew whether I could travel at all. I found our aunt [Maria Rosina Dorothea Göriz, sister of Hegel's mother] and [Henriette] Luise [Göriz, cousin of Hegel's, daughter of Christian Friedrich Göriz, who was the brother-in-law of Hegel's mother and a teacher of Hegel's in Stuttgart] in good spirits, and found [Karl] August [Göriz, merchant son of C. F. Göriz] engaged in quite worthy activity. Regarding Tübingen, quite a few advantageous offers were made to me, but even if I had been more inclined than was possible my relationship with Berlin had already been completely sealed.

In Stuttgart I heard from Luise—and likewise learn from your letters—that you are continuing with the useful occupation and activity of teaching which you had begun. The success of your undertaking truly pleases me, first because you thus have a further source of income, and second because your occupation is both beneficial to health and—through the consciousness of being useful to others—satisfying to the heart. Cousin Göriz, who has guided and supported you in this, deserves sincere thanks. My advice in all this is that you not let yourself be disturbed in the least by rumors and expectations that he might be called elsewhere. Should this actually happen, you would indeed lose an immediate support in life. But you would also lose—beyond perhaps part of your household effects—an established rule of life, which is very important. It is uncertain how and when, at least without great sacrifice, you would establish something elsewhere. On the whole, as I said, you will find in the confidence you have found among the inhabitants of Aalen as in your beneficial activity both support and satisfaction of

heart and conscience, and this motive must always be foremost in our commissions and omissions.

I am sending you in advance the interest due on 300 florins capital along with a small supplement, and will continue to assure proper arrangements from Berlin via Nuremberg. Give my sincere thanks to cousin Louis [Göriz] for all the kindness he has shown you. Extend to him my sincere compliments and ask him as the occasion arises to convey greetings to our aunt, to Luise, and August. My children are pretty well, and are looking forward to the trip. My wife sends you warm regards and wishes you all the best. I likewise send you my warmest greetings. Be ever assured of my brotherly affection. Yours, Wilhelm

CHRISTIANE SUFFERED a relapse in 1820. After concluding on March 18 his lecture series, Hegel wrote to his cousin the Reverend Göriz to suggest a treatment inspired by the French psychiatric reformer Philippe Pinel. Surmising his sister was not so deranged as to confuse obsessive fixations with reality, Hegel hoped she might work herself free of them through trust in a loving authority figure, such as Göriz himself.

Hegel to Göriz [365]

Berlin, March 19, 1820

I am, dear cousin, much obliged to you for procuring and sending my certificate of baptism. I have thus incurred a monetary debt to you as well. I would, of course, like to pay you in person, and am sure you would be willing to bear with me until I visit my old fatherland. The only problem is that this might take too long, and that too much interest might accumulate. You can settle accounts through my sister.

I am also grateful to you for the sad notification you give me of my sister's unfortunate condition. My activities kept me from replying earlier in this regard. Yesterday I finished my lectures, but even today I do not know what I am to say of this. The news has moved me deeply. Of all the things that can affect a human being, this is the hardest to take. She recovered quickly, however, from the earlier attack that befell her when she was still in Mr. von Berlichingen's household, although she admittedly retained an unhappy, irritated mood from that experience. Is it not possible that this relapse is connected with her current age, and that the change in the female constitution—which in her case is only now appearing, though normally it should probably have happened already a few years ago—has had such an effect? You still describe her problem chiefly as hysteria, which was likewise the case then.

The only consolation I can have in this is knowing that she enjoys your loving supervision and, as you have assured me already in your letter, that she does not want for anything. I must likewise appeal to your kind attentions and judgment to decide what further is to be done for her, and what provision and treatment are to be arranged. Since it is in the first instance the physical condition of hysteria which effects such a release of the inner passions, there might still be hope for her recovery through your loving care combined with medical treatment. Because she

probably retains awareness of her surrounding actual environment despite her confused frame of mind, your care is what is most beneficial for her deranged mind, which requires the respect and deference which she will have for you in order to be controlled.

I give you once more my heartfelt thanks for all your kindness and love in this sad situation. I may still ask you for news of her from time to time, and of changes in her condition. Please remember me cordially to your family in Stuttgart. My wife and children, thank God, are well. I learned only from your greetings, however, that you have remarried. I have received no news from my sister in more than a year. So please accept my warm congratulations. May all the love you have given be returned to you in this marriage. Your sincere cousin and friend, Hegel

WHEN CHRISTIANE'S CONDITION did not improve Hegel took steps to have her committed to an asylum if necessary.

Hegel to Göriz [367]

Berlin, May 13, 1820

At the beginning of April, dear cousin, I informed you in a letter [365] of the reports reaching me from Jaxthausen of my sister's illness, and also asked you for your further assistance in this matter. According to further letters from Jaxthausen, the appointment of a guardian to oversee her financial and personal well-being seems necessary. She is indeed in Neustadt, and as she herself writes no doubt has very good accommodations. But she has already found aspects of her present situation which lead her to wish a change. From my present distance I find myself obliged to address myself to others to accomplish what I cannot do myself. And in whom could I have greater confidence than in you, my old friend and cousin! What my sister needs is the [sort of] friend you have always been to her to manage her financial affairs and advise as to her situation—but at once a friend who has legal authority over her in handling such matters. I likewise need such a friend who is closer by to tell me what steps I must take from a legal standpoint. Privy Councillor Count von Berlichingen of course suggests to me the Orphans' Court in Stuttgart, which is responsible for ratification of a guardianship and which exercises ultimate supervisory authority. But I cannot personally arrange for such prior legal guardianship from here, and thus can immediately accomplish the necessary steps only by proxy. So I address my request to you in this unfortunate affair—which is indeed the most unfortunate that can befall men—to intercede and initiate the necessary steps. If a formal authorization is necessary from me beyond the fact that I hereby authorize you in this letter, I would make it over to you upon some indication from you. But my authorization for establishment of a guardianship over my sister also of necessity depends on the medical attestations and testimonies of others regarding her condition and behavior, which I will have to ask you to procure yourself, and which you either already have or can quickly get. The sort of guardianship you already have at once for itself implies the more specific authorization to apply for further legal authority. I have written today to Dr. Uhland in Neustadt, who is her doctor and who has provided for her accommoda-

tion. I have asked him to establish contact with you, in part with regard to the expenses of her stay there, since so far you have handled her financial affairs. Because her own means will not be sufficient to procure decent accommodations—the contract for room and board there amounts to 300 florins a year—I have promised a supplement of 100 to 150 florins. I should really settle accounts with you first regarding this side of the question. According to what you indicated earlier, in Aalen she was no doubt able to get by with what she had. In Neustadt she now longs to return to Aalen, but the only question is whether she can remain or be left there. On the other hand, I have asked Dr. Uhland to inform you of her condition, which will determine whether she could remain in private life or must be placed in the care of a public institution. From all that I have been told and that you have already found out yourself, an authority exercising legal power over her is indispensable to keep her quiet and submissive in private life. The other solution, a public institution, can even more clearly be decided only by a formal and official guardian.

I thus ask you to act in my name as a brother. It is most reassuring for me to be able to see you represent me in this sacred concern. The mail is about to leave, and so I close with the warmest of farewells. Your cousin, Hegel

P.S. As far as I remember from a previous letter of yours, you were in contact with the pastor at Jaxthausen. Would you not like to send him word, and then go through him to contact Dr. Uhland should the doctor not immediately meet my request that he report to you?

BY JUNE 17 IT WAS decided to place Christiane in an asylum in Zwiefalten.

Hegel to Göriz [370]

Berlin, June 17, 1820

Following kind notification from you at the end of last month, dear cousin, I am sending you first the enclosed draft for 300 florins to pay off the sum which I still owed my sister. It has just occurred to me that I should have added interest for you, but this can be done later. A remittance to Stuttgart could not be made. But from what I hear drafts for Frankfurt are sought after in Stuttgart, and you will perhaps be able to sell it yourself in Aalen. Secondly, I am also sending a statement authorizing you to assume the guardianship you have kindly offered to undertake. This authorization can take effect, however, only if tutelage is legally granted and acknowledged. You will know best what is to be done in this regard, and will kindly take care of it.

This formality of guardianship moreover bears on what I will be able and willing to do further for my sister's care. If she acknowledges the tutelage or allows it to be exercised willingly, well and good. But if her actions remain at her own discretion, there is no way I could consent to expenditures in support of her extravagances—here is where the requested supervision of all her household effects is in order—and the costs they occasion even if I had more money available than I in fact have. Such assurance is available only through a court order by which her conduct is no longer abandoned to a willfulness on her part that refuses all good advice. The doctor in Zwiefalten likewise has absolute need of such authorization

over her conduct in order to undertake treatment, though he is indeed charging a little too much in relation to the cost of board. So my express request to you is still to take the preliminary steps in your or my name at the Orphans' Court in Stuttgart.

In thanking you in advance for your friendship in this matter, I at once ask you to express to your mother, brothers, and sisters—and especially the postal secretary [Ludwig Göriz's brother]—my cordial gratitude for the many troubles they have taken. I hope someday to have the opportunity of returning the favor to you and your family. Farewell, Your faithful cousin, Hegel. Please hand over the enclosed brief letter to my sister.

IN JUNE 1821 Christiane was judged fully recovered and released from the asylum (*Briefe* II, 468). Yet Hegel found her still troubled when he wrote on August 12.

Hegel to Christiane Hegel [395]

Berlin, August 12, 1821

It has pleased me deeply, my dear sister, to learn from your letter of June of the fortunate restoration of your health, and of the strengthening and recovered possession of your mind. I only wish this were the only sentiment with which your letter left me. Most of all, I could only wish that the painful and bitter feelings it awakened in me might merely have concerned the past, and not refer to the present and future. For from the strengthening of your spirit and mind it is to be hoped that you may overcome the past, the memory of your sufferings, the feeling of [having suffered] the injustice and insults of others. I may at least draw your attention first to the fact that above all you [ought] work within yourself to put this past behind you, and to concern yourself with your present frame of mind and behavior toward others. The more you can subdue and remove such memories from your present—both your inner present and your outer present over against others—the sounder of health your mind will become, and the friendlier your relation to others, and their relation to you. In your letter [missing] to me you found it necessary for your self-justification to return to so much that is painful. Naturally you needed to convince me of the evil treatment you have received. But consider yourself generally convinced that the repetition in recollection of this past will only be detrimental to the complete restoration of your health. What most justifies you toward others is your sensible present behavior. Justification stemming from [past] treatment toward you, since it inevitably assumes the form of reproaches, turns away the affection of those before whom you wanted to justify yourself far more than it is able to win them over to you. My advice for your health may principally consist in encouraging you to allow your recollection of suffered injustice to dissolve and disappear. But take this matter to be of the greatest importance.

I of course had to expect you to write to your brother of the circumstances that contributed to making you so unhappy. But I shall thus have as little as possible cause to want to justify others or myself here and there against you, and to stir up in you and bring before you again what you are rather to consider as over and done with. So I will touch just briefly on a few points which may be of interest with respect to the future. After all you have written to me about it, it is evident you can

no longer enter into a relationship with Dean Göriz. It seems increasingly [clear] to me that this relationship has been the cause of your illness. I see from what you still write about the idea of returning to the estate of Count von Berlichingen that—as is only natural—you have merely an imperfect representation of the effect which your behavior during your illness has had on others, and can even less understand their behavior regarding yourself. But this makes the challenge to unburden yourself of the representations you have of these matters simply all the greater. I of course am no longer in correspondence with the Count.

I must mention two things about my own behavior. I wrote to you in Neustadt, asking you in the letter [missing] above all to direct your soul to the thought of God, and to receive into your mind [*Gemüt*] strength and consolation from this higher love. I have also written to you about this in a letter to Zwiefalten. But I feel you have replied in a way I had not expected, though what I said could not have come more deeply from my heart. In short, after this letter I immediately received news from you that you want to leave Neustadt, where my [second] letter thus no longer reached you. I wrote to Stuttgart right away, receiving the reply that you had already left from there as well. Thus neither my exhortation nor the assistance which, at my request, my friends perhaps might have given you could reach you any longer. Whether this letter will still find you in Zwiefalten or Stuttgart I do not know. As for the other matter of giving you evidence of my concern by advancing some money, you know that I scraped up the 300 florins which I still owed, and have sent them to our cousin the Dean. I have likewise committed myself to support you in the future as much as my circumstances permit. The reimbursement of that capital has of course hampered me ever since. However, as soon as I know where you will be staying I will make an effort to contribute to it. I must regret you have not wished to retain Zwiefalten as your further place of residence—once more in view of the expenses of a trip, and of the transportation of your luggage. After all that has happened to you in Aalen, and after the impression you made during your illness, you can no longer return there. But I would have thought a small town to provide the most advantageous opportunity for you—if only because the cost of living is less. But why do you not mention at all the intention of occupying yourself again with teaching, which you did successfully and, from what you write to me, with the grateful appreciation of people of Aalen? This would provide you with a more secure subsidy than what you can expect from the assistance of others. Such a purpose, by which you can render service to others, will be the most certain means of preserving your mental and thus physical health. I can never regret enough that you gave up such a situation in Aalen, and have put yourself in a situation of dependence on people on whom you thought you could rely, which has in all probability been the cause of your illness. But once you resolve to rely on yourself, you will be most securely sheltered, both inwardly and outwardly—but “on yourself” at once means on a frame of mind directed toward something Higher. As for teaching, I as well earn my living from it, and honor myself with it just as it honors me in the eyes of others. How this can be accomplished for you again your friends will be able to advise on the spot. But I implore you to accept the good advice of others. At least you may believe me when I say

that you have spurned and severely undercut the well-intentioned sentiment of others in your regard by not accepting their advice and assistance in your own best interest, and by not allowing yourself to be restrained from what has become and has been harmful to you.

Accept these brotherly admonitions as they have come from my heart. May peace be in your heart.

I must still briefly report on myself, wife, and children. The latter will make themselves heard on their own. We thank God that we find ourselves in better health this summer than last winter, when I felt poorly and when my wife was still sicker and weaker. Of my external situation there would be much to say. As satisfied as I am with it, a position in a great state is different. In my field this situation cannot always be free of apprehension and anxiousness for me—whether founded or unfounded [see Ch 17 on demagogue scare]. Farewell for now, dear sister. Your brother, Wilhelm

CHRISTIANE SETTLED in Stuttgart after leaving the asylum, and during the last years of her life was treated by Karl Eberhard Schelling, brother of the philosopher Schelling. Hegel again wrote in August 1822, shortly before his trip to Holland.

Hegel to Christiane Hegel [426]

Berlin, August 31, 1822

It has already been very long, my dear sister, since I have heard from you, as also since I have sent you any news of myself and of our life here. I wish to nourish the hope that you have spent this last year in health, and in a passable, contented condition. For once we have learned what passes as happiness in this life, and how those who are often called happy fare, what we learn to value most is having nonetheless been satisfied within ourselves and outwardly having been in a passable state—even if not satisfied with everything. As for us here this past winter and summer, I have been burdened with much, and we have endured a lot. Last winter my wife was hard-hit when her hope of delivering a child at maturity was unfortunately dashed at great danger to her life. After beginning to recuperate at the start of the summer, she fell violently ill. We all have suffered beyond description. It has been about a week now that we have been able to look forward with more tranquil hope to her mental and physical recovery. Now she is again able to spend most of the day on the sofa. And if—as has thank God appeared for the last week—her recuperation continues, we can expect her health to solidify within a few weeks. My two boys [apparently excluding Ludwig—Ch 16], however, so far are developing, thank God, to my delight—both in health and in learning. With the latter they must now occupy themselves in earnest. This spring Karl had his ninth birthday. Both are, thank God, obedient, good-natured, and healthy boys. Finally, as for myself I have not enjoyed total health again this summer and last winter. If my wife's severe illness had not prevented me, I would have undertaken a trip to a spa during the current vacation time. In one or two weeks, however, I probably shall still have to be on the road a while [Ch 23 on Dresden].

A favor granted me by the Ministry for this purpose has made it possible for

me to send you a token of my brotherly concern. To our cousin, the head post-office treasurer, I have forwarded a bill of exchange for 50 florins. He is in the best position to have the transaction effected for you. I sincerely hope this contribution may be of some relief to you. My entire family sends you warm regards. Do write back to me soon, giving news—I hope pleasant—of your condition and arrangements. Your faithful brother, Wilhelm

FROM SEPTEMBER 1825 there remains a note [497] comparable in intense brevity to Christiane's note of January 15, 1799: "Last night, a little before midnight, our father died most quietly and peacefully. I cannot write more to you. May God stand by me. Your Christiane" [28].

Hegel to Christiane Hegel [497]

Berlin, September 20, 1825

Today is the anniversary of our mother's death, which I will hold forever in my memory.

IN DECEMBER 1825 Hegel took advantage of the elderly Jakob Friedrich von Abel's visit in Berlin to send a Christmas package to Christiane in Stuttgart. Abel had been a professor of practical philosophy in Tübingen from 1790 to 1812.

Hegel to Abel [502a]

December 16, 1825

I take the liberty, Professor Abel, of making use of your kind offer to take something along for my sister. I would be delighted if you wished to call on me this evening, or if you let me know when I could find you at home today or tomorrow.

Hegel to Christiane Hegel [502]

December 16, 1825

What my wife has already written fills you in on our situation and on how life is treating us. I owe my deepest thanks to Prelate Abel for his gracious remembrance of me, as also for the trouble he kindly took to inquire after your condition, letting me know through his son—who is presently here—that you, my dear sister, are fine. Please kindly accept the enclosure I hope Dr. Abel will have the graciousness to take along, assuming it does not burden him too much. It will help you out in the winter, which in our region has been very mild only up to now.

You will have received our letters from last fall at the time, and we hope soon to receive news of you.

Give my thanks as mentioned above to Prelate Abel, and convey as well my sincere interest in his good health, with best wishes for its long preservation. I send him my regards with the greatest of respect. I send you as well my heartfelt greetings for a happy New Year, which will no doubt be upon us by the time you receive this letter. I send them from the bottom of my soul as your faithful brother, Wilhelm

IN 1827 HEGEL took advantage of another visit to Berlin by a Swabian to send Christiane word of himself. Johann Christoph Friedrich Haug had been a school friend of Schiller's in Stuttgart.

Hegel to Christiane Hegel [542]

Berlin, May 16, 1827

Privy Councillor Haug, who has both honored and pleased us with a visit here in Berlin, wishes to take along a few lines from me for you, my dear sister. I can restrict myself all the more easily to a few lines because he will be able to tell you more of our well-being—only my wife has been confined to bed for a few days, with rheumatism—as well as of [our] life and situation here in Berlin.

[The lower half page is missing.]

. . . The present warm weather—yesterday we had a heavy thunderstorm, though today under cloudy skies it is 20 degrees Réaumur [77 Fahrenheit]—will surely do you good as well. Unfortunately our fellow countryman's stay here coincided with the onset of my lectures. A few days before they begin, and during the first week, I am utterly busy. I was thus not able to devote as much time to him as I normally would have liked.

I have learned from your letter of the mishap with my bust; it is to be sure breakab. . . [lines missing]

My wife is still sewing a little frill with which she wants to burden Mr. Haug for you. I do not know if she will still be able to add a line.

A warm farewell for now. Cordially, your faithful brother, Wilhelm

HEGEL'S BUST, then being sculpted by Ludwig Wilhlem Wichmann, would be finished in Autumn 1828 [524]. Hegel's last two letters to Christiane also reflect honors: the rectorship of Berlin University, and the copper engraving and medal mentioned in the letter of January 18, 1831. The medal, offered to Hegel by his students, was the work of August Ludwig Held. Christiane clearly took pride in her brother's acclaim, and was deeply affected by his death in November 1831—a fact which has been linked to her own death by suicide the following year.

Hegel to Christiane Hegel [624]

December 7, 1829

My wife has already told you in the preceding lines, my dear sister, of our life here. I must content myself with doing the strict minimum, since especially in correspondence I have fallen behind vis-à-vis the whole world. My rectorship this year completely consumes all the time I should be spending on literary works. How are you doing with the so early arrival of the cold weather? I enclose a check for twenty-five florins that [the publisher] Mr. [Johann Friedrich] von Cotta will kindly have cashed for you [677]. It shall provide you with some relief for expenses this winter. Let us hear from you soon.

My friends have made a special point of assuring my election to the rectorship. The science I teach, both orally and through my writings, exposes me to very different responses from different directions, and makes my position more

delicate than is the case with other sciences. I have been exposed to much gossip, even in the highest circles. Yet I may now hope that the prejudices which had been brought against me on the whole have diminished [see Ch 19]. Please make do with these few lines, and preserve your love for your faithful brother Wilhelm Hegel

[in the margin:] It is not to be forgotten that the distraction of many preoccupations has prevented me from giving honorable mention in the Berlin critical *Yearbooks [for Scientific Criticism]* to Count von Berlichingen's genial and brilliant transcription of Goethe's *Hermann and Dorothea* into Latin verse. Please excuse this omission of mine as well.

Hegel to Christiane Hegel [664]

[Berlin, January 18, 1831]

My wife has filled you in, dear Christiane, on life with us these days, including the wretched cold fever that both of us, especially Marie, could scarcely shake off. I have reason to believe I am less threatened with a relapse, but in Marie's case I am not yet sure.

A copper engraving of me, of which you wished two copies, can no longer be found. But since I have not only been engraved and sculpted but now imprinted on a medal as well, I shall send you two such medals instead. I would already have done so had I only known how. Sending them by mail would cost more than the medals themselves. I thus prefer to await a favorable occasion.

I enclose a check of thirty florins for you, to be paid from my account with Mr. von Cotta [677]. Even if he is not in Stuttgart, it will be cashed at his business office, as he has already told me. We are presently and—we hope—forever safe from all the [current] unrest. But these are still anxious times, in which everything that previously was taken to be solid and secure seems to totter [Ch 24 on July Revolution]. We hope the good news we received of your health in the fall will be equally true this winter, which has so far been tolerable. With warm brotherly love, your Wilhelm Hegel

XVI

Hegel's Natural Son, Ludwig

ON FEBRUARY 5, 1807, as Hegel had just completed the *Phenomenology*, Christiana Charlotte Johanna Burkhardt gave birth to Hegel's natural son, Ludwig, in Jena. Mrs. Burkhardt, whose maiden name was Fischer, was the wife of a tailor, who was also Hegel's landlord. Hegel is alleged to have promised marriage when Christiana's husband died shortly after Ludwig's birth. Ludwig was baptized Georg Ludwig Friedrich Fischer on February 7. The Jena publisher Karl Friedrich Ernst Frommann and Hegel's officer brother Georg Ludwig not only served as godfathers but also supplied the child with first names. (*Briefe* III, 434-35; IV/I, 231)

For years, however, Hegel preferred "Louis" to any legal first name—until an August 1816 letter [293] in which he announced the decision to take Ludwig into his own home; "Louis" from then on becomes "Ludwig." Because of Ludwig's friendship in Jena with members of Frommann's family associated with the nationalistic *Burschenschaft* (d'Hondt, 167-68), "Louis" was likely raised in Jena as "Ludwig." In assuming responsibility for his son, Hegel acquiesced in the name, but nonetheless sent the child to the French gymnasium in Berlin [411]. The circumstantial evidence is that Hegel wanted Ludwig at least in part to save him from the sickness of Romantic nationalism.

In this chapter are gathered nearly all letters by Hegel which mention Ludwig. It is not accidental that it also contains nearly all his letters to Frommann, and hardly anyone else. Frommann, largely a publisher of secondary school books, brought out the first German-Greek dictionary, thus materially supporting the neohumanist movement in pedagogy to which Niethammer and Hegel belonged in Bavaria (Chs 7-8). He counts with Niethammer as one of Hegel's two greatest benefactors. Niethammer promoted Hegel's career, but Frommann—and his sisters-in-law—helped preserve Hegel's peace of mind by assuring care for Ludwig (or Louis) in Jena, at some distance from Hegel's homes in Bamberg and Nuremberg. Hegel discusses or mentions Ludwig in all his letters to Frommann. And, except for a letter to Hegel's son Karl, Ludwig is mentioned by name only in letters to Frommann, or to Frommann's wife. Hegel's close correspondents occasionally do allude to Ludwig. In 1821 Niethammer greets "all," not "both," Hegel's "dear children" [404]. In 1828 Hegel's close friend and Dutch follower Peter van Ghert expressed regret that, because Hegel had written nothing, he had been unable to facilitate Ludwig's recent entry in the Dutch military service [581]. Yet before

Hegel moved to Heidelberg and thus away from his wife's family and friends, Frommann helped Hegel quarantine a difficult episode in his life. Frommann, who socialized regularly with the literary luminaries of Jena, was presumably more open-minded than most Bavarians of the time. He no doubt felt that Hegel's talents merited an attempt at eliminating a possible obstacle to the duty to realize them.

Domestic irregularity, long associated with the presumably decadent upper classes of France, was not unheard of in the Germany of Hegel's time. It was tolerated in Goethe—who befriended Ludwig (*Briefe* III, 434)—and even celebrated by Romantics like the young Friedrich Schlegel. Hegel's social and financial standing, however, did not allow the license of a Goethe, while his philosophical position had turned against the romanticism of Schlegel or Schleiermacher well before 1807. The Burkhardt affair thus mainly gave him a bad conscience, and solidified his attachment to the conventional ethical life of the family. He was far from being an unrepentant "aesthetic man." He accepted responsibility for his affective liaison. Yet, earlier commitments notwithstanding, he was not ready to set matters right by marriage. On hearing of Hegel's marriage to Marie von Tucher in 1811, Christiana reportedly showed up in Nuremberg demanding satisfaction (*Ibid.*). His sense of guilt was real, but not enough to plunge him into Kierkegaardian despair or to presage a conversion to traditional Christianity as a religion of salvation from sin. He evaded the Kierkegaardian fate and assuaged his guilt with the thought that in the circumstances guilt was unavoidable, that he had done all he could for Christiana [125]. In 1817 he told Frommann that if he had done anything more for Ludwig he would have been guilty of depriving Frommann of an occasion for his own generous assistance over the years [317]. And in 1822 he again wrote that he could do nothing more for Ludwig [411]; anything more would be unfair to his wife.

Hegel's relationship to Ludwig shows ambivalence and compromise. He did not abandon Ludwig; yet, assuming early that Ludwig was not meant for the liberal professions to which Hegel himself belonged, he did not fully accept him either. At worst, he was guilty of rationalization and self-deception. At best he was a victim of conflicting obligations and of the expectations and prejudices of his time. Perhaps the ethical life of no age escapes the "innocent guilt" of conflicting obligations. The only consolation was that ethical life still had "marching orders" [271], and that anyone identified with the world spirit could embrace the pain of its contradictions and ambiguities as the providential means of their eventual resolution (*Werke* XI, 452, 569).

Hegel did not write Frommann until well over a year after Ludwig's birth.

Hegel to Frommann [125]

Bamberg, July 9, 1808

I had delayed my answer, my dear friend, to your last two letters due to two matters about which I also wanted to write you in my reply. The first concerns disclosure of the fate of books which I still have in Jena, while the second concerns presentation of the draft about which you wrote. This draft has not yet reached me. You thus have yourself in part to blame if my account with you has again become

swollen. I would be pleased if you could increase the draft by about three carolins, not only because I would be able to make a debt to Paulsen of about seven thalers payable to you, but also because you will thus receive a small advance for your cashbox. If such an increase in the draft is not possible, I want to send you the proper amount in cash. I thus await your reply in the matter. Concerning the other matter, my books, they are out of danger according to the report I have received. I am obliged to you for having drawn my attention to it. The circumstances surrounding the affair do not, as far as I can see, impugn Mrs. Burkhardt. She is rather the one who has had more to suffer from it, as also from numerous circumstances connected with her situation. I continue to regret painfully that so far I have not been fully able to extricate from her present situation the woman who is the mother of my child, and who thus has a right to call upon me to perform obligations of all sorts. I am very obliged to you for facilitating for me what relief I am able to provide in the matter.

Part of your family has been reunited with you in Jena. This reunion can only help you forget the wounds of the past and overlook many an unpleasantness in the present situation.

You asked me whether I did not want to return to Jena as well. That old pillar of Jena, our [friend Johann Diederich] Gries, is also returning, from what I hear. I would like to do so, too. You disclosed the prospect of an old *philosophus* [Johann August Ulrich, Hoffmeister surmises] almost dying. Almost is *something*, but far from enough. I cannot go there without a respectable salary, but with one, I would love to, and, if I consider the matter well, would rather go nowhere else. Apart from Jena I almost despair of obtaining honorable work again.

But, God willing, in Bavaria a new world will arise. This has long been the hope. And I shall find a niche for myself in Bavaria even should the old world remain.

[Thomas] Seebeck had promised to visit me this spring. It is summer, and he still has not yet come. Urge him to do so.

In connection with your Lübeck relations, it occurred to me you might have some money paid to me there, perhaps between four or five gold franks. Be so kind as to write me about it. I will then immediately send you the money to Jena.

Remember me to your dear family, to my friends Seebeck and [Karl Ludwig von] Knebel in Jena, and especially to Mrs. Niethammer, if she is still there. Yours, Hegel

I do not believe I have told you of the arrival of Niethammer's *Contest* [see Ch 7 on Niethammer]. I thank you for having taken the trouble. A few copies of what has been entrusted have been sold.

IN 1811 LUDWIG was placed in the care of Frommann's sisters-in-law, Sophie Bohn and Elizabeth Wesselhöft. Sophie lost her husband in 1803, and opened a home for boys in Jena in 1807 in collaboration with Elizabeth. Hegel in turn sought to help Mrs. Bohn obtain an apprenticeship for her son in Stuttgart.

I have just received, dearest friend, the enclosed letter from Mr. [Heinrich Friedrich] Jobst in Stuttgart. To save time I send it in its original form [*in Originali*]¹—and indeed to you, since it will hardly find Mr. Frommann any longer in Jena. I add what the sender of the letter adds: “Despite what was said in our conversation about the virtual impossibility of Mme. Bohn paying tuition for her son [Friedrich], the amount at issue in this letter is 100 florins *for four years in all*. Since six years are the rule with us and really are not particularly too many given the different sorts of commodity knowledge which are necessary, and since young Bohn with intense diligence can go just as far in four years and may lay claim after the period to an ever higher wage according to his capabilities, thus enabling him *if necessary* to reimburse the above 100 florins, we hope this matter will not be an obstacle, and I ask for an *expeditious* decision, etc.”

P.S. Permission will no doubt be granted to repay the above 100 florins gradually, which is what we already wanted to arrange.

The [Nuremberg] municipal superintendent’s [Paul Wolfgang Merkel’s] judgment of this, which is also my own, is that finding a position like this is the most fortunate coincidence in present circumstances. The restriction of the period of instruction to four years, especially with a wage of 100 florins, is to be carefully considered.

I now submit these circumstances to the decision of Mme. Bohn. It would please me greatly if the matter turns out to her satisfaction. For my part I likewise request her prompt reply.

I can only add that I may soon be able to give you some good news about myself [his engagement with Marie von Tucher], of interest at once to you because of your friendship for me. I ask you in the meantime please to continue remembering me kindly, and to give my regards to Louis. I remain your most devoted servant, Hegel.

Please return Mr. Jobst’s letter.

FROMMANN’S LETTERS to Hegel reporting on Ludwig are lost, but paragraph three of a letter by Hegel from September 1814 [237] indicates complications in Ludwig’s upbringing. Hegel writes to Frommann that it will be best to make a “businessman” of him. Nine years later he repeated the idea to Frommann, adding that Ludwig was not opposed [419]. Yet in an 1825 letter to the foster father of his half-sister Augusta Theresia (also illegitimate), Ludwig wrote that he really wished to enter medicine but was told that support would cease if he did not agree to business (*Briefe* IV/I, 238).

The long delay, my dear friend, in answering the letter I received from you last spring is chiefly due to the tardy determination of benefits for the gymnasium pupils, and thus also of the number of advance subscriptions for the Greek

dictionary [*Small Greek-German Hand Dictionary*, 2nd ed, 1815-16]. I neglected to indicate to you that in general you can count on me for a goodly number, since I assumed you surely expect this anyway and were certain of my interest. I for my part have counted on you keeping the deadline for advance subscriptions open for me. The greater part of the acquisitions depends on obtaining benefits, and these were paid out just a few weeks ago. The number of copies I have to order is thirty-two. I have the money in hand and hope Mr. [Johann Leonhard] Schrag [Nuremberg publisher of Hegel’s *Logic*] will be able to effect payment to you in Leipzig, which saves us the postage. Otherwise I will send cash payment without delay. But the former procedure is more convenient for me in other respects as well, as also for you. I am sincerely pleased that you are so far along in this important enterprise. The price for advance subscription is extremely modest; you have certainly done everything you could to reduce it. Excellence may likewise be expected from the author [Friedrich Wilhelm Riemer]. But allow me to pass on another thought about the matter to you as a publisher. There still remains an unfilled need, though through your sacrifice you have forestalled its inconvenience as much as possible. Given our practice of requiring Greek of even those who will make no scholarly or other use of it once they leave school, a great number of pupils need a very common pocket dictionary, which at once can be much cheaper. Your initial idea of an excerpt from the large dictionary of [Johann Gottlob] Schneider no doubt rather tended in this direction as well. A man such as Riemer cannot be content with such labor, which some day will nonetheless be his; he will always be improving on it and thus make it more extensive than such a proposal would allow. On the other hand, I imagine many entries in Riemer’s dictionary will contain improvements and expansions over what is found in the great Schneider dictionary, which will upset the [established] relation between the two works, in that the former will in no way be superfluous to one who owns the latter. Indeed, Schneider’s dictionary may perhaps have thereby become, on the contrary, more dispensable. Schneider’s work will at least be forced out of the schools, which surely was not your intention. With the present advance subscription price this consideration, as I already mentioned, almost completely disappears. But with the intervening necessity of a higher retail price in stores, an excerpt of the excerpt at perhaps three thalers could enjoy quite a success. Yet this also depends on what plans you have for the future of the great Schneider dictionary. Furthermore, do you not also have a plan for a dictionary from German to Greek—if only as appendix, as scanty as it may be? We are for once to wallow thoroughly in Greek, and would find such help quite indispensable.

Since I am now talking of schoolbooks, I wish to point out that it is a great inconvenience for us school folk when with each new printing changes are made. This not only causes each time new expenses for the teacher but also, especially with the elementary school pupils, causes confusion and an interruption of instruction. In the end teachers abandon such a book out of annoyance. I advise you from experience to maintain your ground against authors who always want to improve. A single slight improvement is not at all at issue here. Corrections are something else, but anyhow you do not contract for schoolbooks which are to begin with

incorrect. Improvement, however, concerns something which is already good, and of such improvement no end is to be seen. A dictionary can always be improved without disadvantage, but not just any schoolbook.¹

I make these remarks because I would wish your solid undertakings to serve the best interest of the schools and to enjoy all the success they on all sides deserve. I now come to Louis. From what you write of him, I see that his constitution has unfortunately still not quite solidified. The warm summer air, which is good for such a disposition, will not have failed to have effect, but the best thing for him is the loving care he enjoys. I was likewise very touched by the kindness of the two doctors who treated him but accepted nothing for their endeavors. Please thank them for me as you have the chance. You seem to see some promise in his natural abilities. The most appropriate thing will probably be to make a businessman of him. His memory will help him in learning modern languages. That you have decided the increase in board and room meets with my full approval. You have proceeded here in full accordance with my thoughts. It is still but small compensation. Remember me kindly to Mme. Bohn. I admonish Louis to be always obedient and diligent. This summer my wife had written to Mme. Bohn a few times, or started to write, but because of my dallying has not completed or dispatched the letters. However, she will write to her still today to tell her how gladly she herself would assume or facilitate the care she is giving, whether in part or wholly. Mr. Schrag told me he has had 150 florins paid to you in the month of June.

My new official responsibility [as school councillor] this year has caused me quite a lot of work. I am thus obtaining many an opportunity to advance your interests with the schools. However, they are being restricted once again by the entire local situation, and especially by persons who should collaborate. But continue to address me as Rector H.; I cannot accept the title of School Councillor. I could regard this function as the opening to an ulterior career in the field. But the sciences and the teaching of them still control by far the stronger inclination in me, so that I would consider this other occupation to be rather an obstacle.

I hope Fritz causes you much pleasure. He will probably now be going on vacation. Yesterday ours started here. Please greet the gymnasium student, as also kind Alwine. But give my regards in particular to the very worthy Mme. Frommann and dear Minchen—of whom I am pleased to hear she has been returned to you, since she could not have found happiness in the fate that surely seemed destined for her. We have not heard anything here from Knebel for a long time. Give my compliments to him as well as to Gries. We hear that Goethe wants to visit Munich. Perhaps we will then have the good fortune of seeing him here as well. Yours, Hegel

THE ABOVE CONCERN shown by Hegel's wife for her husband's natural son is repeated in other letters. In November 1814 she sent Ludwig her greetings [243a],

¹Hegel's critique of the mania of textbook authors for new editions—based on the principle that what can be improved may not need it—is consistent with his anti-Fichtean attack on the bad infinite and endless progress, though he himself published three editions of the *Encyclopaedia*, revised the *Logic* before his death [see 569 to Schrag] and strongly protested when his publisher suggested [605a] reprinting the unrevised *Phenomenology*.

while in December 1815 [257] and April 1816 [262] she reiterated her gratefulness for Mrs. Bohn's efforts on his behalf.

Hegel to Frommann [243a]

Nuremberg, November 2, 1814

Since your last letter of the 7th, received the 13th of last month, Mr. Schrag has promised, my dear friend, that he would have 109 florins paid to you. I hope that—as I requested of him—this was taken care of while you were still in Leipzig. A few accidental circumstances have delayed dispatch of the balance of 102 florins, which I here remit.

I have received the packet with copies of the first part of [Riemer's] Greek dictionary [237]. My preliminary view of its execution is that it has turned out to be quite satisfactory, in suitable proportion to the scope and the entire internal and external organization. What must strike everybody is the price relative to what is being offered: the [whole] alphabet seems to amount to 18-20 groschen, certainly very cheap for such a printing job.

I likewise render my most humble thanks for the other enclosures. I hope to be able to recommend [Friedrich Wilhelm] Döring[*'s Guide for Translation from German to Latin*, published by Frommann, 1815], and help give it wider use than it has had so far. Please allow me to add still further orders for the [Johann Jacob] Griesbach auction [of books from his estate]. I avail myself of your kindness. The enclosed slip of paper contains book orders from a friend as well as myself. To say that the auction is going well of course means that the books are being driven way up in price, and so we may well not receive very many.

Five weeks ago my wife gave birth to a boy [Immanuel], who is quite well. She, however, has not yet left her bed—due to slow recovery of her strength. The delivery had to be performed by a doctor. Yet nothing else is wrong with her. You promise me further news of Louis soon. Give him, in the meantime, cordial greetings from my wife as well as myself. Greetings likewise above all to Mme. Bohn and your wife. Please remember me as well to the Knebels. It has been a long time since he has given us here news of himself. The Seebecks are very fine. Judicial Councillor [Gottlieb] Hufeland was here a few weeks ago with his wife and son; they are hale and hearty, though she is heavier than in Jena. [Lorenz] Oken, we hear, has married, though we do not yet know whether actually with Mlle. [Louise] Stark. Please congratulate him most kindly on my behalf.

Farewell. Yours sincerely, Hegel

[P.S.] Kindly dispatch the enclosed letter [?] to Berlin, billing me for the postage.

Hegel to Frommann [257]

Nuremberg, December 20, 1815

My dear wife's kind disposition toward Louis, my dear friend, led her to want to contribute in some small way to a Merry Christmas for him. However, a sudden accident, which still is causing her great weakness, has delayed her. I tell you so that you see we have not forgotten Louis and our dear friends in Jena. I had in any case reached an understanding with my wife for her to leave entirely to Mme. Bohn

the purchase of clothing, since what is needed is not always properly seen from this distance. When she is better she will try to make up for what has been neglected. Your and Mme. Bohn's love and friendship will see to it that this holiday for children does not pass joylessly by for him.

My wife has been expectant, but ten days ago the onset of a premature delivery became evident. Only three days ago did the condition reach termination. A violent hemorrhage made it quite frightening but, in view of this, it ended very fortunately. She still has to struggle with very difficult spells, but thank God the danger is now relatively past.

To you and your family, as also to Mme. Bohn and her sister [Elizabeth Wesselhöft], I wish truly happy holidays. Give them all my best regards, as also my wife's. To Louis go our warm greetings, along with an admonition to behave well and be obedient. Yours, Hegel

P.S. Are we soon to receive the second part of the [Riemer] dictionary? You will have learned that Hufeland has been called to Halle, and in fact is going. The incident surrounding Judicial Councillor Martin in Heidelberg will also be familiar to you [see 266]. His papers were sealed at eleven p.m. because he drafted a petition for an estates assembly on behalf of the Badenese. Due to that treatment he has asked to be discharged, but so far has not received a decision.

For now please transmit to Knebel my sincere thanks for the gift of his poems [*A Collection of Little Poems*, 1815]. At present it is impossible to find a quiet moment in which to express personally my appreciation for his kind remembrance.

Hegel to Frommann [262]

Nuremberg, April 14, 1816

The bearer of this letter, Mr. Paul Merkel, has been kind enough to pay you, my dear friend, an advance of 112 florins and 12 schillings in subscription money for an additional seventeen copies of Riemer's Greek dictionary. His father, the former Nuremberg Municipal Superintendent Merkel, with whom you will already be acquainted, will be recommendation enough. We are now ardently awaiting prompt arrival of these copies, as well as the thirty-two copies of Part Two from the previous order, since in a few classes we have been lacking a Greek dictionary for a few years. For me personally their arrival will be doubly pleasant because I will be able to congratulate you on completion of this fine endeavor. Please have the books kindly purchased on my instructions from the Griesbach auction packed along with the dictionaries, which I think should be possible.

Mr. Merkel will be able to tell you that we are quite well here, and that my wife has, thank goodness, now recovered from her protracted indisposition. My children are also prospering pretty well. A short while ago you will have seen [Gotthilf Heinrich von] Schubert, and will have heard him speak himself of his new career and perhaps of our Nuremberg as well. A few days ago [professor of medicine and Württemberg court physician Ludwig Friedrich von] Froriep also passed through with his family [en route to Weimar, where in 1816 he became High Medical Councillor]. You see we send you more acquaintances than the few you send us to tell of you and your family from firsthand knowledge. Yet we have

not been lacking direct and indirect news from Jena, and are happy for such an encounter, restoring us more closely to your circle. Are you not going to set foot for once across the Thuringian Alps which divide your North from our much-touted South? How that would please us! You would probably include Munich in your trip on your own. This stopover alone would make it worthwhile. Last fall I at last spent two weeks there—two weeks of the most enjoyable and pleasant days among friends there who, for the most part, are at once your friends as well: Niethammer, old Jacobi, whom I love and admire dearly and who is also very kindly disposed to me and my wife, [Karl Johann Friedrich] Roth, brother-in-law of the bearer of this letter, Schelling, and so on. Munich's art treasures make it one of the most excellent locales to visit in all Germany.

The government in Weimar again seems to have more far-reaching plans for Jena. Goethe, I hear, is much occupied with the installation, consolidation, and expansion of the collections there. I hear from another source that Schelling has received a call to Jena, though he has declined. This shows they were serious, for one could hardly attract him at the usual salary of a philosophy professor. But he has it too good in Munich: a considerable salary and almost nothing to do. Did no one think of me at all after he declined? My first efforts there as a lecturer, from what I hear, left behind a prejudice against me [first section of Ch 13]. To be sure, I was a beginner, had not yet worked my way through to clarity, and was bound to the letter of my notebook in oral presentation. I have since acquired complete freedom through almost eight years' practice at the gymnasium, where one is constantly interacting in conversation with one's listeners and where being understood and expressing oneself clearly by itself is of the utmost necessity. The thought that a prospect might open up for me in Jena has, I confess, made an impression on me. I hear that a certain Mr. [Christian Hermann] Weisse [Ch 19 on Göschel] in Naumburg or Weissenfels entertains hopes for that position. Should it not be possible to ward him off? What do you know more precisely of the entire matter? Goethe, according to his usual way, does not tend to this matter, I presume. I, to be sure, could not go there with the usual salary of a philosophy professor either. May I ask you to inquire further as to what is planned and what approach recommends itself. Perhaps Mr. von Knebel would also be helpful in this matter. Please give him my cordial regards.

My wife will write to Mme. Bohn and herself tell how much joy Mme. Bohn's continued love gives me, and how grateful I am for everything she is doing for Louis. From his letter we have learned of his very good progress. As to further manly instruction, which Mme. Bohn now thinks advisable, please arrange whatever your common judgment finds appropriate.

I am running out of paper. I must break off, and yet still must ask my cordial greetings to be conveyed to Mme. Frommann, to Minchen, and to Alwine. Yours, Hegel

Due to the arrival of relatives my wife was prevented from writing yesterday; she will make up for it soon.

Before his departure for Halle, Hufeland will attend the marriage of his daughter, Therese, who has grown into a very nice girl, to [Ludwig] Döderlein [see

Ch 13 on philology], who is traveling for the event from Bern to Munich. The wedding will probably take place in two weeks. Since the fall Julius Niethammer [Ch 13 on *Burschenschaften*] has been a student in Erlangen.

FROMMANN WAS Hegel's friend and textbook supplier in the Nuremberg years. Though their correspondence largely concerned other affairs, Ludwig was never forgotten.

Hegel to Frommann [275]

Nuremberg, July 20, 1816

First about the pleasant prospect your last letter affords me. How pleased I should be, my dear friend, by the prospect of seeing you here this summer! Perhaps it will still be this month, and maybe you are even now underway. But you do not yet write of it as completely certain. Yet when I behold the pleasure which this hope makes me feel I can no longer take it to be anything but quite certain, and do not know what else to add other than to bid you to come soon. If your wife does not come along, you can probably bring Fritz with you. There are plenty of departures from here to Munich to make the return trip. The ticket costs eight to ten florins. Last fall I traveled there with my wife this way. The weather is finally clearing up, and I am thus expecting you soon. It goes without saying that you will lodge with me and make do with what I have. And my wife extends an invitation as warm as my own.

I shall wait until then to settle accounts with you. This can best be taken care of here. [Martin] Hudtwalcker [Frommann's brother-in-law] is presently here as well; he dined at home with me yesterday.

We have finally received the [Riemer Greek-German] dictionary, and I am sincerely pleased by such a successful endeavor. I am of course not enough of a lexical scholar for my judgment, which you request, to carry any weight. Nonetheless, I may be allowed to take pleasure in the excellent views and treatment; in the facilitation of such language study; in its reduction to its simple, rational, and ingenious [elements]; and in its practicality, which will give it so many advantages with respect to its usefulness. The Preface, to which you drew my attention, has delighted me highly in mind and heart. Riemer, as they say, is right on target. It is quite funny that this thorough lexicographer feels obliged to be bashful about being ranked with scholars who have gone so far that he prefers to be called a dilettante in comparison with them.

You have sent fifty instead of forty-nine copies. For the time being I will put aside the extra copy for my use.

Mme. Bohn is so kind to have taken Louis along to the spa. I am grateful to her for so much! But unfortunately she has not had good weather so far.

Hoping to see you quite soon, yours, Hegel

A MONTH LATER, Hegel announced his and his wife's decision to take Ludwig into their home [293]. The decision was probably facilitated by Hegel's move to Heidelberg—even if at a deeper level it was motivated by Hegel's wish to guide

Ludwig's education. To have received Ludwig into the Hegel household in Marie's hometown of Nuremberg would have been delicate.

Hegel to Frommann [293]

Nuremberg, August 28, 1816

So instead of receiving you yourself, my dear friend, I shall only be receiving a letter from you. I cannot let that count as compensation, especially since later you will no longer find me in Nuremberg. I wanted to send you this report through Mme. Bohn. But since she did not arrive yesterday as her letter from Schwalbach led us to expect, and since according to your letter we must not expect her perhaps for a few days, I want to let you know in the meantime that my transfer to *Heidelberg* has been decided. You cannot believe how happy I feel once again to get a university, and indeed in Heidelberg. I know the friendly interest you take in this. My reunion with you in Jena was no longer to be. In Berlin people also thought of me. I had to answer the [Prussian] Minister's letter today with [a report of my] acceptance of the Heidelberg position, which was submitted two days before receipt of his letter. I was happy I was spared the choice, for Berlin would of course have been very attractive for me in many respects, though not for my wife, who, after all, likewise has a voice in the matter. And in Heidelberg, which in any case entices me in such a friendly manner, I feel more at home due to the many friends there.

My wife and I have decided henceforth to take Ludwig into our home. This decision agrees all the more with what you write of the matter as also with his present [foster] mother [Mrs. Bohn], and with the imminent arrival of Ludwig himself. Yet perhaps one will not want to leave him with us here right away.

I send my most obliged thanks for the copy of Riemer's dictionary. It is to me a very precious gift. In five of the other copies sheet M from Part One is double, while the same sheet is missing from Part Two. I thus ask you to make up for this defect, and will have the double sheets sent back by the sisters [Mrs. Bohn and her sister Elizabeth].

It was, to be sure, a nice thought and kind invitation to propose that we accompany the two sisters to Jena. However, I hope still to see you here or in Heidelberg beforehand. In the meantime, my dear friend, farewell. Sincerely yours, Hegel

From Niethammer in Altenburg I have today received news that he will arrive in Jena in the middle of September. Since the mail is only leaving today, I still had to let this letter lie around. Yesterday we received a letter from Mme. Bohn from Stuttgart, dated the 24th, in which she announces her departure today and her Sunday arrival. She has perhaps written to you from there on account of the coach.

IN APRIL 1817 Hegel reported to Frommann that Ludwig had joined his household, to the delight of both Hegel and his wife. Yet there was ambivalence on Marie's part. In 1825 Ludwig wrote that his stepmother did not treat him the same as she treated her own two sons and that he thus lived in constant fear (*Briefe* IV/I, 238). If he had had the means, he said, he would have long since run away. Good

intentions failed to nullify the awkwardness of the situation and the prejudice of the times.

Hegel to Frommann [317]

Heidelberg, April 19, 1817

If I had to enumerate to you, my dear friend, all the causes of my long delay in reporting my new situation to you, and especially in discussing the topic nearest at hand—namely my altered situation as far as Ludwig is concerned—I would again have to postpone writing, since it would inevitably become too long a story. Such postponement would also be necessary if I were not sure I could count in advance on your forgiveness. Put briefly, I cannot view a letter to a friend as a piece of business. It can only be a pleasure, and I cannot get to it if my mind is not otherwise free from pressing concerns.

May 31. I shall leave the preceeding opening lines standing so that you see how well I fare and have fared with letter writing. I am now somewhat freer and thus can get to it.

Concerning first the change in my situation, it continues to be pleasant in every respect. The longer I stayed in Nuremberg, the more intense became my wish to have a university professorship again, and the one here in Heidelberg is pleasant and advantageous in many regards. Interest in philosophy that Fries had all but allowed to die out—at least assuming my syntax passes muster here—nonetheless seems still to have been actual. In logic, where he had five to six students, I have about seventy this semester. And I prefer to have them in my second rather than first semester. My wife and my family are likewise fine here. Of course social activities among the professors are not frequent, but this was true in Jena, too—the social life there for the most part had its middle point solely in you. Yet otherwise relations are cordial, even if without yeast. The yeast [Fries?] was spirited [*exorziert*] away before my arrival, fortunately off to you in Jena! Paulus's unrest and agitation are directed toward the outside world; they no more spoil anything locally than they improve anything externally [Ch 13 on Württemberg]. With Thibaut I am on amicable, almost intimate terms. He is an honest and a frank man [Ch 13, last section].

[Heinrich] Voss [son and collaborator of the classical philologist Johann Heinrich Voss] has since brought Ludwig to us. I have just told him of his mother's death, of which Voss had informed me. It affected him more than me. My heart had long ago finished with her. I could still only fear unpleasant contacts between her and Ludwig—and thus indirectly with my wife—and extreme unpleasantness for myself. Was she in Jena? My wife and I take pleasure in Ludwig. It is now clear to me how much he owes to the excellent education and love given him by your sisters-in-law. To them and you he owes everything he will make of his life. He gives evidence of a good mind. He is now attending the local gymnasium, which to be sure could be better. But I am most surprised at how much Latin he has learned this past winter. Mr. [August] Oswald, with whom I am publishing an *Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences* which will soon be completely finished for my lectures, has shown me your receipt for 150 florins. For the present

I entered an order for this lump sum, pending your bill. I am thus glad to see accounts settled and this relationship [for the care of Ludwig]—through which I have caused you so much trouble and yet have experienced encouraging, honest, and loyal friendship from you—brought to a happy conclusion. I thank you most sincerely for all the affection you have shown me in the matter, and I ask you to say as much to Mme. Bohn and her sister. However much I wished to achieve a more self-sufficient external situation earlier, this cherished and gratefully appreciated experience of loyal friendship, caused by my many-sided need of assistance, was one which even for a great deal I would not have missed. In your last letter, still received in Nuremberg last fall, you want to deprive me of the hope of seeing you in the local area. I do not, however, want to give up this hope completely. We should get together again—you, along with with your dear wife, your now grown-up Alwine and Fritz, and dear Minchen. I would bring my family to you. Voss told me how cordially Gries, Goethe, and Knebel still remember me. I ask you to send them my amicable regards, and to assure your dear wife, Minchen, and Alwine of my most heartfelt remembrance. Farewell, and give me news of yourself soon. Yours, Hegel

A few weeks ago [Thomas] Seebeck went to Munich. The ostensible reason is the death of [the Augustinian monk Maximus von] Imhof, the physicist member of the Academy. I broke with Seebeck before my departure from Nuremberg, so that I am no longer in contact with him [300; also Ch 15 on theory of colors]. I have sought a reviewer of Riemer's dictionary for the [*Heidelberg*] *Yearbooks* here, but have not found one so far. Voss will probably take care of it now; I will be transferring this area to him. Voss has rented an apartment for Jean Paul [Friedrich Richter, romantic poet], who wants to spend a month here. [Friedrich von] Schlos-ser, from Frankfurt, will come here to replace [librarian Friedrich] Wilken. We could not get [Heinrich] Luden, who presumably had been [too greatly] stirred by [Jena's] yeast.

LUDWIG RETAINED the attachment to his natural mother which Hegel in the above says he himself had long since overcome. Wary of a disruption of his household, Hegel was relieved by her death. In 1825 Ludwig expressed the wish to know more of his "dear mother," her relation with "Mr. Hegel," and her death (*Briefe* IV/I, 239-40).

Hegel visited Frommann in Jena on the way to his new post in Berlin in 1818.

Hegel to Frommann [351]

Berlin, October 7, 1818

Since my wife has just provided me with inkstand and a bottle of ink, the first use I am making of it is to notify you that we have arrived safely in Berlin, but above all to render our heartfelt thanks for the welcome we found, dear friend, in your home. It was this cozy and cheerful resting spot that chiefly strengthened us for the rest of the trip. After leaving you we spent the night in Weissenfels, and from there soon arrived in Leipzig, departing again at ten o'clock the next day and getting as far as Wittenberg. We could not get away from Wittenberg until eight

o'clock, but with an excellent road all the way we reached Berlin in good time. Your good advice about renting horses has helped me through the entire trip with two horses. We have been in our own lodging since the day before yesterday. It is, to be sure, still incompletely furnished, but is habitable. The distances in Berlin, however, are all too great for a wife seeking to assemble furniture and household supplies. Exhaustion forced her to take a day's rest today. The children have endured the trip well.

I still cannot write much about my impressions of Berlin, for the forest is still blocking my perception of the trees. I have found kind and dear friends. This noon Minister von Altenstein traveled via Leipzig and Frankfurt to Aachen. He is a really kind and excellent man. But everything here is dispersed, grand in scale and style. Admittedly we have not yet become as cozy here as we were in your home. And, given the restlessness and distraction, which at the same time are rather fruitless, the recollection in which we have fixed this coziness is all the dearer to us.

Alexander Bohn [son of Mme. Bohn] visited us in Leipzig. Ludwig tracked him down, and has been treated by him quite splendidly. But he has not been able to find Wilhelm Wesselhöft [nephew of Friedrich Frommann and a member of *Burschenschaft*] here. A letter to Mme. Bohn, which I should have delivered in Jena right upon descending from the good old coach [*vom guten Wagen*], I am mailing only now.

Our most cordial greetings and, once again, our warmest thanks to our dear circle of friends, your wife, Minchen, and Alwine. Please give my best regards likewise to Gries and [Dietrich Georg] Kieser [researcher on hypnotism], and to our friend Knebel and his wife. A warm farewell. Yours, Hegel

IN THE SECOND of two letters from the early Berlin period to his son Karl, Hegel mentions Ludwig in recounting family activities. Karl, the future historian, excluded these 1819 letters to himself as well as other letters mentioning Ludwig from his edition of Hegel's correspondence.

Hegel to His Son Karl [358a]

Berlin, August 13, 1819

It has pleased me, my dear son, to receive a letter from you from Neustadt, which is written quite neatly. When I come to Neustadt you must also show me the two mills you saw, though I do not yet know exactly when it will be.

We had nothing special for the King's birthday except for a speech in the university auditorium delivered by Professor [August] Boeckh. There were no doubt fireworks in the evening, though I did not see them. If you and your brothers and mother had been here I would probably have attended with you.

Since you do not attend school in Neustadt, study all the more industriously with mother, so Mr. Blenz will see you have not fallen behind. Farewell, my dear son, and give my greetings to Manuel [Immanuel]. Your professor father

Hegel to His Son Karl [358b]

Berlin, August 29, 1819

I truly thank you, my dear Karl, for the fine painted flowers you yourself have made and have given me on my birthday. Parents on their birthday are most pleased when they see that their children love them and can make something beautiful themselves, as likewise that they are good, hard-working, and obedient. Always stay like this, and I will always love you dearly. You [*ihr*] have also sent me such beautiful flowers, and even cherries, grapes, and more! I only wish you could have been here with me and helped me eat them. We have not yet finished with the melon. But mother will probably have given you chocolate and other things on my birthday.

You ask in your letter if I am not coming soon. I probably would be with you, but mother [who had suffered a miscarriage] writes she has to take the baths longer than I had thought, and I want to come only to pick you up, so we can take a trip together. We shall probably see the sea, and take a boat ride on the sea.

English horsemen are no doubt in these parts as well. Ludwig has seen them. However, here are no hares and stags as skillful as in your vicinity. Since you have painted something so beautiful for me, I send you a few picture-sheets. One of them is for Manuel. I also send grapes for mother and for the two of you.

Farewell, dear Karl. Your father, Professor Hegel

Greetings to Manuel. Thank him for the little picture which was no doubt from him.

IN 1822, WHEN Ludwig was fifteen, Hegel decided to search for an apprenticeship in business for him. Despite Hegel's claim to the contrary in July 1822 [419], Ludwig's aversion to business conflicted with his father's efforts to channel his development. Three years later Ludwig entered the Dutch military and was sent to the East Indies, where he died on August 28, 1831; Hegel died in November 1831 without learning of his son's fate.

Hegel to Frommann [411]

Berlin, April 8, 1822

A week ago, my dear friend, Ludwig was confirmed, and it is now time for me to find accommodations for him with a view to an eventual vocation in business. I had talked to you tentatively of the idea that the Bohn brothers [Friedrich and Alexander] might be able to procure a place for him close by in Mr. [Friedrich] Jobst's enterprise [in Stuttgart]. My family relations in Stuttgart still gave me pause somewhat, but this has since become my definite wish. Last winter my mother-in-law in Nuremberg wrote my wife that Mr. Bohn had told her in October, during a visit in Nuremberg, that Jobst's enterprise would perhaps need an apprentice in about a year. Little by little, especially in the past year, Ludwig has much improved. He has gained in reflection, diligence, and stability. He has become generally more mature, and has acquired a sense of honor. He has made very good progress in the French gymnasium, especially in his fluency in French. Given the highest confidence and hope I have placed in him, nothing would put my mind at

rest more than to know that he had found lodging under the watchful eyes of the Bohn brothers, who have always shown him so much love, who already have authority over him, and to whom he is attached with gratitude and respect. Society always used to pose a danger for him, and the danger of leaving him among strangers without friendly supervision could only cause me concern. As to the conditions, I of course of necessity wish to place him without paying an apprenticeship premium—just like Mr. Bohn started out, if I remember correctly [182]. I am unable to do any more for him.

I may ask you to have my wish transmitted to the Bohn brothers and, through them, to Mr. Jobst. I may no doubt draw upon the support in this of Mme. Bohn and her sister Betty, to whom I wish to be most cordially remembered. As my dear friend in all this you know how obliged I will be to you along with the Bohn brothers if the affair is successfully concluded.

I hope you and your family have spent this winter in good health. But what about the summer now? Last fall you gave me, after a fashion, hope that you would visit us here with wife and daughter. I count on you to fulfill this hope sooner or later. Much could then be recounted of our respective many-sided modes of life. If accommodation for Ludwig could be found toward fall, I perhaps could bring him to you.

After a bad winter my wife is on the whole healthy and feeling well, though she admittedly has not completely regained her strength. But, God willing, the summer will complete her recovery.

Meanwhile I ask to be cordially remembered to my old friends, to Major von Knebel and his wife, to Dr. Gries, and—as you have the chance—no less to the Asverus family. Please remember me likewise to Privy Councillor [Johann Christian] Stark and High Councillor to the Appellate Court [Paul Christoph] André.

Above all, however, we give your wife and daughter our best regards, and particularly charge them with pursuing fulfillment of your above promise. I remain yours in the friendship of old. Hegel

Hegel to Frommann [419]

Berlin, July 9, 1822

I thank you deeply, my dear friend, for taking the trouble of trying to place Ludwig with Mr. Jobst, and for the report you now give me about it. You leave it open to me to write to Mr. Jobst still directly. But since Mr. Jobst has said that he already promised the place for the son of a friend, and since the Bohn brothers—to whom I ask to be remembered most kindly in the course of your stay in Stuttgart—have also let it be known that in their view Mr. Jobst will hardly consent, I must regard a letter to him as pointless and, in view of such clarification, almost improper.

The idea has of course occurred unavoidably to me that it might be preferable to make a forester or agriculturalist of Ludwig. Upon considering all circumstances, however, I had to hold to the previous idea of dedicating him to the merchant class, to which no preference on his part for any other class poses an obstacle. Yet I must regret naturally now being unable to bring him into close [association] with such good men and acquaintances as the Bohn brothers.

Since this letter should reach you in Nuremberg through Mr. Merkel, I ask you to pass on to this old friend of mine my best regards, and to present to him my wish of finding a situation for Ludwig. I will also ask my mother-in-law [Suzanne Maria von Tucher]—who is informed of your forthcoming arrival in Nuremberg but, as it happens, is residing an hour's ride from there in the country—to present my request to Mr. Merkel. His kind readiness to lend his assistance as well as that of his entire house are all too well known to me from personal experience not to permit myself the hope of obtaining his intercession in this case. More recently I have been very well satisfied with Ludwig's regular diligence, behavior, and willing obedience, so that I can be confident that he will apply himself well under the guidance which he of course more or less needs like any young person of his age.

For you and your dear family, whose memory remains as dear as ever to me, I wish a very pleasant journey and good weather—which so far has been only too good here, though it now promises to be very good traveling weather.

In Stuttgart I have a sister—unmarried. If you wish to look her up, she will feel very honored. Should you give her my regards, please at once tell her I will write soon. A hearty farewell. Once again have a pleasant trip. Yours, Hegel

The Philosophy of Law

THE TITLE of this chapter calls at once for a note on translation. The rendering of "*Rechtsphilosophie*" as "philosophy of law" indeed violates the traditional preference, sanctioned by T. M. Knox, for "philosophy of right." Knox justifies his translation by noting Hegel's remark that "in speaking of Right (*Recht*, i.e., *jus*) in this book, we mean not merely what is generally understood by the word, namely civil law, but also morality, ethical life, and world-history" (*Phil of Right*, vi, 233). However, the reasonable inference to be made from this quote is that the English translation should be "philosophy of law" and not "philosophy of right." For if Hegel is using "*Recht*" in a broader than usual sense in German, we are advised to translate it by "law" equally understood in a broader than usual sense. Hegel presumably speaks of "*Rechtsphilosophie*," even if its meaning in German is more limited than what he has in mind, because it, like "philosophy of law" but unlike "philosophy of right," is a readily identifiable course title.

Hegel's letters and correspondence are most helpful in contextual interpretation of the *Philosophy of Law*. They provide glimpses into his critique of the legendary Prussian civil service. They show his continued reservations about text criticism to the exclusion of speculative construction in the humanities. They reveal the impact of the post-1819 Reaction and demagogue hunt on publication of the *Philosophy of Law*. They show Hegel's faithful support of accused demagogues such as Förster, Asverus, Carové, and von Henning; but they also make clear the *Philosophy of Law*'s support of the Prussian government of von Hardenberg and von Altenstein. And they at once point up the critical reaction which the book provoked in liberals such as Nicholas von Thaden. In the months after publication of the *Philosophy of Law*, the Prussian Reaction expanded from the political sphere into the equally threatening theological terrain. Despite a delicate balancing act between liberal advocacy and accommodation, Hegel as an individual eventually yielded to the enticement of accommodation.

THE PRUSSIAN BUREAUCRACY

Our earliest letter mentioning the *Philosophy of Law* was written in March 1819 to Niethammer [355]. It responded to a January 19 letter from Niethammer about a possible administrative if not teaching post for himself in Berlin. Niethammer's influence in Munich had eroded since the fall of Napoleon, and he hoped he might

be of use to von Altenstein in Prussia. Since the Congress of Vienna had assigned Catholic territories in the west to Prussia, Niethammer surmised that his own experience as a Protestant administrator in Catholic Bavaria might recommend his candidacy. Yet Hegel's reply was not encouraging. He recalls that his recommendation [344] of Friedrich Creuzer and the Heidelberg gynecologist Franz Karl Naegele for posts at the recently created University of Bonn had gone without effect. He mentions the Berlin speculative theologian Philipp Konrad Marheineke as the only one in whom he could confide in the matter; but Marheineke, who was soon to become (with Karl Daub) the leading representative of Hegelianism in theology, was as much an outsider in Berlin as was Hegel himself. Among administrators recently recruited by Prussia, Hegel mentions Johannes Schulze, who was also to become a committed Hegelian. Niethammer had also suggested on January 19 that there might be a place for himself in Frankfurt, seat of the German Confederal Diet created by the Congress of Vienna, but Hegel is no more encouraging here. Niethammer had already expressed greater hope for mediation by a nonsovereign German Confederation than the more realistic Hegel could muster (see Ch 13 on Württemberg).

In the same letter Hegel, replying to Niethammer's claim that the Prussian education Minister had expressed interest in him during a trip to Bavaria two years before, conveys an equally realistic sense of von Altenstein's limited powers. The description of the existing Prussian bureaucracy Hegel gives contrasts to that of the rational state in the *Philosophy of Law* (§280, Addition), where the King's role is restricted to "dotting the 'i's'." Insofar as the King does more than dot "i's," the state is in Hegel's view imperfectly developed: legal codes and the advice of privy councillors remain contradictory, so that a rational monarch must take matters in hand and decide, even if arbitrarily, instead of allowing the ship of state to flounder aimlessly. The implication of the letter is that the existing Prussian state was rationally undeveloped through being burdened with two parallel governments: on the one hand State Chancellor von Hardenberg with his ministers and councillors, and on the other hand the King with his individual and very definite opinions on things and people and his own separate councillors. Friedrich Wilhelm III himself sensed Hegel's criticism. When informed that the Berlin philosopher described the King's function as limited to dotting "i's" he is reported to have replied: "And if the King refuses to dot the 'i's'?" (Rosenzweig, II, 141-42). Hegel's immediate reason for mentioning bureaucratic structure to Niethammer was to cite the case of physicist Thomas Seebeck to show that von Altenstein, though Minister of Education, did not automatically prevail.

Hegel to Niethammer [355]

Berlin, March 26, 1819

Your letter dated back on the 19th of January, my dear friend, was appreciated for the good news it gave me of your family, especially of the best of women, for whom completely prosaic water has done wonders—though on account of the magnetism we should have at least, insofar as possible, introduced some poetry here. Yet although the letter reproaches me with some justification—this I do not

deny—it was very painful in its testimony of continued dissatisfaction with your official position, especially in view of my inability to reply to you with anything opening up a prospect. This feeling of embarrassment, above all, has delayed my reply for so long. I have no one here to whom I could have opened up about it except generally speaking Marheineke—who still wanted to send me a note for you, and who stands about as much as I in the periphery or indeed outside it, without relation to the active and influential circle. If a professorship in Bonn were at issue, a direct word could still be placed, for there good advice is said still to be valued. I had my say in this regard once, but then saw how things go. There are so many councillors on all sides, each of whom has his own judgment and vote, and takes it badly if someone speaks to him of such a matter, suggesting that he felt a need for advice. For myself, I have no connection with any of them. You know yourself that in the appointment of a university professor counsel is not sought on all sides, and that one easily turns to this or that expert in the field. It is different with administrators—all of whom are experts. Yet a confluence of special circumstances is absolutely necessary for the reputation of an administrator in the higher levels of one country to transfer to the same levels of another. Since last fall three new senior government councillors have entered the religious and educational department—including [Johannes] Schulze, governmental councillor in Coblenz, formerly at the gymnasium in Weimar. Interest, to be sure, was really not lacking. In the religious department they are said to have a hard time with the Catholic councillor, High Governmental Councillor [Johann Heinrich] Schmedding, likewise professor of canon law at this university. He is, Marheineke said, no friend of yours because of your work in Bavaria. But the right approach with him and with the whole Catholic question is probably not to fight it out but rather to find a moderate settlement, just as no *Concordat* will be made or negotiated here, in order to avoid discussion. Do not bother thinking of any activity in Frankfurt. If necessary there will no doubt be a military commission, but no religious commission or *Corpus Evangelicorum* will materialize there, formally or otherwise.

I must also give you a short summary of the complicated structure of our mechanism for making appointments here. First comes the Department, with the Minister at the top. Then comes the Chancellor of State, with his reporting Councillors—which explains how professors are said to have been appointed without the Ministry knowing anything about it. Then there is the personality of the King, not only with his very definite individual views on affairs and persons but also with his Cabinet Councillors. A simple matter—like perhaps the appointment of a professor—no doubt follows its course largely unhindered. But whenever a more important consideration enters, as is certainly the case with a higher administrative appointment, each authority no doubt intervenes in its own way. Seebeck, for example, has been here for nine months, though I see little of him. The Minister and his personal friends are old acquaintances and friends of his. About two months ago the Minister brought matters to a point where the Academy appointed Seebeck a member, but he has been unable to procure a salary for him. I maintain my distance from this whole sphere. After much reflection I have concluded that this sort of overture, directly motivated by friendship for the party

concerned, rather creates the worst of effects and, given all the above circumstances, remains without other effect. But enough of what is, as I said, a very painful matter for me, especially because I owe you so much, indeed perhaps my entire external situation; it is surely high time that I repay you. I have not given up the search for an occasion upon which to seize. You can judge best whether to send me or the Minister a letter to be passed on. As for Ludwig [Döderlein], the situation is the same, indeed even more so. First, in Bonn one demands above all well-known, established names; they will thus have to stop taking men who are simply competent. And, secondly, here [in Berlin] there exist such absolute philologists that no one else can get a word in edgewise.

As for us here, we are faring rather well, thank goodness. My wife as well [as yours] has returned from a water cure, though still suffering; and, despite being caught up in the new suffering of setting up a household in a strange environment without more immediate help and friends, she has recovered well from these exertions. A peculiar circumstance prevails everywhere. For someone who has just arrived the local manner is not appealing: a dispersion of people in a life of much socializing, i.e., feasting—even on regular weekdays, and quite a few such days can be accumulated during the week if one tries. But apart from the feasting, everybody still has, if need be, enough time to tend to business. We are enjoying a happy home life as a family—which I have not done so quietly with a proper income for years. As a professor I have only begun. Much still remains to be achieved for me and the Cause. Yesterday I closed shop, and my first lines since are to you. I am still to write a book by the Leipzig Fair: my natural law in paragraphs.

Beyond the personal pain, Jacobi's death has in part overtaken me because, as you write, he had frequently asked for news of me, and will now never have received any from me in Berlin. We feel ever more abandoned as, one by one, these old branches, which we have beheld with admiration from youth on, die. He was one of those who formed a turning point in the spiritual development not only of individuals but of the age, who were pillars of the world in which we represent our existence. Please remember me to Jacobi's sisters; you will be the best interpreter of my feelings for his person and his loss. You and the [Karl] Roth family will experience through this loss an irreparable void. Please remember us amicably to the Roths and, if Mr. [Paul Wolfgang] Merkel is still in Munich, to him as well. I ask them to believe that even if I have not written for such a long time to them—which soon I shall still do—their friendship and kindness toward me are remembered most vividly and indelibly.

You promise in your letter to send Julius to us—though of course only next fall. He shall be warmly welcomed, and it will, in any case, be of lasting interest for him to have gotten to know Berlin and seen conditions here for himself. Greetings a thousand times over to the best of women. Yours, Hegel

P.S. March 27. Last night [Philipp Konrad] Marheineke brought me the enclosed letter. He visited me for a musical presentation offered me by my students.

Hegel was hardly more encouraging about an eventual appointment in Bonn or Berlin for Niethammer's stepson, the philologist Ludwig Döderlein, than for Niethammer [355]. Philology in Berlin was so dominated by Friedrich August Wolf that Hegel saw little hope of exerting influence. Yet Hegel and Wolf, the prestigious founder of classical philology, had much in common. Both opposed "philanthropinism" (see Ch 8 on Niethammer's philosophy of education) and promoted the classical humanistic gymnasium. Wolf effected reforms in the Prussian gymnasiums similar to ones introduced by Niethammer in Bavaria. Yet Wolf disdained the modern systems of German idealistic philosophy from Kant onward. And, for Hegel, Wolf's stress on the pedagogical value of the aesthetic and the moral content of classical literature, i.e., on spiritual rather than purely literal or grammatical interpretation, was spoiled by contentiousness, and by a passion for text criticism that made him famous as the man who denied single authorship to Homeric epic poetry. Hegel refused to be persuaded by Wolf's claim here (*Werke* XIV, 388). Hegel's reservations about current trends in philology [218] were in fact directed to the Wolfian school of text criticism, which also included Barthold Niebuhr and August Boeckh at Berlin University. Nonetheless, Hegel and Wolf achieved a cordial relationship, as an 1821 note from Hegel [396] testifies.

Hegel to Wolf [396]

Thursday, August 23, 1821

I am still inundated with obligations, my Privy Councillor, and have been for a week. Saturday I have Examination Board and faculty meetings and thus find myself unfortunately forced, on the one hand, to reply to your kind note by pleading difficulties and disablements but, on the other hand, am led nonetheless to propose an amicable settlement. If you still have no fixed plans for Sunday—one day on which I am a free man—I will come by at ten in the morning to pick you up at your *Luisianeum* [i.e., Luisenbad] on the way to Tegel. My wife asks me to thank you very much for the nice things you have told her. They have touched her deeply. Confident of your kindness, she hopes you will look favorably on her bringing along a couple of boys for whom there will be room enough in the coach.

I look forward to your firm decision. Good morning, Hegel.

THE ASSASSINATION OF KOTZEBUE AND THE DEMAGOGUE HUNT

Hegel lectured on natural law and politics in the 1818-19 semester. He intended the manual on natural law, announced to Niethammer in March 1819 [355] for the next Leipzig book fair, to accompany these lectures. This optimistic schedule, however, was interrupted by political events. On the same day Hegel wrote to Niethammer, Hegel's follower Hermann Friedrich Hinrichs in Heidelberg wrote to Hegel noting the assassination three days before of the Russophile reactionary poet August Friedrich Kotzebue by Karl Ludwig Sand, a theology student in Jena and a radical member of the Jena *Burschenschaft*.

Kotzebue was a German writer of satirical comedies with a distaste for the Enlightenment, democracy, the French Revolution, Napoleon, academic freedom, and freedom of the press. In the years before his assassination he worked in the service of Russia: he was appointed State Councillor during the struggle against Napoleon and became the Russian Consul-General in Königsberg after Napoleon's defeat. His relation to the Russian Court dated back to the 1790s, when he was director of the Petersburg theater, though the Tzar's government once arrested him and sent him to Siberia. His comedies enjoyed popular success, but were largely critical failures, which helps explain both his self-imposed exile in Russia and his biting satirical attacks on such leading figures of German literature and literary criticism as Goethe and Friedrich Schlegel. Philosophically, he cultivated the language of mysticism. He was admired by Metternich, but was despised by the liberal and nationalistic students of the *Burschenschaften*, who considered him a Russian spy.

Neither Hegel nor Hinrichs wasted any love on Kotzebue. Writing to Hegel, Hinrichs dryly notes:

You will perhaps have already heard that Kotzebue was stabbed to death on March 23 at Mannheim by a Jena student. He came from Jena for the purpose. Kotzebue was stabbed four times after the student—Sand, a native of the Erlangen area—handed him a note stating "March 23 is the day of Kotzebue's death." He then immediately went into the street in front of Kotzebue's house and inflicted two stab wounds on himself, wounds which are no doubt fatal, but which have not yet ended in death. [356]

We have already seen Hegel's deeply ambiguous attitude toward the new German student associations. Sand was apparently deluded into thinking an individual terrorist act could repulse the forces of the Reaction and alter the course of history. In fact he provided a pretext for repressive measures by the Holy Alliance against the entire membership of the *Burschenschaften*, now increasingly attacked for "demagoguery." In July 1819, a few months after Kotzebue's assassination, Metternich prevailed upon Prussia's Friedrich Wilhelm III to issue the Karlsbad Decrees establishing a commission in Mainz to investigate secret societies, impose censorship, and place the universities under direct Royal control. Yet Hegel himself had extensive personal relations to "demagogues" (d'Hondt, 166-70). The sons of close friends such as Karl Friedrich Frommann, Niethammer, and the Jena lawyer Ludwig Christoph Asverus were members of the *Burschenschaften*. Robert Wesselhöft, a nephew of Frommann who convoked mass *Burschenschaften* demonstrations at Wartburg in 1817 and who subsequently fled to Switzerland, had befriended Hegel's natural son, Ludwig. Marie Hegel's brother Gottlieb was also involved in the student movement. Two of Hegel's prominent followers in Berlin—Friedrich Carové and Friedrich Förster—were also prominent in the *Burschenschaften*. Hegel himself shared some of the goals of the *Burschenschaften*, especially constitutionalism. His sympathy for members of the *Burschenschaften* was overtly expressed in action on behalf of students arrested by the Prussian police on suspicion of demagoguery. Carové, whom Hegel had proposed as his first

teaching assistant in Berlin, was rejected by the government because of his liberal political views.

FRIEDRICH FÖRSTER

Förster, a well-known hero and poet of the liberation wars against Napoleon who subsequently publicized his disenchantment with the Prussian state's failure to institute the promised constitution, became a Hegelian publicist after losing his faculty appointment at the Prussian military academy, though by the late 1820s he had mellowed to the point of earning a reputation as "the Court demagogue" (Toews, 120). The group of communications below are traces of Hegel's continuing relationship to him. Förster helped Hegel improve the Latin of his "fiery," stridently Protestant address (*Werke* XX, 532-44) as Rector of Berlin University, marking the three hundredth anniversary of the Augsburg Confession [640].

Hegel to Förster [487a]

Berlin, March 14, 1825

You have quite correctly expressed the gratitude I felt for the friendship and goodwill discernible in the projected association [?]. The dearer in feeling such goodwill becomes to me, the more purely do I desire the enjoyment of such feeling, preserving it from externalities and heterogeneous accretions. . . . [incomplete]

Hegel to Förster [613]

October 3, 1829

On September 24, dear fugitive, instinct led me to your grief-stricken grass widow to pick up your note for me. I greeted your flower-wreathed likeness with sincere friendship, congratulated you for the good fortune of your trip, and thanked you for your kind remembrance and for its source, as also for the notes forwarded from Munich. I have spent five or six days with Schelling in Karlsbad, enjoying the cordial friendship of old [Ch 14 on Karlsbad]. I visited Karlsbad during a tour through Teplice and Prague. I then went to Weimar to visit the eighty-year-old stripling who lives there [Goethe], and to Jena—where the blows you struck [in patriotic verse] once knocked us off our feet.

In Prague please do not forget to call on [Josef] Henniger—pronounced Hennigahr—a history professor and brother-in-law of my uncle there, and of an aunt here. The address is Breite Gasse, Schlichting House, Number 22 to perhaps 25. I have let him know of your arrival. He is very willing to help you in all ways with research and will provide documentation for your writings. Please remember me most kindly to him as also to the museum librarian [Václav] Hanka. You will want to devote a few days to Prague. The King presented Count Waldstein [a descendant of Wallenstein's] with a copy of your publication [*Albrecht von Wallenstein's . . . Letters . . .*, 1829]. Farewell. Have soon a good return trip. Little by little other vacationing colleagues will be trickling back, too. Today the *rentrée* of Mme. [Auguste] Crelinger in [the role of] Gabriele will be celebrated. If only it is

not a *commencement de la fin*. Vienna is said to have laid traps for her. Yours faithfully, Hegel.

Hegel to Förster [640]

June 22, 1830 *Lagrimae Christi!*

[Christ's tears—an Italian wine]

From this we can now clearly see that the tears the Lord has shed over the abuses of Catholicism have been not only salt water but bottles of liquid fire.

And now you wish generously out of friendship to help me prepare the flow of Latin prose that I must now work up, and are going to do so by drawing on this same fire. For this I must first of all thank you. And if this [poor] vessel which is to distill the fiery substance does not spoil it, my amply tortured audience shall thank you for the warmth emanating from me to them. Yours, Hegel

Please remember me most kindly to your dear and beautiful wife.

Hegel to Förster [650]

October 3, 1830

If you, dear friend, still have a sufficient supply of *Lagrimae Christi* to pour me another half dozen small bottles, I will be much obliged—and indeed invigorated!—for you to put aside for me such an amount. Could you perhaps send some immediately along with the bearer of this note?

My best compliments to your equally dear wife. Yours, Hegel.

HEGEL'S DEFENSE OF G. ASVERUS

Gustav Asverus, the son of Ludwig Christoph Asverus, was arrested in the night of July 14, 1819, shortly after release of the Karlsbad Decrees. In the same month Hegel addressed a letter on his behalf [358] to the Prussian Minister of Police, Karl Christoph von Kamptz. But despite Hegel's efforts, Asverus remained imprisoned until June, 1820. An aggravating circumstance, noted in the second letter below [359], was Asverus's participation in recent *Burschenschaft* demonstrations in Darmstadt. Hegel does not deny to von Kamptz that Asverus had belonged to the *Burschenschaft* in Heidelberg, but claims he had been free of presumption or exaltation. Hegel thus notes his opposition to a particular trend in the student movement rather than to the movement in general. This trend was precisely the one that led to Sand's assassination of Kotzebue: the political romanticism and emotionalism of Jakob Fries's followers. Sand studied in Jena, where Fries taught after leaving Heidelberg in 1816. Hegel was of course a severe critic of Fries's Jacobian philosophy of immediate feeling. The assassination of Kotzebue gave Hegel an opportunity in the Preface to the *Philosophy of Law* to point out the deleterious consequences of a philosophy he had long repudiated, as also to solidify his newly threatened position in the Prussian state. The Friesianism of Sand's political romanticism seemed confirmed by publication of a letter from the Berlin Friesian theologian Wilhelm Martin de Wette to the assassin's mother. De Wette defended Sand's motive if not his overt act: Sand had acted out of deep conviction,

and it was right to follow one's conscience, even if the act was wrong. Prior to de Wette's letter the King's decrees had withdrawn the right to teach from persons expressing opinions dangerous to the state, and a commission of inquiry promptly suspended de Wette from his teaching duties. De Wette, persuaded of his innocence, resigned, refused four months' termination pay, and left for Weimar. His mentor Fries still resided in Weimar, though he had been barred from giving public lectures since 1817 due to pressure from the Holy Alliance following his participation in the 1817 Wartburg demonstrations. De Wette's family returned to Heidelberg, where de Wette had taught before going to Berlin. In writing to Friedrich Creuzer in Heidelberg on October 30 [359], Hegel traces disturbances in Berlin involving *Burschenschaften* to Fries's influence in Heidelberg. Law professor Christoph Reinhard Martin, mentioned along with Fries, also had left Heidelberg for political reasons [see 266].

Hegel was thus chiefly opposed to the Friesian tendency in the *Burschenschaften*. His subsequent repudiation of the *Burschenschaften* generally was because Sand's assassination of Kotzebue had made this tendency predominant in the public image of the movement. But Hegel's rejection of the Friesian *Burschenschaft* was not merely a rejection of the philosophy of feeling and the Jacobian concept of moral genius illustrated by Sand. Fries also misled the student movement by giving it a nationalistic, Teutonic, xenophobic, anti-French, and anti-Semitic cast. Hegel probably wished to guide the student movement along more rational lines, i.e., to challenge Fries as the philosopher of the movement. Both Friedrich Förster, who had been a Friesian, and Friedrich Carové were leaders in the movement, and both were Hegelians opposed to nationalism, anti-Semitism, and the cult of Teutonism in manners and dress. Carové published a plea for a "universal" *Burschenschaft* open to Jews and foreigners, invoking both the heritage of the French Revolution and Hegel's philosophy, especially Hegel's 1817 essay on Württemberg (Carové, *Outline of a "Burschenschaft" Order and the Attempt to Found It*, 1818). He approved Hegel's position supporting the Württemberg King's offer of a constitution as a progressive step. But when Carové was proposed as Hegel's first teaching assistant in Berlin, Prussian Minister of Police Wilhelm Ludwig von Wittgenstein denounced him to von Altenstein as unfit, and Hegel was obliged in 1818 to turn to another follower, Leopold von Henning, in his choice of an assistant. Yet the next year von Henning himself would be arrested by the Prussian police.

The letter to Creuzer below [359] and the note to Hegel's publisher [368a] reflect the censorship to which the final revision of the *Philosophy of Law* was subject. The Karlsbad Decrees on censorship were adopted by the German Confederation in September 1819 in Frankfurt. On the October anniversary of the Battle of Leipzig, Prussia announced its own harsher censorship. By the end of the same month [359] Hegel thought he knew where he stood with the censors and thus was ready to publish a book originally ready for publication prior to the September decrees. In the published version he vented his wrath against Friesian demogogy. His reputation as the philosopher of the Prussian Restoration is largely based on this Preface. No doubt the Preface helped Hegel—indirectly targeted by denunciations of För-

ster, Carové, and von Henning—satisfy the censors. Yet his disagreement with Fries was chiefly philosophical, and was political only insofar as bad philosophy spoils political judgment. It is also debatable whether Fries was more "liberal" than Hegel. Victor Cousin reported that in conversation both men held to the middle-road politics of Royer-Collard (*Berichten* 766). In his xenophobic nationalism and anti-Semitism Fries was distinctly less liberal. Hegel's Bonapartist alignment with state authority against direct popular action, recently expressed in the Württemberg essay, would have been illiberal only if von Hardenberg and von Altenstein had lost their hold on power.

Asverus's case continued for seven years with intermittent periods of detainment until, after a conviction and appeal, the King agreed to a pardon. Hegel supported the young man to the end [451, 484a, 486a, 487c, 571a].

Hegel to von Kamptz [358]

Berlin, July 27, 1819

To the Royal High Ministry of Police:

The Saxon Grand Ducal Judicial Councillor Dr. Asverus in Jena, an acquaintance of many years, has sent me the enclosed humble petition with instructions that it be handed over to the appropriate bureau of the Royal Police. I believe these instructions to be best fulfilled by submitting it herewith to the Royal High Ministry of Police. To the humble request contained in this petition I believe myself permitted to add, for most gracious consideration, my own testimony that I came to know the student Asverus during his one-year stay at the University of Heidelberg and his almost equally long stay here in Berlin. I have come to know him to be a young man of upright character, in no way afflicted by introverted self-conceit and fanaticism [*Schwärmerei*] but, on the contrary, open and modest, having increasingly turned away from the fomentation currently on the rise among a portion of the young. He has now shown himself to me at the local university to be a student who has made study of the sciences the earnest motive of his endeavor. It is also known to me in this regard that he has disassociated himself from the student association known as the *Burschenschaft*, and that during his stay here he has taken no part in this association.

In taking the liberty to request that the decision most graciously taken in this matter be communicated to me, I persevere in the deepest respect. Your humble servant, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Titular Professor of Philosophy at the local Royal university.

Hegel to Creuzer [359]

Berlin, October 30, 1819

The two beautiful gifts you have sent me, dear friend, summon me all the more to give you at last some report of myself. Indeed, I have long felt the urge to assure you I have not forgotten your friendship and company here, and even less found replacement for them. So, first of all, many thanks for both beautiful works of yours. I find them most important, and I have already learned much from them [Creuzer, *Symbolics and Mythology of the Ancient Peoples*, 1819 edition; *Illustra-*

tions to Friedrich Creuzer's *Symbolics*. . . , 1819; see Ch 13 on Creuzer]. Your new exposition, as also your way of treating mythology generally, holds infinite interest for me and the world. Your view increasingly imposes itself even among people who act as if they owe it nothing, or who even mean to oppose this view.

I see [Karl] Ritter's works as important support. I have become acquainted with his *Geography* only here, and it is a most welcome find [Ritter, *Geography in Relation to Nature and the History of Man: or Universal Comparative Geography as a Certain Basis of Study and Instruction in the Physical and Historical Sciences*, 1817; see 473]. From a higher point of view his works may be viewed as a fruit and consequence of your own. He acknowledges your merit. I have sixteen proof sheets from his *Prelude to Histories of the European Peoples before Herodotus in the Region of the Caucas and on the Shores of the Black Sea*, First Treatise—which probably is intended as the transition from the section of his *Geography* on Asia to the one on Europe. The Indians of Colchis, Kola, Koros, Apaturia, and so on; Herodotus's geography of the area around the columns of Sesostriis, etc.; the connection of the mythology in the area with Asia and Greece, and so forth—I am curious as to what your judgment will be of this, of his mode of treatment and views. He is presently here employed at the Military Academy, and even, I believe, at the university—though not as a titular professor. It is my wish for you to see in him an important collaborator, although in this field it is admittedly only possible for one to follow in your footsteps.

As for me and my life here, I have found the young receptive to and interested in philosophy. One even finds majors, colonels, and privy councillors attending one's lectures here. I heard you had two hundred students last summer. Our university has the munificence of the government to thank for its facilities. They are all on a very large scale and well-endowed. Collections, a botanical garden, a clinic, etc.—all on a level known only in a few places. Of our academic attainment I need say nothing, since you are familiar with our scholars here. Of course, the political agitation of the student association [*Burschenschaft*] and of de Wette's Friesianism have not won favor for the university. Yet the seeds of agitation were nurtured not here but elsewhere—and where else but principally in Heidelberg! Speaking seriously, the greater number of those arrested were in Heidelberg before my time, when [Christoph Reinhard] Martin and Fries were there. I hear de Wette wants to go to Weimar, and his wife and children to Heidelberg. The students are said to have presented a silver goblet inscribed with the biblical saying about having no fear of those who kill the flesh but cannot kill the spirit, etc. [Matthew 10:28]. Nothing has yet been heard about him being pensioned off. But his sudden announcement of his departure, along with his farewell letter to the King, can surely be interpreted as containing a kernel of defiance, and may tend to undercut the effect of any eventual inclination in that direction. You are aware from the newspapers of our other political and censorship measures. In part they are common to us all in the [German] Confederation. Asverus has now been handed over to the criminal court. It would surprise me if a few others in Heidelberg who also participated in the events and assemblies in Darmstadt should not be arrested. Such participation is what Mr. [Karl Christoph] von Kamptz, to whom I had to turn on

behalf of Asverus [358], first indicated to me as being the aggravating circumstance in his case. If your people have thus far been slower in prosecuting these agitators, the Mainz Commission will now surely make them as busy as bees. You surely understand as well, moreover, that all this does not help brighten one's spirits. I am about to be fifty years old, and I have spent thirty of these fifty years in these ever-unrestful times of hope and fear. I had hoped that for once we might be done with it. Now I must confess that things continue as ever. Indeed, in one's darker hours it seems they are getting ever worse.

The climate here, I think, does not suit me quite as well as Heidelberg. But a trip to Rügen this autumn truly did me good. The day before yesterday I accompanied [Karl] Solger to his grave, not far from Fichte's. Mine will belong there too, beside my colleagues. It would appear from these two that philosophers do not grow old here. For social life one can certainly find plenty of goings and comings, but people go their separate ways just as easily. I have not yet found a circle of friends such as I had in Heidelberg. Give them all my warm greetings: [Anton] Thibaut, [Philipp Christoph Heinrich] Eschenmayer, Heinrich Voss—and especially [Karl] Daub. It is one of my fondest wishes to be remembered by you, and I see that I have succeeded in this from your gifts. I allowed my reply to be delayed partly in order to respond with a few sheets of my *Philosophy of Law*—a poor gift, I know. Not everyone can be as industrious and vigorous in his works as you! I was just about to have the printing begin when the Diet's decisions on censorship arrived. Now that we know what freedom we have under the censors I shall shortly give the material over to the printer. Take good care, and let me hear from you soon again. Yours, Hegel

One more thing: in the copy of your *Symbolics and Mythology* which you gave me, sheet 29 is missing. I mention this because you are in correspondence with Darmstadt, and will kindly have an occasion to write about this. If it is not possible to get a copy of the missing sheet from the deluxe edition you sent me, one printed on ordinary paper will do.

Hegel to Nicolai's Publishing House [368a]

June 9, 1820

I forward herewith a portion of the manuscript [from the *Philosophy of Law*]—half the total or even somewhat over—for the censor, but request that nothing be printed until the remainder, which I will send soon, is back from the censor. Most respectfully, Hegel

Hegel to The Royal Ministerial Commission [451]

Berlin, May 26, 1823

For the file on the investigation of the student Asverus.
To the Royal Ministerial Commission:

In May 1820 I ordered 500 Imperial thalers in government bonds as bail for Asverus, then a student here, to guarantee his return should it be required in the course of further investigation of him.

After the lapse of three years I now wish to dispose otherwise of this govern-

ment bond, which belongs to a series for which, beginning with the next expiration date of July 1, no further coupons are available. Since I want to be able to obtain the new coupons presently being distributed, and since—according to the November 30 decree of last year issued by the Central Office of Government Bonds—presentation of the original bonds is required to obtain new coupons, I have addressed myself in the matter to the Primary Royal Commission, which referred me on February 10 of this year to the Royal Ministerial Investigatory Commission.

In view of the circumstances I thus humbly request the Ministerial Commission to return the above-mentioned bond of 500 Imperial thalers. The serial number is 38144.

To what extent, in light of the status of Asverus's still-pending case, my guarantee is still required I must leave entirely to the discretion of the Royal Ministerial Commission. In this regard, I in no way attach a request for release from such guarantee to my humble petition for return of the government bond. I only believe myself permitted to claim most humbly that, insofar as my guarantee of bail is still required, it might be regarded as sufficiently assured by the office I hold in the Royal service. I continue with the deepest respect as the Royal Ministerial Commission's most humble servant. Hegel, Titular Professor at the local Royal university.

Hegel to Gustav Asverus [484a]

Berlin, October 18, 1824

Beyond the dilatory habit I have, my dear Doctor, in writing and answering kind letters—a habit annoying even to me—my obligation to you has been augmented by the special circumstance that from time to time I was always hoping, along with a reply to the pleasant news frequently sent me of you and your situation, to inform you at last of the final decision [by the Primary Commission] in your still-pending case. Such a decision has now been made, and I hasten to give you at least preliminary notification of the very unexpected result. That a verdict against you, accompanied by severe punishment, is among other things completely contrary to Privy Councillor von Kamptz's own views is as clear to you as to me. Such a verdict is to be disclosed to you by the Primary Commission, which has asked Judicial Councillor [Karl Ludwig] Krause about your whereabouts and circumstances. Yet he wishes to give the Commission to understand that the disclosure is to be made to him.

I have taken the liberty of talking to Privy Councillor Kamptz about the matter, and he has allowed me to tell you his view of the course you should take. There are two avenues, the one being the legal recourse of appeal [to the Ministerial Commission] and the other clemency. It is his decided opinion that you should initially pursue the first avenue, requesting legal acquittal. The avenue of clemency, which may surely be considered failproof, would then still remain, assuming the worst.

I wanted to tell you this much for the time being so that you may be prepared for the formal notification that is coming, and so you know you can count in this matter on the concern of your friends here.

I can refrain all the more from writing further of our life here, since your fiancée will already have told you of it. We were sincerely pleased to have made her acquaintance, only regretting that my wife was not able to enjoy her company more. This fall I took a trip to Vienna [Ch 23], not only finding much many-sided interest and pleasure in it but also greatly strengthening again my health for the winter campaign. My wife and children are likewise well, thank goodness. [Karl Gustav] Griesheim has been named auditor [*Auditeur*] in the regimental military court.¹ All your former acquaintances, so far as I know, have generally all embarked upon definite, tranquil careers.

The results of the investigations in Köpenick, along with the names of the principal parties, are no doubt known to you from the public press and the disclosures that have been made here.

I was told by Mr. [Karl Friedrich] Frommann most recently this fall that your dear parents are quite fine, and I hope they have since continued to be well. Please give them our regards. I hope and pray in particular that the judgment against you—whether you wish to tell them something of this notification in any case depends on you—will not cause them any grief. The avenues of legal redress, as of clemency, can provide complete reassurance and peace of mind in this regard. In the meantime, farewell, my dear friend. Your devoted and sincere friend, Professor Hegel

Hegel to Gustav Asverus [486a]

Berlin, January 8, 1825

First of all, my dear friend, best wishes for the New Year. Speaking of your pending case and your last letter in this regard, I have taken the liberty in the last few days to speak of it again to Privy Councillor von Kamptz, and have mentioned first of all the circumstance you touched on, i.e., the dilemma of falling immediately subject to the punishment even before the judgment at the first level has taken effect. According to the legal passages that the Privy Councillor examined and presented to me, we may, it seems, be completely put at ease in the matter. The law explicitly specifies that anyone not in custody may demand suspension of the verdict's execution [pending appeal].

The Privy Councillor further expressed the definite view that it would be highly advisable for you to appeal to the King for clemency immediately after the verdict is handed down. You ought to do so as promptly as possible, thus more or less preparing in advance the petition by which legal counsel must intervene to withhold the prescribed punishment [*Fatalia*]. He also thinks it advisable to have the petition supported by attestations from your government, which you would likewise have to prepare in advance. You will probably be able to enjoy your government's intercession, and it will no doubt be necessary to take the required steps beforehand in this regard as well. However, I imagine that the manner of this intercession will not be without influence: for I remember that a year ago, perhaps on the occasion of demagogic intrigues, your Ministry—I believe it was Privy

¹Griesheim was a student of Hegel's, a Prussian officer, and an important source of notes on Hegel's lectures.

Councillor Schweitzer, it being understood that I write this confidentially—was ill-esteemed here and unable to achieve any success. He was held in low esteem even by your former ambassador, who was thus compromised and who became embroiled in unpleasant complications resulting in his resignation. But from my standpoint, removed as it is from the diplomatic world, I do not know how to judge matters more precisely. Yet from the proceedings just mentioned I think I can conclude that it would be possible for too much to be done [by Weimar, allegedly a hotbed of liberalism], and that this *too much* might be detrimental to a case that has already gone to court.

For the rest, the procedure is for the petition for clemency to be transmitted by the King to the Ministries of Justice and Police for a report, and I have no doubt that the reports will turn out favorable.

The verdict, by the way, will be handed down to you soon, if it has not already happened.

In a case that was similar to yours though more serious, the King recently was at least gracious to commute the sentence to a relatively much shorter one.²

It only remains to send most sincere greetings to your very dear parents and your fiancée from me and my wife. We are both well and send our best regards. Your devoted friend, Professor Hegel

Hegel to Gustav Asverus [487c]

Berlin, March 29, 1825

Last week, my dear friend, I was so busy with the conclusion of my lectures [on the philosophy of law and the philosophy of history] that I was prevented from giving you the news that has come to my attention regarding your case. Should you not yet have received any cabinet ordinance, I want to tell you what will interest you and your dear father even if the difference is only a matter of a few days, namely, news of the current status of the proceedings.

What I have heard through Privy Councillor von Kamptz's kindness—and he has likewise permitted me to inform you—is that the King is having a petition for clemency submitted to the proper ministry or highest official for a report. Your petition was submitted to the Ministerial Commission only after an extended period. Mr. von Kamptz hastened to indicate in this regard that the usual course is for the King, before he decides, to await the judgment [on appeal] at this second level. It is his view that the Commission might well file its report so as to give you notification. Even if it is now likely that the cabinet ordinance might have such a content, it still remains to be seen how the Royal decision will turn out.

Mr. von Kamptz's chief assumption in holding this view is that the leap would be too great from the term of confinement pronounced in the [first-level] verdict to complete pardon, and that such pardon is thus hardly to be hoped for. But he has high hopes for the success of the appeal. In conversation he entered into the more specific points of the verdict—especially the importance attached in it to a

²Hoffmeister conjectures that this second case was that of Karl Ulrich. See Ulrich's 1822 letter to Hegel [423].

threatening letter to Mr. von Haller.³ Even if a complete reversal of the verdict on appeal were not to result, there would still be reason to hope for a considerable reduction of the sentence, and from there a transition to its complete suspension [by Royal pardon] would be all the easier.

Moreover, the lapse of an extended period of time by itself diminishes the importance of the matter and of the punishment—especially in comparison with the more important revelations which are soon to be presented or become ripe for a verdict in the investigation of the Köpenick affair.

This is about all I can report to you of the matter. In view of my sincere interest, you can believe me when I say how pleased I am that the prospects are looking good, for I have every reason to regard your situation as indeed good.

I must still add that Judicial Councillor Krause, with whom I spoke today, indicated that I should draw your attention to the necessity of meeting the deadline for appeal. Everything depends on the extent to which your petition for clemency suffices to maintain that deadline for you. In any event, it would be useful to authorize Judicial Councillor Krause to take the necessary steps, so nothing is neglected, or at least so greater complications resulting from the delay may be avoided.

We are all fine, thank goodness. I am presently having extensive interchange with Professor [Victor] Cousin of Paris, whose final release [from a Berlin prison] is still made to depend on the decision of the Mainz Commission—much as in your own case [see Ch 24, first section].

The latest on related matters is, I hear, that [Friedrich Ludwig] Jahn, whom the Breslau High Regional Court sentenced to three years, has been acquitted by three other High Regional Courts to which the case was forwarded on appeal.⁴

I must still add that Mr. Kamptz, in sending his compliments, charged me with writing you that he had not yet answered your father—nor the members of the [Anton] von Ziegesar family, who turned to him with great interest in your case—since he had nothing more specific to write. Meanwhile, however, he has perhaps written. My best compliments to your dear parents and bride-to-be. Yours, Hegel

Hegel to Gustav Asverus [571a]

Berlin, January 4, 1828

We have, my very dear friend, sympathized most deeply with you over the great misfortune which has befallen you [i.e., the death of Asverus's fiancée], and of which you informed me in a kind letter. It has stricken you at the onset of a period of your life which, following a series of adversities, was to have been one of happiness. You and your friends were at last able to hope you might peacefully pursue your course in life, having endured and overcome many years of turmoil. But it was not to be. You have come to feel that there are even more painful sensations and harder blows than those which had already befallen you.

³Karl Ludwig von Haller was a leading political philosopher of the Restoration.

⁴Jahn is best known for his attempt to regenerate the German people by founding a national gymnastics movement.

Presenting grounds for consolation is ineffectual in face of such a loss. Time alone—awareness of one's own vocation and occupation in life, which in your case will not be lacking—will dampen the grief, without, however, causing the soul to forget the loss. If one is not of a frivolous disposition, this recollection and remembrance will be preserved all the more sacredly in proportion to the purity of one's grief over a loss in which no essential part was played by any deed.

There is a friend of mine in your vicinity who likewise has experienced pain and, in his own way, bitterness. Professor [of history Heinrich] Leo is no doubt known to you. Perhaps you have already made his personal acquaintance, whether earlier or more recently. In any case you will know his address in Jena and be able to forward the enclosed letter [unavailable] to him [presumably in response to Leo's December 20, 1827, letter to Hegel]. I turn to you to ask this favor because of the possibility that Leo may have since left Jena, in which case you will perhaps be able to obtain his address from Professor [Karl] Götting. I may then ask you to forward the letter on to him.

You ask in your letter about the bail I had put up. The government bond had already been remitted to me earlier. The bail was thus a personal arrangement, which fortunately expired long ago by itself [see 451 above].

Please convey cordial regards from both my wife and myself to your very dear parents. We wish you, as well as them, good health and all the best, especially for the New Year.

My health was pretty well restored by a trip to Paris [Ch 24] I took in the fall, but has not held out at least as far as a cold is concerned, which has plagued me very persistently and confined me to my room for the last two weeks. Yet on Monday I will resume my lectures. Farewell, dear friend, and preserve your friendship for me. Your devoted Professor Hegel

P.S. Do you know that my brother-in-law, Gottlieb [Tucher], is marrying his cousin, *née* Haller?

HEGEL AND SCHLEIERMACHER

After de Wette's resignation, the Berlin faculty, though virtually united in regretting de Wette's letter whitewashing Sand, was equally unanimous in opposing the action of the King, which threatened academic freedom. De Wette now had no hope of a position in any Holy Alliance country and had children to support. When his Berlin colleagues secretly took up a collection to assure him a year's salary, Hegel contributed twenty-five thalers. Yet he and Schleiermacher disagreed in faculty discussions on whether the government had the right to suspend a faculty member. Schleiermacher denied such a right while Hegel, defending the internal sovereignty of the state vis-à-vis corporations (*Phil of Law* ¶278), affirmed the right to debar a professor from lecturing so long as he was not denied his salary. Following an unpleasant exchange between the two men, Schleiermacher addressed a conciliatory note to Hegel on November 16.

... I must be much obliged to you for having immediately replied to the impertinent language that regretfully escaped me recently. For through your

reply you at least attenuated the remorse with which I was left due to my sudden impetuosity. I would like us soon to resume the discussion where it stood before being interrupted by those unseemly words. My esteem for you is far too high for me not to wish agreement with you on a topic that is, in our present situation, of such great importance. [361]

This note and the following reply [362] exhaust the available correspondence between Hegel and Schleiermacher. Despite his own conciliatory tone, Hegel went on to attack Schleiermacher's theology of feeling hardly less vehemently than he had previously attacked Fries's philosophy of feeling (*Berlin Schrift*, 74; *Berichten* 388).

Hegel to Schleiermacher [362]

[draft]

[undated]

First of all I *thank* you, my dear colleague, for the wine dealer's address indicated in the note from you which I received yesterday. I also thank you for the remarks which, by removing a recent unpleasantness between us, serve to mediate a retort of mine likewise uttered in a state of excitement, leaving nothing behind but still another decisive increase in my respect for you. It is, as you remark, the current importance of the subject which led me to instigate in a society [probably the Society without Laws, a private club of which Hegel was a member—see 360] a debate, continuation of which with you—aimed at a mutual accommodation of our views—can only be of interest to me.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND THE PRUSSIAN STATE

The *Philosophy of Law* bears the date 1821 but was actually available in 1820. The first of the three communications below [647] appears in the Hoffmeister edition of the letters with the date September 10, 1830. But since it is addressed to the publisher of the *Philosophy of Law* and concerns proofreading on Hegel's part, there is a strong temptation to assign it to the same month and day ten years earlier. In October 1820 Hegel addressed complimentary copies of the book to both von Altenstein and von Hardenberg; the accompanying letters which Hegel wrote remain in the form of drafts [374 and 376 below].

These two statements show that Hegel's endorsement of the Prussian state was not unqualified. It was an endorsement of Prussia under the "enlightened" leadership of von Hardenberg and von Altenstein. Though the two ministers compromised with the feudal opposition, Hegel recognized that it was to save the Cause for a more propitious occasion, and that they essentially represented the principle of the French Revolution at the very helm of the Prussian state. It was not without cause that von Hardenberg was denounced as a Jacobin by reactionary forces in Prussia. Neither letter is an expression of sychophancy. Von Altenstein was a sincere advocate of freedom of thought at a time of increasing pressure for censorship. Yet he also opposed the political romanticism of the Friesians. Like Hegel he rejected the politics of feeling. In his reply to Hegel's note, he notes

Hegel's identification of the actual and the rational in the Preface to the *Philosophy of Law*:

In putting stress in this work as in your lectures generally, with the earnestness that becomes philosophy, on the need to grasp what is present and actual, to conceive the rational in nature and history, it seems to me that you assign to philosophy the only position that is correct with regard to what is actual. In this way you will most assuredly succeed in preserving your students from the pernicious presumption which repudiates what exists without having come to know it, and which, with respect to the state in particular, indulges in the self-flattery of arbitrarily postulating empty ideals. [397]

Von Altenstein does not reject opposition to what exists out of hand but merely asks that it first be tested for rationality. His *a priori* assumption is not that the Prussian state of 1820 is rational but that "history" is rational. He is surely persuaded that a *posteriori* examination will disclose reason in the existing Prussian state, but this is to recognize implicitly that reason in history someday might abandon Prussia.

Yet Hegel did not need von Altenstein to suggest that the Preface would arouse the most discussion. In his May 9 letter to Daub [387] Hegel refers to the hostile review of his work (*Heidelberg Yearbooks*, 1821, pp. 392-405) by his former friend Paulus, who voiced the view of many liberals who felt Hegel's Preface had betrayed their cause. (Hinrichs, on May 23 [388], mentions another negative review, though from a different perspective, by Gustav Hugo, founder of the historical school of law; this review appeared in the *Göttingen Scholarly Advertiser*, no 61, 1821.) But Hegel holds that liberal opinion was for the most part simply confused by the Preface, since no one suspected him of belonging to the reactionary party of Berlin law professor Theodor Anton Schmalz. Hegel's position could not easily be assimilated to neatly preformed categories. He was unwilling to be a knee-jerk liberal.

Hegel to Nicolai's Publishing House [647]

September 10, 1830 [1820?]

I have kept four copies of the enclosed. They are to be charged to my account.

Another set may be sent here for correction of the misprint, which I had corrected at the last proofreading but which has nonetheless been left by the typesetter. Hegel

Hegel to von Altenstein [374]

[draft]

Berlin, October 10, 1820

In compliance with Your Excellency's permission, I humbly submit the enclosed copy of a work I have just published. . . . Its publication is essentially destined for use in the official lectures I give on this branch of philosophy as a professor at the local university. . . . In presenting this writing, it is above all my deepest wish that Your Excellency may most graciously accept and regard it as evidence of my official activity, and as an attempt to return the content of teaching to recognition of the concept. The printing of this text at once gives account of the

scope of the principles I teach in my lectures on the subject. I consider myself duty-bound as a publicly appointed professor at the Royal University to render such an account to you in view of the genuine freedom of philosophizing enjoyed in the Royal lands under the fair protection and admirable support provided by Your Excellency's high leadership.

Please receive my contribution with the same consideration with which Your Excellency is accustomed to viewing scientific endeavors, and with an indulgence which—at least given the purpose of composition—I believe myself humbly permitted to claim for the imperfection of the execution. I likewise feel permitted to claim Your Excellency's indulgence of my wish to express the deep respect with which I have the honor of being. . . .

Hegel to von Hardenberg [376]

[draft]

[Berlin, mid-October, 1820]

I have the honor of most humbly presenting to Your Princely Highness a copy of the teaching manual I have published on natural law and political science under the title *Philosophy of Law*.

It might at first appear presumptuous of me to bring a philosophical treatise before Your Highness's eyes, especially one on this subject—as if I thought that something destined most immediately for school use could be worthy of Your Highness's gaze. But I must here recall the gracious and most far-reaching attention all scientific endeavors, without distinction as to subject matter, enjoy from Your Highness. I knew that in the exposition of a subject which my official post obliges me to treat, the principal aim is scientific treatment and theoretical form. My scientific endeavors aim to extirpate from philosophy all that falsely usurps this title and, even more importantly, to demonstrate the harmony of philosophy with those principles generally required by the nature of the state. But most immediately they aim at showing agreement with the principle which the Prussian state—belonging to which necessarily gives me great satisfaction—has had the good fortune of having upheld and of still upholding under the enlightened Government of His Majesty the King and Your Highness's wise leadership.

My treatise is thus intended as an attempt to grasp in its principal characteristics what lies before us to such great effect, the fruit of which we [now] enjoy. I do not think I presume too much in my belief that, by adhering to the position required by its specific task, philosophy warrants the protection and favor allotted to it by the state. Moreover, philosophy in its own sphere of action—which, though limited, nonetheless enters into the inner [nature] of man—may give immediate support to the Government's beneficent intentions.

With this thought in mind, I believe I may be excused if, by presentation of a text concerning the subject matter in which Your Highness's genius and rich life have their most essential element, I bear witness to my most deeply felt respect. I also feel permitted to request that this copy be kindly favored by a place in Your Highness's library. Your Highness's most humble G. W. F. Hegel, Titular Professor of Philosophy at the local Royal university.

It was not until toward the end of March that Dr. [Peder] Hjort arrived here—an illness, he said, detained him in Munich all winter—and delivered your amicable letter of last September. This is the most immediate cause of my tardy reply. But though these lines of mine have been immediately occasioned by your letter, please regard them as resulting likewise from my own need to attain a closer feeling of your presence through, as it were, written conversation. Such conversation becomes for me an excursion and a visit for the quiet enjoyment of which I want to have other affairs concluded. As often happens with long-planned trips, one comes last of all to what one would like to do best and most frequently of all. I cannot sufficiently tell you how dear and unclouded my memory of you remains, and how valued and invigorating are the friendship and affection I previously received from you and now find so faithfully preserved. With my decision to leave Heidelberg I knew very well what I would lose by my separation from you, and I still feel it. Your warm remembrance of me lightens the sacrifice I made.

That you find my philosophical works of interest necessarily gives me particular satisfaction, which I must consider a rare gift since you yourself know best how speculative [thought] is regarded by our scholars of texts, syllables, and turns of phrase. My *Philosophy of Law* should long have been in your hands. I hope at least the main issues meet with your approval. I have not been able in detail to expand the study in all the so very numerous aspects of the subject. I was forced to save such developments for the future. Above all I had to set my sights merely on getting through the whole. Thus I have reserved the study of your *Judas Iscariot* [see Ch 13, last section] for my further elaboration of the moral standpoint [*Phil of Law*, Part Two]. Do not let the hope of having your words on dogmatics and morality published remain too long unfulfilled. I am all the more anxious to see the former because I have started to work this summer on the philosophy of religion. Schleiermacher, from what I hear, is presently having his dogmatics [*The Christian Faith*, 1821] published as well. The *Xenien* just came to mind in this regard: "You can get away with paying with IOU's for a long time, but you still finally have to open your purse" [paraphrase of Schiller, *Xenien*, No. 72, 1797]. It remains to be seen, however, whether this purse will dispense anything but more IOU's. In any case his treatise on predestination, published in his theological journal, has impressed me as highly threadbare ["On the Doctrine of Predestination. . .," *Theologische Zeitschrift*, 1819, pp. 1-19; probably by Wilhelm de Wette rather than Schleiermacher].

I have just heard that my natural law [manual] has been the object of a notice in the *Heidelberg Yearbooks*—now published with a dingy cover, which is the only thing I have seen of it so far. I heard only that what has been printed deals with the Preface and am curious to know more about it, should you or Hinrichs not [actually] summon me to do so. I infer that my old fellow countryman Paulus is the author. With my Preface and the explosive statements in it I have of course, as you will have seen, tried to strike a blow at this indigent though arrogant sect. I have sought to hit the calf right in the eye, as the Swabians say. This sect was used to

having the last word without exception, and in part it has been very surprised that from a scientific standpoint one might find nothing in it, and could even have the courage to speak out publicly against it. Here, where this party in particular is, and has been, used to holding center stage and where it has viewed itself as a power to be contended with, I have indeed been compelled to face sour or at least silent countenances. They could not blame what I said on what was previously called the "Schmalz group" and therefore were all the more at a loss as to how to categorize it.

If you are interested in [Friedrich] Carové, to me the most appropriate thing surely seems to be to advise him to think seriously of Bonn, and thus to obtain absolution from the High Ministerial Commission here in the matter of his connection with the former student association [*Burschenschaft*]. If he has not been vindicated in this a further career will remain impossible for him—especially an academic career—not only here but, as he has experienced himself, elsewhere as well. Bonn would in all respects be the right place for him, quite apart from the fact that in Heidelberg he has a rival in the person of Hinrichs.⁵

A warm farewell, my dear honored man. Preserve your kind friendship for me. Your most devoted Hegel

[In the margin:] For the time being I kindly ask you to give my regards to Creuzer, whom I still have to thank for so much. Present likewise my respectful compliments to Thibaut and [Friedrich Heinrich Christian] Schwarz.

VON THADEN AND HEGEL'S ALLEGED BETRAYAL OF LIBERALISM

Hegel's apparent lapse from the liberal cause provoked the criticism of Nicholas von Thaden, a longstanding admirer. Von Thaden, a Danish civil servant, voiced his grievances in a letter of August 8, 1821 [394]. He had corresponded with Hegel for several years, but had always accompanied praise with critical advice. In 1815 he hailed the *Logic* as "the book of books, a masterpiece of the human spirit" [251]. Lamenting the published reviews, he explained them in part by Hegel's abstruse style. He thought Hegel might attain the influence he deserved by writing essays in practical philosophy, in particular by a study on the state. He advised Hegel to avoid the terms "science" and "speculative" in his titles, and to seek a cultivated audience including statesmen rather than merely academics. Hegel's reply [306]—the only letter we have of his to von Thaden—was appreciative.

Von Thaden responded to Hegel's letter on April 26, 1818 [336]. He praised the *Logic* for having emancipated him from dogmatism. He also praised the *Encyclopaedia* (1817), though regretting its terseness. But his real interest was politics. He was critical of Napoleon's enemies. He lamented the popularity of theological debates between supernaturalists and rationalists because they distracted attention from political issues. He criticized the religious mysticism and obscurantism then being propagated by Catholic philosophers like Karl Josef Windischmann and Franz von Baader (Ch 20, 21). On November 12 of the same

⁵Because of his links with the *Burschenschaften* the Hegelian publicist Carové was prevented from finishing his studies and never received an academic appointment.

year, von Thaden wrote again, complimenting Hegel for his 1817 essay on the Estates Assembly in Württemberg [352], and looking forward to a treatise on "natural law and the political sciences" based on Hegel's 1817-18 and 1818-19 lectures. On January 22, 1820, he cautioned Hegel against damaging his cause, indeed the common liberal cause, by sterile quarrels with Schleiermacher [364]. But when von Thaden read the *Philosophy of Law* he concluded in dismay that the book itself had already inflicted damage on the cause. On August 8, 1821 [394], he explained his displeasure (see excerpts below). Though Hegel saved the letter, there is no evidence of a reply. Von Thaden is perhaps the first to have accused Hegel of a failure to hold to his own distinction between contingent existence and rational actuality.

Hegel to von Thaden [306]

[draft]

[Nuremberg] September 30, 1816

On finally responding with equal amicability and cordiality to the kind and cordial greetings you sent me a year ago, my dear sir, the second thing I must do is to say something of my reasons for having put off a reply. The cause is merely to be sought in my desire to reply to your kind interest in philosophical endeavors by a letter touting actual feats.

It has been most enjoyable for me, inasmuch as I have lived largely cut off from literary connections and have gone on the assumption I was pursuing my philosophical writing practically in solitude, to hear such a sympathetic voice from such distant parts. In receiving your letter I congratulated myself for the fact that what I have published has not been an affair exclusively between me and my publisher, and that it has found a mind to whom it appeals and who even points out useful suggestions and ways of taking what my labors have achieved and making it better known and more effective, giving it a form more adapted to general use. Since I then found myself in a position to finish the third part of my *Logic*, I wanted to inform you of its publication. This occurred at the beginning of the summer, thus fulfilling one of your wishes. Other prospects have since been tied in with it, and I wanted to await their final outcome to inform you of this, too: I received a call to Heidelberg, which I accepted, and thus was no longer able to respond to a call to Berlin, which arrived a little later, just as I also have to turn down an appointment to Erlangen, which has since occurred at the initiative of my present government.

I can see from all this that the need for philosophy is again making itself felt among the higher authorities and that even I have not been forgotten. A professorship at a university is what I have long desired again. According to our customs such a position is almost indispensable if one wishes to introduce a philosophy more widely and propagate it. It also grants the only occasion for live person-to-person conversation, which exerts an influence on one's activity as an author totally different from merely imaginary [conversation]. In this respect, I have promise of a greater capacity for achieving something more satisfactory in my writings.

THE PARAGRAPHS which follow are from von Thaden's 1821 critique of the *Philosophy of Law* [394].

You have embarked on a new campaign greater than ever, and you have shocked and wounded friend and foe alike, so that I as well, one of the faithful, can bstride the battlefield only as a convalescent. We are no longer dealing here with a philosophy without label, for you are decryd by turns as a "royalist philosopher" and a "philosophical royalist." Thus a portion of the audacious book has become a center of historical-philosophical controversy. You demand above all, and with good reason, insight into the thing itself, but insight into a bad thing, e.g. the politics of the Turkish state, does not made it good. Your all-important and most central proposition is that what exists is good and rational. The thesis, however, is philosophically true but politically false. Judging the matter one-sidedly, one can assert with equal validity that what is truly right is devoid of content, that what is in actual fact right is bad, and vice versa. That you are not captive to such rigid narrow-mindedness I must presuppose from [knowledge of] your person. I am speaking, however, of your infelicitous manner of expression. You have described the state as the actuality of law, as actualized freedom. But in which state are your doctrines [actual] institutions? For not all states seem to have acceded to this honor. The Turkish state is in particular censored on account of the Pashas, while the free state of North America is not even mentioned. Do you perhaps mean the Russian or Austrian state? I surmise it is Prussia, for in other circumstances you described the institutions of the then-existing [1817] state of Württemberg. But if what actually exists is to be accepted as valid without further examination, philosophizing about the state is superfluous. The objective is then achieved much more simply, and one becomes a good citizen much more easily, by means of a catechism on passive obedience in the manner of [Karl Ludwig von] Haller. For what purpose does it serve to wrack one's brains out perspicuously on actuality, contingency, and necessity? Far better merely to have faith and hope. All is one, and all is right and legitimate.

You have protected property inherited by primogeniture [*Phil of Law* ¶305, ¶306] and, for the benefit of scholars, the property of publishers [Ibid ¶69] as well. But you have not bothered yourself about bourgeois or peasant property in its relation to Princely power. Private persons of course ought not take anything from one another, but everything is at the disposal of the King according to his good pleasure, in peace as in time of war [see Ibid ¶278, ¶324]. But ought it really be a matter of indifference whether the people must give five, thirty-five, or sixty-five percent of their income to the state? In this case it is absolutely right to give the demagogues [*Volkstümlern*] a sympathetic dressing down while not touching a hair of the agitators [*Volkstummlern*]. . . . But by what right do landed property owners in a system of primogeniture enter the universal class to which only state functionaries belong? Because they own land? In that case peasants must also be included. Or is it because they own much land, which is inevitably owned only by one individual through the exclusion of relatives equally entitled? The clever compromise in your book is an excrescence. Thus the quantitative factor and the positive determinations of chance are the two factors making for a privileged landowning elite by the grace of God and the law. Admittedly you have thereby grounded what is actual in most states. But how do matters stand with those states in which there is no such system of primogeniture?

It is *true* that property in land must be fixed like coins. For merit must as much as possible be invariable; i.e., merit as such must be universal for all those entitled. Arbitrary exceptions are not legitimate: a holding of 10,000 acres [*Tonnen*] warrants rights of inheritance no different from a holding of 1,000, 100, or 10 acres. For merit can be [equally] distributed without necessitating an [equal] distribution of possession. But it is *false* that the heir by primogeniture must be comparable to the Prince, for one's status as Prince is arbitrary. Only state functionaries, who in part govern and in part obey, are comparable to the Prince. All private government is an evil, for it is grounded in neither general liberty nor public law, but solely in the particular arbitrary determinations of tradition or positive law. Assertion of the rights of firstborn heirs lands us in plebianism [Plebs], and vice versa: the principle is in both cases the same.

You have dismissed political economy quite disdainfully [Ibid ¶190], but with great injustice, for you have presented it incorrectly. Political economy does not pertain exclusively to civil society. It consists in the determination of due proportion in private law, civil society, and the state. And, if we may speak of quantitative value (as must be supposed when it is a question of much land), political economy is a thousand times more important than provision for firstborn heirs. If property is to have value it must have universal value, so that if the state's economy is in bad shape the condition of the state itself is unjust. For if in constitutional law, if concretely speaking here in political economy, proportion does not matter, then surely it can be stricken without disadvantage from the *Logic* [see Hegel's *Logic* Book I, Sect 3]. One could console oneself over this only with the reply that there is no misery where there is no consciousness of any.

The fact that you have deduced constitutional monarchy to be the only rational form of monarchy for states [*Notstaaten*] is praiseworthy, but the exposition seems inadequate to me. Why have you let the logical sequence given in paragraph 273 lapse in order, out of zeal for Princes, to opt for the dogmatic deduction of an actual constitution [i.e., the Prussian constitution] where what is really at issue is only the deduction of the idea? If one were to follow sound philosophical method, the "I will" of the Prince would have been assigned a position which not only would be better but in fact is the only possible one. Many an invective against the legislative power would then have been superfluous, for [the question of] relative actuality is a matter of indifference to the philosopher.

I would in general have preferred you to have presented these outlines in a purely philosophical manner, as simply and concisely as possible, and not to have scattered them through notes and prefaces which are in part superfluous and in part impassioned. I quite painfully regret something I have also criticized in Schelling, namely that—especially in a treatise like this on natural law—you have not rectified yourself openly and candidly. That your logic is much better laid out in your *Encyclopaedia* than in the more detailed elaboration I find entirely natural and commendable, and I excuse the fact that in such a brief outline attention is not called to the changes. But I must object most sincerely to the fact that in the present work not a single reference is found in the numerous notes to your celebrated [1817] review article [on Württemberg]. These political reflections of 1817 appeared after the *Logic* and after the *Encyclopaedia*, so that I continue with good reason to attach very great importance to them, and in view of their profundity and excellence in no way take them to constitute a merely

occasional polemical writing. Let us suppose that the now-defunct Estates Assembly in Württemberg, along with general interest in its proceedings regarding "the good old law," still existed. Would not the partisan of this law—who, from your standpoint in that article, "neither inquired nor sought to demonstrate what rational law is, or whether there is such law, but rather merely demanded the old positive law simply because it was positive and agreed upon; who had not yet understood that the French Revolution in its inception must be conceived as the battle undertaken by rational constitutional law against the mass of positive law and privilege under which it was crushed. . ." [paraphrase, *Werke* VI, 395-96], and "who were untroubled by considerations of principle, i.e., of rationality and absolute justice. . ." [paraphrase, *Ibid*, 380]—would not these very persons find in the political portion of your volume useful ammunition with which to refute your sound and excellent article, so that most of the political dicta contained in the article would be pulled out root and branch and the defunct "good old law" would thereby be restored to favor? How can you excuse these inconsistencies? Meanwhile I wish to defend the article, unless you refute it directly better than has been done indirectly. . . . [394]

THE ATHEISM SCARE OF 1821

In May 1821, as Hegel wrote to Friedrich Creuzer, a new threat arose just when—to the chagrin of liberals like von Thaden—Hegel seemed to have evaded the witchhunt for demagogues. Having secured his political defenses, he now encountered a threat on the theological front. A certain Dr. C. W. Fenner had applied to teach natural philosophy at Berlin University but was rejected when it was discovered that his degree was in medicine rather than, as he had fraudulently pretended, philosophy. Not to be deterred, however, Fenner announced a lecture series for ladies on Lorenz Oken's philosophy of nature to be offered privately, without university sponsorship. The Prussian King responded by forbidding the teaching of Oken's philosophy in Prussia on grounds that it led to atheism, and further instructed von Altenstein to prohibit the teaching in Prussian universities of any other philosophies leading to atheism. Oken was a Schellingian, and since Hegel's philosophy of nature was largely inspired by Schelling, Hegel himself could well feel concerned by the King's edict. "Atheism" was as taboo in the Berlin of 1821 as in Fichte's Jena a generation before. Hegel's response was to admit that the application of his own speculative philosophy to religion could indeed lead to "atheism" but to caution speculative (i.e., Hegelian) philosophers such as Hermann Hinrichs, who was then writing a book on speculative theology, to be even more careful to avoid being labeled an "atheist" than a "demagogue." Hegel understands that "atheism," more than expressing a concept, is an ideologically loaded code word with little cognitive value. Yet he realizes that his own philosophy, which elevates the standpoint of philosophy above that of religion, is exposed to the charge of "atheism." Fortunately, however, dialectical transcendence (*Aufhebung*) entails preservation of what has been transcended, and this is the moment, he surmises, that needs emphasis to evade the new threat.

Hegel concludes his letter by inviting Karl Daub as well as Creuzer to join him

and other scholars for a vacation in Dresden. Apart from its art treasures, Dresden, the Saxon capital, offered scholars a meeting place that was freer from surveillance than Berlin.

Hegel to Creuzer [389]

[draft]

[End of May 1821]

How can I thank you enough, my dear esteemed friend, for so many treasured gifts. They leave me in debt to your friendship and, like everyone else, to your untiring industry. Such industry astounds me as much as your kindness pleases me. To speak first of the gift which was received last, the first six sheets of Proclus's [Platonic] *Theology* arrived yesterday [see Ch 13 on Creuzer], while today two more sheets have come by way of a courier. I see how you must have pressed the publisher to make rapid delivery to me. This gift, for which you have long led me to hope, has indeed given me very special pleasure with its accompanying translation, notes, completion, and improvement of the text [*Initia Philosophiae et Theologiae ex Platonicis fontibus ducta sive Procli Diadochi et Olympiodori in Platonis Alcibiadem Commentarii*, ed Fr. Creuzer, 1820, *Pars I, Fasc 1-2*]. Among all the Neoplatonists that have come to my attention this Proclus treatise is the most precious and most valued. Platonic dialectic, together with the beginning systematization and organization of the Idea in itself—already more pronounced in Proclus than in Plato—constitutes for philosophy the giant step, which is chiefly to Proclus's credit and from which those who came after drew profit. With this edition you have fulfilled a great need, and in my lectures on the history of philosophy [*Werke* XIX, 71ff] I shall not fail to call attention to Proclus and, more particularly, to this text, which seems to be the true turning point or transition from ancient to modern times, from ancient philosophy to Christianity. Currency is now once more to be given to this transition. Thus nothing seems more timely to me than this new edition of Proclus.

But what am I to say of this even greater and entirely original work, the new *Symbolics and Mythology* [Ch 13 on Creuzer]. Such an extensive, comprehensive body of material, completely developed, not only with vast scholarship but with a sense of the Idea, with philosophy and spirit! I sincerely believe that we once again have in this work a book we may display to foreigners. I cannot say how much I find that having such a book in hand furthers my own work, especially in aesthetics. I propose to lecture on aesthetics in the winter.⁶ Your work enables me to go more deeply into the subject, and probably in time to have something to publish on it. I need not tell you—for you know better than anyone else—how much you have perfected this new edition by completing the scholarly apparatus, evenhandedly treating the different mythological materials, making clear divisions and cutting out. . . [clause incomplete in Hegel's draft]. It has seemed to me that what is especially appealing was the mitigation with respect to the mode of opposition between [on the one hand] *definite consciousness* of a theorem—i.e., the articulately cognized *meaning* of the symbol—and [on the other hand] the feeling of the

⁶In fact, Hegel did not next teach aesthetics until summer 1823.

matter, the instinctive production and, what is more, inevitable germination of reason in the mythological symbolic religions.

But I do not know what to say of this painfully sculpted wood-block head which our good old [Johann Heinrich] Voss sets over against your bust of Carrara marble. He is having this head of his make all sorts of clumsy grimaces and capers [see Voss's review of the 2nd edition of Creuzer's *Symbolics and Mythology* in the *Jena Allgemeine Literatur Zeitung*, nos 81-87, 1821, pp. 162-215]. This man has no sense of the difference between, *a*, merely external, explicit, historical connection; *b*, the completely concealed connection of tradition in which representation [*Vorstellung*] does not recognize itself as tradition and—in the face of loose and ever obscure historical correspondences and suggestions—comes to know itself only by the signs and fruit of such correspondences, through comparison with their *one* source; and thirdly, *c*, the entirely inner connection of reason—which is everywhere *one*—and of a rational world-view.

I have not yet seen your *Vossiana* with annotations [1821], although the day before yesterday I heard they have arrived. From a letter to Privy Councillor [Gustav Friedrich] Parthey I see that you have had sport with them, which in fact was the only thing that could be done. Despite his unhappy, hypochondriacal, irritable disposition, he is really quite happy. In the same letter it greatly pleased me to see that you are taking an interest in [Hermann] Hinrichs. He surely deserves it. Support such as you and Daub are giving will sustain him, but there can be no worse means of earning a living than philosophy, particularly abstract speculative philosophy. It is mainly philosophical lecture manuals or philosophical writings of the completely popular sort—various sorts of inspirational books—which find publishers. I have not yet spoken with Parthey, a publisher who does everything. But a new circumstance has cropped up regarding the subject matter on which Hinrichs is working. A few weeks ago Dr. Fenner, a stranger and a simpleton whom our faculty had refused, wished to give a lecture series for ladies on Oken's *philosophy of nature*. The King, however, forbade him to do so on the ground that this philosophy leads to atheism. The King also instructed the Minister to see that this philosophy of nature and other similar philosophies leading to atheism—[e.g.] speculative philosophizing on religion—not be taught in his universities. *The Relation of Religion to Science* as a title is not above suspicion. A better one might be: *Essays in the Speculative Justification of Theology* [see Ch 18, second section].

I told our governmental representative [at Berlin University] with respect to this that all speculative philosophizing on religion permits of being led to atheism. The only question is: who is doing the leading? The singular piety of our age and the ill-will of these times and others—of demagogues in whom, as is known, piety is in full bloom—will easily provide us with such leaders and bring back into vogue the all-but-forgotten catchword “atheism,” once it has again been invoked. Hinrichs should always keep in mind the prospect of a position in Prussian universities. In any case, once one has been branded in a given place—no matter where and with no matter what label such as “demagogy” or, ultimately, “atheism”—one is a marked man everywhere in the German Empire [i.e., Confederation] and regions of the Holy Alliance. I shall write Hinrichs myself about this aspect. When I had his manuscript in hand I did not examine it more closely from this point of

view to see to what extent the manner of expression might give rise to misunderstanding.

But now one last matter, and indeed one of importance. Last autumn I was in Dresden for two weeks, and after seeing the city was sorry I had not gone there thirty years ago. In particular I have perceived there the singular opportunity of a meeting place for good scholarly friends. It seems to me that neither you nor Daub have been there. I would wish for nothing more beautiful nor more opportune than for us to find ourselves together for awhile during the autumn vacation. Were you to have been there but once you would certainly have the desire to return often. I exhort you because I know for sure you would like it there. You will say I have an advantage over you in being closer to Dresden. But as a spot for the leisurely companionship of friends there is no place, whether between us or to the right or left of your path here, which is in itself so inviting, so rich in diversion—especially in vacation-time diversion. . . .

BETWEEN ADVOCACY AND ACCOMMODATION

On June 9 Hegel wrote Niethammer about the new threat on the theological front. But the letter primarily testifies to the profound ambiguity of Hegel's own position. In the second paragraph he duly lashes out at demagogues and yet at once alludes to his teaching assistant, Leopold von Henning, who was arrested on July 19, 1819, on suspicion of demagogy and imprisoned for several weeks. Von Henning was at most innocent of belonging to the Friesian wing of the student movement. Like Hegel, he in fact was a strong admirer of Napoleon. Hegel himself lets his Bonapartist tendency show in the letter of June 9. The letter was written in response to Niethammer's of April 16 [385], in which his friend in Munich expressed some renewed satisfaction with his own situation. He claimed he owed this satisfaction solely to the Bavarian Constitution of 1818, which in principle accorded Protestants, whom Niethammer represented, equal rights with Catholics. After noting the warm reception that Bavaria had given von Hardenberg in April 1821, Hegel chides Niethammer for having been ungrateful to von Hardenberg's Bavarian counterpart Maximilian Josef Montgelas, for many years a strong ally of Napoleon. Hegel suggests that the rights of Protestants in Bavaria and the educational reforms Niethammer helped introduce were in no small part due to the "disorganizing power" of Napoleon's sudden ascent to hegemony over Bavaria, which cleared the boards for new institutions. In the same letter in which Hegel attacks "demagogues" and "liberalism" he shows impatience with Prussia's peaceful reform from within in contrast to the greater violence of an externally imposed revolution.

Hegel to Niethammer [390]

Berlin, June 9, 1821

In the meeting room of the Board of Scientific Examiners.

I cannot let the good opportunity offered me by Ministerial Councillor von Schmidt to kindly address a letter to you pass. I thus wish to abstain from the just

revenge of replying late to your letter as you did to mine. I merely limit myself to not writing you from home either, but rather to writing likewise from a place where—just as my book [*Philosophy of Law*] accompanies you while away from home—your thoughts, institutions, and regulations are so often recalled to me.

Your sympathetic remembrance in your letter and, above all, your satisfaction with the conditions of your office—together with news of the improved health of the woman whom I have acquired the right through many years' practice to call the best of women—could only cause me deep and heartfelt pleasure. My tenure here—which has endured longer than when I wrote you before—has now allowed me to compare the conditions of your office with the situation you would have in an analogous post here and, after this comparison to be able to appreciate your present contentment further and perhaps more highly than you yourself. It was very nice of you—and we patriotic Prussians must express our thanks to you for it—to have contributed to providing our State Chancellor Prince [von Hardenberg] with greater comfort during his stay in Bayreuth. But such a kindness cannot be done for the one and not for the other! So as the occasion presents itself, you might well render a similar service to your own former State Chancellor, the Count von Montgelas. But if you realize you are indebted to your Constitution for your satisfaction with your situation, it almost seems you are lacking in gratitude to this man who, along with God and Napoleon, was responsible for it. But here in Berlin I see among other things how officials are hampered when their good intentions are not preceded by the sort of disorganizational force which [in Bavaria] was capable of being used directly for unhindered reorganizational activity—as was Count Montgelas's case, a choice portion of which fell also to you and your work. If by chance you were now to enter a similar position with us—the same position in which thirteen or fourteen years ago you began your work in Bavaria [Ch 7]—you would no doubt have to begin at the same point, maybe even with the necessity of publishing a book like the one you published against philanthropinism, though in the Prussia of today it would perhaps have to be written against liberalism. If I want to make a friend angry [Johannes Schulze, Hoffmeister surmises], who holds approximately the same position as you, I tell him that twenty years ago Bavaria was three hundred years behind Prussia but that their institutions of public instruction have since progressed to a level fifty to a hundred years ahead of us. You of course understand that when one wants to make someone really angry one exaggerates the matter a little. But I now hear that [your] directive [144], lithographed memoranda, and so on were recently ordered from Bavaria by our Ministry. You must not believe, however, that we are inactive in this venture, or even far less that goodwill is lacking. Goodwill is present in a high and even very noble degree. *Three and a half years* ago in Aachen the King approved the principles of the school and curricular plan presented to him at the time by the Minister [von Altenstein]. *Since then* work has thus proceeded on comprehensive legislation for the schools [implementing von Altenstein's 1818 principles]. Last winter I had it in mind to write a book on state education. In dedicating it to you I would have said that the book did nothing but explicate your directive and rulings. Thus philosophy has not yet created a burden for us [*nondum nobis haec otia fecit*] in taking up such

practically necessary matters. So much for the comparison that I added in thought while evaluating your situation and your satisfaction with it—in which I share such sympathetic interest as to take complete delight in it.

You perhaps wish, dear friend, to hear me speak as well of my situation. You know I have come here to be in a center of things [*Mittelpunkt*—Ch 4, second section] instead of a province. And now that I am in such a center I feel that my situation is very satisfying and even reassuring with respect both to my official efficacy and to the appreciative sentiments shown me in high places. In this second respect comparison with a role in Bavaria clarifies my own position. If I remember rightly, your country has among its ranks so-called *expositos* [vulnerably exposed individuals]. The same function is also found here. You know, moreover, that a philosophy professor is in and for himself a born *expositus*. I have withstood the peril of demagoguery without personal risk—but not indeed without concern in the face of those casting suspicion, slander, and so forth. Or at least I was concerned until I read *de Wette's* letter and got to know better both a few demagogical individuals and a few who had to take action against them. I then realized the wretchedness and well-deserved fate of the demagogues. And although the action of officials in such a nebulous matter was admittedly not justifiable right at the start, I came to realize its eventual justice. But I became aware of even more than this. For one year now a teaching assistant [*Repetent*] has been made available to me for my lectures. His job is to attend my *lectures* and then go over them with the students four hours a week. For this he is paid a salary of 400 thalers a year. He [von Henning] was under arrest for ten weeks on suspicion of demagoguery, with a gendarme guarding him day and night in prison.

There is now a new peril which I hope will leave me equally untouched. In response to the petition of a useless fool [Fenner], a few weeks ago the King issued a cabinet order instructing the Minister to prohibit the teaching in Prussian universities of Oken's philosophy of nature and similar doctrines *leading to atheism* and misleading youth. You yourself can speak of such perils from experience [e.g., Niethammer's association with Fichte in the *Atheismsstreit*]. I am lecturing on the philosophy of religion this summer and am doing so in good conscience. You know that, on the one hand, I am an anxious man and, on the other hand, that I like tranquility. It is not exactly a comfort to see a storm rise up every year, even if I can be persuaded that at most only a few drops of a light rain will touch me. But you also know that being at the middle point also has the advantage of affording more accurate knowledge of what is *likely*, so that one can be more assured of one's interest and situation. And in the last analysis—but in the last analysis I have nothing yet to say about the issue even to you, since nothing yet has begun to happen!

And there you have a rambling but, I think, accurate outline of my situation. You shall receive news of the rest of my activity gradually in published texts, though in this domain as well I am in truth not overly active.

The reports you give me of the surefooted though at the start admittedly not yet fully productive onset of Julius's [Niethammer's son] career—and on top of that in [Karl] Roth's department and under his direction—have pleased me greatly.

I congratulate you both. I really owe him a letter; please convey to him my warmest greetings. I have also learned with pleasure that Ludwig [Döderlein] has a titular professorship in Erlangen. And please give High Councillor of Finance Roth my preliminary thanks for the many substantial gifts that have been sent to me through his kindness [in particular Roth's edition of Hamann, 1820].

But my most amicable of greetings go to whom? To whom else but the best of women. But I know a fine way for her to be truly the best of all, namely the way to Mecklenburg, so we can celebrate there your sixtieth birthday together should you not wish to come alone to me here for this event [*ad hunc actum*]. With whom could you better recapitulate all you have experienced and accomplished in these sixty years? And who could express to you deeper gratitude for what you have meant to him in his path in life than I? May the time remaining until that day, which in any case shall be a day to mark with champagne, pass very happily for you, but not without letting us hear from you occasionally.

My wife sends her regards with mine but is not to be consoled for having missed all of you last summer. Our children are thriving very well. Emanuel is growing up to our satisfaction, and according to ancient law a tenth or doubtless larger portion in this surely comes from his venerable godfather [Niethammer]. Yours faithfully in the loyalty and friendship of old, Hegel

LEOPOLD VON HENNING

Hegel retained a close relationship with Leopold von Henning even after von Henning's release from prison [e.g. 360]. He continued to function as Hegel's teaching assistant [422a]. No crime was proven, but von Henning's flirtation with Bonapartism was inevitably considered dangerous. Although he fought Napoleon in the wars of liberation, in 1823 he helped Hegel procure literature on the French Emperor. For a while von Henning abandoned Prussia for the more liberal climate of Goethe's Weimar, where he applied himself to the poet's theory of colors with Hegel's recommendation [393, 432], though he later returned to Berlin to function as managing editor of the *Hegelian Yearbooks for Scientific Criticism* (Ch 19).

Hegel to von Henning [360]

Berlin, November 13, 1819

I take the liberty of requesting you to be my guest today at the Society Without Laws. To this end I wish to await you by 2:30 p.m. Hegel

Hegel to von Henning [422a]

August 1, 1822

The number of your weekly review sessions is to be indicated in the lecture catalogue. There are two such sessions for each lecture [series]. The discussion sessions might also be publicized, with specification of the number of hours. Perhaps one for each lecture, if perchance you are otherwise of a mind to add such conversation—which is completely up to you. Please reply as soon as possible.

A good morning! Hegel

April 20, 1823

I have gone over the first sheets of the copy on aesthetics and find that I cannot make much use of it. I thus ask you for the time being to suspend further copying until your notebooks arrive. But the matter is not exactly pressing. Have a good morning, my friend. Yours, Hegel

Hegel to von Henning [458]

August 13, 1823

In returning the literature on Napoleon [Ch 22, last section] to you with my thanks, I would like to request that, once you have received the two fine pictures [?] back from [Berlin University's] Governmental Representative [Christoph Ludwig Schultz], you show them to my colleague [art historian Aloys] Hirt as well, whose curiosity I have aroused. Should they not come back they could probably be retrieved from his [Schultz's] house. It would surely interest Hirt to see them just now, since I understand he is occupied with the field to which they belong. He lives behind the University at No. 1 Dorothea Street. To be sure he leaves home early—at nine o'clock—but if you send them to him the servant will be there to take them. I will be obliged to you if you can still let me have the remarks to the literature on Napoleon before your trip. Yours, Hegel

Hegel to von Henning [?] [487b]

March 19, 1825

Good Morning! [Jean Charles Léonard] Sismondi's *Histoire des Français* [1821–] and [Gagriel Bonnot de] Mably's *Observations sur l'histoire de France* [1765] are still indispensably required for my lectures, especially through Sunday.

So, kindly pass on my request to one of the librarians for permission to keep these items another week. I enclose new slips. Should it be necessary to forward the two works for presentation so as to allow my assistant nonetheless to bring them right back, this would be possible. Most devotedly, Professor Hegel

P.S. I do not believe I still have in hand any other books from the library. Or should I still have something, please notify me.

Hegel to von Henning [600]

May 25, 1829

Good morning. [Friedrich] Wilken, expecting the quarterly payment of royalties which has thus far been established for the *Yearbooks*, has referred his wife to the receipt of this sum which is owed him. She has thus counted on this contribution. Could you remit it to her still today?

[Aloys] Hirt is uncertain whether his contributions, submitted three months ago, have been printed. He says he has not yet received the usual copy. Since we are pressed for manuscripts, it would be useful to think about an assignment for him. At present he has none, and he is a diligent worker. Adieu. Yours, Hegel.⁷

LIKE FÖRSTER, VON HENNING underwent a transition from strident liberal advocacy

⁷Hirt's review of Friedrich Thiersch on the development of the plastic arts among the Greeks was published in the *Yearbooks* in 1829, no 2, columns 44–62.

following the Restoration to a political accommodation to the Prussia of the late 1820s (Toews, 112–19). Hegel underwent much the same transition. In July 1822 [421], the ambiguity of the previous year [390] resolved itself in favor of “elderly” resignation. Hegel continued to concern himself with the defense of accused students (Asverus once more) and to attack the clamor of radical liberals. In a passage reminiscent of the “Owl passage” in the *Philosophy of Law*, he concluded that matters are neither as bad nor as good as they seem: “if philosophy as well fully comes [only] with age, one accommodates oneself all the more easily to the fact that nothing much becomes of the world anymore.” The age of world-historical revolutionary transformations appeared over; in this frame of mind he looked forward to preparing his first lectures on the philosophy of world history, for 1822–23.

Hegel to Niethammer [421]

Berlin, July 18, 1822

I cannot, my dear friend, let such a fine opportunity as the trip of a local friend to Munich pass by without sending a few words through him to you again to renew your remembrance of us, and to tell you likewise how remembrance of you lives on with us here. These lines shall at once convey the request that you kindly assist their bearer during his visit in Munich with guidance in seeing the sights. But it is high time to say who this traveler is: it is Judicial Councillor [Karl] Krause with his wife, the legal counsel of the aggrieved parties, especially Gustav Asverus. From my very first acquaintance with his wife I could not—except for the fact that she is an excellent singer—help finding a resemblance to the *best of women*, and I thus came to like her all the more.

These friends will be able to tell you about our lives here and thus spare me a more extensive account of it. My wife, who sends her cordial greetings to both of you, suffered much during the winter, but has now recovered except for some lingering weakness. I myself have not quite made it through spring without difficulty but feel better now.

I have become ever more settled in our local circumstances and their complexion, and have arrived at the completely reassuring conviction that matters are neither as bad nor as good as they often seem—and, in particular, as they may seem from a foreign country. To you, as a man having long stood at the center of affairs, such a discovery cannot disclose anything new; on the contrary, I believe I recall your having made the same discovery long ago, though at times you believed yourself obliged to be annoyed by it. But for us such a balanced outlook already has something consoling about it. And if philosophy as well fully comes [only] with age, one accommodates oneself all the more easily to the fact that nothing much becomes of the world anymore. As we note with interest from deliberations of the Estates Assembly [in Bavaria], matters are clearly more serious with you. Even if my old sometime friend [Heinrich] Stephani has, as I found, arrived at the dissonant conclusion that “you good people” have talked a lot but not produced commensurately, I myself at the same time saw that after disbursements for school and academic purposes—the other branches do not concern me—more than

Hinrichs and the Rise of the Hegelian School

300,000 florins remained unspent, if I have not misread. We must warmly congratulate you in view of such a surplus, and in view of the resulting prosperity of the educational system now even from the financial side.

I do not have much new to say of ourselves. Since the deadline of three months has passed which the cabinet order of April 12 set for a report on the dismissal of [demagogically minded] professors and teaching staff, one might be curious as to the results, which some people feared might become terrible. All I hear is that it is to be proposed that the situation be defused by means of a circular to the universities—admonishing, praising, recalling, and so forth, except perhaps for one individual who has not been found praiseworthy.

The flourishing state of Bavarian finances reminds me of the lottery tickets which I still own from my days in Bavaria. I have not since received any information about their fate. Not considerable in themselves, they contain on the other hand the hope of big winnings. Even one win could be very welcome to me. I take the liberty of recording them on the enclosed slip of paper and of asking your son [Julius]—who is indeed working with finances and in whose welfare I take great interest—perhaps to inquire into the matter, and if possible notify me of what success there has been by way of Mr. Krause or some other channel.

I am of course hoping to receive the best of news regarding both your health and that of the best of women, and to hear that you will not need a trip [to a spa] in this regard. But such a trip always helps give strength. And your former readiness for such trips should not have so greatly abandoned you that I can no longer hope for you to again visit Mecklenburg occasionally, and then perhaps to visit us here. This fall I will perhaps also make a small excursion, even if only because I have already received money to do so from the Minister. But apart from that I have been invited to St. Petersburg in the company of Mr. Franz von Baader [Ch 21, first section]. Otherwise, I would prefer to stay here this time and work. During the winter I want to lecture on philosophical world history, and to that end there is still much that I must look up [Ch 18 on philosophy of history].

I am enclosing here a few sheets I have written by way of a preface [Ch 18, second section]. These words—since they concern philosophy, theology, Christianity—are chiefly devoted to your field of interest, and for the principles underlying them I would wish your approval. One can in any case only expect the approval of a few in such matters. One has the least success of all, however, with concepts and reason regarding matters touching on the state. Yet I have moreover already explicitly disclaimed wanting any greater success with our rabble of “liberty-minded” militants. But neither should one bother oneself about what is going on elsewhere.

Please transmit the one copy [of the preface to Hinrichs] to High Councillor of Finance Roth. Remember me and my wife most warmly to him and to Mrs. von Roth. I ask you especially to give him my thanks for the gift of Hamann’s writings, which interest me so greatly [Ch 19, letters 513 and 660]. Perhaps Roth is in the process of erecting a house, or is already finished with it. Even if I will not be able to be at the housewarming, at least my best wishes will be present. Hegel

THE PRESENT CHAPTER highlights two very different correspondents: Hinrichs, the earliest of Hegel’s scholastic followers; and Duboc, one of the better nonacademic philosophers in the Hegelian school. A letter by Hinrichs, who was the first to teach the master’s philosophy, led Hegel to define more clearly the relation between himself and his philosophy. Hegel, for his part, guided Hinrichs to a professorship with astute advice, and with assistance in the publication of his first book. But to Duboc he wrote his two most philosophically significant letters, one on truth, the other on the correct understanding of his philosophy—both markedly nonpolemical. Hinrichs and Duboc typify polar opposites among the adherents Hegel won in the Berlin period: amateur philosophers from the business world and the professions, and career-minded academics. The former were sometimes attracted by the relatively accessible lectures on world history which Hegel first offered in winter 1822-23. The latter helped make Hegelianism a sharply polemical school, contending for positions of power in the “spiritual realm of animals” of which the *Phenomenology* spoke. This latter group was quickly predominant. Here was certainly passion. “There is need for us to become progressively louder,” Hegel counseled Hinrichs [410]. Even if nothing great happens without passion, it hardly follows that there is no passion without greatness. The *greatness* of passion is always an open question. Especially—in view of Hegel’s once clear option for nonaggressive internal criticism over the polemics of external criticism (Ch 5)—Hegelian polemical passion.

HEGEL’S PHILOSOPHY: PERSONAL OR PERENNIAL?

When Hegel returned to the university in 1816 he made a strategic decision to stress the teaching of a restricted number of students rather than writing for a larger public. The remaining books he did publish—the *Encyclopaedia* and *Philosophy of Law*—were, unlike the *Phenomenology* and *Logic*, lecture manuals. Although Victor Cousin once held that Hegel would have been better off to write literary works [591], Hegel himself was evidently persuaded otherwise—despite his complaints about the unreliability of the inevitable lecture notebooks that circulated without his authorization [598]. In part the reason may have been that his one commonly cited weakness as he returned to the university was as a lecturer (Ch 13); clearly he had to prove himself to the Badenese and Prussian governments in

this respect. On the other hand, the stress on lecturing harmonized well with an ambition to found a school of followers personally attached to him, and to exert influence by the use of political patronage in placing them in various German universities, thus not relying on the mere power of ideas [363; *Berichten* 334, 382, 390, 443]. Evidence of such ambition, however, suggests a personal will-to-power contrary to Hegel's claim (Ch 3) to have surrendered his personal self-will to the infinite will. Hegel, however, once said of von Weiller and the Old Bavarian followers of Jacobi that political sponsorship was impotent to establish a philosophy that was intellectually indigent [122]. Yet even if his own philosophy was strong enough to prevail through the power of ideas, political sponsorship might not only hasten its establishment but also beneficially influence political life. The most charitable interpretation of the record is that the universal will, having received the gift of Hegel's self-will, restored it to Hegel in trust to be used for providential ends—individual will thus being preserved in its very transcendence.

The first of Hegel's self-declared followers to receive a university appointment and openly teach the speculative philosophy—thus inaugurating Hegelianism as a school—was Hermann Friedrich Hinrichs. After studying under Hegel in Heidelberg, he became a *Privatdozent* there in 1819. In December 1818 he wrote to Hegel of his determination to pursue a career in philosophy:

Having been forced out of the realm of fantasy back to myself, I devoted myself to the study of the dead understanding, to the science of law—which corresponds all the less to the present standpoint of spirit inasmuch as Christianity is already a forgetting of the actual world. I already long felt this aridity, but someone such as you, whom I now eternally revere, was lacking to lead me into the intelligible world. Although during my last visit you disapproved of my declared intention to teach philosophy, this wish has since become all the stronger. . . . I am strongly advised on all sides that if I want to be named professor in any university I should write something as soon as possible. . . . But this I would never do without your advice, which is why I most kindly ask you to give me your opinion, indicating as well the branch of philosophy in which you think there is still something to do. . . . [353]

The book Hinrichs eventually published with Hegel's sponsorship helped win him a nontitular professorship in Breslau in 1822, and a regular professorship in Halle in 1824. But even in the winter of 1818-19 he taught the Hegelian philosophy privately in Heidelberg. On March 26, 1819, he reported his experience to Hegel. He also raised a question of interpretation implicit in the very name of the "Hegelian" philosophy once it is taught by someone besides Hegel. Is Hegelianism personally Hegel's, or is it the perennial philosophy in a new guise? The formation of the Hegelian school attached to Hegel as an individual suggested the first interpretation, while Hegel's concept of self-surrender to the universal will suggested the second. In theory, the concept took precedence over the academic fact. Hinrichs posed the problem as follows:

By adding to my courses discussion sessions, I have been able to note all winter long in my students how science will still be misunderstood. Here in Heidelberg the opinion is current, I have also noted, that you purposely left the last para-

graph of your *Encyclopaedia* obscure, and that, as is being said, you have conceived it ambiguously. It is in particular the term "immediately" in the last line of the last paragraph which is giving much trouble. Some would like to replace it with "mediated." Although I am convinced that the [logical] idea is knowledge remaining immediately by itself, very many people believe that, because in science spirit expresses itself as the truth of logic and nature, it is only in your philosophy that the Absolute has comprehended itself. . . . Spirit developed toward self-comprehension only insofar as the idea is its substance, but it is just this that occasions doubt for many. One of my students, whom I myself was unable to convince about this, asked me to request you to address a few lines on this point to me, and to his request I add my own. [356]

The concluding paragraph from the first edition of the *Encyclopaedia*, which Hinrichs cites above and which was altered in later editions with the result of eliminating "immediately" in the last line (*Encyc* ¶577), reads:

These appearances [i.e., nature and spirit] are dialectically transcended in the idea of philosophy which has self-knowing reason—the absolute universal—for its middle term, and which divides itself into spirit and nature, making spirit into its presupposition and nature into its universal extreme. Nature is to be seen as such, i.e., immediately as merely something posited like spirit, yet as totality turned back into itself and not as presupposition. In this way the middle term, the knowing concept, has conceptual moments for its reality, and is universal knowledge abiding immediately by itself in its determinateness.

The issue which this last sentence raises for Hinrichs is whether knowledge of the Absolute has *à la* Plato been immediately present forever in the eternal logical Idea, or is essentially the result of a dialectical process, i.e., of the long history of philosophy eventuating in Hegel's own *Logic* as a text. Hegel, replying in summer 1819, notes the synonymy of "mediation" and "determinateness" in the above passage: speculative knowledge is thus both immediate and mediate. And since it is mediate, it is after all a dialectical result. Hegel's reply thus counts against the still recurrent Neoplatonic construal of philosophy as an asymptotic reconstruction of an eternal, never-constructed divine knowledge (Lauer 72). The second major point of Hegel's reply is his denial of any monopoly on such speculative knowledge—which on the level of feeling and picture thinking has always existed in Christian theology. Suspicion that he harbors a self-aggrandizing exclusivism is attributed to the perverse self-will of an age which refuses to surrender to the universal will; and which, projecting its own individual self-will onto him, misconstrues his philosophy as a personal *tour de force*. His reply here counts against the influential panlogist construal of the Hegelian philosophy as the original self-construction of the absolute divine mind (Ch 19 on K. F. Göschel). Hegelian speculative knowledge is rather an authentic *reconstruction*, achieved by interpretation of a prior world-historical constructive process, especially in religion. It is a dialectical reconstruction of the original self-construction of the Absolute in the history of human thought, especially religion. And only as such is it a continuation of that original self-construction. However, between Neoplatonist and panlogist misconstruals Hinrichs's 1819 letter [356] opts for the former.

... found and believed there was no choice but to read "mediated" instead of "immediately." But mediation lies in the expression "determinateness," which indeed is nothing else. With regard to the other matter, namely that the conception arises that the Absolute has first comprehended itself only in my philosophy, there would be much to say. Briefly, however, in speaking of philosophy as such one cannot be speaking of *my* philosophy. For every philosophy is the self-comprehension of the Absolute. Philosophy therefore is the comprehension of nothing alien. Comprehension of the Absolute is thus in fact the Absolute's comprehension of itself, just as theology—admittedly theology more as it once was than as it now is—has always expressed this same self-comprehension. But it is of course impossible to prevent misunderstandings by those who in the face of such ideas cannot rid themselves of the standpoint of the particular individual person, be it oneself or others.

I hope your lectures this summer in Heidelberg continue to progress well, and it will please me to hear in this respect that you are satisfied with the success your decision has brought you. I see here as well that philosophy is beginning to arouse interest and gain ground.

I send you my best regards, and am very respectfully your most devoted Professor Hegel

HEGEL'S SPONSORSHIP OF HINRICHS'S FIRST BOOK, 1822

Though Hinrichs's letter of September 19, 1819, is missing, Hegel's November reply shows satisfaction over having found in Hinrichs a follower successfully teaching the speculative philosophy in a second German university.

It has greatly pleased me, my dear Doctor, to learn from your letter of September 19—received through Dr. [Hermann] von Keyserlingk—that the lectures you have undertaken are proceeding well. I am delighted that you have started right off with so much success—I myself did not fare so well. Persevere unremittently for a few years, though this of course depends on the economic situation as well. In the meantime, with such strong enrollment, which I hope will have increased still further this winter, you will receive supplementary income. There is now a great need for competent university professors, particularly in philosophy. We have finally reached the point of seeing a need for this science, and indeed of beholding philosophy itself as a genuine science. The cause of Fries and other such individuals is beginning to fall into serious discredit—inwardly through its lack of content, and externally through its political tendency. I thus have no doubt at all that this career is advantageous even externally. You know I do not advise anyone

to enter upon such a career, that I rather advise against it. But since you have nevertheless taken it up, and in fact have done so with good success, I now believe myself able in all seriousness to advise you to continue. As I have just mentioned, it is simply necessary for you quietly to stick to it for a while, and not to expect an immediate salary and appointment. A government must first see how in fact the lectures of a *Privatdozent* actually fare. That the philosophical faculty in Heidelberg—with Mr. [Georg Wilhelm] Muncke at the helm—does not greatly encourage the study of philosophy in particular makes no difference and will have little or no influence on the government. . . . The other essential condition is that, for your study and the business of your lectures themselves, you free your mind of all other demands. You will at once discover for yourself how much a few years' practice will benefit both your own studies—in the determinateness of concepts and working out of your science—and your lecturing. I rediscover this daily in my own experience. With respect to the form and content of my lectures, this past year has been most fruitful for me compared to my first university year in Heidelberg. The other path is publications, although from the economic standpoint it is most insignificant. This is especially so in the field of philosophy, above all at the start. But it is subsequently very important and essential in [getting] an appointment, and I very earnestly urge you on here. . . .

In 1820 HINRICHS followed Hegel's advice by writing a book on "religion in its relation to philosophy" [375]. The manuscript treated in succession "feeling, the religion of feeling, faith and thought, rational religion, etc." Hinrichs's editor, however, agreed to publish only if Hegel contributed a preface [382]. After looking at the manuscript Hegel consented, but also offered stylistic advice containing what may seem an "un-Hegelian" appreciation of prefaces. Seven years later, writing to Prussian Privy Councillor Friedrich August von Stägemann, Hegel made a similar criticism of another young—though unknown—author [574 below]: despite the firm grasp of speculative reason demonstrated in the work, the mature author's ability to communicate in a publicly intelligible language and format was not yet evident. Stylistically, the youth becomes an adult by abandoning purely subjective insights and private language for participation in ordinary language as an institution of ethical life.

I have run through the manuscript you sent me, my dear friend, with true pleasure. I have not been able to study through it word by word, but do not want to postpone returning it to you any longer for fear of delaying its further revision and destiny.

It will be a pleasure to answer your wish to see your publication accompanied by a preface by me addressed to the public. But there will still be time for this in the course of the manuscript's printing. This summer I am going to lecture on the philosophy of religion, and thus was already induced in any case to direct my thoughts in this direction.

You invite me to express in the preface my thoughts regarding the tendency of your writing. But please permit me right away to express here a judgment against you, and above all to express my wishes with regard to what I take to be of advantage as you undertake to rework this important treatise with a view to its further adaptation vis-à-vis the public and its own arrangement. As I said, these suggestions do not refer to the content or matter itself and the presentation itself. In my judgment you have shown mastery of the subject matter, and I have recognized with true satisfaction your deep speculative penetration. With this publication you give sufficient proof of your skill and mental presence in decisively and freely moving about in the highest regions of speculation, and in producing and carrying forth the matter in a coherent progression out of the thinking concept itself. I have no wish to cite the individual points of evidence that justify my satisfaction. As I mentioned, I have not gone through every detail. But your exposition of, for example, the proofs of the existence of God, the nature of manifestation, of certainty and truth, and so forth, have greatly interested me—as has also your presentation of both Schelling's philosophy and the philosophy that preceeded, the dialectical necessity of the progression, and so on.

My suggestions concern external additions to initiate the reader more quickly, and not merely the reader who is already familiar with speculation. Your procedure is to penetrate ever more deeply into the content, which proceeds sovereignly onward without giving the reader any resting places for reflection. Such, so to speak, historical resting places—not in the sense of external history but in the sense of a prior relation of what you are now about to undertake in the progression of thoughts—would immensely contribute to the required “understandability.” In publishing your work, the aim is surely to find readers as well as, chiefly, to give evidence of your gift for teaching [*donum docendi*]. I want to try to give you a few more precise indications of what I mean. 1. The reader's task would already be facilitated if you broke your paragraphs into smaller ones. The first five pages are without a break, as likewise the following six pages, and so on. There is but one paragraph from page 223 to 238, as likewise from page 241 to 251, etc. To distinguish further these paragraphs [*a linea*] as 1, 2, 3, etc. would make a most essential contribution to gaining an overview.

2. Further assistance must be provided by the historical breaks for reflection to which I have referred. For example, that such and such a stage, form, or the like has such and such a determination, but that a closer examination will indicate the transition, the dissolution of this standpoint, etc.; that this will be explained in what follows; or that this will be demonstrated, or has now been demonstrated, etc. Above all, what is rigorously deduced and where dialectical examination begins should be distinguished and underscored. [What should be generally provided is] a subjective clue to the reader that this is now to be presented, elucidated or proven, that it is this which is at issue here, and the like. In this way the content that has been rounded out for itself is made accessible to the reader, who otherwise does not know where to get a handle on it or what to make of it. And it is not only for the individual section but for the whole that such an overview and divisions affording an overview are advantageous and necessary—even if, as mentioned, only histori-

cally. Even at the start of the first section I feel the lack of such a prefatory clue and orientation; for example, that first the nature of feeling and the like is to be considered. Such an introduction for both the whole and the individual parts, indeed for paragraphs and for theses, will certainly win for your treatise a completely different reception than otherwise would be the case. There would be nothing to change in the content, but with those introductory additions the treatise would have to be expanded by a fourth or third. It is too replete with sheer substance and content, too much in need still of this other consideration, to draw the reader's attention to the progression and results.

3. There is still another distinction I want to mention and thus to call attention to, or rather it would be a question of indicating awareness of it. The issue here is what is accepted as a presupposition, i.e., speech that proceeds from a presupposition. Thus, for example, right from the beginning what you say about feeling is not to be taken as deduced. You rather presuppose the representation—or deduction—of feeling, and here indicate only what it contains. I would make this distinction *explicit*. And at the same place I would wish more precise determination to be given of the respect in which, and extent to which, feeling is at once *indeterminate*, i.e., of the way in which it lacks determination. Explanation by examples would be appropriate here where what you are saying has a presupposition.

I would not have gone on at such length about all this, nor even said anything at all of this side of the matter, if you were writing only for me and a few friends of simple speculation—though even for such friends and myself I would wish something of those additions. It would be very strenuous for me to read through all the detail. But you are writing as well for an audience of readers who are also students, and even more for an audience of pure readers which absolutely needs such introductions and reflections, demands them, and rightly holds that *teaching* as such chiefly consists in them. A tenth of the material contained in your treatise—of even a twentieth, thirtieth, and so on—presented with such elucidation would suffice to make a greater impression in introducing you to the public, toward which we may here chiefly direct our wishes, and would no doubt be more instructive, than such a diamond in the rough. You will not mistake my intention in bringing up all this apparent criticism, and moreover will rather take it as to be interpreted in itself as *praise*.

Now briefly about other things. It will be very useful and meritorious labor to, as you wish, take up with a polemical aim logic as it is now still constituted. It ultimately does not help, or at least does not suffice by itself, to present the matter itself. One must put the matter into play in the enemy's own territory. This forces him rather to look around, to abandon his gentlemanly ignorance, and out of embarrassment to take up his defense.

That you attribute to me editorship of the new *Berlin Monthly Review* [1821-], as it is called, leads me to suppose all the more that many others who know me less than you will charge me with it. There is, to be sure, much talk in it of me, but one should all the less suspect I have something to do with it. Many a thought and occasional idea of mine perhaps slips in as well, but at least I have not expressed

such things with a view to the sort of use as is made of them there. In itself, by the way, the thought is good. The matter must be brought before the public time and time again in a different way.

I should not expect that essays by people from Heidelberg would encounter any special exclusion. In any case, do submit them. What the periodical mainly needs is more diversity in tone without, however, losing the unity of its tendency. I have spoken of your intention to the man primarily responsible, [the Hegelian] Dr. [Friedrich Christoph] Förster. Do send him what you wish to present to the public in this manner.

Carry on with your writings and lecturing. Be ever assured of my warm interest. Yours, Hegel

Hegel to von Stügemann [574]

Berlin, March 2, 1828

I must greatly apologize, my dear sir, for my long delay in fulfilling the wish expressed in your kind note from the beginning of the previous month. But I may surely hope for your kindness to excuse me from an enumeration of the reasons for this delay. Beyond my usual bad habit of answering letters and the like late, it must be added in the present case that the author of the publication [?] about which you wish my opinion—and which I am returning herewith—does not sufficiently entice his readers to familiarize themselves with its contents and envisage its specific physiognomy. But I am ready to report to you as requested what I have been able to derive from it.

To begin with the content, in abstraction from everything concerning exposition, explication, etc., if I understand by “content” merely foundations, much that is profound became evident to me. One sees that the author’s reflection has penetrated to fundamental categories that offer themselves to reflection in the great spiritual actualities of history, state, and ethical life, in their powers and course [of development]—to the abstractions in which the speculative problematics of these actualities move. What is offered is neither the formalism of a set way of thinking nor merely propositions borrowed from a particular orientation. The meditation proceeds thoroughly in the manner of self-productive, self-active thought, characterized more by penetrating reflections than by genial intuitions or by new discoveries, beginnings, and the roots of new ideas.

Concerning the form, it presents itself as both forbidding and disadvantageous. The form is indeed so subjective that it will not even once, it could be said, allow the substance I have just recognized to attain its content. In reply to the question in your kind note about the potential for orderliness in the arrangement of thoughts and for comprehensibility, it would seem to me that the possibility of it, to be sure, lies in the development of the reflective tendency. Yet the author’s manner is revealed in the aim of remaining closed within himself, of maintaining, as it were, the inaccessibility of the subject matter and a, so to speak, hypochondriacal tendency, persisting in a subjective position. It can be seen from the author’s meditations that an intuition, state of affairs, or interest hovers before him, but what his reflection elicits from it are aspects, consequences, possibilities, assur-

ances. Nothing objective becomes evident here, only leaps, accidents, caprices. That in which the given determinations should be grounded and made coherent is not apparent: the connection seems to lie merely in the subject.

Judgment must thus restrict itself to characterizing a subjective manner. Had the author chosen to take up a concrete form of actuality, a historical situation and development, an institution founded in constitutional law, etc., or perhaps a general philosophical view, inquiring into it and interpreting it with penetrating reflection, he would have been forced to stand on the ground of common sense and thus of understandability. But he has not granted the reader the favor of divulging what the general cause of mankind announced in the title is. In the case of first literary efforts the author’s subjectivity, to be sure, tends to be predominant. As the desire, courage, and strength for objectivity grow—please excuse me for our own terminology—the author’s relationship to his readers moves in the direction of a concern to work for a possible sharing of interest and instruction through development of a subject matter and proofs, and of a concern to offer his talents for enjoyment. Whoever gets hold of the writing is hardly likely to develop the interest to read it. To this there corresponds in the author, however estimable his orientation and habit in speculative contemplation, a disinterest in grasping any content, carrying it through, and carrying it out as a subject matter. The rest seems to come down to this central point, including indolence in the style of writing, which is extremely neglectful in spite of all its affectedness.

These, my dear sir, are the reflections into which the reflective publication sent me has drawn me. They are yours to be freely used in the manner you indicated in advance in your note. Yet at the same time I appeal to your discretion, since in examining the work I have fallen into reflection and have not paid sufficient attention to the use to be made of my comments.

Please permit me to tell you how pleasant it has been for me to converse with you, and to add the assurance of my total respect. Your most devoted Professor Hegel

HEGEL’S REFERENCE of April 1821 [383] to a projected polemical treatment of logic responds to a plan, mentioned by Hinrichs on March 14, 1821 [382], to write a polemical complement to Hegel’s own *Logic*. On May 1, 1822 [412], Hinrichs elaborated on the project:

... I absolutely want to view ordinary logic. . . so that it will in the future, I hope, be spared all further consideration. . . I begin with Aristotle so as to show that the categories arise from the entelechy and thus have the sense of being essences of things. From there I am thinking to proceed, by the course followed in the history of philosophy, to the spoiler of logic, namely Leibniz; and to derive from his monad—in which the object itself is representational and by which the object’s reality, being, or thinghood vanishes—the purely subjective position generally in logic. Next, again through the necessary progress of science, I will take the defense of Kant because of the transcendental apperception of self-consciousness viewed as the sole category, which I shall show to be the immediate foundation of your *Logic*. I shall then have to speak of the so-called

Kantians who in fact do not deserve the name—Fries, [Gottlob Ernst] Schulze, and the like. For it will be necessary to indicate first the connection of their subjective posture with the ancient immediate, objective essence of the Aristotelian logic, and second their connection with Kant. This second connection lies in a failure to maintain the standpoint of transcendental unity to which the master had lead them and to develop logic scientifically out of this unity, so that they rather fall back to Leibniz. [412]

Hinrichs interprets the *Logic* here in close connection with the history of philosophy. Book One, the logic of being, finds expression in ancient philosophy and Aristotle; while Book Two of the *Logic*, the logic of essence and reflection, is expressed in the subjective Cartesian turn of modern philosophy, illustrated in Leibniz. The Hegelian logic of the concept developed in Book Three realizes the Kantian insight of subject-object identity. The *Logic*, on such an interpretation, is not an autonomous panlogist self-construction. Nor is it an inevitably unsuccessful Neoplatonic attempt to reconstruct a now-shattered indivisible divine vision. It is rather a reenactment of the rationally necessary progress of thought toward cosmic self-comprehension, imperfectly expressed in the contingent and external details of the empirical history of philosophy. We see an apparent move in Hinrichs from Neoplatonic [356] to hermeneutic Hegelianism.

This reenactment of past history is placid and nonpolemical; only the historical thinkers themselves experience the trauma of conceptual birth. The polemical force of Hinrichs's endeavor is directed instead against contemporary thinkers such as Fries and Schulze, who invoked Kant without making the alleged Kantian transition from reflection to identity-in-difference. Hinrichs might have sought to led these contemporaries to experience the same self-criticism which the *Logic* recollects as the experience of their great historical predecessors. Hegel himself had called for internal criticism of contemporary as well as historical thinkers [70]. Surely alienation from one's contemporaries—e.g., society as a spiritual community of animals (as in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, Ch 5)—implies alienation from the spirit of any age that includes them. But Hinrichs, with Hegel's approval [383], now preferred to criticize living thinkers externally, and thus to write a polemical companion piece to Hegel's essentially nonpolemical *Logic*. Hinrichs's efforts in this field resulted in a book in 1826 [522]: *Rudiments of Philosophy and Logic: An Attempt at a Scientific Transformation of Their hitherto Prevailing Principles*. On September 7, 1826, Hegel indicated his approval by transmitting a complimentary copy of the book to von Altenstein through his disciple and neighbor Privy Councillor Johannes Schulze [525].

Hegel to Schulze [525]

September 7, 1826

Good morning, my dear Privy Councillor! My cordial congratulations to you—and to us for your return. I regretted very much not having been at home last night. Since I cannot go out this forenoon—I am indisposed—I send you the two enclosures. For if I remember well, you would like to hand over personally the

copy intended for the Minister [von Altenstein], along with the accompanying letter. Both reached me about two weeks ago.

My best regards to your wife. Yours, Hegel

FIVE YEARS BEFORE, on Easter 1821, Hinrichs thanked Hegel for offering to write the preface to his first book, on the theme of religion, and asked him to highlight the chapter on the "religion of spirit as absolute religion" as the book's "principal result" [386]. Hegel's letter at the end of May, 1821, to Friedrich Creuzer, written in the context of renewed official condemnation of "atheism," advised that Hinrichs's manuscript be checked to prevent possible misinterpretation by the authorities, and that the title be carefully weighed [389]. Hegel expressed a preference for "Essays in the Speculative Justification of Theology" over "The Relation of Religion with Science." Hinrichs replied to this advice on October 13, maintaining that a title such as "Philosophical Justification of Religion by Science," though accurate, could also occasion misunderstandings [405]. Hinrichs suggested as an alternative: "Philosophical Justification of Efforts by Jacobi, Kant, Fichte, and Schelling to Grasp Religion Philosophically and Develop Its Principal Content." The final title was: *Religion in Inner Connection with Science* (1822), Hegel's doubts of May 1821 notwithstanding.

Having revised his manuscript in response to Hegel's suggestions of April 7, 1821, Hinrichs characterized its basic inspiration to Hegel on January 25, 1822:

This [book] has arisen from the authentic need of my spirit. For since my youth, religion—not false piety—has been what is highest and most holy of all for me. And I took it to be true as presented in the mode of representation for the utterly simply reason that the spirit of the human species could not be wrong in this regard. But your science deprived me of this element of representation. What then could be more natural for me than to seek to appropriate this highest of all content in the form of knowledge, to attempt to dissipate the highest division and highest despair which your science had produced in me and thus win reconciliation in the element of knowledge? And so I often said to myself: "If I cannot now grasp through Hegel's philosophy, in the pure form of knowledge, what in Christianity presents itself as absolute truth in the mode of representation, and do so in such a manner that the Idea itself is the form, I wish nothing further to do with this philosophy"—which of course could only be thought from the subjective side. "But science as it has developed in more recent times in the form of Christian philosophy," I continued, "itself must then be the highest product of Christianity." And so this inquiry carried out in my book became my problem, which I then sought to solve from the standpoint of religion both for my own peace of mind and, at once, for the recognition of science itself. [407]

Hinrichs's letter of December 1818 [353]—in which Christianity is said to be already in itself "a forgetting of the actual world"—shows that, just a few years before, he had himself interpreted his Hegelianism rather ominously as post-Christian. Ludwig Feuerbach would also do so in an 1828 letter to Hegel (Ch 19). But Hinrichs now took a position less threatening to the prevailing culture, namely, that if the Hegelian speculative theology was an organic outgrowth of Christianity, it must be itself Christian.

On April 4 and 7 [409, 410] Hegel mailed his preface to Hinrichs, incorporating the above excerpt from Hinrichs's January 25 letter into its conclusion (*Berlin Schrift*, 82). The preface contains a thinly veiled attack on Schleiermacher's *The Christian Faith Exposed as a Whole according to the Principles of the Evangelical Church* (1821-22). The Evangelical Church had been created in Prussia with Schleiermacher's support in 1817 through the merger of the Lutheran and Reformed churches. What Hegel most objected to in Schleiermacher's dogmatics was its insistence on "feeling" as the sole faculty capable of effecting communication with the divine. Schleiermacher's repudiation of rational thought in theology was to Hegel a repudiation of theology itself. Hegel's suggestion to Hinrichs on April 7, 1821, that he specify more explicitly how feeling is indeterminate anticipates Hegel's point in the preface that feeling is arbitrary in content and requires the guidance of thought. Given such guidance, however, Hegel does not reject a role of feeling in religion. But he insists that true religious feeling be inspired by a true theological concept of God. Though opposed to Schleiermacher's anticonceptual pietism, Hegel did not embrace an antipietistic rationalism or panlogism. His position, based on later interchanges with Göschel, may be characterized as a philosophical pietism (Ch 19).

Hegel to Hinrichs [409]

Berlin, April 4, 1822

I am sending you the manuscript with this letter, though it is not quite complete. There are perhaps only one or two sheets missing. But I did not want to make you wait any longer, assuming I am not already ultimately too late in my response.

a. Time no longer allowed me to put the manuscript in better shape. With the interruptions in my work I had often lost the context. It thus can only appear in its composition as. . . [illegible]

b. You are at the site of the printing and will thus take care to see that it proceeds properly. The passages which call for an addition from the margin, as also those which are to be indented, are correctly indicated. But an attentive typesetter is needed. And there is even greater need of an attentive overseer, which will have to be you. Wherever something seems to you to be missing you must set it right, and will surely do so.

c. Have half a dozen or so copies especially put aside for me. You might send a copy to our Minister [von Altenstein].

d. But I am particularly curious about your work. Since it is already printed, I might have received a copy by now.

Forgive the general content [of the preface], which in part merely repeats what has elsewhere been said. The distraction of my existence permitted nothing else. Here and there it directly bears on our present-day [Schleiermacherian] theology, which will not escape you and [Karl] Daub. But from Daub I expect public clarification of whether that is really, as we have so impertinently and superficially been told, the dogmatics of the United Protestant Church—although naturally we have only been presented *first* with the first part, presumably because one does not dare publish the rest in these so-called times of repression.

I hope, however, I will soon hear that [Joseph] Hillebrand's promotion has worked to your advantage. Nothing could please me more.

Is the Baron [Boris] von Üxküll in Heidelberg? I send a request for him to write me without fail [Ch 21, first section].

I hope soon to receive kind regards from Daub in published form. Tell him how great my hope for such regards is, and how much I am in need of them. I will write to Creuzer in the next few days. Yours, Hegel

Hegel to Hinrichs [410]

Berlin, Easter [April 7] 1822, mailed April 9

The concluding sheets of my preface are attached, my dear friend. The first sheets left here April 4 by mail coach. The conclusion is made up of a passage from one of your letters [407] on your subjective course of development and the orientation of your writing. The passage moved me as much as it pleased me, and it equally pleases me to be able to have it printed. It expresses the tendency of your treatise with clear relief, and if you had to express yourself for publication about what you are about you could not have done it so simply and naturally. At first I left out a few lines, since only today did I find the slip of paper, attached to the cachet torn off the letter, with a few words providing the missing connection of ideas. I have eliminated the words in your draft which designate my philosophy more specifically. A word I have put in in the place of a pronoun, for the sake of clarity, probably expresses what you had in mind, but it was not completely clear to me. To eliminate the want of clarity I have inserted the noun—and as it reads now it is at least good and must remain. And now my best wishes for your actual debut in the world. What reception you have to expect I have said in the preface. Much of it has been said expressly for *Daub*, to whom I ask you to convey my cordial regards, and from whom I likewise hope to see something in print soon. There is need for us to become progressively louder. Tell *Daub* in complete confidence that it is the Minister's [von Altenstein's] thought to invite him and [Friedrich Heinrich Christoph] Schwarz here to confer on theology and the Church [i.e., to challenge Schleiermacher]. Tell him I could not wish anything more ardently, but that here years pass by before a thought once conceived is realized. If the Minister talks to me about it, I will tell him he only needs to request of the two gentlemen, *a*, the articles of the union [between the two Badenese Protestant churches in 1821] and, *b*, a critique of the *Dogmatics* of the Evangelical Church—whose author [Schleiermacher] probably has not dared to come out with the second part, which was to have already appeared by Christmas [Schleiermacher, *Dogmatics*, Part 2, 1822]. He will then see clearly enough what they think of theology, and of such Berlin theology.

I hope I will soon receive good news regarding your hopes in Heidelberg! Such a threesome—such a cloverleaf of titular professors as you have in philosophy at Heidelberg—is moreover something so exquisite that it would almost be a pity if one of the little blades were plucked out. Elsewhere, however, we will have more of the same, in Halle for example.¹ Yet the dirty tricks against me in the

¹An anonymous hostile review of Hegel's *Philosophy of Law* appeared in Halle's *Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung*, 1822, no. 40, columns 316ff. Hegel's harshness with regard to Fries was particularly censured.

newspaper there may well stem not from such a threesome but perhaps straight from your own vicinity, or even more from Daub's vicinity—a fourth bad blade [Paulus] added to the cloverleaf of true breed.

Has Mr. von Üxküll not yet been in Heidelberg? Farewell. Can you have half a dozen copies of the preface especially printed off for me on white paper and sent to me? Yours, Hegel

How is [August] Oswald's publishing house in Heidelberg [which did the 1817 *Encyclopaedia*] doing? Is it still on a solid footing, or at least on some footing? I am interested in knowing.

HINRICHS SENT HEGEL his published book plus copies of the preface on May 1, 1822 [422]. Hegel's August reply addressed the prospects which publication opened for Hinrichs in Prussia.

Hegel to Hinrichs [425]

Berlin, August 13, 1822

It has admittedly been quite some time, my dear friend, since you have heard from me. I wanted to be able to write something pleasant to you of your eventual prospects here with us. But though I still have nothing more definite in this regard to tell you now, I do not want to wait too long without letting you hear from me again.

I have in the meantime at least learned that your publication has made a good impression. What highly commends it to us here, specifically in certain very important circles, is its speculative tone and depth—in part in and for itself, and in part because viewed externally it does not give any offense and shields you from the attacks and thus misunderstandings to which popular expositions can easily give rise. Superficial meaningless philosophizing of course also shares this advantage of displaying nothing dangerous, of not subjecting one to the risk of compromise. But here with us such philosophizing is given no preference over the former.

The Minister did not express to me any negative sentiments in your regard when I seized the opportunity to speak of my preface to your book, and of its author.

Beyond that, I heard that the letter you sent along with the book was purely formal. With us one may speak concretely to the Minister of Education, entering into content and opinion. So you must expect to receive at first a similarly formal reply. Yet the fact that it is so greatly delayed is always a sign that the book is being looked into more thoroughly, and that the person of the author is receiving attention. A main factor in being able to come to a decision is the receipt of assurance from the police that you are not known for demagogical intrigues and opinions. Since I am convinced that your entire intellectual orientation as well as your character have left you wholly untouched by such twaddle, commotion, and baseness, at least no obstacle will be put in your way from this quarter. You will thus have to wait perhaps still a few weeks at most for a reply to your letter, and the contents will give you the decision regarding your eventual prospects in the Prus-

sian state at present. Daub and Creuzer, noble friends of us both, will certainly not fail to recommend you should this be requested.

This is all I have to tell you of the matter. It all comes down to referring you to the ministerial letter of reply you will in any case be receiving.

So much for now. I have hardly had time to write this much. For almost three weeks my wife has been lying abed with a severe illness, and I have suffered bitter days and nights. We still cannot entertain any certain hope for improvement.

My best regards to Daub and Creuzer. I wonder whether Daub has seen the second part of Schleiermacher's *Dogmatics*. Schleiermacher has been refused a leave of absence for travel during the present vacation period. Rumor has it that he faces an investigation.² Yours, Hegel

A MONTH LATER, as Hegel traveled to Holland to visit Peter van Ghert (Ch 22), he was able to congratulate Hinrichs for appointment to a professorship in the Prussian city of Breslau.

Hegel to Hinrichs [433a]

Cassel, September 19, 1822

I have received just this evening, my dear friend, the final report from Berlin that your appointment has been confirmed, and that the letter to you from the Ministry has gone out. I cannot tell you how much it pleases me, how satisfying it is, to see you now arriving safely to port. Just yesterday I wrote a note to you [missing] in which I mentioned the possibility of failure, so as to give you prior notification in case the objection that was raised [?] should acquire significance. But now I may extend my most hearty, warmest congratulations. How pleased I am to have a scientific collaborator such as yourself now in a Prussian university. [Heinrich] Steffens, who arrived in Berlin a few days before my departure, declared himself very satisfied at having with him in Breslau a philosopher of your substance.

I am sending you this news just in case my notification might reach you before the ministerial letter.

Tonight, Saturday evening the 20th, I am leaving for Coblenz, and will be in Cologne in five to six days. Should I continue toward northern Germany and should you have gone home for a visit, I will send a note to Jever at your address. There might be a possibility of meeting somewhere in the area.

In the meantime, take good care. My best regards likewise to your family. Yours, Hegel

In [Philipp Konrad] Marheineke, whom you have met, you will have found a friend of ours and of philosophy. Have you not read his *Dogmatics* [Ch 19, second section]? In referring to a professor from B[erlin] to whom you were not to have mentioned your imminent appointment I had meant someone else, Bks [?], and in a different connection.

²He was suspected of demagogical opinions, but was permitted to travel after a direct appeal to the King.

Several weeks before, on July 30 [422], Hegel had sent a copy of his preface to Hinrichs's book to Edouard-Casimir Duboc, a French-born hat manufacturer from Hamburg who became interested in the Hegelian philosophy through Friedrich Förster's *Berlin Monthly Review* [414]. Requesting Hegel's *Absolute Idealism* in a bookstore, Duboc learned there was no such title and was given a list of the philosopher's actual works. Duboc decided to address Hegel directly for advice in understanding the spirit of his philosophy, and of his concept of truth in particular. His brief June 6 letter [414] to Hegel was followed by a longer one in July [420] in which he sought a response from the philosopher by giving an account of his own philosophical odyssey:

About fifteen years ago I lay sick in France. I was tempted by skepticism—an illness that could be aggravated more than cured by the empirical character of philosophizing which prevailed there at the time. Not wanting to lose sight of our visible ground beneath, we prided ourselves as *esprit forts* in finding stupidity in the saying "Happy are those who do not see but believe." Always inferring being from appearance, we very naturally arrived at atheism or at least skepticism. The sophist and the philosopher—he who loves himself more than truth and he who loves truth more than himself—were both limited to and engrossed in the sensory world. And when the atheist quite insolently exclaimed "There is no God because our globe is devoid of proportion and symmetry" [in French], our good and religious [Jacques Henri] Bernardin de Saint-Pierre wrote by way of refutation his *Studies [on Nature]* [1784], exhibiting anew, with warmth and talent, the phenomenon of harmony. Dissatisfied with French philosophizing and brought to Hamburg by circumstances and business, I sought to console myself in my skepticism with a few thoughts drawn from Cicero and [Bernard Le Bovier de] Fontenelle. But Fontenelle's axiom—with which he himself lived a hundred years [1657-1757]—was of no help to me either as long as I remained inactive. It actually helped me as well only when—and to the extent that—I interpreted it in a manner suitable to my temperament. In effect I declaimed with Fontenelle: "If, as you say, all is possible and everyone is right, it is possible for me to understand Kant and I am right to try. . . ." [in French] . . . I was at least able to free myself of the empirical method and conceive what philosophy must consist in as a science, should such a science be only possible. The undeniable being for Kant was "not nothing." But it was "not nothing" only for us. For in and for itself it was absolute being, i.e., that which was necessarily presupposed through all possible doubt and affirmation, through all possible human representation, without, however, the presupposition of all this representation being necessary for that absolute being to be, but rather merely for it to be represented. Truth thus had to consist solely in a Being which, as an object of faith, can never become an object of positive inquiry. For, since apart from this Being nothing was absolute, no particular harmony could be designated as absolute truth—as truth in the positive sense. But true Being and the truth of Being were forever impossible for us and for philosophy as science. From Kant—whom I had understood chiefly with the help of Reinhold—I came over to [Karl Leonard] Reinhold's view [in *Letters on the Kantian Philosophy*, 1786]. . . . Without having studied Schelling's philosophy, I nonetheless believe myself to some extent used to and

acquainted with the spirit of German philosophy. The German philosophers, it seems to me, always take true Being—as distinct from appearance—to be the object of philosophical inquiry, merely envisaging and expounding the truth of this Being from different standpoints. In this way according to your own philosophical belief truth resides in "becoming," the unity of being and nothing. For Schelling it resides in absolute identity, the indifference of infinite and finite being. And for Reinhold it consists in harmony defined as a subordination of the variable to what is invariable in variable being, and as a subordination of this invariable aspect of the variable to the invariable in itself; or, in other terms, in the differentiating unification of the accident and essence of things within the primordial ground [*Urgrund*]. In the study of philosophy I always had to get along on my own, not having received any philosophical training; and due to various circumstances I have been educated more in practical than theoretical philosophy. The alternation of the active and contemplative life, along with the fact that, though born French and baptized Catholic, I am happily married to a German and am the father of German Lutheran children, has made me a sort of intermediary realizing my earthly career peculiarly enough between the learned and ignorant, Germans and French, merchants and thinkers. But now that—thank goodness—I have little truck with the world and live merely with my family and my brothers in truth, I still have time to philosophize, which is what I do as well as I can. [420]

In his July 30 reply [422] to Duboc's query regarding the concept of truth Hegel sought to differentiate his own version of the correspondence theory of truth from the usual one. Truth for Hegel is not primarily an attribute of subjective representations insofar as they conform to externally given objects. Nor is it such a correspondence insofar as the object is not externally given but is constituted by the knowing mind *à la* Vico. It is rather, in the first instance, an attribute of objectively existing things themselves insofar as they succeed in overcoming their "finitude" or self-contradiction to exist in conformity with their own immanent concepts. Following the lead of ordinary language, which itself speaks interchangeably of, for example, "true friend" and a "good friend," Hegel identifies in quasi-Platonic fashion the true with the good and, ultimately, with the beautiful. The quest for truth is first converted into a practical quest to actualize the concept. But since the concept of things is a standard of self-development internal to them, practical striving for the good issues in aesthetic contemplation of the dialectic by which things actualize their own immanent good or truth without external Fichtean striving on our part. The good as immanent in things, actions, persons, and institutions is precisely the beautiful, i.e., the beauty of the object existing in harmonious correspondence with itself. And the reenactment of the conceptual development of the good and beautiful in things—what Hegel calls the "scientific presentation of the Idea" [422]—yields truth in the secondary sense of a faithful reconstruction.

Hegel to Duboc [422]

Berlin, July 30, 1822

I must apologize, my dear sir, for my delay in answering the gracious letter with which it has pleased you to honor me. Thanks to your first letter I had the pleasure of meeting an ardent friend of truth, and now, thanks to the second, of

finding a man who knows the forms in which philosophy endeavors to grasp truth. I also made the acquaintance of a man matured by both inward and external experience, active in a practical vocation, and satisfied in this activity as in his family relations. These particulars you give me about yourself also make my answer easier, both because they provide me with more precise points of departure for the exposition of my thoughts and because such harmony of disposition, both with oneself and with one's situation, is proof of this inner soundness of mind that surely constitutes the basis of true knowledge for the individual. In the contrary case meditation can easily degenerate into a morbid brooding with neither beginning nor end, primarily because it in fact does not want to find any.

Concerning the explanation of my thoughts on truth to which you invite me, you yourself know that the justification of such thoughts requires an exhaustive explanation, and that a letter can only give general indications. You also would like me to point out those of my writings in which you might find what you seek. I shall try to relate my reply to both requests.

I can omit mentioning that for man in general truth first manifests itself in religion, enlivened and made fruitful by one's experience of life, and of one's own disposition. For there is a second need of grasping truth in the form of *thought*—to use your own expression, not only believing but also seeing it—that is, seeing it with the mind's eye, since physical sight is not adequate; i.e., *knowing* it. And the interest of your mind has long since predisposed you to recognize this need. I recently spoke of the relation between these two forms in a few pages. I take the liberty of enclosing a copy, only asking that you first carefully correct the indicated typographical errors. These sheets form the preface to a text by one of my pupils, Dr. Hinrichs: *On Religion in Inner Connection with Science*.

But as we entertain the thought of grasping, of comprehending the truth in thinking, the Kantian view as to the pure subjectivity of thinking—a view familiar to you, which you have surpassed—immediately confronts us. Since, as I see from your letter, you are French by birth and are furthermore a man engaged in healthy activity, you could hardly come to rest with a hypochondriacal German view that renders everything objective vain, and then only savors itself in this vanity. However, besides the other merits of the Kantian philosophy, I still wish to point out how interesting and instructive it is to see in Kant's so-called postulates not only the necessity of the Idea but also the more precise definition of it. What is said in his *Critique of Judgment* [1790] regarding the thought of an *intuitive understanding*, of the *end in itself* at the same time existing *naturally* in organic things, can very well introduce ulterior views. The viewpoint expressed there, namely that such ideas are taken merely as a subjective maxim of reflection, must of course be put aside. At this point I immediately take up what you point out in your letter, namely that I define the Idea as *becoming*, as the unity of being and nothing. I note in this regard two things: first, that being and nothing are the most abstract, poorest, and thus initial forms of opposition. Being and essence, being and thinking, ideality and reality, the concept and objectivity—as also Reinhold's variable and invariable—unification and distinction, etc., are other forms, of which none is to be maintained exclusively. For me, the scientific presentation of the Idea rather

solely consists in showing that the progression from the abstract to the concrete—for every beginning is to be sure abstract—is self-productive and self-developing. In general, the Idea is essentially concrete as a unity of the diverse, and the highest unity is that of the concept with its objectivity, just as truth, in relation to representations, is defined as their correspondence to objects. I, however, understand truth in the more determinate sense in which it belongs—or does not belong—to objects in themselves. An object without truth can indeed exist, and we can have an exact representation of it. But such an object is not what it ought to be; that is, it is not in conformity with its concept—which is what we call “bad.” A bad action is one that is untrue. The concept of the rational will is not objective in such an action, and this concept is what an action *ought to be*, its very function. The Idea in its highest sense, God, is thus alone truly true, is alone that in which the free concept no longer has any unresolved opposition to its objectivity. In other words, the concept is in no way entangled in the finite. *Secondly*, I note the necessity of exhibiting definitions such as that the Idea is the *unity* of being and nothing, of the concept and objectivity, of the variable and the invariable, and so forth, as also propositions such as that being is nothing, the concept is objectivity, the ideal is the real, along with the converse, and so on. At the same time, however, it is necessary to realize that all definitions and propositions of this sort are one-sided, and that to this extent the Opposition has a right against them. The defect they exhibit is precisely that they express only the *one* side, the *unity*, the *is*, but give equal expression neither to the existing difference—being and nothing, and so on—nor to the negative that lies in [the] relation of such determinations. Reinhold's way of expressing himself—*differentiating unification*, etc.—here finds very good justification. My view is to this extent that the Idea can only be expressed and grasped as a process within such unification—for example as *becoming*, i.e., as movement. For the true is not merely at rest, it not merely is but [is] as self-moving, as living. It is the eternal distinguishing, and the reduction of difference within [the] One which is—so that the difference is no longer a difference. It is what also, apprehended as a mode of feeling, has been called eternal love. Only as this movement in itself, which is at once absolute rest, does the Idea, Life, Spirit have being.

But it is time to close, and so I add only this: I hold that this content is present in all authentic consciousness, in all religions and philosophies, but that our present standpoint is the ascertainment of its development, and that this can only be done in a scientific manner, which is, moreover, the only way in which it can be demonstrated. I have assumed the position of working to raise philosophy to the level of science, and my previous works—in part imperfect, it is true, and in part incomplete—have this sole end. I have tried to give a synopsis in my *Encyclopaedia*, but it is in need of great revision. You will thus want to consider my past and future works in light of this end. My *Logic* and then my *Philosophy of Law*, which greatly offended the demagogical populace, are intended as just such scientific treatments of, respectively, the universal and one part of the Idea which manifests itself in actuality and which is everywhere *one and the same*. There you can observe my method more closely, which should merely develop the necessary

progression [arising] out of the concept, and for the rest should neither look about nor bother with any good reasons and opinions.

I hope that this letter may roughly give you the desired acquaintance with my view and manner of philosophizing. You will at the very least recognize in the attempt how much it has delighted me to meet in you a friend of philosophy—as for those [who wallow] in superficial self-conceit, they are legion. With my highest regards, your most devoted Professor Hegel

THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY: BACKGROUND DOCUMENTATION

In fall and winter 1822, Duboc worked through the *Logic* and the *Encyclopaedia*, while Hegel lectured for the first time on the philosophy of history. The letters to which Hegel replies below are missing.

Hegel to Duboc [442]

Berlin, December 22, 1822

I should have answered long ago your numerous amiable letters, dear friend, and I deserve to be reproached for this. But I have been so busy and, moreover, have had so much of it on my mind that I have been unable to get around to those few lines which in view of the matter would have been at once necessary. In this I am the opposite of a businessman. Writing a few lines to a good friend, which for a businessman is easily and quickly dispatched at a moment's notice, is often for me impossible even in many weeks. What is missing, of course, is not the half hour in which it could be done. When a businessman has concluded a matter, the affair is far from his mind and he can immediately go on to another matter and another letter. But I absolutely have to wait for a time when my mind is free if I am to get to it. If—as the thought interests wander about in my mind—no great urgency is felt, I put off such matters from one day to the next so long as the excuse is present that no actual harm will arise from the delay. My lectures on the philosophy of world history are giving me very much to do. I am still, to begin with, occupied with the Indian and Chinese sphere, absorbed in quarto and octavo volumes. Yet it is a very interesting and pleasant occupation to have the peoples of the world pass in review before me. But I do not quite know yet how I am to get them through up to these most recent times of ours by Easter. . . .

GIVEN THE FREQUENT suspicion that Hegel evolved his philosophy of history in a *priori* fashion, the dependence he displays on empirical history and documentation is noticeable—though he often drew on secondary sources, as anyone writing world history would have to do. The “micrological” research of philologically oriented historians like Leopold von Ranke soon prevailed over Hegel's philosophical world history. Yet it may still be said on Hegel's behalf that if philosophers do not test dominant theological and ideological images of world history or contemplate empirically and logically informed alternatives no one will. For academicians to insist on the cognitive futility of mass theologies and ideologies of history is not so much to eliminate them as to eliminate scholarly and scientific

checks on them. A cognitively satisfying construal of world history may of course be impossible. But it would be uncautious for empirical historians to make such an assumption dogmatically—at least if the speculative philosophy of history is controlled by empirical history and does not itself lapse into an ideologically closed system. Certain letters document Hegel's recourse to historians.

Hegel to the Berlin Royal Library [?] [406a]

January 10, 1822

I would like to receive for inspection [Nikolaus] Müller's *Beliefs, Knowledge—of the Ancient Hindus*, Vol. I, Mainz, 1822; and indeed should like to do so this morning via the bearer of this message. [See Müller, *Beliefs, Knowledge and Art of the Ancient Hindus in Their Original Form and in the Guise of Symbolism, with Comparative Side Glances at the Symbolic Myths of Celebrated Peoples of the Ancient World along with Appropriate Literature and Linguistic Helps*, 1822]. Professor Hegel

Hegel to the Berlin Royal Library [415]

June 7, 1822

Please send me for examination [Johann Christian Friedrich Steudel's] *Examples of the Good [A Collection of Noble Actions and Virtues taken from the World- and Human History of all Times and Peoples, 1809]* with a Preface by [Johann Ludwig] Ewald. Please also send [poet Johann Peter] Hebel's *Small Treasury [of the Rhineland Family Friend, 1811]*. Professor Hegel

Hegel to Nicolai's Bookdealership [443a]

February 14, 1823

I have the first half of Part One of [Christian Daniel] Beck's *Guide to World History and the History of Nations*, second edition [see *Guide to a More Exact Knowledge of Universal World History and the History of Nations, Chiefly for Student Use, 1788-1807*]. This is the half including an introduction, prehistory, and Greece. I thus lack the *second half* of this first part, i.e., the material intervening between the above-mentioned first half and Part Two, which, together with the sequel, you recently forwarded to me.

Unless the missing second half from the second edition has not yet been published, please send it if possible via the bearer of this message.³ Professor Hegel

Hegel to Unknown [445a]

[End of March 1823]

My lectures on philosophy of history have caused me much work, especially toward the end. They have so affected my mind that only now, a few days after the course's end—I still had to lecture this week—could I write. . . .

³Beck was a noted Göttingen philologist and widely read world historian in Hegel's time. The second edition of his history, begun in 1813, remained incomplete.

Professor [Karl] Ritter has just told me that Captain Tuckey's *Narrative of an Expedition to Explore the River Zaire*, etc. [1818], about which I inquired this morning, was purchased by head librarian [Friedrich] Wilken five years ago at Professor Ritter's initiative. Professor Ritter has had this library copy in hand and used it for an extended period of time. This information surely establishes that the book is in the possession of the Royal Library. I thus repeat my request that it be procured, and kindly send it on to me. Professor Hegel

HEGEL WAS INFLUENCED in his conception of the geographical basis of history (*Werke* XI, 120ff) by his Berlin colleague Karl Ritter, who, following the lead of Herder, pioneered in cultural geography. Hegel had already praised Ritter to Creuzer in 1819 [359]. In recognizing a geographical underpinning to history, Hegel repudiated any construal of history as a mere dialectical unfolding of the Idea. Geography places the Idea at the mercy of the external contingencies of nature.

DUBOC'S PANLOGIST HEGEL INTERPRETATION

The Berlin lectures on the philosophy of history became the most popular introduction to Hegel's work. Duboc in Hamburg, however, was obliged to struggle through the *Logic* and the *Encyclopaedia* without the benefit of such an introduction. Lamenting the difficulty of the two works, Duboc summarized their main content in March 1823 [444] so Hegel might check his understanding:

I believe I most accurately grasp your standpoint when I view it, in its decisive contrast to Reinhold's, as absolute rationalism—i.e., as the science of reason becoming aware of itself as of all being—in contrast to relative rationalism. Along with Dugald Stewart and other thinkers, Reinhold holds that "knowledge nowise constitutes these truths, which are its objects." This thought indeed at first glance seems to satisfy reason. In the view of this first friend [Reinhold], true being and the truth of being are independent of human representation. Being—represented or not—is true by itself, in no way presupposing representation to be what it is. Human representation, by contrast, is true only insofar as it is the pure representation of true being. Representation presupposes the existence of its object independently of itself, etc. Truth for Reinhold—i.e., *absolute truth* as distinct from truth relative to knowledge—is the *correspondence of being within itself* [*an sich*], a correspondence which man can genuinely know *only relatively*, i.e., in its generality. But in your view, dear friend, truth is the oneness of opposed relations, and thus the oneness of representation and being as well. Although the understanding never grasps more than a single aspect of the concept and thus remains one-sided, reason rises not only to self-intuition but also to a thinking of itself as a thinking of all being. Reason recognizes the truth of its dialectical nature in the absolute oneness of spirit and nature, and is spirit *for itself* only when it alienates itself [*sich entäussert*] and has withdrawn within itself, i.e., only when "it has posited a show [*Schein*] as its limit and, by overcoming this limit, has recognized its freedom as its essence." Beyond the difference just indicated, I note further that you do not take the senses of the

terms "identity" and "oneness" to be entirely different, as expressing—I should say—two essentialities. If I understand you, your intention is to show that the difference arising with *apparent* duality is not actual difference. For spirit in alienating itself first falls upon what is other than itself—upon nature—and comes *to itself* only through its self-relating negativity. By this dialectical movement, spirit at once recognizes that apart from this its non-being it would not be, that this difference which shows itself is a mere show of difference, and that its truth is absolute indifference, identity, oneness. [444]

In the above summary Duboc interprets Hegelianism "panlogistically" as a closed rational system. In his reply [450], Hegel gently corrects this interpretation. Philosophy, Hegel had written to Hinrichs in 1819, is the self-comprehension of the Absolute, not the comprehension of anything alien, of an unknowable thing-in-itself or transcendent divinity. To know that the thing-in-itself exists, he now indicates to Duboc, would already be to know too much for it to be unknowable; to know that the Absolute is unknowable is, contradictorily, to know something about it (*Encyc* ¶44). But if the Absolute is truly absolute, it is not a "beyond" relative to our knowledge of it but embraces such knowledge within itself. Such knowledge is the Absolute's own self-knowledge. This is the sense Hegel attaches to what Duboc calls Hegel's "absolute rationalism."

It is a deformation of this meaning, however, to suppose that the Absolute is nothing but conceptual self-knowledge; that the form of "religious feeling" has no right over against that of conceptual comprehension; that the distinction between the external world and the knowing mind is totally illusory; that nature is but a Fichtean postulate of the self by which the self limits itself; and that the identity of self and nature is thus one of indifference. This panlogist deformation—clearly rooted in subjective rather than objective idealism—holds Duboc captive in the above summary. Hegel addresses it on April 29. Conceptual self-comprehension, speculative philosophy, is the highest self-manifestation of the Absolute. But it is not indiscernibly identical with the Absolute—unless of course it is construed nonsubjectivistically as the emergent conceptual self-comprehension not simply of the philosopher but of the cosmic Absolute, which previously existed without explicit self-conceptualization.

The Absolute's conceptual self-comprehension, however, relegates many an ordinary concept to incoherence. In the first paragraph below Hegel objects to a pragmatic justification of common categories such as causality. The fact that such categories are indispensable to commonsense beliefs and to the institutions of the world is not a metaphysical or "logical" justification of them. Metaphysically they must be transcended if internally incoherent. If contradictory categories are still invoked by role players in the finite institutions of the world, they become objective contradictions, adopted intersubjectively on non-cognitive, pragmatic grounds. But in philosophy as opposed to ethical life the pragmatic viewpoint proves inoperative.

First I must apologize, dear friend, for my negligence in responding to your two letters and beg your indulgence. In this regard a singular misfortune hounds me. Every time I write a letter I am obliged to begin with apologies. But now that I am inalterably decided to reply, your two letters, which I put aside just a short time ago just for this purpose, are nowhere to be seen. So as not to squander the time and impulse once more in searching, I must write merely from memory. You lay before me philosophical disquietudes and questions that show me your deep interest and labor in the investigation of truth. Possible apprehension that I cannot adequately clarify the matter you raise in a letter has also caused my tardiness. I now wish to try, admittedly guided only by memory, to answer your doubts. One of your reservations arises, if I am not mistaken, with regard to what results from my exposition of causal dependence. It seems to me that what struck you concerns not so much the nature of the concept itself as the consequences elsewhere for knowledge should the concept not hold up. I would note that it is indispensable in logic to consider concepts without reference to their application and consequences. The concepts must stand or fall entirely for themselves. That aside, I would remind you of the result of the Kantian philosophy with which you are familiar: Kantian philosophy asserts regarding the categories of the understanding that only appearances can be known by them. The truth thus does not allow itself to be apprehended in these forms. This inquiry [i.e., logic] is solely concerned to determine which thought determinations are capable of apprehending the truth. Thus nothing is lost when one or another concept shows itself inadequate for the purpose. Such determinations are at home in the finite world. Better still, the finite consists precisely in being contained in such determinations. The Idea requires a different form of oneness with itself. For knowledge of truth in the finite itself, a procedure other than that of those [Kantian, ordinary] categories must be established—a standpoint which the Kantian critique fails to attain.

I was just about to speak of the connection of the above with the contents of your second letter when, after repeated search, I fortunately found that second letter of March 3. The letter expands upon the general metaphysical view and the position of knowledge with respect to truth. I immediately add to what I have already said that when—in mind, in sensibility, and especially in religious feeling—faith, certainty, conviction, or however else we wish to qualify it, holds steadfastly for itself to truth, to God, it is not of primary importance to acquire this conviction through knowledge. In your first letter, in connection with both your career and your situation as head of a household and as a family father, you spoke of such religious feeling not only with fullness of feeling and firmness but equally with kindhearted intimacy. Granted, people also often attain to this conviction by the path of philosophical insight. Yet far more important than attaining it by knowledge is recognizing and conceptually grasping [*begreifen*] this solid foundation that already exists for the heart. In this situation the mind is, so to speak, sure of itself vis-à-vis knowledge. If one's conceptual grasp is not satisfying, such certitude does not suffer. This certitude can remain unshaken, whether one attributes the failure of knowledge to the particular path followed or to the very nature

of knowledge in general. According to this position, knowledge can be viewed more as a luxury than as a need of the mind.

Connected with this, now, is what you said in your second letter about how Reinhold [Ch 5]—I learn from the newspapers that this honest seeker died only a short time ago; you especially will mourn him—and the Scottish thinkers relate the truth and its representation. According to this view the true being is true in itself, and does not presuppose its representation. Human representation, by contrast, presupposes that independent object, and knows the truth only as a relative correspondence [of being] with itself. The truth of being in itself is, on the other hand, the absolute correspondence of being with itself.

I wish to observe in this regard—because it relates closely—that when one discusses being first as a correspondence of itself with itself and then as unknown and unknowable, one affirms the contrary of what was just asserted. For the determination of being as absolute self-correspondence is indeed a thought determination. In other words, being is precisely in this manner thought, and to this extent known. Moreover, I completely grant all these propositions insofar as they specifically concern the nature of representation. Representation is indeed knowledge standing in a relation, burdened with a presupposition. But for the same reason I abstain from the expression designating, for example, the Absolute as the oneness of *representation* and being. Representation belongs to another sphere from knowledge of the Absolute.

I proceed from this to your exposition of my thoughts, which you wish me to judge. It delighted me to see how deeply you have penetrated, and how immediately you have grasped the point where the issue is the most speculative. I wish first to reiterate from what I have already said that I do not oppose the philosophy of Reinhold, of the Scottish and the like in point of content, but that I find myself removed from such a standpoint. I would contradict them only where they claim that standpoint of representation to be the highest. As for your exposition of my aim, which I find to be very accurately and thoroughly interpreted, I wish only to remark one thing. Referring to the result of a difference that, enveloped in *one*, is at once nondifference, you say that this seeming difference is the mere show of difference, and that the *absolute truth* of spirit is absolute indifference, identity, oneness. However, the word “absolute” here could easily acquire the sense of *abstract*—as in *absolute*, i.e., abstract, space. Truth might therefore be merely abstract indifference, identity, oneness, just as being has been determined above merely as self-correspondence. But truth in the sense of what is philosophically absolute I define as what is in itself *concrete*, as—which you also indicate—the oneness of determinations so *opposed* in themselves that this opposition is still preserved in this oneness. In other words, the truth is not defined as stationary or immobile—abstract identity, being—but rather as movement, as life in itself, and as indifference only as an indifference that *shows forth within itself*, an indifference with a difference in it—a difference that, being contained in truth, in oneness, is at once no difference: a difference that exists as a *transcended* [*aufgehobener*], annihilated [*vernichteter*], and [yet] preserved [*aufbewahrter*] difference which, precisely because it does show forth, is *not* nothing.

It is my wish that these remarks may fulfill your aim of confirming the

correctness of your exposition of my concepts. Very little space remains to say that I now find myself in better health than at the end of the winter, during which the strain of my lectures had greatly afflicted me. I hope you and your family have come through this hard winter in good shape. The weather is again bad in our region, and no doubt has kept you as well from occupying your country home. With heartfelt esteem and friendship, your devoted Hegel

HEGEL MAINTAINED intermittent contact with Duboc until Duboc's death in 1829. In 1827 Duboc retired from his hat manufacturing business. In 1829 Hegel wrote to Duboc to introduce the Berlin musician Karl Möser, then planning an itinerary through Hamburg.

Hegel to Duboc [611]

[draft]

[Late September, 1829]

You no doubt still remember from your stay here the rare virtuosity on the violin of Möser, the music director here in Berlin. His plan to visit Hamburg on his tour provides a pleasant occasion for me to renew your remembrance of me. I may ask you to give testimony of his talent, and where possible to help him with your acquaintances.

You send little news of yourself. This fall I took a side trip to the Bohemian spas [Ch 14 on Karlsbad]—yet without really using them—and now feel quite well.

You have heard of our Minister's [von Altenstein's] great misfortune [in losing his son in summer 1829 to tuberculosis], and have no doubt felt it all the more acutely inasmuch as you took special interest in the young man's education.

Miss von Altenstein, whom I visited last evening, is now tolerably well [Ch 14 on rectorship]. The danger that threatened her brother diverted her from grief over her nephew. Yet news from the Minister has dispelled again this fear, and at the end of the month he will return to Berlin completely restored.

We recently received good news from [historian Karl Ludwig] Blum, and of course more extensive news through young von Wahl, a son of Mrs. von Wahl in whose home Blum is residing in Dorpat [now Tartu, in Estonia], whom I have taken into my house this fall for my two boys. Blum has had an eye affliction. A seaside resort in Reval [now Tallinn, capital of Estonia] which he frequented this past fall has done him much good.

It was, I understood, our intention to ask you to contribute to our critical *Yearbooks*. I hope you may thus have the opportunity of letting us hear from you more often. My best compliments to you. . . .

Hegel to Möser [610]

[draft]

[End of September, 1829]

I must greatly regret, my dear sir, being unable to give you any greater assistance. But in the cities in which you indicate you intend to exhibit your artistic talents I am completely unknown. I merely enclose the address of a friend [Duboc]

in Hamburg who is himself a music lover. He has various connections, and I have reason to hope he will be inclined to help you in every way possible.

With my best wishes for your trip, I am very respectfully yours, Hegel

ACADEMIC LIFE AS A SPIRITUAL REALM OF ANIMALS

Hinrichs became a titular professor at the University of Halle in 1824. In June 1823 [455] he had complained to Hegel of the petty academic jealousies that spoiled the atmosphere in Breslau. Two years before [388], he had already written to Hegel that the reviews of Hegel's *Philosophy of Law* might well serve as the subject of an article drawing on Hegel's chapter in the *Phenomenology* on "society as a spiritual realm of animals" (*Werke* II, 303-22), though the same letter expresses a wish to see one of Hegel's students placed as a *Privatdozent* in every German university. Hegel's reply [472 below], cautioning Hinrichs not to expect too much from a transfer from Breslau to Halle, suggests that German academic life was everywhere the same animalistic community. The letter opens with comment on Hinrichs's *Aesthetic Lectures on Faust as a Contribution to Recognition of Scientific Art Criticism* (1825). Hinrichs explained the purpose of these lectures in January 1822:

The aim. . . is chiefly to interweave, in the mode of representation, the *Phenomenology of Spirit* with this tragedy. . . . I have first developed. . . the characterology of personages and deduced each character from all the others, etc.—an operation in which the *Phenomenology* has been most helpful. [407]

Given the Hegelian "death of art," no Hegelian artists, only Hegelian critics, could publicize speculative philosophy through art. A note to Christian Dietrich von Buttel, a Berlin student of Hegel's, possibly refers to Hinrichs's *Faust* manuscript.

Hegel to von Buttel [466c]

February 11, 1824

In a letter [missing] dated the 30th of last month Professor Hinrichs charges me with conveying to you the enclosed manuscript "for careful handling," which I hereby do. Hegel

Hegel to Hinrichs [472]

Berlin, May 4, 1824

I should have replied long ago, my dear friend, to you and your multiple letters. But the status of matters that interest you was such that I still had nothing proper to write, and this continued to be the situation after you recently wrote me of your wishes. The matter concerning the publisher for your *Faust* manuscript has finally been settled, as Dr. [Leopold] von Henning will no doubt have told you—though it is of course not as would have been wished from a financial perspective. I already wrote to you earlier [in missing letter; cf 383] about the form in which you wished to cast your meditations on this poem, and into which you have at last entirely succeeded in working them. This form is at the very least not one which will find success with the public, and it is thus difficult to find a publisher. I have

not seen anything of the other writing on *Faust* whose publication you mentioned to me. Someone suggested it may have originated from notebooks copied from the lectures you delivered on the subject. But you surely would have recognized the fact.

Concerning your wish to be transferred to Halle, the idea likewise occurred to Privy Councillor [Johannes] Schulze here even before you expressed it yourself—especially because he sees no prospect of soon increasing your salary in Breslau. One of your main reasons for wanting to get away—the nefarious factionalism that spoils everything there—carries, it may be said in passing, little weight here. To some extent there prevails the most complete indifference toward it; to some extent malicious joy—one holds the coat, so to speak, for members of the tribe [*Volk*] as they heave up; and to some extent a feeling of complete skittishness and, in a manner of speaking, cowardliness in decisively tackling the matter at whatever point. I must also confess that you would certainly be all the more useful there [in Breslau], but must add for my part that you may by no means suppose the prevailing spirit in this respect to be better anywhere else, apart perhaps from public outbursts in print. What fundamentally disgusts you is to be seen everywhere. But, abstracting from this, regarding other aspects of your transfer to Halle the difficulty is probably greater than ever. At least nothing can be done about it very soon. You are aware that the Minister [von Altenstein] has been ill for a few months. He presently feels sufficiently improved to be able to go to the countryside, but it is really to see which cure is to be undertaken. It cannot be foreseen whether he will again take up his responsibilities this summer. Thus what currently is not already on the agenda will not likely come up, especially the matter of a philosophy professorship generally, which must be decided chiefly by the Minister's personal views and good opinion. The official path of receiving a nomination from the philosophy faculty in Halle would mean something, but what chance is there of realizing such a prospect?

We were happy to learn that you have been reunited with your family since last fall, as also to hear of the large number of students you are attracting to your lectures. For this I congratulate you just as greatly inasmuch as it gives great satisfaction to your friends here, as much from the standpoint of personalities as from that of the matter itself. But those who are ill-disposed [toward you] and wish you no good will not be reconciled by this. At most they will perhaps be silenced for a while, since the stories that at the start gave them so much to gossip about have become passé. Inwardly, however, when the opportunity presents itself they will easily become all the more hostile and enraged, and will gladly avenge themselves for the sort of humiliation suffered.

How do you get along with the governmental representative [at Breslau University]? He could probably do something to improve your pecuniary situation somewhat. Perhaps he will be receptive to an external stimulus capable of determining him in this sense, at least if he is not expressly antagonistic to you. [Heinrich] Steffens, I hear, arrived here yesterday or the day before. I have not yet seen him. [Philipp Konrad] Marheineke is to be married. Have you seen [Johann Heinrich] Voss's latest vilification of Creuzer [Voss, *Antisymbolik*, pt 1, 1824]? A warm farewell. Your sincere friend, Hegel

Polemical Criticism and the Hegelian *Yearbooks*,
1826-1831

THE HEGELIAN PHILOSOPHY is empathetic, constructive, positive, and educative even in the practice of negative criticism. The Hegelian school, on the other hand, was more aggressively polemical. "*Il faut enfin avoir la parole*," Hegel admonished his following in 1826 [513], while a few years later he intoned about the "need for us to become progressively louder" [410]. The contradiction between the philosophy and the school—between collaboration in formative self-criticism (e.g. with Duboc) and aggressive partisanship (e.g. with Hinrichs)—was perhaps inevitable given Hegel's decision to be a teacher first and an author second (Ch 18, first section). As the leader of a school Hegel of course did not renounce his philosophical principle, but neither could he practice it with full consistency. Thus the politically liberal Karl August von Varnhagen [685-86]—no stranger to Hegel's polemical side—diplomatically chose rather to compliment him for his nonpolemical critiques in the *Yearbooks* of Solger and Hamann (*Briefe* III, 455).

The chief vehicle of Hegelian criticism from 1826 was the *Yearbooks for Scientific Criticism*. The present chapter traces the early development and polemical offshoots of the *Yearbooks*. Attention is first directed to Eduard Gans, the initial managing editor of the *Yearbooks*, and to his vain struggle for a democratic, nonbureaucratic concept of the sponsoring Society for Scientific Criticism. Gans was successful, on the other hand, in winning for the venture Goethe's public support and collaboration.

The *Yearbooks* were put out by a private publisher—though with a state subsidy from 1828. Because of the connection between polemical activity in the *Yearbooks*, in the 1827 and 1830 prefaces to the *Encyclopaedia*, and in the 1831 *Logic*, letters concerning these editions and their publishers are included here.

The main body of the chapter, however, concerns polemical issues of the late 1820s. These topics were not chiefly philosophical. The greatest challenge to Hegel's *philosophical* supremacy in the late 1820s came from Johann Friedrich Herbart, but it was addressed by Hegel's follower Gabler rather than Hegel himself [576]. Nor were the chief issues political. Karl Ernst Schubarth attacked Hegel for promoting a constitutionalism tending to subvert the Prussian state, and accused him of atheism. Political repression under the Restoration, however, was more conducive to theological than to political discussion among the Hegelians themselves. Hegel assured Victor Cousin that the Prussian police was not likely to rumage about in Plato [547]. Yet even theological discussion had limits. When a

young and unknown Ludwig Feuerbach sent Hegel an inflammatory interpretation of his philosophy as post-Christian [592], the absence of a reply is perhaps not surprising.

The established theological schools in Prussia encountered by Hegelian speculative theologians such as Daub and Marheineke included Kantian theological rationalists (e.g., Paulus, Wegscheider, Gesenius), anticonceptual pietists or theologians of feeling (e.g., Schleiermacher and Tholuck), a resurgent Orthodoxy (e.g., Hengstenberg), and the Catholic clergy, which now spoke for Catholic populations in Prussia's western provinces. Denounced by a Catholic priest to the Prussian government for anti-Catholic bias in his lectures, Hegel was, as we shall observe, unmerciful in the defense he addressed to Minister von Altenstein. Hegel's dialogue with the pietists eventually proved more authentic. Following the lead of his disciple Göschel, Hegel moved toward a reconciliation between speculative philosophy and pietism.

Apart from theology, we shall see discussion center on issues of empirical scholarship and natural science. Stimulated by the work of Wilhelm von Humboldt and others, Hegel strove to expand his knowledge of Oriental religion and literature. When apparently criticized by Wilhelm's naturalist brother Alexander for obliviousness to empirical fact, Hegel protested vigorously.

Yet in the end Hegel wearied of polemical distractions from philosophy—distractions fit only for additions, letters, reviews, or prefaces. The 1830 Preface to the *Encyclopaedia* criticized the tendency of polemics to fall into personal attacks (*Werke* VIII, 26), and the 1831 Preface to the *Logic* accordingly eschewed all polemical mention of living contemporaries. There is some consolation in the thought that Hegel grew increasingly sensitive to the predicament of an ecumenical philosophy pressed exclusively by a sectarian school.

EDUARD GANS

With the founding of the *Yearbooks for Scientific Criticism* in 1826 the Hegelian school acquired new public visibility. The Society for Scientific Criticism, which published the periodical, was established at a July 23 meeting in Hegel's home. Two days later he reported to his vacationing wife [515].

Among Hegel's collaborators in the venture none played a greater role than Eduard Gans, the Society's first secretary general. A future teacher of Karl Marx, he first knew Hegel in 1818 as a law student in Heidelberg. Completing his studies under Thibaut in Heidelberg, Gans began a successful teaching career in Berlin in 1820. Upon his 1825 conversion from Judaism to Christianity, he was promoted with Hegel's support to a nontitular professorship, and in 1828 to a titular professorship. His first available letter to Hegel [464] accompanied the initial volume of his *Inheritance Law in World-Historical Perspective* (1823). The Preface acknowledged the Hegelian inspiration of the work. Hegel himself noted to Windischmann that the volume drew on his own lectures on world history [470].

Gans criticized von Savigny and the historical school of law for abstracting the folk spirit from its context in the world spirit. World history is the court in which national spirits meet judgment. In considering the world-historical development of

law, Gans adopted Hegel's periodization of history into the Oriental, Greek, Roman, and Germanic worlds. He took Rome to be the real turning point of legal history. Oriental and Greek law is intestate, based on inheritance without a will, while Roman law is testate. In the Orient inheritance is not left to the caprice of individual volition but depends on natural blood relationships. Western inheritance law, on the other hand, illustrates a more individualistic, voluntaristic spirit—von Savigny's belief as to the age's incapacity for legislation notwithstanding. Greek law anticipates that of Rome by allowing for inheritance based on nonnatural volition in the form of adoption. But Rome—which practiced disinheritance as well as adoption—fully displays the self-seeking private person uprooted from tradition and nature.

Gans sought to preserve jurisprudence for philosophy and the natural law tradition, more specifically for the speculative philosophy of world history. Like Hegel, Gans missed holistic perspective in the historical school's "micrological" research. His conversion to Christianity was more than simple opportunism, since it was facilitated by a belief that Christianity affirmed the universal individual human rights to which the French Revolution, in a new world-historical dawn, began to give political actualization.

When Victor Cousin was detained in Berlin by Prussian authorities in 1824 and 1825, Hegel assigned Gans to teach him the Hegelian philosophy of law. Cousin in turn introduced Gans to the French intellectual world. In the months before the 1826 founding of the *Yearbooks for Scientific Criticism*, Gans traveled to Paris, also visiting various German university towns to gather support for the project. Karl Daub, writing to Hegel in March 1826, noted that "Dr. Gans, during his last stay here, spoke to [Friedrich] Creuzer and myself of a literary enterprise in which we have a lively interest" [506]. In April Hegel wrote to Cousin that "Mr. Gans has been named professor of law at our university, which has given me great satisfaction in all respects, especially in view of a project to publish a journal of the sciences which we are presently digesting" [508]. In September [513] Hegel sent Gans—along with Heinrich Gustav Hotho, who had just received his doctorate [520] and who would carry the banner of Hegelianism in aesthetics—to Niethammer in Munich to enlist further support.

Hegel to His Wife [515]

July 25 [1826]

On Sunday morning I had a meeting with fifteen gentlemen here at my place—with sweet drinks, though they had no time to drink even a glass. Our grand literary venture has now been founded. Another meeting is set for next Sunday. After three and a half hours of talking, the lunch at [comparative linguist Franz] Bopp's hit the spot. It was [Karl Ludwig] Blum's farewell meal. He will be leaving tomorrow [for a professorship in history and geography in Estonia].

Hegel to His Wife and Children [520]

August 17 [1826]

... My labors for the printing [of the *Encyclopaedia*] are essential, necessary, and unavoidable. I cannot say how long they will drag out. Yesterday, after

countless headaches with addresses written on oilcloth [*Wachstuchadressen*] and with the post office, the first shipment of the manuscript left.

I am living very quietly and see almost no one but Gans, my loyal friend and companion. Last night we—i.e., the faculty—examined dear Hotho. Now he is through, though he caused himself much anguish and torment over it beforehand. He and Gans then came by in the evening, and I had a really good time. In a week he will have his doctorate.

August 17, 1826

I am perpetually obliged, my dear wife and children, to answer you collectively for the good reason that together you make *one*, while I for my part am likewise only one. You deserve every praise. It always does some good when you have been scolded a bit, though you surely had been quite good even without scolding. I was very pleased to read your letters received the day before yesterday [from Nuremberg], as well as the ones dated the 12th received just now. I see from them how generously and amiably you have been received and entertained among your many dear relatives. The instruction the boys receive from Mr. [Nuremberg schoolmaster Georg Freidrich] Daumer will no doubt do them good, for he does things thoroughly and precisely. Mother should also ask him how, in knowledge and skills, the boys compare for their age to the other gymnasium students. I took a very heartfelt interest in your excursion to Grinsberg. It is a really charming place, and you have given quite a good description of it. But did not mother try to muster and display too much boldness in trying to keep up with you through morass and swamp into dark jaws of devilry? She is being excessively baited, but in fact allows it. It would not be bad for her to sit down now and again to a pitcher of beer at home, or in the outer courtyard where the innkeeper Hamberg is president of the Society [?]. . . [unclear fragment].

That you [*Ihr*] are joining in for gymnastics will help complete your exercises in chivalry.

Hegel to Niethammer [513]

Berlin, September 11, 1826

My wife has sent me your kind invitation to visit you in Munich, my dear old friend—even if you yourself are absent. Though in other respects the time is right, though good companions—whom I shall momentarily introduce to you—are at hand, and though in joining them I would have the more immediate motive of picking up my wife, the *absolute necessity* of preparing the second edition of my *Encyclopaedia* obliges me this fall to decline. I am sending you two stand-ins in my place, my very dear and esteemed friends Professor *Gans* and *Dr. Hotho*. The latter has just finished his doctorate and is planning to make his debut soon as a *Dozent* in philosophy and aesthetics here in Berlin. These two friends will probably be able to fill you in on life with us here in Berlin so far as you wish to know, and I may thus dispense with going into it here. They will also tell you of our plan to establish an institute for criticism and let you know how important we consider your participation to be. Perhaps even Mr. [Karl Johann] Roth will not be disin-

clined to take the opportunity to express himself on this and that. *Il faut enfin avoir la parole*. My wife has had the pleasure of seeing Roth as well. She said he has become more serious. Please thank him very much for the gift of Hamann's works. I am impatiently hoping we will receive the eighth volume at this year's [book] fair, which will be treasured for itself, and on which I still must wait to write an article on Hamann's life and work [*Werke* XX, 203-75] for our periodical.

I have heard about your changed situation. Yet I am not yet completely clear whether the change merely affected you personally, or whether it has been so sweeping as to exclude all Protestant councillors from the department of education—for in addition to yourself the department included, if I remember, another [Protestant].¹ What is [Johann Georg Philipp] Lichtenthaler's position and office at present?

Now and then a Bavarian passes by here. Professor [Johann Christoph] Zimmermann, whom you examined this spring, has returned. But that crazy fellow in Erlangen—[Christian] von Kapp—has now shown the further impropriety toward me of having an excerpt from a lecture notebook of mine printed.² The big new university in Munich will keep us busy asserting ourselves in rivalry with it. Please convey my regards as the occasion permits to Mr. Franz von Baader [Ch 21]. I sincerely hope the spa in Gastein has served both of you well—but also that you have frequented it merely to rest and renew your energy. You have found Berliners there as well. My most cordial farewell to you and the best of women, to whom this letter is equally addressed. Yours, Hegel

NIETHAMMER, REPLYING on October 12 [529], offered to collaborate on the literary review. He also encouraged Hegel in his plans to review Johann Georg Hamann's works. Describing Hamann as a little-understood giant among his contemporaries, Niethammer hoped a deeper understanding of Hamann would help resolve the conflict, recognized since Lessing, between the contingent truths of history and necessary truths of philosophy. Hegel's review appeared in the *Yearbooks* (1828). Hamann in his *Golgotha* had denied Moses Mendelssohn's distinction between eternal philosophical truths and historical truths. He argued instead that all truth is historical—based on faith in testimony. History is biblical prophecy and its fulfillment. Hegel, however, interpreted Hamann's biblical faith as a pretext for a self-indulgent, pseudopietistic expression of his subjective "genius." Hamann used language more to conceal himself than to communicate any thought. Yet he remained noteworthy because of his influence on Jacobi and other Romantics who also championed individual genius against the abstract universalism of the Enlightenment. Jacobi's sanctification of commonsense belief as "faith," for example, was a secularization of Hamann's usage. Hegel's review of Hamann no

¹With the ascension of Ludwig I to the Bavarian throne in 1825 Niethammer's standing, as a liberal Protestant in the Bavarian administration, declined.

²Christian Kapp was then teaching philosophy in Erlangen but had been a student of Hegel's in 1818-19. In February 1823 Kapp addressed a letter [461] to Hegel along with his just-published *Christ and World History, or Socrates and Science: Fragments of a Theodicy of the Actual [World], or the Voice of a Preacher in the Wilderness*. In 1826 he published *The Concrete Universal in World History*. Hegel evidently felt Kapp plagiarized Hegel's own lectures (*Briefe* III, 388-89).

doubt disappointed his own expectations as well as those of Niethammer's. Failing to find rational content behind Hamann's stylistic posturing, Hegel opted for psychological interpretation in light of Hamann's perverse upbringing. Yet an 1830 letter to his student the future law professor Karl Friedrich Ferdinand Sietze suggests that this psychological interest in Hamann proved lasting.

Hegel to Sietze [660]

Berlin, December 14, 1830

. . . I thank you for the delightful anecdotes about Kant and Hamann. The ones about [Privy Councillor Johann Georg] Scheffner [of Königsberg from 1795] completely fit the image I had formed of him from his autobiography. If the people of Königsberg were English, collections of such anecdotes would have appeared in print long ago. Given favorable opportunity, your interest in Hamann and your sense of humor will perhaps lead you to collect such items in your leisure hours [*in horis subsecivis*—a time always well utilized by jurists—and to treat us to them.

ON SEPTEMBER 20, 1826 Gans wrote Hegel from Nuremberg and Stuttgart reporting both new collaborators [526] and an agreement with the publisher Johann Friedrich von Cotta [527]. In Leipzig Gans enlisted Professor Amadeus Wendt. Hegel's October 3 reply [528] indicates that Hegel and Wendt were acquainted. In 1829 Wendt published revised editions of Wilhelm Gottlieb Tennemann's *Outline of the History of Philosophy for Academic Instruction* and of the first volume of Tennemann's longer *History of Philosophy*. Wendt, who was probably the author of the first encyclopaedia article on Hegel (*Berichten* 550), was cited in Hegel's own lectures on the history of philosophy (*Werke* XVII, 146, 149).

In Erlangen Gans met with Niethammer's stepson Ludwig Döderlein, who offered to collaborate but noted his previous ten-year association with two review periodicals without doing a single review. Hegel would be at pains to overcome the negative impression Döderlein's comment made on Gans.

In Stuttgart Gans discussed the *Yearbooks* with von Cotta, who revealed that the Bavarian King had asked him to publish a literary review for the new University of Munich. Von Cotta, who could not politely refuse, suggested a merger of the Munich and Berlin ventures. Gans accepted this proposal, telling von Cotta that "people from Munich would be favorably viewed and welcomed as collaborators in our literary periodical" [527], and that he had already extended invitations to two Bavarians—Niethammer and the Jacobian Friedrich Thiersch. Gans intimated to Hegel that Thiersch, who had been employed by the Bavarian King to institute the planned Munich review, was neutralized through his collaboration on the *Yearbooks*. Hegel endeavored to remain cordial with Thiersch [593a]. Von Cotta agreed with Gans's formula for collaboration between Munich and Berlin, and the two men signed a contract on September 26. Hegel showed satisfaction with Gans's diplomacy, and in the next few years himself became a close associate of von Cotta's [e.g. 592a].

In the following letter Hegel appears to endorse Gans's outspoken commitment to legislative democracy in learned societies—but not, as in Gans's case, in the

state. It was Gans (*Berichten* 486) who persuaded Hegel to put aside his idea (*Werke* XX, 31-35) of founding a state-sponsored literary periodical in favor of a democratically self-governed private corporation collaborating with a private entrepreneur such as von Cotta. Yet despite the support Hegel voiced below, Gans's idea for the *Yearbooks* was not maintained. From 1828 the *Yearbooks* were subsidized by the Prussian state, and the more conservative and bureaucratically inclined Leopold von Henning succeeded Gans as the periodical's manager.

Hegel to Gans [528]

Berlin, October 3, 1826

I am hastily replying by return mail to your second bulletin—which is so important for our venture, and which I have received today. But above all I at once reply belatedly but with pleasure to your first bulletin as well. I have nothing but appreciative praise for the distinction and usefulness of the numerous individuals, beings, etc.—especially my duly esteemed friend Wendt, a man who is just right for the purpose—which you have wafted together so that still *others* might do what the good of the Cause requires. And all on a trip which, given such beautiful weather and pleasant company, I have often wished I had made with you. [Philipp Konrad] Marheineke, as I here note for the sake of our worthy Cause, has also returned with a similarly rich harvest of *others*. Concerning Döderlein's handling [of the question], I surmise you have not described it completely, that you have merely reported its peculiarity. For itself, this peculiarity lies in condescendingly detracting from the dignity of our undertaking—which as such has nothing to do with a review periodical, implying no commitment to such a periodical. Admittedly our scholars can only gradually rise to the standpoint of an electoral canvass [of votes for books to be reviewed]—which they would have to learn to regard as devolving upon them rather than us. We ourselves are hardly permitted to have attention called to "rotten boroughs" [in English] with the aim of conveniently protecting our parliamentary position.

In hurrying away to Stuttgart from Nuremberg after finding elsewhere *neither* the letters requested of [von] Cotta and even undertaken by him *nor* the wished-for information at the grocer Küffner's in Nuremberg, you only did what was expeditious and even necessary. The fact that you have concluded an agreement with Cotta is now *the* or at least *one* main issue, for you know that many main issues belong to any one issue. Good luck now. Well done! The trip and personal presence proved themselves all the more useful and meritorious, and in fact indispensable. Cotta is involved in so many entanglements and connections that it is difficult to neatly lay bare and fix an important matter—which in itself is an equally vast complex. He remained evasive before as well with regard to such further connections [with Bavaria]. If he had not let us—or indeed his *chargé d'affaires* the grocer Küffner—in on any of this, we would have sailed blithely over reefs and shoals seeing nothing but a clear course ahead.

We are, to be sure, threatened by the splendor with which Munich is currently pregnant. There are three prerequisites with which such an epoch in science—and alas, it is to be hoped not at our expense—must provide itself: 1. Famous

names—the fame of which you will no doubt discover in Munich. 2. An *active* publisher, i.e., one who pays bad authors considerable royalties, who prints books on white paper, who is motivated by the spirit of enterprise—whether with capital or without—but who goes bankrupt with great flourish after one year. 3. A literary periodical the likes of which have never before existed; or to put it differently—should God decide to take inventory of the damage—a periodical as commonplace or more commonplace than any that have ever existed past or present. The new Southern German Zion of the sciences has not yet found a way of persuading Cotta, over whose head of iron so many of these brilliant university pregnancies with their associated publishing houses have passed only to die stillborn.

And now all the more magnificent vistas open up before us in the grand world-historical manner: the unification of South Germany—which wanted to stand high-mindedly on its own two feet and lean against us—and North Germany. It is a unification that on the secular level has already begun most worthily with the marriage of our Crown Prince [Friedrich Wilhelm] and the noble Bavarian Princess [Elizabeth], and which must be all the more thoroughgoing in its efficacy inasmuch as the patriotic Bavarians—and especially Thiersch—take such a Royal act as a sign or banner which they feel themselves gladly, patriotically, even enthusiastically obliged to follow. To take this view to be *a priori* was, moreover, superfluous. For it will already obtrude on you well enough by itself as providing the only motive by which these people—especially Old Bavarians—could be lulled into compromise and softened up, as is said already to have happened to Thiersch.

By the way, as a jurist you know that the husband—for the Crown Prince belongs to us—absorbs the wife legally. This provides the basis of your diplomacy. You at once have the remaining credentials in hand: the invitation of eventual convenience extended to Thiersch, the Baron [Franz] von Baader, and a few others whose illustrious names you will discover in Munich. I should also note my friend Niethammer's energetic activity. Moreover, a chief psychological basis lies in the inner certainty even among shallow types as to the inadequacy, emptiness, and barbarian uselessness of those who are most zealous. Last to be mentioned is that you have *concluded* an agreement with Cotta, but have thereby concluded the further aims: the long-winded pretext—necessary to satisfy Cotta—of the great world-historical purpose of unification and the gathering of still *other* co-workers.

Thus all this in the way of an amicable reply to your kind bulletin, honoring its own amicability and pleasantness with my most sincere thanks, insofar as it is possible to render thanks from a distance. I also thank you for kindly taking care of matters at my sister's.

Now for what I have since gathered in local news: [Austria dramatist Franz] Grillparzer was here, quite a direct, intelligent and keen fellow. [Dramatist Ernst Benjamin] RAUPACH's *Night Watchmen* tooted their horn, but not to their advantage [see *Briefe* III, 403; *Berichten* 708; *Werke* XX, 459-69]. In order to decide for himself, His Majesty the King had them toot their horn in Potsdam the day before yesterday. Whether less harm has been done there to the gentlemen is still unknown to me. Professor [Karl Ludwig] Blum is presently in transit here. At

yesterday's session [Heinrich] Leo was given a library appointment with a salary of 400 Imperial thalers. Professor [Julius Friedrich] Abegg from Königsberg [a former student of Hegel's] is here; we both miss you. He is criminologically and criminally working for [Friedrich Christoph] Schunke's—and thus [Georg Friedrich] Puchtas's—journal [on criminal law] and is secretly holding for you a few ethical writings [*moralia*], with which, however, we shall not let him get away. Von Hülsen [a Prussian officer and student of Hegel's] left today. My bust [by Ludwig Wichmann] is almost finished. In a few days [Friedrich Wilhelm] Carové will be here; we might entertain plans to use him for ongoing active secretarial work of a routine nature. The *art exhibit* [offered by Georg Reimer as a benefit for the Greek independence struggle] started ten days ago. Upon your return we hope to receive a report on beginning our first volume, together with relevant outlooks.

My most cordial greetings to Hotho, to my dear friends in Munich, and to you—my dear esteemed friend, whose company I so often miss.

Greetings from my present table company. Yours Hegel

Hegel to Wendt [700]

[undated]

Professor Hegel invites Privy Councillor Wendt to call on him this evening—Saturday—assuming he is not otherwise committed.

Hegel to Georg Christoph Lichtenberg's Son[s] [592a]

December 5, 1828

I have the honor of informing you, honorable sir, that I have spoken with Mr. von Cotta of your plans to edit the collected works of your late father. While not disinclined to take on the project, he requests that a more detailed plan for the undertaking—including the number of volumes, royalties, and so on—perhaps be submitted to him to enable him to make a decision.

Noting in conclusion that Mr. von Cotta will remain here only through tomorrow, residing at the *Stadt Rom* [hotel], it is with the assurance of my highest esteem I have the honor of remaining most respectfully yours, Professor Hegel.

Hegel to Thiersch [593a]

April 4, 1829

I take the liberty of directing a friend to Professor Thiersch in Munich. He is Lieutenant von Wulffen of the Royal Prussian Guard, who is undertaking a trip to Greece. He is not doing so in any diplomatic capacity, but purely with the private aim of personal instruction. I am directing him to you with the request that you kindly assist him in this plan with eventual recommendations, just as he will take pleasure in taking care of any errands you may have for him on the way.

To this renewal of our valued acquaintanceship of old I attach assurances of my longstanding deep respect, and commend myself to your kind remembrance. Professor Hegel

In August 1826 [519] Hegel wrote to Daub in Heidelberg of the *Yearbooks*, in which Daub had already expressed interest [506]. The letter also concerned the second edition of the *Encyclopaedia*, which Daub agreed to proofread despite his complaint of "hypochondria." Daub was still proofreading the 1827 *Encyclopaedia* as Hegel wrote to him again on December 19 [531]. Although Daub never published the review of the *Encyclopaedia* which Hegel hoped for, he did review the second edition of Philipp Konrad Marheineke's *Basic Teachings of Christian Dogmatics* (first edition 1819).

Apart from Daub, Marheineke was the major representative of the Hegelian speculative philosophy within theology. The complete title of Marheineke's 1827 edition marked open adherence to Hegelianism by adding "as Science" to the 1819 title. A Berlin colleague of both Schleiermacher and Hegel, he opposed Schleiermacher's reduction of religion to the mere feeling of absolute dependence. The Schleiermacheran definition reduced religion to anthropology, to a purely human sensory faculty. God, however, is not a sense object. The feeling of dependence on the Absolute is thus implicitly thought, not sensation. But Marheineke did not define religion as the thought or thinking consciousness of God either, since this would be equally anthropological. Christian dogmatics, he held, requires a definition of religion that affirms God's actual existence, not merely the thought of God. The Schleiermacheran feeling of dependence on God must therefore be viewed as God's self-revelation to man, i.e., to human thought. Already in his first edition Marheineke placed the concept of revelation at the heart of Christian dogmatics. In the second edition he stressed that divine self-revelation implied the divine incarnation in man: God reveals Himself to man insofar as man, leaving behind the merely human standpoint of the abstract understanding, rises to divinity as the organ of God's revelation of Himself to Himself. Man's knowledge of God is the means of God's own self-knowledge. God is not revealed as a transcendent substance but as a substance that, being truly infinite, embraces human subjectivity and knowledge of God within itself. This knowledge of God entered history through Christ and his Church, through the descent of the Holy Spirit and the fellowship of believers. Speculative theology does not originate such knowledge, but rather articulates a knowledge already implicitly present in the Scripture, creeds, and life of the Church. Speculative theology for Marheineke is thus an exercise in Christian apologetics, not in the criticism of religion (Toews, 141ff). Philosophy's identity in content with Christian faith is highlighted more than its difference in form.

Hegel to Daub [519]

Berlin, August 15, 1826

I am finally able, my dear friend, to make a start today or tomorrow by sending off the manuscript for the second edition of my *Encyclopaedia*. I report this to you with a feeling of gratitude for your immense kindness in offering to correct the proofs. As greatly as I am obliged to you for this offer, I nonetheless

have a certain amount of bad conscience, given the nature of the manuscript, over having relied too much on such kindness. For the manuscript is surely of the sort that requires the services of an attentive typesetter, so that it will no doubt cause you more effort than I have any right to claim. I have, by the way, taken pains to designate changes, insertions, etc. very carefully and distinctly. Moreover, where you note obscurity, unintelligibility, and repetitions I grant you full liberty to correct, strike out, and come to my aid as you see fit. I must hope that through the interest of the content your mind may be somewhat entertained or compensated for your trouble. Only the amicable encouragement you have shown my endeavors allows me likewise to accept these kind further efforts on my behalf.

I have perhaps drawn out particularly the Introduction to excessive length. To condense would have cost me most of all time and effort. Preoccupied and distracted by my lectures and sometimes by other matters here in Berlin, I allowed myself to undertake the Introduction without an overview of it, so that the work got quite beyond me, the Introduction threatening to become a book. I have thus reworked it several times. The treatment of the standpoints distinguished within it should be of current interest. This Introduction, however, has become all the more difficult for me because it can only be placed *before*, not *within*, philosophy itself. The rest I have naturally tried to make more definite and, as much as possible, clearer. But the main deficiency has not been corrected, namely that the content no longer corresponds to the title *Encyclopaedia*, that the detail should be more restricted, and the whole by contrast more clearly surveyable. For my lectures on the individual branches, on the other hand, extensive detail is again appropriate.

But enough and indeed too much of this. Blum is no doubt already with you. He will thus be able to tell you more of our further life here in Berlin. Marheineke, who intends to be with you in a few weeks, will likewise be able to tell you of the literary enterprise in which you have expressed interest and already promised active participation. Even though it is not yet in operation, a definite start has been made. The first issue is to be finished before January. We are also hoping for the active collaboration of our friends [Friedrich] Creuzer and [Anton] Thibaut. Please remember me kindly to both. A main difficulty with our undertaking is the small number of important works that deserve to be treated. In May you wrote to me of a hypochondriacal demon. I define hypochondria as the affliction that consists in the inability to come out of oneself. I would know of many ways to come out of oneself, but the one I would advise is to reverse the position in which you place this demon relative to activity, not waiting on the demon's departure in order to allow this activity to occur, but rather driving away the demon precisely through activity. A most cordial farewell.

Hegel to Daub [531]

Berlin, December 19, 1826

Today I received the thirteenth printed sheet of the *Encyclopaedia*, and have really been meaning every day to thank you for the painstaking job you have undertaken. I only hope you will find some relief in the interest I am endeavoring to add to the new elaboration. It has cost me at least considerable pains. What I

might even call the miserliness of my effort to eliminate as little as possible has at least been paid for by the resulting greater toil of selecting expressions that would do the least injury to the words of the original. You will by now have a few pages of the philosophy of nature in hand. I have undertaken essential alterations in it, but here and there could not prevent myself from going into more detail again than is commensurate with the tone which ought to be maintained by the whole.

I presume the printer is leaving you the entire labor of proofreading instead of asking you merely to review the text, and thus has substantially and unduly increased your toil. I have enclosed a note on this to [the publisher] Mr. [August] Oswald, from whom I received a note yesterday conveying your kind greetings. I am presently occupied with the philosophy of spirit and, except for a final reading, am finished with more than half. The second half, however, will probably have to be reworked rather completely.

One of the many interruptions which has delayed this work is an article [*Werke* XX, 57-131] I had to finish for our critical journal on Mr. Wilhelm von Humboldt's treatise on the *Bhagavad-Gita*. I shall have to save a second article on the same theme for later. We look forward longingly to contributions to the journal from you as well. Earlier Marheineke gave me the pleasant report of your intention of writing a notice on the second edition of the *Encyclopaedia*. Nothing could please me more or be more greatly appreciated. Your current endeavor certainly facilitates writing such an article, and thus I feel myself all the more permitted to count on it. I hope for it as something on which we may rely. But now I have still a new, more extensive request to make of you, namely that you write a notice on the second edition of Marheineke's *Dogmatics*. I say nothing of the most intense interest this work has, and must hold for you in particular. Instead I wish mainly to note that except for you we would know of no one who could properly discuss the work. And it is indispensable that the work be discussed in a deserving fashion, not only in our periodical but generally; that its reception in the public press not be mere ill-treatment; and that this party [*Volk*] which will pounce on it not be alone to speak out. I thus hope for a favorable reply from you, and even more for a speedy article. The article need not go into detail and enter into particular doctrines, or rather may do so wholly at your pleasure. The main thing is discussion of the general point of view.

A letter from [Karl Immanuel] Nitzsch in Bonn, who together with [Gottfried Christian] Lücke and [Karl] Ullman has undertaken a [Schleiermacherian] critical journal of theology [*Theologische Studien und Kritiken*], will have invited Marheineke to take part—or to incorporate this entire institute into our own—"in order to give a *sign* of its general orientation toward recognition of all *truly new* theology." The main thing is to make clear that in his *Dogmatics*—and indeed already quite sufficiently in the first edition—Marheineke has given a *sign* of his orientation, and incidentally to show both how things stand with this "truly new" theology and the endorsement of it contained in Marheineke's *Dogmatics*. This is what I hope for from you.

We would likewise wish to receive a sign of life in the form of a critical review from our friend Creuzer. Besides conveying my warmest greetings, please

tell him I am charged to ask him or even commission him to undertake, if it should please him, a review of [Karl August] Böttiger's *Ideas on the Mythology of Art* [1826]. I also want to ask him to look at—if I have the name right—Zeisner's [i.e., Christian Gottlieb Eissner's] *The Ancient Pelagians and their Mysteries* [1825] to see if it deserves a notice from him. Even better would be to use this publication as an occasion to do an article on the subject, which is completely within his field of interest. If there is something else on which he would like to express himself, he may let me know to make sure it has not been assigned to someone else.

The periodical does not merely expect contributions from the two of you. What I wish even more is for both of you to give expression and currency to your good cause. With the warmest of farewells, my dear esteemed friend, I remain truly yours, Hegel.

P.S. On a slip of paper which I only now located again, I had written down passages in the manuscript or inserted text remarks which could easily occasion printing mistakes. If it is not too late, I want to indicate to you separately here what is most important, in case these passages still strike your attention during the proofreading. . . [for Hegel's corrections see *Briefe* III, 152].

I believe I have already once requested that you simply omit eventual repetitions—which I fear may occur especially in my treatment of the ontological proof of God's existence.

HEGEL'S RELATIONSHIP with Marheineke was social as well as academic [539].

Hegel to Unknown [539]

Thursday, April 5 [1827]

It has been agreed to meet this evening at 8:30 with wives at *Jagor's* Court Restaurant: besides [Philipp Karl] Buttmann, in the first instance Marheineke and myself. We shall not only wine and dine there, but also plan on raising weighty matters for discussion and deliberation.

Since I cannot express my request and proposal that you join us with your wife orally, I do so in writing in the hope of spending an enjoyable evening with you, which would be quite spoiled if you deprived us of your company.

I thus count on your acceptance. Hegel

ON HINDUISM

The review by Hegel cited in paragraph three of the December 19 letter [531] is of Wilhelm von Humboldt's *On the Episode of the Mahabharata Known as the Bhagavad-Gita* (1826). The review largely concerns Humboldt's exposition of the Hindu world-view, and of the difficulty of translating that world-view into a European idiom. Hegel believed the difficulty could be overcome through the system of categories in his *Logic*, which, because of its comprehensiveness, escapes cultural relativity. For example, the Brahmanism implicit in the *Bhagavad-Gita*, with its extinction of the individual personality through absorption

in the undifferentiated cosmic Substance, was expressed in the West in the Spinozism of the early Schelling [10]—itself an antecedent to Hegel's speculative theology. Substance is a category of thought-in-general, without restriction to a particular culture. Humboldt wrote Hegel on January 25, 1827, with praise of the review [532]. An 1825 letter to Karl Friedrich Zelter, the composer friend of Goethe, also evidences Hegel's interest in Hinduism.

Hegel to Zelter [491]

May 1, 1825

Yesterday, in the second issue from volume five of [Goethe's] *Art and Antiquity* [1825] which you kindly sent me, I read this passage: "a young woman is immured so that the fortress at Scutari can be built. This seems all the more cruel inasmuch as in the *Orient* we find only consecrated images, e.g. talismans, inserted in secret places in the foundations of fortified castles to secure the invincibility of such defensive and offensive structures" [Goethe XII, 330-31]. This passage reminded me of something relating to this which I saw a few days ago in the *Transactions of the Royal Asiatic Society*, London, 1824, vol 1, pt 1, pp. 65-91. I also found it again on page 78 in an essay by [Sir John] Malcolm on the Bhills, a scorned tribe from *India*. The passage reads [in English]:

Jagdéo [Yajnyadéva], One of the former Rájás of Dhár. . . he had four brothers, with which did he attempt to build a fort at Mándú: but all their efforts were unsuccessful; for as soon as a portion was built up, it fell to the ground. This had happened several times, when one night the goddess *Hallaka Dévi* appeared to Jagdéo in a dream and said, that unless one of the brothers would make a sacrifice of the head of his son and his son's wife, they would never accomplish their object. Jagdéo, on waking next morning, repeated the dream to his brothers, whom he assembled for the purpose of deciding what was to be done. One of them said: "Assuredly we have not that urgent occasion for a fort, that we should sacrifice the lives of one of our sons and his wife to obtain it." Jagdéo, after hearing this speech. . . said: "I will give the head of my son and his wife," and did so the same night. *Hallaka Dévi* told him that the fort should be completed before the next morning, which was done accordingly. After this extraordinary event only one of the brothers would remain with Jagdéo etc.

Here it is of course not a question of executing an immurement, but of human sacrifice. But in a few other respects there is also similarity: brothers, the goddess *Hallaka*.

I have copied the passage so that you could send it to Mr. von Goethe. I at once ask you to convey my deepest thanks for having sent the number on morphology [Goethe, *On Morphology*, vol 2, 1824, no 2]. I also want to add that Goethe might be even more interested in the last essay by Captain [James] Tod in the above-mentioned volume of *Transactions* than in the notes on the Bhills [Tod, *Translations of a Sanscrit Inscription, Relative to the Last Hindu King of Dehli, with Comments Thereon*, pp. 133-54]. This essay contains, among other striking things, a notice on a new form of Indian poetry. Quite different from what we have

known thus far, this form exhibits more of a Homeric suspense between gods and men than the otherwise typically fantastic Indian confusion, which by turns holds out promise in its formations of an immediate sprawl into the monstrous, only to return with equally sudden exhaustion to the commonplace.³

Good morning. I return the enclosures with my thanks. Hegel

THOLUCK AND PIETISM, CAROVÉ AND LEFT HEGELIANISM

Daub replied to Hegel's December 19 letter [531] on May 13, 1827, with praise of both the *Encyclopaedia* and Marheineke's *Dogmatics*:

. . . if universities are still to exist in the future, and if truly scientific instruction is at last to be given in them, your *Encyclopaedia* will be the work by which philosophy—without which it must necessarily go under—can be taught in a thorough manner. Seized by the new Introduction, I had expressed to our friend Marheineke the wish to write the notice on the second edition for the Berlin literary review. But now the whole stands before me with such greatness and power as to lead me to fear inability to accomplish my wish. But I have since experienced something that in another respect increases this fear still further. Right after receiving your dear letter of December 19 last year I began work on a notice [Yearbooks for Scientific Criticism, 1828, issues 1-2, columns 197-251] on Marheineke's *Dogmatics* for your literary review. . . .⁴ Taking my start from the way in which dogmatic theology has been treated up to now, I had to try to make the so-called "theologians" with their Christianity—historical and otherwise—understand the necessity of another theology, the fruit of which is given in Marheineke's works. [541]

Hegel replied on May 29 [543], encouraging Daub at least to review the *Encyclopaedia*'s Introduction. Hegel sent with his May 29 letter the new Preface to the *Encyclopaedia*, which discussed Friedrich August Gottreu Tholuck, a major representative of pietistic revivalism. A *Privatdozent* in Berlin since 1823, Tholuck was appointed theology professor in Halle in 1826. Schleiermacher wrote an address on religion; Tholuck, it has been said, wrote out of religion (Barth, Ch 16). Truth was to be felt and inwardly appropriated, not conceptually grasped in speculation. Hegel, replying in the Preface and last pages of the 1827 *Encyclopaedia*, countered that if human religious feeling is to rise above animal feeling it must have a theologically objectifiable thought content, and that Tholuck's neglect of speculative theology left the content of his own religious feeling unclear. The 1827 *Encyclopaedia* points out the ambiguity of the "pantheist" label which Tholuck attaches to philosophy: it may mean (a) that finite things as such are all divine, God being their aggregate, (b) that finite things are self-negated and annihilated within an undifferentiated divine substance beyond the worldly distinction of good and evil (acosmism, Brahmanism), or (c) that finite things are, though negated when viewed as absolute, preserved within God conceived as the self-differentiated

³Hegel's reference to "a new form of Indian poetry" acknowledges a counterexample to his own contrast between Indian and Homeric epic poetry in his lectures on aesthetics (*Werke* XIV, 368).

⁴Daub correctly surmised that his review of Marheineke would eventually become a book: Daub, *The Dogmatic Theology of the Present Time or Self-Seeking in the Science of Faith and of Its Articles*, 1833.

infinite Spirit (Hegel's speculative philosophy of spirit). In the 1827 Preface Hegel explicitly defends "philosophy"—i.e., Spinoza—against Tholuck's charge that it cannot differentiate good and evil. The Preface also defends the dogma of the Trinity, which according to Tholuck had been falsely read into practically motivated biblical texts by later theologians influenced by Aristotelianism and Neoplatonism (*Werke* VIII, 7-24). Hegel's disagreement with Tholuck on the Trinity had already been voiced a year before in a letter [514a below] to him.

Hegel's 1827 letter to Daub [543] refers not only to Tholuck but also to an 1827 review in the *Yearbooks* (columns 383-446) by Friedrich Wilhelm Carové of Johann Adam Möhler's *The Unity of the Church or the Principle of Catholicism Exposed in the Spirit of the Church Fathers of the First Three Centuries* (1825). Carové, a Catholic Hegelian, sought to make Catholicism truly "catholic" by identifying it with the movement for universal emancipation arising out of modern European history. Denied a teaching position and a chance to finish his studies because of previous association with the *Burschenschaften*, he lived by private means while continuing his polemical activity. His livelihood and sphere of activity not being—like Hegel's or Marheineke's—attached to a particular state, he advocated a chiliastic, nonapologetic interpretation of Hegelian theology as a negative critique of orthodox faith, as a revolutionary call for political realization of the Kingdom of God (Toews, 134ff). The gap between Marheineke and Carové was considerable. Yet Hegel's regard for the respectable Marheineke did not interfere with fatherly tolerance of Carové [see also 528].

The article by Marheineke (*Yearbooks for Scientific Criticism*, 1827, columns 473-503) to which Hegel also refers on May 29 is a collective review of Johann Friedrich Ferdinand Delbrück's *Philip Melancthon, The Catechist: A Polemical Writing* (1826) and *On Regard for Holy Scripture and Its Relation to the Rule of Faith in the Protestant and Early Church. Three Theological Letters to Professor Delbrück on his Polemical Writing, Phillip Melancthon, The Catechist. With a Supplementary Letter by Dr. Schleiermacher on the Passages of the Polemical Writing Concerning Him* (1827) by Karl Heinrich Sack, Karl Immanuel Nitzsch, and Gottfried Friedrich Lücke—all representatives of Schleiermacher's "new theology."

Hegel to Daub [543]

Berlin, May 29, 1827

In dispatching the Preface to the new edition of the *Encyclopaedia*, esteemed friend, I also reply to your kind letter of May 13. I at once saw from it that not until this date did you have the 27th sheet before you for proofreading. The delay in sending the new Preface has thus caused no delay in the printing. Because I caught sight of Tholuck's book on sin [*The Doctrine of Sin and the Redeemer*, 2nd ed, 1825] in the course of the composition, the Preface has gone on at greater length than intended. I thank you again for the kind trouble to which you have gone with the proofreading, a task made doubly and even triply difficult by the nature of the manuscript, and thus triply more valuable and appreciated as well. The main reason for the delay of the work was that the Introduction as it was first worked out

began to turn into a book, forcing me to rework the whole thing from the start. Passing on to something else, I see from your letter that the same thing has happened with your article on Marheineke's *Dogmatics*. You give us only the general promise of earmarking a preliminary extract from it for our critical *Yearbooks*. I ask you in every respect to send the extract soon—among other reasons because the *Yearbooks* are much in need of manuscripts. How did you like Carové's and Marheineke's articles on Catholicism and Catholicization? There is at once an even more timely need to discuss the enlightened and—as it calls itself—*new* theology [of Schleiermacher] which Marheineke has treated in his article, though from a somewhat too special angle. This theology almost seems to have the impression that it holds the floor all to itself. You will find in the last sheet and new Preface of the *Encyclopaedia* that even I have gotten around to such articles, and above all to Mr. Tholuck.

If you could still make up your mind to do a notice on my *Encyclopaedia*, it would interest and do honor to our *Yearbook* as well as myself. According to your amicable statements in your last letter, the Introduction had first moved you to do so, but the scope of the remainder restrained you from proceeding. I would not think that this should reverse your first intention of presenting your views on the topics of the Introduction. A notice in our *Yearbooks* is for itself already suited to being an article in its own right, an article which is occasioned by a publication more than it is a mere critique and notice on it. And an article by you would automatically become an eminent first introduction to its subject matter, in which the book's detail can be only briefly considered or even overlooked. There would be quite interesting and ample material in a discussion of the book's point of view, and perhaps of its characteristic [mode] of scientific treatment. And your interest in the subject, as even your friendship, would limit you to treating such material alone.

For a week now Mr. August W. Schlegel has been delivering lectures on the visual arts to a large mixed audience. To be sure he cannot go into much depth, but his clear and eloquent manner is surely very suited to his audience.

Farewell. With inalterable friendship and respect.

Hegel to Tholuck [514a]

Berlin, July 3, 1826

Professor [of linguistics Johann Gottlieb] Radolf, who is moving from here to Halle and whose blindness already arouses sympathy, asks me to give him any letters for acquaintances, and I take the liberty, my esteemed professor, of commending him to your sympathy as well. I do this all the more gladly since it gives me an occasion to repay a still older debt to you, and to thank you for your publication which you most graciously sent me on the *Speculative Doctrine of the Trinity in the Later Orient* [1826]. The disclosures which you have first communicated to the public in this work are of special interest for me as well. As you show in some detail, the influence of Greek, Jewish, and Neoplatonic philosophy is recognizable—for the Arabs do not seem to have brought forth any autonomous results and developments in any science. That I have touched upon a few points I

regard differently is only natural. For I, at least, cannot accept what you say on page 48 about the sober foundation of cautious experience on which Aristotle's philosophy is said to have stood. Aristotle is far more speculative than Plato. In Plato the Trinity comes most definitely to the fore in the *Timaeus*, although of course only in a very abstract manner. The *Philebus*, which you quote, indeed also contains something of it. The main determinations there are the *infinite* [*apeiron*] and the *finite* [*peras*]. No doubt the distinction between *nous* and *psyche* is not held fast [italicized terms in Greek]. The fact that *nous* embraces duality is not so easily put aside even in Plotinus. The main thing is the difficulty of apprehending the relationship of such a difference as lying in activity. Furthermore, should you wish to cite Chinese or Indian sources, no such individual passages will suffice. [Sinologist Jean-Pierre-]Abel Remusat's treatise admittedly was the first to fall into your hands. But much more important, more definite and older sources are available on the subject. Everything here needs more detailed development if something adequate is to come of it. I have found the transition on page 40 likewise very facile: "Much as *Christian* theologians under the influence of Platonic and Aristotelian philosophy derived a speculative theorem from indeterminate (?) expressions in the *New Testament* introduced only (?) with practical (?) reference. . . ." Does not the sublime Christian knowledge of God as Triune merit respect of a wholly different order than comes from ascribing it merely to such an externally historical course? In your entire publication I have not been able to feel or find any trace of a native understanding of this doctrine. I am a Lutheran, and through philosophy have been at once completely confirmed in Lutheranism. I do not allow myself to be put off such a basic doctrine by externally historical modes of explanation. There is a higher spirit in it than merely that of such human tradition. I detest seeing such things explained in the same manner as perhaps the descent and dissemination of silk culture, cherries, smallpox, and the like.

Yet it is time to break off. You will, by the way, pardon these remarks and attribute them to the interest your publication has aroused in me, and for which I thank you again most cordially. Here we have been delighted for you in learning that your career in Halle already shows evidence of prospering and bearing fruit right at the start.

I send my regards most humbly and respectfully, Professor Hegel.

GOETHE

The letters to which we now turn were all written after the *Yearbooks* began to appear. In the first, Hegel joins the Goethe scholar Karl August Varnhagen von Ense in inviting the collaboration of Goethe himself. So far as is known, Hegel's previous correspondence with Varnhagen is restricted to a note from a few months before [533 below], in which Hegel thanks him for having lent an essay on Goethe's *Faust* by the Dutch Hegelian Peter van Ghert. Varnhagen himself was on excellent terms with Hegel, but since he was not a follower he also felt freer to criticize:

The friction between us during the founding of the *Yearbooks* . . . was without sequel. I often had to oppose him, all the more forcefully because I was the only

one in the Society not inhibited by personal relations and deference. . . . Seeing that the *Yearbooks* were already set in motion, Hegel became ever more difficult and tyrannical, conducting himself in meetings so peculiarly that the whole Society felt it could not go on. . . . The role then once more fell to me of resisting in the name of all, and of making it clear to the distinguished man that even he had to respect bounds. (*Berichten* 489)

One issue dividing them was whether to invite Schleiermacher to join the Society. Hegel objected, according to Gans because Schleiermacher had prevented Hegel's membership in the philosophy section of the Prussian Academy of Sciences (*Ibid* 486). Though Schleiermacher never joined the Society, Hegel reportedly moderated his conduct, and Varnhagen proceeded to offer his good offices to Hegel and the Society.

Hegel to Varnhagen [533]

Berlin, January 1, 1827

I hereby return the essay [on Goethe's *Faust*] by Mr. van Ghert which you kindly passed on to me [see *Briefe* III, 365-66]. I at once hasten to ask in embarrassment forgiveness for the fact that the essay slipped completely out of my sight and mind, and that I thus did not return it long ago.

I remain with complete respect yours faithfully, Professor Hegel.

Hegel and Varnhagen to Goethe [535]

Berlin, March 6, 1827

Your Excellency may already have received enough information from published announcements about the purpose and orientation of the present Institute to easily spare us closer discussion and special justification of the matter. You may also have seen the new literary periodical which accordingly has already begun publication. It is edited by a scholarly association known as the Society for Scientific Criticism, which has been organized for the purpose. As the founders and first participants—aware right at the beginning of their worthy aim and important task in establishing this scientific association—endeavored to look about selectively to identify the most desirable sponsors and associates, they inevitably first thought of the name that shines as the first and most beautiful ornament of our literature, illuminating the broader spectrum of this literature with everlasting brilliance. As lively and keen as the desire to obtain for this new endeavor Your Excellency's favor and sympathy meanwhile might be, it seemed nonetheless called for by the circumstances—just as it was at once deeply rooted in our soul—that we should still delay our overtures in this regard, so as not to claim Your Excellency's adherence and participation on behalf of a merely anticipated venture still in planning. But now the enterprise—even if still young and imperfect—has been set before one's eyes vigorously and solidly in an advance inspiring confidence by [actual] deed. The spirit and tendency of the venture have been expressed more definitely in a series of published contributions. Our Society can therefore no longer hesitate in most respectfully submitting to Your Excellency its first and most ardent wish and desire for the favor of fulfillment. In this case the most enthusiastic unanimity has served to cast completely aside all the forms of deliberation and

decision making normally deemed necessary, and has likewise prescribed the unusual form of the present overture. The undersigned have been honorably mandated by the Society to invite most respectfully Your Excellency's participation. We know the considerations making it imperative that we not associate this invitation with any immediate claim on any particular activity. And we in advance willingly subordinate our most ardent wishes in the matter to such considerations. We would, however, consider it a high honor if Your Excellency would favor our endeavor with approval, granting our periodical the hope of enrichment by Your Excellency's hand as the occasion and circumstances arise, and thus permitting us to list Your Excellency's most revered name in the register of our members. This we ask so that we will not stand reproached before the Nation for having neglected to pay the highest of respects which under the circumstances are most uncontestedly due.

As we the undersigned thus most respectfully discharge our assigned mission, we cannot fail to enjoy keenly the rare privilege granted us of combining with an expression of our Society's homage to Your Excellency the expression of our own most reverentially affectionate personal sentiments. With these sentiments we have the honor of remaining Your Excellency's most respectfully devoted Hegel and K. A. Varnhagen von Ense.

GOETHE REPLIED ON March 15:

The letter which you have had the great kindness to write. . . has awakened in me significant memories. Just forty-three years ago Schiller invited me to collaborate on the *Horen*, and I must take great delight in the fact that during this long period the confidence of my compatriots, far from diminishing, is such that a Society formed of the most worthy men honors me with an invitation to new activity in it. I will be especially grateful if you wish to receive me among your number, and so designate me publicly. I say this with all the less hesitation seeing that these gentlemen, out of sympathy with my present condition, expect only occasional participation from me. So please allow me to observe the products of your labor for a time so I can learn in detail of your aims, intentions, and sentiments—with which I am in general already well acquainted—and so that, depending on the circumstances, I may be led to communicate something worthy from what most concerns me. [536]

According to Gans, Goethe was not truly persuaded to participate until a conversation at the poet's birthday celebration in late August 1827, when Gans countered Goethe's suspicion that Hegelianism was a panlogist closed system:

He voiced the opinion that if philosophy recognizes a duty to show regard for the matters and objects which it treats, it might exercise all the more influence were it to concern itself more with the empiricists as well. But, he continued, the question will always arise as to whether it is possible to be at once a great researcher and observer and an important generalizer and summarizer. . . . To be sure, he granted Hegel very extensive knowledge of nature as of history. But he could not fail to ask whether his philosophical thoughts would not have to be forever modified according to new discoveries which would always continue to

be made, and thus would not lose their categorical status. I replied that a philosophy in no way laid claim to thoughts typeset for all time, that it merely represented its age. . . . This modesty of philosophical consciousness seemed to please Goethe, and he thereafter came over to the *Yearbooks*. [Berichten 518]

K. E. SCHUBARTH

When Goethe wrote Hegel on May 9 [540] he asked Hegel to suggest a topic on which the Society would appreciate a contribution. Goethe ultimately took up Hegel's proposal of June 29, 1827 [546], that he expand on a theme from his own *Art and Antiquity* (1825). The poet chose to develop his thoughts on Serbian folk songs, a selection of which had been published in 1822 by Count C. von Stromberg. Goethe's review article appeared in the *Yearbooks* in 1830 (columns 451-80). But in the same May 9 letter Goethe also appealed for Hegel's intercession in seeking a Prussian faculty appointment for Karl Ernst Schubarth. Schubarth, who was finally named professor of history and literature in Kirschberg in 1830, had won Goethe's favor by supporting the Goethean theory of colors. Hegel approached Minister von Altenstein on Schubarth's behalf [545], and sought to be obliging in his reply to Goethe of June 29 [546]. This, however, did not prevent Schubarth from denouncing Hegel in his 1829 book *On Philosophy in General and Hegel's Encyclopaedia of Philosophical Sciences in Particular: A Contribution Toward a Judgment of the Latter*. Hegel's philosophy was denounced as politically dangerous to the Prussian state due to its constitutionalism, and as atheistic. Hegel defended himself in a review of Schubarth and other critics in the *Yearbooks* for 1829 (*Werke* XX, 314-93). Goethe sought to remain aloof from such polemical entanglements by pleading age, though he was not without sympathy for Schubarth's antiphilosophical appeal to common sense (*Briefe* III, 407-09).

Hegel to von Altenstein [545]

Berlin, June 18, 1827

Since I am occupied next Wednesday by a faculty meeting at the usual hour which Your Excellency has appointed for such matters, I take the liberty—in connection with my desire to have an audience with Your Excellency—to humbly present my dutiful request that a time be indicated when I may have the honor of talking to Your Excellency. Please be assured of the deepest respect and devotion with which I have the honor of being Your Excellency's devoted Professor Hegel.

Hegel to Goethe [546]

Berlin, June 29, 1827

I am now, Your Excellency, able to give the following [information]—which I readily admit is still general—in reply to Your Excellency's kind letter of May 9. I do so in view of my understanding of circumstances, and of my carefully considered discussion of both Dr. Schubarth's more specific wishes and the interest Your Excellency takes in them. In themselves this young man's intentions may raise no objections. But here as everywhere in this world—especially in matters of governmental appointments—there are steps and conditions bound up with such

intentions which are more or less fair but which cannot be entirely ignored. Even should the King decree special consideration for a young man's appointment, such an appointment is essentially subject to the condition that the recommended individual's competence be established according to regular procedures. The hopes which Dr. Schubarth professed earlier—and which are mentioned in his letter which I am hereby returning—were probably based on the error of counting too much on purely personal intercession. Dr. Schubarth now plans above all to do something I hear he has not done so far: to submit to the Minister a petition stating his intentions of devoting himself to teaching, plus a suitable application supported by proper testimonies, and, among other things, an indication of his published works. His doctorate—though earned abroad—along with these other accomplishments might well result in waiving the official state examination and substituting a less formal procedure, which will be found satisfactory. He should simply proceed on a basis of conviction and confidence, and should thus be prompted to undertake all the more willingly steps which are in any case necessary, without showing any aversion to them. Such steps will then be received with a goodwill helpful to his cause, and regard for the gracious interest Your Excellency takes in his welfare may then effectively facilitate the task ahead, further promoting attainment of his ultimate wishes.

This matter has provided a delightful occasion for receiving a written message from Your Excellency, with whom I am in any case engaged, as it were, in daily conversation—so diverse and uninterrupted are the points of contact. As to direct contacts, I must above all make amends by gratefully mentioning the gift of the medal, which has become a happy occasion for general celebration.⁵ Through it the Princely couple [of Weimar] has wished to demonstrate and perpetuate this noble bond of friendship, just as Your Excellency has wished to use it to signal remembrance of me.

An indisposition has delayed completion of this letter for a few weeks. In reply to Your Excellency's request to me—recently made upon kindly accepting the invitation of our Critical Society—that I indicate some matter on which the Society might be pleased to receive a communication, I would like to add briefly that we conceive such a contribution as depending entirely on the possibility of something arising on which Your Excellency might be moved to more extensive self-expression than is already contained in *Art and Antiquity* or in Your Excellency's natural science volumes. To mention something specific, however, we were thinking of the soon-to-appear—even if without Tieck's participation—collected works of [Jakob Michael Reinhold] Lenz [the *Sturm und Drang* poet], for whose time and literary quality probably nobody has as lively a sense as Your Excellency. These works will perhaps recall themselves incidentally in the course of the current business of editing Your Excellency's own works. However, should Your Excellency wish to delve once more into things optical, any recently published physics manual or the like would provide the occasion. I have my doubts, however, whether the subjective musings of [Johannes] Purkinje [Purkinje, *Observations*

⁵The medal celebrated the fiftieth anniversary of Goethe's arrival in Weimar.

and *Experiments in the Physiology of the Senses*, no 1, 1823, and no 2, 1825] would sufficiently stimulate Your Excellency to enter into the matter. But material for an appendix to the *Theory of Colors* is available to Your Excellency in abundance. We are not lacking in wishes for, indeed perhaps even in claims on, such an appendix. I might suggest the form of an article for our *Yearbooks*, which could then fit in as an appendix or part of an appendix when Your Excellency comes to the *Theory of Colors* in editing the collected works. I repeat, however, that I offer such suggestions only upon express request.

I shall take the liberty in a few weeks of sending Your Excellency the second edition of my *Encyclopaedia of Philosophical Sciences* with regard to an attempt undertaken in it to indicate an order and succession of stages for the so-called phenomenon of refraction all the way up to the fixation of color [*Werke* IX, 303-61]. I have done so by viewing refraction as the initial differentiation in the transparent [crystal], a differentiation which then might proceed to [the point of] darkening in brittleness, etc. [see Ch 25]. Mr. [Leopold] von Henning is lecturing again this summer on the *Theory of Colors* to a large number of students. On the occasion of his trip to Gotha last year I had asked him not only to present my compliments to Your Excellency but also to charge *Your Excellency* with telling him off for not yet completing for publication, as he had wanted and long ago promised to do, the outline he uses as the basis for his lectures. He seems neither to have dared *not* to carry out this order nor—despite Your Excellency's well-known indulgence—to have dared *to* carry it out, and has avoided doing either simply by not calling on Your Excellency at all during the trip! Next time he cannot be let off so easily.

I now add to my best wishes for your continued good health and cheer a request for Your Excellency's continued kind goodwill toward me, which is one of the truly pleasant sensations of my life. With my steadfast endless veneration I remain Your Excellency's most devoted Professor Hegel

VARNHAGEN ON LITERARY CRITICISM AND THE ATHEISMUSSTREIT

Varnhagen, much more decisively than Goethe, took Hegel's defense in the subsequent confrontation between Schubarth and Hegel (*Briefe* III, 409-10). Hegel's association with Varnhagen in connection with the *Yearbooks* brought him into social contact with his wife, Rahel Varnhagen, a converted Jew who reigned over a literary salon in Berlin in the 1820s [551]. Hegel became an admirer of Friederike Robert [694], wife of Rahel's brother Ernst Friedrich Robert.

As a literary critic Varnhagen honored Hegel in 1830 by dedicating to him his 1830 edition of the *Mémoires* of the Kantian philosopher-physician Johann Benjamin von Erhard. In his dedication Varnhagen praised the "indulgent" content-oriented criticism evident in Hegel's reviews of Solger and Hamann. The theoretical basis of such criticism—practiced only inconsistently because of Hegel's polemical entanglements—was laid in Hegel's 1807 memorandum on founding a literary review (Ch 5). The other publication by Varnhagen to which Hegel refers in the letter is *The Life of Count von Zinzendorf* (1830). Nikolaus Ludwig Zinzendorf had been a reformer of the Moravian Church.

Just days before Hegel's death, an exchange of letters on political topics between Hegel and Varnhagen gave further evidence that Hegel's associates tended to be more liberal and less statist than he [Ch 24]. On November 4, 1831, Varnhagen—then occupied with Goethe's diaries for review in the *Yearbooks*—sent Hegel [685] the following passage from Goethe on the famous *Atheismstreit* of 1798:

Fichte had dared to express himself in his *Philosophical Journal* in a manner seeming to contradict expressions traditionally in use for such mysteries. Objections were made to him. His defense did not improve matters because he presented it with passion, without realizing the extent to which we for our part were well-disposed toward him, or how favorably we were prepared to construe his thoughts and words. But we could not simply tell him this in plain words any more than we could indicate to him the manner in which it was most gently planned to extricate him. Speeches for and against, suppositions and affirmations, confirmations and decisions succeeded one another pell-mell at the Academy in a flood of uncertain words. There was talk of a ministerial admonition, of nothing less than a sort of censure, which Fichte must surely have expected. Having lost all self-control in the matter, however, he considered himself justified in sending the Ministry a virulent letter in which—anticipating the above measures as a foregone conclusion—he impetuously declared in a tone of defiance that he would never suffer anything like that to happen, that he would rather resign from the Academy, and that he would not be the only one to resign, since several important professors had also agreed to leave if he did. In the face of this, all the goodwill toward him was suddenly checked, even paralyzed; and the mildest measure remaining was simply to signal to him his release. It was only then—when it was no longer possible to change anything—that he learned of the response we were preparing to make to him. At that point he could only regret his heedless step, as we ourselves regretted it. [685]

In Varnhagen's view, this passage from Goethe's diary of 1803 (vol 32, pp. 153-54 in Goethe's edition of his works) reflected poorly on both Goethe and the Weimar government he represented. Varnhagen was particularly disturbed that the letter cited in the passage—which Fichte wrote to Christian Gottlob von Voigt, an associate of Goethe's in the Weimar administration—was not kept confidential. Varnhagen further surmised that Fichte's 1798 request to proceed from Jena to Rudolstadt was turned down for fear that students would follow Fichte there in an exodus from the university, but he invokes Schiller's authority to the effect that Fichte made no actual attempt to move to Rudolstadt (*Briefe* III, 470-72). Hegel, however, defended both Goethe and the Weimar government. Varnhagen suspected Weimar wished to "hush up" charges against Fichte made by the Saxon government, though he admitted [685] to Hegel that nothing in this sense was expressly contained in Goethe's account. Hegel [686] characterized Varnhagen's sympathy for Fichte's position as "demagogical."

Hegel to Rahel Varnhagen [551]

July 30, 1827

I regret very much, my dear Mrs. Privy Councillor, being prevented because of an earlier engagement from enjoying the pleasure of spending this evening in

your company as your note kindly invited me to do. I learn from the same note that you finally feel yourself rid of your long indisposition. Please accept for the present my sympathetic congratulations, though I at once reserve the right to convince myself shortly of your recovery in person.

I kindly request you to deliver the enclosed [?] to the Privy Councillor [Varnhagen], though I at once do so with regret that I am unable to address it to you. In the same spirit, I must also have his indulgence called upon with respect to my inability to reply in kind to the beautiful gifts for which I am indebted to him. Rather, I am merely able to reply with such examples of hypochondriacal abstruseness. Hoping in the days to come to recover somewhat from this hypochondria, I most respectfully remain your most devoted Professor Hegel

Hegel to Mme. Robert [694]

[Berlin, undated]

Best wishes and much happiness for the dear birthday child of April 29, who even on other days is born eternally young!

Along with wishing everything you yourself may wish and ask for, all good Swabians entertain every good wish for you. I thus place in your beautiful hand, along with my attached seals, my prior ratification of everything your hand may write or mouth of roses may speak.

As always, your fellow countryman and admirer, Hegel

Hegel to Varnhagen [636]

May 23, 1830

I was just about to take my pen in hand, my esteemed Privy Councillor, to give you my most obliged thanks for your recent gift when I received a second gift—with which you have wished to do me the honor of associating me more definitely by name. I wanted to postpone my thanks for the first gift until a thorough reading enabled me to go beyond the general interest a work of yours arouses in me even at a first quick reading—and likewise beyond my feeling for the friendly gesture of the gift—to characterize more closely both the singular impression it makes and the special instruction I saw I would gain from it. But now that the second gift has arrived, I can neither postpone letting you know how deeply I appreciate the value of this distinction, nor remark on the most obliging manner of its presentation—which so enhances it as to almost make me blush. Yet I reply with a dull head, for already last night I devoured the marvelous vista you have afforded us. I have read most of it, and am thoroughly moved by the most varied emotions. In Zinzendorf we have inner character decided from early youth almost without development, disillusionment, and struggle. He is individualized only as the unindividualized ready tool of his steadfast Supreme Being. In Erhard, on the other hand, you present us in all respects with a self-taught man truly worthy of astonishment. In this great wealth of material, enlivened with interest and spirit, there is a marvelous phenomenon of unfailing efficacy which, from the youthful force of his soul onward, faithfully preserved a trace of itself in him. You state it in the Preface so beautifully and trenchantly on page vii, with the deep feeling for

individuality so characteristic of you. But in order not to delay expression of the special feeling of gratitude with which your kind considerateness has filled me, I cannot allow myself to enter into the full range of suggestions, impressions, and considerations awakened in me. To them I already owe much delight and instruction, just as I find myself enriched with a similar return by each of your works. No less does each of these works increase the respect in which I hold you. I kindly ask you to accept an expression of this respect, and of my much obliged thanks. Hegel

Hegel to Varnhagen [686]

[draft]

[early November 1831]

If what Goethe indicated were interpreted as you suggest, the formation of a party at the University of Jena would appear to be the main issue. Such an interpretation of the motive behind the rebuke is doubtful, since Goethe designates it as a mere rumor in Jena. There is something demagogical in your interpretation. And there is no proof of any decision by—or threatening attitude of—the Weimar government directed against the Saxon Electorate's requisition [that the Weimar government take punitive action against Niethammer and Fichte, the editors of the *Philosophical Journal* accused of atheism]. Goethe's report is thus a personal judgment, not a fact, for there is nothing in it that appears to me to justify the charge of an attempted hush-up.

There is room for differences of opinion as to whether a letter by Fichte to a minister is to be regarded as confidential or official. The minister may regard it as confidential in very insignificant matters but as official in important matters. I note with our Minister that letters have always been taken as official.

It may be that Fichte did not seek to go to Rudolstadt, which he nonetheless viewed as a place of refuge as if persecution were threatening. But I remember that once [presumably in 1795] a withdrawal [*secessus*] on his part from Jena [to Osmannstedt near Rudolstadt, after conflicts over the customs of student associations], and also remember something about students flocking there, and about a spreading of plans—[unclear ending].

HEGEL, A. VON HUMBOLDT, AND NATURAL SCIENCE

In a letter to Niethammer [552] of August 9, 1827, Hegel asked his friend's judgment of the articles published thus far. Hegel himself—finding them frequently too specialized and thus insufficiently philosophical—repeats his longstanding commitment to philosophy conceived in the tradition of *culture générale*. If philosophy originally gave rise to the special sciences, by making their insights available to an interdisciplinary audience the sciences must now regenerate philosophy. Yet, as the last paragraph intimates, contemporary natural scientists—like even Goethe (*Berichten* 518)—suspected Hegel's true procedure was oblivious to the empirical sciences.

The meeting of natural scientists which Hegel mentions here was attended by 157 scientists and physicians on September 27, 1827, in Munich. In the following

year 466 natural scientists would meet in Berlin under the auspices of Alexander von Humboldt. The article which, according to Hegel, the naturalists found offensive is presumably an 1827 review in *Yearbooks* (columns 190-228) of the physiological psychologist Johannes Müller (*Briefe* III, 415-16). Both Müller and the reviewer, Johannes Purkinje, were experimental physiologists. Yet Müller had sought to emancipate physiology from the Schellingian philosophy of nature, while Purkinje enjoyed the favor of Goethe and cultivated the Goethean theory of colors. Alexander von Humboldt was widely identified in the public mind among Hegel's adversaries. In winter 1827-28 Humboldt, recently returned from worldwide travels, gave a popular lecture series in Berlin on physical geography. Though Hegel himself did not attend, his wife did. It was reported back to Hegel that Humboldt cautioned against a "metaphysics devoid of knowledge and experience," described as a "schematism more narrow than the Middle Ages ever imposed on mankind." Varnhagen conveyed Hegel's vehement protest back to Humboldt—who replied to Hegel through Varnhagen, pleading innocence of any "antiphilosophical tendency." Humboldt purported to document his innocence by sending his lecture notes, though the notes he sent were not from the lecture containing the alleged offending remarks. Hegel examined the notes, and returned them through Varnhagen with a November 24 letter [570 below] in which he professed satisfaction. (*Briefe* III, 415-16, 424-26)

Hegel to Niethammer [552]

Berlin, August 9, 1827

I cannot pass up the opportunity presented to me by Professor Gerhard's offer to take along a letter for you, my dear old and revered friend. It is not so much a matter of merely conveying a letter—the opportunity for doing so is always present—as of being invited to write, and thus at once of inviting you to reply. I have from time to time had pleasant news of you, the best of women, and the children. Acquaintances from here have likewise reached you with news that here we are all well. From the newspapers I presume you have just returned from the Franconian general synods.⁶ I am reminded in this connection that weighty topics coming up for discussion there have induced you to promise us as the occasion arises articles for our critical *Yearbooks*—and such a chance will surely now and again arise. We look forward to such an article with anticipation. How do you like the articles [appearing in the *Yearbooks*] on the whole? To me they have turned out almost too scholarly in relation to the view taken in our original plans. Yet we German scholars—fortunately we philosophers do not belong to the class of scholars—are not easily weaned away from erudition, thoroughness, and mere shop talk. I wanted to take up Hamann [in the *Yearbooks*], but am still waiting for the eighth part [of Hamann's works] and the necessary explanatory accompaniments. My best compliments to High Councillor of Finance [Karl] Roth, and my deepest thanks for the kind gift of his continuation [of the Hamann edition].

⁶Niethammer played a leading role in the Franconian General Synod of 1827, which rejected the rationalistic confession proposed by Hegel's one-time student Christian Kapp (*Briefe* III, 415).

That the arts and sciences are becoming quite active in Munich is no doubt for the most part viewed by us without jealousy and by me with pleasure. My expectations are not so high, for I still remember from before how matters proceed there.⁷ But all this will not, to be sure, remain without great ulterior effect upon the future. If you have a chance please give Mr. [Franz] von Baader my best regards—at present I have not yet got his philosophy of religion in hand, but shall start reading it soon [von Baader, *Lectures on Religious Philosophy*. . . , 1827, vol 1, reviewed by Marheineke in the *Yearbooks*, 1827, columns 1492-1504; see Ch 21]. What is [Johann] Lichtenthaler doing? You have received, or soon will receive, a copy of the second edition of my *Encyclopaedia*. It is said to have left Heidelberg on July 12.

This fall you will see a few Berlin natural scientists in Munich. We have caused them great vexation with an article in the *Yearbooks*. Marheineke likewise has caused the theologians widespread vexation, while I have done so thoroughly to all four faculties. They are annoyed by the beginning fermentation and the bulging growth of the leaven I have here and there introduced in their pedestrian understanding. Farewell. And a thousand, thousand greetings to the best of women [Mrs. Niethammer]. Remember me just as cordially to Julius [Niethammer's son]. Yours faithfully, Hegel

In about a week I will venture a trip to Paris and the Netherlands [Ch 24].

Hegel to Varnhagen [570]

Berlin, November 24, 1827

I am returning herewith, my dear Privy Councillor, the handwritten notes from Baron von Humboldt, which you had the kindness to send me with his gracious permission. I had reservations about making use of this kind offer, and my immense respect for Mr. von Humboldt made such verification superfluous. But I could not resist the temptation of looking into his notes, which in every respect could only be interesting and instructive for me, since I was unable to enjoy the advantage of personally attending his lectures. I inevitably took satisfaction in finding my views confirmed by those of a scholar who both embraces empirical knowledge in all its wealth and connects this wealth to universal ideas, though it is a satisfaction I had already experienced in oral interchange with him. I know only too well from my experience as a university lecturer that it is impossible in a public lecture to prevent misunderstandings, unfounded interpretations, and slander. In Mr. von Humboldt's wish that I and my sensibility perhaps not be affected by a misunderstanding regarding me taken from his lectures, as also in his open and even solicitous comportment in the matter, I recognize to his credit a very amiable considerateness, adding significantly to the high personal respect I already had for him.

Since I cannot leave Mr. von Humboldt's exemplary friendliness unanswered,

⁷ The renewal of "artistic and scientific life" in Munich alludes to Schelling's appointment as an "active Professor" [529] at the University of Munich in 1826. Niethammer was skeptical [529] as to whether Schelling would really come out of philosophical retirement.

may I request you, dear Privy Councillor, to be the kind interpreter of the above sentiments and feelings awakened in me by his attitude.

With assurance of my inalterable respect, your most devoted Professor Hegel

ANTI-CATHOLIC POLEMICS

In the face of rumors that Humboldt had chastised Hegel for *a priori* thinking, Hegel is careful to voice his own respect for "experience" [570]. His claim that his own experience as a professor had convinced him of the ease with which public lectures can occasion misinterpretation is likely an allusion to an incident during his lectures on the history of philosophy in 1825-26. But the incident shows him to be considerably less deferential to critics among the Catholic priesthood than to a distinguished naturalist like Humboldt. A priest had complained to the Ministry of Religious and Educational Affairs about allegedly offensive comments on transubstantiation by Hegel in his lectures. As a Protestant professor in a Protestant university and state, Hegel's views on Catholicism were unapologetically expressed.

Hegel to von Altenstein [*Berlin Schrift*, 572-74]

Berlin, April 3, 1826

The disclosure made confidentially to me by Privy Councillor Schulze at the instigation of the Minister, which concerns a report of remarks which I am said to have made in my lectures about the Catholic religion, leads me to the following comments. I had already publicly directed the essential contents of these comments to my students from the lecture podium upon being informed of the charge in question.

1. As Professor of Philosophy at a Royal Prussian university in Berlin, and as a Lutheran Christian, it is only to be expected that I should express myself in such terms on the teachings and spirit of Catholicism. That this should be found remarkable is novel. I would have to consider any other expectation as a personal offense, indeed as an offense perpetrated by the High Government itself, which not only tolerates the Evangelical Church but has long occupied the explicit superior position of Head of the Evangelical German states. To this government all Protestants ceaselessly direct their eyes, seeing in it their mainstay and firm point of attachment.

2. I have not sought the opportunity to speak out on the Catholic Church. On the contrary, in my lectures on the history of philosophy—as for example with both the philosophy of the Church Fathers on the Christian religion and the scholastic philosophy of the Catholic religion—I have had to speak of it, since the scholastic philosophy moves within the Catholic religion and has its basis in it.

3. In the interest of science, which I have exclusively in view in my lectures, I did not leave the matter at the level of generalities of either a mild or timid nature, or of a purely condemnatory, deprecatory nature. I have, on the contrary, had to interpret the Catholic doctrine at its very center—i.e., the Host, to speak of it, and to speak of it with scientific definiteness. I have therefore explained and expressed Luther's teaching as true, and as recognized by philosophy as true. Moreover, I

would believe it to be disrespectful in the present clarification if I were to try to have explicitly reserved to me the right—due to me as a Lutheran Christian—to declare the Catholic doctrine on the Host to be mere papistic idolatry and superstition.

4. Concerning what was indicated as to conclusions I have allegedly drawn from this Catholic teaching, I could invoke the right of oral delivery, the meaning of which, at least with regard to casual remarks, is often based on nuances even in the tone of voice, and therefore can be altered if not completely turned around through slight inconspicuous deviations, eliminations, or additions. In this context I certainly recall having spoken to some extent in a completely indefinite, hypothetical sense. However, as to the matter at hand, it can only be immaterial to me which conclusions the Catholic Church has attached to its teachings, or whether any have been attached at all. It could likewise only be immaterial to me from a historical point of view, where it is all too well known how various conclusions publicly stated at length—as for example papal and other clerical presumptions concerning the secular power of princes and authorities, concerning the religious freedom of Christians in general, concerning confessions which deviate from the Catholic Church and the like, in particular concerning science, etc.—have in turn also been, on the contrary, denied to be teachings and declarations of the Catholic Church. It is equally immaterial to me because in judging that a conclusion does not follow from one of the Church's premises, or rather that it does follow but ought not to be drawn, it is my own judgment, not the judgment of the Catholic Church, which counts.

5. Those who have quoted my lectures show themselves sensitive to conclusions I am said to have drawn. In my opinion, however, they are guilty of claiming the right of making personal inferences. I trust for the time being that I may be permitted to consider any reply by way of defense as superfluous, though I also find it beneath my dignity. On the other hand, in case of an official notice I would doubtless wish to take up action with the Royal Ministry against these people, or perhaps rather before the Royal Courts. The office of a professor, especially in philosophy, would be a most painful position were he to pay heed to, and go into, the instances of absurdity and malice which, as others as well as I have amply experienced, come to be circulated regarding his lectures. Thus I find among the comments with which I am charged much that I could simply reject and characterize as misunderstandings. A further portion I find I have to declare to be, more precisely, errors and misunderstandings born of feeble-mindedness. Still another portion I must declare to be no mere misunderstandings of this sort but rather falsehoods, and yet another portion to be not merely false conclusions drawn from false premises but rather cases of malicious disparagement.

6. Should suit be filed because of remarks I have made from the podium before Catholic students causing them annoyance, they would have to blame only themselves for attending philosophical lectures at a Protestant university under a professor who prides himself on having been baptized and raised a Lutheran, which he still is and shall remain. Or else they would have to blame their superiors for failing to warn them or—as has happened elsewhere to Catholic theology students—for failing to prohibit their attendance.

This, however, was not the only time Hegel felt misunderstood. A rather cryptic statement, widely attributed to Hegel in his late Berlin period (*Berichten* 758) was that even the one man who had best understood him misunderstood him. This man was Georg Andreas Gabler, who had been a student of Hegel's in Jena, and who would become his successor in Berlin and a leading representative of the Hegelian Right. Gabler was still a gymnasium rector in Beyreuth when he addressed a letter to Hegel on September 28, 1827 [568], along with a copy of his first book, *The Propaedeutic to Philosophy*, vol. I. (1827). The volume was largely a paraphrase of the first half of Hegel's *Phenomenology*; a projected second volume never appeared. Gabler explained the purpose of his book in his 1827 letter as follows:

It seemed to me, in opposition to those incapable of cutting themselves loose from external objects and representation that inquiry should at once be directed with particular emphasis to the truth of knowledge in and for itself. And so from the very start I have particularly highlighted this aspect. In doing so I have likewise made use of the external reflection that no matter what attitude we may take we can still never escape the fate of having objects be other than we know them to be, and thus that consciousness needs merely to satisfy itself for itself, and to tend to the inner truth of its knowledge. [568]

Gabler uses "knowledge" here in the sense of *relative knowledge* employed by Hegel in the Introduction to the *Phenomenology*: every attitude or form of consciousness purports to know the objective world, but tests itself in testing whether the world of objects is conformable to its "knowledge." Gabler writes to Hegel that the polemic in his book against those "incapable of detaching themselves from external objects and representation and of examining the truth of their own consciousness" targeted in particular the realists Krug, Fries, and Herbart. Hegel himself had already published attacks on Krug and Fries, but Gabler led the way in the Hegelian assault on Johann Friedrich Herbart.

Herbart had reacted against the whole German idealist movement as a student of Fichte's in Jena before the turn of the century. He, like Fries, wished to purge Kantianism of all tendencies that came to fruition in Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel. He reverted to an empiricist epistemology, while at once anticipating the Freudian idea of the unconscious. He also prepared the way for psychometrics and experimental physiological psychology. Herbart's disagreement with the German idealist tradition from Fichte to Hegel was centered on his rejection of the Fichtean belief in the metaphysical primacy and autonomy of the transcendental ego and its constitutive acts. Herbart interpreted the ego or self rather as a mere theater for the interaction of autonomous mental presentations (*Vorstellungen*). Hegel was criticized in particular for his apparent denial of the Aristotelian law of noncontradiction ontologically interpreted. In the second paragraph of his March 4 letter below, Hegel approved Gabler's reply to the charge (Gabler, *Propaedeutic to Philosophy*, pp. 175ff, 213ff). Hegel indeed affirmed a doctrine of objectively existing contradictions. But while holding that things and institutions are contradictory, he also insisted on their finitude. They lack "true being." They fail to exist according to their concept and are dialectically self-canceling.

In Hegel's last years Herbart posed a modest challenge to Hegel's predominance in German philosophy. The philosophical opposition between the two men, which was well known, provided the background to a note [668] from Hegel to the anti-Hegelian Hermann von Keyserlingk.

Gabler concluded his letter of September 28, 1827 [568], with the hope that his own book would be reviewed in the Berlin *Yearbooks*, and that a favorable review might help him obtain a university professorship, preferably in Prussia. He also accepted the invitation, conveyed through Gans, to contribute to the *Yearbooks*, but only after his own work had been reviewed. Hegel addressed Gabler's career concerns as well as philosophical topics in his March 1828 reply [576]. Hegel's suggestion here that a review of Gabler by Hinrichs would be subject to editorial control reflects Gabler's criticism of Hinrichs's prolixity: "Such verbosity and awkwardness, which are an offense to style and taste, cause me pain for science" [568]. Shortly after Hinrichs's review of Gabler was published Gabler himself made his debut in the *Yearbooks* [587a below] with a review (1828, vol 2, columns 785-872; 1829, vol 1, columns 81-116) of the third edition of Wilhelm Krug's *Fundamental Philosophy* (1827).

Though Hegel was not optimistic in March 1828 about a professorship for Gabler, he continued inquiries on Gabler's behalf. In September 1828 he recommended Gabler to Daub [609] for a position in Heidelberg. The two anonymously published anti-Hegelian works mentioned in the letter to Daub were ultimately ignored in the 1829 article Hegel devoted to criticisms of his philosophy in the *Yearbooks* (*Werke* XX, 393ff). Disillusionment with the quality of Hegel's critics helped dampen his polemical enthusiasm in the last years before his death.

Hegel to von Keyserlingk [668]

[draft]

[Shortly after January 28, 1831]

I know nothing of what, in your kind letter of the 28th, you report to me, dear sir, of an article by Professor Herbart appearing in the *Halle Literary Review* regarding, to use your expression, "my system." But when moreover you inform me that I have replied to such a review in the *Yearbooks for Scientific Criticism*, I know there is nothing to it. In consideration of this—and indeed even apart from such consideration—I do not know what to do with the kind enclosure [?] in your letter, and so must return it. I respectfully remain your most devoted Professor Hegel.

Hegel to Gabler [576]

Berlin, March 4, 1828

I should have been the first to thank you, my dear friend, for your [literary] gift to both me and the public, and moreover should have answered long ago your amicable letter, which I received along with the volume you kindly sent me. I must charge myself with great neglect. It is only because I can count on your patient indulgence that I am permitted to be so late with my thanks, and thus to speak of my negligence. You can thus judge the extent of my negligence, and I can only ask forgiveness and add that this is one of the first letters I have written in a long time.

However, as late as I am in expressing thanks, you will have been convinced by yourself that I have not lagged behind in my delight over your work, and in recognition of its merit. Assurance of the favorable reception the work has found with our Minister will already have reached you some time ago. In this regard I want to add right away—since you might well wish to learn more about it—that I cannot say anything more definite as to whether this favorable impression might soon lead to something more concrete. This, too, has played a part in delaying my reply. A chief factor is whether the money becomes available in a university budget, and whether an urgent external need to fill a teaching position in philosophy is present. In many respects we enjoy greater latitude because we do not have any permanent professorial chairs [*Nominalprofessuren*], but we fare here no differently from anywhere else in that most other needs—mainly material ones—are considered more urgent than the need for philosophy.

We have all agreed on the virtues of your work: it combines thoroughness of speculative insight with definiteness and clarity of development and exposition. I especially regard the digressions in which you treat Herbart's and, in this connection, Aristotle's philosophical results as models of exposition. It is greatly to be wished that you treat other issues on the agenda of the day in the same manner. Confusion of thoughts, shallowness, and even ignorance are equally glaring in much that talks big and struts about full of its importance. This cannot be counteracted by declamations, but only by expositions, such as yours, which follow precisely the author's statements. It is likewise necessary to attack this rubbish head-on, to upset its repose, and to challenge the ignorance by which it maintains its well-being over against more thorough science. Such expositions have their difficulties, but you possess the secret; and it will please me greatly for you to put it in action soon in our Berlin *Yearbooks*, which have still received little but declamations. The notice on your work in the *Yearbooks* [1828, vol 2, columns 132-60] has been assigned to [Hermann] Hinrichs in Halle, and is soon to arrive. We will, however, be able to subject it to some control.

The fact that I have given special consideration to Tholuck^a in the second edition of my *Encyclopaedia* is on the whole accidental, and has been conditioned only by the local stir he has caused, inasmuch as he, rather than someone else, has come my way as a representative of the twaddle about pantheism.

Your exposition of *show* [*Schein*] which you singled out in your letter [568]—where the remarks to paragraph 89 [of Gabler's *Propaedeutic*] are no doubt being alluded to—I have found excellent. It is one of the most difficult points. And even if one has good insight into the interconnection, what is hardest of all is still the exposition, in which you have succeeded perfectly.

Once again my urgent apologies for the long delay in replying. My wife, who has been much plagued this past winter by an indisposition but is well again along with my two boys, sends her best regards to you and your wife. I likewise commend myself to your continued friendship. Your most devoted Professor Hegel

^aHegel's explanation for his digression on Tholuck responds to Gabler's comment of September 28 [568] that Tholuck had not yet much caught on in Bayreuth.

I have the honor, my dear Privy Councillor, of forwarding a review by Gabler from Bayreuth which has been received.

In the meantime Mme. Mendelssohn has sent me the fifth volume of [the Duke of] Rovigo's *Memoires in Contribution to the Biography of the Emperor Napoleon* [French and German versions, 1828]. If I may ask you for the fourth volume, I will have both sent on without delay. [Varnhagen's review appeared in the *Yearbooks* in 1828, vol 2, columns 598-620.] Very respectfully yours, your most devoted Hegel

Hegel to Daub [609]

Berlin, September 27, 1829

I should long ago, dear friend, have answered your kind letter of last spring, in which you forwarded Professor [Jakob] Roux's publication [*The Colors*, 1829] and letter. My indebtedness in matters of correspondence, from which even in the case of good friends I never emerge, is one of the burdens I must endure.

The vacancy of the philosophy chair in Heidelberg, along with the inquiry of a friend as to whether he might not hope to be considered, provided a more precise invitation prompting me to write earlier. It is Rector Gabler in Bayreuth. He wondered if he had a chance of becoming the third rector for Bavaria appointed to that chair. He is probably already known to you from his *Propaedeutic to Philosophy* and reviews in our critical *Yearbooks*, so that in this respect I need add nothing to his recommendation. In him thorough philosophical insight, free of bluff and inner agitation, is rather associated with clarity and definiteness—characteristics which, though they are the vices of shallow philosophy, are invaluable given a deeper orientation. He is of very honest, simple, quiet, and amiable character in this regard. I did not want to stand in the way of his wish to inquire of you in the matter. I am convinced Heidelberg would be very satisfied with him, and may ask you for a brief reply for him in the matter.

Please thank Professor Roux for the forwarded publication. I have handed it over to the editorial staff of the *Yearbooks*; it has long been decided that it shall receive a notice [1829, columns 403-28, 838-70]. But you know from your own case how it fares with such assignments and good intentions! We have been looking forward to a contribution from you for a long time, especially after the hope you raised in us that you would try to set about such work after recovering from your physical indispositions. I hope the summer, which admittedly has not been very favorable, has nonetheless contributed to your complete recovery.

In the critical *Yearbooks* I have—unfortunately I must say—begun to take on opponents, a number of whom came out against my philosophy last year. If one limits oneself to perhaps the strict minimum, i.e., running through such a publication quickly, one gets away with [no more than] general annoyance. But a critique entails savoring all the details of ill will and the incapacity for thinking. Yet, as painful as it might be, critical work may not be entirely lost on the public. As much as the public might often allow its empty head to be puffed up with such writings

and, through silence, might find itself confirmed in its favorable impression, it just as lightly gives this impression up again and claims it never credited such writings with any worth at all once their nakedness is forcefully unmasked. Much in these writings is indeed all too base. *Letters against Hegel's Encyclopaedia* [1829], Vol I, is said to be by Schleiermacher. *Doubts concerning Being, Nothing, and Becoming* [i.e., *A Few Doubts Regarding Professor Hegel's Teaching*, 1829] was sent to me by the author himself, my colleague and friend [Theodor] Schmalz.

Has Gans not visited you? During my absence from Berlin—I took a short trip to Bohemia, and in Karlsbad lived five days of cordial friendship with Schelling just as in former times [Ch 14]—I was told Gans left without quite knowing for what destination. If, as I have no doubt, he has come to see you, he has been able to tell you how life is treating us here, and from him I in turn hope to hear much about life with you. Please convey my best regards to my old friends Thibaut and Creuzer. I remain with all respect and affection yours faithfully, Hegel

K. F. GÖSCHEL'S HEGELIAN PIETISM

Gabler was not the only future representative of the Hegelian Right to win the master's approval in the last years of Hegel's life. Another was Karl Friedrich Göschel. The first reference in the correspondence to Göschel is in a letter of May 1829 from Hegel to Ravenstein, who was commissioned in the Prussian army the same year. Hegel responds to Ravenstein's interest in his philosophy of religion by recommending Göschel's *Aphorisms on Ignorance and Absolute Knowledge* (1829). The book claimed to reconcile Christian piety with Hegel's own speculative philosophy. The standpoint of "ignorance" cited in the title is that of Jacobi and the theology of feeling (e.g., Fries, de Wette, Schleiermacher, Tholuck), while that of "absolute knowledge" is the Hegelian standpoint. Göschel seeks to show that the Jacobian theology of ignorant feeling is unchristian in its denial that God stands revealed. He also holds that theological rationalism, illustrated by Paulus, disagrees with traditional Christian faith. Such Kantian rationalism introduces a radical divorce between faith and reason, religion and philosophy. But examination of the Bible interpreted in the light of traditional Christian faith shows Hegel's speculative theology to agree with that faith. Speculative theology preserves faith in raising it to the level of knowledge. The important point for Göschel is that speculative philosophy, unlike rationalistic theology, is developed from the standpoint of reason rather than from that of the abstract understanding, and that from the standpoint of reason the individual surrenders the standpoint of the finite self, of the understanding, to identify with the infinite self, God. The understanding is the source of depravity, of individual opposition to the divine will, while reason is of the fount of grace. Speculative philosophy agrees that there is no salvation by merit of the individual human abstract understanding, that salvation occurs by faith or grace alone. It agrees because reason, the divine logos, is, unlike the understanding, no mere human faculty. By receiving reason one dies as a merely human self over against a not-self.

Göschel claimed to point out this factual agreement between Hegel and Christian

piety. Yet Hegel makes it clear in his review of Göschel's book in the Berlin *Yearbooks* (*Werke* XX, 276-313) that speculative philosophy, unlike medieval philosophy, does not proceed from the assumed truth of Christian faith. If the principle of speculative philosophy is nonetheless Christian, it is because such philosophy moves *toward* rather than *from* its principle (Ibid, 310). It achieves its position through the autonomous self-determination of reason (Ibid, 278). That this position agrees with Christianity, with biblical faith, is a historical observation made after autonomous self-determination of speculative reason. Hegelian philosophy—as Hinrichs [407] and Göschel (Ibid, 279) believed—may be a product of Christianity. But that does not necessarily mean that it is Christian in the sense of agreeing with Christian faith.

Where Göschel follows the Augustinian standpoint of faith seeking knowledge to the point of actually claiming to have found it in speculative philosophy [661], Hegel himself takes the standpoint of autonomous speculative philosophy, but a speculative philosophy that seeks and finally attains release in the heart, in feeling, in love, in reconciliation with its alien *Friesian* other. The system, not itself the Absolute, overcomes its final abstraction by overcoming itself, transposing itself into its opposite, uniting the concept with sense (*Werke* XX, 304, 307, 309). The Absolute is neither the system nor Friesian feeling devoid of thought, but is the cosmic community of feeling thinking itself. This is the profound union of "Christian piety" and "speculative thought" of which Hegel speaks to Ravenstein. To suppose that speculative thought is the Absolute is to construe it in a manner which for Hegel, in view of his encounter with Hölderlin, could only lack depth. Göschel, for all his admiration for Hegel, professed to discern what since Johann Erdmann has come to be called a "panlogist" tendency in Hegel, a ghostly absolutization of pure imageless thought. Hegel replied in his review by confessing the tendency; but he justified it pedagogically by noting his own historically situated task of raising a humanity all too tempted by imagination to the level of pure thought (Ibid, 302-03). Once science is firmly secured, however, it will no longer need to be so strict in holding itself aloof from representation. Once the transition from representation to the concept has been made, an enlivening transition from the concept back to representation is permissible. Freer reign can be given for representation to develop under the ascendancy of the concept.

Ravenstein, responding enthusiastically to Göschel's book and Hegel's review of it, entered into correspondence with Göschel himself. In Ravenstein's September 21 letter to Hegel he excerpted a communication received from Göschel:

Neither can I hide the fact that Professor Hegel's judgments on my *Aphorisms* in the Berlin *Yearbooks* have not only instructed but also moved me in my whole being. Alongside the most definite severity, he expresses there an indulgence that has done me much good. I view such recognition of these pages of mine written in the midst of professional distractions as repayment for the great respect and affection that I have borne in my heart for ten years for my teacher of philosophy without knowing him. How often have I defended him as best I could in oral conversations against particular misunderstandings. Thus far I have been unable to enter into any relation with this very honored master. Yet I now feel obliged in more than one respect to address him in writing and thank him. [608]

Ravenstein also regretted never having made Hegel's acquaintance. Just two years before, he had been a superficial opponent of Hegelianism, despite having assiduously studied Kant:

Yet I had meanwhile already long heard the inner call to knowledge of the truth. And so the hard struggle of faith with the natural understanding could finally only issue in that rebirth of spirit which alone makes satisfying knowledge possible. I have thus now come to understand with perfect clarity that Christ can only dwell in a completely broken heart. [608]

Among others whose attention was attracted by Göschel's *Aphorisms* and Hegel's 1829 review was Christian Hermann Weisse. Though he had never studied directly under Hegel, Weisse addressed Hegel in 1826 as a follower [504]. Three years later, however, he wrote as a member of the philosophy faculty at the University of Leipzig, and as the author of a treatise in which he took critical distance from Hegel: *On the Present Standpoint of the Philosophical Discipline with Particular Respect to Hegel's System* (1829). In a letter of July 11, 1829, to Hegel [603] Weisse objected to Hegel's claim in his review of Göschel that all the objections recently directed against his philosophy resulted from "the vanity of subjective opinions and brainstorm, a vanity which is *either* incapable of abandoning (*entäussern*) itself to the rigorously scientific concept and its dialectical course, following it as if bound hand and foot, *or* is perversely unwilling to do so." Weisse agreed with the claim in the case of all anti-Hegelian writings except his own work and, possibly, Immanuel Hermann Fichte's *Contributions to the Characterization of Recent Philosophy and to the Mediation of Its Contradictions* (1829). Weisse assured Hegel that his deviations in the "concrete branches of science" were motivated solely by a desire to follow Hegel's own method where, it seemed, Hegel had failed to do so consistently:

At two points of your system I believed such a relaxation of your customary scientific rigor was to be observed in your presentation: at the transition from the absolute logical Idea to the concepts of space and time and to Nature; and at the end of the whole, where you do not elevate [*aufheben*] philosophy, like everything which has gone before, to something higher but rather make it return to the absolute beginning. The dialectical transition from a concept to its negation—not to the first negation but rather the negation of itself—is at the same time a positing, or rather more precisely a deepening into itself, of the concept in transition, and thus an inner enrichment of the concept. It seems to me that on these two points you have not sufficiently taken into consideration this fundamental principle of your entire philosophy. If Nature emerges from a self-alienation of the logical Idea, it seemed to me in consequence of this principle that it ought to have been, just as much, a deepening, and enrichment of this Idea. In the same way, I believed that in the realm of Spirit such a self-alienation was likewise demanded for the concept of philosophy or science, an alienation whose consequence would have been the elevation of this concept to another higher concept. Such an alienation I believed I perceived in beauty and art, which in this form would have related to speculative truth as Nature to the logical Idea. But as for the question of the unity into which everything is reabsorbed, as for you everything is reabsorbed into speculative knowledge, I have not been able to reply

except by the concept of a divinity which, being the self-conscious unity of the absolute Idea, is at the same time an endless progress in the deepening, enrichment, and perfection of itself. For this demand for a growth by dialectical negativity always and ever recurs to me. It has seemed to me that it could in no way be put aside by the supposition of a closed circle in which what is most elevated returns to its beginning *without* growing by this fact and thus—like the Idea in Nature according to you—actually falls away from itself. No matter how I consider it, to me the demand is [for] such a progress toward the infinite as, I feel obliged to infer, must really exist in the divinity.

You yourself, honored teacher, intimated orally to me one day that you were entirely convinced of the necessity of new progress and new forms of the universal Spirit even beyond the form of science achieved by you, without, however, being able to give me any more precise account of these forms. I consider this conviction—which certainly all minds not completely dulled by indolence share with you—to be the form in which this philosophical truth of the necessity of an unlimited dialectical progress, of the growth and deepening of all that exists, manifests itself to a healthy, immediately intuitive and representational consciousness. With you, however, this conviction finds itself in flat contradiction with your systematic teachings, which, far from demanding such a progress of the world Spirit, on the contrary definitely exclude it. If the science of pure thought is truly the unconditionally highest of all conceivable forms of spiritual activity, then the creation brought forth by such thought is the final goal of every development not only of the human but also of the divine spirit. And there remain only two alternatives for this spirit: either it falls away from itself—as has already occurred, according to you, in consequence of the creation of nature—or it repeats *without* end the same thing in an eternal monotonous cycle, a conception which I am firmly convinced is repugnant to you as to me. It is just this incessant return into the abstractly logical concept and the violence with which, in this concept *as such*, the entire positive and concrete essence and magnificence of Spirit must be rediscovered—it is just this return which has engendered the *phantasmagoric* feeling with which Göschel has been seized in the sphere of logic. Certainly this feeling will disappear as soon as one resolves to consider the logical solely as the absolute beginning, an eternal formal determination of the world and of divinity, but not at the same time as the absolute content of both. But to return to this demand for an unbounded progress of the world spirit in general and of the historical spirit of man in particular, I do not profess a desire to designate directly by my scientific endeavors a genuine progress beyond your system. One might say that such progress could no longer occur within science in general but only in other domains of spiritual activity, since the absolute logical formation you have discovered for science is its real fulfillment, the highest work of all scientific activity. I endeavor to do only this: in expressing without reserve my subordinate position in relation to your obvious merit, I seek to interpret your system so that it does not at once exclude the possibility of such progress. . . . [603]

Hegel himself never realized his wish to review Weisse's book, though Gabler made up for this omission in an 1832 review in the *Yearbooks* (columns 389ff). Karl Daub wrote to Hegel on April 15, 1829, that he had found in Weisse "an adversary worthy of you." "His book. . .," Daub continued, "has much occu-

pied me; the great misunderstanding which it contains—namely that at the end philosophy returns to logic as such—will not be entirely dispelled until. . . you publish the worked-out *System of Natural Philosophy*" [596]. The charge of panlogism implicit in this misunderstanding was indeed refuted by Hegel's philosophy of nature insofar as—in accordance with Hegel's 1816 admission to von Raumer [278]—the philosophy of nature remained open to endless increments in concreteness through incorporation of the ongoing positive sciences. On the other hand, the system still remained in a sense circular, both beginning and ending with logic. But the reason the system returns at the end to the beginning is not because it is a closed system. It is rather because the philosophy of spirit concludes with the philosophy of absolute spirit, which in turn concludes with a history of philosophy eventuating in Hegel's *Logic*—i.e., in the logic now concretely grasped in its natural, institutional, and cultural context.

Daub's April 15 statement clearly repudiates the common panlogist interpretation of Hegelianism as the absolutization of a closed system of categories. It represents endorsement by a committed Hegelian of Weisse's own belief in further progress of the world spirit. But although Weisse correctly saw that Hegelianism is not incompatible with recognition of future forms of the world spirit, Hegel's methodological bias in favor of justification rather than criticism of the present encouraged a search more for agreement than for discord between reason and what exists. Hegel's systematic, nonpolemical work in philosophy essentially sought to understand the present as a rational dialectical triumph over the lived—and methodologically relived—contradictions of the past. A complementary attempt to uncover and understand present contradictions in light of projected future resolutions awaited Marx. Yet without this second endeavor Hegelian philosophy risks ideological deformation into a mere rationalization of existing institutions. Thus Hegel himself greatly appreciated Göschel's discovery of *agreement* between Hegelian speculative reason and the existing Christian faith [659] but, as we shall see, apparently remained silent in the face of Feuerbach's proclamation of *discord* between reason and existing Christianity [592]. Hegel was likewise more inclined by his quest for a dialectical reconstruction of the present to perceive the reason rather than contradictions in the existing family (Ch 9), or in the state—which helps explain the reputation for political servility to which he admits [659 below].

Göschel wrote his long-planned letter to Hegel on October 14 [617]. Thanking Hegel for the kind review of his book, he noted that it was not as well received by a reviewer for the *Halle Literary Review* who, being a superficial theological rationalist, assumed that Göschel was a representative of newly resurgent theological orthodoxy [617]. The reviewer dismissed Göschel as a man of "external" faith, eliciting Göschel's reply to Hegel that his *Aphorisms* were as much directed against "the ignorance of faith endowed with content" (orthodoxy) as against "the ignorance of empty faith" (Jacobi). But Göschel professed to be less concerned by criticisms coming from a superficial rationalism than by the failure in Berlin of "actually substantial faith"—which Göschel characterizes as the "living faith of pietism" (Schleiermacher) in contrast to pure orthodoxy—to understand philosophy (Hegel). Göschel confessed being attracted by this pietistic living faith, though

even it was threatened by a Jacobian loss of substantial content, and by an emphasis on divine transcendence to the point that "obedience to Scripture and the Church" is lost. Göschel closed his letter with announcement of a book he was writing in order to do for Hegel's philosophy of law what he had done in his *Aphorisms* for Hegel's theology, i.e., to convey it in "living images," effecting an enlivening transition from the concept back to representation (Göschel, *Scientific and Historical Material from the Teaching and Praxis of Science*, 1832; *On the Philosophy and Theology of Law and Legal History*, 1835).

It was over a year before Hegel replied, on December 13, 1830, sending a copy of the third edition of the *Encyclopaedia*. In the new Preface he replied to his orthodox and rationalist critics. His objection to rationalism was that it has dissolved the specific content of Christian faith, while he criticized orthodoxy for reducing this content to the letter, neglecting the spiritual meaning. The "Halle affair" of 1830 to which Hegel refers opposed the jurist Ernst Ludwig Gerlach—writing at first anonymously in Ernst Wilhelm Hengstenberg's orthodox *Evangelical Church Paper*—to Julius August Ludwig Wegscheider and Heinrich Friedrich Wilhelm Gesenius, both rationalist theologians at the University of Halle. Gerlach accused them of doctrinal infidelity. They replied by filing suit. A move to remove Wegscheider and Gesenius from their teaching posts on the charge of infidelity finally failed when the King declared the complaints against the rationalists insufficiently grounded, although he did remind members of the theological faculties that they were employed to train teachers of the Evangelical Church. In the public debate surrounding the affair, the rationalists invoked freedom of thought and conscience against orthodox defenders of the "dogma and form of the Church." Hegel, who had by now established a record of "defending the rights of governments and the state," at least empathizes with the orthodox party, which had been accused of "servility" much as Hegel himself had been so accused by "liberals" in reaction to the Preface of his *Philosophy of Law*. Indeed, one of these "liberals" had been the rationalist theologian Paulus.

Hegel to Ravenstein [598]

Berlin, May 10, 1829

I really must ask you to forgive me for not having answered earlier your kind letter of April 5. What I might say regarding this delay—namely that it is my general habit in matters of correspondence—would only serve more to magnify my guilt than to provide an excuse.

It could only please me greatly to learn from your letter that what I have attempted in philosophy has met with assent from you. However much someone who has been long occupied by himself with his thinking may have found satisfaction for himself in its course, to encounter assent in the minds of others is just as delightful a confirmation and support. My appreciation of the sympathy you show is inevitably all the greater inasmuch as a deeper interest in the great spiritual concerns of our age—as well as earnestness in their thoughtful study—is typically restricted to the few. But such sympathy also provides abundant compensation for the insults [aimed at Hegel] you mention. Against such insults the only remedy is

to be hardened. And one becomes all the more easily hardened as it is soon evident that those who permit themselves such insults do not even once meet the fair expectation of having knowledge of what they defame.

Concerning your inquiry about an earlier work of mine—*On the Difference between the Fichtean and Schellingian Philosophies* [1801]—I know it has long been out of commercial circulation. Even I do not have a copy, and am no longer able to procure one.

I do not know how to satisfy your wish to obtain a copy of a notebook of my lectures on the science of religion. You will more easily obtain this through connections with students among whom such notebooks are circulating, though they do so without my knowledge and—according to the few I have had occasion to see—not exactly always to my satisfaction. In this connection, I draw your attention to a work issued a few months ago here by [the publisher] E. Franklin: *Aphorisms on Ignorance and Absolute Knowledge: A Contribution to the Understanding of the Philosophy of Our Time* [1829] by C. Fr. G. . . I. From what I understand the author is Göschel, Councillor at the High District Court in Naumburg. The author deals predominantly with my accounts of Christian ideas, and with the justification of these accounts against objections from every quarter. He displays an excellent union of deep Christian piety and the most thorough speculative thought.

Please give my best regards to Dr. Hügel [a student of Hegel's], whose amicable greetings you mention. In assuring you again of the interest which your support of my philosophical works has awakened in me, I at once ask you to accept an expression of my deepest respect. Your most devoted Professor Hegel

Hegel to Göschel [659]

Berlin, December 13, 1830

It has already been some time, over a year, since I received your friendly letter, letting me know how kindly you regarded the liberty I wished to take of personally paying my respects to you. The letter's amiable contents and words of such importance for our contemporary relation to speculative knowledge compensated me for the failure of that attempt. I very much have to ask you to forgive me for the undue delay of my thanks and to excuse me greatly. Naturally I have often had occasion to ask myself what you must think of such neglect. For I—full of inner respect for you—am ever so anxious to keep you kindly disposed to me. I must not entirely neglect to indicate the extenuating circumstances. As the chief such circumstance I must cite an idiosyncrasy that prohibits me, not being a businessman, to dispense with the reply to a treasured letter such as your own as if it were a business matter. Rather, I view such a reply as company with the man to whom I must write, as the kind of conversation for which I wish and even need to await rest and composure, of which I am incapable so long as my soul is crowded with external distraction. But I have found myself in just such a situation [of distraction] over the past year, and no sooner did I want to use the first occasion of leisure that presented itself for such a conversation than, from the first moment on, I was afflicted with a cold fever which I have been fighting off for three months. A

more immediate reason for the initial delay was my desire to receive a number of anonymous writings of which I was given to understand you are the author. But my long wait for these was in vain. Since this delay had already occurred, I also hoped to be able to send you in the spring a new edition of my *Encyclopaedia*, whose preparation claimed all my spare hours, and which to my vexation has only now appeared. I take the liberty of enclosing a copy, and of commending it to your kind indulgence. In particular expressions I have tried greatly to improve much. In the Preface to this edition I have not been able to refrain from touching on a topic on which in part you had expressed yourself in your writing. No doubt the Halle affair had stirred you up as well. It had also claimed the attention of the public, the Ministry, and even higher levels, including the courts. But you have seen what feeble comfort has come from this agitation. You perhaps had also entertained the hope that the parties would reciprocally oblige one another to come to the heart of the matter, and to go into a development of content, whereby your *Aphorisms* would have automatically come to the center of discussion—your *Aphorisms* have come to be known and read in higher circles here as well, but here, too, their effect tends only to reduce people to silence. Still, these *Aphorisms* have in all likelihood powerfully contributed to a possible lessening of apprehensiveness over philosophy, and hence perhaps over philosophers as well. Thus the desired convenience of being able to leave philosophy quietly aside likewise now finds indulgence. I entirely agree with what you say in your letter as to the impossibility of reiterating too often recognition from philosophy's side of the content of living, actual faith. It is therefore to be regretted from this side as well that so little content has been brought forth from that noisy affair, and that the attacks had such a subjective, personal bearing. The other side has tried to shield itself in its own way behind [the cause of] formal liberty, and has taken good care not to betray its nakedness. The assertion of this so-called liberty enjoys for itself immense popularity. It is so defiant in the face of attack in part because it is at once ready to give anyone who defends the dogma and form of the church the hateful appearance of attacking the employment and livelihood of individuals. A similar circumstance occurs when political theorists and orators as shallow as the rationalists in religion accuse those who defend the rights of magistrates and the state of servility, and of seeking to bring such theorists and orators under the suspicion of governments and bring the vengeance of these governments upon them. But at present the immense interest in politics has drowned all others. It is a crisis in which everything that formerly was valid appears to be made problematic [Ch 24 on July Revolution]. As little as philosophy is able to oppose ignorance, violence, and the evil passions of this loud uproar, I scarcely believe that it could penetrate those circles that have settled in so comfortably. For the sake of reassurance as well, philosophy may come to realize that it is destined for only a few. Since I have become used to seeking the satisfaction of my own mind in the pursuit of philosophy, it is both most delightful and refreshing to me when something of it calls forth a sympathetic response in others, and when I encounter them along the same paths. How precious meeting you would be I tell you with deeply felt gratitude and profound respect. I commend myself out of such respect to continued favor in your eyes. Your devoted Professor Hegel

GÖSCHEL, in his December 31 reply, chided Hegel for acquiescing in philosophy's withdrawal from the world in the above letter, written in the context of the July Revolution in France:

I might be tempted to challenge you with regard to, for example, the isolated situation to which you *seem* to wish, with *Cicero*, to assign philosophy. For it will not be easy for you to escape misunderstandings here, as if you viewed philosophy as Epicurean deity unconcerned with anything, or as a fastidious withdrawal "into the tranquil and holy retreats of the heart." Yet elsewhere you have very decidedly and explicitly repudiated both tendencies. It is true that from the outside philosophy is often condemned to such a situation. But it cannot use this as an excuse to cease or let up its protests against such a sentence. In placing demands on other individuals, philosophy honors them as beings capable of reason and of rational development. . . . [661]

This criticism is directed against the Preface to the third edition of the *Encyclopaedia* as well as against Hegel's letter of December 13. Further criticism in Göschel's letter is also directed against both Preface and letter:

In my opinion, an indictment containing invective against personality is not exonerated by the fact that it knows itself to be free of personal interests. But neither does it become personal merely because it honestly names persons, nor because it hunts down the general object of one's censure in all the varied, degenerate forms this object has assumed in the case of particular persons. It is far livelier, for example, not merely to attack rationalism in general, in the abstract, but also to attack the rationalism of specific professors. Personality then becomes an issue only if contingencies are mixed in that have nothing to do with their teaching. I would here venture even to conclude that all these controversies that seem to lead nowhere wound the personality of those being attacked less by personalities than by impersonality. An attack is impersonal when it is merely directed *against* a person without entering into that person and his needs. Every indictment, like every punishment, must not only be directed *against* a person but must also be pressed *for* him, insofar as he is viewed as *worthy* of the indictment. . . . [661]

Göschel here recalls in legalistic terminology Hegel's own conviction that authentic refutation must be internal and thus nonpolemical (Ch 5). Reflecting on the debate between rationalism and orthodoxy Göschel notes that, insofar as the rationalists themselves invoke "reason," an opening is provided by which they may be led to speculative theology through deeper self-understanding: "We should in truth all polemicize like Paul against the Athenians, finding some point of contact to which we can attach ourselves." In the case of the orthodox theologians, the speculative theologian finds common ground in the concept of supernatural revelation, although orthodox theology construes its supernaturalism abstractly and refuses to acknowledge that the infinite Incarnation of the supernatural in nature transfigures nature itself into something supernatural, i.e., into Spirit. Yet—noting that the whole idea of a university rests on the assumed insufficiency of written instruction—Göschel regrets never having had the occasion to discuss such matters with Hegel orally. Though he wrote another letter to Hegel in February 1831 [679], Hegel apparently never wrote a second letter to Göschel before his death in November.

Göschel subsequently won the reputation of being a leading spokesman of the Hegelian Right. The reputation would in part be due to his 1835 writing *On the Proofs of Immortality of the Human Soul in Light of Speculative Philosophy*, which defended the personal immortality of the individual. Such a belief was not shared by Hegel (e.g. *Berichten* 362), and was not yet apparent in Göschel's 1829 *Aphorisms*. Immanuel Hermann Fichte, the philosopher son of the famous Fichte, wrote to Hegel on October 12, 1829, expressing—despite his general satisfaction with the *Aphorisms*—the reservation that individual immortality seemed to remain unsecured:

I have read your judgment of Göschel's *Aphorisms* in the scientific *Yearbooks*, and it has caused me much delight. For I believe I see from my reading of it that at least in general you might not be unfavorable toward my attempt, as well, to reconcile religion and philosophy. . . . Admittedly I acknowledge that even now I still fail to see how, consistent with your system as it has *thus far become clear to me*, it is possible to conceive a *truly substantial eternity and everlastingness for the creature, i.e., eternal individualities*. But I view this as the essential point in the accommodation between religion and philosophy. [616]

We have no response by Hegel to Fichte's request for clarification. Göschel's 1835 response was no longer authentically Hegelian. Göschel—not untypical of the Hegelian Right—found himself in deeper waters with Hegel than anticipated, and sought valiantly but vainly to return Hegelianism to safer, more familiar ground.

However, the classical division of the Hegelian school into Right, Left, and Middle had not yet congealed in 1830. It is curious that Göschel, despite his future association with the Right, in 1830 found himself to Hegel's left [661] in criticizing Hegel's response to the July Revolution in the Preface to the third edition of the *Encyclopaedia*. Within Hegel's lifetime, the Hegelian Right was politically if not theologically pioneered by Hegel himself, only to be repudiated by followers such as von Thaden [394], Göschel, Gans (Ch 24), and Michelet (*Berichten* 638), who had attached themselves to him in his earlier, more liberal period.

FEUERBACH

Another student of Hegel's who, like the younger Fichte, interpreted him as denying personal immortality was Ludwig Feuerbach, who attended Hegel's lectures for two years before receiving his doctorate from Erlangen in 1828. In the following letter to Hegel [592], which accompanied a copy of his dissertation entitled *On Reason*, Feuerbach explicitly construes the Hegelian philosophy as excluding individual immortality. But where I. H. Fichte is apprehensive of such an interpretation, Feuerbach enthusiastically celebrates it. Feuerbach takes the doctrine of personal immortality to be an expression of selfishness. When he published his *Thoughts on Death and Immortality* in 1830, he lost any prospect of advancement in the academic world and soon gave up his post as a *Privatdozent* in Erlangen.

Feuerbach boldly informs Hegel below that the Hegelian speculative philosophy is post-Christian. He does so, however, on non-Hegelian grounds, since he understands Christianity to be the sensuous actualization of the Hellenistic philosophy of

personal immortality. For Hegel a philosophy is the self-conceptualization of an established religion; for Feuerbach a religion is the self-realization of an established philosophy. For Hegel, Christianity's self-conceptualization strips it of the Hellenistic accretion of personal immortality, while for Feuerbach Hegel's denial of personal immortality marks Hegelianism as post-Christian and thus revolutionary in its call for the world-historical foundation of a new religion. When we recall both Hegel's apprehensive counsel to Hinrichs in 1821 to avoid all association with "atheism" [389] and his article in the *Yearbooks* of 1829 defending himself against charges of "pantheism," it is perhaps understandable why no reply to Feuerbach's letter has been found.

In the opening lines of this 1828 letter—dated November 22—Feuerbach himself appears to relate to Hegel much as, in his later theory of religious alienation, the theist relates to his God: Feuerbach professes inability to accomplish anything on his own except insofar as the spirit of the Master moves through him. The extreme deference, however, is deceptive. Feuerbach really demonstrates his emancipation from such external authority, since a main point of the letter is to deny that speculative philosophy—which even according to Hegel leads us to surrender the "standpoint of the individual, particular person" [357]—can be the property of any individual person, even of Hegel.

I take the liberty, dear Professor, of sending you my dissertation. Not that I attach any particular value to it, or that I imagine it holds in and for itself any interest for your mind. I send it only because I, its author, stand to you in the special relationship of an immediate disciple to his teacher, inasmuch as for two years I attended your lectures in Berlin and may thereby attest to the high esteem and veneration due to my teacher, which I gladly acknowledge as my duty. But at the same time this very relationship engenders in me a certain timidity in presenting my work. For if a disciple's high esteem and veneration for his teacher are attested and expressed not by external actions, speech, or sentiments, but only through works, this is possible only through works executed in the spirit of the teacher, worthy of a disciple, fulfilling the demands ordinarily placed on one as an immediate disciple. But when I consider my work—if, by the way, my dissertation merits this title—I myself recognize only too well what is defective, insufficient, corrupt, and blameworthy in it, so that I cannot even consider it as fulfilling the demands which I place on myself—I who have enjoyed for two years your so formative and substantial teaching. It is true that the reason for many defects and mistakes is to be sought in the narrow limits of scope, aim, and language imposed in general on a dissertation, especially in the field of philosophy; and many faults can thereby be excused. Nonetheless, I can excuse myself for the liberty taken in presenting you with my dissertation. But I can do so only thanks to an awareness—which I openly confess—that, on the whole and in general, it breathes a speculative spirit. An awareness that it is—only, to be sure, as a fragment uprooted by an external circumstance—the product of a study consisting in a living, so to speak essential rather than formal assimilation and imagination of ideas or concepts forming the content of your works and oral lessons. It is an assimilation fastening onto and taking up the soul, the singular productive and autonomous power of this content—a free assimilation, which is thus in no sense arbitrary, selective, or nibbling.

I am aware that the ideas engendered or awakened in me by you and expressed in your philosophy do not obtain on high in the universal sphere, beyond the sensuous and the apparent, but continue to act in me creatively. They issue, so to speak, from the heaven of their colorless purity, immaculate clarity, beauty, and unity with themselves, descending and taking form in an intuition which penetrates the particular, cancels [*aufheben*] and masters appearance within appearance itself. I am aware, further, that my dissertation bears within it, at least in general though in an altogether imperfect, crude, and mistaken form which fails to avoid abstraction, the trace of a manner of philosophizing which could be called the actualization and secularization of the idea, the *ensarkosis* or Incarnation of the pure logos. But it is in no way popularization, and even less the translation of thinking into a blank intuiting, or thoughts into images and symbols. This awareness gives me the courage, in spite of the insufficiency which I perceive and feel in my work, to present it to you. I am also firmly convinced that this manner of philosophizing, being not yet detached and released from myself, throws but a glimmer on my work, is only present in me in a state of becoming, and perhaps will never come, at least through me, to existence and to a perfected form. I am therefore, as I was saying, convinced that this manner of philosophizing comes at an opportune time or, otherwise stated, is founded on the very spirit of the new or latest philosophy, issuing from it.

For the philosophy which bears your name is, as acquaintance with history and philosophy itself teaches, not the affair of a school, but of humanity. At the very least the spirit of the latest philosophy claims, perforce tends, to burst the bounds of a single school, to become a general world-historical and public intuition. There resides in this spirit not only the germ of a higher literary activity, but also of a universal spirit expressing itself in actuality, the spirit, as it were, of a new period in world history. It is thus now a question, so to speak, of founding a Kingdom, the Kingdom of the Idea, of thought which contemplates itself in all that exists and is conscious of itself. The founder of *this* Kingdom will naturally bear no name, will not be an individual, or will be this individual which alone is, the World Spirit. Further, it is a question of overthrowing from its throne the ego, the *self* in general, which, especially since the beginning of Christianity, has dominated the world, which has conceived itself as the only spirit to exist. This spirit, [in asserting itself] as absolute, has validated itself by repressing the true absolute and objective spirit. This ego spirit is to be driven from its tyrannical throne in such a way that the Idea may be actual and may reign, that it may shine through all things as one light, and that the old empire of Ormuzd and Ahriman and dualism in general may be vanquished. This is not to be done, as has always been the case thus far in history, in the faith of a church apart from the world and turned in on itself, nor in the idea of *one single* substance, not generally in any way that involves a beyond, something negative, and exclusive relation to an other. Rather, it is to be done in the knowledge of *reason* conscious of itself as all reality [*Realität*], of reason single and universal, existing and knowing, actual, omnipresent, of reason unseparated from itself and uninterrupted by any difference.

The solitary reign of reason will and must finally come [see Ch 20 on Hegel's fulfillment of Lessing's prophecy]. Philosophy, which for thousands of years has been working toward reason's completion and actualization, but which, raising itself by degrees, embracing the whole, the universe—or whatever name

one gives it—always within a particular determination, a determinate concept, has by this fact always and necessarily left something else out, whether it be determinateness and existence itself in general, religion, nature, or the ego, etc. Philosophy, I say, which has finally grasped the whole itself as a whole and expressed it in the form of a whole, must now also have the consequence that nothing subsist any longer as a second or other, perhaps with the appearance or right and claim to be a second truth, such as a religious truth, etc. Millennial forms and modes of intuition, which from the first natural creation extended themselves across history as fundamental principles, must disappear. For knowledge of their vanity and limitation has arrived, even if this knowledge is not yet manifest. Everything will become Idea and reason. What counts now is a new foundation of things, a new history, a second creation in which it is no longer time and—outside of time—thought, but is rather reason that becomes the general form of the intuition of things. It can be demonstrated with perfect clarity that man becomes guilty of the maddest of contradictions if he so much as speaks of things being detached and separated from thought—not even to mention if he says that thought is something subjective and unreal [*Nichtreales*] where in fact man, like things themselves, has no existence at all outside thought, thinking being the all-embracing universal true space of all things and subjects. Every thing, every subject, is what it is only through the representation or thought of it. But it is *then* clear that if the ego, the self—as well as the innumerable things dependent upon it—is overcome in knowledge as something absolutely fixed, as the general and determinate principle of the world and of intuition, the ego even disappears outside intuition. It is then clear that the self expires, and that it ceases to be what it formerly was and indeed perishes.

This is why it is not a question here of a development of concepts in the form of their generality, in their abstract purity, and in their closed-off in-itselfness. It is rather a question of actually abolishing world-historical modes of intuition assumed up to the present. Modes of intuiting time, death, the this-worldly, the other-worldly, the ego, the individual, the person, as also that person considered as something absolute outside the finite, namely God, etc.: modes containing both the basis of history such as it has been envisaged up to the present and the source of the system of Christian representations, orthodox as well as rationalistic. It is a question of scuttling such truth, and of allowing cognitions to be introduced in its place which yield an immediately present world-determining intuition. Such cognitions find themselves enveloped in modern philosophy, as in the kingdom of the in-itself and hereafter [*Jenseits*], in the form of naked truth and generality.

Christianity cannot, for this reason, be conceived as the perfect and absolute religion. This can only be the Kingdom of actuality, of the Idea, of existing reason. Christianity is nothing other than the religion of the pure self, of the person taken as a *solitary* spirit—which holds forth in general. Christianity is by this fact but the antithesis of the ancient [Greek] world. What meaning, for example, does nature have in this religion? What a spiritless, thoughtless place does nature have in it? And yet just this absence of spirit and thought is one of the underlying pillars of this religion. Indeed, nature lies there uncomprehended, mysterious, and taken up into the unity of the divine essence so that only the person—not nature, nor the world, nor spirit—celebrates its salvation, a salvation which in fact is only to be found in knowledge. That is why reason is not yet

redeemed in Christianity. It is also why death is likewise still taken in a totally spiritless manner—although being merely a natural act for the most indispensable day worker in the Lord's vineyard, for the disciple and companion of Christ accomplishing for the first time the work of salvation fully. Since the foundation [*Grund*] and source of every religion lies in philosophy, in a definite mode of intuition on which the religion originally rests, the finite, the negative, the beyond of which Christianity itself has a presentiment admits of proof in the most categorical and convincing manner. Generally, every religion up to now has been nothing other than the immediate present, show and appearance of the universal spirit of some philosophy, [which presents itself] as a *single* coherent whole through its different systems, for example, the Greek. Christianity is the manifestation, spreading in the form of fixed finitude, of the spirit of Hellenistic [*nachgriechischen*] philosophy. But the striving of the individual must now be so directed that through religion Spirit as Spirit may hold forth in appearance as nothing other than itself. Yet I must break off for fear of overstepping the limits of modesty and respect were I, most honored teacher, to retain you any longer in the exposition of my knowledge, striving, and thoughts. In the hope that you will wish to accept this letter kindly, as well as my dissertation, which at least in general suggests philosophical self-application and a striving to call abstract ideas into immediate presence, I remain, with the most profound and sincere respect, your honor's most humble Ludwig Feuerbach, Dr. of Philosophy. [592]

REVISED EDITIONS OF THE *ENCYCLOPAEDIA* (1830) AND THE *LOGIC* (1831)

Despite a clear methodological penchant to the contrary, Hegel did on occasion identify contradictions—not resolutions—in the present. Thus the *Philosophy of Law* identifies the predicament of the “rabble” as an unresolved contradiction of the age (§224, Addition). Though never himself a member of the rabble, as the employee-editor of the *Bamberg News* he had experience of what Marx would call the proletarian condition (Ch 7). And his relation to profit-seeking publishers somewhat resembled a proletarian relation to capitalist proprietors. His letters suggest little personal satisfaction in the relation. Gans had conceived the *Yearbooks* as the work of a self-governing community of scholars, but this meant a cultural corporation at the level of absolute spirit, not a production corporation in civil society. For production and marketing the Society for Scientific Criticism did not enter into a fixed *wage contract*. But it did enter into a profit-sharing *royalties contract*. The self-governing corporations recognized by Hegel within civil society were not production corporations, but professional or commercial corporations (*Phil of Law* §288) organized to include all members of a vocation—both wage earners and the self-employed. Conceivably a scholarly corporation might escape quasi-proletarian dependence by either decentralized socialism or statism. The first solution would expand a scholarly/scientific corporation into a genuine production unit responsible for its own publishing and marketing, while the second would lead it into a *subsidy contract* with an interventionist state. Despite his 1807 call [108] upon the state to trust the free initiative of the people, for the promotion of higher culture Hegel favored the traditionally European (e.g. French) statist solution over both decentralized socialist and capitalist solutions (*Berlin Schrift*, 509-30). He

trusted the superior taste and judgment of the universal class more than the shifting popular tastes to which private publishers and self-managed publishing corporations of scholars—both market oriented—would be subject. Still, as a corporately unorganized lone author he remained annoyingly dependent on private publishing houses—though quite independent of them for his livelihood.

Correspondence on the third edition of the *Encyclopaedia* concerns contracts, royalties, deadlines, and other issues taken up with his publisher and printer. Preparation for a second edition of the *Logic* began earlier than for the third edition of the *Encyclopaedia*: the Nuremberg publisher of the first edition of the *Logic*, Johann Leonhard Schrag, approached Hegel on the question in 1827 [569]. In the end, however, von Cotta published the revised edition of the *Logic* [665, 677], which was printed in Berlin in 1831 by Johann Friedrich Starcke. The last words written by Hegel before his death were a note [688 below] to Starcke sending a motto for the title sheet of this new edition. This motto, which is absent in current German and English editions, reiterates the Epicurean withdrawal from the world which Göschel had criticized as un-Hegelian [661]. It is taken from Cicero's *Tusculan Disputations*, Book II, Ch I: “*Est enim philosophia paucis contenta iudicibus, multitudinem consulto ipsa fugiens, eique suspecta et invisa*” (For philosophy is content with few judges. With fixed purpose it avoids, for its part, the multitude, which in turn views it as an object of suspicion and dislike).

Hegel to Winter [608a]

Berlin, September 27, 1829

Only upon returning from my vacation trip, dear sir, did I find your kind letter of the 22nd of last month with several enclosures informing me of the new situation of the Oswald publishing house, the rapid sale of the second edition of my *Encyclopaedia*, and the need for a new edition.⁹ Since, according to what the letter says of the matter, I must believe I have to direct my remarks primarily to you, I hasten to reply. I of course wish to refer first to your statement, in your gracious letter following your assumption of administrative responsibility, to the effect that you commit yourself in the publishing house's name to the prompt payment of the royalty. I believe I can only understand your declaration as implying that—if I have what is indeed an indirect claim [*Beziehung*] in the matter on the publisher's funds, whose extent are unknown to me, and which have rather been declared insufficient by the agreement now concluded—I am nonetheless completely dependent on you and your approval as my sole guarantee in undertaking this [new] edition. Further, I may regard this guarantee as having been rendered independent of all other dispositions which may have already been deemed necessary, or which may later be so deemed. And so I must leave my claim [*Verhältnis*] upon those funds, according to your kind assurance, solely to you. Presupposing this view, confirmation of which I request of you, I now pass on to other matters.

From the contract, from my correspondence with Mr. Oswald, and from the

⁹Christian Friedrich Winter had assumed control of August Oswald's publishing house, which had published the first two editions of the *Encyclopaedia*.

invoices occasioned by the second edition of the *Encyclopaedia*, you will have seen our agreed upon date for a subsequent edition. For the original eighteen sheets in the first edition we settled upon two-thirds of the 25 florin royalty. For the additional number of sheets we reverted to this original royalty, and for the further eighteen sheets of the second edition we agreed on 22 florins per sheet. In this agreement I reserved for myself the royalties of the first edition for the additional material contained in any new edition. I thus simply suggest that for eighteen sheets two-thirds of the first edition's royalty be retained and that for the additional sheets, which in the second edition also amounted to eighteen, 22 florins be likewise stipulated. Whether, and by how much, this number of sheets might still be increased in the contemplated new edition I cannot yet say, since the task catches me by surprise, and since I have not yet had a chance to run through the text with this in mind. In general, however, I do not foresee undertaking any significant change or expansion. The printing remains fixed as before at a thousand copies, with eighteen complimentary author's copies, twelve on vellum and six on writing paper.

Since I have been notified so late of the need for a new edition—Mr. Oswald's letter is dated July 13—the manuscript may be sent off later than you probably would wish. Seeing how my work has since piled up, I cannot yet say anything definite on when it will be. I shall do my best, however, to enable the edition to appear by Easter.

I confess an emphatic preference for having the printing done here in Berlin where I can take care of the proofreading myself. In the future I shall make this a precondition in further printing arrangements. The last edition came out of Oswald's printing shop with mistakes all too atrocious. In the case of abstract matters this is doubly, even triply, unwelcome. Substantially greater care and accuracy are to be demanded of the printer.

Please transmit my best regards to Mr. Oswald, and to the banker Fries, whom I would have been happy to have seen personally in Berlin. It would probably have been superfluous to write to him in particular, as also to Mr. Oswald. In any case this letter will pass as having been written as much to Mr. Oswald as to him. Kindly assure him of my interest in his future welfare. Please have the enclosed letter [609] transmitted to Privy Councillor Daub—whom, by the way, I did not dare again ask to take the trouble of proofreading.

Looking forward to your kind reply, dear sir, I remain with complete respect your devoted Professor Hegel

Hegel to Winter [629]

February 10, 1830

Concerning the proof sheet on vellum paper you kindly sent, dear sir, I note that it indeed looks fine but that it lets ink pass through. Such a sample would be especially unsuitable for my purposes. I thus ask you to please supply the sort of paper on which the forwarded manuscript is printed. It might also be useful to have half a dozen copies printed on this sort—though preferably on somewhat heavier vellum paper—plus a dozen on fine white writing paper corresponding approx-

imately to stationery. I thus ask you to please have a sample of this kindly forwarded to me.

In addition to the eighteen copies mentioned above, please add three copies on ordinary printing paper for me, so that the number of my free copies amounts in all to twenty-one.

I may in any case still ask you to please have forwarded to me as soon as possible a sample of the printed type style you have chosen. For the style can hardly be exactly the same, and perhaps a choice between a few styles might be possible.

I remain, my dear sir, with complete respect your most devoted Professor Hegel.

Hegel to Winter [633]

Berlin, March 27, 1830

Your kind letter, dear sir, all but found me with the same sort of concern out of which it itself was written. The typesetting [*Druck*] has begun later and the printing [*Abdruck*] has advanced more slowly than I had wished. At my urgent request it is now going somewhat faster, but not as fast as needed. I told Mr. Reimer that I have to begin two lecture courses on the *Encyclopaedia* on May 3,¹⁹ that it is every bit as much in the interest of the publishing house to be able to distribute finished copies by that date, and that delivery of isolated sheets would give a very bad impression. I subsequently conveyed your letter to Mr. Reimer just as I received it. I only now have six proof sheets in hand. While I will be sure to press Mr. Reimer further myself, I ask you to impress upon him from your side the urgency of the order. There is still time.

The paper is better than in the earlier edition, but the characters are somewhat smaller, and do not have as good an appearance as in the previous edition.

Hope was raised last week that I would receive five sheets during the week for proofreading, but this has not yet happened.

The critical condition of my dear friend Privy Church Councillor Daub, of which you kindly informed me, has deeply affected me as well as his other friends here, whom I have notified. Should you have the chance to convey my most sincere sympathy as well as most cordial wishes for his improvement and recovery, please do so along with kindest regards. Most respectfully, your devoted Professor Hegel

Hegel to Reimer [634a]

Berlin, April 8, 1830

Our most recent understanding permitted me at the very least to hope printing would be continued at the same pace, and indeed would rather be accelerated. But I have received no proofs for a whole week. I therefore urgently request, dear sir, that you kindly take steps to make up for this interruption and accelerate the printing. With complete respect, your entirely devoted Hegel

¹⁹Georg Andreas Reimer assumed responsibility for the printing on Hegel's insistence that the printing be done in Berlin [608a].

I shall have to post an announcement in two weeks to the students that they may pick up copies. At least twenty-four sheets will have to be ready. [These sheets comprise the first two parts of the *Encyclopaedia*—logic and philosophy of nature—on which Hegel taught in summer 1830.]

Hegel to Reimer [645]

August 31, 1830

With regard to the Nortmann printshop, nothing has changed and no progress has been made. A few days ago I requested of them a definite explanation of their persistent refusal to finish the printing only to receive the same rejoinder, which can only be called deceitful, namely that I should receive corrected proofs the same day or the next. [Reimer delegated the printing of the *Encyclopaedia* to Karl Nortmann.]

You, dear sir, have assumed responsibility for the printing. I must therefore address myself to you, and have no alternative but to ask you to relieve Nortmann of the printing of the few sheets that remain. It is no longer even an entire sheet of the text. The two prefaces and table of contents are in any case to be printed in different types. If necessary have the manuscript, which as it now seems he purposely acquired complete, reclaimed through the police. I see no other way out. Your most devoted Hegel

Hegel to Winter [649a]

Berlin, October 1, 1830

I finally received today, dear sir, the corrected proofs of the conclusion of the *Encyclopaedia*. Compared to the previous edition this one has been enlarged by five sheets, and in all amounts to forty-one sheets.

It is most disagreeable to both of us that the printing has been so greatly delayed. Mr. Reimer has not been able to do the printing himself, and has found only a mediocre printing shop to hand it over to, so that it took a long time just to get started. A paper mix-up resulted in five sheets being printed twice, and I had to undertake the very difficult task of proofreading twice. Finally, beyond the usual flight of typesetters, the printer had to borrow letter type for the prefaces. I almost despaired that it would ever be finished. The print used in these prefaces is misshapen and has come out too large, just as the type in the entire text is somewhat smaller than that of previous editions.

With respect to royalties, I have requested no advance. But since they have been delayed so greatly I ask you to make the remittance required by our agreement as soon as possible. I hope the publishing house will not suffer any losses in the venture.

I will have two copies on writing paper for Privy Church Councillor Daub forwarded to you. For now I ask you to send him, as also Privy Councillor [Friedrich] Creuzer and [Anton] Thibaut, my best regards. The same goes for Mr. Oswald as well.

I ask you in conclusion to accept assurances of my total respect. I remain your most devoted Professor Hegel of the local Royal university.

Hegel to Reimer [650a]

Berlin, October 18, 1830

Having now received the copies of the *Encyclopaedia*, I take the liberty, dear sir, of asking you to attach the enclosed [copy] on writing paper [for Karl Daub] to the copies—indeed to the first shipment which you are dispatching to Mr. Winter in Heidelberg. From my side, I express my thanks to you for all the trouble you have taken in handling this matter.

The author has become used to the galley sheets, having made corrections on them. You would do me a favor by completing them by the addition of the last sheet, which the negligent Nortmann printshop has not sent. Respectfully, your most devoted Hegel

Hegel to Reimer [653]

Berlin, November 9, 1830

Last Friday I addressed a note requesting you, dear sir, to inform me if anything should be known to you of Mr. Winter's disposition in payment of the royalties owed [649a]. Since you had kindly taken printing matters in hand, it seemed quite likely to me that Mr. Winter would notify me through you, especially in light of his rather long silence toward me. So if I can obtain the information from you in short order I would much appreciate the favor. Otherwise I will at once address myself directly to Mr. Winter.

I remain most respectfully, my dear sir, your completely devoted Professor Hegel

Hegel to Winter [654]

Berlin, November 10, 1830

I had notified you at the beginning of October, my dear sir, that the new edition of my *Encyclopaedia* had been completely printed and was ready for delivery, and I had asked you to arrange for speedy remission of the royalty, which is past due. I have since received no news from you; and Mr. Reimer, whom I asked, replied to me that he, too, knew nothing about it. According to our agreement, the sum amounts to: 1. 18 sheets at 16 florins, amounting to 300 florins. 2. 24 sheets, including 19 1/2 sheets [of] text and 4 1/2 sheets for the prefaces at 22 florins, amounting to 528 florins. The total: 828 florins.

I now request you to have this sum kindly forwarded to me without delay in keeping with your word. I remain most respectfully, my dear sir, your entirely devoted Professor Hegel.

Hegel to Winter [654a]

Berlin November 20, 1830

A letter of mine to you, dear sir, of the 10th of this month has crossed with a letter to me from Mr. Fries of the same date. The estimate of the royalty contained in this second letter differs from the estimate I had quoted in that letter to you in accordance with what we agreed.

I have no closer knowledge of Mr. Fries's relationship with Oswald's publish-

ing house. I must attribute the divergence in the calculation to its not having been suitably settled upon by you personally. Since I negotiated the conditions with you, I must address to you my request for an adjustment. Those conditions were in part made as a consequence of the earlier contract with Mr. Oswald. But in part they have been altered so that—as I stated in my letter of August 8th last year [probably 608a]—18 sheets were calculated at two-thirds 25 florins, with each additional sheet calculated at 22 florins. After you agreed with my proposal in your letter of November 10 of the same year, I submitted the manuscript to the printer.

In confirming these calculations, please prevail upon Mr. Fries to kindly cover by a remittance here of what is still unpaid in the 828-florin total.¹¹

I respectfully remain, dear sir, your most devoted Professor Hegel.

Hegel to Schrag [569]

Berlin, October 29, 1827

I safely received, my dear sir, your kind letter of November 26 last year notifying me of the approaching need in one or two years hence of a new edition of my *Logic*. My reply, however has been long delayed for a number of reasons, the principal one being the necessary deliberation as to how to organize the work, and as to the deadline by which I could send it to you. I had no time to get to this in the almost full year since your kind letter. This is my principal excuse for delaying a reply, in which nothing definite could have been given. Now, upon my return from an extensive trip [to Paris], I see a period of time ahead in which I can make it my main business to work out this second edition. After a close look at what was to be done, it soon became clear that a recasting of many parts has become necessary, and that this will require a longer period of time. My work may thus be ready by the time—upon exhaustion of whatever reserve copies you still have—the need for a new edition arises. You will perhaps now be able to foresee somewhat more exactly when this will be—beginning with the first volume, i.e., the first two parts. I thus ask you for further clarification on this.

As to royalties for the second edition, permit me to say this: since my philosophy has now gained more widespread currency, and since more and more universities are offering lectures according to my ideas, more considerable royalties for my publications—whose sale appears assured—are now offered than I could demand at the start of my career. However, I am willing to stick to the same amount per sheet for the second edition as for the first.

I look forward to payment, as required by the contract, of the remaining royalties for the second volume in accordance with your expectation of the imminent depletion of copies.

More recent unpleasant experiences have proven once again to me the necessity of having the printing take place under the author's eyes. I thus must request it as something essential that you arrange for the printing to take place here.

Looking forward to a kind reply, I remain most respectfully, my dear sir, your very devoted Professor Hegel.

¹¹Hegel's claim was ultimately honored by the publisher.

Hegel to Starcke's Printshop [688]

November 13, 1831

I have just noticed that the enclosed slip, which I had wanted to enclose yesterday and whose words I indicated are to appear on the back of the title sheet, has remained behind.

Windischmann and the Magical Arts

HEGEL'S THREE REMAINING letters to Karl Joseph Hieronymus Windischmann testify to a longstanding relationship to a philosopher of some repute in his own time. Like Franz von Baader, whose relation to Hegel will be the subject of the next chapter, Windischmann was a noted lay Catholic theologian. Von Baader had once studied medicine; Windischmann was a medical doctor by training. Though Windischmann, like von Baader, was more conservative than Hegel politically, Hegel considered both to be in basic agreement with himself philosophically. Hegel was clearly more concerned about speculative than ideological agreement—though both Windischmann and Hegel became more conservative over the years. In 1810 [155] Windischmann gave every indication of adhering to the German Enlightenment. He first wrote to Hegel concerning his 1809 review of the *Phenomenology* in the *Jenaische Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung* (nos 31-34, columns 241-72). Apart from the 1810 review in the *Heidelberger Jahrbücher* by Hegel's former student Karl Friedrich Bachmann (Sect I, pp. 145-63, 193-209), Windischmann's was the most important to greet Hegel's first major work. The review was chiefly expository, though Windischmann's overall evaluation was positive. He explained to Hegel that his account of the *Phenomenology*'s Preface along with his general evaluation of the work had been omitted from the published review. Windischmann's praise of Hegel recalled Lessing's prophetic utterances in the *Education of the Human Race* three decades before. A major theme of Lessing's had been that a new age of generalized rational and moral autonomy, of emancipation from external authority, was certain: "... it will come! It will assuredly come, ... the time of a new eternal Gospel" (Lessing, 55). For Windischmann, Hegel's *Phenomenology* opened the door to this millennial Gospel of human emancipation prophesied by Lessing:

The study of your system of science has convinced me that someday, when the time for understanding has come, this work will be viewed as the elementary text of human emancipation, as the key to the new Gospel announced by Lessing. You will of course understand what I mean by this, but you will also understand what this work—not as a text but as a *work*—means to me, and why few have felt it so deeply. [155]

Windischmann's current research was on the Romantic theme of magic, but he viewed it as he viewed the *Phenomenology*, i.e., in the spirit of the Enlightenment as a contribution to human emancipation. Of his own research he wrote to Hegel:

In itself, such an investigation would have to go hand in hand with your *Phenomenology of Spirit*, since any other manner of treating the subject would be accumulation of material. . . . Everything rests on the fundamental thought that what is temporal, finite, in a state of becoming. . . is the Eternal itself comprehended in its evolution, development, and self-knowledge, and that the impenetrable Spirit must of necessity individualize itself and take form in the infinity and infinite diversity of moments, which in themselves can nonetheless be most sharply grasped. In this way equally numerous forms of one-sidedness and of incantation are possible and effective, each along the path of Spirit's development. All such forms must find their explication in this investigation, beginning with the first and full magical power of the Impenetrable—and of Nature surging forth everywhere—over man, proceeding through the isolation and interlocking of moments, and ending with the penetration, illumination, and complete magical power of Spirit itself, which dissipates all magical incantation and constitutes the clarity and freedom of life itself. You will easily understand that in such an investigation the most singular and maligned topics will arise. . . ; you will also understand that if the subject is well treated and understood something great should result for the true emancipation of man from himself. . . . I would wish, within the limits of my ability, to do *something*, especially for educators and physicians. Please think about this and let me know if the fundamental thought appears tenable. . . . [155]

Hegel, who replied on May 27, endorsed Windischmann's view of magic as a hypnotic trance cast by one finite spirit over others, or even over itself. Windischmann's attribution of such magical power even to natural forces implied endorsement of the Romantic, panpsychist philosophy of nature championed by Schelling against the Cartesian-Fichtean divorce of nature and spirit. In his Berlin lectures on the philosophy of religion Hegel viewed the animistic religion of magic as the most primitive, prehistorical religion (*Werke* XV, 279-324). Theologically, he considered magic a "dark" power—whether it be the magic of a witch doctor seeking lordship over nature or even that of the miracle-working Old Testament God. Nor did he come to appreciate political magic of Oriental despots or restored absolute monarchs in the West. In the field of medicine, however, Hegel recognized the utility of magic. In grappling with the mental illness of his sister he recognized the magical role of the psychotherapist's personality and authority over the patient (Ch 15). But the objection to the use of magic in religion follows from the very nature of its utility in medicine. Religion is the finite individual's self-identification with the infinite Spirit, not a manipulation of nature by the individual for finite ends—be they even the ends of a physician.

Windischmann appealed to Hegel in 1810 in part because he was passing through an enervating "hypochondria" which tempted him to abandon his research:

For about two weeks I have in fact found myself in the worst of mental states. It was precipitated by an attack almost resembling apoplexy. My situation, which in any case was already painful, thus came to weigh on me like a rock on the chest. A profound hypochondria and semiparalysis had taken hold of me, and everything I do and write disgusts me. . . . I absolutely *must* free myself of this

painful condition, and I cannot do so more deeply than by resolutely throwing off all else and devoting myself once again solely to science. . . . [155]

Hegel in his reply identified personally with Windischmann's affliction. Hegel's biographers have speculated as to what period in his own development Hegel may have had in mind. His own statement indicates a period after embarking on wide-ranging studies in the natural and historical sciences yet before he had formulated his system. The most natural dating of Hegel's "hypochondria" is sometime in the Bern and/or Frankfurt period [17, 21], in which he was accumulating voluminous notes on classical antiquity and church history but had not yet perceived the necessity of expressing the ideal of his youth in systematic and reflective form [29]. The problem in Jena, on the other hand, was how to introduce an already-nucleated systematic standpoint to the public. The search for an effective means of introduction—which eventuated in the *Phenomenology*—resulted in development of the systematic position to be introduced, but the systematic research of the Jena period is not that of a hypochondriacal soul which has "finally made its way with interest and hunches into a chaos of phenomena" [158]. "Final" entry into such a chaos rather suggests a field of empirical-historical study such as occupied Hegel prior to Jena. By 1810 Hegel had a sense of having long since emerged from his dark night of the soul, but not of having achieved "confidence in himself and everyday life." He suspects that science has incapacitated him for ordinary happiness, though the following year he will assign to his fiancée the task of teaching him otherwise [186].

Hegel to Windischmann [158]

Nuremberg, May 27, 1810

I was very happy, my dear friend, to see from your kind letter the amicable sentiments you harbor toward me, and to find thereby an immediate occasion both to tell you how much I value these sentiments of yours and to thank you for earlier expressions of them. You have had the kindness to want to occupy yourself so thoroughly with my literary work, and to give the public the so very detailed account of it contained in the *Jena Literary Review*. Especially in these times one never knows or gets a chance to see if philosophical writings find, not to say a public, but only a few individuals devoting their interest and attention to them. The fact that you were not indifferent to my work was thus all the more appreciated by me. [Gotthilf Heinrich von] Schubert had already informed me of what you had the kindness of having conveyed to me concerning the failure to print your remarks on the Preface. Yet it would appear that he has neglected to tell you what I asked him to write to you about the matter. Given the willfulness and caprice which are becoming so frequently apparent in the management of that *Review*, as much against the authors as in its attitude toward collaborators, what was more surprising to me is that so much of your review did get published. I am hereby returning to you the portion of the review on the Preface which you sent me. I thank you for this communication, which has been valuable to me and which contains so much that would be quite good to have often said before the public.

I am very curious to have your work on magic in hand. I confess I would not dare tackle this dark side and mode of spiritual nature or natural spirit, and am all the happier that you will both illuminate it for us and take up many a neglected and scorned subject, restoring it to the honor it deserves. Health and serene mood—indeed a stable serene mood—are called for in no other field of work more than in this. Consider yourself convinced that the frame of mind you depict to me is partly due to this present work of yours, to this descent into dark regions where nothing is revealed as fixed, definite, and certain; where glimmerings of light flash everywhere but, flanked by abysses, are rather darkened in their brightness and led astray by the environment, casting false reflections far more than illumination. Each onset of a new path breaks off again and ends in the indeterminable, losing itself, wresting us away from our purpose and direction. From my own experience I know this mood of the soul, or rather of reason, which arises when it has finally made its way with interest and hunches into a chaos of phenomena but, though inwardly certain of the goal, has not yet worked its way through them to clarity and to a detailed account of the whole. For a few years I suffered from this hypochondria to the point of exhaustion. Everybody probably has such a turning point in his life, the nocturnal point of the contraction of his essence in which he is forced through a narrow passage by which his confidence in himself and everyday life grows in strength and assurance—unless he has rendered himself incapable of being fulfilled by everyday life, in which case he is confirmed in an inner, nobler existence. Continue onward with confidence. It is science which has led you into this labyrinth of the soul, and science alone is capable of leading you out again and healing you. Throw off, if possible, this burden for a period of time. If you kept yourself at a distance from it you would come back to it with renewed strength and greater power over it.

My own further work [on the *Logic*] progresses slowly given my present official duties [as gymnasium rector], which are tied to it only in part. Yet I have not completely left it aside. How fortunate you are not to see your pursuit of your most personal interests curtailed by such external obligations.

I am pleased to still be remembered by th [Dr. Johann Christian] Ehrmann household in Frankfurt. I thank you for the regards you conveyed, and ask you to please return them as the occasion arises. A warm farewell, your most humble Hegel

P.S. Forgive the delay of this reply. By accident I lost sight for an extended period of the letter's beginning, which was written long ago but whose continuation was interrupted.

WINDISCHMANN'S TURN AWAY from Lessing and the Enlightenment became apparent in *The Judgment of the Lord on Europe* (1814). Windischmann became more conservative not only politically but theologically, rejecting Lessing's pantheistic tendencies along with the ideology of emancipation. Hegel's most liberal correspondent during the post-Napoleonic years, Nicholas von Thaden (Ch 17 on Hegel's liberal apostasy), despaired of Windischmann [251], and three years later wrote to Hegel: "Windischmann has, it appears, entirely repudiated you—perhaps

out of zeal for his religion" [336]. In 1820 von Thaden advised Hegel not to break with Schleiermacher, a potential ideological ally, "since otherwise everything will be lost for a very, very long time and [Restoration philosopher] Mr. [Karl Ludwig] von Haller, Windischmann, and [popular preacher] Klaus Harms will sing: 'Halaluya! The Lord has worked everything out for the best'" [364]. Hegel did not follow von Thaden's advice: he broke with Schleiermacher on questions of first philosophy but continued to cultivate Windischmann, visiting him in Bonn on his 1822 trip to the Low Countries. He reported to his wife after visiting Windischmann in 1822 that the two got along well and for the moment were quite satisfied with each other [436].

In 1823 Windischmann wrote Hegel regarding a private collection of stained glass Hegel had seen in Cologne in 1822 [453]. The owner, a widow of the name of Hirn, had fallen into financial stringency through bad investments by her son and wished to take up Hegel's oral offer to help her should she ever wish to sell the collection. But the letter also concerned Hegel's and Windischmann's respective philosophical positions. Though he praised the *Logic's* contribution to "the very foundation of philosophy" and noted the harmony between his religious convictions and Hegel's "scientific opinions" as expressed in the Preface to Hinrichs's first book (Ch 18, second section), he also noted that delicate unstated differences remained between them. He would have something to say about Hegel's teaching, he said, in his forthcoming book: *What Medicine Lacks: An Attempt at Its Unification with Theology* (1824). Hegel responded on August 23:

Hegel to Windischmann [459]

Berlin, August 23, 1823

It has taken a long time, dear friend, for me to find time to answer your kind and trusting letter of June 2. Although the main reason for the delay—my inability thus far to respond satisfactorily to your request—remains, I cannot delay any longer at least answering your letter. What occasioned your letter has caused me true pain, and I can imagine how sorrowful this misfortune that has befallen such a worthy woman [Mrs. Hirn] must be for you. Her piety, the love and respect in which she is held by her fellow citizens, and the good she has done for so many people will grant her no small consolation and help. As for the collection of [stained] glass, I have placed the matter in the hands of someone who can best set it in motion and advance it. Yet I cannot make the hope out to be greater than it shows itself to be. A main factor is the sluggish pace at which such matters proceed. Three possible avenues by which attempts may be made have presented themselves—namely, that the King might decide on a purchase, that the Princes might do so, or that a Polish dignitary building a church might be inclined to use a portion of the glass. You know, by the way, how such matters are investigated and deliberated upon by persons in high places. My advice would be for Mrs. Hirn to make an offer directly to the King. In this way the matter comes up for definite consideration and deliberation. However, that a considerable amount would be given for the collection is hardly likely in view of all that has recently been spent in the field of art, as also in view of the continuing costs of artistic establishments for

which commitments have already been made. If Mrs. Hirn has some other chance to sell the collection, the most advisable thing might be to take advantage of it. The English, who due to their Gothic taste have the greatest demand for stained glass, have factories to satisfy their need inexpensively. Though this is not much, it is all that I can say for now on this matter, the advancement of which I would very gladly assist.

What you said further on in your letter about your industriousness has truly pleased me, as also your promise that I will soon be receiving a product of your labors. Nothing can be more desirable for me than to hear from you again, and indeed to hear you philosophize on my philosophizing. Yet it is equally necessary for the public that men who are philosophers once again be heard. They are admittedly unable to hold sway again; for the power and expanse over which bare, shallow, and even mindless arrogance has spread have become too great. Even though you perceive differences between us, I know at once that the things we agree upon are more extensive and decisive; and over against those others we shall be fellow combatants immeasurably more than adversaries. For now it only matters to have secured our common ground, the speculative standpoint. The two approaches to this standpoint which the world previously followed by itself—mysticism and thought—are now indeed more or less obstructed or made unpassable by inundation. That you have given Dr. Esser's head a good scrubbing in any case may have done no harm. You, however, will know better than I whether you have not tried to wash a black man white.

When you wrote your letter you were looking forward to the joy of becoming a grandfather. I thus may now probably congratulate you. I hope that this joy has been realized just as I also hope that you—especially your eyes—and your whole dear family are in good health. My family and I are, thank goodness, rather well. With affection and respect, yours, Hegel

WILHELM ESSER HAD BEEN a student of Windischmann's in Bonn, and from 1823 taught philosophy in Münster. Hegel himself criticized Esser in connection with his own *Logic* (*Berlin Schrift*, 564-67), but even Windischmann was critical of his student's understanding of Hegel.

Hegel's use of a racial slur in reference to Esser seems to show complicity—conscious or unconscious—in racist attitudes enshrined in ordinary German as well as in other Western languages. The expression conflicts in spirit with his philosophical commitment to universal human rights (e.g. *Werke* XI, 544), though such conflict between feeling and thought, the philosopher and his philosophy, falls short of contradiction—which exists only internal to thought. Yet it does show thought to be imperfectly actualized.

Windischmann sent Hegel a copy of his book on philosophy and medicine in October 1823 [465], and wrote again in March 1824 when he had received no direct response [467]. Hegel finally replied on April 11. The main burden of Windischmann's book—which Hegel approved—was an attack on purely physicalistic therapies. He sought to make a place for therapeutic methods based on Christian philosophy, methods which would treat the patient's soul rather than

merely "the externals" of his physical condition. Windischmann, a noted representative of the Romantic school of medicine, sought to treat the patient as a whole and support the natural recuperative powers of body; in effect he resisted the emerging specialization of medicine. He himself had recently had a personal encounter with nonphysical therapy: Prince Alexander Leopold Hohenlohe, a Catholic priest known for miraculous hypnotic cures, had used the method to cure Windischmann of an eye affliction [436]. Windischmann's interest in the medical use of hypnosis parallels his earlier work on magical incantations for the benefit of physicians as well as educators. In 1810 Hegel, writing to van Ghert, analyzed hypnosis as the subject's return, through self-detachment and sympathetic identification with the hypnotist, out of the structural differentiation and specialization of functions, back into the general stream of life [166]. Such a return is therapeutic when the affliction is due to the self-absolutization ("isolation") of a particular organ or function in negation of the fluid organic totality of all functions. In April 1824 Hegel noted an analogy between such nonphysicalistic holistic therapy, oriented toward "life" or the "soul" in its generality, and the rejection of the "externals" of positive authority in his own speculative theology. There is a suggestion that speculative theology in this emancipated Protestant spirit provided a context in which Windischmann's equally inward therapeutic practice might flourish.

Hegel to Windischmann [470]

Berlin, April 11, 1824

I can excuse the long delay in answering your several kind letters, my dear friend, only in part by citing my general way—itself inexcusable—with letter writing. In part, however, I delayed because I intended to express my gratitude to you in greater detail for the kind gift of your publication. To be sure I could have found enough clock time for writing, but not enough leisure time. A letter, if it does not concern a formal business matter, is for me a kind of journey to a friend. To give myself over to such a trip I wish to wait until my mind is free of other doings, concerns, and distraction. Thus I often do not get around to answering dear letters such as yours before vacation, though I have been answering them in my mind all winter long. An illness has also had its share in the delay. I must first give my cordial thanks for the kind invitation in this connection to spend a few months in your home. Were I only well enough to be able to do so! Yet on the whole my health is pretty good again, so that I am able to discharge my office; and spring will do its part, I hope, in solidifying it completely. I am happy to learn from your letters that you and your dear family, including your grandson, are in good health.

To speak of the treatise—of which you have kindly had a copy sent to me—I was pleased with it. It is one of the few writings from which I have been able to profit and derive further hope for the future. You attack the evil at its root. Those bogged down in it are already incapable of hearing any longer. On the other hand, among those who—merely due to the generally prevailing tone—can no longer develop strong confidence, this word of strength and heart will bear fruit, and the courage to know will grow in them. You have first addressed medicine, and the exposition becomes most telling when it attacks the peculiar need and requirement

of a [particular] discipline. A similar stimulus would benefit the other disciplines, especially theology, from which the others shall necessarily derive all confidence and inwardness. But it is the state of this science that almost justifies the others, for to them the [inner] sanctuary is not entrusted. And if the priesthood—in which I also include the philosophers and, in a way, even governments—has allowed the people [*Volk*] to fall into such externality, medicine as well will be forced to take up the people's suffering in a similarly external fashion, for it will then no longer find any point of attachment for a spiritual efficacy penetrating what is inner and operating from within outward. It is, however, at least of the greatest importance that, in the case of the recovery of your eye, for example, animal magnetism at the present time again stand out as a fact, in part in order to vindicate previous work [in the field], but chiefly to reestablish such a field for itself, even if only as a *special* one *alongside* others—[seeing that] externality and the lifelessness of what is inner have fared so well as to become living authority. It will be of equal importance to vindicate this field by knowledge [*Erkenntnis*], which admittedly comes most unexpected to superficial knowing [*Wissen*] persuaded in its arrogance that it has mastered everything and made its treasures—albeit quite barren—secure. In this regard your Preface could but hold special interest for me, [indeed] on a quite personal level. For I take satisfaction in finding your approval in it of the path of speculative cognition which I have taken, and I at once note your commitment to working in this field and presenting us with the products of your meditations. What has been doubly interesting for me is the culmination to which you continue your exposition. While this point is in itself of the greatest interest, it may at once contain what you designate as our "differences." Yet if the path we walk together is such a long one, and if this path offers so much that we hold in common in point of spirit and content, for me these differences relegate themselves, scientifically speaking, to such a remote sphere of representation that for the present I simply adhere to the feeling of your dear friendship, in which I take sincere satisfaction. May our friendship endure. I remain with all my heart very truly yours, Hegel

P.S. I have played no more precise role in the reception your publication has found in the Ministry, a reception with which you are satisfied. It is solely due to our Minister [von Altenstein] and to our common friend.

Please give Dr. Jarcke my preliminary thanks for the forwarded treatise, as well as my apology for not yet having answered. I will do so soon. Here and there things are starting to become more lively in jurisprudence. Have you not seen Dr. Gans's publication on the history of the law of succession, part one? He has made my lectures on world history its basis.

Dr. [Friedrich Wilhelm] Carové recently wrote me of your well-being and of your amicable sentiments toward me. The notebooks on my history of philosophy, which he conveyed to you, will give you more precise indications of that world-historical dimension. But I am curious as to how generally you will judge my basic conception of the history of philosophy.

WINDISCHMANN FOUND HIS OWN formulations in surprising agreement with Hegel's on the history of philosophy—with the one unexplained exception of the role of Christianity in the history of philosophy [475].

Karl Ernst Jarcke, mentioned above, taught criminal law on the Berlin faculty from 1825. In March 1824 Jarcke sent Hegel his just-published *Attempt at an Exposition of Roman Censorial Penal Law* at the urging of Windischmann—under whose influence he had recently converted to Catholicism. The accompanying letter [468] expresses Jarcke's delight over Hegel's nonutilitarian concept of punishment as the moral conversion of the criminal. The idea, to which Windischmann had directed Jarcke's attention in the *Philosophy of Law* (§99-103), was now, he said, the guiding principle of his own research.

In Windischmann's reply of September 5, 1824, he at last reveals the nature of the remaining "difference" he perceives between himself and Hegel:

What meanwhile I call our "difference" is such a delicate matter that I dare not express its singular nature until I can precisely evaluate the difference in our faith in the Holy Mystery of the person of Jesus Christ. To me it all seems to come down to Faith in Him as the Divine Actualizer of the Idea of eternal truth, as the Living Truth itself assigning to all speculation its true and complete content, as God Himself who as man walks among men, who by His entry into the world first made possible a genetically progressive, ever more closely self-determining knowledge of truth in its divinely human and complete form. To me the spirit of such Faith, united to that of hope and love, appears to be the breath of Life which must penetrate science in its endeavors and lead it on, and which at once must keep science humble. For only the mysteries of science can lend science its power—inasmuch as these mysteries come to be known as the mysteries of Faith. Our agreement is perhaps more certain than I can know. But, on delicate matters such as this, one can reach understanding and certitude only personally and by oral conversation. [475]

Windischmann's preoccupation with the "mystery" of Christ and the "humility" of a science subject to "infinite progress" reveals doubts and reservations about Hegel's alleged "panlogism" similar to those which worried von Baader, Göschel, Weisse, and others. He did not receive an immediate response from Hegel on the question. In fact it was only after Hegel's 1829 review of Göschel's *Aphorisms* (Ch 19 on Hegelian pietism) that Windischmann felt he had received clarification:

I am happy to see from your judgment of the *Aphorisms*, . . . that as far as the important relations of faith and knowledge are concerned you have expressed yourself just as I expressed the hope you would on page 635 of the second volume of the translation of Joseph de Maistre. . . . You have borne an important testimony to truth by declaring yourself so decisively Christian, seeing that precisely on this point judgments were not yet settled. [605]

The translation mentioned above was of Maistre's *Les Soirées de Saint Pétersbourg*. Subtitled "Conversations on the Temporal Government of Providence," this work by the Ultramontane, archconservative philosopher of the French Restoration was published in German translation in 1824 with supplements by Windischmann, who sent Hegel a copy in 1825 [500].

In later years Windischmann's relationship with Hegel was clouded by Hegel's

oral charge of plagiarism against Windischmann in connection with their respective treatments of Chinese philosophy. Windischmann had long been interested in Oriental philosophy and religion, but Hegel felt that the first volume of his *Philosophy in the Course of World History* (1827), which was devoted to China, drew upon privately circulating notes from his own lectures on the philosophy of history. In the same letter in which Windischmann voices satisfaction with Hegel on the relation of faith and knowledge, he expresses chagrin over the plagiarism charge. Denying any borrowing from Hegel's lectures, he explains the admitted similarities of treatment as due at least in part to common sources, and suggests that Hegel should have been delighted to find his views confirmed by an independent investigator. "I began with Chinese philosophy," he explained, "because of my longstanding plan of beginning with what is the most ancient, simple, and primitive in the natural history of man, and of grasping the supernatural only from the point when it openly reveals itself in world history" [605].

Windischmann's and Hegel's accord on China extended to error as well: both were wrong in supposing China to be the most ancient historical civilization, having been misled by the veneration for antiquity characteristic of China's own historians. The ideological abyss between the two thinkers, however, would have driven them further apart, and thus perhaps obviated the charge of plagiarism, had the subject been modern Europe rather than China. Hegel last saw Windischmann in 1827 on his way to Paris [566], but we have seen from Hegel's relations, both that year and later, with Victor Cousin's circle of liberals in the French capital that he remained a son of the Enlightenment despite growing tactical trepidations. What Joseph de Maistre was in French political literature, Karl Ludwig von Haller—the reactionary patrician ideologue from Bern, whose aristocracy Hegel knew well—was in the German literature of the time. And Hegel made no effort in his *Philosophy of Law* (§219, §258) to hide his contempt for von Haller's cult of blind obedience. It is true that in the review of Göschel which pleased Windischmann, Hegel repudiated pure conceptuality without love, feeling, heart, or representation. However, the pietistic interpretation of this repudiation, which seems most natural, falls short of the sort of humility of science before sacred mystery for which Windischmann calls. It is true that Hegel denied that the Absolute is reducible to a conceptual system. But since that system is, however incomplete, the Absolute's self-comprehension, Christ—who for Hegel as for Windischmann is the Absolute, the actualization of the logical idea, and the true content of all speculative philosophy—stands revealed to knowledge and thus eludes the category of mystery for Hegel (*Werke* XVII, 112). Even if there is more in the Absolute than can ever be thought, nothing in particular irreparably eludes thought. In 1823 Hegel conceded mysticism as a possible path to speculative truth [459]. It would be a crude mistake, however, to confuse "mysticism" here with an acquiescence in mystery.

Hegel and Franz von Baader

IN 1816 HEGEL WAS contemptuous of the "intensive method" by which Franz von Baader—the Bavarian mining engineer turned lay Catholic theologian and theosophist—dispatched philosophy in a few pages [278]. Eleven years later, after von Baader's abortive ecumenical mission to Russia, Hegel wrote in the Preface to the second edition of the *Encyclopaedia* that he and von Baader were in essential agreement. The only comparable example of a noted contemporary occasioning such a reversal on Hegel's part is Jacobi. Immanuel Niethammer was instrumental in Jacobi's case (Ch 5 on Jacobi), and to some extent was in von Baader's as well. Niethammer knew both Jacobi and von Baader in Munich. Schelling was of course also in Munich, and the post-1811 hostility between Jacobi and Schelling may have contributed to the rapprochement between Hegel and Jacobi. If so, after Jacobi's death in 1819, Hegel's support of von Baader was a way of checking the hostile influence of Schelling. Although von Baader had known Schelling since 1801 and had sympathized with his philosophy of nature, he was critical of Schelling's pantheistic tendencies. He approved Schelling's turn toward theism in *On Freedom of the Will* (1809), and in the 1811 polemics with Jacobi. Yet from 1812 Schelling ceased to publish. Von Baader was obliged to acknowledge that the mantle of German philosophy had passed to Hegel, whose *Logic* he carefully studied.

Since von Baader was a lay Catholic theologian championing the Lutheran mystic Jakob Boehme, to Hegel von Baader's work may have seemed to tend toward an internal Protestant reformation within Catholicism itself. After Hegel's death von Baader challenged papal authority, and in 1838 fell under a general church ban on lay theology professorships. What most distinguished Protestantism in Hegel's view was of course that truth and enlightenment were the common possession of the laity, not the preserve of a priestly hierarchy [272, 309]. But a further cause of Hegel's rapprochement with von Baader was likely the influence of Baron Boris von Üxküll, a Russian student of Hegel's from Estonia who had fought against Napoleon and who knew von Baader.

BORIS VON ÜXKÜLL AND RUSSIA

Alexander I of Russia was apparently influenced in his conception of the Holy Alliance by 1814 and 1815 appeals addressed from von Baader to the Prussian, Austrian, and Russian sovereigns. Von Baader sought to reverse the French Revo-

lution's anti-Christian secularization of politics. He strove for a reunification of Protestantism, Catholicism, and Orthodox Christianity; and of religion and politics. He opposed both Jesuits and Encyclopaedists. In the early 1820s he tried to found an Academy for Religious Science in St. Petersburg, and in 1822 he and Boris von Üxküll set out from Berlin for Russia with this in mind. For reasons that are not entirely clear, however, von Baader was expelled from Russia. Returning to Berlin in 1823, he remained there until spring 1824. Perhaps the Russians sensed von Baader was secretly trying to establish Catholic domination of the Orthodox Church. Hegel himself was invited to join von Baader and von Üxküll on the trip to St. Petersburg [421], though he finally decided to visit the Low Countries instead (Ch 22). But that Hegel toyed with the idea of joining von Baader for the trip is curious in view of Hegel's antipathy to the feudal despotism of the Tsar (*Werke* 7, 403). Hope after 1815 that Alexander I would institute liberal reforms had already been dashed by 1822. Still, Hegel recognized the geopolitical importance of Russia. Though his lectures on world history, aiming to understand the past and present, hardly mention Russia, a fragment from a 1821 letter to von Üxküll [406] shows Hegel's sense of Russia's future.

The fragment echoes Napoleon's view after 1812 that Western Europe had reached the limit of its development. Napoleon once contemplated fleeing to America, which Hegel would call the "land of the future" (*Werke* XI, 129). Already on the way back from Moscow in 1812, Napoleon also evoked the Russian spectre over Europe. Hegel's youth was spent under the hegemony of France, which produced the Revolution. Napoleon's defeat marked a transfer of leadership to Germany, whose mission would be to unite a spiritual reformation to the French political revolution. Hegel's comment to von Üxküll shows that, contrary to the usual interpretation of Hegel's philosophy of history, world history might not be completed in the Germanic world. Yet, should the Slavic world assume a "higher destiny" in world history, it would have to unburden itself of its feudal past and play a further role in human emancipation. Hegel perhaps briefly viewed von Baader's mission to St. Petersburg as a way of bringing Russia closer to the orbit of Western world history.

Hegel to von Üxküll [406]

[Berlin, November 28, 1821]

. . . You are so fortunate to have a fatherland which occupies such a great place in the realm of world history, and which no doubt still has a much higher destiny. The other modern states, it could seem, may have already more or less achieved the goal of their development. Several among them may already have their point of culmination behind them, their condition having become stagnant. Among the remaining states Russia, on the other hand, is perhaps already the strongest power, and may well bear within her womb an immense possibility for development of her intensive nature. You have the personal good fortune of having—by your birth, wealth, talents, knowledge, and services already rendered—the more immediate prospect of a by-no-means subordinate position in this colossal edifice. . . .

HEGEL AND VON BAADER were in personal contact in Berlin both before and after the latter's unsuccessful mission. Something of Hegel's attitude toward von Baader's trip appears in this contemporary fragment.

Hegel to von Üxküll [Rosenkranz, 303-04]

[date unknown]

. . . it is said that no one has much success passing as a prophet in his own homeland. So I should have thought that he [von Baader] would find acceptance in Russia. Yet so far it would appear not to be so. They are looking him over very carefully. Such a prophetic man, being esteemed but little, is able on the one hand to arouse fewer suspicions and on the other to be more effective than someone who is clearer about himself and thoughts, about men and conditions, and who among other things is thus more honest with himself and others.

EXCEPT FOR THESE fragments, the letters Hegel wrote to von Üxküll were lost in a 1905 fire at the family estate in Estonia (*Briefe* II, 491). The only other available letter from Hegel to the family was addressed to the Baron's mother in September 1822:

Hegel to Mrs. von Üxküll. [430]

Berlin, September 10, 1822

Following the instructions of Baron Boris von Üxküll, I have the honor, Madame, of sending you the manuscript of the lecture which he gave in Paris at the *Institut de France*, and which he had the kindness to send me.

In taking the liberty of congratulating the mother of a son whose genius and activities have won honors for him in all walks of life, I ask you to accept assurances of the deepest respect with which I have the honor of being your very humble servant Hegel, Professor at Berlin University.

HEGEL'S ABORTIVE COURTSHIP OF VON BAADER

The sole letter we have from Hegel to von Baader was written during the latter's 1823-24 stay in Berlin. Von Baader's reputation as a philosopher was largely based on his *Fermenta Cognitionis*, the first four volumes of which appeared in Berlin between 1822 and 1824, the last volume appearing in 1825 in Munich. The volumes evidence both von Baader's debt to Hegel's *Logic* and reservations about the Hegelian system. Hegel's interest was aroused [699].

Von Baader ultimately rejected: 1, the panlogist tendency he saw in Hegel, 2, the revolutionist Hegelian philosophy of history and deification of the state, 3, the process view of God as embracing both man and nature in a divine autobiography, 4, Hegel's elevation of philosophy above religion. Yet despite apparent differences, Hegel sought to persuade both the public and von Baader himself that their positions were reconcilable (*Werke* VIII, 22). Von Baader responded negatively to such overtures, though he respected Hegel as a critic of Kant, Fichte, and Schelling (Grassl, 110).

The objection that Hegelianism absolutized logic was of course a common one. In 1828 Issak Rust, who studied under Hegel in Heidelberg, wrote to Hegel from Munich that Schelling's fundamental idea was that philosophy so far—e.g. in the reigning Hegelian system—had only been considered from the "logical point of view" [588]. Four years before, von Baader had characterized Hegelianism to Windischmann as a "philosophy of dust," protesting the excessive stress of Hegel's Berlin students on concepts without representation, imagery, or poetry [*Berichten* 401].

Von Baader's social philosophy was medieval in inspiration. He rejected equality as a social ideal. He insisted on subordination of the individual to the state, but equally on subordination of the state to the church. He opposed laissez-faire economics, and in the 1830s would advocate a church-led organization of the proletariat.

In the 1827 Preface to the *Encyclopaedia* Hegel sought to address the third objection that the speculative philosophy reduced nature to God—i.e., the idea—in a state of self-alienation or fallenness (*Werke* VIII, 22-23). To von Baader, Hegel developed the Gnostic Schellingian view that created nature is inherently evil, its destiny lying in an eventual reconciliation with the God from Whom it fell away at creation. The Fall and Creation are equated. As a theist von Baader was concerned to defend the integrity of the creature, especially the personality of the created self. Quite apart from the question of who is right philosophically, Hegel's protests against von Baader's interpretation of him do not seem fully convincing.

Three years earlier, in his letter of January 1824 [466a], Hegel sought to defend himself against the criticism that religion is transcended by philosophy in his system. Hegel asserts that religion and philosophy are identical in content, differing only in form. Yet his logic, which propounds the identity of form and content (*Werke* X, 34-35), excludes an identity of content with a distinction of form. The form of religious representation (*Vorstellung*) projects God as transcendent, "external" or "given," while philosophy remains rational or "free," "at home with itself" in relation to an object which is immanent. This difference in the form of apprehending God implies a difference of *belief content*—though not of *subject content* or what Hegel below calls "truth content"—between philosophy and religion. Religion apprehends falsely what philosophy grasps truly. Rightly or wrongly, Hegel thus subordinates religion to philosophy. It is difficult not to attribute any reluctance to admit this to the insecurities Hegel felt in Berlin during the Restoration.

Drawing on Neoplatonism and the German mystics, especially Jacob Boehme, von Baader himself held that faith and knowledge, religion and philosophy, were complementary. Faith is imperfect until raised to the level of knowledge or enlightenment; yet human knowledge is a participation in divine knowledge and thus presupposes religious faith. Von Baader as well as Hegel rejected "religious Kotzebuanism" (Ch 17 on Kotzebue) devoted to an anticonceptual mysticism, religious faith without conceptual comprehension. Since the relation of feeling and concept was the crux of Hegel's polemical activity, von Baader's position on this single issue makes Hegel's affinity with him understandable. Von Baader coined

the phrase "religious Kotzebuanism" (Grassl, 110), but in its Jacobian, Friesian, and Schleiermacherian forms Hegel had made it his chief polemical target.

Hegel to Nicolai's Publishing House [699]

[undated]

I wish to order Franz von Baader's *Fermenta Cognitionis*, which has appeared in serial form. Professor Hegel.

Hegel to von Baader [466a]

January 19, 1824 [Berlin]

I wanted to express personally my sincere thanks, dear sir, for the kindly forwarded volume [five] of *Fermenta*, but I did not find you at home, and since yesterday I have been incidentally prevented from visiting you. I do not want to wait any longer to let you know what great interest your gift has aroused in me, especially since there are so few workers in this field where work is most greatly needed.

I think we are in agreement on the main issue. A few misgivings concerning a small number of points which you cite from my work probably would easily be removed. As for the way in which I speak of the difference between religion and philosophy, I reduce everything to a distinction in the *form* of cognition. In view of what is not merely a communality but indeed an identity of truth *content* in the two cases—a content to which Spirit, the Holy Spirit, bears *witness*, in other words in which reason is at home *with itself* or *free*—I designate the form of religion chiefly by the expression *representation*, i.e., as a mode by which religious consciousness is occupied with something *external*, *given*, and so on. Because religion not only ought but in fact does exist for *everybody*, and not merely for those educated in thinking, its content is, so to speak, to enter the heart and speak through representation, through the mode of our ordinary consciousness, without being elaborated by scientific concepts. And, *from this vantage point*, I hold that *thinking* reason is not at home with itself in such content insofar as the content is merely represented.

The sore point with which our age and our North are afflicted you yourself have accurately hit upon and very well characterized as *religious Kotzebuanism*. It will not shrink from offering resistance, though resistance of a peculiar nature. Here we indeed have *world-wisdom*—to use the label with which these people again affect to designate philosophy—which has thus severed itself from form as well as content, and has *swept its house clean* [*la maison nette*]. The hangman, while not merely riding the [horse of] world-wisdom religiously, does not do so in a purely nonreligious manner either. He does so to try his hand at theology as well, and thus to despise and contest content and thoughts alike, bearing spiritless witness to conceits, to subjective as well as objective futilities of grammatical, historical, and still other sorts. The resistance [in question] thus becomes the force of inertia against the concept, the force of conceit against it, as at once activity directed at reversing rather than apprehending it, bedeviling [*bekratzen*] it with the scabs it inflicts upon it.

But enough of this. In any case I cannot prevent notebooks from my lectures

from circulating. Mr. [Leopold] von Henning will gladly impart his own to you. I cannot generally vouch for what is contained in such notebooks. But I am confidently certain of the use to which you will put them.

Please spare me an evening sometime soon. Let me know which evening this week you are free and could grant me the kindness of a visit. Most respectfully, Hegel

JAKOB BOEHME

What Hegel valued in von Baader was, according to the 1827 *Encyclopaedia*, his endeavor to exhibit the philosophical idea underlying the writings of mystics like Boehme. Von Baader himself reports stimulating Hegel's enthusiasm for Meister Eckhart in private discussion (*Berichten* 397). In 1830 von Baader expressed appreciation for Hegel's 1827 published support by dedicating his lectures on Boehme's *Mysterium Magnum* to Hegel [648]. Hegel had written to van Ghert in 1811 that the difficulty of Boehme lay in the fact that he struggled to express a genuinely speculative content in the language of representation. In Hegel's view von Baader had resumed this struggle, but with the assistance of the Hegelian *Logic* was better able to break through representation to the concept. The identity of form and content implies the imperfection of any speculative content—such as Boehme's—as expressed in a still imperfect conceptual form. In the German mystics and even in Schelling there was a Neoplatonic element that was foreign to Hegel. Eckhart's distinction between the Godhead and the trinitarian God, like Boehme's distinction between the Abyss and the personal God, recalled the Neoplatonic distinction between the One beyond all process or differentiation and its emanations, but it also anticipated Schelling's distinction between the identity of indifference and the world of finitude. The genuinely speculative intuition imperfectly present in Boehme was not the intuition of a One or *Urgrund* beyond all differentiation, but of identity in difference, i.e., the identity of the finite and infinite. Hegel detected the same intuition of identity in difference in von Baader, who vehemently objected to Schelling's "indeterminate infinite."

Hegel to van Ghert [192]

[draft]

[Nuremberg, July 29, 1811]

Your kind intention, my dear sir and friend, has finally been realized. The edition of Jakob Boehme, along with the other enclosures, has reached me in good condition. Please accept my heartfelt thanks for this beautiful gift of friendship and remembrance. It has pleased me greatly. The edition and copy are excellent. Now I can study Jakob Boehme much more closely than before, since I was not myself in possession of his writings. His theosophy will always be one of the most remarkable attempts of a penetrating yet uncultivated man to comprehend the innermost essential nature of the absolute essence [*Wesens*]. For Germany, he has the special interest of being really the first German philosopher. Given the limitations of his time and his own slight training in abstract thinking, his endeavor constitutes the most arduous struggle both to bring the deep speculative [content], which he holds

in his intuition, into [the form of] representation and to so master the element of representational [thinking] that the speculative content might be expressed in it. There remains so little that is constant and fixed in his work, because he feels everywhere the inadequacy of representation to what he is trying to achieve, and feels representation again overturned. This is why—seeing that this reversing of absolute reflection [*Werke* III, *Propaedeutic*, 1810-, 42-43] lacks determinate consciousness and conceptual form—there appears such great confusion. It will be difficult or, so it seems to me, impossible to go beyond recognition of the general depth of his basic principles and to disentangle matters of detail and determinateness.

To the Low Countries, 1822

IN 1822 HEGEL SET OUT on the first of his three major excursions of the Berlin period. The trip, like other shorter ones, was funded by the Prussian government. It took him west to Coblenz, then north on the Rhine to Cologne, and then to Brussels, where he was reunited with Peter van Ghert, his former student, friend, and follower—with whom he now shared an interest in the emerging Napoleonic legend. His homeward journey took him through The Hague and Amsterdam before returning him to German territory. The artistic dimensions of the three major trips paralleled the development of the art forms in Hegel's fine arts lectures from architecture to literature. The trip to the Low Countries highlighted architecture, sculpture, and painting, while his 1824 trip to Vienna was a largely musical experience, and his 1827 experience in Paris was chiefly theatrical.

WINNING A UNIVERSITY TRAVEL GRANT, BERLIN 1822

When Hegel came to Berlin in 1818, von Altenstein, the Prussian Minister, promised an expanded field of activity and income [332]. He hoped to obtain for Hegel membership with an annual stipend in the Berlin Academy of Sciences. Not having heard from von Altenstein in this regard since his 1818 appointment, Hegel inquired in June 1822 [413]. It turned out that suspicion of philosophy during the "demagoguery" scare in the early 1820s had persuaded the Minister that it would be unwise to press forward quickly on Hegel's behalf [417]. Von Altenstein regretted "not being able to implement the project. . . originally conceived to improve. . . [Hegel's] situation." "It was not possible," he explained, "without running the risk of harming you and your activity, and even now—despite the favorable turn certain events have taken—I hesitate to execute my project too quickly."

Yet he was able to announce a 300-thaler reimbursement for Hegel's 1821 trip to Dresden, and an equal sum for another trip in 1822. Having been induced to view the 1821 trip as necessary for the restoration of Hegel's health, he saw the proposed fall 1822 trip in the same light [417]. He obtained new travel funds for it through a June 10 appeal to Chancellor von Hardenberg, describing Hegel to von Hardenberg as "in all probability the deepest and most substantial philosopher Germany has." "With courage, earnestness, and expert knowledge," von Altenstein continued, "he has opposed solid philosophizing to spreading degeneration, and has broken through the darkness of youth. He is to be highly honored for his convictions, and

this along with his beneficial influence will generally be acknowledged even by those filled with mistrust of all philosophy'' (*Berichten* 376). Von Hardenberg responded favorably on June 21, and Hegel thanked von Altenstein on July 3 [418].

Hegel to von Altenstein [413]

Berlin, June 6, 1822

Your Excellency was gracious enough at the time of my appointment to the local university to give me hope that your developing plans for scientific establishments would enable you to open up a more extensive [field of] activity for me and increase my income in the future.

I could only view realization of these kind assurances in the context of Your Excellency's high aims for the advancement of the sciences and education of youth, and in that context I could only view my own wish for an improvement in my economic situation as subordinate. Because, however, four and a half years have elapsed since my appointment here, and because my situation has come to weigh heavily on me due to a variety of domestic misfortunes, I was inevitably reminded of Your Excellency's gracious earlier statements. Your Excellency's kind sentiments permit me to speak of the wishes occasioned by such circumstances. I have not acknowledged the supplement in my salary stemming from your kind appointment of me to the local Royal Scientific Board of Examiners [Ch 14 on philosophy in the gymnasium] without appreciation of the associated economic advantage. But this supplement is almost completely consumed through my greater responsibility with advancing age to think of the future of my wife and children. This responsibility is all the greater inasmuch as I have totally sacrificed what means I possessed to acquire the training which I now place in the Royal service. The premiums paid to the general widows' fund, assuring a future yearly payment of 300 thalers to those I leave behind, already cause, along with what I must pay into the university widows' fund, a yearly expense of 170 thalers. And with such a considerable sacrifice each year I cannot be blind to the fact that, should I not die as a professor at the Royal University, all that I have paid into the university widows' fund will be completely lost, and that due to my payments into the general widows' fund my future widow and children will even less be able to expect support by the grace of His Royal Majesty.

In addition to the expense required for protection for my family, illnesses in the family, along with the heavy educational costs in this city for my growing children and setbacks suffered for some time now in my own health, have burdened me with expenses I could not afford out of my present income. I may frankly add that thorough and conscientious treatment of the scientific discipline to which I devote my powers in the Royal service requires both more time and effort of a wholly greater order than is the case with the subjects taught by many another professor. It thus leaves me little time even to improve my income by authoring literary works. Moreover, philosophical works, even when addressed to the public, offer in any case very little economic reward.

In view of all this, I have thought myself permitted to take the respectful

liberty of humbly commending both my circumstances and my cherished hopes to the same gracious favor which Your Excellency showed me already last fall by according a trip [to Dresden] for the restoration of my health and usefulness in my official occupations [Ch 23, first section]. Your Excellency's humble servant, Hegel, Titular Professor at the local Royal university

Hegel to von Altenstein [418]

Berlin, July 3, 1822

Your Excellency has chosen to respond so graciously to my humble petition of June 6 that I feel obliged to express my most sincere gratitude. The extraordinary remuneration kindly granted to me on June 26 frees me from the various urgent economic burdens which I carried. Moreover, such help acquires higher meaning both from the delicate way in which it was extended and from the kind words with which Your Excellency has deigned to accompany it. Permit me to thank Your Excellency for this in particular, and to do so all the more deeply inasmuch as your kind satisfaction thus far with my public activity encourages and strengthens me in this difficult profession of mine.

As to further enhancement of my external situation, I must respectfully entrust myself to Your Excellency's wise judgment with the same absolute confidence I had in accepting your honorable appointment of me to the Royal civil service. Given the scope of the profession to which I have dedicated my life, I can hardly think of any further enhancement of my situation except what is by itself immediately attached to it, namely to complete the scientific works I have begun, to win for my scientific endeavors further efficacy, and to direct them to the greater public. In this work, for the good success of which freedom and serenity of mind are also especially necessary, I need not fear being troubled or disturbed by any further worries of an external nature after Your Excellency has completely reassured me by kind promises in this regard, and after various unmistakable signs have instilled the heartening conviction in me that possible anxieties on the part of the highest authorities which can easily be caused by wrongheaded endeavors in philosophy [389, 390] have left my public efficacy as a professor untouched. I have, on the contrary, been persuaded that my work as well has not gone without recognition and success in helping young minds studying here attain correct concepts, and in making me worthy of the trust of Your Excellency and of the Royal Government. With sentiments of the most respectful gratitude, Your Excellency's humble servant, Hegel, Titular Professor at the local Royal university

TO THE RHINE

Though Hegel felt obliged to take a trip for his health, a desire to fill gaps in his aesthetic education also played a role. By mid-September he was en route, writing his wife from the Prussian city Magdeburg southwest of Berlin. He was unattracted by the city's relatively plain cathedral, preferring the more completely Gothic Sebald Church in his wife's own Nuremberg. Nuremberg had been a birthplace of German art, and was the home of Peter Vischer, the great bronze sculptor whom

Hegel mentions in connection with the Magdeburg Cathedral [431]. Vischer's Magdeburg Apostles, which Hegel finds "really too awful," are from his *Tomb of the Archbishop Ernst* [1495]. They are more Gothic in style than the Apostles from Vischer's "Shrine of St. Sebald" (1508-19) in the Nuremberg church, which show the influence of the Italian Renaissance that Hegel prefers.

With little to captivate Hegel aesthetically in Magdeburg, the highlight of his stopover was the chance to meet General Lazare Carnot, the elderly French revolutionary. Carnot had been a member of the Legislative Assembly and Convention. As a member of the Committee for Public Safety he organized the mass mobilization that assured France victory against the crown heads of Europe. Though Carnot had played no major role during the Empire, he was a minister during the Hundred Days after Napoleon's return from Elba, and was accordingly exiled by Louis XVIII. There can hardly be a better example of the ambiguity of Hegel's position than the homage he paid to this symbol of the Revolution during a trip funded by Prussia on grounds of his political trustworthiness in the face of the "degeneration of youth" and widespread suspicion of philosophy.

Heading toward Cassel, Hegel left Prussia, stopping en route in Brunswick, a ducal residence, and very briefly in the university town of Göttingen. Napoleon had incorporated Brunswick into Westphalia in 1807, but the ducal line, siding with the Prussians, reestablished the Duchy at the Congress of Vienna. Cassel, capital of the Landgraviate of Hesse-Cassel, had been the Westphalian capital, but reverted to the Landgrave after the Congress of Vienna. The palace which Hegel notes on Wilhelmshöhe, a hill overlooking the city with a monumental statue of Hercules at the top, was in the recent neoclassical style. The paintings missing from the gallery in Cassel which Hegel reports visiting [433] had been taken by Napoleon in 1806 and given to the Empress Josephine, who later sold them to Tsar Alexander I.

En route to Coblenz [433] Hegel stopped in the Protestant university town of Marburg, dominated by a hilltop castle and the Gothic St. Elizabeth Church. In Coblenz, on the Rhine, he returned to Prussian territory. The nearby fortress of Ehrenbreitstein, which Hegel visited, guarded Prussia's western gate and was reputedly impregnable. A leading Berlin Hegelian, Johannes Schulze, had been a Prussian Church and School Councillor in Coblenz between 1816 and 1818, and Hegel accordingly came to Prussia's western provinces with recommendations from Schulze. An undated query to Schulze [693] appears to echo the 1822 trip.

From Coblenz to Cologne Hegel took the customary boat trip down the Rhine, stopping at the towns of Neuwied and Linz, and at Bonn. Neuwied was founded as a refuge for victims of religious intolerance. In Linz Hegel visited the parish church, seeing a triptych representing scenes from the life of the Virgin Mary by the so-called Cologne Master of the Life of Mary, while in Bonn he visited the philosopher Windischmann [Ch 20].

In Cologne itself he was captivated by the city's Gothic cathedral, originally conceived by Meister Gerard in the thirteenth century. Work on the cathedral was suspended in the sixteenth century, to be resumed only two years before Hegel's visit. His description [436] of the cathedral hesitates between a predisposition to

construe it romantically and an encounter with a colossal Oriental-symbolic structure indifferent to human function. For Hegel Oriental architecture symbolically elaborated form apart from utilitarian function, while classical architecture subordinated form to function. The Christian-Romantic Gothic cathedral combined both symbolic and classical aspects, at once functioning to embrace the community in worship and elaborating form in "upward flight" [436] as a conscious symbol of that very function, that is, of the turn away from finite interests.

Painting as well as architecture continued to hold Hegel's interest. He tells his wife that to *see* is to see with the eyes of a painter. Unlike architecture, which has an Oriental bias, painting is more Christian-Romantic, expressing pluralistic individuality rather than monistic substantiality. It expresses the individuality of the Christian soul, as in works of such Italian portrait painters as Correggio in which light is not restricted to an external source but wells forth from a depth in the individual's own breast [437]. The claim that only the painter *sees* thus has a metaphysical implication, privileging aesthetic experience and the category of individuality upheld by Herder and Goethe. It also highlights the potential of sight-seeing as a metaphysical experience insofar as the tourist sees with the eyes of a painter. Unlike Goethe, Hegel apparently never tried to paint. But his travelogues show him as an occasional poet, seeking to transmute what is seen with a painter's eye into the more spiritual medium of language. Since God is an infinite spiritual community of individuals rather than a classically ideal individual, art has died as a revelation of the Infinite for Hegel. But it survives as a revelation of various uniquely individual members—e.g., "a single human being" [436]—of that spiritual community.

Hegel to His Wife [431]

Sunday morning, September 15, 1822

Good morning, dear Maria, from the sunshine of Marianburg, i.e. Magdeburg, whose maid [*Magd*] is Holy Mary, to whom the Cathedral is or [before the Reformation] was dedicated.

The first thing I would have to tell to assure you a good morning, namely that we have arrived safely, follows in part from what I have already said. I have traveled in quite decent company. It got cold at night, but four woolen wraps or coats gave me sufficient protection, so that after unpeeling with great pains I have remained intact. We arrived here yesterday midday at one o'clock, but it is more difficult to get out of Magdeburg than into it. The Postmaster and Prussian intelligence for all their alertness have not yet cast an eye on the local mail coach service, at least not as far as it affects me. The coach for Cassel does not leave until midday Tuesday—or almost, I should say. The daily coach on which I arrived makes no connection with any further departure. To stay here until Tuesday is much too long. I thus decided, since there is a coach for Erfurt early tomorrow, to take that direction first. How nice it would be to bring Goethe personally the packet I had to send him from here [432], and from there to travel further down the great military thoroughfare [of Napoleon's retreat to the Rhine before the Allied advance]. But at that point I saw the mail coach. What a cart! I would have had to travel on it about

forty-four leagues to Cassel. I thus decided to take the special mail coach, but now learn I would be transported on the same sort of cart—a rack-wagon under the open sky. At that point I was briefly determined to return quickly to Berlin to fetch my traveling coach and then, properly equipped, comfortably resume this trip I am [supposed to be] taking for my health. With this happy thought of soon seeing you dear ones again I fell asleep and passed the night quite well. Yet you see that I would not be returning like [St.] Peter [to Rome] with the intention of staying home but, on the contrary, with that of in all seriousness traveling off again. Moreover, to stay home would have been no miracle, for I indeed started this trip with more reluctance than I was permitted to express. If I had not already obtained the money, as necessary as the trip was for me it would have been difficult to bring me to it.

By the way, I saw yesterday afternoon what is to be seen here—the famous Cathedral—which may be noteworthy simply because it is a cathedral. But the overall architecture is not as well conceived as the Gothic churches of Nuremberg, and the art work inside—a bunch of wooden and cast [bronze] statues, paintings, and plaster—is really too awful. The cast Apostles by [Peter] Vischer of Nuremberg cannot be compared with those in Nuremberg. The works sink entirely to the level of handicraft. But of all that I saw the most treasured sight was General Carnot, a kind old man and Frenchman. It was the famous Carnot. He took it kindly that I looked him up. I then took a walk along the Elbe, where a fleet of thirteen ships out of Hamburg entered with swollen sails. Each vessel had two sails, though only one mast. The Elbe is a beautiful stream, flanked by beautiful vast fertile plains—though fertile here, elsewhere, along the stretch between Potsdam and Burg, which we saw by day, they are completely desolate—all under the even more beautiful and most radiant of skies. . . .

Right now a coachman is arriving. He has to take an Englishman, who as it appears is [really] German, to Cassel in three days; I will join him. . . .

Hegel to His Wife [433]

Cassel, September 18, 1822

I thus arrived safe and sound this morning at eleven o'clock in Cassel. Having still strolled about much in the morning and afternoon, I want to occupy myself this evening with you, my dear, and with an account of my way of life and mode of travel thus far. . . . My trip is not proceeding as quickly as first intended. So far things have been fairly tolerable. For people who have money and keep to the military [i.e., main] highway the world is in good shape. But also implied in this is that they receive good news from their loved ones. I left reassured about you. I cannot be completely free of worry, however, and for still other reasons I set out with great reluctance and really continue my travel only because I am at last en route, as I am obliged to be.

Now to the heart of the matter. Nothing came of the plan to hire with the Englishman a coachman in Magdeburg to make the trip here. So we boarded the coach Monday noon in Magdeburg for Brunswick. This route to Cassel is the most usual one, only one or two leagues farther than the one I had in mind as the most direct. Everywhere we found excellent highways and good mail coaches. Here I

must apologize to the Prussian postal service, toward which I was indignant in my previous letter on account of the other routes. The coach was upholstered, fitted out with green morocco and so on. We arrived in Brunswick toward five o'clock in the morning. At the suggestion that we travel via Brunswick I recalled that Governmental Representative [to Berlin University Christoph Ludwig] Schultz had spoken to me of a painting there which was worth a trip all by itself. We thus saw the museum there, especially the gallery, and in it there were to be sure outstanding, superb pieces. The painting the Governmental Representative had in mind is in particular of quite singular excellence.

Having slept through the afternoon—having seen beforehand beautiful gardens and an iron obelisk seventy feet high erected in memory of the last two dukes who died in the war against the French—and afterwards seen a bad comedy, we boarded the express coach [*Diligence*] again after ten o'clock—or rather, quite in the spirit of [Friedrich August] Wolf's travesty, boarded sloth itself [*die Paresse*]. The night was beautiful, the stars shone splendidly, and the morning star rose with a special beauty. Now, in broad daylight we saw a different natural physiognomy: no longer tilled or untilled plains, but beautiful oak woods, mountains, hills, gentle slopes covered with orchards, valleys with meadows—in short, a nature reminiscent of at least my homeland, for you were born in a region which is half sandy and are perhaps in your native element in Berlin a little more than I. On we traveled in just such beautiful countryside. With my Englishman, who speaks French and some German as well, I got along very well. He is a young man of twenty-five or -six, handsome, somewhat like the actor [Karl Wilhelm] Blum. He is of the same bearing but makes a still better impression, good-natured and well-informed. He is on his way from Italy to Paris. From Paris he will set out via Milan to Constantinople; traveling privately, not too fat, rich—in short, just as I would also wish other traveling companions from now on. In Northeim, where we arrived yesterday [Wednesday] at three in the afternoon and where my coach had to wait on a second one until about eight or nine that evening, I decided it would be too uncomfortable for me to spend a third night without a bed and proper sleep. I thus took the special mail coach, which first went to Göttingen—scholarly Göttingen. By the way, merely tell our dear friend [Johannes] Schulze that as a titular professor from Berlin I did not mind traveling on in five minutes, but that I did not shake the dust off my shoes outside of [Göttingen's] gates only because I did not pick up any dust. I thus traveled on to Münden, where I arrived at ten o'clock and quietly slept abed until six o'clock this morning, then making the trip all the way here. The road is indeed lovely. Cassel is superbly situated in a vast valley. One already catches sight of Hercules on Wilhelmshöhe a few hours before as a peak in the middle of a mountain range. Around Cassel itself it is very beautiful. There are streets in part in the Berlin style. The meadow is a public garden of somewhat the same type as the new gardens in Potsdam, beautiful green grass with many robust trees scattered about, without shrubbery to block the view. It is lovely to amble about in it. One finally reaches a beautiful mirror of water with a bank covered in places by weeping willows, with benches, etc., and a coffeehouse where one can drink in the open air. Coffee? A chicory brew, I should say. For many days now this is all I

have gotten to drink, no coffee. The entire countryside of Brunswick is everywhere covered with fields of this deceptive root. Tomorrow I will go up Wilhelmshöhe and visit the art gallery. Today my Englishman has left me in the lurch. . . .

Friday evening, September 19, 1822

After lunch I went today again to the post office, where I registered for tomorrow's coach to Giessen. In Giessen the road to Coblenz branches off from the one to Frankfurt. I also received your letter, my dear, and cannot tell you how delighted I was. . . .

Now still something about my day. It will be brief, for an adequate description would necessarily become too detailed. In the morning I was at the library. Then I saw the gallery—from which the best items have probably gone from Paris to Petersburg instead of returning here. But there are still enough splendid pieces—especially by the Dutch painters. In the afternoon I traveled with my Englishman, whom I found again here, to Wilhelmshöhe, which affords a magnificent view. But after having climbed five or six hundred steps it was too wearisome to climb again up into the Hercules [statue]. It is a wonderful leisure castle, inhabited by the Elector, with the most exquisite promenades and an expansive view of Cassel and the fertile valley bordered by distant hills. We still hit it just right, for on the way home it started to rain, precisely on the 19th of September, the time of the autumn equinox, just like three years ago on [the Baltic island of] Rügen. May God grant that only beautiful weather follows this rain again. That year we were together to celebrate our anniversary at sea. This time you have perhaps thought of it more audibly with the children while I have done so in silence. . . .

Saturday morning, September 20, 1822

I am ready for departure. The weather is clearing up. I hope to find a letter from you in Coblenz or Cologne. I will probably get to Cologne in five to six days. I must finally close. Farewell to you all!

Hegel to Schulze [693]

[undated]

Just to be certain, I still ask whether the new inscription on the Bonn picture literally reads "Have faith in the Gospel!" Good morning, Hegel

Hegel to His Wife [434]

Coblenz, September 24 [1822]

Long live Immanuel! Here I sit, my dear, in fulfillment of my destiny of being in Coblenz, seated by a window with my darling Rhine, the bridge and Ehrenbreitstein below. I am eating grapes of the sweetest, best-tasting sort and am thinking of all three of you, of writing to you. I went to the post office this morning, but have not found a letter from you. I hope, however, to find one in Cologne if no further letter from you addressed to me here reaches me. This noon I will drink a special glass to Immanuel on his birthday, and today you will likewise drink to my health. We will thus toast quite formally! But it is not nice weather for

fireworks today; anyhow, you will take proper care of yourself. Of course there is one main matter I still do not know for sure and yet can hardly doubt, namely that our dear mother [Hegel's mother-in-law] is among those celebrating and toasting. She will thus be likewise included in the image of the table [of persons] with whom I toast. Thus, greetings [*salve*] and long life [*vivat*] to all.

Now I should continue my travelogue. I thus left Cassel Saturday afternoon. My Englishman remained behind, and so thereafter I found myself ethnically quite in my element among nothing but fellow German countrymen, but missed my fine free Englishman all the more. There were six of us, three on each seat, myself facing the rear. A student from Göttingen had and kept his Number One seat undisturbed in the rear opposite me. We sat crowded. It was not the best. We soon came to the Lahn [River], and are now still following it. Beautiful, fertile regions! Sunday noon we were in Marburg, a stooped university town badly housed, but the valleys and hills are quite lovely. I saw there St. Elizabeth Church in pure Gothic style. The choir has Catholic services while the Reformed congregation has the nave. This church is totally different from the Magdeburg Cathedral—for which our King, the people of Magdeburg said, has allotted 40,000 thalers for repairs. The tomb of Elizabeth [Church] is of the same kind as in Magdeburg. There are twelve Apostles of the same size as in Nuremberg, but seated; the work is wrought in silver and gold cover—not first rate, though richly studded with gems, with the precious ones broken out.

Then it was on to Giessen, a pleasant city and environment with two pretty castles in the neighborhood. Here I had the company of three colleagues: the Giessen philosophy professor, [Friedrich Wilhelm] Snell; Snell's Marburg colleague [Christoph Andreas] Creuzer, a cousin of the Heidelberg Creuzer; and a nontitular professor of theology, an ambitious man of insight and culture. But I had to overlook what juiceless grapes these latter two colleagues were inasmuch as the one from Giessen led us right away to the wine and treated us to a very good vintage. In Giessen we parted with those who went on to Frankfurt, among whom, as we had settled in the beginning, I was not to be counted—especially because I would otherwise have had to remain longer in the same company. But my colleague in the teaching of youth, the Israelite, remained with me. We followed the Lahn. Weilburg is romantically situated; a beautiful narrow valley rich in vegetation and pleasant bends of the Lahn. And as a former princely residence [it has] pretty estates.

We arrived there toward daybreak, and then at eleven o'clock were in Limburg. From this cursed hick town we were not conveyed on until five o'clock by the excellent Imperial postal service of the Taxi Princes! A few passengers joined us, and finally at two o'clock at night we arrived here. We ran around in the rain and pitch-dark to half a dozen inns until we finally found lodging, and in the end I still slept well this third night. In the morning I identified [the hotel] where I now am, The Three Swiss. A little while ago in the street I met [Law Professor Johann Christian] Hasse from Bonn and talked with him. I continue to spew forth even if I do not think I have much to say. This much I will say in encouragement of the friend of the Giessen student who accompanied us for a few stops. "Farewell," the

student shouted to his friend, "and write me soon!" "How am I to write you?" the friend replied, "I have nothing to say." The voyager answered: "Just write without delay. Farewell!"—upon which he sprang with boots and spurs into the mail coach. He is a superintendent's son.

I am returning from a promenade up to the Ehrenbreitstein fortification. A wonderful view; beautiful, solid works! I went into a cannon casemate where a Swabian mason's wife has her household. She explained things to me in the Swabian dialect. The rooms are very nice, bulletproof and dry. But I am not dry—this is in truth the third shirt I have put on today. You see that I am not lacking for exercise, even in marching exercises, and that the exertions are keeping me fit. We are now going to eat, and though I am satiated by the delicious grapes I will still relish it. Tomorrow I will probably arrive in Bonn. This afternoon it is raining incessantly, so I have slept late. Day after tomorrow to Cologne. I can hardly indicate anyone to whom to address letters for me. I will not be able to receive a reply to this letter before twelve days, but by then will have long since passed through Brussels. After Amsterdam I go through Emden, then Hamburg. . . . Give my greetings above all to Privy Councillor Schulze. This evening I want to visit Governmental Councillor [Friedrich] Lange. . . .

Hegel to His Wife [436]

Cologne, September 28, 1822

I thus have safely arrived in the once venerable Imperial city of Cologne. . . . In Coblenz, where my last letter ends, I remained mostly inside, resting that afternoon and the next morning. Consistorial Councillor [Friedrich] Lange, to whom Schulze had referred me, was not present. Undecided because of the weather, I let express mail coaches, riverboats, and other opportunities depart without me. Yet Wednesday afternoon the weather cleared up. I took a barge, traveled to Neuwied on the beautiful Rhine, and saw the home run by Moravian sisters. It was too dark to go into the Prince's Brazilian collection. The most beautiful part was the evening—moonlight shone beautifully over the Rhine flowing by my port-holes. Owls, whom I had never heard speak in my life, chimed in with music. In the morning, after eight o'clock, I boarded the riverboat, a barge specially fitted out for passengers. At first one could spend some time on deck, but then it got windy, cold, and rainy, ending with a continuous cold downpour. As a result the party of passengers was enclosed in the cabin. Among them were students taking their Rhine excursion. They wore white or rather yellow straw hats and carried knapsacks covered with a green oilcloth, with boots hanging out on each side and with wide new straps—everything in order. So I took my own excursion down the Rhine, though naturally with more ballast than they even if I did not thereby take in any more sights. And I could not match their proud awareness of simply taking a trip down the Rhine. The rainy weather in Coblenz had already done its part to spoil traveling for me, and this Rhine excursion business [*Rheinreiseerei*] has completed the job. If only I had not been so far from home and, most of all, had not been leery of the mail coach, I would have quickly returned home to you. I am on the whole traveling only out of duty and would draw a hundredfold more satisfac-

tion from dividing my time between you and my studies. If someday you come with me to the Rhine I will guide you about differently. On the water you see neither the Rhine nor the region. You neither see the Rhine—because you do not see it flowing through plains and hills—nor behold it as part of a painting, which is what makes for the true beauty of its setting or flow. Nor do you see the region, for you only see the banks, its limits, and at most reflect that there might be beauty concealed behind them. In Linz, where we went ashore, I saw the painting praised by our friend Privy Councillor Schulze. It is in a church on a rise from which one has a view of the Rhine and the beautiful surrounding area. We went ashore in a torrential rain at Bonn, where I visited Windischmann and his son-in-law [Ferdinand] Walter, whom you know through [Anton] Thibaut. Windischmann was healed a year ago of a six-year-old eye affliction—of the sort Jacobi had, only much worse—through prayer, in union with Prince Hohenlohe; and his health is now completely restored. With Windischmann I got along quite well, and for the time being we were indeed very satisfied with each other. I was just as pleased with Walter, who remembers you very warmly and sends his most amicable greetings. This visit refreshed me greatly. The weather cleared up as well and thus I left yesterday afternoon in a better mood. . . . Bonn has extremely narrow bumpy streets, but the surrounding region, the view, and the botanical gardens are very beautiful, though I would still rather be in Berlin.

Cologne is huge. I searched out the Cathedral right away. The majesty and gracefulness of it, or of what exists of it, the slender proportions, the elongation in them, which do not so much give the impression of a rise as of upward flight, are worth seeing and are wholly admirable as the conception of a *single* human being and the enterprise of a single city. In the Cathedral one vividly beholds in every sense a different dimension, a human world of a quite different sort, as also of another time. There is no question here of utility, enjoyment, pleasure, or satisfied need, but only a spacious ambling about enveloped by high halls that exist for themselves and, as it were, simply do not care whether people use them for whatever purpose. An empty opera house, like an empty church, has something lacking in it. We encounter here a tall forest, though admittedly a spiritual forest full of art, standing for itself, existing there regardless of whether people crawl around down below or not. It could not care less. What it is, it is for itself. It is made for itself, and whatever ambles or prays about within its walls—or tours about in it with a green oilcloth knapsack and an admittedly still unlit pipe in the mouth—is, along with the caretaker, simply lost in it. All this—standing and walking around in it—simply vanishes in it.

Mrs. Hirn, a widow who owns a wine dealership here [459] and whom I met at the Windischmanns, already invited me today for lunch in Bonn. She is a most excellent and charitable woman, very typical of Cologne. After lunch her son showed me his collection of [stained-]glass paintings—probably the richest there is—about a hundred large windows and four to five hundred smaller pieces. What splendid stained-glass windows the Cathedral also has! And other churches as well. Due to Mrs. Hirn's favor I likewise saw the Lyversberg collection: magnificent pieces, with one probably by Leonardo. Thanks to her introduction, I was also at

Professor Wallraf's, a kind dear old man of seventy-five years. He even showed me his paintings at night [including] a marvelous *Dying Madonna* smaller than Boisserée's, and then escorted me about for over half an hour—he can walk only with great difficulty—through all the old Roman *campos*—i.e., camps—in the city. The man has been very kind and affectionate to me—a good upright man.

That is my day's work. It goes without saying that I have also seen the Rhine, with the seemingly limitless string of large two-masters along it, plus another few churches. Tomorrow, Sunday morning, I will see the Cathedral again for a mass with music, and other things as well, probably in the company of the young Counts [of] Stolberg and Dean [Georg] Kellermann, their tutor of many years who was present at Stolberg's death. I will then leave tomorrow afternoon for Aachen. So far, thank goodness, everything is fine. . . . If only I were not so far from you and the boys. Embrace them warmly for me. . . .

PETER VAN GHERT

In Brussels, Hegel's next major stopover, he was reunited with Peter Gabriel van Ghert, who had been his student in Jena and was now active as a Dutch functionary responsible for church-state relations in Catholic Belgium. He had been employed by the Dutch ministry for religious affairs since 1808. In 1815 Belgium was attached to Holland by the Congress of Vienna to help check any renewal of French imperialism. Van Ghert was particularly concerned to remove education from the control of the Catholic clergy in Belgium, and felt he was thereby applying Hegel's doctrine of separation of church and state (*Phil of Law* ¶270). Between 1823 and 1829 he occupied the influential post of Ministerial Councillor at the Ministry for Roman Catholic Affairs. He was himself a Catholic, though only nominally. As late as 1817 [323] Hegel assumed that his devoted follower and former student was Protestant. Not surprisingly, van Ghert's policy in Belgium provoked the hostility of the Catholic population, and in 1829 the Dutch King sought a compromise with the Catholic clergy by removing van Ghert from office—just a year before Belgium completely threw off Dutch rule.

After van Ghert's departure from Jena, Hegel first wrote to him from Nuremberg in 1809. Concerned about Hegel's livelihood, van Ghert had offered assistance in locating a faculty post for him in Holland, though he noted classes there were still taught in Latin. Hegel responded on December 16 [152]. In July 1810, Holland, which had been ruled by Louis Bonaparte as a distinct kingdom, was annexed to France. Van Ghert expressed concern for the future of the Dutch universities in a letter of September 1810 [164].

Hegel responded to such concerns on October 15 [166], though his letter also comments on hypnotism—on which van Ghert was doing research. On June 22 [160] van Ghert claimed that by hypnotism he had cured a relative of a psychologically caused disturbance of the menstrual cycle. He asked Hegel's views on hypnotism, i.e., "animal magnetism," with reference to his hypnotic subject's apparent ability, upon interrogation in a hypnotic state of sleepwalking, to see distant objects never seen in walking life [160, 164]. Hegel sought on October 15 to

explain somnambulism by invoking the equipotentiality of organs: each specialized organ allegedly harbors the powers of all, and indeed of life itself. Inhibition of the organ of conscious vision in the sleepwalker thus allows assumption of that special function by other organs. Yet Hegel views his interpretation as a hypothesis to be tested empirically.

Van Ghert sought to facilitate understanding of the *Phenomenology* in Holland. Horrified by a Dutch review of the book characterizing it as a "description of philosophy written in a poetic and edifying language," van Ghert published a review of his own [177]. In thanking van Ghert—who had recently been appointed court recorder and substitute judge in Amsterdam [201]—for his support, Hegel at once excuses himself for the imperfection of his systematic formulations by citing the precariousness of the historical situation [215]. He does not reply to van Ghert's request [201] for a bibliography for the *Phenomenology*, but does address van Ghert's request [212] for copies of his 1801 dissertation *On Planetary Orbits*.

After his transfer to Brussels, van Ghert again offered to help Hegel obtain a university post, this time in Belgium. Several German professors were to be called to Belgian universities. Van Ghert's only complaint was that regional differences between Belgian and Dutch universities had not been eliminated in favor of a uniform educational system throughout the Realm:

It may be supposed that the Belgian universities are becoming better than the Dutch ones. The distinction should have been eliminated and the two parts more amalgamated, for we might then have expected more amity and unity between the two parts of our Realm. Fanaticism among the Catholics and Protestants is largely responsible, and it will cause still further damage—which is sad, especially since freedom of the press still exists in our land. [319]

Hegel, now teaching philosophy in his native tongue in Heidelberg, was not interested in a move to Belgium. But he used his reply to protest van Ghert's distaste for local differences. Both van Ghert and Hegel upheld the Napoleonic rational state with a controlled press, uniform laws, and state control of education. Both were critical of regionally varying legal differences based on accidents of history. Yet Hegel was now equally critical of the Napoleonic effort to eliminate positive historical differences between states by Imperial fiat. That effort had left a trail of oppression, distrust, and resentment. Hegel urges that the goal of uniform laws requires more patience. Irrational national or ethnic differences had to be tolerated to build the mutual confidence necessary for their eventual surrender. Van Ghert's Holland was, with the addition of Belgium, an imperial state in miniature. But Hegel's advice went unheeded. Both van Ghert and the Dutch King followed Napoleon's policy in assimilating Belgium, and their empire met with a similar fate.

Though in his 1817 letter [323] Hegel said that he would probably travel to Cologne that year or the next, he did not do so until 1822. But in 1822 he went all the way to Brussels. On September 28, 1822, he wrote to van Ghert from Cologne announcing his imminent arrival in the Belgian capital [435].

The kind letter, my dear sir and friend, which you graciously wrote to me on August 4th, with its assurance of continued remembrance of me this year, has pleased me. Such proof of sympathetic friendship has touched me deeply. I note at once with satisfaction that you have already entered upon an honorable career in your fatherland. I congratulate you doubly, both because this career affords the opportunity of generally serving your fatherland and because it enables you to be active on behalf of the sciences. You are, furthermore, kind enough to wish to be useful in your present position to your former teacher. I acknowledge this wish of yours with gratitude, and have postponed replying so long only to be able to write to you as to how far, given external conditions, a positive response on my part is indicated. Though no final decision on my further fate has yet come, I cannot wait to attest my heartfelt gratitude to you for your kindness, and to inform you of the circumstances of my life—in which you take kind interest. This obliges me to enter into an account of my present situation.

The catastrophe in Jena indeed destroyed my situation at that university, and forced me to take recourse to the temporary remedy of an occupation allowing me to await better prospects. I have now been Rector and Professor at the local gymnasium for a year with a salary of approximately 1,100 florins, so that my immediate economic needs are met. I had hoped to obtain an opportunity for a university professorship because of altered political conditions. Meanwhile, however, nothing has been decided. Given your interest in my fate, you are no doubt happy to see that, at least so far, it has not been as bad as you feared and has in fact been tolerable. My official duties admittedly have something heterogeneous about them. But they are nonetheless very close to my real interest in philosophy in the strictest sense, and are in part actually linked to it.

Moreover, I can only prefer the position for which you have kindly opened a prospect and offered your services over the one I presently hold. As to the language in which lectures at Dutch universities are usually delivered, at least in the beginning this would have to be Latin. If usage permitted a departure from this, I would soon seek to express myself in the native tongue. For I hold it to be in itself essential to the genuine appropriation of a science for one to possess it in one's mother tongue [55, third draft]. You mention an important factor: the indifference or aversion to philosophy prevailing in Holland—especially to German philosophy. It would be more important in this regard to see if philosophy is at least considered a general prerequisite for culture and study and is viewed as providing the introduction and abstract basis for the other sciences, and if its study is prescribed for its propaedeutic value. Inasmuch as philosophy can lay claim to being of independent interest, indeed even of the highest interest, the teacher must nevertheless admit on all sides to all that nowhere does it have such value for more than a few. The more objective the form generally attained by the science of philosophy, the freer of bias and pretension is the form it assumes, and all the less does it matter whether the initiate takes it as a mere means and introduction, or at its full value—which even in Germany will be the case only with the smaller

number of individuals. But I always knew I would find in you an ardent and true friend of philosophy, and it would be very pleasant for me to be close to you. A more definite hope of a professorship at a German university would impose a difficult choice on me.

As regards the continuation of my philosophical work—about which you sympathetically inquire—I have been able to work at it only intermittently. I am very obliged to you for your kind offer to seek a publisher in Amsterdam, and I reserve the right to make use of, if need be, your kind permission for me to turn to you in this matter.

In conclusion, I assure you once again of my delight over your good fortune and kind remembrance of me. I wish for uninterrupted continuation of the former, and ask you to continue in the latter as well. I remain most respectfully, my honored and esteemed friend, your most humble servant and friend, Rector and Professor Hegel

Hegel to van Ghert [166]

Nuremberg, October 15, 1810

I must greatly apologize, dear sir and friend, for replying so tardily to your first letter [160], as also for not replying earlier to your second one [164]. Both were much appreciated, and contained so many kind thoughts in my regard. The first had invited me to write my view on animal magnetism for you. The wish to respond satisfactorily to this request and to explain my thoughts to you at length moved me to await a time of leisure, which I have not yet been able to find. But I cannot further delay telling you how much your friendly remembrance delights me and puts me in your obligation.

The political changes in your fatherland will no doubt also have influence on the organization and condition of your formerly so well-established universities. These venerable and richly endowed seats of deep learning, which continue to maintain their reputation, will sadly enough have to bend to the political fate of the whole. Bodies of that sort, each constituting a free whole existing for itself, indeed fall with the passage of time into a kind of stagnation. But they preserve a certain solidity, which will always be lacking in our modern German academies—which, as appears to be the case with the French institutes, are now being oriented to external utility and the aims of the state, and which no longer pass as something which is to be closed off in and for itself, as workshops of pure scholarship as such [Ch 14 on faculty senates]. The branch of philosophy, which had not established any deep roots in Dutch institutions [of higher learning], will admittedly thus be even less favored than before. In the present time our only thought must be for the preservation and perpetuation of philosophy in isolated individuals until governments and the wider public again raise themselves out of their external need and distress, and raise their sights toward something higher. You declare that your career will undoubtedly be upset by the most recent modifications of your fatherland. But it at once gives me joy to see you have the prospect of resuming it soon.

I was very interested to hear that you are occupying yourself with animal

magnetism. To me this dark region of the organic conditions seems to merit great attention because, among other reasons, ordinary physiological opinions here vanish. It is precisely the simplicity of animal magnetism which I hold to be most noteworthy. For what is simple is typically made out to be obscure. Further, the case in which you applied magnetism was an inhibition of life processes by the higher centers. To express my opinion briefly, the magnetic state seems generally active in cases of a pathological isolation of sensibility, as for example also occurs in rheumatisms. Its operation seems to consist in the sympathy into which one animal organism [*Individualität*] is capable of entering with a second, insofar as the sympathy of the first with itself, its fluidity in itself, is interrupted and hindered. That [sympathetic] union [of two organisms] leads life back again into its pervasive universal stream. The general idea I have of the matter is that the magnetic state belongs to the simple universal life, a life which thus behaves and generally manifests itself as a simple soul, as the scent of life in general undifferentiated into particular systems, organs, and their specialized activities. With this is connected somnambulism and, generally, manifestations normally restricted to special organs but which here can be effected by other organs almost promiscuously. Since experience affords you direct knowledge of the matter, it falls to you to test these thoughts and determine them more precisely.

Your beautiful gift of the folio edition of Jacob Boehme's writings I accept with the warmest thanks. I had already long wished to possess his entire collected works. I am doubly pleased, first to receive such an excellent edition, and secondly to have received it out of your kindness. As to how to get it to me, the simplest way is to give it to a wagoner just as you would any other merchandise, having it sent entirely by such conveyance to my address here [Ch 21, last section].

I am happy if the critical notice on my philosophical work [*Phenomenology*] in the *Heidelberg Yearbooks* [1810, sect 1, pp. 145-65, 193-209] has made the public more attentive to it. This is the most essential service reviews can directly perform. I am likewise delighted that Mr. [Karl Friedrich] Bachmann continues to occupy himself with philosophy. With zeal and knowledge he will accomplish something in the field. To be sure, as you remark in your letter, it is the content that chiefly seems to have occupied him, as also a few other reviewers. What is mainly to be emphasized in all philosophizing, and now more than ever, is of course the method of necessary connection, the transition of one form into another. However, at least from what I have seen of the review it is not yet concluded, and it will thus perhaps still get around to addressing this.¹

I conclude with my best wishes for your well-being. Preserve your kind sentiments in my regard. I remain with high respect your most devoted Hegel, Rector and Professor.

Hegel to van Ghert [215]

Nuremberg, December 18, 1812

I would rather not indicate more exactly to you, my dear friend, the circumstances chiefly to blame for delaying so greatly my reply to you. In part rude

¹The reviewer, Bachmann, had been a student of Hegel's in Jena; after 1820 he became known as an adversary of Hegel's philosophy.

domestic blows which fate has dealt us are to blame: the birth of a child, followed by its death a few weeks later [Ch 10 on Hegel's daughter]. Even if I could have found the time to write you, I still needed the peace of mind and freedom which for me are necessary if I am to bring my recollection of distant friends to verbal expression and converse with them by letter.

I congratulate you on the appointment you have since received, especially because it still leaves you time and freedom to occupy yourself with philosophical works. I am very curious to see those on animal magnetism. You will already be acquainted with the journal edited in Westphalia by [August Wilhelm] Nordhoff devoted to the same subject. I have not seen it, and hear it has been discontinued. Perhaps you are in contact with the author. The subject once again is attracting attention in Berlin. In the public press you will have read a clarification by the Administration of Instructional Establishments regarding the rumor that the Prussian government sent a representative to [Franz Anton] Mesmer.

The second part of the first volume of my *Logic*—i.e., the second book, the doctrine of essence—has just been printed. You will see from the date of the enclosed order that I thought of you right away when the first part appeared, setting aside one of my complimentary copies for you. I do not know, however, how soon the publisher will dispatch this second part. The second volume, constituting the conclusion, will contain logic as ordinarily defined, and will appear by Easter.

I owe it chiefly to you that my works are stirring up attention in Holland. I am sorry that there are complaints about the ponderousness of the presentation. It is, however, the nature of such abstract subjects that treatments of them cannot assume the ease of a common reader. Truly speculative philosophy cannot take on the garb and style of Locke or the usual French philosophy. To the uninitiated, speculative philosophy must in any case present itself as the upside-down world, contradicting all their accustomed concepts and whatever else appeared valid to them according to so-called sound common sense. On the other hand, I must be satisfied for the time being with having broken new ground. The whole situation in which we find ourselves makes it impossible for me to carry this work around for still another decade, continually improving it so as to present it to the public in a form more perfect in every respect. I have confidence in the public, and confidence that at least the main ideas will gain access.

Concerning my dissertation, I would gladly fulfill your request but have hardly a single copy left. In any case you are not missing much. For the study of astronomy it hardly makes any difference which manual you use. [Johann] Bode's works enjoy much merit as popular texts. Deeper penetration requires competence in differential and integral calculus, especially according to the more recent French expositions. Please return my cordial compliments to Mr. [Hermann] Suthmeyer [a former student of Hegel's]. His remembrance pleases me, just as it likewise makes me happy to recall those good times of intense philosophical fervor we had in Jena. Farewell. Sincerely, your most devoted Professor and Rector, Hegel

P.S. I find I have left a few points in your last letter unanswered. Yet they are not important; thus perhaps some other time. For the time being I only wish you may be successful in locating Spinoza's papers.

If I, my dear friend, were to give a justification or at least an apology to you for my long silence, I could do no better than to refer to the many times I sincerely began to write, and as proof I could present actual beginnings of letters. This, however, has become superfluous. For I see from your letter of June 23 that you have forgiven my excessive delay, and that your amicable sentiments toward me have not diminished. Be likewise assured that my long silence is not due to any decline in my fond remembrance of you. A more exact cause for this long delay was that last year I wanted to wait until I could report to you the completion of my *Logic*, the second part [1816] of which, I gather from your letter, has reached you as I instructed. A second cause is that, since negotiations on my transfer to a university were underway, I wanted to wait until I could announce a decision in the matter. The Bavarian government had appointed me professor in Erlangen, and I simultaneously received a call to Berlin just as I had given my binding word to Heidelberg—a decision I have thus far had no reason to regret. I know what sympathetic interest you take in my fate. I was about to notify you of it, but the pressure of business and circumstances made it impossible before the present vacation. A letter to a friend is for me an enjoyable diversion for which I must be free of confining and pressing business. I cannot regard it merely as a matter to be expedited.

Above all I give you my best wishes in your new position in Brussels, though I will be among the last to congratulate you. I imagine it is a very delicate position, especially since you are a Protestant. I am acquainted with a few of the professors called to Belgium. [Georg Jösef] Bekker, who studied here, was a student of mine last winter. [Konrad Dietrich] Stahl, from Landshut, formerly of Jena, is, as far as I know, a Protestant. You regret that the universities of Holland and Brabant have not been more greatly amalgamated. I must take a different view of the matter. Through the strict separation and exact preservation of what each party may consider its right, distrust—which is the first evil resisting all improvements and accommodations—is removed. Once confidence is thus acquired, such means, like all defenses against distrust, consequently become superfluous and destroy themselves. I have likewise seen in several German lands the deception that occurred when partiality, considering itself to be impartial, removed all external barriers and thus obtained the opportunity of acting partially under the guise of impartiality. In an earlier letter you mentioned Friedrich Schlegel, who might well be inclined to work for emancipation from ultramontane principles. I have, however, every reason to presume that exactly the opposite might be the case with him.

I thank you for sending me the second journal on [animal] magnetic cures—which I received about four weeks ago—as likewise for the first. I found, especially in the second one, several very interesting circumstances indicated [van Ghert, *Mnemosyne of aanteekenigen van merkwaardige verschijnsels animalisch magnetismus*, 1815]. If I find the time I will write a notice on it for the *Heidelberg Yearbooks*.²

²No such notice appeared.

I deeply regret the unfortunate accident that has caused your hand to suffer for many months. You are very kind to invite me to visit you some day in Brussels. How much pleasure this would give me! I will probably go to Cologne this year, or rather the next, but from there it is still too far to you. But how would it be if we could meet there?

A few weeks ago I completed my *Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences* for use in my lectures. I will have a copy ordered for you. Given the meager nourishment and small encouragement which the study of philosophy has long been given, it was a pleasure to note the interest which youth immediately shows in a better grade of philosophy once offered to it. I am quite satisfied both with this interest and with my situation at the university.

Farewell, and preserve unaltered your kind remembrance of me, never doubting my respect and friendship for you. Yours, Professor Hegel

Hegel to van Ghert [435]

Cologne, September 28, 1822

I have undertaken this fall to carry out, my dear friend, my long-cherished wish and promise to visit you someday in Brussels. From the fact that I am writing from Cologne you can see I am already well underway. I did not want to write before since my project had to remain undecided until the last minute. Yet I still wanted to give you prior notification, since I do not generally like surprises. Moreover, this notification will perhaps still give you time to arrange some of your affairs so as to make my presence—to which I permit myself to invite you to devote a few days—less bothersome to you. Perhaps you can arrange to join me on a few excursions, or on a stretch of my further trip. How happy I will be to see you in your family milieu and fortunate situation, at least if chance and business should not happen to find you unfortunately away from Brussels. I will go to Aachen tomorrow. I have been advised to travel from Liège through the valley of the Meuse via Namur because of the beauty of the region. I will thus probably arrive in Brussels in four to five days. In the meantime, your most devoted and faithful friend, Professor Hegel.

BELGIUM AND HOLLAND

The route from Cologne to Brussels took Hegel through Charlemagne's capital of Aachen. However, the emperor who according to legend found Charlemagne sitting on his throne three centuries after his death was Otto III, not Friedrich I as Hegel guesses. The collection of paintings Hegel saw in Aachen had been formed by Franz Theodor Bettendorf. Hegel had come to know the complementary Boisserée collection—also strong in "Old German" art—in Heidelberg, but his hope that Prussia would buy it was not fulfilled. Hegel uses "Old German" (*altdeutsch*) to embrace Dutch and Flemish as well as strictly German works. This agrees with his view of the "German world" in the philosophy of history to mean "Germanic" rather than "German" in a narrowly national sense. The debate over whether Gothic architecture was "German" is seen differently if "German" is allowed to mean "Germanic" and thus embrace the Franks and Anglo-Saxons. For

Hegel "Old German" art was Germanic art prior to both the Reformation and the Italian Renaissance, and thus embraced Gothic art. Whereas Gothic architecture represented for Hegel the pinnacle of Christian architecture, he considered Old German painting inferior to that of the Italian Renaissance. Hence his qualified praise of the Bettendorf and Boisserée collections (Ch 13 on Boisserée) of Old German masters as the most magnificent collections "of this sort." His predilection for the Italian painters—especially Michelangelo—is clear from his preference of Rogier van der Weyden's *Italian* Flemish over Jan van Eyck's "drier" style, though just what painting by van der Weyden Hegel means is unclear. The two works by Hans Memling cited by Hegel were originally parts of the same work. However, the original of the *Descent from the Cross* which he mentions was by der Weyden, not Raphael or Albrecht Dürer. Hegel apparently saw a copy. The Correggios he notes have not been identified; the ones at Sanssouci are considered copies. And the Bettendorf collection is not known to have had a Michelangelo. Hegel is also mistaken [438] in ascribing the tomb in Breda of Count Engelbert von Nassau and his wife to Michelangelo. (*Briefe* II, 507-08)

Hegel was impressed by Brussels's prosperity [437], and a few days later would be even more so by that of Dutch cities [438, 439]. He appreciated bourgeois comfort: "For people who have money and keep to the main highway the world is in good shape" [433]. Both Brussels and Amsterdam were commercially ahead of most German cities. Hegel's 1822 visit to the Low Countries was a renewed encounter with the dynamism of modern civil society. Yet he knew too well that the affluence of civil society had an underside not to wonder where the poor were lodged [438, 439].

Hegel to His Wife [437]

Brussels, October 3 [1822], Thursday Morning

So now you see, my love, that I am at my journey's destination, just about the most distant spot from my point of departure. I say "just about" because there will still surely be a small excursion in the vicinity, but my main course will now be homeward to you. Yet thus far I am still without further news from you except for the letter I received in Cassel. Last night I went to the post office upon arriving, but it was already closed. It will be seen in an hour whether there are any letters from you. . . . So for now I will only say that I have been lodging here with Mr. van Ghert—who would not have it any other way—and that I spent last night at his house and feel quite fit. I wrote you from Cologne. Sunday morning I was finally shown [Ferdinand] Wallraf's paintings by daylight. Among them was in particular the *Dying Madonna*, without doubt by the same master, [Jan] Scorel, who did Boisserée's painting of the same subject which you also always liked so much. Wallraf's painting is smaller—perhaps two and a half feet high—but wider. The recipient [*Donatar*] on the one wing and the woman on the other are portraits of one and the same person, and were completely familiar to me. The disposition of the figures in the painting—the position of the bed and so on—is different. After I had attended mass at the Cologne Cathedral and said farewell to the good people who so amicably welcomed me, I went to Aachen in the afternoon in the good

company of an elderly Englishman of German origin and a lawyer from Cologne who always carries Goethe's *Faust* with him as his Bible and who, in doing so, shows unaffected satisfaction with himself. We arrived at ten in the evening; in Aachen I first saw the Cathedral and sat on Charlemagne's throne. It consists of two marble plates on the sides and another on the back of the seat, all polished and two and a half inches [*1 1/2 Zoll*] thick. They were covered with stories engraved in gold, of which still a few pieces are preserved. [According to legend,] three hundred years after Charlemagne's death an emperor—Friedrich, I believe—found him seated on this throne clad in Imperial robes, the crown on his head, his sceptre in one hand and the Imperial orb in the other. These accoutrements were placed with the Imperial crown jewels and his remains buried. I sat upon this throne, on which thirty-two emperors were crowned, and was assured by the caretaker that I did so as well as the next man, but the whole satisfaction is just in having sat on it. The main thing, however, was that for three hours in the morning and then likewise in the afternoon I saw Mr. Bettendorf's collection of paintings, which are now being sold off individually. He was kind enough to keep me company personally. In the field of Old German [painting] this collection forms the counterpart to the Boisserée collection. The two collections together would, both gentlemen surmise, represent the most magnificent collection of this sort [in the world] if bought by the [Prussian] King. Mr. Bettendorf has no great, exquisite van Eycks as does Boisserée, but his Memlings [*Hemlings* in the German]—especially one—are at least as splendid as Boisserée's. A few figures in Boisserée's Memlings, in particular the *Jew Gathering Manna*, are identical with the figure carving the paschal lamb in Bettendorf's painting. But a painting by a Rogier van der Weyden is the most magnificent that can be beheld. Every particularity, e.g., a certain dryness which one would still like removed even in the most exquisite van Eycks, has here completely vanished. It is just as magnificently Italian as Dutch. Another jewel is a *Descent from the Cross* with many figures drawn by Raphael and painted by Albrecht Dürer. What loveliness, what beauty! A *Woman with Child* attributed by some to Michelangelo is an infinitely great painting. And then, what is more, a *Night* by Correggio! Having called the one in Dresden his *Day*, I call this one his true *Night*. What a painting! The light radiates likewise from the child. I prefer this Madonna to the one in Dresden. She smiles, along with the surroundings, on the infant. Everything is serene and yet more serious. And the shadows, which resemble Correggio's paintings at Sanssouci in the later style of this master, are most excellent.

As evening approached I still had time for a walk toward Burscheid, and since in Aachen the spa is famous I took the waters. Was that hot! It smelled of pure sulphur. Tuesday morning at seven-thirty we left Aachen and arrived in Liège toward five o'clock; the route is up and down hills, mostly on ridges with deep valleys on both sides. Everything is green and is traversed by endless hedges and rows of trees. Toward Liège one looks into the beautiful Meuse valley. I was very tempted to travel here from Liège up the Meuse valley through Namur, but it would have taken almost two extra days due to coach schedules, and I would have made part of the trip at night when nothing can be seen. In Liège I along with

another traveler spent the night. The coach on which we arrived departed immediately. In the tourist party there had been still another trite, talkative German, a man from Würzburg who also claims to be an Englishman. I have had one of these irksome people so far in every coach party. At first I took my companion to be either a tailor sensitive to light—he has still quite a different grin from our Berlin master dressmaker—or a disabused gambler, or a croupier from Aachen, or another Englishman. He turned out to be the latter. We got along quite well. He meanders around in the world half asleep or half conscious, has been in Italy, France, everywhere, is off to Paris for next winter, to Vienna for the summer. Except for this companion I had the coach to Brussels all to myself yesterday morning. In Louvain three more persons joined us. The road led through fertile grainland on all sides, as in [the recently Prussianized] Swedish Pomerania; then, from Louvain on, magnificently alternating valleys to the side, a splendid fertile countryside; Tirlemont is a pleasant little country town; Louvain is a large city with beautiful homes, a Gothic city hall, and a hall which I did not see in which eighty quadrilles can be danced at once, etc. . . .

It is a joy to travel in the Netherlands. From Liège to Brussels it takes twenty-four hours. The trip is being shortened to twelve hours on paved roads similar to the newly paved Königstrasse in Berlin, and costs ten francs. This land is rich. . . .

In Brussels I strolled around with van Ghert. A very beautiful city. In many streets the lower floor is but a single row of large windows with the most beautiful merchandise elegantly displayed, much more tastefully and neatly than in Berlin. One likewise finds bread behind beautiful wide windows. This afternoon we are going to take a walk up to Laeken Castle, while tomorrow morning we are to visit the battlefield at Waterloo. . . .

I will probably stay here until Sunday. . . .

Hegel to His Wife [438]

Antwerp, Tuesday, October 8 [1822]

. . . This has been the first hour of quiet solitude for a few days in which I find myself alone and can continue, my dear, the account of my trip for you. . . . Friday we visited the battlefield at Waterloo in a convertible, where I saw these ever memorable terrains, hills, and points. My attention was called in particular to the high forested rise from which one can see miles around, where Napoleon, that prince of battles, set up his throne, which he there lost. In the sultry midday heat we ran around for three to four hours on the paths where under each clump of soil the brave lie buried. On Saturday we saw the gallery, strolled around in the park, visited St. Gudula Church, beheld its beautiful windows—the most beautiful I have ever seen—its paintings, marble statues, etc. In the evening we went to Laeken Castle—a pleasant walk and a pretty spot. Sunday morning was still spent going out, visiting churches, shopping for you, my dear, and packing; at two-thirty we rode off together. Mr. van Ghert had the kindness and—as a convalescent from illness—by coincidence the leisure as well to accompany me to Ghent. Here we saw the fine Cathedral, a few other churches, and then attended the swearing in of

the rector at the university, which lasted until one o'clock. We then had a fast lunch and left at two-thirty for Antwerp in a convertible, arriving yesterday after ten in the evening just opposite from here, on the other bank of the Schelde. . . .

Yet I must break off. It is eight in the evening; at nine the stagecoach is leaving. I have to pack. In nineteen hours the coach will arrive in Amsterdam.

Breda, October 9

Instead of traveling straight ahead I have been unable to resist the temptation to get off here to see a monument by Michelangelo. By *Michelangelo*! Where else in Germany can one see a work by this master? But to continue my account, we spent the night in Tip of Flanders [*Flammandsch Hoof*]. It is, as I have said, a pleasure to travel in this country; all highways are paved like Königsstrasse in Berlin; along the roadside, nothing but fruit orchards, gardens, or meadows, with a tree-lined thoroughfare. From around Aachen to Liège the road crawls with beggars. This way we have met with none. Grown-ups and children seen in the villages are always well-dressed and happily at play, not a child in rags, none with shoes—many in clogs—or stockings. We passed through a village of 15,000 inhabitants.

Yesterday morning we rode across the broad, beautiful, proud Schelde into the great city of Antwerp, again with 60,000 to 70,000 inhabitants. Ghent has just as many. One must visit the churches in these cities. The world-famous Cathedral in Antwerp; in its nave, as in the unfinished Cathedral of Cologne, are three rows of pillars on each side. How spaciouly and freely one strolls about in it! The spaces are not blocked with pews and benches, not a single bench, everything open, but there is a pile of a hundred armchairs all stacked up. Everybody who comes has one given to him and carries it from one altar to the next. Here a small group, there a crowd, always changing, coming and going. . . .

The Hague, October 9, in the evening

We are advancing rapidly. Beautiful roads and cities, ocean liners in abundance, broad green meadows, everything charming, rich, good weather, extending ever further and more expansively. But this is the most distant point. We shall now be turning back. I arrived here tonight after eight; yet tomorrow the North Sea is still to be seen, an irresistible temptation. . . .

The Hague, October 10, 11:00 p.m.

My scribbling is beginning to be very disorderly, but I do not know how I can restore order if I am to catch up in my account.

Thus in the end it was a matter of churches. The churches in Ghent and Antwerp, as I said, must be visited if one wants to see magnificent wealthy Catholic churches—large, broad, Gothic, majestic. Stained-glass windows; the most wonderful ones I have ever seen are in Brussels. Along the pillars are marble statues, life-sized, placed at some height, otherwise lying, sitting, dozens of them. Paintings by Rubens, van Eyck, and their students, large pieces, some of them splendid, two to three dozen in *one* church; marble pillars, bas reliefs, trellised chairs, confessional boxes, a half dozen or full dozen in the Antwerp church, each

decorated with four excellent life-sized wood-carved figures. It made me think of the *Angelic Salutation* [by Veit Stoss in St. Lorenz Church] in Nuremberg. The city halls are just as uniquely Gothic. We have been up and about in Antwerp for four hours this morning. I have been sweating a lot this past week, though at Waterloo I reflected that I had not done so quite as much as the French and Allies. In Antwerp I parted with my dear friend Mr. van Ghert. He returned to Brussels with instructions to inquire whether letters from you had arrived and send them to me in Amsterdam.

So in the evening after writing to you I set out for Breda by coach and saw the splendid work by Michelangelo—a mausoleum. Six life-sized figures of white alabaster: a count [Engelbert] with his wife lying in death, and four figures. Julius Caesar, Hannibal, Regulus, and a stooped warrior stood at the four corners of the black stone on which they lay. The figures bore on their shoulders a stone just as black—a wonderful, spirited work by the greatest of masters [*Werke* 13, 464].

At ten o'clock in the morning I traveled on by coach from Breda. Three coaches leave daily from Amsterdam to Antwerp and return, all via The Hague. There are also daily coaches from Paris to Brussels. For twenty-five francs one is in Paris in thirty-six hours. What a temptation! If it had not been so late in the season and if, moreover, I had received news from you, I do not know if I could have resisted. In Rotterdam there is also a steamboat once every week to London—exactly twenty-four hours without fail, assuming there is not too bad a storm. From Breda I yesterday continued on by steamboat to Moerdyk—fertile land with roads now completely paved in brick like the sidewalk in Berlin. From Moerdyk, by steamboat across a bay, Hollandsdiep is a half-hour away. My dear friend the Southwest Wind, which had brought me nice weather for such a long time, assisted this crossing as well. Here ships came from afar; a proud three-master, like a sultan with a majestic white turban, a swollen white blouse, then wide white breeches with a coat behind as shown in the [attached] sketch. From here one leaves for Doordrecht, a great port city of forty—or God knows how many—thousand inhabitants. Here one passes into the real Holland—all the houses of red brick with white trim drawn as if by a ruler. No trim or corner crumbled or worn. Beautiful canals, lined with trees, pass through the city, all full of large boats; straight beautiful wharfs everywhere. Then after three o'clock, over the wide Maas again, arriving in Rotterdam at five o'clock. What a large city again! Then through Delft, and after half an hour into the beautiful Hague. The Hague is indeed a village—beautiful green meadows everywhere. From Doordrecht onward the tidiest vegetable gardens—as beautiful as only Mrs. Voss can maintain—separated by rows of trees and cut off by moats from one another and from the main road, beside which there always lies a canal. Everywhere there are black and white spotted cattle, which remain on the meadow even at night. In the evening people are seen milking the cows. Everywhere landscapes purely in the manner of [Paul] Potter and Berghem [Nicolaes Pietersz Berchem]. This forenoon, leaving the city gate, I entered a wood resembling the Berlin Zoo but with more beautiful paths, lined by beech and oak trees. No shrubs, nothing but a high leafy wood. Scheveningen is an hour away. Here is seen the endless North Sea, the German Ocean. My friend the

Southwest Wind was blowing vigorously, bringing the nicest waves. Then a visit to the gallery. In the afternoon a promenade in a wood more beautiful than the pasture by Cassel, with ponds as splendid as in Charlottenburg. And after all that I attended a French comedy, or in fact three in a single evening. I had to rest, for I had walked and stood a lot. In the gallery there is a watchman from Württemberg, and beautiful, very beautiful items. Today I put on my scarf before the mirror and noticed I have become thinner, I believe because I have been much fatigued. But otherwise I am healthy, vigorous, and well. Also things are still fine moneywise. I do not think I have lost anything yet, and that almost annoys me, for one has to have bad luck in something. I reckon, however, I atone for everything in having no letters from you. . . .

Hegel to His Wife [439]

Amsterdam, the evening of October 12 [1822]

First I must tell you that today I found your letter along with the one from your dear mother—plus the one from dear Karl—here at the post office. I cannot express my joy, nor tell you how much I have been moved by such happy and reassuring news from you. At long last, I am, thank goodness, relieved. . . . Now, lighter of heart, on to the further account of my travels. I boarded the coach at seven in the morning to make the trip here via Haarlem. What a beautiful land! The country is made for promenades. There are green meadows everywhere, with well-fed cows but no young herdsman with whips following behind. Long wooded parks of oak and beech, and country homes. Holland is the most populated country in the world. Yet there are few villages on the flat farmland. Brabant is a very fertile land full of villages. Haarlem is tidy, a large and beautiful city like the others, beside the Haarlem Sea. As extensive as the beauty is which I have seen and am still seeing, there is just as much that I have not seen. But I have seen the main points—the best and most beautiful. Each city is rich, neat, and tidy. Where the common people and the poor are put up—especially in The Hague—I have not yet been able to see. Dilapidated houses, broken-down roofs, decayed doors, and broken windows are nowhere to be seen. Both in The Hague and even more here, the streets are all full of the most beautiful shops. In the evenings all the streets are bright with lights. There are boundless supplies of everything—gold, silver, porcelain, tobacco, bread, shoes—everything displayed most beautifully.

I thus arrived here in Amsterdam at half past noon and went at once to Dr. Besseling, a [physician and] very pleasant man to whom Mr. van Ghert has commended me. Then it was off to the gallery. Here are works by *Rembrandt* fifteen to twenty feet wide and twelve feet high. I have not yet seen everything. Afterwards I sat down to a midday fast at Dr. Besseling's, since he is Catholic. Then I saw the city and the harbor with him, and in the evening visited both Jewish synagogues. This city, which was once the queen of the seas, on land is queen still today. I imagined an old smoky city, but Amsterdam is fully as beautiful as the others. Countless canals, boats, bustling with people, and thriving business everywhere. When the bell rings at three in the afternoon at the stock exchange, the stream of people is like a crowd leaving the theater in Berlin. I am now thinking of

my return trip. I will hurry to Hamburg, traveling day and night. I will not pass through Emden, where you shall be trying to reach me.

Hegel to His Son Karl [440]

[Amsterdam, October 12, 1822]

It pleased me very much, my dear Karl, to have received a letter and news from you as well. I see that you and Immanuel are well, and I hope that Ludwig is likewise well, and that he, too, has been diligent during vacation. I am very happy you have translated some passages from [John] Clark's [English text], and when I get home I want to look them over and see how far you have progressed and avoided mistakes.

You have not written, however, whether you were promoted to a higher grade. By now this will probably have been decided. I am happy you enjoyed Immanuel's birthday. It is of course a pity that the bad weather did not allow mother to travel with you to Potsdam to set off fireworks. I have also had bad weather, but only for a few days; otherwise it has been [at least] passable and for the most part pretty good. No doubt you have since been to Potsdam with grandmother. She wrote me that she was satisfied with you, which I was happy to hear.

I have seen many beautiful cities, regions, paintings, and churches. Only Dutch is spoken here. If you and Immanuel want to learn to speak Low German in Berlin, you might speak more with the people here than I can [written in Low German]. Most of them, however, understand French and in part German as well. But one gets furthest with French, which most people know more or less how to speak, or at least most people with whom one commonly has dealings.

In Scheveningen, close to The Hague, I collected shells on the beach, just as we did on the shores of the Baltic Sea—by no means a bagfull but at least a few. I have also dickered for a bird with shells for feathers. I will bring it along.

Give warm greetings to your two brothers, to Mr. Pieper [a Berlin private tutor?] who gave Immanuel the geranium stem, and to Anne [a servant in Hegel's household]. I am especially anxious to find out if the geranium stem will still be green when I get home and if the canary will survive. Good night now. It is late. Your faithful father, Hegel

Hegel to His Wife [441]

Harburg, opposite Hamburg, from which I am separated only by the Elbe, in the moment of my arrival at ten o'clock at night [October 18, 1822]

So far I may be deemed fortunate. My last letter from Amsterdam will probably be in your hands, my dear! I sent it early Saturday morning, and then still saw the second, most varied part of the gallery—including magnificent pieces—and the former city hall, which Napoleon had arranged into an Imperial palace. Taking away the disposition of rooms, furnishings, and so on, the building, which is still occupied by the Royal family when they are in Amsterdam, is the most wonderful conception of a city hall that a free, prosperous, art-loving citizenry could generate. I visited a church famous for its stained-glass windows and then

had lunch at Dr. Besseling's, in whose home—since he is a stricter Catholic than my Mr. van Ghert—I ate fish both times, though excellent fish. I then boarded the coach at five o'clock (Saturday).

A Frenchman [Pierre Hyazinthe Azais] has written a work on compensations and shown that the good and bad in life all even out. Thus my trip so far has been quite fortunate, though saddened by lack of news from you. However, after receiving news from you in Amsterdam it was the trip's turn to meet with ill fortune. Thus instead of taking the direct route here, the baggage boys—everything went too fast for me to be able to inform myself more precisely—put me on the coach for Utrecht, where I spent the night. At eight-thirty in the morning we left for Deventer. From Utrecht on—which is likewise a beautiful city with a university and lovely surroundings—it was farewell to beautiful Holland and Brabant. From then on nothing but heaths, though covered with shrubs. In Deventer I spent the night again and took a genuine German mail coach. . . . I was happy at not having been on this coach from its starting point, for otherwise I could not have spent the previous night in bed. Thus day and night we went through bleak heaths, interrupted, however, by a few oases. Bentheim is charmingly situated on a rock hill with a splendid, unobstructed view of this small but fertile land. We drank good coffee in Dutch kitchens—if I had a house built I would have just such a kitchen installed—but there was no time for a decent lunch. We crept slowly on in the sand, or along improved stone roads which were even worse. We spent our time in this torture chamber until Wednesday morning at five o'clock, when we arrived in Osnabrück. I remember my traveling companion gratefully, a gentleman from Hildesheim, a Mr. Cludius [?] if I am not mistaken, with whom I was quite at ease and on familiar terms, in contrast with the previous mute, pattern-card Dutch travelers [*Musterkartenreuter*] who were unable to converse with me and just as little inclined to much talk even among themselves. In Osnabrück I slept a few hours quite soundly and then looked up a former student of mine from Jena, Professor [Bernard Rudolf] Abeken, a brother of [Professor Ludwig] Abeken of Berlin, whom you often have met at [Gustav Friedrich] Parthey's. I was quite pleased to see him again, and he showed me around most amicably; the surroundings of Osnabrück are quite lovely. I also saw the hall where the Treaty of Westphalia was concluded. Toward three o'clock I boarded the coach for Bremen, and in Diepholz parted with my good gentleman from Hildesheim, who went to Hanover. The route was [bathed] in very beautiful sunshine, which I pitied for having to shine on such steppes. Yet toward Bremen green Dutch meadows [appeared]. We arrived there yesterday [Thursday] night, slept until this morning, and left for here by the special mail coach service. This morning the sky rained down upon the October 18th patriotism of the people of Bremen [commemorating Napoleon's defeat at Leipzig in 1813]. Yet the evening allowed me to see the Hamburg rockets and other fireworks clearly. . . .

Hamburg, October 19, ten o'clock

I am just now arriving, and having my things sent from the boat to the post office to get a place on the express mail coach today and be with you on Monday. But there are no places available, not even for Wednesday. Yet in compensation I

find two dear letters from you. How reassured and happy I am about the good news from you. . . . I am sitting here in the King of Hanover [Hotel] with the most beautiful view. But now I cannot leave until Monday by mail coach—which I await with foreboding—and cannot arrive [in Berlin] before Thursday. . . .

RISE OF THE NAPOLEONIC LEGEND, 1823-1826

Although van Ghert like Hegel preferred the German to the French university system [164], both defended the Napoleonic idea of the rational imperial state, even if Napoleon's defeat persuaded Hegel that temporary concessions to nationalism or localism were necessary. Napoleon had died the year before Hegel's trip to the Low Countries. But by spring 1823, when Hegel finally wrote van Ghert thanking him for his hospitality, the Napoleonic legend was already resurgent. In the first years after the Emperor's death a number of "best sellers" about him were published by associates. The legend was fueled by Napoleon himself, whose *Mémoires* were published in 1823 under the editorship of Count Charles-Tristan de Montholon and Gaspard Gourgaud. In 1822 the Irish surgeon Barry O'Meara, who followed Napoleon into exile, defended the Emperor in *Napoleon in Exile, or a Voice from St. Helena*. The Count Emmanuel de Las Cases—who, after having taken arms against the Revolution, attached himself to Napoleon unswervingly—published his *Mémorial de Sainte-Hélène* in 1823. The letters below show Hegel's eager attempts to obtain this inflammatory literature from Belgium through van Ghert. The last letter [505] shows Hegel's persistence in seeking satisfaction from one Brussels distributor of Napoleonic literature. The letter also shows Hegel's continued support of van Ghert's ill-fated struggle for the separation of church and state, and in particular for a philosophical seminar independent of the Catholic clergy. This was the liberal cause with which Hegel, marked by his Nuremberg rectorship under Napoleonic hegemony, was most directly identified.

Hegel to van Ghert [447]

Berlin, April 4, 1823

My vacation started a few days ago and today I will set out again on a journey to you, my dear friend, though of course only by the pen—whereas I spent my last vacation in your home in person. Of course, by the pen I should have called upon you earlier. I reproached myself enough all winter, and still do so, for not having thanked you and your wife for all the good and kind things I enjoyed in your home, from which I drew sustenance all winter. I cannot send off this tardy letter without giving some excuse. The immediate cause of the delay was my wish to send you the few sheets of a preface I promised you [Ch 18, second section]; the publisher, who could not right away specify any opportunity for sending it, occasioned the first postponement. Furthermore, I was so heavily burdened with my domestic responsibilities and lectures [on philosophy of history, and of law] that, though I probably could have found hours to write an urgent business letter, I could not have found a few hours of calm and serenity to undertake this imaginary trip to you. For me a letter to a dear friend [such as you] promises the undisturbed and leisurely cultivation of my relationship with you and the enjoyment of a conversation. But

just as one does not decide to go out socially knowing that at any moment one might be called away and interrupted, so I am not in the habit of getting to a letter when my mind is occupied, when either its interests or external occupations interrupt me and prevent me from devoting myself completely to its composition. Now that vacation has arrived, I have the leisure to allow myself the enjoyment of a conversation with you. What a difference, however, remains between the recollections to which I am now restricted and the actual company which I enjoyed with you in your home. I may thus ask forgiveness if my delay in writing may justifiably have irritated you. Simply attribute it to the above-mentioned indolence, to the fact that recollection of my stay with you was too precious for me to occupy myself with it merely under pressure and in a hurry. I thus imagine my indolence as already pardoned by you. To preserve you in my recollection without anything against me clouding your features is too important for me. From no trip have I retained such a serene, gratifying, and rich recollection—rich in the manifold beauty and delight of both nature and art, but above all rich because of the kind sentiments found as always in you.

Berlin, April 7, 1823

This is as far as I had written when I received your letter of March 25 [445], in which I found just expectations of a letter from me this past winter, but also the most amiable patience with my negligence. In all fairness you could have scolded me. Your news about your family and the circle of acquaintances to which you introduced me, and about your recently impaired health, from which you have fortunately recovered, without, however, fully regaining your strength yet—an impairment probably caused by the bustle to which you were led to make my stay with you entertaining—all this has so vividly brought me back into your midst that only the very impossibility of the thing has prevented my desire to visit you from being transformed into an ardent longing operating in conspiracy with your very kind invitation. Be ever prepared, however, for the renewal of my visit within the next few years. To everyone I preach that for comfort and instruction one simply must make a trip to the Netherlands. After our separation in Antwerp I indeed did travel with favorable weather and so forth, but it is this miserable Germanic stretch between Holland and Hamburg which causes the difficulty. If this distance could be cut out, you might soon see me at your house in Brussels. It would have done me much good during this vacation. I greatly exerted myself this winter. My lectures on the philosophy of world history have taken up my time and reflection day and night, so that in the end I found my stomach quite upset and my mind quite exhausted. Last night I declined to accompany a friend to Leipzig because of a headache from which I often suffer. This morning I feel better, however, and in a few hours will board a coach with him and allow myself to be jostled about for a few days in order to regain my strength for the summer.

Some time ago, however, we heard that the Queen of the Netherlands will pay a visit here to His Majesty her brother [the King of Prussia], and now the same is being said of the Crown Princess. I had hoped this would provide an occasion to see you here. Each should have an escort, which should include [your friends] Dr.

Verhagen as the accompanying physician, Mr. [Cornelius] von Marle as treasurer, and you, by virtue of your office, as Court chaplain.

My wife in particular thanks Mrs. van Ghert for her kind effort in selecting the Brussels lace cap. My wife recuperated quite well this past winter and feels healthier than before. She has just returned to tell me the coach will be here soon. I must close. Please remember me very kindly to Mr. Verhagen and Mr. von Marle—I have treasured their acquaintance. If you have the chance remember me above all to Dr. Besseling in Amsterdam, to whom I owe thanks for having made their acquaintance.

I will send the preface mentioned above—along with a copy for Dr. Besseling—this coming Easter.

I hear a reprint has been made in Brussels of the Paris edition by Gourgaud and Montholon of Napoleon's *Mémoires*. Could you not charge the bookdealer with sending me a copy along with a list of his recent releases, indicating a bookdealership in Leipzig where I could remit payment.

Now a fond farewell. With all my affection and friendship, your most devoted Professor Hegel

Hegel to van Ghert [456]

Berlin, August 10, 1823

I only learned, dear friend, through receipt of the French books from [the Brussels bookdealer] Mr. Frank that you received the letter I finally wrote in the spring. I thank you for having kindly procured the books I had asked you to order. This first shipment may also serve as a test of how Mr. Frank conducts himself. Since I will be ordering other things from time to time from Brussels bookdealers, I ask your assistance in finding out how Mr. Frank computed the bill.

First of all, however, please notify Mr. Frank that the seventh leaf in Volume IV of Las Cases's *Mémorial de Sainte-Hélène* is double, while the ninth leaf, pp. 200-24, is missing. In sending the sequel, Mr. Frank may thus kindly forward me this missing sheet with pp. 200-224 of vol. 4.

Concerning the prices he has quoted me, you will have a chance to compare them with those in Brussels. He quoted the following prices postage-free to Leipzig: *Napoléon en exil* by O'Meara at five Prussian thalers, i.e., eighteen francs; Las Cases, all eight volumes at eight thalers, i.e., twenty-nine francs.

I have read of the Paris edition of O'Meara in the French translation—the same as the edition sent to me—priced at 12 francs, which gives me a more specific reason for inquiring about it. You know the prices in Brussels and can easily compare them with those above. There is no reason why I should pay more than the Brussels prices plus postage. Mr. Frank surely cannot quote the franc higher than $6\frac{3}{4}$ Prussian groschen (24 groschen = 1 Royal thaler). If this is the exchange rate he is using, well and good. If not, we could no doubt arrange for you to give the orders to some other dealer you might indicate, and for me to pay you. In short, I wish to be on solid ground as regards the bill. What I would like to receive afterwards is Napoleon's *Mémoires* edited in four volumes by Gourgaud and Montholon, if a Brussels edition is available—or the Paris edition, which here

comes to about 37 $\frac{1}{2}$ francs, should it be significantly cheaper ordered from Brussels.

During the summer Dr. Wiesinger brought me a note from you. He probably left during the few days I spent in Potsdam after finishing my lectures.

I would have wished to write you of still another matter. It had been thought that one of my local friends here—nontitular Professor [Enno Heeren] Dirksen—might be called to Groningen as professor of mathematics. But later we heard that the trustees had proposed two natives. Had Mr. Dirksen been nominated, I would have written to you of the merit of this excellent man—who, being from Emden, is already fluent in Dutch—thinking you would have an occasion to speak of him to the Minister of Scientific Affairs, who might have been interested to hear a judgment of Mr. Dirksen from Berlin. But now it would be pointless.

Mr. Wiesinger told me of your having sought the help of a mesmerist in the illness of one of your sons, and of your having found it very beneficial. As much as I regret this illness in your home to which you have been exposed, I am equally pleased that, as I hope and trust, it is now over. Perhaps you will make both me and the public better acquainted with this story. For the rest, I hope and pray that your wife—to whom I send my best regards—has been and is well, along with your other children.

My family and I have been in rather good health this year. I am still enjoying the benefits of the cure afforded by my trip of last year and my visit with you. And as relapses again threatened, such a good basic conditioning made it all the easier to turn them aside. May I ask you to remember me very kindly to Mr. van Marle and Dr. Verhagen.

You can see how well I am faring with letter writing from the fact that today is already August 22.

Farewell, my dear friend, and write soon. Yours, Hegel

Hegel van Ghert [463]

Berlin, September 30, 1823

Dr. [Adolf] Asher has had the kindness to deliver your letter, my dear friend, along with the diploma of the learned society [Concordia] and a catalogue of the French publisher. So as to take advantage of his return trip in order to have the present letter delivered, I have time only for a few words of thanks for all this. For now please convey thanks in my name to the Society [of which van Ghert was a founder] as well. I shall soon do so directly myself.

Above all I have to congratulate you on the addition to your family. Dr. Asher has notified me that your wife has happily delivered a boy again. I share in your joy and ask you to offer my warmest compliments and congratulations to Mme. van Ghert.

I must also congratulate you on the promotion of which you tell me in your letter. And in such access to a voice in the State Council I at once see a step on the way to still further advancement.

The catalogue, for which I thank you and which has occasioned an expense for you, shows the difference between the price for which Las Cases's *Mémorial*

de Sainte-Hélène sells in Brussels and the one Mr. Frank has sent. This answers the question I asked you to check on in my last letter [456]. For *Las Cases* he has added about ten francs, plus about seven francs extra for *O'Meara*. He can in no way calculate this as postage to Leipzig. I do not know what if anything you have said to him of the matter. I would simply ask you to pay him in Brussels according to the price in the catalogue plus postage, and I can always find a way of reimbursing you from here.

A year ago—for it will shortly be just that long—I was with you in Brussels. I often recall this visit with pleasure. This year I have for once remained quietly at home, and have studied various things during vacation. I must close and so bid you a warm farewell. Your sincere friend, Hegel

Hegel to van Ghert [505]

Berlin, March 8, 1826

A local acquaintance—Mr. [Gustav Friedrich] Parthey, the grandson owner of [Christoph Friedrich] Nicolai's publishing house—is going to Paris via Brussels along with the philologist Dr. Paul [?] and has offered to do an errand for me here and there on the way. It is an opportunity I could not pass up to let you hear from me again, my dear friend, and to inquire about your health and present activities. To rouse me out of my lethargy in letter writing such prodding is necessary. You surely know for sure that my negligence is not the result of any cooling off of my friendship or remembrance of you.

As for my own activities, I am still caught up in the same routine in which fate seems to have placed me, namely lecturing on philosophy at the university here. I am already bound by my position and the nature of the matter to view such teaching as my principal vocation [Ch 18, first section]. I am, thank goodness, beginning to see the fruit of this activity flourish in a number of well-trained and very promising followers, and I am finding that first philosophy has begun to win attention and a firm foothold. Yet it is further connected with this [vocation of mine] that I thus work out the detail ever more extensively and ripen it for publication, though this occupation has not allowed me to get around to literary works. This winter I have or rather should have worked on a new edition of my *Encyclopaedia*, which has been out of print for half a year.

I have thus rendered account of the nature of my activity, which is at once really a form of inactivity. In light of the sympathetic interest you have always taken in me and my endeavors, I thought I owed you some account.

And now for yourself. That you are not exactly idle I have had many occasions to infer from the public press. The philosophical seminar and the bad neighbors striving to smuggle themselves into your territory so as to lure [people] into migrating over to the other side: so many manifestations of a struggle against clericalism give me evidence of the active involvement of your hand and head in it. If General Director [of Catholic Affairs Melchior Joseph] Goubau, whose name I believe I read in the papers, is the same man who occupied this post at the time of my fondly remembered visit in your home, your position in the matter is still the same. I hope you will fill me in at length about all this. It is an important battle that

is now being fought over this in western Europe. Here in Prussia we are spared all this and know nothing of such vexations. The state of liberty that prevails here is excellent. But still a word, my friend, about the ill-fated book and sheet negotiations with the wretched bookdealer Frank. Instead of sending me the missing sheets about which I wrote, he has sent two sheets with the right page numbers but taken from a *new edition* of *Las Cases* with different pagination from the *first edition* which I had bought. So I am still missing the same sheets. I find the missing sheets upon checking to be sheets eight and nine—i.e., pp. 177-225—of the *older edition* from the *imprimerie* of H. Remy. If this nonsense is still to be set right, Mr. Parthey would have the kindness to procure the two sheets. But in any case he will kindly correct the bill, and in order to conclude the matter I ask you to assure that this be done.

In conclusion, please accept my best wishes and convey my compliments to your dear wife and children. My wife—who likewise sends greetings—and the children are fine, thank goodness; and so on the whole am I.

You are once again embraced with all the friendship and affection of old by your sincere friend, Hegel.

To Vienna, 1824: The Lure of the Italian South

IN 1822 HEGEL ENJOYED the art and scenery of the Low Countries (Ch 22). Two years later he took the opposite direction, stopping in Dresden, Teplice, and Prague on his way to Vienna. The letters which follow record artistic dimensions of this trip to Vienna, but that is but a prelude to an encounter with Rossini and the Italian opera in Vienna itself.

DRESDEN, TEPLICE, AND PRAGUE

Hegel had already visited Dresden in 1820 and 1821 [402]. The city was then both a contemporary and a historical art center in Germany. It was the home of painters like Karl Adolf Mende—in whom Hegel expressed interest in May 1820 [366 below]. But it was also renowned for its gallery. Hegel's two surviving letters from Dresden to his wife [402, 476] show a lively interest in painting. The Dresden gallery and museums were known throughout Europe for their systematic collections. Like those of Vienna, they were inspired by the Enlightenment ideal of representative balance if not encyclopaedic completeness. Both Vienna and Dresden had made more progress in realizing this ideal than Berlin [480], which Hegel criticized for having lagged in giving the public free access to art holdings [481, 483].

In Dresden—the “Florence of Germany”—Winckelmann and Goethe had found aesthetic stimulation. Now Hegel surveyed representative works from the different genres and periods of art history, thus lending greater concreteness to his lectures on fine arts. The first letter [402] comments on the “Madonna of the Burgermeister Meyer” by the German master Hans Holbein the Younger. The painting was influenced by the Italian Renaissance style, which Hegel generally prefers. He is incorrect, however, in supposing the Dresden painting to be the original and a Berlin painting to be a copy: just the reverse is in fact the case (*Briefe* II, 490). Prague [478] as well as Dresden was rich in “Old German” paintings and art, though this national style, predating the Italian influence, held comparatively little interest for Hegel. Karl Förster, the brother of the Hegelian Friedrich Förster, noted Hegel's lack of enthusiasm for such paintings in Dresden (*Berichten* 326). In an era of increasing nationalism Hegel's aesthetic taste remained markedly non-nationalistic.

In both 1821 [402] and 1824 [476, 477] Hegel mentions having visited Ludwig

Tieck, the Romantic poet known for fairy tales and folk stories. In the 1820s Tieck's literary readings in Dresden were a local attraction for visitors. Henriette von Finkenstein held a salon in the city frequented by Tieck and other literary figures. The work which Hegel, on his way to Vienna, heard Tieck read was the “Duped Freeman” by the eighteenth century Danish poet Ludwig von Holberg. Hegel also visited Tieck on his return trip from Vienna [484].

Writing from Dresden [476] in 1824 Hegel alludes to Austria under Metternich and the Restoration. His liberal reserve toward the Restoration is still apparent—as also his less liberal concept of the feminine role. Dresden was a meeting ground for liberals. Hegel's September 1824 visit to the city resulted in a chance meeting with French philosopher Victor Cousin, who shortly thereafter was arrested in the city and turned over to the Prussian police (Ch 25).

Hegel to Unknown [366]

Berlin, May 13, 1820

I hoped this morning for the pleasure of being able to inspect Mr. Mende's treasures in your company, but I still have letters to dispatch that cannot wait, which oblige me to stay at home and forego that visit. Yours, Hegel

Hegel to His Wife [402]

Dresden, Thursday morning, September 20, 1821

It has already been one week today, my dear, since I left home. I hope every day for a letter from you. My first letter you will not have received. I hope you are fine except for my absence—if you indeed miss me—and for the weather. Here the weather is completely detestable and without any hope of improvement. I probably shall not be going any farther than Dresden. There is nothing to do but stay inside, sitting in one's room. From where I sit I see the dark grey clouds of the sky off in the distance, and hear the shutter banging ceaselessly against the window. Yet at times there has been some diversion. The day before yesterday I was in Pillnitz, where I saw the Royal family dining. Above all, however, we climbed Porsberg, a promenade of one hour. From the summit one has a view of the surrounding region in all directions. There was, to be sure, no sign of the sun, but there was no rain either. I went of course to the gallery and among the paintings inspected dear old friends. Above all I was anxious to see the painting by Holbein of which we saw a copy in Berlin, and I paid special attention to the particulars which I had already noted in Berlin, namely the complexion of the middle figure among the three female figures, the nose of the mayor, and the child on Mary's arm. Considering these particulars, it was immediately clear to me that the figures in the Berlin painting, as beautiful as it is, taken for itself, were made by an understudy. Visibly, the child in the painting here is sickly. It is obviously—and I in this am completely convinced of the correctness of what was indicated by the local inspector—supposed to be a dead child of the donee which they see in the Heavenly Mother's arm, and which in this embrace sends down to them [a message of] consolation and resignation [to the divine will]. The accuracy of this interpretation is confirmed by the child in the middle at the bottom, which is almost standing

and which here is most beautiful. I have no doubt at all that the painting in Berlin is a skillfully made copy, but one in which there is above all a lack of spirit.

Last night I was at the Countess Finkenstein's house and at Tieck's, who read a play to us by [Carlo] Goldoni in a delightful manner. I see from the visitors list that [Karl] Leonhard arrived here yesterday, but I was unable to find him in the inn which he indicated upon arriving. There was probably no room for him there. I have neither seen nor heard anything of [Heinrich] Leo. A doctor arriving from Erlangen had no news of him. However, he said that [Gotthilf Heinrich von] Schubert will arrive here from Erlangen in a few days. Your brother [Johann Siegmund Karl von Tucher, a Bavarian officer] likewise has had terribly bad weather on his way, and he needed nicer weather here more than I did.

Yesterday I went to [Karl August] Böttiger's lecture. This evening he wants to show us the antiquities in torchlight. Thus there is still something doing at times—and then time to write letters and, above all, receive one from you.

Hegel to His Wife [476]

Dresden, September 7, 1824

... The trip has been uneventful and, due to the change in weather, bearable. On Sunday, it was cloudy with intermittent rain as far as Jüterbog. At Herzberg over the noon hour on Monday I allowed myself at the urging of a country priest to accept the company of his niece as far as Dresden. Not ugly, already up there in years, so insignificant and yet polite in the Saxon manner that I had neither desire nor cause to talk much more than if I were alone. So you need not suppose anything improper in this company. I might add that had I been a proper Englishman during the trip I would not have let myself be talked into it but would have kept to myself. But since a German is always something of a soft touch, I could not refuse and thus bought—as we Swabians say—a pig in a poke. The result was not exactly bad, just insignificant. Upon arrival I immediately went to the inn where I heard Privy Councillor [Johannes] Schulze was staying. I, of course, registered at the Blue Star. Fortunately I met him. . . and convinced him, after he had already had everything settled for his departure today, to stay on with me another day. We were both genuinely pleased to run into each other. Yesterday morning the first thing I did was to go to Schulze, then to the gallery, and finally to Böttiger's lecture, where we once more reviewed antiquities.

In the afternoon we took a coach to Plauen—this time I was on top of the rock at a point from which one has a vast and very beautiful view. I then left Schulze.

This forenoon was devoted to the gallery and art exhibit. I went out into Brühl's terrace, where the view pleases me today somewhat more. Yesterday it did not make much of an impression. On the whole I have had enough of Dresden. Do not forget that I spent an hour at Ammon's, and today after this letter I shall be off to the gallery once more, and then to Tieck's. I now hope to find a letter from you in Prague. It is unnecessary to caution you that the letters are read in Austrian territory and thus are not to contain anything political—which in any case would not happen coming from you. So only sweet and affectionate things. . . .

Hegel to His Wife [477]

Teplice, September 11, 1824

I have thus got as far as Teplice, my dear, and I wish you were with me. . . . Thursday afternoon in Dresden I once more visited the gallery, and then took a walk to Link's spa. In the evening I attended a most delightful, truly brilliant reading of a [Ludwig] Holberg comedy in the home of Tieck and the Countess Finkenstein, though I left before the end because I had to be ready to depart no later than four-thirty the next morning. Yet I was ready by one o'clock. A terrible thunderstorm plus the moonlight awakened me—until the nearby sentry I asked replied that it was only one. I thus undressed again, slept, and was ready at half past four, though we did not leave until later. Bad weather, which did not allow me to wear the silken bathrobe, forced me to put on a jacket and even an overcoat. Instead of taking a coach alone, I took the opportunity to travel in mixed company—an actress with child and dog and three fellow travelers from Württemberg. But everything went all right. The view from Nollendorf height [named after the Prussian victor over the French at Kulm in 1813, General Friedrich Kleist von Nollendorf] and from the descent overlooking the Bohemian countryside is indeed delightful in its richness and beauty—Miss Stock told me so; send her my special regards. At Peterswalde—i.e., before Nollendorf—we crossed the Austrian border and went through customs without any difficulty or long delay. Things are quickly settled with these people. They wished nothing more than to have done with formalities quickly. From there we continued through Abersau, Kulm—the region of the Battle of Kulm—everywhere alternating hills and fields, all tilled and fertile—to Teplice, which is very beautifully and charmingly situated. I took lodging in a brand-new inn because it bore the name “King of Prussia.” Today I went immediately up Schlackenbergl opposite the inn. Miss Stock had likewise recommended this path to me. From atop the hill, if one walks around it, one has a view of the whole area surrounding Teplice. A most charming view of the entire vast region—limited in the distance by higher mountain ranges. The most varied mix of hills, valleys, rows of houses—all exceedingly cheerful. Then I drank from the waters in the hospital garden—one spring is a source of eye lotion and was very beneficial for me. Next I entered the park adjoining Prince Clary's castle. He is the local lord. Afterwards I took the waters at Steinbad—a wonderful spring—and then ate with gusto. I will take a ride up Schlossberg.

Weltrus, evening time, Sunday evening in fact.

I continue my account. From atop Schlossberg there is a view over the entire Teplice valley, situated between two mountain ranges. One range separates Saxony and Bohemia, while the second is to the south. Between them is a valley of three to four hours width, with Teplice right in the middle. The church on the rise at Nollendorf, Kulm, and Marienschein—which refers to you—are at the foot of the first range. Aussig is situated in the corner on the river Elbe, in the range toward the east; the boys should look it up on the map of the Seven Years' War. I then took a walk around Teplice. Finally I went to the theater, a few acts of *Preziosa* [presumably *Preciosa* by von Weber, 1821]—a much more affected though charming damsel [Zierliesel] than the one you designate in such terms in Berlin.

On Sunday I drank from the spring waters again, went to Clary's beautiful grounds, bathed, went once more up to Schlackenbergl to see the lovely view one last time, and then boarded the coach at eleven. First we rode over the second of the two ranges mentioned above. Hills filled with fertile fields alternated with meadows. In the valleys: villages and fruit trees. After climbing the mountain for an hour and a half, except for a few small hills it is flat or downhill all the way to Prague—from the mountaintop down into this new plain there is an open vista as far as Lobositz, just as varied and rich. It is a flat region with monotonous orchards. We crossed the Eger [Ohre] twice—the second time with the most beautiful reflections of moonlight on the water in the direction of Weltrus. Today we traveled through equally monotonous country, except for the moment when all of a sudden I looked down into the Moldau [Vltava] valley and onto Prague—a pleasant view enveloped in fragrance. We arrived at eleven p.m. I am thus writing from Prague, where right away I find two points of interest: a letter from our uncle [Baron Johann Georg Haller von Hallerstein, an uncle of Marie Hegel and Austrian officer] and one from you, which is to be picked up. . . .

IN PRAGUE HEGEL FOLLOWED the advice of the Berlin archaeology professor Aloys Hirt in drawing up his artistic agenda. The sights included Hradcany Castle. The fourteenth-century Charles Bridge, which, as Hegel mentions, crosses the Moldau to Little Prague and the Castle, even in Hegel's time was flanked by more recent baroque statues.

Hegel to His Wife [478]

Prague, Tuesday evening, September 14, 1824

. . . There is so much I should write to you about my stay in Prague, assuming I do not, as is all too likely, forget some of it. Yesterday and today I have worn my legs out and almost walked my hired man's legs off as well. My main objective derives from the advice of my colleague Hirt. I am conscientious enough to be ashamed of not visiting anything he has recommended. But a description of what I have seen—since it concerns choice morsels of Old German erudition—would be of little interest to you. Nor could I describe them with much expertise. So yesterday morning, before lunch, I was at the library again. The principal items here were two Old German paintings. Then the monastery of the Brothers of the Cross. After lunch I crossed the [Charles] bridge to so-called "Little Prague," which is the quarter on the left side of the Moldau. This quarter goes up a hill on which is situated the so-called Imperial Castle. But you must imagine by this a modern palace, not an angular, many-cornered, shapeless, uninhabitable, windowless, pentagonal, formless, and indefinable thing such as Nuremberg castle. The Cathedral is likewise situated in the vicinity and together with the Castle is known as "Hradcany." Since just as I arrived a cannonade fell from the ramparts upon the approaching enemy, I left through the gates. Now the Rainer and Kutschera regiments again advanced, forcing the enemy to retreat further under a hail of cannon and small-weapons fire. I followed close behind until I finally had enough of the victorious march and, though unbeaten, retired from battle. I still looked up

Count [Georg Franz] Buquoi, though I did not find him in his palace, since he is presently staying on his estates. Tired of walking, I returned home, ate, drank, and slept, remembering you all in my dreams. Today, however, I have again been up and about on my legs, and by coach. Before eight o'clock this morning the Baroness von Haller [Marie Hegel's aunt-in-law, wife of Johann Georg Haller von Hallerstein] arranged an invitation for me to accompany her on maneuvers, which I was forced to decline. For upon inquiry yesterday only one seat was left on the express coach to Vienna—what we call a "rapid coach." So this morning before anything else. . . I had to reserve the seat. I have thus now committed myself to a departure date for Vienna. But the coach will not leave before Sunday morning. So I have to remain here the entire week, which means two days or at least one day too long. After all this I went to [Charles] bridge and Hradcany—the view from the bridge and Hradcany is admittedly beautiful, in fact very beautiful. Only today have I taken a really good look at it.

I then visited the famous Cathedral. You would be amazed to see all the Old German paintings I have seen there. Afterwards I went to the gallery, the so-called estates gallery—it consists solely of privately owned paintings. Their owners have arranged a common and quite beautiful locale for their treasures. There are beautiful items—once again a special collection of Old German paintings, though neither of us is sufficiently erudite on the subject for me to write any more. After lunch I went to the maneuvers by coach, but it was already over when I arrived. I thus returned and merely placed myself at the gate to see the regiments, especially the Kutschera regiment, pass in review. Soon our stately uncle [von Haller] came by at the head of his regiment, commanding it with his adjuncts, majors, and so forth at his side. I, along with the other spectators, tipped my hat; he sighted and acknowledged me, came over, bowed down from atop his mount and embraced me cordially. Tomorrow I shall call upon him.

I then went to the theater. But to give you a description of the play would demand more time, paper, and memory than I still possess. In the meantime content yourself with the program. You must realize that the allegorical figures do not appear entirely mute but perform real action, indeed quite moral action, comparable perhaps to that of *the Prodigal Son* or, better, *Don Juan*. The hero becomes insane, looks for his head in his coat pockets, is delighted to have found it, bites at it from hunger, and then laments over having bitten off his nose. To put it briefly, for us such things are at times very strange, and yet are at times very funny as well—since it is done, as I said, with such stiff moral earnestness. The moral is that it is all the same whether I have money or not. . . .

Friday, September 17

Yesterday I spent all day on a trip to Karlstein, an old castle four hours away where further old paintings hang. Otherwise there is nothing to be seen. This morning I visited churches and galleries in part for a second time, and have completed my business of sight-seeing. The heat during yesterday's tour as well as this morning had greatly tired and exhausted me. Lunch at our uncle's today has restored my strength superbly. After lunch he took us by coach to a really lovely

entertainment spot. There is foliage here everywhere, and though it has not rained for a long time it is still quite green. I will be eating tomorrow as well at his house. The warm and friendly reception given me by his family makes me feel very welcome in his home. . . .

VIENNA AND THE ITALIAN OPERA

Leaving Prague, Hegel traveled to Vienna in the company of the former physician of the Archduke Karl, who commanded the Austrian forces against Napoleon until 1805 and was Minister of War until 1809. There was a time—after the French army passed from defense of the Revolution to wars of imperial conquest but before Napoleonic hegemony in Europe—when Hegel looked to Austria and hence to the Archduke Karl to lead Germany out of its distress and rejuvenate the German imperial state (*Hegel Studien* XII, 83ff). After having lodged at the *King of Prussia* in Teplice, Hegel took up residence at the *Archduke Karl* in Vienna. Yet Hegel continued to disdain cultural nationalism. Though he was enraptured by Vienna's galleries, his real discovery in the Austrian capital was Italian opera, especially Rossini. His closest encounter in Berlin with Italian opera was apparently through the works of the Italian expatriate Gasparo Spontini, who directed the Royal Prussian Opera from 1820, after having held a similar post under Napoleon and Louis XVIII in Paris. An 1824 note [466b below]—presumably to Johann Teichmann, an administrator in the Royal Berlin Theater—marks Hegel's attendance at a performance of Spontini's opera *Olympia* months before his trip to Vienna.

Yet the grand opera style of Spontini was remote from Rossini. And the other major force in German opera in the 1820s, Karl Maria von Weber, was even further removed from Italian opera. In the early 1820s von Weber was promoting national German opera in Dresden, a post he assumed in 1816 after three years in a similar post in Prague. In Teplice Hegel heard two acts of a comedy by the German actor Pius Alexander Wolff with music by von Weber, calling it charming but affected [477]. In his letter of September 21-23, 1824 [479 below], however, he shows seemingly boundless enthusiasm for Italian singers. The Italian *bel canto* tradition, which was precisely what German opera since Gluck had striven against, subordinated the libretto to brilliant vocal display. Hegel reduces the contrast between the Italian and the German operatic traditions to one of national spirits between Italian expressive spontaneity and German reserve or deliberateness [481, 483].

The celebrated Berlin soprano Anna Pauline Milder-Hauptmann, whom Hegel greatly admired, had recommended the Italian opera in Vienna to him. A fragment [505a] to the Berlin landscape painter Johann Rösel indicates Hegel knew Milder socially. Yet he characterized even her singing as a "work of volition" compared to the Italians. A brief letter presumably to Christoph Siegmund Ströbel [465a], a former student of Hegel's in Nuremberg, was occasioned by Hegel's attendance at the opera *Dido* by Bernhard Klein in which Milder sang the title role.

Klein, whom Hegel had known since Heidelberg, defended the musical theories of the Heidelberg jurist Anton Friedrich Justus Thibaut, upholding earlier com-

posers such as Handel and Palestrina against current trends. Klein directed the institute for church music in Berlin since 1818. In 1824 he was in Vienna at the same time as Hegel. Yet hearing both Mozart's and Rossini's *Figaro* in Vienna won Hegel over to Rossini's cause—despite Klein's (and Gustav Friedrich Parthey's) distaste for the Italian composer [480]. Though Hegel had previously found act 1 of Rossini's *Zelmira* boring [479], he was enchanted by the singing then as well as later [483]. In his letter of September 27-October 1 [481] he concluded that Rossini's music was more conducive to brilliant operatic singing than Mozart's. Hegel's musical tastes were more contemporary and secular than those of musicologist friends like Klein or Thibaut. He delighted in the emancipation of the pure music of the human voice from text as well as accompaniment.

The superiority which Hegel grants to Italian opera, painting, and indeed art generally is a superiority as *Christian art*. Thus what he admires in the Italian-influenced Madonna by Holbein is the Christian idea of the Incarnation as a reconciliation with the Infinite Will not merely symbolized but fully expressed in the attitude of the figures [402]. Medieval Italian Catholicism best expressed the aesthetic genius of Christianity. German Protestantism rebelled against the Catholic sacralization of the finite in art as well as in ecclesiastical institutions, but in so doing lost a sense of the Incarnation, seemingly reverting to a pre-Christian, more Hebraic position (Hegel's *Faith and Knowledge*, 1802-03). Old German painting was thus characteristically realistic, lacking the mystical aura of Italian works. Yet Hegel resisted the widespread temptation of conversion to Catholicism. Christianity reached its highest aesthetic expression in Italian art, but Christianity differed from classical Greek culture in that its highest *aesthetic* expression was not its highest expression. An even higher expression was its modern philosophically comprehended Protestant *political* expression. Through the incipient descent of the Kingdom of God, the finite is politically sacralized; and the Protestant finally achieves a deeper participatory actualization of the Incarnation than is possible aesthetically. Of course a Madonna in a museum exists chiefly for aesthetic contemplation, while in its original setting it was a cult object for the faithful. Yet worship distances the faithful from true participation in the Incarnation as much as does aesthetic spectatorship.

Yet this awareness did not prevent Hegel from taking sensual delight in Italian operatic singing. The enjoyment of music is the most participatory of aesthetic experiences. Sculpture evokes detached contemplation, while literature evokes reflectiveness. Throughout the 1820s Hegel enjoyed the music and song of the Berlin theater. It may have afforded relaxation from the rigors of the system he taught—as if implicitly to acknowledge that the system was not by itself the true Absolute. What the abstractly viewed system lacked and what art—especially Italian opera—provided was *love*: the singing Hegel most enjoyed was intensely *con amore* [481], the singer completely surrendering his finite ego to the self-creative contagion of melodious feeling.

I have a number of box tickets at my disposal for *Dido* at the opera tomorrow and thus invite you, dear friend, to join me there tomorrow evening. Would you be so kind as to meet me at my place at five o'clock?

Yesterday I forgot to tell you that the official transfer of the rectorship takes place this forenoon. It will give you a chance to see both the entire assembled faculty and our auditorium. Both the departing rector and the new one will speak. The ceremony will take place at eleven o'clock in the university building, one flight up. You will find the place without difficulty.

Have a good morning. Yours, Hegel

I take the liberty, dear sir, of drawing upon your kindness to obtain a parquet ticket for *Olympia*—on the left, if possible in the first rows toward the side—since I cannot be there right at the beginning due to my lectures [on the history of philosophy]. Respectfully, Professor Hegel

. . . to whist with Mme. Milder and the reception of my wife's gratitude.

Good morning from Vienna, my dear. Yes, from Vienna! It is only unfortunate that you are not here, too. . . . In order to get to Vienna I still remained in Prague Saturday afternoon. That is as far as the account in my last letter got. With everything in order, we rode out through the gates of Prague at six in the morning. The express coach was in three sections. The main coach—mine—was divided into two compartments connected by a kind of window, with four persons in each compartment. My three companions included a gentleman and his wife returning from Karlsbad [Karlový Vary]; the third companion was the personal physician of the Archduke Karl for twenty-four years. Now retired, he lives independently. We made the trip of forty-two leagues in thirty-six hours, up and down, day and night, all getting on very well with one another. Bohemia is a uniformly fertile, arable land. Afterwards we crossed parts of Moravia—Kollin, Czeslau [Caslav], Iglau [Jihlava], Znaim [Znojmo]—and then entered Austria proper, with vineyards, fields, hills, woods, one village after another, and a broad overview of these rich lands, this marvelous country. Next to the last stop, we entered the vicinity of the Danube—though still without seeing it. We traveled on low-lying land for about half a day—unvaried and still without sighting Vienna. We arrived in Vienna itself after six in the evening. Then to the customs and post office. After that into a cab to look for an inn. We got a second-floor room opening onto the courtyard at the Archduke Karl. The rooms facing the front were not for us. When I inquired about

Dr. [Gustav Friedrich] Parthey [owner of Nicolai publishing house in Berlin], I found that the [Bernhard] Kleins—the young couple—are lodging here, but had just gone out. After hiring help—the knapsack was still at the customs office and I did not arrive at the inn until seven—I went to the Italian opera at seven-thirty still covered with dirt from the trip. Mme. [Anna Pauline] Milder, whom I must mention again further on, had instructed me to do so. It was an opera by [Guiseppe] Mercadante; Mme. Fodor does not appear in it, but what male voices! What voices, what demeanor, enchantment, volubility, power, and resonance two tenors [in particular] had: [Giovanni] Rubini and [Domenico] Donzelli! It is indescribable. They sang a duet of unrivaled power. The bass [Luigi] Lablache does not have a main role, but even so I had to admire his beautiful voice, as powerful as it is pleasing. These male voices must be heard for their resonance, purity, power, total freedom, and so on. There was also a German singer—her name is Eckerlin—whose beautiful, full, strong middle notes are reminiscent of Milder. Yet only Mme. Milder could contend with those three male voices, holding them in bounds. Mme. Fodor will perform today in *Othello*! I will stay in Vienna as long as the money holds out to pay for the Italian opera and the homeward journey. After the opera there was a *pas de deux* by a pair of Parisian dancers. It was quite as good as the Berliners, even if in Berlin ballerinas extend themselves only at right angles while the Parisians elevate their legs even beyond. I then returned to the inn, where to our heartfelt and mutual delight I found Lilli and Klein—Parthey's young wife stayed in her room, indisposed. Things have really turned out quite pleasant for me. They are going to stay this week, and we have already arranged to go around together. They were surprised to see me coming from the Italian opera. For three days they have gone every evening to see slapstick [Kasperl] and the German theater. So far they have not even set foot in the Italian opera! This morning we have an excursion to *Belvedere* [i.e., the Imperial Gallery], then to the post office to pick up letters from you, and then the customs office to settle passport matters.

[noon]

This morning I was at St. Steven's Church, and then the Imperial Gallery. What riches, what treasures! Today hardly even a hurried overview! To that the daytime is to be devoted, leaving the evening for the Italian opera. Now to lunch. . . .

Vienna, Thursday morning, September 23

. . . Now about my life in Vienna. So far it has only three chapters: the Imperial Gallery, Italian opera, and occasional views of Vienna's exterior. The Gallery I visited in the morning the day before yesterday, yesterday morning and evening, and again today. But I cannot go into detail. That would require too long an account. I am now oriented, and have seen magnificent things. But the Italian opera! Monday *Doralice* by Mercadante, the day before yesterday *Othello* by Rossini, yesterday Rossini's *Zelmira*. *Zelmira*, however, bored us, especially the first part. The male and female voices displayed an excellence, power, purity, and training of which only Catalini and Mme. Milder can give you an idea. The day before yesterday Mme. [Josephine] Fodor appeared on stage: what training, spirit, charm, expression, taste! A marvelous artist! Though her voice is brilliant, one

notices in places that it is no longer quite as strong. But she contrives a delicate softening of the voice that appears completely intentional, and at the proper place. My favorite, Rubini, and the excellent baritone Donzelli had as much to sing that evening as [Karl Adam] Bader in *Olympia*. Yesterday and the day before [I heard] the most admired and applauded [Giacomo] David, the principal tenor. A wonderful voice, and such power and strength! The higher notes are *falsetto* but are done very lightly, as in a *single* transition, as if it were nothing special. Then there was the marvelous bass *Lablache*, followed by *Botticelli* and *Cintimarra*, two excellent basses. And then there was *Signora Dardanelli* yesterday. Compared with the mettle of these singers, especially the male voices, all voices in Berlin—except of course Mme. Milder—have something impure, rough, hoarse, or frail about them, like beer compared with transparent, golden, heady wine. *Heady*, I say. Nothing is held back in the singing and bringing forth of sounds, no mere recitation of lines. The entire person of the singer is invested in it. The singers, and Mme. Fodor in particular, generate and invent expression and coloration out of themselves. They are true artists, composers as much as the man who set the opera to music. Being German, *Signora Eckerlin*—whose beautiful, magnificent voice reminded me at first of Mme. Milder—is unable to place her whole soul on the wings of song and throw herself freely into the melodies. Yet she would already accomplish a lot if only she had [Mme. Milder's] power of volition. But do go see Mme. Milder. In fact, I explicitly charge you. Give her my regards and thank her for insisting that I go to Vienna for the Italian opera and the public garden, which belongs to Vienna's exterior. By the way, these Italians are only here for the summer. The lessee of the theater also has theaters in Venice and Naples where he engages the company in the winter. You must imagine that the best Italy has to offer is here. Klein and Parthey cannot hear anything better in Italy. Parthey has in fact not yet heard anything comparable in Italy.

I cannot say anything yet about Vienna's exterior, for I have not yet seen enough of it. I have remained in the center, in Vienna proper rather than the suburbs. My street, Kärntner Street, is somewhat like Königsstrasse. Otherwise there is hardly a single straight street. Immense palaces but narrow streets. If Viennese [streets] were unfolded like our Linden, Leipzig, and Wilhelm streets, they would admittedly be beautiful. For the rest there is not a single architecturally beautiful structure. At Hofburg, which is done in the manner of Dresden Castle, it is impossible to tell which side is the front. For a year now there has been a new gate and Theseus temple in the style of our main [Royal] guard building [*Hauptwache*]. And then there is the public garden, where I went right away with Lilli on Mme. Milder's orders. By the way, between city center and suburbs, which do not come together to form a single city, there are walks—all green, fresh, and yet autumnlike as in Berlin.¹ I have not yet been to Prater or Augarten. My top priority is to finish with my art agenda.

¹In Hegel's time the inner city was still fortified, though later in the century the encircling "ramparts" to which Hegel will refer on September 29 [481] would be replaced by *Ringstrasse*. The "suburbs" which Hegel mentions are now urban districts.

BY SEPTEMBER 25 Hegel had expanded his Viennese horizons to include comedy and pantomime. Kasperl was the Austrian equivalent of the German comic character Hanswurst. Harlequin was a clownlike character originally developed in Italy. The contrast between Kasperl and Harlequin approximates that between the foolishness of a character we laugh at and the intelligent mockery displayed by a character who succeeds in making us laugh with him about all else. Hegel's preference for Harlequin over Kasperl is perhaps explained by his general preference (*Werke* XIV, 559) for the lowbrow or "ancient" comedy (e.g. Aristophanes) over highbrow modern comedy (e.g. Molière). Though it represents the self-dissolution of art (*Ibid*, 580), ancient comedy evinces a philosophical insight deeper than tragedy into the vanity of finite aims when pursued with infinite self-importance. For while tragedy works toward such insight, comedy takes it as its point of departure. Despite its superficial frivolity, the content of Harlequin's comedy was taken quite seriously by Hegel.

Hegel to His Wife [480]

Vienna, Saturday September 25 [1824]

. . . I have once more heard and seen a lot and continue to give you an account as faithfully as before. . . .

I stayed put Thursday morning to see the zoological collection—exhibited very nicely, and well-endowed. The curators are all in touch with Berlin professors, and upon presenting myself as a colleague they gave me a warm welcome. They are all most agreeable and ready to help—quite honest and knowledgeable people. In the afternoon I passed through a maneuver, which I allowed myself to observe because the Emperor and his entire family were in attendance; but one was not allowed to approach too closely. There was a huge mass of men out there. The Emperor soon broke off the maneuver, and I got little more out of it than the fatigue of walking about for a few hours. Moreover, I am on my feet all day long, either walking or standing, only sitting down mornings when I write to you and evenings at the theater. The day before yesterday, since there was no Italian theater but pantomime ballet instead, I attended the world-famous slapstick *Kasperl* at Leopoldstadt Theater. Now I as well have seen this much-ballyhooed wonder. It is not so difficult to give you a brief idea of it. The main actor is now Mr. Ignaz Schuster. The plays in which he acts are *The False Primadonna* and *The Hats in the Theater*. I saw *The Naughty Damsel*, which is nothing extraordinary or singular, nor really [even] bawdry comedy. Schuster is not as common and vulgar a comic actor as Karl, whom you have seen in Munich, but is something like Gern, on the whole with the same impact, a small stooped-over man like [landscape painter Christian Philipp] Köster. For the rest, the play itself was sentimental and morally weak—the other actors and actresses were infinitely more stiff and dull than [even] mediocre ones in Berlin. The play lasted about an hour; then came a pantomime with music—the eternal story of Harlequin with his Columbine. Thus for once I saw this play in its entirety. It is a hodgepodge of merry nonsense, street ballads, and dance music. Three and a half frolicsome hours race by without letting up. One hardly has time to laugh, for there is always something new and different,

and everything is done with the greatest of merriment and skill. Even ballets are included. No extraordinary extensions of the legs, but excellent leaps. In short, quite delighted, I did not return to my room until eleven.

Yesterday morning I first visited a few churches, and then Archduke Karl's collection of sketches and portfolio of copper engravings. The director joined me for almost three entire hours. One can of course only see a few things—there are 150,000 engravings. I went through the portfolio of sketches by Michelangelo, then the series by [Andrea] Mantegna which you once saw at the Privy Councillor [Christoph Ludwig] Schultz's. What in Berlin has been laboriously gathered, incompletely acquired, and described in large essays here exists in abundance. Then Martin Schön's [Schöngauer's] portfolios, and a few others.

Afterwards I saw the private Imperial Garden and the greenhouses beside the Castle. I entered and exited from the Castle through a kind of subterranean passageway, which the Emperor himself uses every day to spend a few afternoon hours in his garden. As for the flora, I could only hope for insignificant dahlias and hollyhocks [*Althaea*], whereas on this peacock island I found something of an altogether different order.

In the afternoon I spent a few more hours at Belvedere. And [then] Rossini's *Figaro*—what a *Figaro* Lablache is! And what a Rosine in Mme. Fodor! She is a consummate singer. What beauty, grace, art, freedom, taste in her singing! And then the exquisite Lablache! What a bass! How merry and spontaneously comical, never once vulgar or crude. When the entire chorus sings in unison, the orchestra thundering along equally *fortissimo* with all the power at its disposal, Lablache is heard more distinctly than ever, as if effortlessly and without shrieking he were singing solo. [Guiseppe] Ambrogio was likewise very good again as Dr. Bartolo, and then there was a new singer, da Franco. It is quite a brood, ranging from the excellent to the exquisite, free of all defect. And what a response on the part of us in the audience! Three to four singers are applauded each time they first enter the stage, and then with each re-entry are applauded again, or are greeted with "bravo," "bravi," and then immoderately applauded after every scene. The singer bows and exits, but the applause continues with uninterrupted force until he or she is not simply applauded but applauded out onto the stage again. After the performance, however, the singers are not called back. Parthey and others repeat that *Figaro* is not to be seen performed this way anywhere in Italy. Today I read in a Viennese theater gazette that the most experienced critics agree that in their most distant memory—which goes back fifty years—no such Italian company has visited Vienna, and that in all probability none of this caliber will be seen here for another fifty years. After I had scolded them into it, the Partheys [including Berlin music director Bernhard Klein, who had just married Lilli Parthey] have not missed a performance since, and have both been most delighted—although they have run down Rossini's music, which is at times boring even to me.

This forenoon I first visited the Imperial Library—with 300,000 volumes in a single hall! After that came the Imperial Treasury. The most valuable diamond is valued at a million, and so on. Thirdly came antiques. One plate with coins was 2,055 ducats heavy. In short, the chance to see Vienna is not to be missed.

Tonight I will probably see my beloved Harlequin and his touchingly dear and

faithful Columbine. Tomorrow will be Mozart's *Figaro*, *Lablache*, *Fodor*, and *Donzelli*! What do you say to that!

HEGEL'S NEXT LETTER [481] records visits to private galleries in Vienna. He had already visited the Imperial Gallery, which was then housed in Belvedere Castle [479]. Vienna's Lichtenstein, Czerny, and Schönbrunn collections still exist—though, especially in the case of the Schönbrunn gallery, the contents have changed. The Esterhazy collection belonged to a Hungarian aristocratic family. What undoubtedly attracted Hegel to these galleries was their cosmopolitan character, traceable in part to Austria's past imperial role in non-German regions of Europe. While his attendance at the Italian opera acquired a hedonic tone, his Vienna gallery tours were aimed at furthering his historical education. Yet from the October 2 letter [482] we again see that Hegel set limits to the extent of his historical scholarship. If he became a philosopher, it was not to lose his encyclopaedic balance by acquiring overly erudite knowledge. It is an attitude quite removed from any claim to absolute knowledge in the sense of omniscience.

The October 2 [482] letter records Hegel's attendance at two comedies, just as the entry of September 29 [481] records attendance at comedies. The image of a Prussian officer's careful observation of a satire on Frederick the Great is a token of the rivalry between the two major German powers.

Hegel showed appreciation of ballet on September 21 and 25 [479, 480], though, like opera, it does not receive separate treatment in his cycle of art forms. His October 3-7 letter gives his most elaborate account of a Viennese ballet performance. He viewed ballet, like opera, as a composite art form drawing on architecture (settings), sculpture, painting (scenery), poetry (e.g. the myth of Psyche and Amor), and music. Ballet and opera both had been originally devised in an attempt to retrieve the art forms of classical Greece. Hegel's description of the "truly classical heads" of opera singers as suited to Greek statues and of the "Roman heads" of ballet dancers betrays a view of opera and ballet as classical sculpture come to life. Sculpture epitomized classical art, while the animation of classical sculpture in opera and ballet marked them as postclassical, Christian-Romantic art forms. The attempt at retrieval thus produced art forms more central to the Christian world than the long-vanished song and dance of classical antiquity had been to that culture. In ballet, opera, and theater, Hegel beheld art which could not be preserved in museums and galleries, and yet which—because it was the art of our world—had no need of such preservation.

Hegel to His Wife [481]

Morning morning, September 27, 1824

... The fine weather is now gone, but the fine days in Arenjuez are not quite gone yet, for I will still be spending a few more here. There are still many things I do not know. But a few weeks are surely not enough to both observe what is new and examine more exhaustively what I already know. This morning the Kleins are departing. Although there was little opportunity to roam about and take in the sights together, we did see one another at meals and enjoyed the conversation.

To resume my account, on Saturday afternoon I finally went to the Prater,

which indeed must be seen by anyone who claims to have seen Vienna. It is a forest like our animal park—crossed by paths but with no further improvements. The difference is that the ground is grassier, that there are more and larger green clearings, and that the paths are broader. Small installations in immense number are scattered about for diversion, not like our tents and Royal Gardens but somewhat in the style of Moabit or Pankow. . . .

After the Prater I went to Leopoldstadt Theater. First there was a curtain raiser in which Schuster, almost as before, played an elderly businessman with a young wife. *The Magic Pear* followed. If only I could have had the boys along with me for this. Even you would not have been too old to enjoy it for a second time, as I myself did.

That night it started to rain in an awful downpour and continued all through Sunday and still this morning. I fear what is in store. Yet one must not give up hope. I did not mind it raining so hard Sunday morning, since for once I had to rest. But after lunch I took a ride to Augarten and toward Nussdorf despite the weather. On the way I saw a pear tree—as big a one as can be—in full blossom. It had already borne its fruit; I am enclosing a small blossom, one for you and the other in remembrance of the fruits that have flourished in this land, as a sign of how much I acknowledge and appreciate the excellence of such soil. I have gotten at least a preliminary idea of how Augarten and Nussdorf are set up and have found them very beautiful. . . .

To reach now the end of my story, where do you suppose I went in the evening? Mozart's *Marriage of Figaro*! For this the Kleins stayed over Sunday. I had to confess that the Italian voices did not seem to have as many opportunities in this more restrained music to display those brilliant feats which are so sweet to hear; but the arias, duets, and so forth, and especially the recitatives were, in and of themselves, performed with great perfection. The recitatives are entirely free and natural creations of the singer. What a Figaro Lablache is! Fodor is Susanne, though for this role she admittedly should have had greater beauty and height. Signora Dardanelli played the countess. A truly beautiful woman with a lovely Italian head, exuding composure and nobility in attitude and deed—a very lovely, beautiful demeanor. I all but fell in love with the woman just as I did with you. She is indeed most charming. Donzelli as the Count contrasted rather sharply with her. Such situations are not right for him.

[Tuesday, the 28th]

Only briefly about yesterday. In the morning I went to the Prince Lichtenstein collection—a most splendid palace with equally splendid treasures. What all one can see there! In the afternoon I saw again the Czerny's collection, noting here as well a few choice pieces. In the evening I attended for once the Burg Theater to see a more elevated play. A very large theater, and rather crowded. [Heinrich] Anschütz, whom I saw more than twenty-five years ago, has matured into an excellent actor. The others have good parts and good sides to their performances, but leave something to be desired. . . .

I am starting a new page and will thus indulge in writing somewhat more,

though I am weak and tired from walking around and standing all day long in Esterhazy's Gallery, and in Schönbrunn, where I ate; since the Italian opera is going to start in half an hour, I prefer not to engage in any further recounting but will only say that the weather cleared up yesterday afternoon and that today we have the finest weather imaginable, not too hot; and it promises to remain so for a while. Flesh and blood were locked in a battle with volition to race home to you on Friday, October 1. But you give me permission to stay. I have seen and enjoyed everything in a whirlwind tour. I have been diligent, all day long on my feet, but there is still much to see in order to retain what is worthy and create a treasury of recollections for myself. I must see it all twice, but I was admittedly not seeing the Italian opera merely for the second time. The beautiful, infinitely varied surrounding region I have enjoyed today for the first time, and in the most beautiful sunlight. . . .

Wednesday, September 29

So as to not fall behind, I will at once pick up where I left off yesterday. In a world of such riches what I have to write about seems to expand even as I write. You yourself can see how much there is to say from the fact that each of the two galleries here—the Prince Lichtenstein and the Prince Esterhazy—would by itself make a city famous and merit a trip of a hundred leagues. Each gallery is situated in a splendid palace, surrounded by lovely gardens with the most beautiful views. The Emperor [Josef Karl] Franz [I] wanted to pay 180,000 florins for the marble staircase in the Lichtenstein Gallery. These treasured collections of paintings are at once open to the public in the most liberal fashion. Each of these two Princes has his own gallery director and attendant. No tip is required, though I give one because I cause more work for the people, coming on days when the galleries are closed, and mornings and afternoons until six o'clock. In other respects as well everything is arranged most comfortably. It takes three to four hours to go through the galleries hurriedly but without racing, looking at the important paintings more closely, while passing over the rest. One would need days to recover one's breath completely and sit down to see the small Chinese figurines moving their heads. . . .

But I still must describe *Schönbrunn* to you—a castle with grounds in the rear. On a gently rising terrain one finds a sunny clearing as wide as the castle, extending all the way to the summit, where a pavilion affords an unobstructed view in all directions. A most splendid panorama, partly limited in the distance by hills, partly by far-off mountain ranges—the mountains of Styria and Moravia—and partly extending into an endless horizon. Everywhere fertile fields, villages, castles, and roads [*Alleen*] extending endlessly. It is this site that constitutes the unique beauty of Vienna. The Danube, by the way, adds little to the vista. Surrounding the city are first high ramparts with walkways on top—bastions overlooking the *Glacis*, i.e., the flat terrain surrounding the bastions, perfect sites for the boys to fly kites. Beyond is a green meadow crossed by roads, and then—farther from the city—the most varied alternation of palaces and gardens, churches, large and small buildings, so that beside the city and ramparts we see a life of completely rural and rustic appearance. But I must rush on. Tuesday morning was spent at the

Esterhazy collection. Noon was spent in Schönbrunn, though I saw neither the menagerie nor the botanical gardens. These gardens are said to be in their greatest splendor. In the afternoon it was back to the Esterhazy collection, and then to the Italian theater for [Rossini's] *Corradino [il cuor di ferro]*. Signora Dardanelli was lovely, singing exquisitely with David. Act 2 begins with a septet and finishes with a duet between the two. What a duet! Now I completely understand why Rossini's music is bad-mouthed in Germany, especially in Berlin. For just as satin is only for the ladies and *pâté de foie gras* only for connoisseurs, so *this* is music created solely for Italian voices. It is not for the music as such but for the singing *per se* that all else has been created. Music having validity for itself can also be performed on the violin, on the grand piano, and so on, but Rossini's music has meaning only as sung. It is when David and the amicable Dardanelli sing together that one really ought to see if the composition measures up. If only I could hear this piece once more! A new bass, a buffo of an excellent sort, made his debut here. Another singer also emerged out of this brood in *The Barber of Seville*, but the women are mostly German. I went by chance to the front row and got a seat next to a Persian or Turk who every evening sits in the same place—the doorman said it was Prince [Demetrios] Ypsilanti, which one I do not know. I greeted him, he thanked me by crossing his forehead and chest, and we applauded together enthusiastically.

Yesterday morning I ran a few errands, then went to the Imperial Library, where I obtained an erudite view of copper engravings. This collection, which is different from the Archduke Karl's, has 300,000 engravings! What a job it would be to look through them all! If you were to look through 300 pages in one day you would need three years. In the afternoon it was off to the Belvedere, then to [the historical painter] Mr. [Karl] Russ, whom I accompanied to the observatory, and then to the Italian theater—Rossini's *Barber of Seville* for the second time. I have by now already so spoiled my taste that this *Figaro* of Rossini's has pleased me immeasurably more than Mozart's *Nozze*. I was also delighted by the way the singers performed and sang so much more *con amore*. How marvelous and irresistible it is. So much so that indeed one cannot tear oneself away from Vienna.

Friday, October 1

... I am still feeling yesterday in my bones, for it was a day of heavy marching. After the hour of letter writing in which I conversed with you—without first having visited with you I could not get out—I went once more to the Prince Lichtenstein Gallery. Even if I visited it ten more times I would not exhaust its treasures. I remained there until twelve o'clock. Then to Währing, a gallery almost half an hour away. From there, I went to call upon my colleague who holds the philosophy chair locally, Professor [Ludwig] Rembold. He is not as old as I, but is a regular fellow countryman of mine to whom my writings are not unknown. Still, people here tend to be stuck in the mud too much. Traveling and looking about themselves do not come as easily as for us. From there I crossed a branch of the Danube over to Augarten, where, with a good appetite, I had a lunch as tasty as any I ever had, and less expensive than in my inn, where the fatal practice of eating *à la carte* prevails. Afterwards I looked around Augarten. The garden is maintained

just like Schönbrunn, with splendid wide paths. Trees and bushes along the paths are cut to form vertical walls. The trees resemble fans, much as when you hold onto the stem of a pear and then cut the pear around the stem so that what remains is hardly thicker than the stem. One walks merely between [never under] trees and leaves and always sees the sky, which today was surely a most beautiful blue. But the sun was already descending so that the walls cast shadows. Yet from the top of Augarten a view opens onto the richest land, bounded by hills approximately an hour away—Leopoldiberg, Kahlenberg—a most beautiful landscape, most beautifully illuminated. We who have seen such views are indeed to be envied. Then it was off to the Prater—a forest just after my heart, with green grass and no bushes or shrubbery between the tree trunks. Besides countless pubs, bowling alleys [*Kegelbahnen*], merry-go-rounds, optical indoor rides, and so on, I have found a few very elegant coffee pavilions—here the correct spelling is "*Kaffeh*." Finally, out of fatigue after much ambling around, just to rest up we went to the Leopold Theater, where Schuster played a schoolmaster, and quite well. He spoke High German, by the way. The second play was *The Magic Pear* again. Genuinely tired, I then went out into the most beautiful moonlight—the good weather is inalterably faithful—and returned to my inn for supper. . . .

Hegel to His Wife [482]

Vienna, October 2 [1824], Saturday evening

What presently occupies most my thoughts here is the wish to soon be with you, my dear. As much as I could accomplish of what I consider my business here—seeing and hearing of local treasures—is finished. In the first place, further occupation with it would not lead to any new discoveries but only to repeated pleasure. Of course one can never see enough of these paintings, nor hear enough of the voices of David, Lablache, Fodor and Dardanelli, Ambrogio, [Luigi] Bassi, and so on. And Dardanelli is worth seeing as well as hearing! Secondly, however, such further occupation would inevitably have led to a deeper and more extensive scholarly examination than in every respect I could or should let myself in for; thus I am primarily occupied with thoughts of departing, and with my longing and wish to have the monotony of traveling already behind me. . . .

First still a brief account taking up where I previously left off. I hardly know at present how to give an account of yesterday. Someday I will have to have you tell me how I spent my time here! So yesterday I visited the Ambrosi collection. What is that? If you are really curious, sometime you will have to ask friends or girl friends of yours who know either antiquity or Vienna. Then on to Belvedere. After that, it was off to our friend Russ, who lives nearby. Since he was not yet at home, his wife and daughter meanwhile showed me engravings by Dürer and others. Then, after a walk with Russ, I attended the *An der Wien* theater, where I had not yet been. It is the most beautiful theater here, with five balconies—called "floors"—but there are no orchestra boxes. Two plays were being performed on the same theme of a king who enters a lowly family incognito; in the second play he was openly identified as Frederick II [The Great] though his title was that of a duke. For the rest the names, uniforms, etc. were all Prussian. A well-known

anecdote about Frederick was in one of the plays. He seems in the process of becoming a kind of stock figure in the world of theater—hunchbacked, old, cane in hand, snuff in the vest pocket; and as chance would have it a Prussian officer happened to be sitting next to me, carefully noting all that was being said about this duke—all in all a mediocre production. The house, with its immense height, was very empty. . . .

Early this morning I was off for the third time to the Esterhazy collection; treasures that cannot be admired enough. One can really never tire of them. The most beautiful pieces are in the Prince's private room, a garden room in the pavilion next to the castle where the great gallery is located. The Prince was occupying it, and when he heard footsteps above he asked who was there, since this was not one of the days the gallery was open to the public. He took pleasure in hearing that it was a professor from Berlin who was already coming for the third time, and ordered the valet to show me everything. And since he rode away, I once again was permitted to see the beautiful pieces of his cabinet. What a living room! A few miles from Vienna this Prince can travel on his own land all the way to the Turkish border. I remained there from nine to ten in the morning. Then back to my room within a half-hour, and after a change of clothes off to the cabinet of antiquities. The director, Professor [Ignaz von] Sonnleitner, invited me—he is single—to lunch in a restaurant with a professor from Padua—a very scholarly and endearing man. We scholars immediately feel at home with one another, quite otherwise than with bankers, for example. Afterwards, a few errands downtown and, finally, once more to the Italian opera and, in fact, just what I wanted very much to see: *Corradino il cuor di ferro* [by Rossini, staged in Rome as *Mathilde di Shabran* in 1821]—a heart of iron melted and softened up by the lovely Dardanelli. How sweetly she sang—and how David again sang with her! I did not contradict the man with whom I conversed last night at dinner, who maintained at great length that Rossini's music was [specially ordered] for the heart. . . .

Hegel to His Wife [483]

Sunday noon [October 3, 1824]

All uncertainty has now come to an end. I have the express coach ticket in hand. Yesterday I received the reply that all seats for Tuesday and Friday were taken, but that people could still register for extra coaches. By today two individuals from Prague had put in their names, but for Wednesday instead of Tuesday. Thus, in order to have the matter settled by Wednesday, I was forced to put off my departure by a day. In thirty-six hours I will be in Prague, and closer to you by half the distance. If only the remaining half could be crossed as quickly, so as to be with you and the boys, my dear, resting up by your side and recounting the trip to you, though there will be little left that I have not already recounted in writing. But you will have all the more to tell me, and I shall be getting back to work.

This morning I rested and completed arrangements for the express coach. Afterwards I took a walk around a few bastions and then entered the fortress chapel, where I was still able to hear part of a sermon, though I was not close enough to understand much. I merely discerned beautiful language, organ music,

and decorum. Afterwards I attended mass, with beautiful music especially provided by the clear voices of the boys' choir. Most importantly, however, I had a good view of the Emperor and Empress. He indeed has a very handsome and dignified head. I saw as well "little Napoleon," as the people of whom I inquired about the little Prince [Napoleon II] called him. He has the handsome head of a boy, dark-blond hair, quietly serious, and natural bearing.

Taking a walk by the water on the way back, I sort of hoped for an opportunity to give you a description of local feminine elegance, but as it turned out I saw only bourgeois sorts. Elegant society is only to be seen in coaches in the Prater. What I saw of it—whether here or in the opera—gives me no more definite an idea. Nothing special has struck my attention. From what I have seen, at least elegance does not appear any more pronounced than with you in Berlin; and a certain flat, heavy-footed manner of walking is certainly more common here than in Berlin. The millinery shops seem as numerous to me, meat and sausage shops are situated next to ladies' hats, silver shops next to rope makers, and so on. Those schnapps bars, schnapps pubs, schnapps taverns, and so forth, which are nestled everywhere in Berlin, here are nowhere to be seen. It is now mealtime. . . . I will not yet close this letter, since it will be the last from here; and I should then like to fly faster than my letters. Tonight Act 1 of *Zelmira* with Dardanelli is to be performed, and since tomorrow is St. Francis Day, "God Save Our Good Emperor Franz" will be sung in all the theaters.

Monday noon

Sunday afternoon was bad weather. Since I overlooked the notice on the theater program which read "Beginning exceptionally at six-thirty rather than seven," I arrived only at seven and missed precisely the main event: the chorus of "Long Live Our Good Emperor Franz." Then came Act 1 of *Zelmira*. Dardanelli sang exquisitely. But above all there was Donzelli, whose recitative was a real triumph. In *opera seria* he is without peer. He and Lablache have truly classical heads. Bearded with black curls. Donzelli is just starting out, while Lablache is already mature. One could place their heads atop any statue from classical antiquity. This first act was over at nine. Then came ballet—*Amor and Psyche*. But what am I to tell you of these fairy-like figures, pantomimes, feet, decors, metamorphoses, and stage settings? A chorus of sixteen *figurantes*, with sixteen children portraying Love, whether along with these extras or alone. The children at one point each appeared carrying a paper lantern on a high stick, with a large bouquet of flowers over the lantern. Each of sixteen *figurants* then lifted a child on his shoulders—each of the children with its high lantern—and the sixteen *figurantes* each led by the hand of a *figurant*, performed dances, entanglements, and turns. Among other things, there were at least six changes of scenery: first fog and night with Psyche, then the moon with a starry sky, followed by daybreak, dawn, the sun, and finally a glittering palace full of flower vases and silver leaves. *Amor and Psyche* were performed by Signora Torelli and Signora Brugnoli. They have Roman heads, the blackest eyes, Roman noses, fire, animation, agility, grace, expressiveness in pantomime, everything livelier and with more movement

and charm than in Berlin. Yet when, at eleven, a new act began, it started to drag on too long for many and they left. I, however, remained to the end with other loyal [spectators], and thus did not go to supper until eleven-thirty. This morning I packed my baggage, and while doing so had several visits. I then went to the Imperial Library in the rain and looked through the treasures. After lunch there are additional tax and postal affairs to expedite, though I shall not be leaving right away tomorrow. A superfluous day, though I am still hoping to go to the Italian opera, where today German cold is being derived by translation from French frost, yielding *Der Schnee* [*La Neige* by Daniel Auber].

Vienna, October 4, 1824

. . . Vienna again! Baggage has already been checked at the depot—in some respects a little heavier and in other respects a bit lighter due to travel expenses. But these expenses have not amounted to an enormous sum [*Heidengeld*]. It has all been spent on good Christians, and on myself, who am a good Christian as well. With such matters settled, where did I go next but to the Italian theater! First of all to hear folk singing, for today is St. Francis Day. The rainy weather, by the way, prevented the illuminations that perhaps would have been the only festivity of the day. For I was unable to learn of any other doings. I, too, celebrated the day by listening to the singing, performed to the one side by Signora Fodor *à la tête*, then Dardanelli, and so on—thirteen in all—and to the other side by Signor David *à la tête* followed by Donzelli, Rubini, Lablache, Ambroggi, Bassi, da Franco, etc.—sixteen male voices in all, all singing in unison without solos or variations. Yet considering the awesome means deployed the net result remained somewhat mediocre. The men were in black, the ladies in white satin. This time the house was bursting at the seams, probably due to St. Francis Day but also because of the German opera performed today for the first time—which is really French music, i.e., French opera sung by German male and female voices. Due to the overcrowded house I, on the one hand, had the chance to see many or at least several pretty ladies; on the other hand, I could take greater notice of Viennese ladies because I no longer had to look at or listen to Italian singers. . . . I now pass on to the German opera, i.e., the pretty French music by Auber sung by German voices: in the last act passion enters the voices due to a French *coup*, and at last they let themselves go, though until then the soul of the singing amounted to no more than chirping and yearning—all quite subdued. With the Italians, by contrast, the sound is immediately free of mere yearning, and the true ringing of naturalness is ignited and in full swing from the very first moment. The sound is freedom and passion from the start. The singers blissfully go at it with open breast and soul from the very first note. The divine furor is at bottom a melodic stream spreading rapture, penetrating and freeing every situation. Ask Milder if it is not so. She herself exhibits this quality in singing [Christoph] Gluck, though not Rossini, whose timbre, sound, and action are essentially passion and soulfulness from the very start. You yourself, my dear, feel this as well when such fullness lives on in you—sounds on, rages on—in echos or even mere recollections of itself. I may still mention that at last the first act of yesterday's ballet was performed. Eberle, a

German, danced exquisitely, though not entirely with the Italian flare of a Torelli, who with her admirable manners and—even more—Roman physiognomy gave me an idea of Italian dance. But enough for now concerning such profane sights and performances. . . .

October 5

. . . This afternoon the weather has cleared up again. [Weather forecaster Siegmund] Dittmar of Berlin sure enough predicted it. From the local papers and other sources I see what a reputation this prophet enjoys here, which is not his fatherland—just as I myself left Swabia for Berlin via Nuremberg. But to come back to my dry historical account, this morning I spent some time at the Imperial Library, paying a visit to Raphael and Marc Anthony. What soulful grace and harmony! But I add another prosaic remark: on certain days one can see here, free of charge, every imaginable treasure of artistic genius, and in the Imperial Library one is admitted without charge any day. Sometimes a tip is given to the curators in attendance, and even when it has not been necessary I have always given tips—at least for the honor of Royal Prussian professors. On the other hand, the Berlin-Potsdam mess is decried here and throughout the world. And I, Royal Titular Professor of Philosophy at the Royal University in Berlin—on top of that a professor of *philosophy*, the subject of subjects—have paid or should have paid a ducat in Berlin, Potsdam, and Sanssouci when I wished to see something. I shall advise acquaintances of mine who would like to see works of art to save all the ducats and thalers required for anything and everything—not only for the grave of Frederick the Great but even for those of his dogs—and to use them for a trip to Vienna, where they can see the most magnificent treasures, more in fact than can currently be seen in Berlin. Read some of this to my dear esteemed friend Privy Councillor [Johannes] Schulze, so he may fully appreciate my gratitude for all the cherished good things I have seen thanks to his generous and kind interest. And assure him that despite the above I have given local professors the opportunity to see that we in Berlin need envy no one. On the contrary! But forcing myself back to my account, I will briefly report that this afternoon I once again visited beautiful Schönbrunn with its sights. I also visited the menagerie, though I saw only the gardens and, of the animal population, only the royal members: the elephant and ostrich. The remaining rabble [*Pöbel*] had already gone to sleep. I also missed the plants. Since the flowers cannot be seen by lantern, I have saved this as well for another time. And lastly, today there is no Fodor, no Dardanelli, no Lablache, nor any of the rest. All's bad that ends bad, namely another installment from a play at the Leopold Theater. I will bring back the program. Tomorrow at the crack of dawn my coach will be galloping off. God protect the coachman! For the time being all my heart's wishes are concentrated on this alone. . . .

Thursday, 7:00 p.m.

Good night, Vienna. I write these lines in *Prague*, where I have just arrived this very minute—after a happily terminated trip. Yet I got off to a bad start, since yesterday morning I missed the express coach, though I soon caught up with it. But resumption of the trip was then threatened by a broken axle, so that another coach

Hegel and France, 1817-1831

had to be substituted. But despite all, the trip has, as I say, ended happily, and—as has been the rule—is still on time. I immediately sent for letters at uncle's, and sit here awaiting them.

And what do you know! The hired man brings me your dear letter, which has arrived here safely to welcome me along with the longed-for happy news that all is well with you. Even if the news is only that you are well, for me it is like double interest. The first return is in finding you well, and the second is in finding you well after having felt so well myself. The fact of having fared so well myself, of having luxuriated in spiritual pleasures, would have given me a bad conscience if I had discovered that you in the meantime had not been faring well. I was often disturbed by the thought that while I was enjoying so many beautiful things and living amid utopias my Marie might not be as fortunate. If she is at least well, then my conscience is set at ease. But you have forgone many pleasures I have enjoyed alone. If only I could bring back to you all the beautiful things I have seen and heard. But at least I will bring myself back, and this, my dear, will have to do. But that is the main thing, is it not? Or so I asked myself to imagine your answer. . . . In Prague I now have cut in half the distance between us. . . .

Hegel to His Wife [484]

Duxan, October 8, 1824

Where Duxan is you will hardly be expected to know. I myself have only known for a half-hour but shall now impart my knowledge to you. It is situated perhaps somewhat over halfway from Prague to Teplice. I will be staying here overnight.

Leaving Prague after eleven in the morning, I traveled through the Bohemian countryside in the most beautiful, lovely sunshine, adding beauty to everything. The Bohemian landscape is very rich in beautiful sights; the villages are poor, and to me are now no longer Bohemian villages. Now that the sun has set, the full moonlight and a few scanty candles embellish my memory of you. Tomorrow noon I will arrive in Teplice, and tomorrow evening or perhaps as late as Sunday in Dresden.

P.S. Dresden, October 11, 1824. I arrived Saturday afternoon in Teplice, and here last night—so far, or rather so close to you, my dear!. . . Last night I went right away to Tieck's and there met Professor [Hermann Friedrich] Hinrichs, who is moving to Halle, plus Mr. Friedrich von Schlegel, who, however, was made known to me only after his departure.

FRANCE ALWAYS REPRESENTED for Hegel the most significant contemporary non-German culture. England was both more distant and the object of a certain antipathy. Italy, for all its art, was a land of the past; while Russia, like America, remained a land of the future. Hegel's close relationship to France was apparent in his letters to Schelling on the Revolution, and in letters to Niethammer on Napoleon. The letters translated in this chapter document his relationship to France under the Restoration. If the original Revolution left a deep impression on Hegel's early development, and if the Napoleonic era was a time of mature labor for him, under the Restoration he came to enjoy international recognition. Hegel always had had a relation to France; now, through Victor Cousin, France had a relation to Hegel. Hegel traveled to Paris in 1827—in part to keep a low profile in Berlin on his birthday, which the year before had aroused the envy of the King. In Paris he discovered the French and English stage, and then traveled homeward with Cousin as far as Brussels and Cologne. In the next few years the fall of the Bourbon monarchy led to the political and professional rehabilitation of the liberal Cousin, who became minister of education after the July Revolution. But Hegel's attitude toward this Revolution was not predictably supportive—a fact which clouded his relationship to his follower Eduard Gans in the last months of Hegel's life. Hegel's response to the 1830 Revolution raises the final question of this chapter—that of a possible philosophical apostasy on his part. However, interpreted in the light of contemporary texts, his letters perhaps show advancing old age and a private faintheartedness, but no lack of philosophical self-fidelity.

VICTOR COUSIN

Victor Cousin first became known as a disciple and protégé of Pierre Paul Royer-Collard at the Sorbonne. Royer-Collard had been a professor of the history of philosophy at the Sorbonne since 1811, and enjoyed Napoleon's favor in his defense of the Scottish commonsense philosophy of Thomas Reid against the sensationalism of Condillac and the Ideologists. The latter were tainted in Napoleon's eyes by association with atheism and the anarchy of the early Revolution. The political position taken by Royer-Collard and Cousin largely oriented their philosophical quests. Repudiating both Jacobinism and the clericalist traditionalism of Joseph de Maistre bent on full restoration of the *ancien régime*, they sought, like

Hegel, to uphold a middle position of constitutional monarchism in the years after Napoleon's downfall. The problem was to find philosophical ammunition for such ideological service. Without completely turning his back on Thomas Reid, Victor Cousin chose to cast his net more widely. A 1817 "fishing expedition" among German philosophers brought him to Heidelberg, where he met Hegel and began to incorporate the Hegelian position into his openly "eclectic" approach in philosophy.

Cousin recalled his first meeting with Hegel in these words:

He had just published his *Encyclopaedia*. . . for the use of those attending his courses. I poured myself avidly into this book, but it resisted all my efforts, and at first I saw nothing but a compact and tightly woven mass of abstractions and formulas far more difficult to penetrate than the most bristling scholastic philosophy. . . . Fortunately, while visiting in Hegel's home I met a student of my age, a well educated and amiable young man, Mr. Carové. . . . In the autumn of 1817 he performed the service of reading with me a few chapters of the terrible *Encyclopaedia*. Several times a week we met in the morning, walking through the ruins of the old castle or along the path which everyone in Heidelberg knows as the *philosophers' path*, Mr. Hegel's manual in hand, me asking questions and him replying with untiring indulgence. But this young master was scarcely more advanced than his pupil. My questions often went unanswered, and in the evening we went to Hegel's home together to take tea in the German manner and then interrogate the oracle, who himself was not always very intelligible to me. . . . Hegel himself liked very much to chat about art, religion, history, and politics. On these subjects he was much more accessible to me, and we more easily fell into agreement. . . . I was delighted to hear him speak to me of all the great things which humanity had done from its appearance on earth up to its present level of development. . . . (*Berichten* 766)

The next year Cousin again visited Hegel in Heidelberg. When in planning his itinerary Cousin asked Hegel for introductions to other German philosophers, Hegel, responding in French, sought to oblige [344].

Hegel to Cousin [344]

Heidelberg, August 5, 1818

I was very pleased to receive news of you, sir, and particularly to receive assurance that you still remember me and that your friendship for me, which I have come to value so greatly and will value forever, remains intact. This pleasure is further enhanced by the pleasure, which you lead me to envisage as imminent, of welcoming you here soon. You request the addresses of friends in Munich from me. I enclose a letter for Mr. [Karl Johann Friedrich] Roth, Councillor at the Ministry of Finance, a financial expert but above all a historian and political scientist. He occupies the same house as Mr. Jacobi, to whom I ask him to present you, and to whom even without such a presentation you would not fail to pay a visit. Please show him all the respect and affection I never cease to feel for him, and tell him likewise I have not forgotten that it was he who gave the first impetus to my call to Berlin. Secondly, please present my compliments to Councillor

[Friedrich] Niethammer at the department of school affairs. I remember you spent an evening at my house with his son [Julius], who is pursuing his studies here. You will find these gentlemen very liberal in their way of thinking, though with nuances you will easily grasp and which perhaps tend a bit toward this Teutonic, anti-French patriotism. Please give Mr. Schelling my compliments. You will no doubt receive a warm welcome from him, and politically find a way of thinking free of anti-French prejudices. This is the extent of my connections in Munich. It is perhaps superfluous to add that Mr. Schelling and Mr. Niethammer get along well, but that Mr. Schelling and Mr. Jacobi are on terms such that it is more advisable not to mention a connection with the one in conversation with the other [Ch 5, second section]. In Stuttgart, my hometown, where I spent a few days this spring after an absence of twenty years, I naturally still have a few old friends left, especially Mr. [Karl Eberhard] Schelling, the brother of the Munich philosopher—and besides that a physician with very charged days. I ask you, if you see him, to give him my very cordial regards. As for the philosophers, there is Mr. [Gottlieb Christian] Fischhaber, a professor at the gymnasium who has just published the first issue of a philosophical journal [*Zeitschrift für Philosophie*, 1818-20] containing several articles by Councillor [Johann Christoph] Schwab, an anti-Kantian philosopher who is at once pre-Kantian, and who I believe shared with Mr. [Antoine de] Rivarol a prize thirty years ago [1784] from the Berlin Academy on the causes of the universality of the French language. But I know neither of them personally. As for Tübingen, I have written a letter to Mr. [Adam Karl] Eschenmayer on your behalf. A philosopher, he is above all a friend of animal magnetism. But so as not to make this mailing too bulky, I sent it directly to him, though it starts out by saying it will be presented to him by you in person. You do not indicate to me the approximate time you will be arriving here. This fall I will be exchanging Heidelberg, which you fondly call your adopted fatherland, for Berlin, where I have received a call. I plan to set out for Berlin in the middle of September. I am alerting you to ask you, if it does not force you to alter the itinerary for your philosophical errands, to make arrangements so that the pleasure of my seeing you still this fall does not escape me.

My wife, whom you have kindly remembered, instructs me to send you her compliments. And, as for myself, I am already in advance enjoying talking also of politics with you. I greet you very cordially, Hegel

A few annoying occupations have delayed the mailing of this letter. It makes me mad. You will long since have been in Munich. I hope it will still be of use to you. Mr. [August] Schlegel, who has been staying here for a few weeks, celebrated the day before yesterday his engagement to Mlle. [Sophie] Paulus, who is well known to both Mr. Roth and Mr. Niethammer. They will be pleased to receive news of this from you.

IN 1820 COUSIN LOST his teaching posts when his position at the Sorbonne was suspended by a decree in the official *Moniteur* in late November, and when the *Ecole normale supérieure*, where he also lectured, was closed down shortly after. He was a victim of the reaction against liberals after the assassination of the

reactionary Duke de Berry. Unable to resume his teaching until 1828, Cousin used his leisure to translate and edit works in the history of philosophy, namely Descartes, Plato, and Proclus. In 1824 he undertook a further trip to Germany, but in September, before returning home, was arrested. The arrest was ordered by the Mainz Commission, which had been set up after the assassination of Kotzebue in 1819 to counter revolutionary fomentation in the German states. Although the French government officially protested, the French police had secretly denounced Cousin to the Prussian police (d'Hondt, 194). In 1821 Cousin had attracted suspicion through his friendship in Paris with Santa-Rosa, the Italian revolutionary Count Annibale de Rossi. Upon his arrest Cousin was transferred to Berlin, where he was incarcerated until February 1825 and subsequently retained under surveillance until an investigation was closed on April 20. In the first letter which follows, Hegel, speaking on Cousin's behalf, addresses the Prussian Minister of the Interior, Kaspar Friedrich von Schuckmann, shortly after the arrest. Hegel's request to visit Cousin in prison was honored. In the second letter, Hegel requests Leopold von Henning to see Cousin off after termination of the inquiry in April.

Hegel to von Schuckmann [486]
[draft]

Berlin, November 4, 1824

Though I am uncertain as to the permissibility of doing so, I take the liberty of presenting Your Excellency with a humble request, and of respectfully submitting the following circumstances in explanation.

In 1817 and 1818 Professor Cousin of Paris—whose recent arrest and transfer to this city have come to my attention—undertook two trips to Germany, during which he made the acquaintance of several philosophy professors at German universities, and also looked me up in Heidelberg.

In my association with him during his stay of several weeks in the summer of 1817, I came to know him as a man with very serious interest in the sciences in general, and in his own special field in particular. I may add that it was in this capacity alone that I then came to know him. He showed himself to me at the time to be a man driven by an ardent desire to familiarize himself as exactly as possible with the way philosophy is pursued in Germany. Such an aspiration was to me especially appreciated, coming from a Frenchman. Furthermore, the zeal and thoroughness with which he tackled our abstruse way of doing philosophy (traits which could not be underestimated judging from the notebooks which he sent me at the time and which formed the basis of his philosophical lectures at the University of Paris), along with his otherwise upright and gentle character, have aroused in me, I may well say, a lively, respectful, and sympathetic interest in his scientific endeavor. Since then, I may add, this interest has not decreased, though I have not had any news from him in the six years that have now gone by. But I did learn that after having been suspended from one of his two teaching appointments—the other post was retained—he lay enfeebled with a hopeless illness. To secure a living in his leisure time he at once undertook large-scale literary endeavors in his field and published several of his works. Among these works I came to know his

philosophical essays in the *Journal des Savans* and in *Archives littéraires*—of the latter I do not know to what year they continued to appear, nor if they continue in the present. But I also came to know of a new edition of Descartes's works [1824-26] with which he has provided us, the beginning of his French translation of Plato's works [1822-], and in particular a new edition of Proclus's works based on a comparison with the Paris manuscripts [1820-27]. As for his edition of Proclus, he has done me the honor of dedicating the fourth volume [1821] to me along with Schelling.

These varied works could, on the one hand, only increase my esteem for Professor Cousin's scientific and scholarly activity. On the other hand, I had to regret but could hardly be surprised to learn that such exertion—of which I confess I would hardly consider myself capable—had plunged him into a long and enfeebling illness.

A few weeks ago I ran into him in transit through Dresden, and received from him various assurances of his continued kind sentiments toward me. To me these sentiments appeared sincere and, as I took it, to do honor to me. I was thus all the more surprised to have to conclude from his present arrest that Your Excellency must hold very grave circumstantial evidence against him.

Yet inasmuch as he presently finds himself indicted but not yet pronounced guilty, and inasmuch as nothing has yet been decided on his guilt, I believe it permissible for me to continue both my respect for him and my prior opinion of him, which under the circumstances I have most humbly taken the liberty of citing to you. But insofar as my good opinion may now have become more doubtful, I feel myself in view of my friendly relations with him in the past. . . [text unclear] and his literary reputation. . . to express my sympathy in his present situation or perhaps. . . render service to him in this matter—considering his earlier expression of amicable and respectful sentiments and behavior, which he just recently renewed.

I likewise believe I need have no reservation about expressing such a wish to Your Excellency, thus submitting the matter to Your Excellency for gracious judgment. For. . . the particulars of the case are unknown, and I have no wish to draw from them and bring forth any further motives for my request. I only allow myself to add that I will not fail to consider most respectfully all the conditions which it may please Your Excellency, in the interest of the police, to place upon this visit [with Professor Cousin], should it be permitted, in order to assure that my visit reflects honorably on myself.

[The following is addressed to Karl Christoph von Kamptz, chief of the Prussian Police:] In accordance with Your Honor's gracious permission, I take the liberty of entrusting to Your Honor the enclosed humble petition [486] for His Excellency the Minister Baron von Schuckmann, subject to the respectful and confident request that the propriety and admissibility of delivering it to His Excellency be left entirely to Your Honor's kind and perceptive judgment. Hegel

Good morning! I repeat to you this morning, dear friend, the request made last evening for you to kindly take care of Cousin's departure this afternoon. Above all see that his trunk is not left behind at the express station or, in case this does not work out, that other arrangements are made. Yours, Hegel

BACK IN PARIS in August 1825, Cousin wrote Hegel emotionally of the death of Santa-Rosa in the Greek liberation struggle. Speaking of his own restraint both during his detainment in Berlin and in statements upon returning to France, he writes:

This entire affair has proven two things: first that I am invariably attached to the cause of liberty, but secondly that no one could drag me into any folly. . . . In general my situation in my country is just about what you could wish for me given my principles, which are still, my wise friend, a little younger than yours. [494]

When Hegel delayed responding, Cousin wrote once more, on December 13: "Your soul is in peace, Hegel. Mine is suffering. I spend my time regretting my prison. . . ." [501]. In his April 1826 reply, which like all available letters from Hegel to Cousin was composed in French, Hegel confessed to advancing old age, which he set in contrast to Cousin's still youthful protest to the way of the world, and to his already mature vigor in pursuit of the work of the world.

Hegel to Cousin [508]

Berlin, April 5, 1826

I cannot, dear friend, begin this letter, which I am finally now getting to, without the bitter awareness of the reprimands I deserve for having postponed so long my reply to the precious and repeated expressions of kind remembrance you have not ceased to give me. Attribute my slowness to a kind of idiosyncrasy to which I am subject in this connection, and with which no one can be more dissatisfied than I. In my uneasiness I am left with but one consolation, but it has unfortunately contributed to prolonging my negligence: I take it to be certain that you have not inferred any halfheartedness in my sentiments for you, and that despite the justice of any anger you may have felt it has not undercut the basis of your friendship. Moreover, for quite a time after you left Berlin, I considered myself in a kind of conversation with you through common friends [e.g., Gans] who have had the good fortune of having been quite some time in Paris, and above all of having enjoyed your company. After they all finally returned, I of course had to replace this indirect rapport by signs of life of my own. What aggravates the severity of my guilt are the heavy obligations acquired toward you by virtue of the precious gifts you have had sent to me, and which have caused me as much pleasure as instruction. I have carefully distributed copies of your "Prospectus" [unavailable] which you sent, including most recently the one for your friend [the Romantic writer] Baron [Friedrich Heinrich Karl] Fouqué. For this writing I have

words of thanks and compliments to transmit from all sides. And I myself appreciated the depth of the views and relations you expound. They are as true as they are ingenious. But I appreciated just as much the power and clarity of the exposition. This forceful and expressive style is unique to you.

Then came the works of Descartes himself, and Proclus—a gift of great value in every respect for which I must deeply thank you. With this enormous work before me I congratulate you on the industriousness of which you are capable, and likewise congratulate France for the fact that such undertakings in philosophical literature are possible there. In comparing myself to you I must chide myself for laziness. And in comparing the distaste of our publishers for undertaking philosophical works I must persuade myself that the French public has much more taste for abstract philosophy than ours. Your edition of Descartes gives us not only the point of departure of modern philosophy but also the full panorama of scholarly endeavors in his time. I look forward above all to your promised exposition and critique of Cartesian philosophy—in itself a beautiful theme, very fruitful in relation to this time of ours, and to its way of viewing philosophy.

Beyond the thanks I owe to you, please convey my thanks to Mr. [Joseph-Daniel] Guigniaut [a student of Cousin's], who has kindly presented me with his valuable work based on Mr. [Georg Friedrich] Creuzer's treatise [*Symbolism and Mythology*]. Undoubtedly it is to your kindness that I owe this consideration on Mr. Guigniaut's part, which has touched me deeply. Mr. Guigniaut's labor has produced a book out of Mr. Creuzer's work [Ch 13 on Creuzer]. Beyond this merit of a recombination [*réfusion*], he has so greatly enriched the work through his erudition and development of the ideas that I know of no work capable of conveying a clearer and at once more richly developed idea of the religions Mr. Guigniaut has treated—especially none that could be more convenient for the sort of studies I engage in, and which could have charged me with more serious and yet more pleasant obligations. Please transmit to Mr. Guigniaut an expression of my deep gratitude along with assurance of the highest esteem I have acquired for his learning by repeated reading of his work.

But to come back to you, I could not fail to notice in one of your letters some somberness, but was not surprised. If you compare this somberness with the peace of my own soul, I admit I perhaps have more peace of mind than you. But do not forget that you are younger and thus not yet so hardened in the habit of renunciation, and that if I should possess this advantage it would be all too amply paid for by the relaxation in the motive springs of activity which my age is beginning to make me feel. It has resulted for me in the displeasure of a delay in a new edition of my *Encyclopaedia* just like the delay in replying to your letters and kindnesses. The edition was supposed to appear during the winter, then by this Easter. I will devote the two weeks of vacation remaining to it. Even now this manuscript is far from being much advanced. I must envy you your activity. I also learned with great pleasure of your interesting relationship to the young, in which you maintain and nourish the need for thought. It is upon individuals that the preservation of spiritual and philosophical progress devolves.

The course of your affairs in the public domain has taken on a decidedly

uniform color, so that I am even surprised at the moderation of the dominant party. If in the private cases surrounding freedom of the press it has now succumbed in the court of law, in the Chamber it has not only taken its revenge but has done so in a manner that arouses my surprise at its satisfaction with such shabbiness.¹ As for us, we are following the accustomed path with which you are familiar. A very strong and developed letter has been written by our King in his own hand to his sister (i.e., his natural sister), the Duchess of Anhalt-Köthen, upon her conversion to the Catholic religion along with her husband the Duke, and has begun to circulate in copied form. It would create quite a contrast if printed alongside your Jubilee processions in Paris. The King has also had the displeasure of seeing another of his natural siblings [*frères*], the Count [Gustav] of Ingenheim, snatched away by this sister in the same operation. The operation having, it is said, been accompanied by a lack of honor, the King has banished him from the Court and all Royal residential cities in the Kingdom.²

But I must hasten to finish this letter while still adding news of your friends here. Unfortunately the news is not all pleasant. Mr. [August Friedrich] Bloch, who I believe is hoping for a reply to a letter addressed through his wife to you, has succumbed to the temptation of the commercial markets that led so many people astray last year, but he was still able to arrange so as not to lose his position, and so as in a few years to be able to free himself of his obligations. [Soprano] Mme. [Anna-Pauline] Milder presently suffers from a pretty severe ailment in the knee which is confining her to bed. She has instructed me so many times to tell you that despite her discontent in seeing you in Paris she does not cease sending you her love. Mme. von Liemann [Milder's sister] is terminally ill. Mr. [Eduard] Gans has been named Professor of Law at our university, which has caused me much satisfaction in every respect, especially in view of the project we are presently studying of a journal of the sciences [*Yearbooks for Scientific Criticism*] to be published here. Mr. [Heinrich Gustav] Hotho is fine; he will soon graduate from our faculty. Has he written you that he has chosen Descartes's philosophy as the theme of the dissertation he is to defend? They are fine acquisitions for work in the Lord's vineyard. Mr. Henning and Mr. [Karl Ludwig] Michelet will personally have sent news of themselves in thanking you for your kindness. I am having the pleasure of seeing still other collaborators come forth. . . .

By the way, Mr. Gans will have written you of our unfortunate and inappropriate behavior—quite leaden, indigestible, and without remedy.

At last goodbye, my very dear friend. How many times have I wistfully recalled the evenings it pleased you to spend with me. At least let me often hear from you. Adieu. Yours, Hegel

¹The French Minister, Count Jean-Baptiste de Villèle, who led the ultra-Royalist majority in the Chamber, had encountered a setback in December 1825 when a Royal tribunal in Paris acquitted two liberal periodicals, the *Constitutionnel* and the *Courrier français*. The periodicals had been attacked by the Chamber for articles critical of the Jesuits and of ultramontaniam. (*Correspondance* III, 358)

²Hegel alludes to the conversion to Catholicism of Duke Friedrich Ferdinand von Anhalt-Köthen and his wife, the Countess of Brandenburg, daughter of the Prussian King, Friedrich Wilhelm II. Hegel compares the ultra-Protestantism of the Prussian King with the ultra-Catholicism of France's Charles X, who participated from Paris in celebrations of the Church Jubilee led by Pope Leo XII. (*Briefe* III, 387)

COUSIN REPLIED to Hegel on April 25, 1826 [509] and August 1, 1826 [517], thanking him for his letters and requesting—in vain as it turned out—Hegel's judgment of the Preface to his *Fragments philosophiques* (1826):

I want to instruct myself, Hegel. I thus need stern counsel with respect both to my conduct and my publications. . . . You owe me in this regard a serious letter from time to time. I have sent you my *Fragments*, i.e., the Preface, which is alone readable. . . . It is a *compte rendu* of my essays in philosophy from 1815 to 1819. Come down from the heights and lend me your hand. There are four points in this little writing: 1, the method; 2, its application to consciousness or psychology; 3, the transition from psychology to ontology; and 4, a few attempts at a historical system. . . . Be all the more pitiless knowing that, since I am determined to be useful to my country, I will always take the liberty of modifying the directives of my German masters according to the needs and condition, such as it is, of this poor country. This I have forcefully said to our excellent friend Schelling, and I believe I wrote it to Gans as well. It is not a question of creating here as in a hothouse an artificial interest in foreign speculations, but rather of implanting in the entrails of the country fruitful germs which will develop naturally according to the primitive qualities of the native soil, of impressing upon France a French movement which will subsequently go forward on its own. . . . You tell me the truth, Hegel, and I will transmit to my country whatever of it is capable of understanding. . . . If you do not have time to write me, dictate to your secretaries Henning, Hotho, Michelet, Gans, Förster a few German sheets in Latin characters. . . . [517]

As a founder of the long-surviving *philosophie de l'esprit* of academic French philosophy, Cousin enjoyed some success. French spiritualism from Cousin through Louis Lavelle featured a Cartesian reflexive beginning and an Augustinian-Platonic metaphysical conclusion, grounding the activity of the self in God.

Cousin sent along with the above letter his edition of Plato's *Gorgias* (1826). The translation was dedicated to Hegel, but Cousin worried that the following critical reference to the Prussian police, also contained in the dedication, might upset Hegel:

When, as I was recently traveling again in Germany, an extravagant police, directed unbeknownst to it by an odious political line, dared attack my liberty, making the most atrocious accusations, declaring me proven guilty and convicted in advance, you [Hegel] spontaneously rushed forward to tell my judges that I was your friend. . . . (*Briefe* III, 404-05).

Cousin's letter of August 1, 1826, concludes with advice for Hegel upon the founding of the Berlin *Yearbooks*:

. . . do not engage yourself too quickly in a journal enterprise. Favor it, but do not enter into it lightly. It is a great responsibility. . . . Let Gans do it. He is young, ardent, and indefatigable. He can descend into the arena every day. You, my dear friend, can scarcely at your age resume such an occupation. Reserve yourself for the big occasions. A new edition of your *Encyclopaedia* is well

worth a hundred journalistic articles. I say this just between us, for the venture is a beautiful one, suitable for your friends if they are wise and well-united. . . . [517]

On March 15, 1827, Cousin wrote to Hegel again [536], repeating a request of August 1 [517] for handwritten copies of Hegel's unpublished lectures on the history of philosophy and the philosophy of history. "To refuse," he wrote, "would be proof of a distrust I do not deserve." Hegel's letter of July 1, 1827 [547], indicates that lecture notes compiled by Hotho were finally sent to Cousin. This letter, with its reference to the terseness of the *Encyclopaedia*, highlights the value of such privately circulating notebooks of Hegel's lectures, although Cousin himself once opined to Friedrich Carové that Hegel would have more impact if he wrote for the entire German public instead of lecturing to his students [591]. But the letter's main content is Hegel's acceptance of Cousin's proposal for a reunion. Cousin had suggested on March 15 [537] that they meet at the Rhine, but Hegel was now inclined to go all the way to Paris. He had already asked the Minister's permission to travel [544].

Hegel to von Altenstein [544]

Berlin, June 11, 1827

A humble petition from Professor Hegel for vacation leave:

I take the liberty of humbly petitioning Your Excellency for gracious permission to take a vacation trip, which I of necessity wish to make to restore my weakened health. I would intend to set out after the middle of August.

I have the honor of remaining most devotedly Your Excellency's obedient [servant] Hegel, Titular Professor at the local Royal university.

Hegel to Cousin [547]

Berlin, July 1, 1827

Here, my dear friend, is at last the letter which I have been writing for such a long time, and which I owe you in so many regards. I am plunged into a general bankruptcy with regard to both my literary obligations and my correspondence, and I am not yet very clear as to how to extricate myself. I view the credit you have extended as privileged, and I take it up first so as to repay it before all others.

The second edition of my *Encyclopaedia* occupied me during the entire winter. The printing, which was done in Heidelberg, will be finished in the coming days, and the publisher has been instructed to send you a copy first of all. Since this book is but a succession of theses, their development and clarification being reserved for the courses, I could not do much to eliminate the formalism and concentration which prevail in it. I did add more notes, which are more readily grasped by the readers.

I am especially behind in the thanks I owe you for the multitude of works which have seen the light of day due to your industry, and which have reached me out of your kindness, including one in which you have wished to honor me through the dedication. This dedication, a monument of your friendly sentiments in my regard, contains at last your manifesto against our police—for whose omniscience

Plato, I may add, is probably an obscure corner into which it has not likely penetrated.

The interest which *Les Fragmens* inspired in me led me to promise an article on it for our critical journal. I have not yet given up the idea, but will be tardy in bringing it to realization. In any case a failure of timeliness is a German character trait. Your complete edition of Descartes, which you have given me, is a beautiful present. The naïveté of his procedure and exposition is admirable. One can regret not being given the power to force men to be introduced to philosophy by studying these treatises, at once so simple and clear. But what is still missing to make the edition complete—which is really the most interesting thing—is your work on the Cartesian philosophy.

The young [Jean Jacques] Ampère is here, and is kind enough to come see me sometimes. So as to throw himself completely into the world of romanticism at its center, he plans still to visit Sweden and Denmark. I, who am not much at home in these fogs, am not in a position to contribute to the advancement of his views. I recently sometimes had news of you from Mr. [Theodor] Panofka, who will kindly deliver both this letter to you and, at last, Mr. Hotho's notebooks.

Panofka tells me that you are beginning to give up the idea, which you wrote me about earlier, of visiting the banks of the Rhine this summer. I have long contemplated this hope of spending a few days with you. I even mustered the fortitude to contemplate joining you on your return to Paris, or persuading you to come all the way to our house here. In any case please advise me as to what you decide in the matter. I am not indisposed to surprising you in Paris this autumn, nor to making an excursion from there to the Netherlands. But above all I would not want to arrive in Paris in your absence. For the rest, I am not an independent man like yourself but am subject to regulations both from on high and from below, and thus have to adapt my plans to them. So you might find yourself much inhibited in trying to coordinate your plans with mine. Most importantly, for the present all this is but castles in Spain on my part. So as not to expose myself to ridicule I am not yet talking here about the idea. For to me it remains more likely that nothing will come of it. Mr. August von Schlegel is about to complete a lecture series which he has given to local ladies and gentlemen on the fine arts. He has not succeeded too well in his lessons, nor in his manner of conducting himself in society. But for the rest we get along well together.

Farewell, my dear friend. I hope to receive news from you still this month. Take care. Do not be too industrious in your study, and preserve your affection for me. Hegel

Mme. de Milder charges me with telling you that in August you will find her in Wiesbaden [*Wisbade*] and in September in Ems. She persists in being your good friend.

HEGEL'S FIFTY-FIFTH BIRTHDAY, 1826

Hegel's desire to go to Paris in August 1827 has been linked to a misadventure with the King surrounding his August birthday in the previous year (d'Hondt, 102). His friends and students had offered him a party whose extravagance as

reflected in the Berlin press appeared to outshine that of the King's own recent birthday—whereupon the King decreed that private parties were no longer to receive such public attention (*Briefe* III, 402). In two letters to his vacationing wife Hegel both anticipates this 1826 celebration and reflects on it, already with some apprehensiveness, the day after:

Hegel to His Wife and Sons [521]

Berlin, August 22, 1826

How falsely, my dear wife and children, you have led me to speak, and even think! All last week I thought and repeated what nice weather we were having for your church fair. And then everyone said that especially Sunday—the 20th—you would all be at the church fair that day, while in fact, you see, it had already taken place a week earlier! Such a church fair I consider as good as none at all! In any case, you no more than I have been deceived about the altogether pleasant and enjoyable time you expected in Simmelsdorf. I have taken heartfelt interest in your account of so pleasant a region, and even more so in what you tell of the friendly, cheerful company of our dear relatives. It has delighted me in part because, if you do not take it amiss, you are still off my back and I can keep house in peace and quiet, which except for a few things I do. Among these few things currently belong the art of Mme. [Antoinette Sophie] Schröder—a great, grand tragic actress. There is something to be seen, heard, compared, and challenged!

But I must be brief today, for I still have to deliver my confounded lectures! Everything is already closing down around me, but for myself I see still no end before the first week in September. This is essentially connected with some of your plans as well. At first you want to go through Frankfurt. The world thus becomes too large: there is almost too much that is enjoyable and inviting for you to endure it all. First of all Darmstadt is nearby. And if you were in Frankfurt, you would in any event have to see Mrs. Schenk, among other things because two or three days ago a letter addressed to you from Mr. Schenk arrived, which I opened seeing that it was stamped Darmstadt. He announced in it his wife's delivery—a very good one—of a boy on Friday the 11th at ten o'clock in the evening, as I here faithfully report as if copied out of a Nuremberg chronicle or family register. The joy is great, giving assurance of our friendly interest, of our apologies for our silence thus far, and in general of our heartfelt sentiments. I must reply to one matter in particular (I will write back tomorrow), namely, [the claim] that I have turned my heart away from South Germany and am responsible if you do not go to Darmstadt. They have looked at every coach which passed their house to see if we were in it. I will tell him I have given my heart completely over to these regions of the Rhine ever since his wife went back there.

Now from Darmstadt Heidelberg is not far! Could you go to Darmstadt without making an outing there? On the other hand, should you wish to take me as your guide it would be even worse—for I am, God knows for how long, bound hand and foot, at least until the middle of September! Thus I cannot make any plans for myself either as to *when* or even *whether*. In any case, Munich—I was much moved to read the friendly lines from Niethammer—would be an inescap-

able stopping point. Gans will travel to Augsburg, handling affairs of ours—Society affairs [Ch 19, first section]. He asks daily, as is his habit once he gets something in his head, if I am going along! Result? If you had intended *in any case* to stay longer in Nuremberg we could have talked *later* of *whether* and *when*. At present I can still say nothing definite about my plans and aims.

But yesterday the French gymnasium started up again. Things are getting underway now. I give Mrs. [Elenora] von Rosenhayn [Marie Hegel's aunt, married to an Austrian officer] a kiss on her pretty little hand, but not on the "hond" [*d'Hond*]*—*she says "hand" with such a broad Austrian accent. I do so because of, among other things, her interest in the boys' piano playing. But you do not, I think, take all this badly or make anything of it. The boys write as if the ringing of the bells had given them as much or even more satisfaction and honor than the organ playing.

Mrs. Marheineke will have arrived here the day before yesterday in the evening, but I have not seen her yet. Professor [Philipp Konrad] Marheineke already closed up a week ago to accompany her to Heidelberg, but will probably let her rest up for a few more days.

Your letter from Simmelsdorf is kind, warm, and loving. I give you a kiss for it, and include the boys in it. For Sunday—my birthday—friends have organized a get-together, which I have accepted. It shall last far into the night—until we have linked Goethe's birthday on the 28th with mine. You and the boys also drink a glass to my health! Treat them at least to something—to champagne! Be honest rather than extravagant, and do not always talk of your search for opportunities. You are yourself as good an opportunity as others! And above all, think of your rest and relaxation, for you have rushed others much and, on top of that, yourself, too. Do not take this as nagging. It is concern for you that [makes me hope] the trip will not only be a source of excitement and cheer but also of quiet and strength. My warmest greetings to all. Everyone's and especially your Hegel.

Hegel to His Wife and Sons [524]

Berlin, Tuesday, August 29, 1826

I am so bursting with things to tell, my dear wife and children, that I do not know where to begin or end. First of all, dear mother, there is the pleasant news in your letter of your extended stay with your family. In the midst of the pleasant news there is no longer talk of a detour to Frankfurt. You did not at first eagerly accept the invitation, but in your next letter you seemed to be thinking seriously of it. The result for me was that upon envisaging the situation [*i.e.*, a trip to Frankfurt] further, everything put together—your rushing and chasing about, the related [exertions] which emerged and which would have been more unfair to eliminate than the detour itself, the unjustifiably prolonged absence for the boys—all this quite ate away at me, as you will have seen from my last letter written on Saturday. I take only briefly the pleasure of mentioning the favorable reception given by the dearest and most amiable of all great uncles to the little I said [521] regarding the most gracious Aunt Rosenhayn. I cite with equal brevity the joy over your brother Wilhelm's arrival, in whom you only now discover a similarity to Mr. von Finke.

You at once confess how much the latter pleased you even before you had any realization of the similarity. I furthermore mention, only in passing, the affection of your mother and other relatives, the kindness shown to the boys, and their as well as your entire well-being. The reason for my brevity about all this is that I still have so much to tell about myself—although, to be sure, at random. I received your letter of Friday today, Tuesday. So this letter cannot reach you in Nuremberg before Saturday. I naturally hope it will find you there; or, rather than having to be forwarded to you in Frankfurt, that it be sent back to you here. So I have really wanted to write you what I have to write. I thus take the risk of writing this to Nuremberg.

What I have to tell concerns my birthday. Your birthday remembrance, which Mrs. Aimée [von Hartwin] very nicely prepared for me here behind my back, along with the letters from the boys, has pleased me very much. From the bottom of my soul I have tenderly given you my greetings, and given you all a kiss. As early as Mrs. Aimée arose to make sure your remembrance would be the first with which I would be greeted, she nonetheless did not get up early enough. For we had begun celebration of my birthday from its very onset at midnight. I went to Mr. [August Friedrich] Bloch's for whist, which was much delayed and which, due to the supper being prolonged, resulted in the night watchman ringing in the 27th, which was matched and even surpassed by the ringing of glasses. We also drank affectionately to your health—I first, but the others as well, especially [Johann Gottlob] Rösel. The [Karl Friedrich] Zelters were there as well.

In the morning, however, there were various well-wishers, dear loyal souls and friends, plus several letters with poems. Then a business meeting during which I received a visit from—guess who?—His Excellency Privy Councillor [Karl Christoph] von Kamptz [head of the Prussian police] himself in person! At noon I kept quiet and only tenderly toasted and drank to your health at the appointed time—thus saving myself for the evening. For great honor, joy, and testimonies of affection then awaited me. In a new restaurant, *Unter den Linden*, which was celebrating its grand opening, there was a large supper, so extensive it merits characterization to you as the most complete and exquisite of dinners. [Friedrich] Förster the organizer, Gans, [Captain von] Hülsen, Hotho, Rösel, Zelter, and others attended—about twenty persons. Then a deputation of students arrived, presenting me with an exquisite silver cup. When the silver merchant learned it was for me he made a contribution himself, since he himself had been one of my students. The cup was presented on a velvet cushion along with a number of bound poems. Still many other poems were recited orally, including [landscape painter Johann Gottlob] Rösel's [523], which he had already sent me in the morning along with an antique gift [a small statue of Isis]. In short, it was hard to finish with them before midnight. It will be understood that the students brought along music and fanfare. The company kept them, as it were, for dinner. Among the guests was one whom I did not know. It was Professor [Ludwig Wilhelm] Wichmann—it was divulged to me that my much-discussed bust, which [Christian Daniel] Rauch could not get to, had been entrusted to him. Next week—this current one I still have to lecture—I will pose for him. I will have the honor of sending my mother-

in-law a copy of his effort. If you want to surprise her please say nothing about it. I could have surprised you with it as well. Yet you know that for my part I do not like surprises, and I had to tell you of the affection and honor shown me on my birthday. I must not forget to mention a flower vase of crystal from Mr. von Hülsen [a military officer and student of Hegel's]. And so at midnight we linked my birthday with Goethe's on the 28th.

Yesterday I slept until eleven and recuperated a bit, though not as much from physical fatigue as from the deep stirrings of my heart. And upon rising I received still another poem, a morning greeting from Dr. [Heinrich Wilhelm] Stieglitz [a student of Hegel's]. You will not believe what warm, deeply-felt testimonies of confidence, affection, and respect have been shown me by these dear friends—the mature ones and the younger men alike. It has been a rewarding day for the many troubles of life.

I must now guard against overdoing a good thing. Even if talk can become too boastful in a circle of friends, to the public it looks different. I want to enclose an article which has already been printed.

A warm farewell now to all of you, wherever this letter may reach you. Your faithful husband and father, Hegel

P.S. A trip for me, even if it were actually to materialize, at least will not be possible so soon—so that under no circumstance could you take it into account.

TO PARIS

Cousin [550] enthusiastically supported Hegel's travel proposal of July 1, 1827 [547], and by August 19 Hegel was en route, writing from Cassel. His itinerary to Paris took him through Ems, Trier, Luxembourg, and Metz.

Hegel to His Wife [555]

Cassel, Saturday morning, August 19, 1827

Good morning, my dear! As I was awaiting my bowl of soup last evening I had just reflected on whether I should still start a letter to you when who do you suppose entered my room but Mr. Heinrich Beer [Berlin businessman and student of Hegel's] and his wife! You can imagine our joy over such an unexpected encounter. Since he is returning directly [to Berlin] from here he will be able to tell you he found me in good health.

To tell the truth, so far the trip has not been free of discomfort. The first night was the worst. It was all too crowded in the cabriolet. I sat down in the two-wheeled coach for two [*Beichaise*] though actually we were four; and at every station we got another coach invariably worse than the last. From Wittenberg on things were better. At noon we arrived in Halle, and the party had grown smaller. I picked up [Hermann von] Hinrichs [Ch 18], ate lunch, and slept pretty well during the afternoon. At six o'clock we left for Nordhausen, now traveling in the company only of a student. It was an excellent express coach. Each of us had a whole side to himself. The bench was like a sofa, and I spread myself out and slept. As you know, I am used to sleeping on sofas through most of the night. Both yester-

day and the day before we had the most beautiful weather, though during the first night it rained very violently from midnight on. Still in the company of students, we set out yesterday on the trip from Nordhausen to Cassel at six o'clock.

This is all I have experienced since leaving you. But I now have an errand for you. Please give Mr. Beer in my name a copy my *Encyclopaedia* [second edition]. I reserve the right to autograph it, which I forgot to do before my departure. When I left the express coach last evening a young man was already waiting for me in the name of Vice-Rector [Gustav] Matthias, the father of one of my students. He invited me to put up at his house, which of course I did not accept. I am out of paper, as also subject matter. This afternoon or tomorrow morning I will probably set out with the hired coachman. Say hello to the boys. Your Hegel

Hegel to His Wife [556]

Ems, August 23, 1827

I have just returned from the spa and am writing you quickly, since the mail leaves at three o'clock and lunchtime is approaching. You see from the date and the waters I have taken that I have already advanced eighty leagues and am taking my cure very seriously. First of all, I must continue my travelogue to you, though it is rather simple. Before you receive this letter Mr. and Mme. Beer will have already told you of the pleasant day we spent together in Cassel despite the bad weather. . . . The express mail did not leave Cassel until Tuesday night. I thus rode by hackney-coach on Monday the 20th from Cassel to Marburg—uneventfully. In the evening I was able to visit Privy Councillor [David Theodor] Suabedissen, Professor of Philosophy in this rough-and-tumble hick town. The Professor had quite a brood of female relatives around him, so I soon made off. On Tuesday I went to Wetzlar, where I visited [Christoph Ludwig] Schultz—who lives outside the city in a garden—only after lunch. He and his wife were genuinely pleased over my visit. They are all very healthy and look well. The children—including my godchild—who were almost sickly, are now quite strong and well. The garden is situated on a mountain, with constructions overlooking it about thirty steps up the hill. I was obliged to spend the afternoon and evening until after ten o'clock with him. In the morning Schultz came to see me, conducted me around the few things worth seeing, and remained with me until I boarded the express coach at ten o'clock. He has thrown himself body and soul into very interesting investigations [into Roman fortresses along the Rhine], and his conversation was very instructive to me. The entire family lives quite happily. . . . Yesterday I arrived at ten o'clock in Coblenz; the express mail coach from there to Trier leaves already in the morning, which was too early. I thus will not depart with it until Monday—making the trip to Trier in one day. Had I known this in advance I could have asked you to write to me in Trier, where I could have received a letter from you on my birthday. On that day I shall drink to your health and happiness. Now greetings and embraces, the boys included. In Paris I will no longer understand any German. Do write to me a lot from Berlin, about yourselves and other things. . . . Greetings to our friends, above all to Privy Councillor [Johannes] Schulze.

Hegel to His Wife [557]

Trier, August 28 [1827]

As I am still dawdling about in Germany, my intention has been to wait until I am in France to write you. But since I have some leisure this evening, I want at least to give account of the further course of my trip, even though the letter is only to depart from a foreign post office, so as not to give rise to doubt as to whether I will in fact cross over the border. I cannot conceal the fact that traveling already bores me at times, and that I would know of nothing better than to spend the evening with you at home, telling you orally what I have seen during the day. I have not lacked for noteworthy, pleasant, and friendly things, which indeed I experience everywhere.

To be sure, I could have arranged a somewhat shorter stay in Ems, where the weather was bad. This stopover really put me back by three full days. . . . Saturday I returned to Coblenz. Sunday morning I took a walk to Horchheim on the Rhine, a short hour away from Coblenz, and sought out the locale of Joseph Mendelssohn's [banker son of Moses Mendelssohn, uncle of Felix] estate. The weather was still alright. The Mendelssohns welcomed my visit very amicably. I came upon Mr. Mendelssohn himself; his wife, whom you have always singled out as a fine, worthy lady; his son [Alexander] with his wife of only a few months; and the other daughter-in-law, whose husband is in Berlin. The estate is splendidly situated. The garden, vineyard, house, indeed everything is in excellent, charming condition. It was a very delightful visit, made for quiet enjoyment. I stayed for lunch. Afterwards Mr. Mendelssohn took me back into town, and from there building inspector [Johann Claudius] Lassaulx conducted me to the Carthusian monastery [*Karthause*], the most beautiful point in the vicinity of Coblenz, affording a view of the splendid rich landscape, of the Rhine with its flourishing banks, and of the manifold hills and castles bordering it in the area, including *Stolzenburg*, a property of the Crown Prince, whose silhouette I immediately recognized from Rösels light screens. . . .

Yesterday I had to get up at three in the morning to leave precisely at four o'clock by the express mail coach. The route is over sixteen leagues long, very frequently nothing but hills, yet on a good main road. We arrived here at eight o'clock. Everywhere I find people who know me and who are otherwise kind and amiable. After having enjoyed a good night's sleep I set out after eight o'clock under the guidance of the innkeeper's brother, who showed me the notable Roman ruins and conducted me around the area, taking in among other places an estate of General Procurator [Johann Albrecht] Eichhorn's brother-in-law. We were on our feet until one thirty. Trier is excellently situated on the Mosel, a beautiful valley of the greatest fertility surrounded by soft hills covered with vineyards. In the afternoon I visited the churches. . . .

Yesterday I gave a toast to your remembrance of me and to our well-being—indeed with a very good Mosel wine. What are the dear boys doing? If you think it appropriate, have them take further private lessons. Just admonish them to do a lesson every day for me.

I arrived here an hour ago in good company. . . . I have left Germany but not yet entered France. But even this is not quite accurate, since this part of the Low Countries still belongs to the German Confederation. I have just returned tired from a walk I took under Mr. von Hanfstengel's guidance through the city and part of the fortifications. The latter are so admirable even I can appreciate them. I have a reservation for the coach to Metz, and will leave early tomorrow morning. From Metz on I will have entered upon the actual destination of my trip. All the rest has been a mere prelude. You see that I do not overexert myself. The physical fatigue is negligible, while the mental fatigue consists in inactivity, in the lack of conversation with you, and on the other hand in conversation with insignificant company. Yet even this works out on the whole pretty well. A good Brabantian from Louvain, undertaking a tour on the Rhine to distract himself after a recently suffered loss of a twenty-one-year-old son and a seventeen-year-old daughter, joined us today in our coach. A composed, self-controlled man, he invited me to visit him in Louvain.

Hegel to His Wife [558]

Metz, [August] 30 [1827]

I have just now, at three o'clock in the afternoon, arrived here. . . . I could leave for Paris right away at five o'clock, but following the system I have stuck to thus far I prefer to rest up again. . . . So I have indeed arrived in France! . . . It is now evening. I have already registered for the Lafitte coach, traveling in the *coupé*, which is the vehicle's forwardmost compartment. There are three successive compartments. The middle one is called *l'intérieur*, while the one at the rear is the *cabriolet*. The *coupé* has three seats alongside one another facing the front, and is closed with windows rather than open like the so-called cabriolets in our express mail coaches. Before eating I briefly looked over some of the city. The Cathedral is most charming from the outside, and the view from a stretch of the rampart is especially so: the valley through which the Mosel flows is flanked by gentle hills. It is more extensive and abundant in cultivated lands and villages, and more enticing than the area around Dresden. Since Metz is an important fortress, the garrison is large. After dinner I went to the theater, which was completely packed with officers; there was hardly a dozen women and civilians. *Ruse against Ruse* [was playing], which has also appeared on the German stage. Then there was vaudeville—all foolish and very leaden; but it was played and spoken with such liveliness that I hardly understood a word, and in fact understood nothing at all of the wretched singing. . . .

I have not had any sick spells, nor any trouble with the customs and the like. My appetite is very good, and I sleep well. What I am lacking is news from you [euch], though I am hoping to receive some Sunday, the day after tomorrow. It is now Friday morning. . . .

Hegel's September 3 celebration of Paris—"this capital of the civilized world"—shows a persistent cosmopolitanism in an increasingly nationalistic age. The letter also points up a continuing interest in the French Revolution. During his stay in Paris Hegel read a recent history of the Revolution by François-Auguste Mignet: *Histoire de la Révolution Française* (1824, 2 vols). Mignet was a liberal, and a friend of Cousin's. Hegel dined with both men while in Paris [564]; also present at the meal was Adolphe Thiers, a friend of Mignet's and the future President of the Third Republic. Mignet's history of the Revolution, written with Talleyrand's encouragement, was popular and openly ideological. Published during the Bourbon Restoration, it sought to rehabilitate the reputation of the Great Revolution, to present its violence as a natural result of special historical conditions, and to perpetuate a legend to draw upon in the struggle against the Reaction. Mignet, like Cousin, took a leading part in the Revolution of 1830. Hegel's characterization of the work as the best available on the subject is an indication of Hegel's own ideological posture as late as 1827. Yet the correspondence with Cousin shows that Hegel was growing uneasy about the political consequences of this posture.

Hegel to His Wife [559]

Paris! September 3, 1827

I am now writing to you, my dear, from this capital of the civilized world, in the office of my friend Cousin, who, to mention this first, has handed me your dear letter from the 20th of last month. So I finally have news from you and the boys, whose letter has likewise delighted me. . . .

To take up matters in order, I would still have to describe to you my trip here from Metz. It is usually best, however, to forget the trip itself. We left Thursday at five o'clock, first crossing a very high mountain, traversing Verdun at night, then across vast plains after having seen *St. Menehould les Islettes* atop mountains, part of the Ardennes—famous points in the first revolutionary war. We also saw in particular the windmill of September 20, 1792, at Valmy [site of a Prussian defeat by the French]—*La Lune*, [reviving] memories of my youth, when I took the greatest interest in all this. . . . After crossing the plains we headed toward Châlons-sur-Marne. In connection with this name and those plains, remind the boys of the *Campi Catalaunici* [site of a A.D. 451 defeat of Attila by the Visigoths, Franks, and Romans].

The Marne did not leave us until Paris. It is in the valley of the Marne that the Champagne vine grows—a very beautiful, rich, charming valley stretching on for many hours. We sampled Champagne first in Châlons, then in Juigny, and then came through famous Epernay. The situation here is just like that of Rhine wine in the Rhine district [*Rheingau*], where the best Rhine wine is not drunk. Then at night, again a short distance from the Marne, we traversed Montreuil and, before that, Château-Thierry. From there we entered the vicinity of Paris. A few hours from Paris there are also fields and plains with shrubbery, uninteresting though not

infertile. But the Mosel and Marne valleys are especially fertile, cultivated, and rich in villages. The villages are better built than our German ones, as also in particular the small cities. So we finally approached Paris via Bondy and Pantin. A few hours before, the dust became as bad or worse than with us in Berlin. . . .

I arrived here yesterday, Sunday, between ten and eleven o'clock. I descended at the *Hôtel des Princes* and hunted up Cousin right away. But the multitude of great things here I have already seen and skimmed over—i.e., from the outside—overwhelms me: *boulevards*, *Palais Royal*, *Louvre*, *Tuileries*, *Luxembourg*, the gardens and palace, etc.; last evening the *Champs-Élysées*, with carousel, taverns—i.e. *cafés*, indeed the *Café des Ambassadeurs* and the *Café de l'Aurore*, similar to *Zelten*, only with ten times as many people at the tables. Philistines with wives and children, etc. As I go through the streets, the people look just the same as in Berlin, everyone dressed the same, about the same faces, the same appearance, yet in a populous mass.

This morning I checked out of the *Hôtel des Princes* and temporarily deposited my [personal] effects with my friend Cousin. The hotel is very expensive. This morning we are going to hunt out a furnished room [*chambre garnie*]. That we get on well together, enjoying a warmly cordial relationship, is obvious. We did not dally long over lunch [*déjeuner*—we had cutlets at eleven with a bottle of wine—because *il à veiller aux intérêts de Mme. Hegel*, i.e., he has to make sure this letter is posted still today, which means by two o'clock. . . .

THE FRENCH AND ENGLISH STAGE

Hegel's great discovery in 1824 in Vienna had been the Italian opera (Ch 23), in particular Rossini. He also enjoyed Rossini in Paris in 1827, but his real discovery that year was the French and English stage, especially Molière. Throughout the Berlin years Hegel frequented the theater to distract himself after lecturing [e.g. 507 below]. The undated letter below addressed to the actress Auguste Stich, who left Berlin in 1823 to return later in the decade with the new married name of Auguste Crelinger, shows that the "distraction" of the Berlin theater was not professionally unrelated. The letter, which precedes this 1823 departure, alludes to Hegel's 1821-22 lectures on fine arts, and to his 1822-23 lectures on the philosophy of history containing the famous association of "greatness" and "passion" (*Werke* XI, 52).

But despite connections between his theater attendance and fine arts lectures, Hegel did not generally approach plays with the standards of a drama critic. A note to his follower Friedrich Förster [626 below] suggests a reluctance to allow scholarly questions—e.g. of fidelity to the original—to interfere with enjoyment of a performance on its own merits. Still, in Paris in 1827, Hegel sharpened his critical standards for judging good acting. Hegel considered Molière to be French theater at its best. The seventeenth century comic poet provided paradigms of modern comedy to hold up to the ancient comedy of Aristophanes. In the 1820s, the veteran actress at the *Comédie Française* Mlle. Anne Mars led a Molière revival. Hegel wrote to his wife that before seeing Mlle. Mars in *Tartuffe* he had never

understood why the play was a comedy. In his lectures on fine arts *Tartuffe* is viewed as impure highbrow comedy in which audience laughter is mixed with pain because we laugh *at*, not *with*, the character (*Werke* XIV, 577).

Mars had been a contemporary at the *Comédie Française* of the French tragedean François-Joseph Talma, who had rejected the soulless, declamatory style of classical French theater, but who was not yet a Romantic actor like Edmund Kean or the German Ludwig Devrient. In Talma's—and Mars's—view the actor's task was to maintain a balance between passion and reason, inspiration and calculation, nature and art. He must feel himself empathetically into his character's situation, and yet must not completely abandon himself to the foreign personality. He must modulate and edit the expression of passion, with a view to its impact on the audience. He must unite the greatest "sensibility" with the greatest "intelligence." Hegel approvingly employs the same terms in describing Mlle. Mars. She embodied French classicism for him. No longer a young woman, the artistry with which she still portrayed youthful roles illustrated the classical ideal of nature perfected by art. In 1827 Hegel saw her impersonate an eighteen-year-old blind girl in August Eugene Scribe's *Valérie*, one of the first Romantic "modern dramas" played by the austere *Comédie Française*. Hegel wished to meet Mlle. Mars, but Cousin discouraged the encounter for fear the actress would find Hegel's speech ridiculous (*Berichten* 521).

In 1827, however, the Romantic ideal of raw natural power without artifice was more clearly seen not at the *Comédie Française* but at the *Odéon*, where Charles Kemble and an English company from Covent Garden were successfully presenting Shakespeare. A few years before, the performance of Shakespeare in Paris by an English company had been hooted down by a xenophobic public. Hegel of course was no stranger to Shakespeare—nor to Molière. Shakespeare had won his position in world—and not just English—literature largely due to his acclaim by Lessing and other Germans who sought to escape the confining influence of classical French tragedy. Still, Hegel had little appreciation for the acting of Charles Kemble.

Kemble was from a famous family of actors. He later made a successful tour of the United States; yet in Britain he was never considered in the front rank of tragedians. Though an interpreter of what for Hegel was the essentially "Romantic" world of Shakespeare, Kemble lacked the spontaneous energy and inspiration of the archetypal Romantic actor, compensating through painstakingly contrived effects. He represented the paradox of a one-sided application of *intelligence* to what was primarily a theater of *sensibility*. The raw energy of Shakespeare was simulated by pure artifice, not expressed. All the sound and fury was indeed of nothing. Hegel objected to Kemble's labored overdramatization and mannered posturing, which alternated with lifeless recitation. From Hegel's contrast on September 9 between the restrained acting of the *Comédie Française* and the more emotional acting of the German stage it appears he was familiar with the newer Romantic acting. In theater as in politics (Ch 17 on Kotzebue) and theology (Ch 19 on speculative theology) he preferred classical restraint to the Romantic cult of feeling. Yet he recognized that modern aesthetic classicism was but a faint copy of

an irretrievable Greek model. Romantic celebration of the unique individual better expressed the modern spirit—even where it fell into the extreme of English eccentricity.

Hegel to Teichmann [507]

April 5, 1826

I was not able yesterday to get any orchestra seats from the box office for *Alanghu* [by Ernst Raupach] tonight. If through your help, dear secretary [of the Berlin Royal Theater], I might still obtain two tickets, I would be highly obliged to you. Respectfully, your most devoted Hegel

Hegel to Mme. Stich [692]

May 19 [18-?], Berlin

My failure to respond yesterday right away, most honored lady, to your kind invitation was due to my curiosity—for which I was immediately punished—to see a play in which you did not appear.

But this delay causes me even greater embarrassment. For my imagination has given itself over to the free impulse to enhance the lines which you have sent me—and for which I am already indebted to you—by supplying your magical rendition of them, with all the soulfulness and charm of their imagery. It is to your interpretive rendition, which so enriches these images, that I owe my reawakened interest in art. You have, you say, been seized by art with a passion. But art can only become genuine and great through such passion.

I must also especially express thanks for the gratifying kindness with which you welcomed my bold visit, and with which you now gratify my desire for the pleasure of making your personal acquaintance.

Since these diverse feelings constitute my more intimate reply to your kind invitation, I would be embarrassed to put this reply in writing had you not also made this easier for me and requested nothing but a friendly “yes.” Availing myself here most comfortably of this brief expression which you permit me, I [merely] note that I shall not fail to arrive on time. With deep respect, your most devoted servant and admirer, Professor Hegel

Hegel to Förster [626]

[Beginning of January, 1830]

Good morning! First concerning Ueberschuh [?]

Yesterday I read once again a preliminary [notice] on *Semirimas* [by Voltaire], and wanted to ask if it would not be more advisable to put aside as much as possible the comparison with Calderon and only judge such a play as it appears before us on stage. You yourself have suffered under Shakespeare. You thus have every reason not to put up with the pretension of giving us the beauty of Shakespeare, Calderon, etc. to enjoy on stage—though you would not exactly please the Merry Wives of Windsor(?)!

Lastly, once again my congratulations for [your part in the New Year's] procession of the Grand Elector. It is a classic of its kind. Hegel

Hegel to His Wife [560]

Paris, September 9 [1827]

. . . I am surrounded by a library in which I am studying more closely and familiarizing myself with the interests and perspectives of the French spirit. To be sure, I have little time for it. The weather so far has been continuously good, and rainy days are really not to be desired. . . .

As to the main thing, my life here, first there is the lodging: a furnished room [*chambre garnie*], *rue Tournon*, *Hôtel Empereur Joseph II*. If you still have Gans's map, look up the place. The *Jardin de Luxembourg* is close by. *Rue Tournon* runs directly into the *Palais des Pairs*. I am lodged in the last house [on *rue Tournon*] before *rue Vaugirard*. You must be able to find exactly where I am residing.

Otherwise my activities are divided between running around to take in the noteworthy sights and, on the other hand, eating and chatting with Cousin, whose faithful friendship has taken care of me in every other respect as well. If I should have a cough, he is at once on the spot with his obligations to *Mme. Egell*. But I cannot describe to you all the sights. It would take too long. Paris is a city of ancient wealth in which for many centuries both art-loving kings enamored with splendor and—last and most strikingly of all—the Emperor Napoleon and other wealthy personages, along with an active and industrious people, have accumulated in every way wealth of all kinds. There is a multitude of palaces and public buildings. Every faculty at the University, for example, has a palace rather like our university building. The *Halle au vin*, a building consisting of nothing but cellars, is a grandiose establishment. It is in the vicinity of the *Jardin des Plantes*, a magnificent institution with a multitude of buildings containing natural-historical collections plus structures and preserves for all kinds of animals, the menagerie, pathways, greenhouses, flower beds. Everything is, of course, three, four, or ten times more extensive, spacious, and comfortable than with us. And everything is for the immediate use of the public, and yet is protected so as to prevent deterioration. I especially wished you could see the *Palais Royal*, the Paris within Paris. The immense number of boutiques, the abundance of merchandise, the most beautiful jewelry and costume jewelry shops fill one with astonishment. But every street is embellished with the same overabundance and splendor. Everything is everywhere available. There are, for example, *cabinets de lecture* everywhere. In every cafe and restaurant, all newspapers, moreover, are available. There are several in the Luxembourg Garden, where one can read the latest newspaper for one *sou*. There are likewise clean restrooms [*cabinets d'aisance inodores*]. And all one's dealings with the people proceed simply, sensibly, and honestly. One must simply avoid petty chicanery. The churches, the *Panthéon*, *St. Geneviève*—a new church—and the old Cathedral of *Notre Dame* are architecturally grandiose. . . .

The gallery is in the Louvre. It is a straight long hall, vaulted at the ceiling and with paintings hanging on both sides—an almost endless corridor a quarter-hour long. I had passed through it quickly with Cousin a few days ago. Yesterday, as I wanted to start a more thorough examination and study, it turned out that yesterday and today there was just time enough to do it. Beginning tomorrow the museum—i.e., the collection of paintings and antiquities—is closed in prepara-

tion for the exhibition of paintings by contemporary masters. There is immense wealth, famous items by the noblest masters one has seen a hundred times in copper engravings: Raphael, Corregio, Leonardo da Vinci, Titian, and so on. I will return in half an hour to find once more [Friedrich von] Raumer and Panofka—whom I met there yesterday—and make an arrangement with them for this afternoon. Today is Sunday, and there is a parish fair in St. Cloud, i.e., a fish catch in Stralau. Cousin's advice is to skip it. Instead there is a horse race at the *Champ de Mars*. This noon Raumer has an audience with Mlle. Mars. He has to get near all the actresses. Cousin finds it ridiculous to go see her. He would have taken me to Talma or Mme. [Giuditta] Pasta were they still there. Concerning Mlle. Mars, I as well have naturally already been to the theater, [seeing her] twice in the *théâtre français*—once in Voltaire's *Alzire* and Molière's *L'école des maris*—thus two of the most famous plays—and a second time in *Emilia*, a tragedy by Walter Scott. In *Emilia* Mlle. Mars performed, and then Mlle. Leverd as Queen Elizabeth. Mlle. Mars was very lovable and noble, but of course with a certain idiosyncrasy. One understands every word of hers, and of [Jeanne Emilie] Leverd's. They perform—as likewise the men on the whole—with greater reserve and much less pathetic rage than our actors and actresses. The males are mediocre. [Pierre] Lafond, the most famous after Talma, plays almost like a butcher. The French are generally calmer and more definite in the expression of their emotions than we, especially than you. How often do I tell you you should state and treat a matter without emotion. Yet your vivacity often becomes you quite beautifully.

Otherwise, I have still seen and spoken to few people here. At this time [of year] nobody is in Paris. Cousin wanted to take me along to see the Duchess of Montebello, though we finally abstained because she is ill. Everybody is in the country. The foolish German honor of having talked to this and that individual is on the whole out of place here. . . .

The boys are doing well in their correspondence. They should not neglect to write me very frequently. Someday I will then take all of you with me to Paris. . . .

I am having discussions or strife with Cousin about eating. When we dine together it is he who orders; . . . but if I am alone I do not know what the enormous list on the menu means. Yet I now know a *table d'hôte* where one can see what is offered and what one likes or does not like. . . .

Hegel to His Wife [561]

Paris, September 13 [1827]

. . . My life in Paris this week has not offered much variety for me to recount to you. It has on the contrary been very monotonous, and it is about this very monotony that I above all have to write to you, so you will not be worried unnecessarily by others and will learn from me directly of my temporary indisposition. I believe I wrote you that I still wanted to visit the museum the last time it was to be open. That was last Sunday. Then, after having had lunch with Cousin and taken a long walk across the *Champs-Élysées* to the famous *Champ de Mars*, I was struck by stomach pains during the night. I have thus paid the tribute which most foreigners pay to the local water of the Seine, or to a way of life about which I had

already been more closely advised en route. Though I was assured right away that no doctor was needed to get over the indisposition, when Cousin found me out of sorts the next day he insisted on hunting down his doctor and, after a long search, bringing him by. This doctor, a young and very intelligent man of considerable discretion, thus treated me entirely in the French manner with *lavements*, *fomentations* and *tisanes*. As well and confident as I felt throughout this treatment, I could not help suspecting that I could have recovered more quickly with German remedies. . . . I have thus become acclimated here, have satisfied the condition that makes it possible to live in Paris, and thus may now remain here as long as I please, and as is otherwise appropriate. . . . This week I had to miss the English theater, which opened here a few days ago. The day before yesterday and again today *Hamlet* was performed by the famous Kemble. Raumer, who is above all cultivating the theater, has attended. . . .

Hegel to His Wife [562]

Paris, September 19 [1827]

. . . Thus one can never be entirely without worries over the non-arrival of letters, and I worry all the more deeply because I know your desires and anxieties in the matter. Such circumstances, as likewise my indisposition, number among the many contingencies to which we are exposed and which we have to accept [with equanimity]. . . .

I have since done considerable visiting, riding about, and sight-seeing but have remained strictly on guard against overexertion. The distances here are very great. Once one becomes acquainted with the layout of Paris streets the bustle becomes tedious. Far and wide there is the same mass of people, of well-frequented stores, etc. The monotony is the same as in Berlin, only of a different order. I met a few scholars and visited the large manuscript library, by far the richest in Europe. On Friday I will attend a session of the [French] Institute to which [sinologist] Abel Rémusat has invited me—the *Académie des Inscriptions*. . . . Apart from my indisposition, I have read and studied a lot. I had planned to write something in Paris to make use of my stay for a more definite purpose, but soon abandoned the idea. Yet in another respect my reading has been fruitful in knowledge of the intellectual condition of France. I have visited many places and spots here because of their historical noteworthiness, for example, *La Place de la Bastille*, *La Place de la Grève*, the square where Louis XVI was executed, and so on. I have now read currently the best history of the French Revolution [by Mignet]—which takes on greater presence once one has seen the squares, streets, houses, etc. I had to skip the theater for several days; in general it does not especially attract me. Yesterday I saw the English company—Shakespeare's *Othello* played by Kemble, a famous English actor. Miss [Henriette Constance] Smithson played Desdemona. The whole affair is of a quite peculiar sort, quite different from what we know. A common standard prevails in the singing. Deviation arises [in the German theater] partly in the style, but chiefly in the greater or lesser degree of excellence. Here, however, deviation is predominantly national in origin, something which one first has to get used to, which we must first admit [in

principle] before we can say whether we like it. Such passion, diction, and declamation would never enter the head of a German actor or audience. It is the sort of thing that cannot really be described. What is most striking is a deeply persistent, frequently arising manner of sound and speech production that is slowly solemn or even growling—like the growling of a lion or tiger. And then there is the way in which syllables are raspingly spit out. Much of this is due to the nature of the English language. But then there is the rapid speech again, painfully screamed, etc. I understood most of it, since I read along every word in my little book.

But what is especially noticeable is how the muscles work apart around the mouth and cheeks, a contortion and grimacing that looks perfectly ugly. The appearance of the whole is new, impressive, and quite remarkable—in any case a high, thorough development of the art, a boldness, freedom, and deepening which we are not used to, and which with us brings forth mostly mere caricatures. I will see this still more often.

Thursday, September 20

I wrote the above yesterday morning. At ten o'clock I rode with Raumer and his party to St. Denis and Montmorency. The famous Cathedral is there, the funeral site of the French kings. On the inside the Cathedral was still draped in black from a previous day's funeral. In Montmorency there is a country estate known as *Eremitage*, where Rousseau once lived a while, and which is thus an object of frequent pilgrimlike visits, even on donkeys. I myself visited it by such conveyance. There are many small relics, including a rose tree planted by Rousseau. Montmorency is situated high, and behind it one ascends to still greater heights. One sees Paris two hours away in the distance, while Montmartre and large rich plains sown with villages and country homes unfold before one's eyes. The environs of Paris are beautiful, fertile, and varied. No wonder people live in the country so much. . . . Tonight I will go to the Italian opera to hear the very famous [Benedetta Rosamunda] Pisaroni. In the morning I will go to the gallery at the Louvre again.

I have not yet written to you of how feminine attire looks here. However, it is very simple. I can notice no peculiarities relative to Berlin. Of course I have not seen the *haute société*, though I have surely seen enough elegant people at the theater. The hats which one generally sees are straw, with almost entirely white bows—long, starched, and extended. The brim is natural and round, but with multicolored flowers and everything imaginable on the dressier hats. . . . Now a few things concerning your letters. On Immanuel's birthday he will have recalled his father's heartfelt love, and will have likewise recalled the reminders and admonitions for the continued good behavior and diligence implicit in such love. I have received Goethe's letter [554].

. . . It is gradually beginning to be time to think of the date and mode of my departure. Long overland travel by diligence, express mail coach, etc. had become very burdensome for me, and I did not think of it happily. I am thus most pleased that Cousin will travel with me via Brussels. He will accompany me as far as *Cologne—chose convenue*. From there it is only a stone's throw to Cassel, and from Cassel to Berlin. . . . When I return we shall speak nothing but French.

September 21

. . . Yesterday I saw *Romeo and Juliet* performed by the English company. Juliet was very good, though not in full form, not as good as Mme. Crelinger [formerly Stich]. Romeo-Kemble in the first four acts was totally mediocre, completely lifeless, but in the last act was ghastly, crazy. I have now seen English rage in its entire splendor. The way they botch Shakespeare is wondrous. Juliet awakens during the last act while Romeo is still alive but has already drunk the poison. They completely lose their minds in the scene, raging about in the most horrid way. Equally botched is the scene of Romeo and Juliet's first encounter. Being already in love with her beforehand, he sits down next to her in the armchair before talking with her; and as she has been interrupted by the nurse, Mercutio jokes with her [the nurse] so that Romeo and Juliet can talk still longer.

I thought I would go more often to the French theater than I have done. The small theaters and plays are nice, yet I am soon done with them. The jokes are quickly over. At present Mlle. Mars only plays in *Emilia*—in which I have seen her. Pisaroni sang yesterday, but we preferred the Englishmen—who are in my neighborhood—at the *Odéon*.

At present there is not much going on in grand opera. Yet it must still be seen.

Hegel to His Wife [563]

Paris, September 26, 1827

. . . Our departure has been more or less set for next Monday. Yet in some respects there is no relying on Cousin. Even if we have said *convenu* ten times, everything is going to be overturned again anyway. My health continues to be good. Like other sensible Germans, I normally eat a proper yet moderate lunch at one or one-thirty. Parisian order, or rather disorder, still stems from the Revolution, which as far as this issue is concerned is still completely in full swing. Last time I wrote you about the English theater. The next day I went to the French opera, the following day to the Italian opera, and finally to the French grand opera and ballet. But how am I to describe it all. The voices simply cannot be depicted. In the French opera or melodrama at the *Odéon*, Mme. [Johanna] Schütz has a powerful, superb voice in *Tancredi* [by Rossini, opening in French on September 7]. She presents herself well, and is of a free and slender build. If her strength were occasionally even more flexible, gentle, and methodical, she could become very excellent. Mme. [Marie] Garcia [Malibran] at the Italian opera has a clear, not very powerful, but methodically trained guttural voice. But what can be said of Mme. Pisaroni in *Tebaldo* [*e Isolina* by Francesco Morlacchi]: a small figure, somewhat hunchbacked, a face just like Dr. [Karl Wilhelm] Heyse's wife, except that she is not one-eyed. On the other hand in certain passages she distorts her mouth in the ugliest way, thus producing a somewhat crowlike sound, though she has a strength and metallic timbre in her lows and highs which one admires. The opinion is current that among living female singers she comes closest to [Angelika] Catalani, though admittedly she still falls rather short. In the French opera [Prospero-Etienne] Derivis's bass is the most excellent. Except for the singers I have mentioned, there is none better. But nothing is wasted either. Mediocrity, but nothing bad. . . . Local audiences are very good-natured, and are especially stirred by

moralistic and touching features. They show the greatest approval, even if singers and actors are not that deserving. The pure music of *Oedipe à Colone* is still to everybody's liking, is being performed just as purely. It is presently being played almost exclusively. For the foreign visitor it is unfortunate that for weeks on end, especially during the present season, the same thing is endlessly repeated. It is fatiguing to go to the grand opera. It starts at eight o'clock and is hardly over before midnight. At first *Oedipe* in three acts, then a ballet in three acts—the house bursting at the seams.

What is to be said of the ballet? Here a theme has been worked into ballet which until now has not occurred to a single human being, and which would not easily have occurred to any other being either: a sleepwalker! There is dancing in the first act, with all the frills. Yet there is also action. Moreover the *corps de ballet* shows grace, cheer, and agility. In the second act a somnambulist, coming through the window on a ladder with a lantern in her hand, appears in the master's bedroom, and lies down after having kneeled and prayed. The French audience around me said she was Protestant, since she did not pray in an *église*. Protestant churches are officially called *temples* here. Out of respect, the master of the house climbs out the same window and leaves her alone—all to great applause over his virtuous conduct. The third act starts with supreme indignation on the part of the sleepwalker's groom over her having been found asleep in a gentleman's room. The master explains to him and to the entire populace that she entered his room asleep, but they refuse to grasp or comprehend. But then she appears once more strolling on the roof with a lantern, marching high over a dangerously caved-in wall, and a general reconciliation brings everything to a close. There is no further dancing in the last two acts. Yet there is much grace and vivacity in the pantomime, which of course cannot be everywhere understandable.

Yesterday I was to St. Cloud—beautiful surroundings on the bank of the Seine, whose twists and turns here form almost a complete circle, enclosing a vineyard. Paris lies before one with her beautiful towers, domes, and countless houses.

I am of course with Cousin every day. Yet the life style to which I have returned prevents us from seeing each other more often. Since my indisposition I have stuck to German cooking and have lunch at one o'clock, while he waits until five. . . .

Today the weather is miserable. I hope for better weather for the trip. I will be deeply happy, however, to be able to sit once more with you [*Euch*] in a decent warm room. The rooms here mostly have brick floors. . . .

Hegel to His Wife [564]

Paris, September 30, 1827

Last Thursday and in the days that followed, my dear, I hoped in vain for a letter from you. I hope all the more that its absence is due solely to your supposition that a letter would no longer reach me in Paris. I do not wish to indulge in other ill-defined worries, and shall remain with the thought that on the whole you are all well and contented. Our departure—i.e., Cousin's and mine—has already

been set for tomorrow or the day after. Both of us already have our passports in order. In Brussels I hope to find a letter from you at the post office.

Among my goings-on here I must especially speak of the theater. I can mention without further elaboration that I attended a session of the Academy of Sciences, saw the heads of the famous men there, even talked with a few, looked up others without finding them, and that I have had work at the library—which, however, is now closed for vacation. But the complications of meeting or not meeting and then, after the matter has been decided, finding oneself once again prevented from reaching one's aim due to unforeseen events take away a great deal of time. I have since experienced two major theater performances. One was Rossini's *Semiramide* at the Italian theater, in which Pisoni sang again—Ninyas; Signora Blasis played Semiramis. The opera was excellent in every respect—a performance as distinguished as the music was magnificent. It is sad that for the most part Berlin knows of Rossini—or presents as Rossini—only such stuff as *The Italian Girl in Algiers*. But in Berlin one is of course incapable of presenting much more. I was very happy to have heard Signora Pisoni once more. Not only is her singing magnificent, but her acting is animated, warm, and full of intelligence. But the singular greatness of French dramatic art was yesterday to be seen in *Tartuffe* and *Valérie*—for you [*Euch*] [in Berlin], *Emilie the Blind*. Mlle. Mars played in both. One can only marvel at her. She has the quiet deportment of a cultivated woman who despite her age is still very good looking, especially *en face*, darting her beautiful eyes back and forth. Her voice is as clear as her expression is unfailingly correct, intelligent, full of feeling at the proper places. Not a single eye had an easy time staying dry, especially in *Emilie*. Mlle. Mars keeps her eyes open and is not as vacant as [Sophie] Müller. She likewise moves her eyelids, while admittedly her eyeballs merely gaze out into the yonder [*ins Unbestimmte*]. She is supremely moving, but just as essentially expresses a correct understanding of the role, i.e., the inner thoughtfulness. At several points the performance was interrupted by a general cooing, which counteracted other disturbances, such as the people in the audience blowing their nose, sighing, and sobbing. It was not until I saw Mars perform in *Tartuffe* that I realized why *Tartuffe* is a comedy. *Tartuffe* was most splendidly played by [Pierre Marie Joseph] Michelot. He also played Orgon, whose character must be essentially comical not to be simply foolish. Through her performance the chambermaid becomes a principal character. All the roles are excellent in *Valérie*, too, and contribute to this deep impact of the play. How can those critical scoundrels of ours eternally rail at [Auguste-Eugène] Scribe, the author of *Valérie*?

Yesterday I was at Versailles and have seen its splendors, along with the greater and lesser *Trianon*. The latter two structures are furnished, though the Versailles palace is not. Thus one sees only the splendor of its gates, walls, ceilings, and wall paintings—the latter for the most part completely new and mediocre. The gardens are all too much in the old French style—wide squares with trimmed hedges, little wooded areas, special side installations consisting of trees, fountains, statues, colonnades, etc. There are a hundred and thirty marble statues in the garden. The *Orangerie* is admirable. The oldest tree was planted in

the year 1420. By the *Trianons*, on the other hand, are charming English layouts, but with the frivolity of artificial rocks and Swiss houses. What causes the greatest excitement are the leaping waters [of the fountains], which we of course did not see. All we saw was the crowd of Neptunes, Tritons, frogs, etc.

Upon my return from this excursion Cousin handed me your dear letter in which you write about my indisposition and the concern it caused you. . . . Immanuel writes to ask why I was not feeling well. He must know that I am no longer such a young stripling as he, but am already an old father, and that I above all hope for health and further years in order to see him and his brother prosper further, to be able to contribute my part, and to share with you for still a long time to come, my love, this hoped-for satisfaction which we more vividly recall on Immanuel's [September 25] birthday. . . .

You note that I do not write from Paris with such fire and enthusiasm as from Vienna, and also that you have passed many a thing to friends. This may be, but everything of which I write has been too fleeting for it to be capable of more extensive communication. You must also realize that my indisposition made me lose much time, and moreover that everything is so immensely distant and spread-out that one must be in full vigor physically to take in more, and that it is essential to stay longer for more thorough contacts and explorations. It is a most interesting terrain. A few weeks, however, suffice only to emerge from one's initial benumbed state and become accustomed to all the splendor and manifold [sights]. Today, for example, we drove to an *abattoir*, i.e., a slaughterhouse. In what city in the whole world would I go visit a slaughterhouse? But this is one of the noteworthy things that Paris still owes Napoleon—like a hundred other great things. . . . Then we went up to Montmartre, from which one overlooks the wealth of Paris's homes and the magnificent, fertile, vital surroundings. We were also to see the Palace of the *Chambre des Députés*. We had already visited the *bourse*—likewise set up by Napoleon. What a temple! At five-thirty I ate with Cousin and [Claude] Fauriel, editor of the [modern] Greek folksongs which are also translated into German. A few days ago we ate with [Auguste] Mignet, [Adolphe] Thiers, [Andreas] Mustoxidis [Greek director of public instruction in 1828], Fauriel, etc. In short, one must remain in Paris half a year to become more at home with everything in which deeper interest is taken. And as I already said, through habit one loses interest in all that is at first striking and worth seeing. Cousin has often laughed scornfully at me as I saw—and found it noteworthy to see—what the conscience of a traveler and the tourist guide for foreigners required me to see. . . .

Yet I must break off here, just as I also break off seeing more of Paris. As little as I can exhaustively describe of what catches one's eye, just as little could I exhaustively discharge even in four more weeks the duties of a conscientious traveler methodically taking in all the sights.

You give me much interesting news. It would take too long to reply in detail. Yet Goethe's kind utterances are much too tempting for me not—for the sake of a side trip to Weimar—to be pulled back from my travel plan of rushing back to you. The main thing is that we—Cousin and I—have bought tickets for tonight's coach to Brussels. We preferred to leave early Tuesday morning. Within thirty-six hours we will be in Brussels via Valenciennes and Mons. So this is the last letter you will

be receiving from me from Paris. . . . In perhaps two weeks I will embrace you all with deep joy, but will still write you [*Dir*] en route. . . .

THE LOW COUNTRIES REVISITED

Hegel to His Wife [565]

Brussels, October 7, 1827

So now I am in *Brussels* at the home of my friend Mr. [Peter] van Ghert [Ch 22] with a pen in hand that Mme. van Ghert has just sharpened for me in a single stroke—no time at all. You can see from this that I was serious about renouncing Paris, despite doubts in your letter—which I have just had fetched for me at the post office—that it would happen so quickly. . . .

Above all I have to tell you of the further course of my trip. I believe I wrote you about the last days of my stay in Paris. I still saw that giraffe the *Neorama*—St. Peter's Church in Rome. While you in Berlin have been working on a house for [Karl Gropius's] *Diorama* for a half-year, the Parisians have long gone beyond that [i.e., beyond the original *Diorama* designed by Louis Daguerre, opened in Paris in 1822]. The newest thing is the *Neorama*, very beautiful, quite perfected. Now I do not need to travel to Rome to see this basilica and the Pope with his cardinals and so on worshipping St. Peter on their knees. On Tuesday, October 2, we—Cousin and I—set out at precisely seven o'clock in the morning in a *coupé* compartment, where we soon found ourselves alone and most comfortable. It is a most fortunate circumstance—for which I am very grateful—that Cousin is traveling along, as I have become very weary of traveling with strangers. The route was almost totally flat through the fertile yet monotonous plains of Picardy, and then Hennegaus and Brabant via Senlis and Peronne, where we had supper—you will find these cities on the map; next through Cambrai at night; after that Valenciennes, where we had coffee, and Mons, where we stopped for lunch, arriving here in Brussels Wednesday evening. No longer being in Paris, my appetite was again very strong on this trip, and I eat and drink as much as a Dutchman. I immediately visited my dear friend Mr. van Ghert, who, not being informed of my trip, was greatly surprised and delighted. I at once had to spend the night at his house—he would not have it any other way. I was just as cordially welcomed by his wife, a very good and dear Dutchwoman. Everyone is talking to me of my much better appearance than four years ago. On Thursday we went out and about, in the beautiful park, etc. where we met Mr. [Melchior] von Goubau, the former Minister and supervisor of Mr. van Ghert. He is now a state councillor. The most current topic [here] is the Concordat with the Pope, which is being heartily reviled. It is also very disadvantageous, causing much toil for my friend and destined to cause even more [505]. He is now above all responsible for working on this matter with the Catholic Church. . . .

Friday morning Cousin stayed in Brussels, while I took the coach to Ghent and saw what was to be seen there of van Eyck's painting, of which we have beautiful examples in Berlin [see *Briefe* III, 422]. At two o'clock I boarded the barge on the canal for Bruges. The barge is horse-drawn. In the cabin passengers read, play whist, etc. . . . I arrived at eight in the evening; Ghent has 70,000 and

Bruges 33,000 inhabitants. Bruges's exterior has fully preserved the character of Dutch architecture, which already in Ghent and even more so in Brussels has been effaced by modernization.

In Bruges I saw the most noteworthy, splendid, and magnificent original works by van Eyck and [Hans] Memling [*Hemling*]. I could not have been more delighted at having attained and enjoyed this sight. This goes as well for a Madonna with Child in marble by *Michelangelo* [actually by an unknown artist]. What all is here in the Netherlands! There is not a single work by Michelangelo in all of Germany and France, and yet in the Netherlands there is this most magnificent likeness of Mary, entirely singular and truly grand in conception, and splendid in execution. And, what is more, there is that immortal, even greater [sculpture] in Breda I saw four years ago [letter 438—October 10]. Yesterday afternoon, at three o'clock, I once again took the coach, returning here this morning at six o'clock. I then went to bed, had breakfast, wrote to you right away upon receipt of your letter, and so will now go out with my dear friend [van Ghert] and Cousin. Tomorrow morning we will continue on to Cologne, where I look forward to a letter from you.

Farewell. Perhaps four years from now we will see Mr. van Ghert and his wife in Berlin; to you they send their warmest greetings, and to me confess having made this promise. At the table with us are six children, five boys and one girl. The eldest son is seventeen. When he finishes his studies here, he is to complete them in Berlin with confidence in us.

Hegel to His Wife [566]

Elberfeld, October 12, 1827

You may well be surprised to see the date and place I am writing from, but if you look at the map you will find that Elberfeld is along the way to Cassel. Regarding the date, my excuse can only be that, except for the last leg of the trip, we have traveled completely at leisure. We remind wife and child—and with that mother as well—of this should they reproach us for not having been quicker to return to their arms.

I must above all express my satisfaction with the punctuality of your letters, which I always found on time, with their contents—affectionate contents of love—and finally with the arrangement of external matters and circumstances. . . .

Our lodging arrangement [in Berlin] is as satisfactory to me as to you, seeing how greatly it gratifies you. Feeling ever more strongly the need for comfort, and having been somewhat strengthened in this need by my present trip, I am especially content with it. As security, you could conclude the contract immediately for ten years—I have given you full power to do so. Mr. von Hartwig [who lived in the same house as Hegel] would have perhaps been willing to function as your guarantor and protector [*Schirmvogt*], to use what is but a Swabian title designating the office of representing the woman vis-à-vis men. I approve everything you write of doing. I thus want to live and die at *Küpfgraben* [Street]. Determine how long you want to make the arrangement for.

But now about our trip again. I wrote to you from Brussels. In this letter you will learn when we departed. I believe it was Monday, after we, too, had seen the

evening before the lights in the city for the first outing of the Queen—our King's sister. . . . We went first to Lüttich via Louvain—rich country. Then the next day to Aix-la-Chapelle. We saw the Cathedral by lights and sat down again on Charlemagne's throne, then to Cologne—both short day trips. From Lüttich to Aix-la-Chapelle there are especially beautiful, rich terrains. In Lüttich as in Louvain and Ghent there are beautiful university buildings. We have looked these universities over as a prospective resting place in case the priests in Berlin make *Küpfgraben* completely unbearable for me [Ch 19 on anti-Catholic polemics]. The Curia in Rome would in any event be a more honorable adversary than the inanities of an inane clericalism [*Pfaffengeköchs*] in Berlin. We thus arrived Wednesday afternoon in Cologne and immediately picked up your dear letter, but found out that the express mail coach will not leave for Cassel until Friday, i.e., today. Then, instead of vegetating Thursday among curiosities in this ugly old city, I took a side trip to Bonn and visited my dear old friend Windischmann [Ch 20]. Together, we then visited Mr. [August] von Schlegel: first his house by storm; and then, when he finally appeared, the man himself, full of cordiality and good cheer. But I will wait to tell you in person of the fine or rather most stately and comfortable arrangement of the residence, even down to the chicken coup and peacock pool with its coat of paint and its layout. Only there is nothing to say of a wife one would like to see in it. Yet she is not missed completely, since one already finds something at least womanish if not feminine there. In Bonn we could, to be sure, have spent several days quite pleasantly, engagingly, and even earnestly—though for earnestness we were not at all disposed. It must serve as my conclusion that we have spent this morning profitably with another visit to the sublime Cathedral, Wallraf's collection [436], an examination of the Dying Madonna [Ibid], etc., then with oyster eating, Mosel wine drinking etc. Beyond that I note only that I arrived here alone at noon after recrossing the Wupper in the company of a few pipe-smoking students.

On this new sheet, however, I sum everything up by saying that my friend Cousin could not have pleased me more than by accompanying me to Cologne. Overland travel with express mail coaches had been so disagreeable to me given the company one enjoys on such trips that I was already thinking of going to Hamburg from Rotterdam by sea. Thus with chatting, eating, and drinking—none of these three was neglected—we have had a most pleasant, healthful, and merry tour together. Half the distance has now been endured, and I will always be grateful for it to Cousin—of whom I have grown even more fond. The dull monotony of the remaining half of the trip I will. . . , in accordance with repeated urgings and reports of invitations, interrupt with another side trip to Weimar [567]. . . . I can then hardly be back in Berlin before the end of next week. . . . Express my full satisfaction to Karl over his promotion to the fifth [gymnasium] year. . . . It only remains for me. . . to greet and kiss you all affectionately. . . .

YEARS LATER, Cousin recalled his 1827 visit with Hegel to Cologne in connection with their respective views on religion:

We were both convinced that religion is absolutely indispensable, and that one must not give oneself over to the fatal chimera of trying to replace religion with philosophy. . . . I was a strong partisan of a sincere entente between these two

powers, one of which represents the legitimate aspirations of a small number of elite minds, the other of which represents the permanent needs of mankind. Hegel was of the same opinion. . . . But Hegel believed that no reconciliation between religion and philosophy was possible outside Protestantism. As soon as it was a question of Catholicism he forgot our common principles and abandoned himself to flights rather unworthy of a philosopher. One day in Cologne as we were both going to the Cathedral to see again the first masterpiece of Rubens and as we found in the square before the Cathedral women and tattered old men displaying their misery and doing a business in little sacred medal and other objects of superstitious worship, he said to me in anger: "There is your Catholic religion for you, and the spectacles it presents us with! Will I die before seeing an end to all that?" I was not at a loss to give him a reply, and in the end he admitted and agreed that Christianity, being the philosophy of the masses at the same time that it is the religion of the philosophers, cannot remain at the heights to which it is raised by Saint Augustine, Saint Anselm, Saint Thomas, and Bossuet, and that he himself had to become a man of the people among the people. But the old Lutheran muttered nonetheless. Despite all his enlightenment Hegel remained a sort of eighteenth-century philosopher. . . . He did not conceal his sympathies for the philosophers of the last century, even for those who most fought the cause of Christianity and the philosophy of spirit. Like Goethe, he went as far as to defend Diderot, and he sometimes told me that I should not be so severe, that they were lost children of our cause. . . . (*Berichten* 766).

COUSIN AND THE JULY REVOLUTION

Cousin's cause in France began to prosper when in November 1827 the ultra-royalist government of Count Jean-Baptiste Villèle was defeated in elections by the liberal opposition. On January 4, 1828, Villèle's ministry was replaced by that of Jean-Baptiste-Sylvère Gay de Martignac. Cousin's philosophical mentor, Royer-Collard, who had represented the Marne in the Chamber of Deputies since 1815, left the opposition to become President of the Chamber. Hegel commented on this turn of events in March 1828 [575]. Later in the same month Cousin regained his teaching position at the Sorbonne.

Hegel to Cousin [575]

[Berlin] March 3, 1828

Finally—you will say, my dear friend—a letter from this lazy fellow who kept me on my feet so much in Paris, for whom I have even set out on a journey of a few hundred leagues—this ungrateful man whom I have showered with friendship, care, attention, and sacrifices of all kinds. I must endure all the malicious epithets you heap upon me. I must resign myself to the repentance of a conscience that knows itself a sinner. I more or less reasoned in my laziness that you yourself almost know how to write my whole first letter all by yourself, since—from this I would not be able to pull myself away and go on to another matter—I would simply recount the pleasant memories remaining from my stay in Paris and the journey that took me to the Rhine. You, my friend, were yourself present through it all, witnessing the pleasure I tasted. You would err in forgetting your part in putting

me everywhere at ease and procuring for me the facilities, counsel, and means to instruct myself and enjoy everything; or in forgetting the cheer and hilarity spread everywhere by your spirit, gaiety, and good humor. What remained for me to add to these memories was little: having left you on the banks of the Rhine and having been abandoned to the mercy of the coaches and company of my fellow countrymen, I doubly regretted my separation from you, so that I all but vowed never to leave Berlin again unless it should be in an air balloon dropping me within a few hours at No. 14 *rue d'Enfer*, or to be led back there by you. The few days I spent in Weimar raised my spirits a bit. I rediscovered Goethe in his former serenity, benevolence, and cordiality, but above all in much better and more solidified health than he has been in several years. I had to tell him much of Paris and you. And so here I am at last thrown back. . . into my lectures, local headaches, and annoyances. My health, which had never been better than upon my return, resisted these influences only a few months. For the rest I have been renewed, but under our heavy fog ill humor has been more stubborn than in Paris. . . .

My course on the history of philosophy [winter 1827-28]—the notebooks from it are already in your hands—led me to consult your translation of Plato and look much more closely at several sections. To my mind it is a model of translation. You have preserved the original precision, clarity, grace; and one reads it as a French original. You master your language by [the force of] your spirit. In your arguments as well the same originality and power of turning a phrase are found. In a few of these sections I would perhaps not entirely agree with you concerning the merit you bestow on the Plato you have taken under wing—I refer for example, to the argumentation of [Plato's] *Euthydemus*. I add this because you want my criticism. I find it very natural that, not having been satisfied with what you have found in such a dialogue, you at least make up for it by leading us to anticipate where it might have been led.

But how is your work coming? And your assiduity? Throughout the whole winter I have heard nothing from you. But I always imagined that you had not fallen into the solitude found in the vicinity of ocean waves. To the rude roaring of such waves you have preferred proximity to the tocsin music of liberal energy with which Paris, all France, and Europe resound. I see you pressing on from your side, beaming with satisfaction over victories—of which each day's mail announces to us one more. Above all, I share with you the satisfaction of seeing a philosophy professor [Royer-Collard] at the head of this Chamber [of Deputies], whose composition has so furiously surprised the powers that be. But there is still much to be done, especially the resumption of your lectures. It seems that the field is yielded only gradually, and that they are letting themselves be gently forced. Mr. [Joseph Henri] Lainé perhaps has his own reasons for having refused, as is reported, to enter the ministry. Actually I have the feeling that what is essential has been won, which is to have instilled at the highest levels the conviction that the course taken so far can neither be continued nor resumed, that it has been—albeit with regret—inwardly renounced, so that it is now only a question of following through in matters of detail and of consequences, though it is often precisely from them that one shrinks back. I hope the delay in reestablishing your courses is due rather to the

decorum one prefers to maintain toward the former ministry by not being too pronounced in the blame one attaches to it by all at once reversing a very great number of its acts, i.e., that it must be attributed to a decision against this consequence of a general disavowal of the system. But I must close. This letter will be presented to you by Dr. Rosen, a Sanskrit specialist and a very estimable and very modest young scholar. Dr. [Karl Ludwig] Michelet will follow him in a month, and probably still other Orientalists as well. A very distinguished Chinese visitor, Minister [Wilhelm] von Humboldt, will reach you within a few weeks [see W. von Humboldt, *Letter to M. Abel-Rémusat on the Grammatical Forms in General and Genius in Particular of the Chinese Language*, 1822, in French]. You have heard about the brilliant success of Mr. Alexander von Humboldt's courses. All the princesses, my wife included, and sometimes even the King himself, have partaken [Ch 19 on von Humboldt and natural science].

But *adieu, adieu*, my dear friend; do not chastise me with long silence. *Adieu*. Yours, Hegel

This letter is finally leaving today, March 25, 1828. Yesterday I asked Mme. [Friederike] Robert [694] if she had no greetings to give me for you. She did, adding that she feels fine in Berlin, that she enjoys the company of the *émigrés* from Jerusalem as much as others have enjoyed that of the *émigrés* from Paris. Mme. Milder is likewise fine. Her fine voice, which a year ago seemed to suffer a bit, has completely regained its power and brilliance. Do you hear our Mlle. [Henriette] Sontag much? Are you any more smitten with this extravagant phenomenon than before?

Just this moment a notebook from the *lycée* has arrived, and I see I owe it to you, through your authorship of an article.³ I have run through it with pleasure. By the way, as for Kant being so much lower than Plato, and the moderns so much below the ancients, in many connections this is undoubtedly true, but for depth and breadth of principles we are generally on a higher trajectory.

THE ABOVE LETTER was entrusted to Friedrich August Rosen, an Orientalist and Berlin student of Hegel's.

Hegel to Rosen [576a]

March 25, 1828

I hereby take the liberty, my dear Doctor, of sending the letter to Mr. Cousin—plus a package for him which an acquaintance of mine was charged to send him. If you can still take it along, Mr. Cousin will be greatly obliged to you.

Once again, I truly wish you a good trip. Yours, Hegel

IF HEGEL'S DEFENSE of the moderns in philosophy [575] was more pronounced than Cousin's, personally Hegel nonetheless grew to be more apprehensive than Cousin of the political consequences of modern philosophy. Comparing his own political views to Hegel's, Cousin later wrote:

³What article Hegel has in mind here is unclear. Cousin agreed with Hegel's view of the relation of the ancients and moderns in his *Introduction à l'histoire de la philosophie* (1828), Lecture 2.

In politics Hegel is the one German with whom I was always the most in agreement. He was, like me, impregnated with the modern spirit. He considered the French Revolution to be the greatest step taken by the human race since Christianity, and he never ceased to inquire about the affairs and men of this great era. He was profoundly liberal without being in the least republican. Like myself, he considered the Republic as having perhaps been necessary for overthrowing the old society, but he thought it was incapable of serving for the establishment of the new. He did not divorce liberty and royalty. He was thus sincerely constitutional and declared himself openly for the cause defended in France by Royer-Collard. He spoke to me of our affairs as [Jakob] Fries did in Jena, no doubt with less animation and enthusiasm, but with deep feeling. I can confirm that, having seen Hegel on several other occasions between 1817 and his death in 1831, I always found him with these same thoughts, to such an extent that the Revolution of 1830, of which he did not in principle disapprove, seemed very dangerous to him in that it shook too greatly the basis on which liberty rests. When I left him in Berlin two months before his death he was as somber about our future as Royer-Collard, and for the same reasons. His fear was every day greater that the monarchy would not bear up under the test to which it was being subjected, and I remember very distinctly that I caused him noticeable pleasure in letting him know that the great Minister who then so firmly held the reins of government in France had done everything he could to save the former dynasty and prevent a revolution up to the last moment. . . . (*Berichten* 766)

Cousin's reply of April 7, 1828, to Hegel's letter of March 3 already addresses Hegel's nervousness about liberal reform in France:

. . . the future of France offers nothing to fear. Be assured that we will be prudent. . . . Rest at ease about France, regardless of what people say to you, and of what may seem to be the case from afar. [577]

After the July Revolution Cousin would acquire, through membership on the Council of Public Instruction [683] and later as Minister of Public Instruction, a decisive influence on academic philosophy in France. Yet—always an ideological broker and merchandiser in the service of bourgeois order—he would turn from Hegel's "pantheism" to the late Schelling, as if to suggest that Hegel's own philosophical position ought to have made Hegel himself politically apprehensive. Hegel's last letter to Cousin, dated February 26, 1830, addresses Cousin's rather cavalier treatment of post-Kantian German idealism in his *Introduction à l'histoire de la philosophie* (1828), Lecture 13. Cousin seemed to reduce Schelling's philosophy to a realistic "philosophy of nature" opposed to Fichte's subjective idealism. He suggested, moreover, a parallel between Condillac's covertly materialistic sensationalism and Schelling's—and Hegel's—philosophy of nature; and between Fichtean idealism and French spiritualism. The future allegedly belonged to an "eclecticism" combining these opposed positions. Hegel was not impressed [630].

My colleague [Friedrich von] Raumer is forcing my hand, my dear friend, to get a letter of introduction to you. You see that no less than this is needed to tear me away from this lethargy. Your letters and many gifts have not achieved as much with me. I have to accept much blame myself in this respect, not only in relation to you but to almost all my acquaintances. But the principal reason for not having written to you a few lines of a letter was that I had good intentions of sending you a long epistle in public. For it has been resolved and even publicly announced that in our critical journal I would do an analysis of—beyond your courses—your two volumes of fragments. I believed I owed your works a reasoned and public thanks. But heaven destined me to carry out neither the resolutions of my will nor my solemn commitments. And so here I am saying a great deal merely to say why I have not said a word to you. I confess further I have not been free of a sentiment that interfered with my promptness in taking up the task. This feeling concerned the historical facts you have mixed into your expositions of the course of philosophy in your own time and across national frontiers, especially in Germany. I have well understood your position before the French public, but I have failed to see the necessity of entering into historical relations. And that, in passing, is also the reason I have not been able to be dissatisfied with regard to what I have worked up in philosophy. For since it seemed to me superfluous for you to speak of the turn philosophy has taken with us in general, inevitably it seemed to me even less necessary for you to go on to a more advanced era. Thus I would not have been able to avoid saying before the public that I would have preferred you to speak not at all than to treat this historical section as you have. I should have said that Schelling's philosophy, which you mention, embraces in its principles much more than you have conceded to it, and that you yourself surely must have known that. I could not have blamed your silence, but I had trouble noticing any air of reticence: here is the. . . [text unclear] hesitation to undertake the work of public homage to your talents and achievements which was imposed on me both by the importance of your works and our friendship.

I have seen to my regret in the public press that an indisposition has prevented you from resuming your lecture course this winter. I am assured that the professed reason was the true one, that there was no other reason officially hidden underneath. Above all one must be in good health. I hope with all my heart your health is, the gods willing, restored in time to resume your illustrious exploits, on whose success I congratulate not only you but science as well, with all the interest I take in both.

As for myself, I painfully drag myself through this abominable winter. Adieu, Hegel

HEGEL AND THE JULY REVOLUTION

When the Revolution broke out in France in July 1830, Eduard Gans was there. In an almost breathless tone, he wrote to Hegel in Berlin this August 5 report:

1. Peace has been restored in Paris. 2. The National Guard has assembled, with Lafayette at its head. 3. The old Royal Guard was asked to declare itself either for or against the Ordinance, and to remove itself from Paris should it be for it; it has marched out of Paris. 4. Where the King and [Jules Armand] Polignac are no one knows. 5. The Lords and Chamber of Deputies have assembled. 6. A provisional government has been appointed. [644]

Hegel did not share Gans's enthusiasm. In December 1830 he wrote to Göschel: "... at present the immense interest of politics has drowned all other interests. It is a crisis in which everything that was formerly valid appears to be made problematic" [659]. The same idea was repeated on January 18, 1831, to his sister Christiane: "We are presently and, we hope, forever safe from all the [current] unrest. But these are still anxious times in which everything that previously was taken to be solid and secure seems to totter" [664]. Göschel reprimanded Hegel in late December 1830 [661] for having claimed in his letter of a few weeks before [659]—contrary to the deeper impulse of his own philosophy—that philosophy was merely for the few. But Hegel's *Weltschmerz* was still present three months later in a communication [673 below] to a former student, Rakow.

On January 6 Hegel had sent an indignant and anxious report [662] by his historian-follower Heinrich Leo—on the subject of student unrest in Halle—to his friend, the Hegelian Johannes Schulze, School Councillor in Berlin [663 below]. Writing a few weeks later to Johann Friedrich von Cotta, his editor, Hegel referred derisively to the revolutionary proceedings, which by then had spilled over into Belgium and Poland, as a great carnival [665]. In addressing [669 below] Christoph Ludwig Friedrich Schultz—a former associate of von Altenstein then studying Roman archaeology in Prussia's western provinces—Hegel again referred to revolutionary stirrings in Poland on Prussia's eastern frontier, and to the prospect of French intervention on behalf of the Poles. The anti-French language here contrasts strikingly to his letters in the Napoleonic years, thus supporting the claim by Karl Ludwig Michelet that "later on Hegel attenuated his political claims and turned back from the enthusiasms of his youth for the Revolution of 1789, since he never once granted his approval to the July Revolution" (*Berichten* 638).

In 1830 repercussions outside France particularly concerned him. In France itself, the Revolution was quickly over. But events in Belgium, Poland, and even Germany showed that its consequences were not limited to one country. Not sure where it would stop, Hegel clearly feared it might go further than it did.

Hegel's avid reading of newspapers during Parliament's deliberations on the Reform Bill finally adopted in 1832 raised fears that England, too, would be derailed. He expressed his apprehensions in a somewhat ill-tempered essay, the first parts of which were published in the official *Prussian State Newspaper* in April 1831 (*Werke* XX, 471-518). The concluding section was left unpublished on orders of the King, who found the essay's criticism of British institutions ill-advised in an official organ of the Prussian state. Conflicting motives ran through the essay. Hegel wished to show the superiority of Prussian to English institutions. But, although he diagnosed the confusing irrationality and indeed rottenness of British conditions based on the "positive" accidents of custom and history, he

feared that the rationalizing medicine provided by the Reform Bill might—however intrinsically justified—overwhelm the patient. Replying to von Beyme, a reader of the essay, Hegel commented on this anonymously published work in May 1832 [675b below].

At the end of May Hegel concluded a further letter [677 below] to von Cotta with sarcastic comment on reverberations of the Revolution in the German states. In a number of states, constitutions promised since the wars of national liberation were now to be granted. The July Revolution which Hegel criticized was clearly a continuation of the world-historical Revolution of 1789 with which he had long identified. Writing to von Cotta, however, Hegel takes seemingly malicious pleasure in the imperviousness of the Berlin populace to current calls to liberty. World history for Hegel remained at its deepest level the story of human emancipation. But, although a long-standing “liberal” himself, Hegel knew the foibles of populism and political romanticism, of liberalism in the manner of Fries. He had identified with the Napoleonic and, subsequently, Prussian statist organization of liberty from above. But his comments to von Cotta are unfaithful even to statist liberalism. One may gain the impression that in private communications he wished to retain the luxury of a playful willfulness, forestalling friends from taking his allegiance to any party for granted. The weight of the evidence, however, is that Hegel’s later conservatism expressed a genuine shift in his personality, though not in his philosophy.

Hegel to Schulze [663]

[Berlin] January 6, 1831

Since because of your meeting today I will probably not, dear Privy Councillor, find you at home or be able to talk to you after the session, and since it might interest you to learn the contents of this letter [662] soon, I have put it in an envelope, believing myself allowed to send it to you as it is. Good Morning. Yours, Hegel.

Hegel to von Cotta [665]

Berlin, January 22, 1831

I do not want to fail, my dear sir and friend, to notify you that I will finally deliver the manuscript of the *Logic* [second edition, Vol 1, Book One] to Starck’s printing shop tomorrow. I need not go into detail on the reasons for the delays to which this delivery has been subject, i.e., the rectorship [of Berlin University], arrangements for a new [third] edition of my *Encyclopaedia* [1830], and especially illness, including that of my wife. I continue to hear with pleasure now and again that you and your wife have maintained your accustomed good health and energy. It is my intention to see the [second] edition [of the *Logic*, left unfinished at Hegel’s death] finished by Easter if possible. We have agreed on twenty-two florins [*Gulden rh.*] per sheet for an edition of a thousand copies. My deletions and additions—I have entirely reworked most of it—will more or less balance out. There will be a few sheets more than in the first edition.

I hear you have become tougher with the editorship of the *Yearbooks*. But you

are always raising your prices, and cannot have suffered any loss last year. On the contrary! Unfortunately I have contributed nothing this entire year, particularly because of the *Logic* again. Due to my indisposition I have not been able to have any say in it for quite some time.

From travelers I learned of the happy prospect of seeing you with your wife here this coming winter. This time the Elfinger [wine] was not in danger of succumbing to the freezing cold on the [mountain] pass, especially if you have perchance crossed it already a few days ago, for the temperature has risen ten to twelve degrees centigrade. I still hope you will arrive by our Carnival time. Yet you will surely not keep the great carnival that has opened up [in France, Belgium, and Poland] entirely at arm’s length. You will of course not have the chance to join in a *Polonnaise* here with us. Yet, apart from the numerous other diplomatic and political counterdances, I have heard that political-commercial excursions have been introduced again.⁴ I would be very pleased with such excursions were they to bring to us such dear fellow countrymen as you and your most beloved wife. I have heard that both of you have fond remembrance of Berlin. My wife sends her most sincere compliments. Yours, Hegel

Hegel to Schultz [669]

Berlin, January 29, 1831

I am now finally in a position, dear Privy Councillor, to give you the information you wished in your kind letter of December 6 [658] concerning old editions of *De Aquaeductibus* by [Sextus Julius] Frontinus. As it turned out, however, the information I have is not to your liking. There was a delay at the library because an old edition of [Roman architect] Vitruvius to which Frontinus is ordinarily appended had been loaned out. After a search showed that no edition of Frontinus prior to 1513 was held by the library, this copy of Vitruvius, which dates from 1511, still gave hope of perhaps finding Frontinus in it. Unfortunately, however, I was notified a few days ago that Frontinus was not attached to it; and with that the faint hope of being able, from this side, to further your wish somewhat has vanished.

Concerning the aspiration of Mr. [Gustav] Marezoll, presently of Giessen, to be appointed in Bonn, I have indeed spoken of it at the appropriate place [660a below, to Johannes Schulze]. You know more than anyone the ramifications such a matter acquires, so I may dispense with an extensive explanation of them. Privy Councillor [Johannes] Schulze would be well inclined to advance the cause of [Mr. Marezoll] personally. He knows and respects him, if I am not mistaken, as one of his oldest students. As much as the value of Mr. Marezoll’s earlier publication [of 1816 on Roman law] is recognized, what is sought for Bonn is a *big name*, which for itself is at once to some extent a condition for appointing a foreigner to a Prussian university. According to what I have further learned, recalling [Karl] Mittermaier has been suggested by Bonn, and negotiations in this sense are now

⁴Von Cotta was to participate in negotiations with a view to a free-trade union or *Zollverein* between Bavaria, Württemberg, Hessen-Darmstadt, and Prussia.

pending. I should think Mr. Marezoll could address a letter with full confidence to Privy Councillor Schulze. One which could be shown to others, and which might then occasion a more specific initiative by the Ministry. I should hardly think he would compromise himself thereby with his government.

I am delighted that the above matter has afforded an occasion to receive both kind greetings from you and news that you and your dear family are well. The hope of perhaps soon welcoming you here personally has inevitably given me great pleasure. By the way, we are providing ourselves with no interruption of political peace and quiet on the Eastern frontier—the stock market is rising. But a sultriness still seems to hang over these relations through the appearance of ever so loudly proclaimed French attitudes still bitter over just humiliation and thirsty for glory and conquest.

The university here, which my older son [Karl] has been attending since fall, of course offers many advantages. Sustenance and sympathy for the interests and the new disclosures you have prepared on many a subject, but probably contradiction as well, will not be lacking. I hear my brother-in-law [Philipp Guido] von Meyer [married to Sophie Marie von Tucher] has taken up again his idea of settling down with his family in the garden in which you resided [as governmental representative to Berlin University until a dispute with von Altenstein in 1824]. I only hope that it may agree with his family as much as it has agreed with you and yours. Please extend greetings from my wife and myself to your family. With sincere respect, your most devoted Professor Hegel

HEGEL'S INTERCESSION on behalf of Gustav Marezoll, of which he assured Schultz in the above letter, is attested by a letter to Johannes Schulze [660a].

Hegel to Schulze [660a]

December 14, 1830

I believe myself permitted, Honorable Privy Councillor, to send you the enclosed letter [658 from Christoph Ludwig Friedrich Schultz], and to ask for some indication of a reply [regarding Marezoll] as the occasion arises. You will find still another curiosity in it concerning Vitruvius. Please return the letter to me soon so I can take care of Schultz's request at the library.

How is your health? Mine is passable. Have a good morning! Yours, Hegel

[P.S.] I did not consider it quite proper to send the Minister one of my medals [664]. I probably have your interest in the matter as well to thank for a very kind and obliging letter [from von Altenstein] [657] on the copy of the *Encyclopaedia* [3rd edition] which I sent.

Hegel to Rakow [673]

[draft]

[Berlin] March 30, 1831

Having finished my lectures the day before yesterday, I am today starting to catch up on my correspondence, as is my custom during vacation. In doing so I inevitably came across the letter [632] I received from you, dear sir, already a year

ago. The renewed greetings expressed in that letter were accompanied by a product of your "leisure." I must greatly apologize for my unpardonable negligence in thanking you, and cannot omit mentioning at least the most immediate reasons for my delay, since these were due to the quite external and really silly circumstance that you had signed your kind letter with merely your name, without your title or further address. I had wanted to address you in my letter, however, by your title. But my inquiries were unavailing, which is also my excuse for the address of the present letter. And if I—who am no businessman—let the initial period of urgency for replying slip by, the unpleasant feeling of guilt itself scares me off from putting pen to paper.

To my thanks, which I now render, as the proverb rightly says, "better late than never," I add both a sincere request for your forgiveness and an expression of my pleasure in discovering your continued kind remembrance of me. [Incomplete fragment follows]. . . .

If your legal practice, as you say, often greatly distracts you from philosophy and science, politics has for quite some time absorbed almost all other interests, though on closer examination the importance of concepts is manifested in the fact that so little importance is now attached to what is positive [*dem Positiven*] for itself. Yet how often can the wish arise that those who are the loudest should occupy themselves more with concepts.

But in any case I see with pleasure that philosophy is remembered fondly by you, and ask that I may continue to fare as well with you. Hegel

Hegel to von Beyme [675b]

Berlin, May 21, 1831

Your Excellency has, in a most gracious letter of the 16th, sought to offer me flattering testimony of Your Excellency's satisfaction with an article in the *State Newspaper* whose authorship has been attributed to me. Concerning such authorship, I understand that an agreement exists between the editorial office of the state paper and the author not to admit the latter's identity even when it is widely known, as can easily happen for a variety of reasons. I would thus have to consider it inappropriate for me to claim what, vis-à-vis Your Excellency, would surely be the harmless right of making a declaration on my part, since it would be interpreted as unilateral. Even less could I claim for myself the all too high praise that Your Excellency has wished to bestow on the essay. Its tendency has taken advantage of the occasion provided by the English reform bill. This tendency lays claim to principles which, among other things, have been a constant source of misunderstanding and defamation of the Prussian constitution and legislative process, seeing that the pretension and admitted renown of English liberty are allowed to count as valid against that constitution and process. Thus the view might well have arisen that the English political constitution was being attacked. And this, being unseemly for the *Prussian State Newspaper*, is said to have prevented the conclusion of the article from being printed. A special printing—for which Your Excellency's gracious encouragement would be the most important motive—would probably require greater development, for time more than material would probably be lacking.

[The printing of the essay was in fact completed privately; see *Berliner Schriften*, 1818-1831, 578.]

I have the honor of taking this occasion to return to Your Excellency, with most humble thanks, the excerpt from the English review of Cousin's writing [i.e., review of Victor Cousin's *Cours de Philosophie. Introduction à l'histoire de la philosophie*, 1828, in the *Edinburgh Review*, vol 50, 1830, pp. 194-221] which you kindly sent me. I add a most emphatic apology for the long delay. Since it at once concerns me in a most immediate way, it has been most interesting for me to see the extent to which the English enter into philosophical studies and into acquaintance with foreign philosophizing, and to see that they polemicize against German ideas even with German—specifically Kantian—views.

In requesting most gracious acceptance of my assurances of my deepest respect, I have the honor of being Your Excellency's humble servant, Professor Hegel

Hegel to von Cotta [677]

Berlin, from the little castle atop Kreuzberg,
May 29, 1831

Toward the end of last January I was able to report to you, my dear sir and friend, that I had sent to the printer the manuscript of the new edition of the *Logic* on which we had orally agreed during the pleasure of your most recent visit here [655]. After four months I am finally making amends for apparent neglect by notifying you that the printing has begun, and that it should continue now that Mr. Starck has let me know a few days ago that you have at last enabled him to procure the necessary paper both for the ordinary and the complimentary copies—though, as he has informed you, the paper will cost a few thalers more than he had thought. I have patiently waited for developments, hoping each week that this matter would be settled, naturally without supposing I would have to wait so long. That this undertaking became involved with the affairs of the critical *Yearbooks* came as a surprise to me. Since it has nothing to do with those affairs, it was likewise unexpected that I should encounter the disadvantage of such a delay. In your kind letter of February 21, you write that due to my having been prevented from completing the work earlier—the work in question is not an easy task—the venture had fallen into bad times. Should this consideration have contributed to the delay, an explicitly [declared] wish to give up the undertaking necessarily would have been preferable to me. For I then could have made an arrangement by which the work would probably now already have been printed here right before my eyes. If, as appears, the political and hence commercial outlook has cleared up somewhat, the one delay would have in this respect made up for the first.

With regard to the incidental and quite innocent mention of the affairs of the *Yearbooks* in my letter [665], I have fared much as the Saxon major I met after the Battle of Jena. Being forced to remain behind in Jena due to wounds, he explained his injuries like this: Already for half a day he had faced a French post with his battalion. Then, when he at last opened fire, such an explosion of bullets and canister shots came back in return that had he only imagined it beforehand he certainly would never have given the order to fire in the first place. I would have

likewise refrained from making any such remark had I foreseen that it would become for you an occasion for the ensuing exhortation. Some of it, such as your mention of double payment, was unclear to me. Mr. [Leopold] von Henning is managing the financial side of the *Yearbooks*. I preferred not to inform him of the details, since in the course of doing the books the matter of the advances you mention and the reproach of double payment will inevitably resolve themselves quite naturally. However, on recalling the advances I was conscience-stricken by the fact that you were kind enough to permit me to make out a few drafts on your account for my sister in Stuttgart [624, 664], and that these remittances, on the supposition that I was to pay them off through work for the critical *Yearbooks*, could be viewed by you as advances. I have expected, in calculating my debt to you, to send to the *Yearbooks*, at your pleasure, a draft to cover what I owe. Since I did not earn anything from that source last year, I could have paid my debt in cash. But now this matter will in any case be settled along with that of the royalties for my book now in press.

In my letter of January 23 [665] I had mentioned our oral agreement concerning these royalties for the new edition of my *Logic* without citing the other secondary conditions as to the number of copies for the edition and the complimentary copies. In your kind reply I might have hoped likewise to find a written response to this mention of mine.

I hear that you are presently in Munich, where you are thus witnessing more closely the deliberations of the estates on important issues of the day now being dragged out on the carpet: freedom of the press, the answerability of ministers [*Ministeranklagen*], Catholic difficulties regarding marriage. It seems that there as elsewhere German imitations, if it is permitted to say so, of French freedom fetishes—indeed imitations introduced by German Princes—have straightaway begun to cause trouble and interference for a few governments and ministries. Things are quiet here. A few days ago the King could scarcely prevent those who happened to be about him as he rode away from a spectacle of trick riders—i.e., the *people*, to use the official term for them—from disharnessing the horses and pulling him home themselves. His admonition to them not to sink to the level of animals, coupled with his assurance that he would otherwise be obliged to go home on foot, allowed him to ride away to loud applause. Instead of ministers being accused, with us three of them are presently being created for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs: the current one, Count [Christian] Bernstorff, [Jean Pierre Friedrich] Ancillon, and Baron [Heinrich] Werther in Paris. All three *at once*, and to a certain extent each individually, are to stand at the head of this department. Yet the question is still being deliberated in the Royal Cabinet. Our world-famous censor [Johann] Granow died a few days ago, but censorship did not die with him. According to the obituary he was mourned by those he left behind—perhaps by the books no longer to be censored by him.

For the amicable lines accompanying the letter I kiss the hand of the gracious Baroness. With the greatest of regret, which so many shared, I learned that we will not yet see either of you here very soon. From this garden, in which we are busy solidifying our health, we send our best compliments. Yours truly, Hegel

Despite Hegel's personal antipathy to the July Revolution, Eduard Gans—to whom Hegel had left the teaching of his philosophy of law since 1825—continued to expound the subject in a liberal vein sympathetic to the Revolution. When two years before, Karl Schubarth charged publicly that Hegel's philosophy was anti-Prussian and revolutionary, Hegel responded contemptuously (*Werke* XX, 362-93). But in 1831 the Prussian Crown Prince, the future Friedrich Wilhelm IV, invited Hegel to his table to express concern over the "liberal," even "republican," coloring given to Hegel's doctrine by Gans, especially with respect to events in Belgium and Poland. The Crown Prince urged Hegel to resume teaching the subject himself. Hegel responded apologetically, disclaiming knowledge of what Gans was teaching (*Berichten* 682).

It is hard to see how such a reply could have been completely frank. Hegel and Gans were close associates—as is evidenced by an otherwise indecipherable note [697]. Hegel was hardly unaware of Gans's politics. Hegel's son Karl recalled that Gans was a frequent visitor in the Hegel household, that he "lived more in politics than in his specialty of law," and that he "occasionally interrupted our lunch to convey the latest news from France about Minister Martignac or Polignac" (*Berichten* 708). Michelet wrote of his conversations with Hegel in 1830-31: "When we came to speak of politics and I put in a good word for the world-historical advance achieved by the Revolution he addressed me imperiously with the words: 'You talk just like Gans!'" (Ibid 638).

Hegel is said to have assured the Crown Prince that he himself would lecture on the philosophy of law in the winter 1831 semester. But by the time Hegel announced lectures on the subject, Gans had already done the same. Arnold Ruge reports that, due to Gans's greater intelligibility and more liberal reputation, Hegel's class failed to fill up (Ibid 682). Hegel, again according to Ruge, then wrote to Gans, in a letter apparently lost, that it was inappropriate for them to compete in teaching the Hegelian philosophy of law. Gans replied by posting a public notice to the effect that since Professor Hegel was to teach the philosophy of law he was canceling his lectures on the subject in favor of the history of law. But even this did not much improve registration in Hegel's lectures. The blow to Hegel's prestige may explain the bitterness of the November 12 note [687 below], in which Hegel charges Gans with having embarrassed him in his poster. Ruge reports that Hegel wrote still a further message to Gans, suggesting that Gans needed the protection he enjoyed through his numerous students (*Berichten* 682). Yet Hegel died suddenly of cholera only two days after the note of November 12. The two men, who were genuinely attached, were reconciled as Hegel lay on his deathbed (Ibid).

Hegel to Unknown [697]

[undated]

Having no positive confirmation through Dr. Gans that I will see you here at my house today, I take the liberty of inviting you once more to grant me, if you can

arrange it, the pleasure of your presence this evening. Most humbly yours, Professor Hegel

Hegel to Gans [687]

Berlin, November 12, 1831

Given the method of announcement, which I will only qualify as adventurous, into which you have fallen, dear Professor, by posting a notice in which you both inform the students of a circumstance of rivalry, which has become a subject of discussion, and permit yourself to recommend my lectures to the students, it might well seem I owed it to myself to post a public notice of my own to counter the obvious appearance of placing me in a foolish light with colleagues and students, as if such a notice on your part together with a recommendation of my lectures had been made at my bidding and instigation—as you almost gave me to understand in your note, contrary to my own statements [in the matter], and as if I agreed with such a procedure. Both my hope that at least those who know me will not credit me with such a procedure and my concern not to give you an opening for further awkwardness lead me to declare my view of your notice, not by a public notice of my own, but merely by these lines. Your most devoted Hegel

LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT

We may fairly conclude from Hegel's letters in 1830 and 1831 that he personally underwent a far-reaching change since the Napoleonic years. His anxiety over the fact that everything that previously seemed "valid" [659] or "solid and secure" [664] appeared suddenly to be "problematic" [659] and to "totter" [664] represented a divergence not only from the views of an admirer and ideological kinsman such as Cousin but also from students such as von Thaden, Göschel, Michelet, and Gans, products of his own teaching. Hegel's letters showed anxiety about economic and professional security from his last years in Jena through 1831, when he felt himself with some justification to be the indirect target of attacks upon Gans. In the earlier Berlin years, however, he had even greater reason to feel himself targeted by the persecution of such liberal students and friends of his as Carové, von Henning, Förster, Asverus, and Cousin himself, for he had intervened in their legal and professional defense. By 1831 the balance of power in Prussia had shifted further to the right. In view of the Crown Prince's apparent request that Hegel chastise Gans, it would have taken courage for Hegel to defend his follower even if he were inclined. His letters after the July Revolution, however, show he was no longer inclined. The main object of his anxiety was no longer his own professional security but the "security," "solidity," and "validity" of established institutions. He now had a personal distaste for revolutionary change, and thus had less reason than before to fear for his career. He no longer gloried in the thought that the world spirit had been given "marching orders" [271]. His new conservatism was not a front put on display for the authorities, but was inwardly felt—though the shift was possibly in part a defensive reaction-formation against perceived threats from those very authorities.

Hegel's attachment to "solid and secure" institutions was surely a departure from the superb detachment, confidence, and bravado expressed in the Preface to the *Phenomenology*, where truth is said to be a "Baccanian revel" (*Werke* II, 45) that abjures the "dogmatism" of a "fixed and final result" (*Ibid*, 39):

Thoughts become fluent and interfuse, when thinking pure and simple, this inner immediacy, knows itself as a moment, when pure certainty of self abstracts from itself. It does not abstract in the sense of getting away from itself and setting itself on one side, but of surrendering the fixed quality of its self-affirmation. . . . (*Ibid*, 35)

The life of mind is not one that shuns death, and keeps clear of destruction; it endures death and in death maintains its being. It only wins to its truth when it finds itself utterly torn asunder. It is this mighty power, not by being a positive which turns away from the negative, as when we say of anything it is nothing or it is false. . . ; on the contrary, mind is this power only by looking the negative in the face and dwelling with it. This dwelling beside it is the magic power that converts the negative into being. (*Ibid*, 34)

The truth—i.e., Spirit—admittedly abides and indeed alone abides. But as a "Baccanian revel" Spirit is an infinite self-activity in which nothing finite abides—not even the Prussian anticipation of a rational state fostering the life of absolute spirit, not even an eventual *satisfactory* institutionalization of such a state. If "Hegelianism" is the product of Hegel's "manhood"—which Hegel in the Berlin *Encyclopaedia* held to be the true standpoint—we will find it betrayed in some of Hegel's last-stated opinions. Nietzsche's "gay science" seems more "Hegelian" than Hegel's letters of 1830-31 (Nietzsche, *Die Fröhliche Wissenschaft*). Hegel's absolutization of inevitably finite institutional arrangements and his consequent alienation in the face of their negation at the hands of undigested otherness seem a personal falling away from the standpoint of reason to the abstract understanding—a mental sclerosis indicative at least of old age if not of submission to external authority.

Yet comparison of Hegel's public and private statements in the the last year of his life shows that he retained a clear distinction between his altered subjective inclinations and the objective truth which he still grasped. The abstract understanding and its fixations are themselves a moment in the life of reason. The above letters may be set beside Hegel's admission to Michelet that it would be possible to get along with the new Bourgeois King in France if he behaved reasonably (*Berichten* 638). But they must be placed beside his acceptance of the world-historical "perpetuation" of "agitation and unrest" at the end of his 1830-31 lectures on the philosophy of history: "This collision, this nodus, this problem is that with which history is now preoccupied, and whose solution it has to work out in the future" (*Werke* XI, 563).

The surrender of self-will to providence, to the universal will in History, is a bid for eternal life in the face of the inevitability of death. The ultimate resource concealed in the hardening of old age is to recoil at the last moment into its opposite—fluid identification with cosmic efficacy. In the autumn of 1831 death

threatened Berlin very concretely in the form of a cholera epidemic. Hegel retreated with his family to a vacation home at Kreuzberg outside Berlin to weather the storm. There, on August 27, he celebrated his last birthday, writing to his friend Heinrich Beer two days later [681 below]. And there, the next day, he issued a kind of last will and testament to his spiritual heirs [680 below]. A student, Heinrich Stieglitz, had summoned him in a poem to give again, like the Sorcerer, the magic word which his apprentices in their disarray had forgotten [679]. Hegel's rhymed response [680] was a charge to students to free themselves of apprenticeship in the mere letter, in spiritless and hence forgotten words of magic. He expresses faith in the further world-historical efficacy and destiny of his thought, and readiness to surrender to that efficacy. That philosophy would remain restricted to the isolated few [659] is now less obvious.

Hegel to Beer [681]

Berlin, from the little castle at Kreuzberg,
August 29, 1831

I thank you very much, my dear friend, for the warm greetings which you have wished to send me from afar upon yet another birthday of mine. They arrived on the very day itself. You express the interest that a few segments of my last lectures [summer 1831] in particular have aroused in you. This is proof to me that I have hit upon the [treated] viewpoints in their truth. And as great as is your sensitivity to this deeper truth, you add to it a beautiful and dazzling gift of your own. Placed on top of the many other gifts, this one showed that even this sort of proof of your goodwill and kind remembrance has long been superfluous. Inasmuch as I have already seen the gift in your hands, I have received it with less inner embarrassment. Do continue, however, to enrich the most valuable gift for which I am indebted to you: namely, the conviction that the insights to which I have contributed may gain ever more solid footing in your mind and character, and may bear abundant fruit.

Please express to your wife, to Mr. Thilenius, and to [Heinrich Beer's son] Ludwig my appreciation for their kind greetings. It was said that you wish to go to Paris along with your family. But I have heard from Privy Councillor [Johannes] Schulze that the cure and trip have indeed given you and Mme. Beer a boost, and that you are thinking of being back here at the beginning of September. Your health is solidified. And, as far as anything is reliable at all in such matters, against the cholera which is continuously being discussed here day and night, and which is creeping up [upon us] slowly, in the end the most reliable remedy is health and conduct, alongside a few preventive measures. Here private institutions are everywhere busy in the struggle, but public ones are now also to be put to the test. I still believe that we can keep the disease entirely at bay. I closed shop on Friday, taking up quarters here in my little castle to await what shall come. I am convinced, among other things, that if we cannot hold off the disease from here it will pass throughout Germany. For this reason as well I thus prefer to endure the storm here, should it come.

In any case, I should be pleased to see you and your wife here soon. Please

remember me to your wife most kindly. And, so I will not forget again, please convey to her Mrs. von Cotta's most effusive regards. I admittedly received this request long before your departure, and apologize for not having acted on it earlier. I might have remembered to do so while I was with you, but Mme. Beer was so occupying me at the time that such a distant matter could not come to mind. Thus I do not want to await the risk of her return!

Until I see you soon or—if it should be—later, most amicably yours, Hegel

Hegel to Stieglitz [680]

To Stieglitz the day after [Hegel's birthday] August 27, 1831

Such a greeting from my friend I welcome,
 But with this greeting now a call for resolve has come,
 For a deed of words to conjure up—no less—
 The many—friends included—enraged to madness.
 Yet what means "crime" to those accused by you,
 If not that each but wants to hear himself, to do the talking, too.
 Thus the word that was to ward the evil off
 becomes another means to increase the mischief,
 And if this word, as it has long driven me, were at last to escape,
 Your call would bind me to proceed with daring and not to wait,
 But to hope that to this word other spirits would reciprocate,
 That empty grievances should not dissipate this word,
 That these spirits may bear it to the people and put it to work!

—From the little castle atop Kreuzberg

Hegel

Goethe

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN Hegel and Goethe—perhaps the most eminent philosophical and literary figure of an unusually distinguished era—is profound in two related senses. First and most importantly, Goethe lies at the very source of Hegel's philosophical inspiration. Hegel twice wrote to Goethe that he considered himself one of the poet's spiritual sons [373, 489]; and Goethe, contrasting Hegel to Fichte and Schelling, acknowledged an affinity to Hegel (Goethe, *Gespräche* III, 428)—though he never endorsed what seemed Hegel's Christianization of an essentially pagan world-view. Goethe, like Hegel, sought mediation between the extremes of subjectivity and objectivity (Goethe, *Werke* XIII, 38, 272). And the mature Goethe, after his own earlier romanticism, became an important precursor to Hegel in upholding the Greek ideals of theoretical contemplation and ethical life (*Sittlichkeit*). Faust's evolution from Part I through Part II of Goethe's drama exhibits an Hegelian evolution from subjective to objective spirit.

While Hegel's philosophy followed the Kantian tradition in adopting the form of philosophical reflection [29], in content its origin is, as Dilthey observes, traceable more to Goethe and Herder (Dilthey, 58-59). The substantial issue separating Kant and Goethe was the relation of man and nature. Where Kant divorced human freedom and rationality from the natural order, the romanticized Spinozism of Goethe and Herder led them to view human freedom as itself an expression of the creativity of nature. For Goethe, as for speculative philosophy generally, man's knowledge of nature is nature's own self-knowledge (Goethe, *Werke* XIII, 45-48). Goethe's nature, like Hegel's Absolute, thus already embraces spirit as well as substance—though Hegel's ultimate preference for the term "spirit" is indicative of his greater concern with the historical dialectic of the Absolute's human self-awareness than with the observation of spirit in an alienated natural state.

At the University of Tübingen Hegel and Hölderlin sided with Goethe in the controversy initiated by Jacobi over Lessing's alleged pantheism. They upheld Lessing's pantheistic philosophy of the One and the All against Jacobi's condemnation of its fatalistic atheism. Yet as Hegel increasingly strove to express his position in the abstruse form of philosophical reflection, at least on the surface he parted with Goethe, who had little patience for technical philosophy in the Kantian tradition. In the last letter we have from Goethe to Hegel, dated August 17, 1827, the poet wrote that he kept his mind "as open as possible to philosophy," being delighted every time he found something he could assimilate. But philosophy

pursues its studies, he wrote, "in a way nature has declined to accord me" [554]. As a result, his relation to Hegel acquired depth in the second sense of remaining largely concealed. Except for the strong support Hegel lent to Goethe's theory of colors in the *Encyclopaedia*, Goethe is rarely mentioned—and then only in passing—in Hegel's published works. The chief evidence of their relationship thus comes from correspondence.

Their correspondence extends over a twenty-year period. The first group of Hegel's letters presented here dates from his association with Goethe as a Jena faculty member. The second and fourth groups, which are the focal point of the chapter, concern Goethe's theory of colors and related problems in optics. These two sections of natural philosophical letters are connected—not entirely by accident—by a small group of Jena letters to Hegel's wine dealer. In the final section the chapter returns to the question of spiritual affinity between the two men.

HEGEL AND GOETHE IN WEIMAR

When Hegel arrived in Jena early in 1801, Goethe had already served Weimar's Duke Karl August for a quarter century, and had exerted considerable influence on the university in Jena. As the Minister responsible for education, Goethe had brought Fichte and Schelling to Jena before Hegel. Goethe's diary records a meeting with Hegel as early as October 20, 1801, and he received Hegel on a number of occasions throughout Hegel's stay in Jena (*Berichten* 43 ff). On November 27, 1803, Goethe wrote to Schiller (*Ibid* 78) that he had spent "quite pleasant hours" with Hegel, the Schellingian Franz Josef Schelver, and Hegel's Jena colleague in philosophy Karl Ludwig Fernow. But Goethe at once noted that "as for Hegel the question has occurred to me whether through technique in the art of delivery great advantage could not be procured for him. He is a perfectly excellent man, but too much stands against him with respect to his expression." Schiller, with whom Hegel apparently never corresponded, replied on November 30:

... I am pleased to see you are getting to know Hegel better. What he lacks could probably now be given him only with difficulty. But this deficiency in the gift of self-expression is on the whole the national deficiency of the Germans; it is compensated, at least for a German student, through the German virtue of thoroughness and upright earnestness. So try to bring Hegel and Fernow closer together. I think each will of necessity serve to help the other. ... Hegel will have to think about a teaching method to make his idealism understood, while Fernow will be forced out of his superficiality. ... (*Berichten* 70)

The general opinion that his classroom delivery was deficient did not escape Hegel. When he turned to Goethe in September 1804 to solicit consideration for a nontitular professorship he claimed that at least in the previous winter he taught to the satisfaction of numerous students, and would try to have even more in the coming winter [49]. In winter 1804-05 his auditors rose to thirty. He lectured both winters on the entire system of speculative philosophy—including logic and metaphysics, natural philosophy, and the philosophy of spirit. The treatise ex-

pounding philosophy scientifically, which he tells Goethe he hopes to finish in the course of the winter lectures, he in fact did not publish until 1817. In that year the *Encyclopaedia* appeared, though even then in outline rather than in truly scientific form. The essays Hegel had published in the *Critical Journal* in 1802-03 he considered too insignificant to want to be judged by them.

Hegel's appeal bore fruit the following year when Goethe's intervention resulted in his appointment as nontitular professor [65]. In June 1806 Goethe managed to obtain a yearly salary of one hundred thalers for the philosopher; in sending him notice on June 27, Goethe wrote Hegel that it was "proof that I have not ceased to act silently on your behalf." "I actually hoped to announce to you more than this, but in such cases many a thing is gained for the future once the first step has been taken" [64]. Hegel expressed gratitude three days later [65].

Goethe and Hegel met both socially and for scholarly interchanges several times in 1806 before the Battle of Jena in October. Topics discussed included the theory of colors and the latest work of Heinrich Steffens, the Schellingian natural philosopher. The Battle of Jena, however, endangered both university and faculty finances. Hegel was among the professors about whose well-being Goethe inquired on October 18 after the battle (*Berichten* 75). On October 24 Goethe asked Karl Ludwig von Knebel in Jena to advance Hegel up to ten thalers as need be (*Ibid* 111). But Hegel's inquiry [87 below] about a possible salary increase from funds freed by the Schellingian Franz Josef Schelver's transfer to Heidelberg came to nothing—though the meeting Hegel requests took place on January 31, 1807. In March 1807 [92] Hegel consequently asked Goethe's blessing for a leave of absence from the university to take employment as editor of the *Bamberger Zeitung* (Ch 7); Hegel's letter was delivered to Goethe by von Knebel on March 13. Goethe replied to von Knebel the next day that he was pleased Hegel had gone to Bamberg to supervise the printing of the *Phenomenology*: "I finally for once want to see an exposition of his mode of thought," the poet wrote; "he is such an excellent man, but communicating himself comes difficult to him" (*Berichten* 126).

Hegel's readiness to assume Schelver's botanical duties suggests the increasing gravity of his own financial situation. Yet his professed interest in botany was no doubt sincere. Another natural science cultivated by Goethe in which Hegel as well showed interest was mineralogy. Johann Georg Lenz, to whom Hegel wrote the last letter in the group below [107a], had been a nontitular professor in Jena since 1794, and two years later had founded a mineralogical society in his capacity as Director of the Natural History Cabinet. Hegel was active in the society. His pursuit of the natural sciences, dating back to his gymnasium years in the 1780s, was in fact a bond with Goethe predating by far Hegel's association with the Schellingian philosophy of nature. This pursuit is apparent in his earliest available letter [1], which also expresses an appreciation for Kepler which appears later in his polemics against Newton in his dissertation (Ch 5 on Jena habilitation) and in the *Encyclopaedia* (§ 269-70). The cultural nationalism which Hegel would repudiate in the case of Italian composers and artists (Ch 22, 23) is displayed on behalf of Kepler against the English Newton. Hegel's resentment against

Newton—or at least against the dominant legion of his overly self-assured contemporary followers—was of course another bond with Goethe. This first letter, presumably written to a schoolmate, shows Hegel's emerging self-identity as a man of learning, but his early role models in scientific abstraction and distractedness are here mathematicians.

Hegel to Haag [1]

June 8, 1785

I am most obliged to you [*Dir*] for your last letter. Regarding insects, I wish only to observe that you do not call them by the disgraceful name of "vermin." I likewise want to make a contribution to you of my own on this chapter: it has been observed that all insects breathe, not through cavities in the head (i.e., the nose), but through small ventricles on the abdomen, 3, 4, 6, etc. on each side. If one coats these ventricles with some sort of glutinous oil the insects die for lack of air. I read this in a [manual on] natural history, checked it out myself, and found it confirmed by experience. I was in particular able to detect the small ventricles on the hard integument of the beetles. Your faithful friend, G. W. F. Hegel

But now I wish to write you about still another topic. I want to send you, as I recently promised I would, Mr. [Abraham Gotthilf] Kästner's epigram on Kepler. It goes like this:

Never has a mortal risen to Kepler's height
—and yet of hunger died.
Solely for the pleasure of spirits did he have a head;
so bodies left him without bread.

How clearly Kästner's inexhaustible wit stands out here! A wit so rare among mathematical minds. Here is another epigram:

The spirit by which an Euler greatness won
rests on no order and enters no ribbon.

Elsewhere—addressing a friend in his album—he says this in praise of mathematics:

Oh if only you could be aroused by a shadow
of the voluptuousness felt by hearts who know,
devotedly, the art of the surveyor!
Then would you reclaim from Fate's door
those hours so empty and long
which you spent in song.

I want to tell you an anecdote about the depth of his reflection. At an assembly of distinguished professors in the university hall our Kästner—a Privy Councillor and Professor of Mathematics at Göttingen born in 1719 in Leipzig—was also in attendance. The others were already at their places when he took his place too. Upon entering, everyone was already laughing at him, though he did not notice. Finally the man next to him told him he was wearing one black and one white sock.

P.S. I have not quite understood the term "star-cylinder" [*Sternröhre*]. Please be so kind as to send me clarification.

Hegel to Goethe [49]

Jena, September 29, 1804

I take the humble liberty, Your Excellency, of confidently approaching you with a request founded as much on the wish to become, to the best of my ability, useful in my field as on the conviction as to how greatly everything affecting the welfare of the local university may count on Your Excellency's kind attention.

Since I hear that a few of my colleagues expect to be graciously appointed to professorships in philosophy, and since I am thus reminded that I am the oldest *Privatdozent* in philosophy locally, I venture to put it to Your Excellency to decide whether I must not fear being held back from working at the university according to my abilities should the high authorities grant such a distinction to others.

Since in every advantage that can fall to the university and its members we direct our eyes and hopes to Your Excellency, I have mustered the courage to commend myself—should our most exalted benefactors decide to appoint new professors of philosophy—to Your Excellency's goodwill and gracious intercession. Having been a *Privatdozent* in philosophy for three years, I believe I have lectured at least last winter with the satisfaction of my numerous students, whom I shall strive to win over even more this coming winter. So far my literary works are too insignificant for me to dare present them to Your Excellency. The purpose of a work I hope to complete this winter for my lectures—a purely scientific elaboration of philosophy—will permit me to present it to Your Excellency, should I be kindly permitted to do so.

I know all too well that the above circumstances must be complemented by the kind favor of Your Excellency before they can give me hope of being serviceable to the university in my field. That is why I place my wishes and hopes entirely at Your Excellency's gracious disposal. But I know equally well how greatly my endeavors would be stimulated should the exalted trustees kindly show me the consideration of not placing me behind others.

Permit me, Your Excellency, to add assurances of the most respectful devotion with which I remain your humble servant, Dr. Hegel, *Privatdozent* in philosophy at Jena.

Hegel to Goethe [65]

Jena, June 30, 1806

Given that His Ducal Highness has been kind enough to allot me an annual salary and that it is to His Highness that my initial thanks is due, Your Excellency may kindly allow me to express the obligation in this regard I feel toward you.

I at once take the humble liberty of requesting Your Excellency to submit to His Ducal Highness an expression of my most respectful and most dutiful appreciation for this support and encouragement of my endeavor to become useful to my branch at the university. The kindness for which I express this gratitude at once has the fine distinction of coming from that noble Prince [Karl August] who is honored by

German arts and sciences as their greatest connoisseur and most generous protector. Having direct experience of the happy role Your Excellency plays in the advancement and realization of these beneficent intentions and knowing how indebted I am to you for this new kindness shown me, I ask you to accept graciously this attestation of my most respectful gratitude. I shall endeavor to the best of my abilities to merit what is for me truly invaluable proof of your kindness. I commend myself confidently to Your Excellency's continued goodwill and protection, and remain most respectfully your most humble servant G. W. F. Hegel, Dr. and Professor of Philosophy.

Hegel to Goethe [87]

[Jena, end of January 1807]

Your Excellency's kind benevolence toward me emboldens me to present a request. I humbly ask you to respond with the same graciousness you have always shown me.

His Ducal Highness has been kind enough to grant me most gracious support in the exercise of my teaching duties here. While honoring his kindness with my most humble thanks I believe myself permitted—seeing that my present annual income is insufficient for me to devote proper time and effort to my lectures—to entertain the hope that it may please Your Excellency as the occasion arises to enlarge upon this kindness, assuming I have not made myself unworthy of it. I can thus at once muster confidence enough in Your Excellency's kind sentiments to permit myself to humbly ask your support in this if funds freed from the salary of former Professor Schelver can be viewed as such an occasion.

I venture to solicit your gracious consideration of my case in reallocating this salary because of my understanding that through Your Excellency's kind intervention it was increased beyond what was previously budgeted—which may provide a propitious moment for a more general disposition. But if I should at once be most graciously permitted to move into the currently unoccupied apartment of the Ducal Botanical Garden, I might adapt myself more closely to the purpose for which those funds were budgeted by assuming temporary responsibility for inspection of this interesting establishment—such inspection being necessary for its maintenance. Given the interest which Your Excellency takes in the establishment, I would discharge this administrative responsibility with as much pleasure as zeal. It would at once be an occasion to resume my botanical studies, which at one time I pursued with fondness. To this end, I collected a herbarium in Switzerland, part of which I still preserve as a keepsake.

Given the resources available in the Botanical Garden—along with Your Excellency's support, should I be able to count on it—I could soon deliver botanical lectures as well as ones on philosophy, seeing that the latter, which even in other regards are often viewed as a kind of luxury, seem to many a student all the more dispensable in hard times.

I would also like to take the liberty of entertaining Your Excellency with news I have received of newly breaking physical and philosophical wonders: first, of a man discovered in Tyrol who, like the already known servant of [Pierre]

Thouvenel, detects concealed water and metal when he finds himself over it. And, secondly, of the experiments that have been taken up again in this connection on the free movements into which metals and brimstone fall when held steadily on a thread over other metal or over water by the fingers [90]. This force, known as *siderism*, is said to grant even far higher insight into the riddles of nature—or at least to give promise of doing so—than was formerly expected of galvanism. However, I must fear going on at too great a length. I thus reserve the detail, which has already been extensively developed, for a personal audience, which I hereby ask permission to have with Your Excellency. I cannot help wishing that my earlier humble request, the content of which can in no way be compared to the wonders of *siderism*, may gain more actuality than such wonders may perhaps exhibit. Yet I am able to credit it with a more secure ground, I believe, by seeking its principal support in Your Excellency's grace, to which I wholly entrust it. In humbly requesting both Your Excellency's protection in the matter and continued kind sentiments in my regard, I remain, with feelings of the deepest respect, Your Excellency's devoted servant G. W. F. Hegel, Dr. and Professor of Philosophy.

Hegel to Goethe [92]

[Bamberg, March 1807]

I need not explain at length, Your Excellency, that the salary I have been granted by the grace of His Ducal Highness, together with the amount that can be earned from the performance of my teaching duties, does not suffice in these times for my subsistence. Having now received a temporary private business offer on the occasion of my present trip to Bamberg to attend to literary matters here, and seeing that by accepting the offer I can for the time being provide for my subsistence, I have taken the liberty of addressing myself to His Excellency Privy Councillor [Christian Gottlob] von Voigt with the most humble request that he place before His Ducal Highness my petition for a leave of absence this summer from my professorship. I could meanwhile live here by private means and, having provisionally earned my living, could await the opportune moment when with gracious support the performance of my teaching duties at the university enables me to earn my subsistence as well as engage in higher occupations. I at once take the humble liberty of daring to present the same request before Your Excellency's ever so frequently tested goodwill and kindly disposed sentiments. I request in this your most gracious support.

May Your Excellency permit me likewise to request your kind indulgence for a publication of mine [*Phenomenology*] to appear this Easter. I take the liberty of enclosing a copy, and of paying the most reverential respects, with which I have the honor of being Your Excellency's humble servant, G. W. F. Hegel, Dr. and Professor of Philosophy in Jena.

Hegel to Lenz [107a]

Bamberg, November 17, 1807

I am pleased, my Honorable Mining Councillor and dear friend, to have cause to write to you and inquire both about how life is treating you and how our dear

science of mineralogy is faring—the study of which I have forever grown fond of under your guidance, and have in a small way recently found occasion to renew. It is this that causes me to address a request to you, for which I should be pleased to be at once able to render you a service in return.

There happens to be a respected devotee [?] of mineralogy here in Bamberg, who took up this study only a few years ago. To this end he has started to set up a cabinet that in many a branch is indeed well endowed and even contains a few very fine specimens, but is still very incomplete. At present he is working to complete it, is in touch with many dealers and other devotees, but as often happens at the outset has frequently been duped and has thus become somewhat suspicious. I proposed to him that if he wished to allow me a few carolins I would try to write to you. I have no doubt that at least in many respects you could provide from your own cabinet what his collection lacks, and that in both quality and price he would be satisfied with the trial which I expressed a willingness to undertake with you in the matter. He very gladly accepted my offer. I am authorized to spend twenty thalers and have also received from him a list of the gaps in his collection to be filled. I enclose the list with the present letter and ask you to return it to me. Knowing the abundance of your private collection and recognizing that you have the most extensive contacts with a view to what is new, I have no doubt that through your kindness this private cabinet here in Bamberg could be most enriched. And I surmise you are in any case disposed to part with some items in these times of tight budgets. For someone with your contacts is in any case continually flooded with minerals. So I ask you to write me soon what you are able to send for twenty thalers from this list. Write moreover what, beyond this, you have in stock, and for what price. Do not forget that the enclosed list contains what is completely missing, that this cabinet is still in need of better specimens in many categories, and that if items can be obtained from you at a reasonable price compared with the rates with which we are familiar a continuing business arrangement can be established. Should I order something for myself, I would at once ask you to pack everything together and mail it here. But, as I have said, first just kindly send a list of the shipment. On receiving this list, which I have no doubt will turn out satisfactory, the definitive order for actual shipment will at once ensue. And on receipt of the shipment proper payment will follow just as promptly—most conveniently, I think, through Pfündel, who constantly does business here. I remind you further that the preference is for specimens of about five or four inches, clean, well preserved, with the crystallizations not crushed, with fresh breaks, not worn down, and so on. You likewise know that a teacher often needs a small inferior specimen of a new fossil, or of a fossil for which he lacks a better specimen. In a private cabinet, on the other hand, there is a greater wish to possess impressive specimens, and one prefers to postpone acquisition of a fossil if the specimen is not of excellent quality.

With this I say goodbye. Please reply promptly. Write what other nice items you have. It will please me to hear from you soon and, after a long interlude, to enter once more into a mineralogical exchange with you, my dear friend and teacher—which I trust will work out to your satisfaction and advantage. Meanwhile, farewell. Your most devoted friend and servant, Professor Hegel.

GOETHE'S THEORY OF COLORS

Though Hegel sent Goethe one of the first copies of the *Phenomenology* and though Goethe expressed interest in finally reading the philosopher's system, he apparently did not read it very quickly. Five years later, in 1812, Goethe came upon a quotation from the first page of the Preface of the *Phenomenology* which he mistakenly attributed to the just published first volume of Hegel's *Logic* (*Berichten* 159). When Hegel did not return to Jena, his correspondence with Goethe lapsed until publication of the *Encyclopaedia* in 1817. Paragraphs 220 and 221 of the 1817 *Encyclopaedia* defended Goethe's theory of colors against the Newtonian theory. Goethe sent Hegel a note of appreciation [321] after the art historian Sulpiz Boisserée called Goethe's attention to the paragraphs; the poet welcomed allies against the Newtonians. Attached to Goethe's note was a copy of his *On Natural Science in General*, vol. 1, no. 2 (1817). The three essays in this number included two devoted to so-called *entoptic colors* (*Double Images of Rhomboid Calcite* and *Elements of Entoptic Colors*) and one essay on mineralogy (*On the Bohemian Mountains*). Hegel, in his reply of July 1817 [322], addresses the first two essays in particular.

The "new riddle," beyond color phenomena, which Hegel cites in his letter arose from the related phenomena of reflection and refraction. Thomas Seebeck, who as an experimental physicist collaborated with Goethe, had written Hegel a lengthy letter in 1811 [188] describing research on reflection and refraction. Seebeck in particular investigated the varying chemical effects of differently colored light on various substances, especially phosphorescent material. He also did research on the depolarizing effect of double refractory crystals. The polarization of light had been discovered just a few years before by Etienne-Louis Malus in Paris. In 1808 the French Institute had announced a prize competition on double refraction. In double refraction light rays entering a crystal are divided into two rays, each with a different angle of refraction: an *ordinary ray* following a law of refraction determined by Descartes, and a so-called *extraordinary ray* following a more complex law discovered by Huygens. One of the crystals giving rise to double refraction is calcite—also known as spar—which is rhomboidal. The phenomenon, on the other hand, is not induced in cubical or regular octagonal crystals.

In the polarization of light double refraction is interfered with and even canceled. Malus's discovery of polarization began with an observation made while looking through a crystal prism at the doubly refracted light of the setting sun reflected off the windows of the Palace of Luxembourg. He noticed that one of the two images of doubly refracted light varied in intensity depending on the angle of incidence of sunlight on the reflecting windows, and found certain angles of incidence at which the double images are reduced to a single light image. When light in what is normally a double refractory crystal is singly rather than doubly refracted due to the angle of incidence at which reflection and refraction occur, it is said to be "polarized."

In his 1817 letter [322] Hegel credits Goethe with raising the phenomenon of polarization from a purely empirical level to that of thought. According to Hegel,

Goethe's achievement was due to treating polarization by the same method followed in his other work in natural science, beginning with his study of the metamorphosis of plants and proceeding through analogous studies of the animal organism and color. As Hegel describes it, this method consists in abstracting what Goethe calls the "primordial phenomenon" of which other phenomena within a given subject area are progressively constructed as complications under varying experimental conditions.

In the course of research designed to test the depolarizing effect of certain doubly refracting crystals, Seebeck discovered what came to be known as "entoptic colors." The discovery won Seebeck a prize in 1816 from the Academy of Sciences in Paris and corresponding membership in the French Academy. Entoptic colors are seen in normally transparent bodies due to the brittleness caused by heating. Seebeck was residing in Nuremberg and was in contact with Hegel when he made the discovery, and in fact it was Hegel who coined the term "entoptic," which Goethe adopted in his 1817 essays. (The "epoptic colors," by analogy with which Hegel says he coined the new term, appear on the surface of ordinarily transparent bodies due to a disruption of cohesion brought on by an application of pressure.) The close relationship which existed for much of the Nuremberg period between Hegel and Seebeck is attested by an 1811 letter [196a] to Seebeck's wife.

In the first of the three essays forwarded to Hegel in July 1817 [321], Goethe discusses observation of the doubly refracted image of a white figure seen through calcite crystal on a black background. Goethe also repeats Seebeck's observation that if one looks at the figure through two crystals the two images completely separate. Goethe calls the images produced by double refraction through calcite "shadowy" because they are grey regardless of whether the figure casting the images is white on a black background or black on a white background. No one would say that the grey images are due to a decomposition of a figure's blackness, and Goethe infers by analogy that no one should conclude, as the Newtonians allegedly did, that in the case of a white figure the grey images are due to a decomposition of white.

Hegel, picking up on a suggestion of Goethe's, expresses in his letter of July 1817 [322] the desire to see a phenomenal realization of the double refraction occurring in both a single and a double prism. Such a phenomenal realization would be achieved "mechanically," i.e., by means of a humanly constructed combination of mirrors, with reflection functioning in the place of refraction. Hegel suggests that double refraction, unlike mathematical points or the elementary particles of physics (which for Hegel are purely "metaphysical" in a derogatory sense), is more than a construction of pure thought, that its inner logic can be made to appear sensuously, i.e., can be made visible in a mechanical model, which, being humanly constructed, makes that logic more immediately understandable. The phenomenal realization in a visible mechanical model of a process invisibly locked in the crystal enables us to *see* thought, to grasp it with our eyes as well as with our minds. Hegel's own thought coincides here with a basic aspiration of Goethe's own scientific endeavors. The quest for a visible model of invisible thought is neither pure empiricism nor pure rationalism. True knowledge is derived

neither from the empirically given nor from *a priori* thinking. Truth is first and foremost a property of empirical realities insofar as they rationalize themselves, i.e., of concepts insofar as they empirically actualize themselves. The quest for truth becomes, in a sense, a practical quest for the empirical actualization of rational concepts in visible models. The concept is actualized in such a model, while empirical reality at once gains in intelligibility—illustrating Vico's principle that we have paradigmatic understanding only of what we ourselves have made. But this activity of constructing and reconstructing reality is ultimately not willfulness; it is the self-activity of the concept itself. The individual who grasps the concept makes himself into the consenting vehicle of its self-actualization, though the concept is itself modified in the process. A concept incapable of actualization, which is said to be *metaphysical*, lacks truth. Hegel's position in the field of optics—and natural science generally—on the relation of thought to its actualization is inwardly identical with his much better known position on the same relation in the field of political philosophy: much the same could be said of the concept of the rational state and its actualization.

Goethe next wrote Hegel on October 7, 1820 [373], to send a copy of the third number of *On Natural Science in General* (vol 1)—the second number of which Hegel had received in 1817 and commented on in his 1817 letter [322]. Goethe's letter alludes again to Hegel's contribution of the term "entoptic," stresses the difficulty the poet feels in his scientific writings when he tries to express in words what should be presented to the eyes, asks for Hegel's continued support, and insists that he is concerned to communicate a method rather than impose an opinion. He concludes by congratulating Hegel on his new stature in German philosophy:

I learn with pleasure from several sources that your effort to form young men after yourself is bearing the best of fruit. It is admittedly necessary in this curious era for there to be a center somewhere or another from which a doctrine capable of favoring life theoretically and practically spreads. It is true that empty heads will not be prevented from indulging in vague ideas and sonorous verbiage. But good heads suffer from it as well, since in recognizing false methods in which they have been ensnared since youth they withdraw back in themselves, become abstruse, or take refuge in transcendence. [373]

Hegel replied in February 1821 [381]. Showing embarrassment over a mere terminological contribution, he attributes to Goethe the far more significant paternity of founding the whole cultural movement in which Hegel himself stands. Hegel both approves Goethe's procedure in natural science and attacks the poet's Newtonian adversaries. The chief difference between the Goethean and Newtonian approach to light and colors is that each viewed as simple and primary what the other took to be complex. Both parties sought what is elementary. Yet where Newton found ordinary white daylight to be composite and the individual spectral colors separated by refraction to each be simple, Goethe found natural daylight to be simple and the different colors composite. For Newton the different colors are derived from a decomposition of white daylight into its simple elements, while for

Goethe each color is constructed through a mixture or composition of nondecomposable white light and dark. Newton thus ends up with a plurality of simple primordial elements in the world of light—the different spectral colors—while Goethe has only one such element: natural daylight. Light for Goethe is a sensory symbol of the Platonic One, while contrasting darkness is its first emanation. Particular colors, each lighter than darkness and darker than pure light, are derived as mutual limitations of lightness and darkness, as a darkening of light or lightening of darkness. The lightening of darkness yields orange and then yellow, while the darkening of lightness yields blue and then purple. Each apparently stable color thus conceals a dynamic contest between light and dark, with first the one and then the other on the attack. It surely was not difficult to see in this process a sensuous analogue to the antithesis and mutual limitation (synthesis) of the Fichtean transcendental ego and non-ego.

But the difference between Goethe and the Newtonians went deeper. For the elementary colors into which light decomposes are not for Newton phenomenal colors but rather invisible atomic corpuscles, while the unanalyzable light which Goethe takes to be primitive is phenomenal. Goethe objected to the Newtonian interpretation of what actually appears as illusory appearances of nonphenomenal material particles. He held that the phenomenon is itself a revelation of reality. Yet he was no phenomenalist. He did not deny the reality of a transphenomenal external world. Indeed, in propounding a chiefly physiological theory of color he insisted on the existence of this world—in which the physiological organism exists. But as a Spinozist he believed that physical differences were manifested in corresponding phenomenal differences. In his letter of February 1821, Hegel denounces Newton's corpuscular theory of color as bad metaphysics. Hegel held that material atoms were pure thought objects constructed by abstraction from sensuous bodies, and that it was a mistake to interpret them realistically, supposing that they could exist by themselves independently of any knowing mind.

Goethe had been working on his anti-Newtonian theory of colors since 1791. It first occurred to him that Newton was wrong when, in looking through a Büttner prism at a white wall beyond, he saw only the white wall rather than the Newtonian spectrum of decomposed colors he expected. But despite Hegel's recollection of this 1791 observation of Goethe's in what follows, the anti-Newtonian inference Goethe drew was erroneous. The Büttner prism refracts the different spectral colors at different angles, and thus indeed separates the colors. Yet only a white wall is seen through the prism because each individual color which is separated out refractively from the light ray reflected from a first point on the wall, and which is thus seen at a second point, is combined with light particles of other colors refracted to that second point from still other points on the wall. If light particles of all the colors are reflected from all points on the wall, orange particles reflected from a first point will be refracted to a second point but, equally by refraction, will be replaced at the first point by other orange particles reflected from a third point. If, on the other hand, one looks through the prism at a white wall on which there is a black horizontal slot, color fringes will be seen on the top and bottom fringes of the slot. For in the case of a wall that is not uniformly white, corpuscles refracted to

another position are not always replaced by the same sort of corpuscles refracted from another position. Hegel, along with Goethe, was simply mistaken to think that such fringe colors evidenced the emergence of color from the mutual attack and retreat of light and dark rather than from the Newtonian decomposition of light.

But to cite the failures of Goethe's theory of colors is not necessarily to denigrate his general ambition of making thought phenomenally visible in experimentally constructed models. Hegel, citing the permission Goethe gave in his letter of October 7 [373], wishes to appropriate Goethe's method in the natural sciences for his own purposes, which are of course philosophical. Hegel suggests on February 24 [381] that in his own philosophy the Absolute—which in Schelling's Spinozistic version remains "dark," the point of indifference or night in which all cows are black—struggles toward the sunlight, toward an ever greater brightening of its grey on grey (cf quotation from Hippel in letter 11). Goethe's primordial phenomena become for Hegel sensory actualizations—or at least analogues—of the abstract schemata of his *Logic*. And Goethean "natural science" is thus transformed into Hegelian "natural philosophy." Hegel is aware that the shadowy world of pure imageless thought in the *Logic*, which grounds Goethean natural science just as Goethean science in turn lends tangibility to the same logical abstractions, is considered inaccessible by Goethe. But he requests the poet's indulgence for philosophy.

Goethe responded to Hegel's letter of February 1821 [381] on April 13, writing that the encouragement he received from Hegel would steel him against his critics. Accompanying his letter were two gifts. "Seeing that you conduct yourself so amicably with the *primordial phenomena*," Goethe wrote in allusion to Hegel's letter of February, "and that you even recognize in me an affiliation with these demonic essences, I first take the liberty of depositing a pair of such phenomena before the philosopher's door, persuaded that he will treat them as well as he has treated their brothers" [384]. The two gifts were an opaque stained wine glass which Goethe had described in Appendix 9 of the *Theory of Colors* and a prism of the sort used in optics. Hegel refers to both gifts in the first paragraph of his August 1821 letter [393], giving his preference to the more distinctly Goethean stained glass over the Newtonian prism.

Hegel's second paragraph refers to an 1809 text by Hegel's Heidelberg friend Friedrich Creuzer on the Dionysian mysteries (Creuzer, *Dionysos*). Creuzer's approach to "primitive symbolic history" had recently been attacked by the now elderly translator of Homer, Johann Heinrich Voss. Hegel's preference for Goethe's color symbolism over the ancient mythological symbolism studied by Creuzer is due to its promise as a contemporary living mythology. This point is developed further in Hegel's letter to Goethe of September 15, 1821 [432]. Hegel closes on August 2 by recommending his follower Leopold von Henning to Goethe. Von Henning subsequently visited Goethe in October 1821, and later lectured with the poet's support on the *Theory of Colors* at Berlin University.

I hasten to notify you at once, dear friend, in connection with the matter of currency exchange which you have wished to entrust to me. I have, as was also your thought, offered the draft to Mr. [Paul Wolfgang] Merkel, who, to be sure, has no need of it himself, but who is willing to take care of its sale so that you can count on receiving the sum via the mail coach leaving Nuremberg Saturday. Since I know for sure that Mr. Merkel is taking care of this transaction most advantageously and that you neither specified nor requested prior notification of the price, the transaction will be immediately settled, and you will, as is your wish, receive the sum as soon as possible. Mr. Merkel could not yet quote me the price more exactly and thus I cannot tell you in advance. I am fully assured, however, that it will be as advantageous as possible.

At the same time it has greatly pleased me to have had this occasion to receive news from you and your dear children [in Bayreuth] as well as from Seebeck [in Reval, Estonia]. I take the greatest of interest in your current situation. What most worries you in your present situation will be neither Seebeck's absence [188] nor the rumors of war [with Russia] that have long been circulating. You have long since become sufficiently used to Seebeck's being away on trips to be able to put up with it with less worry and unrest. And as far as those rumors are concerned, you may take the word of the old politico whom you will still take me to be that though there is indeed no formal certainty that peace will be preserved—for of course the public is not more closely informed of matters of this sort—there is no probability or appearance presently evident of war breaking out. On the contrary, for the last month the prospects have much improved and brightened.

But Seebeck's present trip is, I hope, to decide the question of your future place of residence. I have strongly encouraged him not to allow this to remain undecided any longer, and to arrange his situation in his fatherland [Estonia] with this end in mind. His connections in St. Petersburg make the present time very opportune for it. It is my strongest wish that this decision may turn out to your satisfaction. I am not unselfish in this wish, for nothing would interest or please me more in my future life than to see fate bring me together again with Seebeck, enabling us to further live together in the community of scientific endeavor. It has pleased me to have found him determined now to enter into a definite situation. His connections in Russia will perhaps open up for him very advantageous prospects. And the other considerations likewise argue for his acceptance. I know you are, if it must be, also ready to accept. I of course hope, even without regard for myself, that he can decide to stay in Germany without too great a sacrifice.

The interest which you show me in my changed situation has touched me deeply. My wedding already took place on the 15th of last month, so I have now been a married man for one month. Even beforehand I repeatedly talked to my wife of you, always expressing the wish that we might attain your own domestic happiness. She is already a loving wife and, God willing, will someday be a happy mother as well. Seebeck told me with deep joy so many dear things about how your children are growing up and progressing that I can think of no more beautiful

consolation than the one you find in them. Please give them my warm greetings. How pleased I shall be to see this beautiful circle again, and at once to acquaint my wife with it and with you. I commend her to you, and she sends her regards as well—especially in the hope of still meeting someday soon. It has pleased me greatly that you express the same wish.

Please give me soon another opportunity of doing something for you. I will make every errand my own personal business as best I can. I hope that such an occasion will provide me with further news of you. If you write to your husband, do not forget to remind him as well of my wish that we may remain close in place of residence as otherwise. I commend myself, my dear friend, to your continued kind remembrance, and remain with the highest respect your most devoted Hegel.

Already Your Excellency has greatly pleased me by approving statements I could not help making on the blind attitude of the [Newtonian] School regarding the question of light. After light had been turned on by Nature to sensation, you have turned in on to the mind! I was also delighted for you to give testimony of such approval through Mr. Boisserée. But on top of that Your Excellency now adds still something further. You not only have the kindness to say this to me directly, but also to give me the rare delight of an entirely new gift [*On Natural Science in General*, vol 1, no 2, 1817]. After I—as moreover all of us, though we are no great crowd—have become indebted to you for a correct understanding of the nature of light and a great wealth of its manifestations, I now confess that the solution to the new riddle has taken me quite by surprise. It is a riddle that has dangled at once simply and yet ever more compositely before my eyes for a number of years. In the ever more complex forms that arose along my path—at ever greater distances from the source—the hope I conceived for the resolution of this riddle proved vain. Yet removal from the source, far from removing the pain of thirst, can only intensify it. Your Excellency prefers to call your conduct in the pursuit of natural phenomena *naïve*. I consider myself able to trust my own faculty of judgment enough to recognize and admire the *abstraction* of it. You have accordingly held fast to the basic truth and then inquired into conditions as they have taken form in the newly discovered development, uncovering them and bringing them into simple relief. Confronted with Malus's initial phenomena of the disappearance and reappearance of light according to the different relative positions of mirrors, I, no more than anyone else, could not help *seeing* that the positioning by itself diminishes the light or even makes it disappear. But this simple visually perceived relation Your Excellency has now thematized, and thus raised to the level of thought and given permanence. Further, you have thereby at once extracted the distinction of bright and dark. You have likewise obtained everything that is needed for all the rest to which this distinction transfers from the distinction between what elapses on the plane of reflection and outside it. And this you have done so simply that what is gratifying about it must to every unprejudiced mind be just as illuminating as it is—in comparison with the many-sided explanatory setups of the

theoretical sort involving polarization, rectangularity of light rays, etc., plus all the experimental setups as well—not only unannoying, which is surely to be wished, but I almost want to say amusing.

The first essay in the kindly forwarded sheets gives us, regarding the *nature of the images* in the most interesting phenomenon of double refraction using spar and thus at once with respect to the accompanying color phenomena, the key word helping us at once over our uneasiness in the face of the many ever-new color apparitions—much as the [Sorcerer's] Apprentice [*Famulus*], who forgot the magic word [*Meisterwort*], was helped over the flood of spirits which he could no longer master. In your elucidation on page 24 [Goethe, *Sämt Werke* X, 197] you mention that the calcite phenomenon can also be treated mechanically. Malus's so-to-speak "rhomboidalizing" opposition of mirrors which cross one another gave me the fleeting hope that it would perhaps help us achieve an *externally manifested* presentation of the phenomenon. Philosophically speaking, I may remain comfortable with the *thought* that the phenomenon of *refraction* in the doubling of images is grounded in the rhomboidal *nature* of the spar, which is *at once* transparent and which to this extent refracts in a purely ordinary manner. Both determinations together allow what in Malus's apparatus is produced as a phenomenon of *reflection* to appear *once* but *successively* through the opposed positions of the mirrors. If I have rightly understood, Your Excellency takes the *reflection* in the fine lamellae of your beautiful spar specimen to be *afterimages*, except that the epoptic [phenomena] will appertain to transitions as *existent* fissures. I thus believe I also understand you aright when I claim the principal double image entirely for refraction. For I can likewise only hold to the view that the same phenomenon arises with the totally water-clear spar as arises with entoptic figures in the brittleness of glass, which I specified as its *punctal nature*, [though] fissures and points are not in the least respect recognizable—as little as, for example, in viscous materials, ray packets, and so on; I am happy, in passing, to see that you have allowed the term "entoptic" as I have derived it from the Greek on analogy with "epoptic" to pass muster. In physics, I also hold, pores and atoms are unacceptable precisely because they are not seen, though as thought objects—which is what they are—metaphysics finishes with them in short shrift.

Given a mechanical or *externalized* exposition of the refraction phenomenon in the double spar, I would thus have imagined a connection of both parallel mirrors and other, mutually transverse mirrors, so that the so-called ordinary image would allow itself to be shown in *reflection* through parallel mirrors, while an extraordinary image would *at once* allow itself to be shown through the transverse mirrors; and so that the altered angle, the alternating reinforcement of one image and weakening of the other, and even the disappearance of one image (in the case of calcite spar, in the main section, if I still remember correctly) might emerge. Apart from doubt as to whether such an arrangement could be effected mechanically, a gap would always remain between the modes of refraction and reflection as also between existent mechanical differentiation and a difference remaining wholly enclosed in the inner nature of the thing.

But an even larger gap now appears to me as I see that I may give the

impression of replying to Your Excellency's clear and beautiful image with a sudden brainstorm reminiscent of a wholly shadowy afterimage. Yet I may ask you to ascribe this brainstorm to the interest which your fine exposition has awakened in me, and which is capable of leading one astray into such a state. So try to overlook such an unripe grape as part of the fruit which your views, as momentous as they are simple, have already born, and which in any case can only leave slim pickings for others. Try to view it as the only reply I could muster upon the most delightful enrichment of my knowledge afforded by the above-mentioned essays as also by the mineralogical essay—which at once brought back with such great pleasure memory of the examination of the accompanying collection which Your Excellency once kindly granted me in Jena. I enjoyed the lines [Goethe, *Werke* I, 327f, 357], as deep as they are light, with which as vignettes you have decorated the opening of this collection of natural science essays. The start you have made in this collection, moreover, gives promise of still so much else, part of it new and part newly revised—much which, though it has hardly obtained immediate special attention, already has so actively penetrated the entire conduct of natural science with its indwelling spirit.

If Your Excellency wishes to honor my more recent efforts with your attention, I wish you might find I have not entirely missed my main objective. This objective is to proceed on a sure footing even though the audience is thereby greatly reduced, and to forsake general analogies, fantastic combinations, and so-called mere tangents—thus avoiding a procedure which has almost deprived the sounder basis of the philosophical tendency in natural science of all credit.

With the highest respect and inalterable esteem, Your Excellency's most devoted servant, Professor Hegel.

Hegel to Goethe [381]

Berlin, February 24, 1821

To enjoy thoroughly once more the delightful gift Your Excellency has made to the public with a new volume on natural science [*On Natural Science in General*, vol 1, no 3, 1820]—and to me in particular, both with a copy of it and with such a gracious letter—and to reply to this gift with a few occasional thoughts of my own at least to attest to the interest it has aroused in me—all this I had reserved for the leisure of the holidays. I then believed I could surely defer an expression of my thanks until then. For I believed I could count on your being convinced of how dear to me would be both your gracious remembrance and this new wealth of insights, and of how refreshing to me would be the remaining serenely serious expressions of your genius. But during vacation I was not feeling very well, and now I cannot permit myself any further delay before according some sign of my gratitude.

Among the so very rich contents of the volume I have first of all to thank Your Excellency for the understanding which you have wished to afford of the entoptic colors. Both the way the treatise progresses and is rounded off as well as its content have necessarily awakened my highest satisfaction and recognition. The numerous apparatuses, contrivances, and experiments on this topic notwithstanding, or rather

in all probability precisely because of them—and even in spite of questions of godfathership or paternity—we had *understood nothing* of the initial phenomena that Malus brought forth and the further phenomena deriving from them. But for me, at least, what counts most is understanding, and interest in the bare phenomenon is for me nothing more than the awakened desire to understand it.

In order right from the start to have done with this question of godfathership, since Your Excellency still has wished to recall my mention to you of how I once helped you out with a few syllables, you of course know how little importance is attached now to the godfathership of a child. Still, this recollection of yours obliges me to reply expressly with the explanation that my mention of a contribution was not intended to win any honor or even secret merit of my own. It was rather merely intended to represent a parable, as it were. It is well known that in a parable the event invoked has no historical value for itself but merely serves to signify a universal circumstance—the instructive fiction [*fabula docet*], so that the single case employed is completely insignificant. Thus when the general lesson is expounded by means of another example, this other case may in no way be comparable in content to the first, and the first example may no longer be even capable of entering one's mind. Thus, as the subject of discussion is now light and color, it is natural to welcome the insignificant particular of the contribution of a letter or comma, since it calls to mind, parabolically from afar, the frequent circumstance that persons who have profited from Your Excellency in all they have and know, people for whom it is not a question of one or another letter but of everything, now act as if they have dug it up out of their own brains. But when they perhaps come upon some further detail, they show immediately how little they have even merely assimilated what they have received. For they are unable to make this detail intelligible on the basis of their own mentality. They must attribute it exclusively to Your Excellency in order to entice form from the lump of clay, and to bring it to life by such authentic godfathership, only then instilling in its nostrils a spiritual breath.

This spiritual breath—it is of this that I really wished to speak and that alone is worth speaking of—is what has necessarily given me such great delight in Your Excellency's exposition of the phenomena surrounding the entoptic colors. What is simple and abstract, what you strikingly call the “primordial phenomenon” [*Urphänomen*], you place at the very beginning. You then show how intervention of further spheres of influence and circumstances generates the concrete phenomena, and you regulate the whole progression so that the succession proceeds from simple conditions to the more composite, and so that the complex now appears in full clarity through this decomposition. To ferret out the primordial phenomenon, to free it from those further environs which are accidental to it, to apprehend it as we say abstractly—this I take to be a matter of great spiritual intelligence for nature, just as I take that course generally to be the truly scientific [form] of knowledge in this field. Newton and the entire community of physicists following him, on the other hand, lay hold of no matter what composite phenomenon, rush to fix themselves in it, and end up putting the cart before the horse, as the saying goes. It has happened in this connection that they have made out circumstances immaterial to

the natural state [*Urstand*] of the matter to be its [essential] conditions, even when such circumstances were merely the result of the mishap of putting the cart before the horse. And they then force, botch, and falsify everything before and after willy-nilly into the mold. Yet they are not lacking for something primordial [*Ur*] here. They bring on a metaphysical abstract entity. As created spirits they place an inner [content] worthy of themselves into the phenomena—a content they have created for them. Enconced in this center, they are as delighted by the wisdom and splendor—and are just as serious workmen—as the Freemasons in Solomon's Temple.

Regarding the primordial phenomena, the story occurs to me which Your Excellency adjoins to the *Theory of Colors*—the story of how you looked with Büttner's downward refracting prisms at the wall and still saw *nothing* but a white wall. This story greatly facilitated my access to the theory of colors. And whenever I now have to deal with this general subject, I see the primordial phenomenon before me: I see Your Excellency with Büttner's prisms, observing the white wall and seeing nothing but white. But may I now still speak to you of the special interest that a primordial phenomenon, thus cast in relief, has for us philosophers, namely that we can put such a preparation—with Your Excellency's permission—directly to philosophical use. But if we have at last worked our initially oysterlike Absolute—whether it be grey or entirely black, suit yourself—through toward air and light to the point that the Absolute has itself come to desire this air and light, we now need window placements so as to lead the Absolute fully out into the light of day. Our schemata would dissipate into vapor if we tried to transfer them directly into the colorful yet confused society of this recalcitrant world. Here is where Your Excellency's primordial phenomena appear so admirably suited to our purpose. In this twilight—spiritual and comprehensible by virtue of its simplicity, visible and apprehensible by virtue of its sensuousness—the two worlds greet each other: our abstruse world and the world of phenomenal being [*Dasein*]. Thus out of rocks and even something metallic Your Excellency prepares for us granite, which we can easily get a handle on because of its trinitarian nature and which we can assimilate—no doubt more easily than your many somewhat degenerate children may allow themselves to be returned to your lap. For a long time we have gratefully had to acknowledge that you have vindicated the plant world in its simplicity—and ours. With the aid of bones, clouds—in short by means of everything—you thus lead us ever upward.

I now find that Your Excellency probably wishes to locate the region of something inexorable and incomprehensible approximately where we are lodged—along with [Karl Wilhelm] Nose, who moreover should not have relegated such important subjects merely, as I see from page 221 [Goethe, *Sämt Werke* IX, 578], to the appendixes of his *Genesis of Basalt* [1820]. This is precisely the position from which we wish to justify and comprehend your views and primitive phenomena. And yes, as one says, to demonstrate, deduce, construct them, and so forth. I know at once, however, that even if Your Excellency does not know how to be grateful to us for it, and even if your views might thereby attract the label “natural philosophy,” you will tolerantly allow us to conduct ourselves with what

is yours in our own innocent way. Yet it is still not the worst thing to have befallen you. And I can count on your knowing that when one has done something clever human nature has a way of making the others race to it and want to have done something of what is really your own. But, apart from this, we philosophers already share with Your Excellency a common enemy, namely metaphysics. Newton already posted the great warning: "Physics, beware of metaphysics." But misfortune has it that, in bequeathing this Gospel to his friends, who publicize it faithfully, he and his friends have only countlessly repeated the predicament of that Englishman who did not know he had been speaking prose his whole life through. Yet the latter finally came to realize it, while the former presently are not yet far enough along to know that the language they speak is precisely that of the accursed bad metaphysics. But I leave something still to be said of the necessity of ruining this metaphysics for the physicists. I must return to one of Your Excellency's lessons. I cannot refrain from still telling you my warm delight and appreciation concerning the view that you have given of the nature of doubly refractory bodies. This contrasting double image of the same thing, expressed first by an external mechanical means and secondly as a damask inwardly woven by nature itself, is in my view surely one of the most beautiful tricks that could possibly be done.

This damask weave, at once arising out of lightening and darkening, necessarily leads still further. What is living in the beautiful is the fertility which it at once possesses. But because in all things there is always something to regret, I should indeed have to regret not having been able to go through the instructive series of phenomena with bodily eyes, preferably under Your Excellency's guidance. Yet perhaps I may promise myself this favor for a future date, and by itself this hope banishes that regret. But in order not to try the patience of Your Excellency with still further talk, I now permit myself merely to repeat my joyful gratitude for your kind remembrance, and for the wealth of instruction which has been received. Hegel

Hegel to Goethe [393]

Berlin, August 2, 1821

I have to give Your Excellency so much thanks—and at the same time to apologize for my delay in doing so—that I do not know where to begin. The beautiful, nicely packed gift has thus arrived safely. But I have not yet been able to enjoy enough the unfathomable depth of the phenomenon, the ingenuity of presentation, the delicacy of execution, and the fruitfulness of consequences. It is precisely this many-faceted enjoyment, joined to gladness over Your Excellency's kind generosity, that has not allowed me to express appropriate words of appreciation earlier. Since glass for once plays a principal role in the abstract phenomenon of color, the drinking glass is in and for itself a so much more enjoyable piece of apparatus than the triangular glass rod with which Satan's angel, wielding it in his fists, strikes out at the physicists. At least the wine connoisseurs among them should let themselves be enticed into removing from their flesh the thorn of that delicate instrument of three cutting edges, and to look instead into the glass and thus behold the objective emergence of color which here offers itself to sight in its

full and free naïveté. The phenomena of the derived colors emerge in the same agreeable fashion when we proceed to lead the drinking glass via the multicolored wine to fulfill its more specific destiny.

As instructive as a glass of wine has always been, it has now gained infinitely through Your Excellency's employment of it. If wine has already lent mighty assistance to natural philosophy, which is concerned to demonstrate spirit in nature and which thus finds in wine the most immediate and impressive testimony on behalf of its own teaching; and if the ancients already acknowledged and venerated Old Bacchus essentially as the mystical Dionysius, no matter how much our old friend Voss may fly off the handle, bark, and flail against it, it would now seem to me that only through Your Excellency's gift has any real understanding dawned on me of my friend Creuzer's mystical cosmic cup. What can this cup be but the all-embracing transparent enclosure by the yellow belt of the Zodiac adorned with the Twelve Signs in gold. Turned as much toward the radiant Ahura-Mazda as toward the darkness of Ahriman, this zodiacal belt brings to manifestation the whole variegated world of colors. But this world is kept from being a world of phantoms by those golden leaves and fruit which fill the cup with the blood from which these motley shadows drink up to full strength and health, much as the Elysian shadows did from the goat's blood Ulysses gave them to drink. But it is to Your Excellency's health that, upon each trial, I use this goblet so rich in meaning to make a toast. In this remembrance I draw still more sustenance than from primitive symbolic history. And I celebrate both proof of my faith in the transubstantiation of the inner and outer—of thought into the phenomenon and of the phenomenon into thought—and my gratitude toward the one who has provided this proof.

Along with these toasts to long life [*vivats*] an occasional death wish [*pereat*] is, to be sure, also emitted for the Philistines. It seems to me that I remember Your Excellency letting it slip out that twenty years ago you still wanted to nail the asses' ears of the physicists to the table. If subsequent leniency has restrained you from letting such justice take its course, still the history of how the *Theory of Colors* has been received might offer an interesting picture—a sort of counterpart to the reception of *Werther*. And detailed analysis and refutation of what has been brought forth against you might have considerable impact, and indeed might even appear necessary in exhibiting more the nature of a discussion of the pros and cons. Silence, the failure to give any notice, is the favorite weapon of the morgue and indolence, and is the most effective means of preserving authority vis-à-vis the public. Still it is fortunate that a few have spoken out. Yet this supplies the dear guild with a ready excuse for saying that Your Excellency's so-called objections have been answered, and that there the matter lies, since nothing has been said in reply. I wish to see these distinguished gentlemen deprived of this consolation. This wish is now stirred up in me again due to a copy of a book by my colleague in Kiel, [Johann Erich] von Berger: *General Fundamentals of Science*, Part Two. It has just been given to me by a young man here. With regard to "the critique of experiments made to support or refute [Goethe's theory of colors] and the results of those experiments," the book simply says in parentheses: "in this regard we refer

the reader to the illuminating exposition and critical judgment of the controversy by our friend [Christoph Heinrich] Pfaff in his publication [*On Newton's and Goethe's Theories of Colors and the Chemical Opposition of Colors*, 1813], etc." If I still accurately recall this so-called publication of this Pfaff, he bases himself above all in it on an experiment with lenses. In any case, in the *Theory of Colors* you still did not fulfill your obligation with respect to this side of the primitive phenomenon's reflection. This circumstance would strip of its polemical edge even your disposal of Pfaff, should you wish to tackle it not in prose but in verse. But such a simple reference to Pfaff [as von Berger's] is surely all too confident and comfortable for Your Excellency to let it lie in rest. Moreover, the comfort is possible only so long as our friend retains the last word.

The young man [who showed Hegel the book]—Dr. [Leopold] von Henning, who I believe has the honor of being known to Your Excellency—told me today of his intention to attempt an examination of all public critiques of the *Theory of Colors* in a publication of his own. He has zeal, insight, and good prior knowledge of the matter. I have high hopes in him. Yet he is already so very busy, and maybe will not be able to devote himself exclusively for perhaps half a year to the work that would probably be necessary. I will not fail to encourage him and, as far as possible, to assist him. I should perhaps not say so in the present context, just having expressed the wish to see such an enterprise realized by Your Excellency. Yet without giving up this latter hope, at least with respect to treatment by Your Excellency of points which hold interest for themselves, I hope my friend's work might still be of use in its own way. If this endeavor prospers further, I will let you know, and perhaps you will even now and again allow me to obtain your advice.

In conclusion, may Your Excellency allow me with heartfelt appreciation to drink once more to your health, not only from the cup of faith but also from that of sight—both for the present and, in advance, for the 28th of this month [Goethe's birthday], for you do not pay heed to such things yourself [*nam de te cetera sumis*]. Your Excellency's most devoted Hegel

OF NATURAL PHILOSOPHY AND WINE

Hegel perhaps had experience of what he calls above the "mighty assistance to natural philosophy" [393] afforded by wine and the Dionysian mysteries. Surviving letters and notes show, in any case, an earnest approach to wine purchases.

Hegel to Ramann Brothers [30]

Jena, August 8, 1801

I have the honor, most noble gentlemen, of again asking for a quarter of a bucket—this time Medoc. You will have received the money for the keg. But I request that you send me one in better condition. The last one was so rotten at the top that a few bottles had run out. The money will follow immediately. I hope to receive the wine by next Saturday, and have the honor of being your devoted servant, Dr. Hegel

Friday. P.S. I wrote this letter on a Wednesday and had inserted the money

assuming there would be a mail coach. I am today now sending the letter alone in the hope of receiving the wine—Medoc, at 24 thalers the bucket—still in the next week. I will forward the money with the next mail coach.

Hegel to Ramann Brothers [35]

Jena, May 25, 1802

Yesterday I received your letter and asked you to send me this week without fail a half a bucket of Erlauer. I will settle this bill as well as the remaining balance next week for sure. Yours, Dr. Hegel

Hegel to Ramann Brothers [36]

Jena, July 2, 1802

I am ordering another bucket of Pontak and request you to dispatch it as soon as possible, but so that it is underway at night, since with the current weather it would be damaged by day. I also request you to send me a good quality, since I find that wines have come here from you at the same prices but better in quality than the ones I have obtained. In view of my consumption and prompt payment I believe myself just as worthy of good wines. So in this hope I address myself to you for one bucket at 26 thalers.

I here remit five carolins on my account and ask you to credit the amount to my account. Your devoted servant, Dr. Hegel

Hegel to Ramann Brothers [36a]

Jena, April 5, 1803

I send you herewith four carolins, since the departure of the mail prevents me from hunting up the bill to check on the balance and settlement. I am ordering a half bucket of Erlauer. . . . [incomplete]

Hegel to Ramann Brothers [43a]

Jena, November 28, 1803

I shall be sending six carolins to you, most honorable sir, with tomorrow's mail coach. At the same time I ask you to send me half a bucket of the same white French wine as you gave Dr. Seebeck. Since he has put aside some of it for me and since I have promised to return it to him in kind, I at once request you to give me wine of at least as good quality, and to ship it as soon as possible. I most respectfully have the honor of being your devoted servant, Dr. Hegel.

Hegel to Ramann Brothers [67a]

Jena, August 18, 1806

I again request, honorable sir, a bucket of good French white wine at the earliest opportunity, at the usual price, and in the proper measure. Beyond the recently receipted bill, I paid off something a few days ago to Mlle. Völker, and will shortly be able to remit a larger amount [with royalties expected from the *Phenomenology*]. I most respectfully remain your devoted servant, Professor Hegel.

Hegel enters most deeply into the didactic third part of the *Theory of Colors*—as contrasted to the second polemical or anti-Newtonian part and the first historical part—in a letter of September 1822 [432]. In the third part, after a physiological introduction, Goethe presents a phenomenology of color, which does not as much contradict Newtonian optics as it simply undertakes a different task. Goethe sought to study the physiologically conditioned world of color as it is directly experienced, not the invisible and thus in his sense colorless world of photonic particles (or waves) which is not physiologically conditioned. Hegel is at pains to show Goethe that the basic developments of his phenomenology of color have philosophical significance, and in particular that colors—along with their contrasts and harmonies—symbolize logical categories. He once again sees in Goethe's scientific efforts a tangible, sensory realization of the unearthly abstractions of his own thought. But the quasi-Neoplatonic (Spinozistic, Schellingian) bias of Goethe's own formulations is turned aside by Hegel. Pure light, Goethe's primordial phenomenon, is not ontologically primordial for Hegel. Like the pure being of Hegel's *Logic*, it is a mere abstraction [381 above]. What is truly first is the concrete totality of which pure abstraction initiates the scientific reconstruction. Thus there is more truth in red and in its interchange with green than in pure light.

The table of four colors which Hegel reproduces is derived by the exclusion of violet and orange. Violet is simply a mixture of red and blue, while orange is a mixture of red and yellow. Whereas adjacent colors, such as yellow and orange, are distinguished only quantitatively, yellow and blue are qualitatively different. It is thus possible to discern some yellow in orange, but not in blue. But though yellow and blue are qualitatively different and thus opposed as extremes, they are also complementary—indeed as complementary and inseparable as light and dark, which they represent. Light is light only by spontaneously expanding into a darkness which it dissipates, or by retreating as darkness itself takes the initiative. When light or yellow is active, it appears as a "source" (*Grund*), while darkness appears rather as a "medium." But what was the source may become the medium, as when light is extinguished, and vice versa. Only the presence of light permits darkness to become an active ground or source.

The opposition of red and green is also one of qualitatively distinct colors. Yet the opposition of red and green is qualitatively distinct from that of yellow and blue. Red and green are not opposed as the extremes of light and dark. Each is itself a stable synthesis of light and dark, not an antithesis. Each unites light and darkness within a single color. In each the contest of light and dark achieves a compromise solution of mutual limitation, of limited light harmonized with limited darkness. In this, red and green are similar. Yet they are also different: green, the symbol of rest and the color of the plant world, is a peaceful reconciliation of light and dark, yellow and blue. But the passivity of green is achieved by an external, mechanical combination of yellow and blue, as in mixing yellow and blue powder. Red is, by contrast, an active, individual, or subjective unity of light (yellow) and dark (blue). Before, the infinite diffuse activity of yellow advanced against dark-

ness; now red, the color of animal blood, advances against its green complement as a limited, purposively directed activity against a definite obstacle.

Red, we see, is parasitic upon the green it attacks. Green in turn presupposes yellow and blue. But where green is a quantitative mixture of yellow and blue—some green can be seen in both certain yellows and blues—red, separated from yellow by orange and from blue by violet, is a nonquantitative, qualitative, inner synthesis of the lightness of yellow and darkness of blue. As the color of synthetic individual activity directed upon passive green, red is the most intensely stimulating color. The preeminence of red in part symbolizes the lordship of the animal world over an earthly greenness which is itself the effect of solar yellow penetrating cosmic darkness. But it also symbolizes the dialectical preeminence of subjective spirit, of the finite ego, over the indeterminate being or the Fichtean infinite ego symbolized by light, over non-being or the infinite non-ego symbolized by darkness, and over the determinate being or determinate non-ego represented by green. The Goethean construction of colors thus offers—however incompletely, as is only to be expected in nature, which is the Idea alienated from itself—a phenomenal materialization of the dialectic of Hegel's own logic. It offers a symbolic "mythology of reason" ("System-Programme" in Harris, 510ff). And in this may be found a source of Hegel's support for Goethe's unorthodox and to some extent mistaken color theory despite the philosopher's usual scientific conservatism.

Hegel to Goethe [432]

Magdeburg, September 15, 1822

I have not yet thanked you as I am most obliged to do, Your Excellency, for having kindly forwarded the fourth volume on natural science [*On Natural Science in General*, vol 1, no 4, 1822]. I have been delighted by numerous suggestions, references, instructive notices, etc.; and everywhere by your amicably sympathetic, all-embracing, overarching spirit. I found, moreover, that you not only amiably welcomed a letter from me but that it has pleased you to characterize it as "encouragement" and to have it printed [Goethe, *Sämt Werke* X, 622-24]. When presented with so many and rich pleasures and challenges, we are obliged to reply at least with grateful appreciation, and beyond this the only remaining task is to move others to share in the delight and to work on external aspects, consequences, and the like.

To have at my instigation encouraged Dr. von Henning to work his way into the theory of colors of necessity delights me all the more because, beyond what he has already accomplished, you now entrust to him the formulation of complementary special developments, detailings, explanations, etc.; and because it now likewise pleases you to present this conclusion of the work to us for our instruction. Since he soon will be or already is with you, he will perhaps be able to tell you of other further matters. Maybe he will know how to make himself more understandable orally concerning, among other things, a view I have formed as to the mode of operation of the prism. But I shall take the trouble later on of making my basic insight clearer to myself, and of grasping more clearly the viewpoint from which the insight could be of some interest—so as to apprehend a closer determination of

this insight and viewpoint. For the only thing that could count is this matter of more precise determination. Dr. von Henning will also be able to tell you that grey disappeared almost entirely for me.

Since you and Privy Councillor [Christoph Ludwig] Schultz are battling the color schema back and forth, he has let me see your more recent schema to him on the subject. I thus wish to comment briefly on what Mr. von Henning may explain more extensively. Something philosophical is involved here. I start with no knowledge apart from that of the schema you use on page 241 of the fourth notebook as everywhere:

RED

YELLOW

BLUE

GREEN

For the time being we put aside here violet and orange [*Gelbrot*] as *common quantitative* mixtures.

To begin with, the opposition of *yellow* to *blue* poses no more of a problem than that of any light or dark source to a medium that is by contrast opaque—where the opaque medium is, as the case may be, either lightened or darkened.

Red and *green*, on the other hand, stand as extremes in a differently determined relation over against each other. We have here a second opposition of a different nature [from that of yellow and blue]. What I in principle take to be immediately decisive is that yellow and blue are already *qualitative* extremes, that we expressly cannot be content here with *quantitative* differences, which for the rest merely belong to the pyramid of colors and possess no actual interest for theory or contemplation—quite to the contrary. Further, *red* and *green* must now also be apprehended as qualitative differences over against each other, just as this second opposition is qualitatively different from the first. All this is to be found in your own work, and I have never been able to understand you otherwise, though you yourself refrain from the use of such formal determinations as “qualitative” and “quantitative.”

Following your exposition, I believed myself in the first place entitled and even obliged to interpret the second opposition, in contrast to the first, as that of *equally suspended* [extremes], as the equilibrium of synthesis; i.e., the indifferent penetration of ground and opaque medium, so that the difference between ground and medium really loses all meaning. There is no need to cite to you confirmation and documentation from your own work. Proceeding on this basis, such synthetic unity is now to be placed and is indeed placed under [the category of] difference—in the one case as mere *neutrality*, dissolution, perhaps even *mixture*, as in the mechanical [mixture of] blue and yellow powder. But chemical equilibrium is also a case of neutrality. Red, by contrast, would be *individual* unity “inwardized” to [the point of] *subjectivity*—to put it briefly by means of an artificial expression. Unity in the form of individuality needs explanation least of all for you. You have thus declared red, among all hues, to be the *royal* color,

whereas we have seen in it the *lovely intimacy* of rose and, with a light modification of the phenomenon, both characteristics.

I would hope that you would recognize your own meaning in this way of putting things using our forms. I could then consider our explanation justified.

I note finally that I have taken the liberty of having a clean copy made of a few essays [apparently lost] in their present form and of including them [with this letter]. They owe their origin entirely to conversations last winter with Mr. Schultz and Mr. von Henning. They concern a few incidental circumstances, the first of which perhaps has the further interest of removing [considerations of] *near* and *far*, which tend to intervene in the phenomenon of double images. I lacked further time to revise a third essay. It likewise concerns a priestlike [*pfäffisches*] experiment by Pfaff, on which he especially prides himself greatly, which you yourself have indicated to him in your *Theory of Colors*, pp. 454ff. Newton's second and eighth experiments [*Theory of Colors*, Polemical Part, ¶47-81, ¶169-86] are at issue. There is something here that deserves special attention.

Yet I must close. I was not able to write this letter in Berlin, and therefore have to apologize for the paleness of the ink, which is characteristic of inns. I have the honor of designating myself with the most cordial respect Your Excellency's most humble servant, Professor Hegel.

P.S. Please be indulgent toward the figures. Part of it is likewise in the pale ink of the local inns. The wine was not so watered down.

HEGEL IN THE WAKE OF GOETHE

The two essays on color theory which Hegel in September 1822 [432] mentions sending to Goethe have been lost, though on May 3, 1824 [471], Goethe acknowledged receiving them. This 1824 letter from Goethe also expresses further appreciation for Hegel's support:

That you approve the main direction of my mode of thought, honorable sir, only confirms me in it all the more. I believe I have significantly benefited in several ways, if not from the whole then at least for myself and my inner being. May everything that I am still able to achieve be linked to what you have founded and are building up.

Hegel replied on April 24 of the next year, confessing the filial dependence on the poet we have already touched upon. In this letter Hegel admits the deep, even preconscious nature of the Goethean influence. Goethe himself had written that an external heritage had to be earned by one's own labor to be truly assimilated (*Faust* I, Scene 1), but Hegel was aware that such labor could lead to the self-deception of attributing to oneself what was at once received from without—a form of self-deception perhaps not entirely escaped by Schiller in relation to Goethe.

Hegel to Goethe [489]

Berlin, April 24, 1825

The final departure of my friend Professor Cousin of Paris [Ch 24, first section], who is setting out on his return trip with the intention of presenting

himself to Your Excellency in Weimar, offers me a ready occasion to call on your kind remembrance of me as well. It has been a year since you conveyed such remembrance of me in a letter, which touched me most deeply, and which would have further increased my deep regard and most heartfelt affection for you were it only possible.

I must apologize for my failure to reply until now. This failure, however, has not meant an interruption in my association with you. For not only have the occasional reports from your many friends here afforded continued good news this winter again of your uninterrupted vigorous good health; but, even more, the writings you have had published have provided us with much instruction, long-lasting stimulation, and pleasure [*Art and Antiquity*, vol 4, sect 2, 1823; sect 3, 1824. Also *On Natural Science in General*, vol 2, sect 1, 1823; sect 2, 1824]. Yet the very delight you thus afford us contributes to making our relationship with you a one-sided one in which you bear the full cost of its maintenance. It is a relationship in which we feel the need to hold our breath and not speak ourselves, so as not to disturb enjoyment of the ambiance radiated by your spirit.

But since you yourself kindly mention my penchant [for Goethe] as something which you value, I feel myself encouraged and indeed entitled to talk more precisely about the reason for the devotion and even piety I feel for you. For when I look back over the course of my intellectual development, I see you everywhere woven into it, and may call myself one of your sons: what is inward in me has been nourished by you [in its growth] toward resilient strength in the face of abstraction, and has oriented its course by your forms as by beacons.

Inasmuch as such effects appear in connection with [external] excitations of one's inner nature, consciousness may be less exposed to [self-]deception than when it either traces the nature and worth of its *results* and achievements back to activating origins, pretending to be able to judge such results by these origins; or when it transforms suggestions into conscious purposes, and has supposed it necessary to determine the productions of its nature and talent according to such purposes, or to judge according to them. This last consideration has been immediately occasioned by the interesting disclosures you have made of letters by Schiller [Goethe, *Art and Antiquity*, vol 5, no 1, 1825], arousing in us the hope for more. Seeing contradictions which, among other things, appear to relate to what I have touched upon [e.g. Schiller to Goethe, 8/18/1802] has particularly attracted me, after my own fashion, and has more closely brought before my eyes the inner struggle for perfection in the man.

Perhaps you will allow me in the future to express myself more clearly about this, especially if you provide us with further disclosures. My friend urges me to finish. As in so much, he sympathizes in reverence and affection for you with Your Excellency's most devoted Hegel.

HEGEL LAST VISITED Goethe as he returned from Paris in October 1827. Goethe had just recently consented to collaborate on the *Yearbooks for Scientific Criticism* [Ch 19 on Goethe]. Hegel related his visit to Weimar to his wife on October 17.

... My last letter thus brought me as far as Elberfeld. From there we crossed Westphalia via Arnsberg and Arolsen to Cassel. ... From Arnsberg I continued in an ordinary old mail coach instead of an express coach, and indeed the very last one. Next time I shall take an express coach. This old mail coach was something to endure. My hope of reaching Eisenach still on Sunday thus could not be fulfilled. We did not reach Cassel until the afternoon, where I had to spend the night. I rested up, went to the theater for a half-hour—Goethe's *Egmont*—and left only the day before yesterday, Monday, for Eisenach with a hired coachman through forested valleys, not exactly a hospitable land. What all we saw of Westphalia, first the Wupper Valley and then others! The area around Arnsberg was more charming. ... Here I was no longer in France, nor in the beautiful Low Countries, whether judged by the terrain or the inns. My attention was drawn to the latter by my good appetite. For a few days now no good inns have been found, or rather the coachmen have in part used their own judgment or self-interest in leading me to "good"—i.e., bad—inns. I spent the night in Eisenach. In the morning I rode out before daybreak in heavy fog in a one-horse carriage—so that I saw nothing of the city, since I arrived at night. It was not until toward Gotha that the fog was overcome by the sun. In splendid weather we now continued from the friendly [town of] Gotha to Erfurt, where I looked up Mr. [Karl Gustav] von Griesheim.¹ I did not find him, however, but rather presented my compliments to his brother and mother—a dear, cultivated, intelligent woman to whom I was not unknown. I thus arrived here yesterday evening, at sundown. After washing up I strode off to the destination of this detour, my old venerable friend. The house was lit up, since the Grand Duke had announced he would visit for tea. In the meantime, however, I had forwarded announcement of my own arrival. Goethe received me most kindly and cordially. I had many a thing to tell him. After half an hour the old Grand Duke arrived. I must, however, not forget an important highlight: in addition to [Friedrich Wilhelm] Riemer, I met [Karl Friedrich] Zelter at Goethe's. Goethe introduced me to His Grace [i.e., the Grand Duke], whom I joined on the couch. I even believe I sat on his right-hand side. He asked about Paris. He is somewhat deaf. ... The evening thus went by—Zelter and Riemer prudently seated themselves in the adjoining room—in as good conversation as was possible with the old gentleman until half past nine. During all this Goethe stood nearby. I gradually noticed that the Duke was somewhat deaf, and that if the conversation falls silent one should not try to entertain him but should rather simply wait until something occurs to him again. Otherwise everything proceeded without embarrassment. I had to endure a few hours nailed to my sofa. The Grand Duke suggested that I see his botanical gardens at Belvedere. This morning at ten o'clock I rode out with Zelter. Goethe had readied his carriage for us. The gardens indeed have very large, extensive installations. The Duke himself is a great botanist. There are beautiful

¹Griesheim was a student of Hegel's; his notes provided source material for the edition of Hegel's lecture courses published after his death.

plant specimens to be seen there, though of course neither of us was knowledgeable enough to appreciate everything properly. By noon we were back again. I paid my visit to Mr. and Mrs. [Friedrich Christian] von Schwendler, where I naturally had to meet with many a regret that you were not with me and that I had to let myself be monopolized by Goethe. I then took a stroll through the old familiar paths of the beautiful park, paths on which I walked twenty-five years ago. I then greeted the banks of the little Ilm and its gentle waves, which have heard many an immortal song. At two o'clock it was lunch at Goethe's. It was excellent and was honored by a hearty appetite. The wife [Ottalie] of [August] Goethe [Goethe's son], expecting to deliver any time, was not to be seen. She was thus not at the table. Instead there was her sister, Miss [Ulrike] v. Pogwisch—quite cheerful; Privy Councillor [Karl] Vogel; the physician, Dr. [Johann Peter] Eckermann; Goethe's secretary, Goethe's two grandchildren, his son, Zelter, and I. I sat beside Goethe; to my right sat the sister. The guests from Weimar were quieter. We, however, were quite sociable, talkative, eating and drinking heartily. I had much to tell Goethe about political and literary views and interests in France. Everything interested him deeply. He is quite strong, healthy, in general the man of old, i.e., ever young, somewhat quieter—such a venerable, good, jovial head that one forgets the high man of genius and inexhaustible energy of talent. As old faithful friends, we are in any case not at the stage of observing how the other appears or what he said, but were cordially reunited with no thought of the vanity and honor of having seen and heard such and such from him, etc. After the meal, his son told me very explicitly how much his father had looked forward to having me lift his spirits on my return from Paris. He generally spoke in every respect at length of his relationship to his father and his feeling for him. Goethe has to be counted happy in view of his age and way of life to enjoy such affection and care, and for this his son must be esteemed and held fondly. This evening I went to the theater once more, and now I am writing this to you. What I have to add concerns above all our plan or indeed decision finally to return home. Goethe wanted to have Zelter and myself return to his house again at least tomorrow. We are thus leaving the day after tomorrow. Zelter is as satisfied as I that we are traveling on together. But since we by now are both elderly gentlemen to whom comfort is pleasant and useful, we are not in the mood to brave the express mail coach. . . but will on the contrary leave Friday with the hired coachman whom we have already retained; and, God willing, we will arrive home Sunday, where your Ulysses, after his variegated voyages, will then embrace you upon his return to the monochromatic plainness of domestic life. . . .

I would, to be sure, have liked to arrive Saturday so as to spend Sunday quietly before I report in and everything gets going again. I will begin my lectures a week from Monday. So do not mention that I will be arriving Sunday. Say instead probably not before Monday, so that Sunday I will have at least one quiet evening with you and the children. And now I embrace you and them one last time in writing; next time in person. Say hello to all our friends. I would like to continue writing much more, but paper and time are running out.

OTTILIE VON GOETHE recounted above luncheon somewhat differently:

One day Goethe announced to [the sister of] his daughter-in-law [i.e., to Ulrike] that there would be a guest for lunch, without, as was always his custom, telling her his name or introducing him as he made his appearance. Silent bows on both sides. During the meal Goethe was comparatively quiet. No doubt so as not to disturb the free speech of his very voluble and logically penetrating guest, who elaborated upon himself in oddly complicated grammatical forms. An entirely novel terminology, a mode of expression mentally overleaping itself, the peculiarly employed philosophical formulas of the ever more animated man in the course of his demonstrations—all this finally reduced Goethe to complete silence without the guest even noticing. The lady of the house likewise listened in silence, no doubt somewhat taken aback, and glanced at "father"—as she always called Goethe. After the meal had ended and the guest departed, Goethe asked his daughter: "Now how did you like the man?" "Strange," she replied, "I cannot tell whether he is brilliant or mad. He seems to me to be an unclear thinker." Goethe smiled ironically. "Well, well, we just ate with the most famous of modern philosophers—Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel." (*Berichten* 525)

The next day, October 18, Goethe offered a tea for Hegel, during which, according to Eckermann (*Berichten* 527), Hegel undertook to explain dialectic as the "methodically cultivated spirit of contradiction which lies within everyone as an innate gift and which is especially valuable for discerning truth from falsehood." Goethe replied that he feared such skill might be used to turn falsehood into truth and truth into falsehood. But Hegel would grant this only in the case of the mentally deranged. Goethe proposed the study of nature as a preventive against such derangement, "for in nature we deal with something infinitely and eternally true which immediately rejects as incompetent anyone who fails to evince a totally above-board honesty in his observation and treatment of the subject. I am certain many a dialectical affliction could find a cure in the study of nature."

In early January 1832, shortly after Hegel's death and before his own, Goethe reflected to Karl Varnhagen that "the foundations of his [Hegel's] teaching lay outside my horizon, though where his activity touched me or in fact even intervened in my own efforts I invariably drew intellectual benefit" (*Ibid* 754). Goethe never sufficiently penetrated the formidable superstructure of Hegel's teaching to realize the basis of this affinity, i.e., the actual presence of the foundations of Hegelianism in Goethe's own horizon. The builder of the structure, however, realized more clearly the soil on which it stood.

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Briefe von und an Hegel, edited and annotated by Johannes Hoffmeister and published by Felix Meiner Verlag, presents Hegel's correspondence in chronological order, assigning a number to each entry. The English edition of Hegel's letters uses the Hoffmeister numbers but arranges the letters topically within the framework of the commentary. This chronological index provides a cross-reference to the German edition. The first number in each pair below refers to the letter number in the Hoffmeister edition; the second number (in parentheses) is the page on which that letter occurs in the English edition. There are a few letters included that did not appear in *Briefe von und an Hegel*, and these are incorporated here as I*, II*, III*, IV*, V*, and VI*, with appropriate citations in footnotes.

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